Opinion — Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh Valley RR

MEEKER, SURVIVING PARTNER OF MEEKER

& COMPANY, v. LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD

COMPANY.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

THIRD CIRCUIT.

No. 434. Argued October 13, 14, 1914.—Decided February 23, 1915.

The limitations in Rev. Stat., § 1047, on suits for penalties accruing

under the laws of the United States, relate to punitive penalties

for infractions of public law and not to liabilities imposed for re-

dressing a private injury even though the wrongful act be a public

offense and punishable as such. It does not relate to a liability ac-

ee

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MEEKER &« CO. v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. R. 413

36 U.S. Syllabus.

cruing under §§ 8, 9, 14 and 16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce

which is not punitive but strictly remedial.

Vhile Congress did not intend, in amending § 16 of the Act to Regulate

Commerce by the act of July 29, 1906, to reserve claims already

barred by local statutes, it did intend to take all other claims out

of the operation of the varying state laws and subject them to limita-

tions of its own creation operating alike in all the States.

rhe effect of the amendment to § 16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce

by the act of July 29, 1906, was to extend the time for invoking

action by the Commission upon complaints for damages to two

years from the accrual of the claim, but until one year after the pas-

sage of the act as to all claims which had accrued before its passage.

The purpose of the joint resolution of June 30, 1906, postponing the

effective date of the act of June 29, 1906, amending the Act to

Regulate Commerce, was to cause the act to speak and operate at

the end of the postponed period as if that were the time of its pas-

sage, and when the extended period expired it gave a full year for

presenting accrued claims.

Dbjections to portions of the reports of the Interstate Commerce Com-

mission awarding reparation for which the action is brought, on the

ground that they contain statements which are not findings of fact,

and not definitely identified in the record, are waived by failure to

direct the court to the subject when charging the jury.

Under § 16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended by the

act of June 29, 1906, the report of the Commission awarding repara-

tion need not necessarily state the evidential facts, but must contain

findings of the ultimate facts, and as so stated they are to be taken

as prima facie true.

In this ease held that the facts stated, although interwoven with other

matter, and not expressed in terms generally employed by courts in

special findings of fact, if taken as prima facie true,sustain an award

against the carrier made by the Commission to shippers, as damages

for unjust discrimination resulting from giving rebates to other

shippers.

Where there are two reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission

in the same proceeding and the later affirmatively shows that it was

supplemental to the original report, they should be read together.

The measure of damages to a shipper is the pecuniary loss inflicted

upon him as the result of giving rebates to other shippers and re-

quiring him to pay the higher rate. Such loss must be proved in

order to be recovered. Where the findings show that the amount

awarded was the actual loss and recite that they are based on evi-

SSP LEAT IPE

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OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Argument for Respondent. 236 U.S.

dence, it must be presumed, in the absence of the contrary being

shown, that they are justified by the evidence.

A statute making findings and reparation order of a body, such as the

Interstate Commerce Commission, prima facie evidence of facts

therein stated, but only establishing, as in the case of § 16 of the

Act to Regulate Commerce, a rebuttable presumption, cutting off no

defense, and taking no question of fact from the court or the jury,

is merely a rule of evidence and is not unconstitutional as abridging

the right of trial by jury or denying due process of law.

Quere, whether the mere amount of an allowance for counsel fees under

§ 16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, made by the court below,

can be reéxamined in this court; but held that where the record

shows that it was predicated upon a transcript of proceedings, and

on statements in open court, and no evidence appears to have been

offered or objections made by defendant as to amount, defendant

cannot claim in this court that the allowance is excessive.

Although this court may not review the amount of such an allowance,

it may determine whether as matter of law it is objectionable alto-

gether.

Under §§ 8 and 16, of the Act to Regulate Commerce, the allowance

for attorney’s fee to be added as costs to the judgment recovered by

a shipper on an unpaid award for reparation is for services of the

attorney in the action on the award and not for services in the pro-

ceeding before the Commission, and such part of an allowance for

attorney’s fees as is specially given for services in that proceeding

should be eliminated from the judgment.

211 Fed. Rep. 785, reversed.

Tue facts, which involve the construction of §§ 1 and 2

of the Act to Regulate Commerce and questions of dis-

crimination by the carrier against shippers of coal over

its line, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. John A. Garver and Mr. William A. Glasgow, Jr.,

for petitioner.

Mr. John G. Johnson, with whom Mr. Edgar H. Boles,

Mr. Frank H. Platt and Mr. George W. Field were on the

brief, for respondent:

Plaintiff has failed to prove by competent evidence that

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MEEKER & CO. v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. R. 415

3 U.S. Argument for Respondent.

e railroad violated the Commerce Act. Plaintiff relied

- his proof, upon the reports and orders of ihe Commis-

m. These do not prove that Meeker and Company

re discriminated against; and do not prove that unlaw-

| rates were charged.

Plaintiff has failed to prove by competent evidence that

titioner sustained damage. The measure of damages,

any, should be the loss to petitioner as the result of the

leged discrimination or the alleged unreasonable rate.

does not follow from the conclusion of the Commission

at an established rate is unreasonable in so far as it

ceeds a stated amount, that a shipper who paid the

tablished rate has been damaged, or that his damage, if

iy, should be measured by the difference between the

yo amounts.

The Commission’s opinions contain statements, ar-

iments and conclusions which the act does not purport

. make admissible as prima facie evidence in a suit for

unages. In admitting the reports in evidence the trial

wurt prejudiced the rights of defendant, making it

ereafter impossible for the defendant to place before

1e jury its side of the case unembarrassed by the incom-

tent and misleading statements in the opinions.

Section 16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce is uncon-

itutional in so far as it deprives the defendant in a

amage suit of a fair trial by jury.

The complaint in the proceeding before the Commission

as filed July 17, 1907, at a time when the right of the

‘ommission to pass upon the discrimination claims and

ne greater part of the excessive charge claims had expired

y limitation.

The Commission had no jurisdiction over any claims

cerued prior to July 17, 1905.

On July 17, 1907, when the complaint was filed before

he Commission all claims accruing prior to July 17, 1902,

ad been outlawed by § 1047, Rev. Stat.

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Festa. Cis We os x

416 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Argument for Respondent. 236 U.S.

On September 3, 1912, when an action was commenced

the plaintiff was barred by limitation from bringing an

action upon any of his claims.

The allowances for counsel fees are invalid and excessive.

In support of these contentions, see Alchison, T. & S.

F. vy. Int. Com. Comm., 188 Fed. Rep. 229; Atchison, T. &

S. F. v. Matthews, 174 U. 8. 96; Baer Bros. vy. Denver &

R.G. R. R., 200 Fed. Rep. 614, 233 U.S. 479; Balt. & Oh.

R.R.v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U.S. 481; Blake vy. National

Banks, 23 Wall. 307; Carter v. N. O. & N. E. R. R., 143

Fed. Rep. 90; Cattle Raisers’ Assn. v. Ft. Worth & D.C.

Ry., 7 1. C. C. 513; Holy Trinity Church v. United States,

143 U. 8. 457; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Feintuch, 191 Fed.

Rep. 482; Cin., & Tex. Pac. Ry. vy. Int. Com. Comm., 162

U.S. 184; Coggell v. Lawrence, 6 Fed. Cases, 2957; Councill

v. R. R., 1 1. C. C. 339; Darnell Lumber Co. v. Sou. Pac.

Co., 190 Fed. Rep. 659; Dickerson y. Louis. & Nash. R. R.,

15 1. C. C. 170, 191 Fed. Rep. 705; Equitable Life Ass'n

v. Hughes, 125 N. Y. 106; Farmers’ Warehouse Co. vy.

Louis. & Nash. R. R., 12 1. C. C. 457; Goff-Kirby Coal

Co. v. Railroad, 13 1. C. C. 383; Gulf, Col. & S. F. Ry. v.

Ellis, 165 U.S. 150; Heck v. Railroad, 11. C. C. 495; Int.

Com. Comm. v.C. P. & V. R. R., 124 Fed. Rep. 624; Int.

Com. Comm. v. Louis. & Nash. R. R., 73 Fed. Rep. 409,

227 U.S. 88; Int. Com. Comm. v. Un. Pac. R. R., 222 U.S.

541; Jacoby v. Penna. R. R., 200 Fed. Rep. 989; Kile &

Morgan vy. Railway Co., 15 1. C. C. 235; Ky. & Ind. Bridge

Co. v. Louis. & Nash. R. R., 37 Fed. Rep. 567; Lehigh

Valley R. R. v. Clark, 207 Fed. Rep. 717; Macloon v. Rail-

road, 51. C. C. 84; Maryland vy. Balt. & Ohio R. R., 3 How.

534; McClaine vy. Rankin, 179 U.S. 158; Mitchell Coal Co.

v. Penna. R. R., 230 U. 8. 247; Morrisdale Coal Co. v.

Penna. R. R., 183 Fed. Rep. 929; S. C., 230 U.S. 304; Mo.

& Kan. Shippers’ Assn. v. R. R.,13 1. C. C. 411; Nicola v.

Louis. & Nash. R. R., 14 1. C. C. 199; Norris v. Crocker,

13 How. 429; Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Peters, 433; Parsons

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MEEKER & CO. ». LEHIGH VALLEY R. R. 417

36:U. S. Opinion of the Court.

. Chic. & N. W. Ry., 167 U. 8. 447; Penn. R. R. v. Inter-

ational Coal Co., 230 U. 8. 184; Rawson v. R. R., 3

C. C. 266; Riddle y. Railroad, 1 1. C. C. 594; Robinson

_ Balt. & Ohio R. R., 222 U. S. 506; Russe v. Int. Com.

omm., 193 Fed. Rep. 678; Seaboard Air Line v. Seegers,

7 U.S. 73; Southern Ry. v. St. Louis Hay Co., 153 Fed.

ep. 728; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Co., 204 U.S.

65; United States y. Del. & Hud. Co., 213 U. 8. 366;

niled States y. Standard Oil Co., 148 Fed. Rep. 719;

alker vy. Sou. Pac. Co., 165 U. 8. 593: Western N. Y.

P. Ry. v. Penn. Refining Co., 137 Fed. Rep. 343:

oodward v. R. R., 17 1. C. C. 9;1 Bouvier’s Law Diet.,

370; Drinker on Interstate Commerce; Judson on In-

rstate Commerce; 2 Stewart's Purdon’s Digest, 13th ed.,

2282; Rev. Stat., § 1047.

By leave of court, Mr. Joseph W. Folk and Mr. Charles

. Needham filed a brief in behalf of the Interstate Com-

erce Commission.

Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of :

e court. j

This was an action under § 16 of the Act to Regulate

mmerce ' to recover from the Lehigh Valley Railroad

mpany damages alleged to have been sustained by a

pper and awarded by the Interstate Commerce Com-

ssion by reason of the company’s violation of the pro-

jition in §$1 and 2 of that act against unreasonable

es and unjust discrimination. The plaintiff prevailed in

» District Court, but the Cireuit Court of Appeals re-

sed the judgment, 211 Fed. Rep. 785, and a writ of

See act February 4, 1887, ¢. 104, 24 Stat. 379, and amendments of

rch 2, 1889, c. 382, 25 Stat. 855; February 10, 1891, ¢. 128, 26 Stat.

; February 8, 1895, c. 61, 28 Stat. 643; June 29, 1906, «. 3591, 34

|. 584; and June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. 838, Joint Resolution No. 47.

VOL. CCXXxvI-—-27

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418 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court. 236 U. 8,

certiorari granted under § 262 of the Judicial Code brings

the case here. 234 U.S. 749.

The plaintiff was the surviving member of Meeker &

Company, a copartnership, and sued in that capacity.

This firm was engaged in the anthracite coal trade in

New York City and was accustomed to purchase its coal

at collieries in Pennsylvania and to ship it over the de-

fendant’s railroad to tidewater at Perth Amboy, New

Jersey, and thence by vessel to New York. Two distinet

claims were involved. The first covered shipments from

November 1, 1900, to August 1, 1901, and was grounded

upon a charge that the railroad company had unjustly

and injuriously discriminated against Meeker & Company

by giving (on August 1, 1901) to another and extensive

shipper of anthracite between the same points an indirect

but substantial rebate upon all shipments during the same

period, and that by reason of this rebate the other shipper

had obtained a contemporaneous service in all respects

like that rendered for Meeker & Company at a less rate

than was exacted from the latter. The second covered

shipments from August 1, 1901, to July 17, 1907, and was

based upon the charge that the established rate paid by

Mecker & Company during that period was excessive and

unreasonable.

On July 17, 1907, a complaint embodying both claims

was presented to the Interstate Commerce ( ‘Commission

under $$ 9 and 13 of the act, and after a full hearing in

which the railroad company was an active participant,

the Commission made a written report (21 LC. C. 129)

finding that the charge of unjust discrimination was

sustained by the evidence, condemning as excessive and

unreasonable the rate which was in effect from August 1,

1901, to the date of the report, naming what was deemed a

maximum reasonable rate, holding that the claimant was

entitled to an award of reparation upon both claims, and

directing that further proceedings be had to determine the

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MEEKER & CO. ». LEHIGH VALLEY R. RR. 419

236 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

amount to be awarded. Under § 15 of the act an order

was then made requiring the railroad company within a

time named to cease giving effect to the prior rate found

unreasonable and to establish a new rate not exceeding

that found reasonable.

Thereafter a further hearing was had at which additional

evidence bearing upon the question of reparation was

presented, and, on May 7, 1912, the Commission made a

supplemental report, saying (23 1. C. C. 480):

“Tn our original report we found that the rates charged

complainant for the transportation of anthracite coal

from the Wyoming coal region in Pennsylvania to Perth

Amboy, N. J., during the period from November 1, 1900,

to August 1, 1901, were unjustly diseriminatory in viola- A

tion of § 2 of the act to the extent that they exceeded the

rates contemporaneously charged the Lehigh Valley Coal

Company under the contract then in effect between that

company and defendant; and we further found that the t

rates in effect from August 1, 1901, to July 17, 1907, were

LOND LE MONI

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unreasonable to the extent that they exceeded rates of y

$1.40 per gross ton on prepared sizes, $1.50 on pea, and 5

$1.15 on buckwheat. :

“On basis of our conclusions in the former report, and :

upon consideration of the evidence adduced at the hearing ;

upon the question of reparation, we now find that during é

the period from November 1, 1900, to August 1, 1901, com-

plainant shipped from the Wyoming coal region of Penn-

sylyania to Perth Amboy, N. J., 55,257.75 tons of eoal of

prepared sizes, 16,689.76 tons of pea coal, 11,448.93 tons

of buckwheat coal, and 4,926.77 tons of rice coal, and paid

charges thereon, amounting to $129,989.18, at the rates

found to have been unjustly discriminatory; that com-

plainant has been damaged to the extent of the difference

between the amount which he did pay and $118,979.85, the

amount which he would have paid had he been given the

benefit of the rates applied by defendant to similar ship-

gases ay

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420 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court. 236 vU. 8.

ments of the Lehigh Valley Coal Company; and that he is,

therefore, entitled to an award of reparation in the sum of

$11,009.33, with interest thereon from August 1, 1901.

We find further that from August 1, 1901, to July 17, 1907,

complainant shipped from the Wyoming coal region in

Pennsylvania to Perth Amboy, N. J., 246,870.15 tons of

coal of prepared sizes, 106,051.09 tons of pea coal, and

87,250 tons of buckwheat coal, and paid charges thereon

amounting to $685,375.27, at the rates found to have been

unreasonable; that complainant has been damaged to the

extent of the difference between the amount which he did

pay and $626,945.62, the amount which he would have

paid at the rates found reasonable, less $193.20 deducted

by stipulation of all parties on account of certain claims

already paid; and that he is, therefore, entitled to an addi-

tional award of reparation in the sum of $58,236.45, with

interest, amounting to $27,750.64, on the individual

charges comprising said sum from the dates of payment

thereof to September 1, 1911, together with interest on

said sum of $58,236.45 from September 1, 1911.

* * * * * * * *

“The exhibits showing details respecting the shipments

upon which reparation is asked are too extensive to be set

forth in this report. But inasmuch as the accuracy of

the figures in said exhibits respecting the shipments made,

freight charges paid, and reparation due, is conceded of

record by defendant, we deem it unnecessary to make

detailed findings respecting the numerous shipments

involved.”

Thereupon the Commission made and entered of record

an order for reparation which, with a slight amendment

made June 15, 1912, was as follows:

“This case being at issue upon complaint and answers

on file, and having been duly heard and submitted by

the parties, and full investigation of the matters and

—

MEEKER & CO. ». LEHIGH VALLEY R. R. 421

6 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

ings involved having been had, and the Commission

ving, on the date hereof, made and filed a supplemental

port containing its findings of fact and conclusions

ereon, Which said report is hereby referred to and made

part hereof:

“Tt is Ordered, That defendant Lehigh Valley Railroad

ympany be and it is hereby authorized and required

pay unto complainant, Henry E. Meeker, surviving

rtner of Henry E. Meeker and Caroline H. Meeker,

-partners, trading as Meeker & Company, on or before

e Ist day of August, 1912, the sum of $11,009.33, with

terest thereon, at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum,

ym the Ist day of August, 1901, as reparation for un-

stly discriminatory rates charged for the transportation

anthracite coal from the Wyoming coal region in Penn-

lvania to Perth Amboy, N. J., which rates so charged

ve been found by this Commission to have been un-

stly discriminatory, as more fully and at large appears

and by said report of the Commission.

“Tt is Further Ordered, That defendant Lehigh Vailey

uilroad Company be and it is hereby authorized and

quired to pay unto complainant, Henry E. Meeker,

rviving partner of Henry E. Meeker and Caroline H.

eeker, co-partners, trading as Meeker & Company,

or before the Ist day of August, 1912, the sum of

8,236.45, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per

nt. per annum, amounting to $27,750.64, upon the

rious individual charges comprising said sum, from

e dates of payment thereof to September 1, 1911, as

mized in complainant’s Exhibit 2, together with inter-

Pat the rate of 6 per cent. per annum on said sum of

8,236.45, from September 1, 1911, as reparation for

reasonable rates charged for the transportation of

rious shipments of anthracite coal from the Wyoming

al region in Pennsylvania to Perth Amboy, N. J.,

ich rates so charged have been found by this Commis-

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Opinion of the Court. 236 U.S.

422 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

sion to have been unreasonable, as more fully and at

large appears in and by said report of the Commission.”

Although duly served with a copy of this order, the

railroad company refused to comply with it; and, on

September 3, 1912, after the time allotted for compliance

had expired, the plaintiff, conformably to § 16 of the act,

filed in the District Court his petition setting forth briefly

the causes for which he claimed damages and the reports

and orders of the Commission, and praying judgment

against the railroad company for the amounts claimed

and awarded and for interest and costs, including a rea-

sonable attorney’s fee. The defendant answered deny-

ing the claims set forth in the petition and asserting that

they were barred by the applicable statute of limitations,

that the Commission was without jurisdiction ‘‘to make

the findings and order of reparation” relied apon, and

that ‘there was before the Commission no substantial

evidence to sustain said findings and said order.”’ A

trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff assessing the

damages at $109,280.17, the total amount awarded by

the Commission with interest, and judgment was entered

for this sum with costs, including an attorney’s fee.

At the trial the plaintiff produced no evidence tending

to show unjust discrimination, exaction of unreasonable

rates, injury to Meeker & Company or what damages

were sustained by them, other than the evidence afforded

by the reports and orders of the Commission; and the

defendant produced no evidence whatever, save some

computations intended to be helpful in determining how

much of the claims was barred according to each of several

views advanced respecting the applicable statute of limi-

tations.

Whether the claims were barred in whole or in part

by some applicable statute is one of the questions which

the record presents, and to dispose of it we must notice

three statutes upon which the defendant relies.

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BIH PAW EE PRENATAL RETAILS ANDI NEA

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MEEKER & CO. v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. R. 423

236 U. 8. Opinion of the Court.

One of these is Rev. Stat., § 1047, which places a limi-

tation of five years upon any ‘“‘suit or prosecution for

any penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, accru-

ing under the laws of the United States.’”’ The words

“penalty or forfeiture” in this section refer to something

imposed in a punitive way for an infraction of a public

law, and do not include a liability imposed for the purpose

of redressing a private injury, even though the wrongful

act be a public offense and punishable as such. Here the

liability sought to be enforced was not punitive but

strictly remedial, as is shown by $$ 8, 9, 14 and 16 of

the Act to Regulate Commerce. So § 1047 was not ap-

plicable. Chattanooga Foundry vy. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390,

397; O'Sullivan vy. Felix, 233 U. S. 318; Destington v.

Altrill, 146 U. 8. 657, 666-669; Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S

148.

Next in order is a Pennsylvania statute containing a

limitation of six years. 2 Stewart’s Purdon’s Digest,

13th ed. 2282. It could apply only in the absence of a

controlling Federal statute. Rev. Stat., § 721; Camp-

bell v. Haverhill, 155 U. 8. 610; McClaine v. Rankin, 197

U.S. 154, 158; O'Sullivan v. Felix, supra. Such a statute

was adopted and put in force before any part of either

claim fell within the bar of the local limitation. By the

act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, 590, Congress

amended § 16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce by in-

corporating therein the following limitations: ‘ All com-

plaints for the recovery of damages shall be filed with

the Commission within two years from the time the cause

of action accrues, and not after, and a petition for the

enforcement of an order for the payment of money shall

be filed in the Circuit Court! within one year from the

date of the order, and not after: Provided, that claims

accrued prior to the passage of this Act may be presented

The Judicial ( ‘od, § 291, which ane ame eBectine Sanne ary 1, 1912,

requires that the words ‘Circuit Court” be read “ District Court.”

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424 OCTOBER TERM, i914.

Opinion of the Court. 236 U.S.

within one year.”” The words of the proviso make it

certain that the amendment was to reach claims already

accrued as well as those thereafter accruing. And while

there doubtless was no purpose to revive claims then

barred by local statutes, it is evident that Congress in-

tended to take all other claims out of the operation of

the varying laws of the several States and subject them

to limitations of its own creation which would operate

alike in all the States.

This amendment is the third statute upon which the

defendant relies, the contentions advanced thereunder

being (a) that it prevented the Commission from consider-

ing any claim accrued more than two years prior to the

amendment, and (b) that the year granted for filing claims

which accrued before the amendment expired June 28,

1907. Either contention, if sound, would defeat all of

the first claim in suit and the major part of the second.

The first contention is plainly not tenable. The amend-

ment contained a general provision limiting the time for

invoking action by the Commission upon complaints for

damages to two years from the accrual of the claim, and

also a proviso saying that “claims accrued prior to the

passage of this Act may be presented within one year.”

The proviso was in the nature of a saving clause, and,

while, as before observed, it probably was not intended

to revive claims which were then barred by applicable

local laws, we think there is no warrant for saying that it

was not intended to include claims accrued more than two

years before the amendment. The plain import of the

words is to the contrary. The Commission has uniformly

construed it as permitting all accrued claims, not already

barred, to be presented within the year named, and we

think they reasonably could not have done otherwise.

The other contention turns upon the sense in which

the words ‘‘ the passage of this Act”’ were used in the pro-

viso. The act contained a concluding section saying

MEEKER & CO. v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. R. 425

5

236 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

“this Aet shall take effect and be in force from and after

its passage,” but, on the day following its approval, its

effective date was postponed by a joint resolution for

sixty days, that is, from June 29 to August 28, 1906. 34

Stat. 838. If the act be separately considered and the

proviso read in connection with the concluding section,

we think it is apparent that the words named referred to

the time when the act was to speak and operate as a law,

and that the year given for filing accrued claims was to

be reckoned from that time. In other words, the mean- ‘

ing was the same as if the proviso had said “claims accrued f

heretofore may be presented within one year hereafter,”

or “claims acerued before this Act becomes effective

may be presented within one year thereafter.” It was

not an instance where words referring to the date of

passage were chosen to distinguish it from the effective

date of the act, for the act was to take effect and be in

force upon its passage, and therefore there was no occa-

sion for such a distinction. And, coming to the joint

resolution, we think it did not affect the sense of the

words in the proviso. That was to be determined in the

light of the situation in which they were used, and not by

what subsequently happened. Not only so, but the pur-

pose of the joint resolution was to cause the act to speak

and operate at the end of the sixty days as if that were

the time of its passage. In the meantime the act laid no

duty upon this or any other claimant and when the sixty

days expired it gave a full year for presenting accrued

claims, and not a year less sixty days. See Matter of

Howe, 112 N. Y. 100; Harding v. People, 10 Colorado,

387, 392; State v. Bemis, 45 Nebraska, 724, 739; Patrick

v. Perryman, 52 Ill. App. 514, 518; Schneider v. Hussey,

2 Idaho, 8; Charless v. Lamberson, 1 lowa, 435, 443. It

is not a question of notice, as in Diamond Glue Co. v.

United States Glue Co., 187 U.S. 611, 615-616, but of the

meaning and operation of the statute.

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426 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court. 236 U.S.

It follows from these views that the complaint, which

was filed with the Commission July 17, 1907, was season-

ably presented and that no part of either claim was barred

at that time. And, as the action in the District Court

was begun within a year after the date of the order fot

reparation, the defense predicated upon the statute of

limitations must fail.

With a single exception, the other questions pressed

upon our attention center about the use and effect of the

reports and orders of the Commission as evidence, 2

subject concerning which the courts below differed.

The pertinent provisions of the Act to Regulate Com-

merce are these: Section 14 (34 Stat. 589) requires the

Commission, upon investigating a complaint, to make

a written report thereon ‘‘which shall state the conclu-

sions of the Commission, together with its decision, order,

or requirement in the premises,” and, if damages be

awarded, “shall include the findings of fact on which the

award is made.” Section 16 (34 Stat. 590) requires the

Commission, upon awarding damages to a complaining

party, to make an order directing that ‘‘ the sum to which

he is entitled ’’ be paid within a fixed time; and then, afte:

authorizing a suit to enforce payment, if the order be

not obeyed, provides: ‘“‘Such suit shall proceed in all

respects like other civil suits for damages, except that

on the trial of such suit the findings and order of the

Commission shall be prima facie evidence of the fact:

therein stated.”

At the trial the plaintiff offered in evidence the report:

and orders of the Commission and asked that the fact:

stated in the findings and orders be taken as prima facie

true.

An objection was interposed to the admission of the

reports upon the ground that they contained various

statements which it was claimed were not findings of fact

and therefore were not admissible. A colloquy ensuec

MEEKER & CO. v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. R. 427

236 U. S. Opinion of the Court.

between court and counsel in which counsel for the plain-

tiff conceded that portions of the reports should be elim-

inated and suggested that this could be done in the charge

to the jury. As a result of the colloquy the reports were

received in evidence, the court observing that it would

indicate to the jury what portions were to be considered.

The reports were not read at the time, but when the evi-

dence was concluded counsel for the plaintiff, as the record

recites, “‘read to the jury what he stated to be material

portions” of them. The record does not more definitely

identify what was read; nor does it show that complaint :

was then made that anything was read that should have ;

been omitted, or that the court’s attention was drawn to

the subject at the time of charging the jury either by a

request for a particular inst ruction thereon or by excepting

to the absence of such an instruction. The court’s charge .

apparently proceeded upon the theory that the portions Z

of the reports which had been read to the jury were prop-

erly before them. In these circumstances the objection

eannot now be considered. If it was not obviated by

excluding the supposedly objectionable portions of the

reports from what was read to the jury, it was waived by

the failure to direct the court’s attention to the subject

when the jury was charged. «

Another objection which was directed against the orders

as well as the reports is that they contain no findings of

fact or at least not enough to sustain an award of damages.

The arguments advanced to sustain this objection proceed

upon the theory that the statute requires that the reports,

if not the orders, shall state the evidential rather than the

ultimate facts, that is to say, the primary facts from which

through a process of reasoning and inference the ultimate

facts may be determined. We think this is not the right

view of the statute and that what it requires is a finding

of the ultimate faects—-a finding which, as applied to the

present case, would disclose (1) the relation of the parties

ACN TL Ie

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3

Sh

p woh os

428 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court. 236 U.

as shipper and carrier in interstate commerce; (2) tl

character and amount of the traffic out of which the clain

arose; (3) the rates paid by the shipper for the servi

rendered and whether they were according to the estal

lished tariff; (4) whether and in what way unjust discrin

ination was practiced against the shipper from Noven

ber 1, 1900, to August 1, 1901; (5) whether, if there w:

unjust discrimination, the shipper was injured thereby

and, if so, the amount of his damages; (6) whether tl

rate collected from the shipper from August 1, 1901, 1

July 17, 1907, was excessive and unreasonable and, if »

what would have been a reasonable rate for the servic

and (7) whether, if the rate was excessive and unreaso1

able, the shipper was injured thereby, and, if so, tl

amount of his damages. Upon examining the reports :

set forth in the record, we think they contain findings «

fact which meet the requirements of the statute and th:

the facts stated in the findings, if taken as prima fac

true, sustain the award of the Commission. ‘True, tl

findings in the original report are interwoven with oth

matter and are not expressed in the terms which cour

generally employ in special findings of fact, but there is 1

difficulty in separating the findings from the other matt

or in fully understanding them, and particularly is th

true when the two reports are read together, as they shoul

be. We say “should be” because both were made in th

same proceeding and the later one affirmatively show

that it was made to supplement and give effect to th

original.

But it is said that the reports disclose that the Commi

sion applied an erroneous and inadmissible measure of dan

ages, and therefore that no effect can be given to the aware

What the reports really disclose is that the Commissio:

“upon consideration of the evidence adduced upon t!

hearing upon the question of reparation” found (a) ths

by reason of the unjust discrimination resulting frot

.

MEEKER & CO. ». LEHIGH VALLEY R. R. 429

236 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

giving the rebate to the Lehigh Valley Coal Company

Meeker & Company were ‘‘damaged to the extent of the

difference’ between what they actually paid from Novem-

ber 1, 1900, to August 1, 1901, and what they would have

paid had they been dealt with on the same basis as was

the Coal Company, and (b) that by reason of being,

charged an excessive and unreasonable rate from August 1,

1901, to July 17, 1907, Meeker & Company were “ dam-

aged to the extent of the difference” between what they

actually paid and what they would have paid had they

been given the rate which the C ommission found would

have been reasonable. In this we perceive nothing point-

ing to the application of an erroneous or inadmissible

measure of damages. The Commission was authorized

and required by §8 of the Act to Regulate Commerce to

award “the full amount of damages sustained,” and that,

of course, was to be determined from the evidence. If it

chowed that the damages corresponded to the rebate in

one instance and to the overcharge in the other the claim-

ant was entitled to an award upon that basis. The case

of Pennsylvania Railroad v. International Coal Mining Co.,

93() U.S. 184, is cited as holding otherwise, but it does not

doso. There a shipper, without proving that he sustained

any damages, sought to recover from a carrier for giving

a rebate to another shipper, and this court, referring to

$8, said (p. 203): ‘The measure of damages was the

pecuniary loss inflieted on the plaintiff as the result of

the rebate paid. Those damages might be the same as

the rebate, or less than the rebate, or many times greater

than the rebate; but unless they were proved they could

not be recovered. Whatever they were they could be re-

covered.” There is nothing in either report of the Com-

mission which is in conflict with what was said in that

case. On the contrary, the plain import of the findings

is that the amounts awarded represent the claimant's

actual pecuniary loss; and, in view of the recital that the

Ji inochi ALES ROI NG RAR

430 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court. 236 U.

findings were based upon the evidence adduced, it mt

be presumed, there being no showing to the contrary, th

they were justified by it.

It is also urged, as it was in the courts below, that t

provision in § 16 that, in actions like this, “the findin

and order of the Commission shall be prima facie eviden

of the facts therein stated” is repugnant to the Constit

tion in that it infringes upon the right of trial by jury a

operates as a denial of due process of law.

This provision only establishes a rebuttable presum

tion. It cuts off no defense, interposes no obstacle to

full contestation of all the issues, and takes no question

fact from either court or jury. At most therefore it

merely a rule of evidence. It does not abridge the rig

of trial by jury or take away any of its incidents. N

does it in any wise work a denial of due process of la’

In principle it is not unlike the statutes in many of tl

States whereby tax deeds are made prima facie eviden

of the regularity of all the proceedings upon which thc

validity depends. Such statutes have been general

sustained, Pillow vy. Roberts, 13 How. 472, 476; Marr

Hanthorn, 148 U.S. 172, 182; Turpin vy. Lemon, 187 U.

51, 59; Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed. 52

as have many other state and Federal enactments esta!

lishing other rebuttable presumptions. Mobile &c. Ra:

road v. Turnipseed, 219 U. 8. 35, 42; Lindsley v. Natur

Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. 8. 61, 81; Reitler v. Harris, 2:

U. S. 437; Luria vy. United States, 231 U. 8. 9, 25. A

instructive case upon the subject is Holmes v. Hunt, 1:

Massachusetts, 505, where, in an elaborate opinion |

Chief Justice Gray, a statute making the report of «

auditor prima facie evidence at the trial before a jury w:

held to be a legitimate exercise of legislative power ov

rules of evidence and in no wise inconsistent with tl

constitutional right of trial by jury. And in Chicago &

Railroad v. Jones, 149 Illinois, 361, 382, a like ruling w:

ee ee

MEEKER «& CO. ». LEHIGH VALLEY R. R. 431

236 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

made in respect of a statutory provision similar to that

now before us.

Complaint is mace because the court refused to direct a

verdict for the defendant, but of this it suffices to say that

the ruling was undoubtedly right, because the plaintiff's

evidence, including the findings and orders of the Commis-

sion, tended to show every fact essential to a recovery upon

both claims and there was no opposing evidence.

The District Court made an allowance of $20,000 as a

fee for the plaintiff's attorneys and directed that it be

taxed and collected as part of the costs, the allowance

being expressly apportioned in equal amounts between

the services in the proceeding before the Commission and

the services in the action in court. Complaint is made of

this on the grounds (a) that the allowance is in any view

excessive, (b) that the act does not authorize an allowance

for services before the Commission, and (¢) that the pro-

vision authorizing an allowance for services in the action

is invalid as being purely arbitrary and as imposing :

penalty merely for failing to pay a debt.

Without considering whether the mere amount of an

allowance under the statute can ever be reéxamined here

(see Rev. Stat., § LOLL; Martinton vy. Fairbanks, 112 U.s.

670, 672; Montague v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 48; Railroad

Co. vy. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24, 31; New York &c. Railroad

v. Winter, 143 U.S. 60, 75) we are clear that it cannot be

in this instance. The record discloses that the allowance

was predicated upon an exhibition of a transcript of the

proceedings before the Commission and upon a statement

made in open court, in the presence of counsel for the de-

fendant, of the services rendered before the Commission

and in the action. But the transcript and statement have

not been made part of this record and so we cannot know

what was shown by them and cannot judge of their bear-

ing upon the amount of the allowance. Besides, it does

not appear that the defendant offered any evidence tend-

aihsand dae Te gta Da

Ape

432 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court. 236 |

ing to show what would be a reasonable allowance

that it in any way objected or excepted to the amc

of the allowance when it was made. The only excep

reserved was addressed to the allowance of any fee

the services before the Commission or for those in

action. In this situation the defendant is not now |

position to claim that as matter of fact the allowanc

excessive. Whether as matter of law it is objection:

is another question.

Section 8 provides that a carrier violating the act s

be liable to any person injured for the damages he |

tains, ‘‘together with a reasonable counsel or attorn

fee, to be fixed by the court in every case of recoy

which attorney's fee shall be taxed and collected as |

of the costs in the case.” And § 16, relating to action

enforce claims for damages after the Commission

acted thereon, provides “If the petitioner shall finally |

vail he shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee, t«

taxed and collected as a part of the costs of the suit.”

In our opinion the services for which an attorn

fee is to be taxed and collected are those incident to

action in which the recovery is had and not those be

the Commission. This is not only implied in the we

of the two provisions just quoted but is suggested by

absence of any reference to proceedings anterior to

action. And that nothing more is intended becomes p!

when we consider another provision in § 16 which requ

the Commission, upon awarding damages, to make

order directing the carrier to pay the sum awarded “or

before a day named” and then declares that, if the car

does not comply with the order “within the time lim

the claimant may proceed to collect the damages by s

The Commission is not to allow a fee, but only to {

the amount of the damages and fix a time for paym

and, if the carrier pays the award within the time nam

no right to an attorney's fee arises. It is only when

> secrets

MEEKER vr. LEHIGH VALLEY R. R. 433

236 U.S. Opinion of the Court. °

damages are recovered by suit that a fee is to be allowed,

and this is as true of the provision in § 8 as of that in § 16.

The evident purpose is to charge the carrier with the cost

and expenses entailed by a failure to pay without suit

if the claimant finally prevails—-and to that end to tax

as part of the costs in the suit wherein the recovery is had

a reasonable fee for the services of the claimant's attorney

in instituting and prosecuting that suit. It follows that

the District Court erred in matter of law in allowing a

fee for services before the Commission.

The contention that the provision for an attorney's

fee for services in the suit is invalid as being purely arbi-

trary and as imposing a penalty for merely failing to pay

a debt is without merit. The provision is leveled against

common carriers engaged in interstate commerce, a quasi

public business, and is confined to cases wherein a recovery

is had for damages resulting from the earrier’s violation

of some duty imposed in the public interest by the Act

to Regulate Commerce. Allantic Coast Line Railroad vy.

Riverside Mills, 219 U. 8. 186, 208. One of its purposes

is to promote a closer observance by carriers of the duties

so imposed; and that there is also a purpose to encourage

the payment, without suit, of just demands does not mili-

tate against its validity. Missouri, Kansas & Texas

Railway v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 651, and cases cited. It

requires that the fee be reasonable and fixed by the court,

and does not permit it to be taxed against the carrier until

the plaintiff's demand has been adjudged upon full in-

quiry to be valid. In these circumstances the validity

of the provision is not doubtful but certain.

It results from what has been said that the judgment

of the Cireuit Court of Appeals must be reversed and

that of the Distriet Court must be modified by eliminating

the allowance of $10,000 as an attorney's fee for services

before the Commission and affirmed as so modified.

It is so ordered,

VOL. CCXXXvVI- —28

RAE PDE TER EPL TN RE IS EEN ————

e PRED

434 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Counsel for Parties. 236 U.S.

MEEKER v. LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

THIRD CIRCUIT.

No. 435. Argued October 13, 14, 1914.—Decided February 23, 1915.

Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. R., ante, p. 412, followed as to con-

struction effect of the amendment to § 16 of the Act to Regulate Com-

merce and the act of June 29, 1906, in regard to presentation of claims

by shippers against carriers for damages by reason of unreasonable

and excessive rates and discrimination, and that the attorney's fee

allowed for recovery of the amount awarded can only be for proceed-

ing in court and not on proceedings before the Commission.

A report of the Interstate Commerce Commission holding a rate ex-

cessive and declaring what would be a reasonable rate and a repara-

tion order based thereon were properly admitted as prima facie

evidence of the facts therein contained, although made in another

and identical proceeding between the same parties, and which the

Commission had power in its discretion to consolidate therewith,

it also appearing that the carrier did not then object to its admis-

sion and the order recited that it was made after a full hearing on,

and submission of, the issues in the proceeding in which it was made.

Harmless error constitutes no ground for reversal, and so held as to

the presence of irrelevant matter in a report of the Interstate Com-

merce Commission which matter, while it should not have gone to

the jury, did not prejudice respondent.

211 Fed. Rep. 785, reversed.

Tue facts, which involve the construction of §§ 1, 2 and

16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce and questions of dis-

crimination, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. John A. Garver and Mr. William A. Glasgow, Jr.,

for petitioner.

Mr. John G. Johnson, with whom Mr. Edgar H. Boles,

Mr. Frank H. Platt and Mr. George W. Field were ou the

brief, for respondent. (See argument, ante, p. 412.)

By leave of court, Mr. Joseph W. Folk and Mr. Charles

W. Needham filed a brief in behalf of the Interstate Cum-

merce Commission.

—

MEEKER v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. R. 435

J.S. Opinion of the Court.

Ir. Justice Van Devanrter delivered the opinion

re court.

his is a companion case to that just decided and in-

es a claim for reparation similar to the second claim

hat case, and arising out of the same rate.

1 this instance the shipper was Henry E. Meeker,

had succeeded to the business of Meeker & Company,

shippers in the other case, and the shipments in re-

tof which reparation is sought were made between

i] 13, 1908, and April 13, 1910. Otherwise the two

ms differ only in amount. A complaint covering this

m was filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission

i] 18, 1910, before it passed upon the complaint cover-

the other. In its report of June 8, 1911, upon the

ier complaint the Commission referred to the later one

said (21 1. C. C. 129, 137): ‘As the subject-matter

he two complaints is the same, in so far as the rea-

ableness of thé rates is concerned, the disposition of

later case will perhaps be determined by the conclu-

is reached in this ease.” In that report it found that

rate in question was excessive and unreasonable and

at would have been a reasonable rate, and directed a

ther hearing upon the matter of reparation. Such a

ring was had on both complaints and, on May 7, 1912,

. Commission made a supplemental report, entitled

both cases, in which it referred to its original report

i the findings therein and, after dealing with the repara-

n sought in the first complaint (Commission’s No.

30), said of the present claim (23 I. C. C. 480, 482):

‘On basis of our decision in No. 1180, and upon con-

eration of the evidence submitted at the hearing of the

‘sent ease regarding the amount of reparation due com-

inant, we now find that the rates exacted by defend-

t for the transportation of anthracite coal from the

yoming coal region in Pennsylvania to Perth Amboy,

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436 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court. 236 U.S.

N. J., during the period from April 13, 1908, to April 13,

1910, were unreasonable to the extent that they ex-

ceeded rates of $1.40 per gross ton on prepared sizes,

$1.30 on pea, and $1.15 on buckwheat; that complainant

shipped from said point of origin to said destination during

the period above set forth, 46,772.02 tons of coal of pre-

pared sizes, 26,972.06 tons of pea coal, and 22,004.09 tons

of buckwheat coal; that complainant paid charges thereon,

amounting to $136,663.41, at the rates herein found to

have been unreasonable, and was damaged to the extent

of the difference between the amount which he did pay

and $125,849.81, the amount which he would have paid

at the rates above found reasonable; and that he is, there-

fore, entitled to an award of reparation in the sum of

$10,813.60, with interest amounting to $1,526.53 upon

the individual charges comprising said sum from the

dates of payment thereof to September 1, 1911, together

with interest on said sum of $10,813.60 from the Ist day

of September, 1911.

“The exhibits showing details respecting the shipments

upon which reparation is asked are too extensive to be

set forth in this report. But inasmuch as the accuracy

of the figures in said exhibits respecting the shipments

made, freight charges paid, and reparation due, is con-

ceded of record by defendant, we deem it unnecessary

to make detailed findings respecting the numerous ship-

ments involved.”

Thereupon the Commission made and entered the

following order:

“This case being at issue upon complaint and answers

on file, and having been duly heard and submitted by

the parties, and full investigation of the matters and

things involved having been had, and the Commission

having, on the date hereof, made and filed a report con-

taining its findings of fact and conclusions thereon, which

said report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof:

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MEEKER v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. R. 437

236 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

“It is ordered, That defendant Lehigh Valley Railroad

Company be, and it is hereby authorized and required

to pay unto complainant, Henry E. Meeker, on or before

the 15th day of July, 1912, the sum of $10,813.60, with

interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum, amounting

to $1,526.53 upon the various individual charges com-

prising said sum, from the dates of payment thereof to

September 1, 1911, as itemized in complainant's Exhibit 1,

together with interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per an-

num on said sum of $10,813.60 from September 1, 1911,

as reparation for unreasonable rates charged for the trans-

portation of various shipments of anthracite coal from

the Wyoming coal region in Pennsylvania to Perth Amboy,

N. J., which rates so charged have been found by this

Commission to have been unreasonable, as more fully

and at large appears in and by said report of the Com-

mission.”

The railroad company was duly served with a copy

of the order, but refused to comply with it, and, on Sep-

tember 3, 1912, after the expiration of the period allowed

for compliance, the claimant brought the present action

in the District Court. The railroad company answered

as in the other ease. At the trial the plaintiff relied in

the main upon the findings and order of the Commission

as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and

no opposing evidence was presented. The plaintiff had a

verdict and judgment for $13,161.78, the amount of

damages awarded by the Commission with interest. The

court also allowed an attorney’s fee of $5,000, to be taxed

and collected as part of the costs, one-half of the allow-

ance being expressly attributed to services before the

Commission and the other half to the services in the

action. The ease was taken to the Cireuit Court of Ap-

peals where the judgment was reversed with that in the

other case. 211 Fed. Rep. 785. This case was then

brought here in the same way as the other. 234 U. 5. 749.

438 OCTOBER TERM, 1914.

Opinion of the Court. 236 U. 8.

Save that the statute of limitations is not relied upon,

the questions here presented are almost all identical with

those in the other case, and in so far as they are the same

they are sufficiently disposed of by what is there said.

There are but two points of difference and they require

only brief mention.

The Commission’s report of June 8, 1911, finding the

rate in question excessive and unreasonable and what

would have been a reasonable rate was admitted in evi-

dence over the defendant’s objection that it was made

in another and separate proceeding, that is, upon the

complaint of Meeker & Company, and therefore was

not admissible in this case for any purpose. The objection

was rightly overruled. Without any doubt it was within

the discretion of the Commission to permit Henry E.

Meeker to intervene in respect of his individual claim in

the proceeding begun by Meeker & Company or to con-

solidate his complaint with theirs. This, in effect, is

what was done. The supplemental report so shows and

it does not appear that the railroad company objected

to that course or was in any way prejudiced by it. Be-

sides, the reparation order recites that it was made after

a full hearing and submission of the issues presented by

the complaint and answer relating to this claim and

there was no evidence tending to contradict the recital.

The further objection was made to the admission of

the same report that it contained much that was not

relevant to the case on trial, but the objection was over-

ruled and it is fairly inferable from the record that the

entire report was placed before the jury. It hardly could

be said that the presence of some irrelevant matter ren-

dered the whole report inadmissible, and yet the ob-

jection seems to have been made in that view. The

objection would have been better founded had it been con-

fined to what was deemed irrelevant. Of course, all that

should have gone before the jury was the relevant findings

_—

SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. R. R. COMM., INDIANA, 439

236 U.S. Syllabus.

in the report, and counsel for the plaintiff ought not to

have asked more. But we need not fix the responsibility

for what occurred, for it is certain that the defendant was

not harmed by it. The case made by the evidence rightly

admitted was such as, in the absence of any opposing evi-

dence, and there was none, clearly entitled the plaintiff

to a verdict for the amount claimed. Every fact essential

to a recovery, save the service of the reparation order and

the refusal to comply with it, was prima facie established

by the findings and order of the Commission and these

could not be rejected by the jury in the absence of any

countervailing evidence. Kelly v. Jackson, 6 Pet. 622,

632. The service of the order was expressly admitted

and the refusal to comply with it was fully proved and

practically conceded. Of course, harmless error consti-

tutes no ground for reversal.

We conclude, therefore, that the judgment of the Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals must be reversed and that of the

District Court must be modified by eliminating the allow-

ance of an attorney's fee of $2,500 for services before

the Commission and affirmed as so modified.

It is so ordered.

SPREE ORNS ae

_—