Opinion — St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Conarty

ST. L. & SAN FRAN. R. R. ». CONARTY. 243

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

238 U. 8.

ST. LOUIS & SAN FRANCISCO RAILROAD COM-

PANY v. CONARTY, ADMINISTRATRIX.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS.

No. 166. Submitted March 3, 1915.—Decided June 14, 1915.

Where a duty is imposed for the protection of persons in particular

situations or relations, a breach of it which happens to result in injury

to one in an altogether different situation or relation, is not, as to

him, actionable.

The evils against which the coupler provisions of the Safety Appliance

Act are directed are those which attended the old fashioned link and

pin couplings where it was necessary for men to go between the ends

of the cars to couple and uncouple them: it was not enacted to pro-

vide a place of safety between colliding cars.

An employé of a railroad company not endeavoring or intending to

couple or uncouple a car or to handle it in any way but riding an an

engine that collided with it, is not in a position where the absence

of a coupler and drawbar prescribed by the Safety Appliance Act

operates as a breach of duty imposed by that Act for his benefit.

106 Arkansas, 421, reversed.

Tue facts, which involve the construction and applica-

tion of the Safety Appliance Act in an action for injuries

based upon the Employers’ Liability Act, are stated in

the opinion.

Mr. W. F. Evans and Mr. Thomas P. Littlepage, with

whom Mr. B. R. Davidson was on the brief, for plaintiff

in error:

The cause should have been removed to the Federal

court. Gains v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 17; Gavin v. Vance, 33

Fed. Rep. 84, 85; In re Woodbury, 98 Fed. Rep. 833, 837;

Harrison v. St. L. & 8S. F. R. R., 232 U. 8. 318; Martin v.

Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 327; Reagan v. Farmers L. & T.

Co., 154 U. 8. 362, 391; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. 8.

OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 238 U. 8.

275, 279; Sharon v. Terry, 33 Fed. Rep. 337, 355; State v.

Coosaw Mining Co., 45 Fed. Rep. 804, 810; Van Brimmer

v. Tex. & Pac. Ry., 190 Fed. Rep. 394, 399.

The coal car had been withdrawn from commerce.

C. & N. W. R.R.v. United States, 168 Fed. Rep. 236; Delk

v. St. L., I. M. & 8S. Ry., 220 U. 8. 580, 585; Erie R. R. v.

United States, 197 Fed. Rep. 287; Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Beh-

rens, 233 U. 8. 473; Nor. Car. R. R. v. Zachary, 232 U. 8.

248; Siegel v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R., 178 Fed. Rep. 873;

Southern Ry. v. Snyder, 187 Fed. Rep. 492, 497; Taylor v.

Bos. & Me. R. R., 188 Massachusetts, 390; United States

v. Erie Ry., 212 Fed. Rep. 853, 855; United States v. Louis.

& Nash. R. R., 156 Fed. Rep. 195; United States v. Rio

Grande & W. Ry., 174 Fed. Rep. 399.

The absence of the coupler was not the proximate cause

of injury. A., T. & S. F. Ry. v. Calhoun, 213 U. S. 1;

Beach on Con. Neg. (2d ed.), § 31; Broom’s Legal Maxims,

§ 215; C., B. & Q. Ry. v. Richardson, 202 Fed. Rep. 836;

Cooley on Torts, pp. 68-71; Cole v. G. S. & L. Soc., 124

Fed. Rep. 113; 3 Elliott on Railroads (Original ed.),

§ 1310; Gill v. Railway Co., 160 Fed. Rep. 260; Gilbert v.

Railway Co., 128 Fed. Rep. 529; Henry v. St. L., K. C. &

N. Ry., 76 Missouri, 288, 293-4: Logan v. Railway Co.,

129 S. W. Rep. 575; Lyddy v. Louis. & Nash. R. R., 197

Fed. Rep. 524; Midland Valley Ry. v. Fulgham, 181 Fed.

Rep. 91; Pennell v. Penna. R. R., 231 U. 8. 675, 679;

Ray’s Negligence of Imposed Duties (Personal), 133;

Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (5th ed.), §§ 25 and

fol.; St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. v. McWhirter, 229 U. S. 265,

280, 282; 1 Thompson’s Comm. on Neg. (2d ed.), § 45;

Webb’s Pollock on Torts (Enlarged Am. ed.), 29; Watson

on Damages for Pers. Inj., §§ 33-35; 1 White on Pers. Inj.,

$§ 20-39.

Deceased’s negligence was cause of his death—assump-

tion of risk. Butler v. Frazee, 211 U. 8. 459, 465; Gibson

v. Ches. & Ohio R. R., 215 Fed. Rep. 27; Ches. & Ohio R. R.

ST. L. & SAN FRAN. R. R. v. CANARTY. 245

238 U. 8. Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

v. Hennessey, 96 Fed. Rep. 713; C., R. I. & P. Ry. v.

Shipp, 174 Fed. Rep. 353; C., R. I. & P. Ry. v. Jackson,

178 Fed. Rep. 832; Erie Ry. v. Kane, 118 Fed. Rep. 223;

Int. & Gr. N. Ry. v. Story, 62 8. W. Rep. 130; Ill. Cent.

R. R. v. Behrens, 233 U. 8. 473; Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Hart,

176 Fed. Rep. 245-247; Jackson v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 104 Mis-

souri, 448; Riley v. Louis. & Nash. R. R., 133 Fed. Rep.

904; Schweig v. C., M. & St. P. Ry., 216 Fed. Rep. 750;

Seaboard Air Line v. Horton, 233 U. 8. 492; Southern Ru.

v. Crockett, 234 U. 8. 725; St. L. & 8. F. R. R. v. Dewees,

153 Fed. Rep. 56; Suttle v. C. O. & G. Ry., 144 Fed. Rep.

668; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Bousman, 212 U.S. 536, 541.

The members of both crews were fellow servants.

Allen v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 174 Fed. Rep. 779;

Beutler v. Grand Trunk Ry., 224 U. 8. 85; Ill. Cent. R. R.

v. Behrens, 233 U. 8. 473.

With a safe and dangerous course open to him, deceased

selected the dangerous one. Hirsch v. F. B. Bread Co.,

150 Mo. App. 162, 174; Moore v. Railway Co., 146 Mis-

souri, 572, 582; Smith v. F. N. Box Co., 193 Missouri,

716.

Plaintiff, as the wife of deceased, was an incompetent

witness. Cash v. Kirkham, 67 Arkansas, 318; De Beau-

mont v. Webster, 71 Fed. Rep. 226; De Roux v. Girard,

112 Fed. Rep. 89; Jarvis v. Andrews, 80 Arkansas, 277;

Luken v. L. & M.S. Ry., 248 Illinois, 377; Morris v. Nor-

ton, 75 Fed. Rep. 912; Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Watson, 30

Fed. Rep. 653; Nunely v. Becker, 52 Arkansas, 520; Page

v. Burnstine, 102 U. 8. 664; Park v. Lock, 48 Arkansas,

133; Rainwater v. Harris, 51 Arkansas, 401; Rush v. Pres-

cott & N. W. Ry., 83 Arkansas, 210; Williams v. Waldon,

82 Arkansas, 138; Wilson v. Edwards, 79 Arkansas, 69;

Whitney v. Fox, 166 U. 8. 664.

The testimony of witnesses Daniel and Woolum was

also incompetent. Gutridge v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 94 Missouri,

468, 472-3.

246 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Argument for Defendant in Error. 238 U. 8.

Defendant’s motion to require plaintiff to elect on

which cause of action she would prosecute should have

been sustained. Thornton, Fed. Empl. Acts (2ded.), § 104;

Andrews v. Hartford &c. Ry., 34 Connecticut, 57; Amer-

ican R. R. v. Berch, 224 U. S. 547; Casey v. Transit Co.,

205 Missouri, 721; Cooley on Torts (2d ed.), 309; Daubert

v. Western Meat Co., 139 California, 480; Edwards v. Gim-

bel, 202 Pa. St. 30; 3 Elliott on Railroads, § 1375; Fulgham

v. Midland Valley Ry., 167 Fed. Rep. 660; Fithian v.

Railway Co., 188 Fed. Rep. 842; Gulf, C. & S. Ry. v. Mc-

Ginnis, 228 U. S. 173; Garrett v. Railway Co., 197 Fed.

Rep. 715; Hendrix v. Am. Exp. Co., 138 Kentucky, 704,

709; Hartigan v. So. Pac. Ry., 86 California, 142; Little-

wood v. Mayor of New York, 89 N. Y. 24; Legg v. Britton,

64 Vermont, 652; Mich. Cent. R. R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S.

59; Munro v. Dredging Co., 84 California, 515; McCaf-

ferty v. Penna. Ry., 193 Pa. St. 339; St. L., I. M. & So.

Ry. v. Hesterley, 228 U. 8. 702; Strode v. St. L. Transit

Co., 197 Missouri, 616; Shearman & Redfield on Neg. (5th

ed.), § 140; Walsh v. Railway Co., 173 Fed. Rep. 494.

Mr. Samuel R. Chew for defendant in error:

Intestate was engaged in an act of interstate commerce.

North Carolina R. R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 383;

Pedersen v. Del., Lack. & W. R. R., 229 U.S. 149; St. L.,

S. F. & T. Ry. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 157; Chicago Jct. Ry. v.

King, 169 Fed. Rep. 372.

The defective coal car was engaged at the time of the

injury in interstate commerce. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.

v. Voelker, 129 Fed. Rep. 522; Southern Ry. v. United

States, 222 U. 8. 100; Delk v. St. L. & S. F. R. R., 220

U. S. 580; Erie R. R. v. Russell, 106 C. C. A. 160; Johnson

v. So. Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1.

The coal car in question did not comply with the pro-

visions of the Act of 1893 or of 1910.

As to the Act of 1910 see Sen. Rep. No. 250, 61st Cong.

ST. L. & SAN FRAN. R. R. ». CONARTY. 247

238 U. S. Counsel for amicus curiz.

2d sess., p. 3; St. L., I. M. & So. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U. S.

281.

The intestate was not guilty of contributory negligence

and did not assume risk of employment. See Employers’

Liability Act of 1908, 35 Stat. 65.

Action for loss of service and pain and suffering of in-

testate survived to his personal representative under the

amendment of 1910, and see Mich. Cent. Ry. v. Vreeland,

227 U. 8. 59; St. L. & S. F. R. R. v. Conarty, 106 Arkansas,

421.

The defective condition of the coal car was proximate

and primal cause of intestate’s death, and the evidence

of defendant in error was competent. St. L. & S. F. R. R.

v. Fithian, 106 Arkansas, 491 ; Giles v. Wright, 26 Arkansas,

476; United States v. Clark, 96 U. S. 37; 1 Greenleaf,

§§ 348-350.

The evidence of Woolum and Daniels was also com-

petent. 1 Greenleaf, 14th ed., § 440; Eastern Transp. Line

v. Hope, 95 U. 8. 297; West. Coal Co. v. Berberich, 36

C. C. A. 368; Washington v. Baillie, 92 U. S. 331; Union

Ins. Co. v. Smith, 124 U.S. 405; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Watson,

190 U. S. 23.

The trial court had jurisdiction. 36 Stat. 1094; Mondou

v. N.Y., N. H. & H. Ry., 223 U.S. 1; Southern Ry. v.

Smith, 205 Fed. Rep. 360; Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Wright,

207 Fed. Rep. 281.

The instructions of the trial court as given were correct.

Mich. Cent. Ry. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59.

The writ of error was improperly granted, no Federal

question was raised that has not been adjudicated. Mich.

Cent. Ry. v. Vreeland, 227 U. 8. 59; Delk v. St. L. & S. F.

R. R., 220 U. 8. 580; Johnson v. So. Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1;

St. L., I. M. & So. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281.

Mr. Edward J. White and Mr. E. B. Kinsworthy filed a

brief as amicus curi@.

OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court. 238 U. 8.

Mp. Justice VAN DEvANTER delivered the opinion of

the court.

This was an action for personal injuries ultimately re-

sulting in death, the right of recovery being based upon

the Employers’ Liability Act, April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35

Stat. 65; as amended April 5, 1910, c. 143, 36 Stat. 291, in

connection with the Safety Appliance Acts, March 2, 1893,

c. 196, 27 Stat. 531; April 1, 1895, c. 87, 29 Stat. 85;

March 2, 1903, c. 697, 32 Stat. 943; April 14, 1910, c. 160,

36 Stat. 298. The injuries were received in a collision

between a switch engine and a loaded freight car having

no coupler or drawbar at one end, these having been pulled

out while the car was in transit. The car was about to be

placed on an isolated track for repair and was left near

the switch leading to that track while other cars were

being moved out of the way—a task taking about five

minutes. At that time a switch engine with which the

deceased was working came along the track on which the

car was standing and the collision ensued. It was dark

and an electric headlight on another engine operated to

obscure the car until the switch engine was within 40 or

50 feet of it. The deceased and two companions were

standing on the footboard at the front of the switch engine

and when the car was observed his companions stepped

to the ground on either side of the track, while he remained

on the foot-board and was caught between the engine and

the body of the car at the end from which the coupler and

drawbar were missing. Had these appliances been in

place they, in one view of the evidence, would have kept

the engine and the body of the car sufficiently apart to

have prevented the injury, but in their absence the engine

came in immediate contact with the sill of the car with the

result stated. The deceased and his companions, with

the switch engine, were on their way to do some switching

at a point some distance beyond the car and were not

ST. L. & SAN FRAN. R. R. v. CONARTY. 249

238 U. 8. Opinion of the Court.

intending, and did not attempt, to couple it to the engine

or to handle it in any way. Its movement was in the

hands of others. The car was loaded with freight moving

from one State to another, the railroad company was

engaged in interstate commerce and the deceased was

employed therein at the time. He died from his injuries

six days later leaving a widow and three minor children.

The only negligence charged in the complaint was a failure

to have the car equipped, at the end struck by the engine,

with an automatic coupler and a drawbar of standard

height as required by the Safety Appliance Acts, and

there was no attempt to prove any other negligence.

The plaintiff had a verdict and judgment for $10,000,

and the Supreme Court of the State affirmed the judg-

ment. 106 Arkansas, 421.

The principal question in the case is whether at the

time he was injured the deceased was within the class of

persons for whose benefit the Safety Appliance Acts re-

quired that the car be equipped with automatic couplers

and drawbars of standard height; or, putting it in another

way, whether his injury was within the evil against which

the provisions for such appliances are directed. It is not

claimed, nor could it be under the evidence, that the

collision was proximately attributable to a violation of

those provisions, but only that had they been complied

with it would not have resulted in injury to the deceased.

It therefore is necessary to consider with what purpose

couplers and drawbars of the kind indicated are required,

for where a duty is imposed for the protection of persons

in particular situations or relations a breach of it which

happens to result in injury to one in an altogether different

situation or relation is not as to him actionable. The

Eugene F. Moran, 212 U. S. 466, 476; Gorris v. Scott, L. R.

9 Ex. 125; Ward v. Hobbs, L. R. 4 App. Cas. 13, 23;

Williams v. Chicago & Alton R. R., 135 Illinois, 491, 498;

O’Donnell v. Providence & Worcester R. R., 6 R. I. 211;

250 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court. 238 U.S.

Metallic Compression Co. v. Fitchburg R. R., 109 Mas-

sachusetts, 277, 280; Favor v. Boston & Lowell R. R., 114

‘Massachusetts, 350; East Tennessee R. R. v. Feathers, 78

Tennessee, 103; Pollock on Torts, 8th ed. 28, 198.

The Safety Appliance Acts make it unlawful to use or

haul upon a railroad which is a highway for interstate

commerce any car that is not equipped with automatic

couplers whereby the car can be coupled or uncoupled

“without the necessity of men going between the ends of

the cars,” or that is not equipped with drawbars of stand-

ard height—the height of the drawbar having, as explained

in Southern Ry. v. Crockett, 234 U.S. 725, 735, an impor-

tant bearing on the safety of the processes of coupling and

uncoupling and on the security of the coupling when made.

It is very plain that the evils against which these provi-

sions are directed are those which attended the old-

fashioned link and pin couplings where it was necessary for

men to go between the ends of the cars to couple and un-

couple them, and where the cars when coupled into a

train sometimes separated by reason of the insecurity of

the coupling. In Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196

U.S. 1, 19, this court said of the provision for automatic

couplers that ‘‘The risk in coupling and uncoupling was

the evil sought to be remedied”; and in Southern Ry. v.

Crockett, 234 U. 8. 725, 737, it was said to be the plain pur-

pose of the two provisions that ‘‘where one vehicle is used

in connection with another, that portion of the equipment

of each that has to do with the safety and security of the

attachment between them shall conform to standard.”

Nothing in either provision gives any warrant for saying

that they are intended to provide a place of safety between

colliding cars. On the contrary, they affirmatively show

that a principal purpose in their enactment was to obviate

“the necessity for men going between the ends of the

cars. 27 Stat. 531.”

We are of opinion that the deceased, who was not

PENNA. R. R. v. MITCHELL COAL CO. 251

238 U. 8. Statement of the Case.

endeavoring to couple or uncouple the car or to handle it

in any way but was riding on the colliding engine, was not

in a situation where the absence of the prescribed coupler

and drawbar operated as a breach of a duty imposed for

his benefit, and that the Supreme Court of the State erred

in concluding that the Safety Appliance Acts required it

to hold otherwise.

Judgment reversed.