Opinion — Atlantic Transport Co. of W. Va. v. Imbrovek

ATLANTIC TRANSPORT COMPANY OF WEST

VIRGINIA v. IMBROVEK.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT.

No. 215. Argued January 29, 30, 1914.—Decided May 25, 1914.

As a general principle, the test of admiralty jurisdiction in tort in this

country is locality.

Admiralty has jurisdiction of a suit in personam by an employé of a

stevedore against the employer to recover for injuries sustained

through the negligence of the latter while engaged in loading a vessel

lying at the dock in navigable waters.

The precise scope of admiralty jurisdiction is not a matter of obvious

principle or of very accurate history, The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361,

and quere whether the admiralty jurisdiction extends to a case where

the tort is not of a maritime nature although committed on navi-

gable waters.

A tort committed on a vessel in connection with a service thereto may

be maritime even if there is no fault on the part of, or injury to, the

ship itself.

_—

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ATLANTIC TRANSPORT CO. ». IMBROVEK. 53

234 U. S. Argument for Petitioner.

Stevedores are now as clearly identified with maritime affairs as are

the mariners themselves.

Whether the employer failed to provide a safe piace to work is a ques-

tion properly determinable by the Circuit Court of Appeals in last

resort, and this court will not disturb such a finding if concurred in

by both courts below and justified by the record.

193 Fed. Rep. 1019, affirmed.

Tue facts, which involve the admiralty jurisdiction of

the United States courts over suits for personal injuries

sustained on a vessel in port while being loaded by a

stevedore, and questions of negligence of the stevedore,

are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Edward Duffy, with whom Mr. Nicholas P. Bond

and Mr. Ralph Robinson were on the brief, for petitioner:

Admiralty has not jurisdiction; locality is not the sole

test of jurisdiction ; the tort is not of a maritime nature; the

master did not fail to furnish a safe place to labor; failure

to use pins was not the proximate cause; there was no evi-

dence to show that the master failed to use reasonable care.

In support of these contentions, see Atlee v. Packet Co.,

21 Wall. 389; Alaska Mining Co. v. Whelan, 168 U. S. 86;

Amer. Bridge Co. v. Seeds, 144 Fed. Rep. 605; Black Book

of Admiralty (Twiss); Bacon’s Abridg. Actions, Local and

Transitory; British African Co. v. The Compania, App.

Cas. (1893) 602; 2 Brown’s Admiralty (1 Amer. ed.),

94-95; Benedict’s Admiralty (4th ed.), 39, 46, 47; The

Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361; 2 Bailey’s Personal Injuries,

§§ 2885 and 2993; Brown v. People’s Gas Light Co., 81

Vermont, 477; B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368;

Campbell v. Hackfeld, 125 Fed. Rep. 696; Cleveland &c.

R. R. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 208 U. 8. 316; 9 Columbia

Law Rev. 1; Cleveland v. R. R. Co., 73 Fed. Rep. 970;

DeLovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 399; Gilbert’s Practice (3d ed.),

84, 85; 16 Harv. Law Rev. 210; 18 Jd. 299; 25 Id. 381;

Hussey v. Coger, 112 N. Y. 614; Hogan v. Henderson, 125

54 OCTOBER TERM, 1913.

Argument for Respondent. 234 U.S.

N. Y. 774; Kelly v. Norcross, 121 Massachusetts, 508;

Kelly v. New Haven Stmb. Co., 74 Connecticut, 343; Kelly

v. Jutte Co., 104 Fed. Rep. 955; Leathers v. Blessing, 106

U. 8. 626; The Morris Maz, 137 U.S. 1; Mostyn v. Fabri-

gas, 1 Smith L. Cases (11th ed.), 591; Malloy de Jure,

Bk. II, Ch. IIT, § XVI; Martin v. West, 222 U. S. 191;

Martin v. Railroad Co., 166 U. 8. 399; McKenna v. Fiske, 1

How. 240; McDonnell v. Oceanic Nav. Co., 143 Fed. Rep.

480; The Noranmore, 113 Fed. Rep. 367; The Osceola, 189

U.S. 158; Phila. &c. R. R. v. Phila. &c. Co., 23 How. 209;

The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20; The Pickands, 42 Fed. Rep. 239;

The Picqua, 97 Fed. Rep. 649; Queen v. Judge, 1 Q. B.

(1892) 273; The Queen, 40 Fed. Rep. 694; Regina v. Keyn,

2 Ex. D. 63; Railroad Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 386;

Skinner’s Case, 6 State Trials, 712; Stevens v. Sandwich, 1

Pet. Ad. Dec. 233; The Strabo, 90 Fed. Rep. 110; Tilly v.

Rockingham, 74 N. H. 316; Westinghouse v. Callaghan, 155

Fed. Rep. 397.

Mr. W. H. Price, Jr., and Mr. John E. Semmes, Jr.,

with whom Mr. John E. Semmes, Mr. Jesse N. Bowen and

Mr. Matthew Gault were on the brief, for respondent:

Admiralty has jurisdiction in the cases at bar, for the

following reasons:

The admiralty courts having properly assumed juris-

diction when the libel was brought against both the ship

and the stevedore company, should retain jurisdiction to

determine the liability of the stevedore company, even

though the libel be subsequently dismissed as to the ship.

Jurisdiction once assumed by the Federal court because

jurisdictional amount is alleged in good faith to be in-

volved, is not lost because it subsequently develops by the

evidence that less than the jurisdictional amount is ac-

tually involved.

Where the requisite diversity of citizenship exists at the

commencement of a suit, no subsequent change in the

ss

234 U.S. Argument for Respondent.

ATLANTIC TRANSPORT CO. ». IMBROVEK. 55

situation of the parties ousts the jurisdiction of the Fed-

eral court.

Where Federal and non-Federal questions are involved

in the same suit, and jurisdiction has properly attached for

the purpose of determining the Federal question, it is

proper for the Federal court to decide the local question

only and omit to decide the Federal question. Campbell v.

Hackfeld, 125 Fed. Rep. 696, can be distinguished.

The sole test of admiralty jurisdiction over torts is the

locality of the person or thing injured at the time of the

impact with the intentional or negligent force.

There is a distinction between admiralty jurisdiction of

the United States and that of England.

Locality is the sole test.

The constitutional extent of admiralty jurisdiction is

involved in this case.

The tort in this case was essentially maritime in its

nature.

On the evidence the master failed in his duty to provide

a safe place.

The gang boss was a vice-principal, as was also the fore-

man.

The evidence was sufficient as to the proximate cause

of the accident and as to lack of safety of place of work.

In support of these contentions, see Barry v. Edmonds,

116 U. S. 550; The Blackheath, 95 U.S. 361; Balt. & Ohio

Ry. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. 8. 368; Clark v. Mathewson,

12 Pet. 164; Chappell v. United States, 160 U.S. 499;

Campbell v. Hackfeld, 125 Fed. Rep. 696; Cleveland R. R.

Co. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 208 U. 8. 316; The Coningsby,

202 Fed. Rep. 814; Chicago Junction Ry. Co. v. King, 222

U.S. 222; C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 229 U.S. 317;

The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110; The Carib Prince, 170 U.S.

655; The Clan Graham, 153 Fed. Rep. 977; DeLovie v. Boit,

2 Gallison, 398; Ex parte Easton, 95 U. S. 72; The Genesee

Chief, 12 How. 443; The Gilbert Knapp, 37 Fed. Rep. 209;

escort.

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6 OCTOBER TERM, 1913.

Opinion of the Court. 234 T. S.

The George T. Kemp, Fed. Cas. No. 5341; Gaynor v.

Klander-Weldon Co., 174 Fed. Rep. 477; Grand Trunk R. R.

v. Ines, 144 U. S. 408; Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall.

1; The Iriquois, 194 U. S. 240; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall.

358: Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U. S. 626; Morgan’s Heirs v.

Morgan, 2 Wheat. 290; Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537;

Moorewood v. Enequist, 23 Fow. 493; Martin v. West, 222

U.S 191: Miller's Case, Fed. Cas. No. 300; Manchester v.

Massa, 139 U. S. 240; The Mattie May, 47 Fed. Rep. 69;

Mullan v. P. & S. Mail S. S. Co., 78 Pa. St. 25; N. J.

Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants Bank, 6 How. 344; Omaha

Horse R. R. Co. v. Cable Tramway, 32 Fed. Rep. 727;

O'Brien v. Buffalo Furnace Co., 183 N. Y. 317; The Plym-

outh. 3 Wall. 36; Peters v. George, 154 Fed. Rep. 634;

Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135; Smith v. Green-

how. 109 U.S. 669: Schunk v. Moline M. & S. Co., 147 U.S.

500: Smithers v. Smith, 204 U. S. 632; Siler v. L. & N. R.

R. Co... 213 U.S. 175; Simmons v. S. 8. Jefferson, 215 U.S.

130: The Segurranca, 58 Fed. Rep. 908; The Senator, 21

Fed. Rep. 191; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257; Thomas

v. Lane, 2 Sumner, 1; The Troy, 208 U.S. 321; Tex. & Pac.

R. R. Co. v. Howell, 224 U. S. 577; United States v. Bails-

ford, 5 Wheat. 184; United States v. Wiliberger, 5 Wheat.

76: United States v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290; United Siates v.

Wilson. 28 Fed. Cases, No. 718; United States v. Berans, 3

Wheat. 336: United States v. Rodgers, 150 U. S. 255;

Warring v. Clark, 5 How. 441, 464; Williamson v. United

States, 207 TU. S. 425.

Mr. Justice Hucues delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a libel to recover for personal injuries sustained

by the libelant as a stevedore in the employ of the Atlantic

Transport Company (the petitioner) which was engaged

in loading the Pretoria, belonging to the Hamburg-

American Steam Packet Company, while lying in the port

7

ATLANTIC TRANSPORT CO. +. IMBROVEK. — 57

234 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

of Baltimore. The libel was brought against both the

owner of the ship and the stevedore company. It was dis-

missed as to the former, but a recovery against the latter

was allowed by the District Court (190 Fed. Rep. 229) and

sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals (193 Fed. Rep.

1019). This writ of certiorari was granted.

The libelant was one of a gang engaged in loading and

stowing copper. He was working on the ship, under one

of the hatches. The covers of the hatch were in three

sections, the division being made by two movable iron

beams placed athwart the ship. The coverings of the

middle section had been removed and placed on top of the

fore and after sections. On the dock, the copper was piled

upon a rope mat which was lifted by a winch, swung over

the hatch, and lowered into the hold. On one of its return

trips the mat caught under the after crossbeam which was

instantly jerked out of its support and, with the lengthwise

timbers resting on it and the hatch covers, fell into the

hold severely injuring the libelant. The District Court

(referring to the petitioner, the Atlantic Transport Com-

pany, as the stevedore) said, p. 231: “‘There would have

been no accident had the entire hatch been uncovered.

To uncover a hatch takes time and labor. If bad weather

comes, it must be covered. Unnecessary uncovering is

to be avoided. It is easy to make a partially covered

hatch absolutely safe. The crossbeams of the hatch have

holes in their ends. There are corresponding holes in the

hatch combings. Pins can be put through these holes. It

takes about five minutes to put them in. When in place,

an accident such as gave rise to this case cannot happen.

The ship’s carpenter of the Pretoria keeps the pins when

not in use. Accidents often happen because an opened

hatch has been left unguarded, or because the hatch cov-

erings fall into the hold. When they do, there is usually a

dispute as to whether the ship or the stevedore is to blame.

In the case at bar the ship and the stevedore were repre-

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58 OCTOBER TERM, 1913.

Opinion of the Court. 234 U.S.

sented by the same proctors and by the same advocates.

The stevedore acquits the ship . . . The stevedore

proved that, when the ship came into port, it took complete

charge of the hatches. It uncovered so much of them as

it saw fit. If the pins were in and it wanted them out, it

took them out. It laid them on the deck. The ship’s

carpenter gathered them up. If the pins were out and it

wanted them in, it told the ship’s carpenter. He put them

in.” For its failure to use due diligence in seeing that the

libelant had a safe place in which to work the District

Court held the Transport Company liable.

The principal question is whether the District Court had

jurisdiction; that is, whether the cause was one ‘of ad-

miralty and maritime jurisdiction.’ Const. Art. III, § 2;

Rev. Stat., § 563; Judicial Code, § 24; Act of Sept. 24,

1789, c. XX, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76. As the injury occurred

on board a ship while it was lying in navigable waters,

there is no doubt that the requirement as to locality was

fully met. The petitioner insists, however, that locality

is not the sole test, and that it must appear that the tort

was otherwise of a maritime nature. And this was the

view taken by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit, in affirming a decree dismissing a libel for want of

jurisdiction in a similar case. Campbell v. Hackfeld & Co.,

125 Fed. Rep. 696.

At an early period the court of admiralty in England

exercised jurisdiction ‘over torts, injuries, and offences,

in ports within the ebb and flow of the tide, on the British

seas and on the high seas.’ De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398,

406, 464, 474. While its authority was denied when the

injurious action took place infra corpus comitatus, it was

not disputed that jurisdiction existed when the wrong

was done ‘upon the sea, or any part thereof which is not

within any county.’ (4 Inst. 134.) The jurisdiction in

admiralty of the courts of the United States is not con-

trolled by the restrictive statutes and judicial prohibitions

a

ATLANTIC TRANSPORT CO. v. IMBROVEK. 59

234 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

of England (Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441, 457, 458; In-

surance Company v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1, 24; The Lotta-

wanna, 21 Wall. 558, 576); and the limitation with respect

to torts committed within the body of any county is not

applicable here. Waring v. Clarke, supra; The M agnolia,

20 How. 296. ‘In regard to torts”—said Mr. Justice

Story in Thomas v. Lane, 2 Sumn. 1, 9—I have always

understood, that the jurisdiction of the Admiralty is ex-

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clusively dependent upon the locality of the act. The j

Admiralty has not, and never (I believe) deliberately P

claimed to have any jurisdiction over torts, except such as ;

are maritime torts, that is, such as are committed on the :

high seas, or on waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.” .

This rule—that locality furnishes the test—has been fre- .

quently reiterated, with the substitution (under the doc- E

trine of The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443), of navigable

waters for tide waters. Thus, in the case of The Philadel-

phia, Wilmington & Baltimore R. R. Co. v. The Philadel-

phia & Havre de Grace Steam Towboat Co., 23 How. 209,

215, the court said: “The jurisdiction of courts of ad-

miralty, in matters of contract, depends upon the nature

and character of the contract; but in torts, it depends en-

tirely on locality.” Again, in the case of The Plymouth, 3

Wall. 20, where jurisdiction was denied upon the ground

that the substance and consummation of the wrong took

place on land and not on navigable water, the court said,

p. 35: “The jurisdiction of the admiralty over maritime

torts does not depend upon the wrong having been com-

mitted on board the vessel, but upon its having been com- k

mitted upon the high seas or other navigable waters.—A :

trespass on board of a vessel, or by the vessel itself, above

tide-water, when that was the limit of jurisdiction, was

not of admiralty cognizance. The reason was, that it was

not committed within the locality that gave the jurisdic-

tion. The vessel itself was unimportant. . . . The

jurisdiction of the admiralty does not depend upon the

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60 OCTOBER TERM, 1913.

Opinion of the Court. 234 U.S.

fact that the injury was inflicted by the vessel, but upon

the locality—the high seas, or navigable waters where it

occurred. Every species of tort, however occurring, and

whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or

navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance.”” See Manro

v. Almeida, 10 Wheat. 473; Waring v. Clarke, supra,

p. 459; The Lexington, 6 How. 344, 394; The Commerce, 1

Black, 574, 579; The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213, 215;

The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 637; Ex parte Easton, 95 U. S. 68,

72; Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U. 8. 626, 630; Panama Rail-

road v. Napier Shipping Co., 166 U.S. 280, 285; The Black-

heath, 195 U. S. 361, 365, 367; Cleveland Terminal & Valley

R. R. Co. v. Cleveland Steamship Co., 208 U. 8. 316, 319;

Martin v. West, 222 U.S. 191; The Neil Cochran, Fed. Cas.

No. 10,087; The Ottawa, Fed. Cas. No. 10,616; Holmes v.

O. & C. Rwy. Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 75, 77; The Arkansas, 17

Fed. Rep. 383, 384; The F. & P. M. No. 2, 33 Fed. Rep.

511, 513; The H. S. Pickands, 42 Fed. Rep. 239, 240; Her-

mann v. Port Blakely Mill Co., 69 Fed. Rep. 646, 647;

The Strabo, 90 Fed. Rep. 110; 2 Story on the Constitution,

§ 1666. It is also apparent that Congress in providing for

the punishment of crimes committed upon navigable

waters has regarded the locality of the offense as the basis

for the exercise of its authority. Act of April 30, 1790,

ce. IX, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113; act of March 3, 1825, c. LXV,

4 Stat. 115; Rev. Stat., §§ 5339, 5345, 5346; Criminal

Code, § 272, 35 Stat. 1088, 1142; United States v. Bevans,

3 Wheat. 336, 387; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat.

76; United States v. Rodgers, 150 U. 8. 249, 260, 261, 285;

Wynne v. United States, 217 U. S. 234, 240.

But the petitioners urge that the general statements

which we have cited, with respect to the exclusiveness of

the test of locality in cases of tort, are not controlling; and

that in every adjudicated case in this country in which the

jurisdiction of admiralty with respect to torts has been

sustained, the tort apart from the mere place of its occur-

ATLANTIC TRANSPORT CO. ». IMBROVEK. 61

234 U.S. Opinion of the Court.

rence has been of a maritime character. It is asked

whether admiralty would entertain a suit for libel or slan-

der circulated on board a ship by one passenger against

another. See Benedict, Admiralty, 4th ed., § 231. The

appropriate basis, it is said, of all admiralty jurisdiction,

whether in contract or in tort, is the maritime nature of

the transaction or event; it is suggested that the wider

authority exercised in very early times in England may

be due to its antedating the recognition by the common-

law courts of transitory causes of action and thus arose by

virtue of necessity.

We do not find it necessary to enter upon this broad in-

quiry. As this court has observed, the precise scope of

admiralty jurisdiction is not a matter of ‘obvious principle

or of very accurate history,’ The Blackheath, supra. And

we are not now concerned with the extreme cases which

are hypothetically presented. Even if it be assumed that

the requirement as to locality in tort cases, while indis-

pensable, is not necessarily exclusive, still in the present

case the wrong which was the subject of the suit was, we

think, of a maritime nature and hence the District Court,

from any point of view, had jurisdiction. The petitioner

contends that a maritime tort is one arising out of an in-

jury to a ship caused by the negligence of a ship or a per-

son or out of an injury to a person by the negligence of a

ship; that there must either be an injury to a ship or an

injury by the negligence of the ship, including therein the

negligence of her owners or mariners; and that, as there

was no negligence of the ship in the present case, the tort

was not maritime. This view we deem to be altogether

too narrow.

The libelant was injured on a ship, lying in navigable

waters, and while he was engaged in the performance of a

maritime service. We entertain no doubt that the service

in loading and stowing a ship’s cargo is of this character,

Upon its proper performance depend in large measure the

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62 OCTOBER TERM, 1913.

Opinion of the Court. 234 U.S.

safe carrying of the cargo and the safety of the ship itself;

and it is a service absolutely necessary to enable the ship

to discharge its maritime duty. Formerly the work was

done by the ship’s crew; but, owing to the exigencies of

increasing commerce and the demand for rapidity and

special skill, it has become a specialized service devolving

upon a class ‘as clearly identified with maritime affairs

as are the mariners.’ See The George T. Kemp, 2 Lowell,

477, 482; The Circassian, 1 Ben. 209; The Windermere, 2

Fed. Rep. 722; The Canada, 7 Fed. Rep. 119; The Hattie

M. Bain, 20 Fed. Rep. 389; The Gilbert Knapp, 37 Fed.

Rep. 209; The Main, 51 Fed. Rep. 954; Norwegian Steam-

ship Co. v. Washington, 57 Fed. Rep. 224; The Seguranca,

58 Fed. Rep. 908; The Allerton, 93 Fed. Rep. 219; Hughes,

Adm. 113; Benedict, Adm., 4th ed., § 207. The libelant

was injured because the care required by the law was not

taken to protect him while he was doing this work. We

take it to be clear that the District Court sitting in ad-

miralty was entitled to declare the applicable law in such

a case, as it was within the power of Congress to modify

that law. Waring v. Clarke, supra; The Lottawanna, supra.

The fact that the ship was not found to be liable for the

neglect is not controlling. If more is required than the

locality of the wrong in order to give the court jurisdiction,

the relation of the wrong to maritime service, to naviga-

tion and to commerce on navigable waters, was quite suffi-

cient. Even with respect to contracts where subject-

matter is the exclusive test, it has been said that the true

criterion is “‘whether it was a maritime contract, having

reference to maritime service or maritime transactions.”

Insurance Company v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1, 26. The Con-

stitution provides that the judicial power shall extend ‘to

all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,’ and the

act of Congress defines the jurisdiction of the District

Court, with respect to civil causes, in terms of like scope.

To hold that a case of a ter’ committed on board a ship

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|

ATLANTIC TRANSPORT CO. v. SZCZESEK. 63

234 U.S. Statement of the Case.

in navigable waters, by one who has undertaken a mari-

time service, against one engaged in the performance of

that service, is not embraced within the constitutional

grant and the jurisdictional act, would be to establish a

limitation wholly without warrant.

The remaining question relates to the finding of negli-

gence. It is urged that the neglect was that of a fellow-

servant and hence that the petitioner was not liable. Both

courts below, however, concurred in the finding that the

petitioner omitted to use proper diligence to provide a

safe place of work. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Baugh,

149 U. S. 368, 386. As the question belongs to a class

which under the distribution of judicial power is deter-

minable by the Circuit Court of Appeals in last resort, we

shall not undertake to discuss it at length or to restate

the evidence. Chicago Junction Rwy. Co. vy. King, 222

U. S. 222, 224; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Rwy. Co. v. Brown,

229 U. S. 317, 320; Grand Trunk Rwy. Co. v. Lindsay, 233

U. S. 42, 50. It is sufficient to say that we are satisfied

from an examination of the record that the ruling was

justified.

Affirmed.

ATLANTIC TRANSPORT COMPANY OF WEST

VIRGINIA ». STATE OF MARYLAND TO THE

USE OF SZCZESEK.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT.

No. 216. Argued January 29, 30, 1914.—Decided May 25, 1914.

Decided on the authority of Atlantic Transport Company v. Imbrovek,

ante, p. 54.

193 Fed. Rep. 1019, affirmed.

Tue facts are stated in the opinion.

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64 OCTOBER TERM, 1913.

Syllabus. 234 U.S.

Mr. Edward Duffy, with whom Mr. Nicholas P. Bond

and Mr. Ralph Robinson were on the brief, for petitioner.

Mr. W. H. Price, Jr., and Mr. John E. Semmes, Jr.,

with whom Mr. John E. Semmes, Mr. Jesse N. Bowen and

Mr. Matthew Gault were on the brief, for respondent.

Mr. Justice Hucues delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a libel filed on behalf of the widow and infant

children of Martin Szezesek to recover damages for injuries

resulting in his death. Szczesek was a stevedore in the

employ of the Atlantic Transport Company, the petitioner,

and was engaged in loading the ship Pretoria. The District

Court allowed a recovery against the petitioner (190 Fed.

Rep. 240) which the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

193 Fed. Rep. 1019.

The questions presented are the same as those which

were considered in Atlantic Transport Company v. Im-

brovek, ante, p. 52, decided this day and, for the reasons

stated in the opinion in that case, the decree is affirmed.

Affirmed.