Opposition Brief — Imperial County Air Pollution Control District v. Sierra Club

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5

No. 03-1334

s ipreme Co U.S.

FILED

MAY 2 1 2004

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IMPERIAL COUNTY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT

PETITIONER

VU.

SIERRA CLUB, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT

IN OPPOSITION

THEODORE B. OLSON

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

THOMAS L. SANSONETTI

Assistant Attorney General

D. JUDITH KEITH

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

GUEST AVAILABLE COPY |

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding

arbitrary and capricious the finding of the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) that the State of California had

established that the Imperial Valley Planning Area’s

nonattainment of the national ambient air quality standards

for particulate matter of 10 microns or less by the

applicable attainment date under the Clean Air Act, 42

U.S.C. 7401 et seq., was due to emissions from sources in

Mexico.

2. Whether the court of appeals erred in remanding

EPA’s finding to the Agency with instructions that the

Imperial Valley Planning Area be reclassified from a

moderate to a serious nonattamment area.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def.

Comet, 608 U.S. 67 (10GB) 2... cece cccccees 10

Federal Power Comm'n v. Florida Power & Light

SORE MPC MEMEMPURD occ cccaccvcvevveseccevcecss 8

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729

i eee eee eho ce sway cabdabevenaes 8-9, 11

INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) .......... 14

INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) ............... 13, 14

INS v. Yi Quan Chen, 527 U.S. 1016 (2002) ......... 14

Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. |

ee a kas a ts chan een 7-8, 10 |

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State

Farm M ut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) .... 10-11

Statutes and regulations:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seg. ..............005. 2

EE, PED ite wecevacevccssunta 3

OP, POD oe cee cdewcevevicccce 3

§§ 108-109, 42 U.S.C. 7408-7409 ................... 3

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§ 110(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(2) 1... cece cc ee 3

§ 179B(d), 42 U.S.C. 7509a(d) ............. 2, 3, 4, 6,10

eR 3

EE Be 3

§ 188(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. 7513(b)(2) «2.2.2.2... ee eee 2,4

(IIT)

IV

Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page

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§ 190(b)-(e), 42 U.S.C. TEIG(D)-(e) 0... ccc cece ec cence 3

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8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)(4) (1994) (repealed by Omnibus

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L.

No. 104-208, Div. C, Tit. III, § 306(b), 110 Stat.

I oe ae ban Se a ere ere eee bok ie ee 14

40 C.F .R. Pt. 50:

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gS Eee Te Terre TT TTT COT TTR TTT ree re ee 6

Miscellaneous:

State Implementation Plans for Serious PM-10 Non-

attainment Areas, and Attainment Date Waivers

for PM-10 Nonattainment Areas Generally Ad-

dendum to the General Preamble for the Imple-

mentation of Title I ofthe Clean Air Act Amend-

ments of 1990, 59 Fed. Reg. 41,998 (1994) ............ 4

Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 03-1334

IMPERIAL COUNTY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DISTRICT,

PETITIONER

Vv.

SIERRA CLUB, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENT

IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-16a) is

reported at 346 F.3d 955,and theamendment to the opinion

(Pet. App. 17a-19a) is reported at 352 F.3d 1186.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

October 9, 2003, and amended on December 18, 2003. A

petition for rehearing was denied on December 18, 2003

(Pet. App. 17a-19a). The petition for a writ of certiorari

was filed on March 17, 2004. The jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

ae

2

STATEMENT

Petitioner seeks review of a decision of the court of

appeals arising from rulemaking under the Clean Air Act

(CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., by the United States Envi-

ronmental Protection Agency (EPA). EPA promulgated

a rule pursuant to CAA Section 179B(d), 42 U.S.C.

7509a(d), in which the agency found that California had

established to EPA’s satisfaction that, but for wind-borne

emissions of particulate matter of 10 microns or less (PM-

10) emanating from the bordering nation of Mexico, the

Imperial Valley Planning Area (Imperial County) would

have attained CAA standards for PM-10 by the applicable

attainment date. Pet. App. 65a-9la. Asa result of that

determination, Imperial County was not subject to a find-

ing that it had failed to attain the PM-10 standards and

thus was not reclassified from a “moderate” to a “serious”

non-attainment area under CAA Section 188(b)(2), 42

U.S.C. 751&b)(2). Pet. App. 65a.

The Sierra Club petitioned for review, challenging

EPA’s rule, and the court of appeals granted the petition

and remanded with imstructions that EPA reclassify

Imperial County from a moderate to a serious nonattain-

ment area. Pet. App. la-16a. Petitioner Imperial County

Air Pollution Control District petitioned for rehearing and

moved to stay the mandate pending filing of the petition

herein. Jd. at 18a-19a.' The court of appeals denied

rehearing but granted the stay. [bid.

1. The CAA establishes a comprehensive program for

controlling and improving the nation’s air quality through

' Petitioner is the local governmental agency charged with ad-

ministering and enforcing the requirements of various air quality laws,

including the CAA, in Imperial County. Pet. App. 3a. Petitioner was

an intervenor-respondent below.

3

both state and federal regulation. Under the CAA, EPAis

directed to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards

(NAAQS) for air pollutants at levels requisite to protect

public health and welfare. 42 U.S.C. 7408-7409. EPA

promulgated NAAQS for various pollutants, including PM-

10. See 40 C.F.R. Pt. 50. The PM-10 NAAQS relevant

here requires that PM-10 in ambient air in a given area of

the United States not exceed the regulatorily prescribed

level for more than one day per year. 40 C.F.R. 50.6(a).

The States have primary responsibility for ensuring

compliance with the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. 7407(a). Once

EPA promulgates a NAAQS, each State must formulate a

state implementation plan (SIP) that provides for the at-

tainment, maintenance, and enforcement of the NAAQS.

42 U.S.C. 7410(a). Each State’s SIP is subject to EPA’s

review and approval. 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(2).

EPA designated areas of the countryas “attainment” or

“nonattainment,” based on whether each area satisfied the

PM-10 NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. 7407(d). EPA is required to

classify PM-10 nonattainment areas as “moderate” or

“serious.” 42 U.S.C.7513. All PM-10 nonattamment areas

were initially designated as “moderate” and were required

to achieve attainment by December 31, 1994. 42 U.S.C.

7513(a) and (c). If attainment was not achieved by that

date, then EPA was to rediassify the nonattainment area as

“serious” and to require that the nonattainment area im-

pose more stringent controls on sources of pollution and

achieve attainment by December 31, 2001. 42 U.S.C. 7513

(b)-(c).

CAA Section 179B(d), 42 U.S.C. 7509a(d), provides an

exception to reclassification. Under Section 179B(d), if a

State establishes to EPA’s satisfaction that a nonattain-

ment area would have timely attained the PM-10 NAAQS

“but for emissions emanating from outside the United

renee |

4

States,” then the nonattainment area will not be reclassi-

fied from “moderate” to “serious.” 42 U.S.C. 7509a(d); see

42 U.S.C. 7513(b)(2). In 1994, EPA issued administrative

guidance (EPA Guidance) setting forth suggested infor- |

mation and methods for evaluating the impact on a PM-10

nonattainment area of emissions emanating from

sources in a country bordering the United States.” Pet.

App. 4a-5a.

2. Imperial County is located in southeastern Cali-

fornia, and shares approximately 80 miles of border with

Mexico. Pet. App. 2a-3a. The County was classified as a

moderate PM-10 nonattainment area and was required to

attain the NAAQS by December 31, 1994. Jd. at 4a.

During the period 1992-1994, the PM-10 standards were

exceeded at various monitoring stations in the County on

seven days. Jd. at 26a. EPA, however, took no action to

reclassify Imperial County. In 2000, respondent Sierra

Club filed suit in the United States District Court for the

* See State Implementation Plans for Serious PM-10 Nonattain-

ment Areas, and Attainment Date Waivers for PM-10 Nonattainment

Areas Generally; Addendum to the General Preamble for the Imple-

mentation of Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 59 Fed.

Reg. 41,998 (1994).

The EPA Guidance identifies five examples of information and

methodology that may be used: (1) monitoring PM-10 level and wind

speed and direction near the border, and correlating changes in PM-10

levels with changesin wind direction; (2) inventorying domestic PM-10

emissions in the nonattainment area’s vicinity and demonstrating that

those emissions did not cause exceedance of the PM-10 NAAQS; (3)

analyzing ambient sample filters for specific types of particles

emanating from the bordering country; (4) comparing mventories of

PM-10 emission sources, and the relative magnitude of PM-10 emis-

sions, for foreign and domestic sources; and 6) performing air dis-

persion or receptor modeling to quantify the relative impact of domestic

and foreign sources of PM-10 on the nonattainment area. Pet. App.

5a-6a.

>

District of Columbia, seeking to compel EPA to reclassify

the County as aserious nonattainment area. That suit was

resolved by a consent decree, in which EPA agreed to make

a reclassification determination for the County by October

9,2001. Jd. at 6a.

In August 2001, EPA issued a proposed rule that

included two possible alternatives. Pet. App. 20a-64a.

Under the first alternative, EPA proposed to find that

California had established to EPA’s satisfaction that, but

for wind-borne emissions emanating from Mexico, Imperial

County would have attained the PM-10 NAAQS by

December 31, 1994, and therefore should not be re-

classified. Jd. at 24a-33a. Under the second alternative,

EPA proposed to find that Imperial County failed to attain

the NAAQS and should be reclassified. Jd. at 33a-37a.

The first alternative, which EPA ultimately adopted in

its final rule, was based on petitioner’s July 2001 “Imperial

County PM-10 Attainment Demonstration” (Attainment

Demonstration). Pet. App. 24a. Consistent with the EPA

Guidance, the Attainment Demonstration contained data

from various sources, including PM-10 monitors located in

Imperial County, spatial plots, wind roses, back tra-

jectories, and a model based on an inventory of emissions

sources in the County.’ Jd. at 26a-31a.

With respect to the PM-10 monitors, EPA proposed to

conclude that, for five of the seven days that the PM-10

NAAQS was exceeded, “the analysis clearly supports the

conclusion that but for the transport of emissions from

: Spatial plots reflect the concentration of PM-10 measure ments at

various monitoring stations in a given area. Pet. App. 15a n.7. A

windrose diagram shows the percentage of time that wind blows from

each compass direction for various ranges of wind speed. /d. at 15a

n.8. A back trajectory is a map that, by measuring wind speed and

direction a certain distance above the ground, shows the most likely

source of a given parcel of air that hits a monitor. Jd. at 15a n.9.

6

Mexico,the PM-10corcentrations would not have exceeded

the standard.” Pet. App. 27a. The other two exceedances

occurred on January 19 and 25, 19938, at the Brawley

monitoring station twenty-one miles north of the County’s

border with Mexico. Jbid.’ The proposed findings noted

that “there are less data on which to base an analysis” for

those two days. Jbid. Nonetheless, in light of the

“magnitude of emissions in the City of Mexicali” just south

of the border, the proposed finding concluded that “[t]he

emissions from Mexico are likely to have contributed to the

PM-10 concentration at the monitor, although it is difficult

to precisely quantify the extent of the contribution.” bid.

See also zd. at 54a (“{[G]iven the number of hours with a

southerly wind direction, and the closeness of the ex-

ceedance to the standard, it is likely that, but for transport

from Mexico, [the Jamary 19] exceedance would not have

occurred.”); 7d. at 55a (similar for January 25 exceedance).

The Sierra Club submitted adverse comments on the

proposed rule, contending, inter alia, that California failed

to show that Imperial County’s exceedances of the PM-10

NAAQS on January 19 and 25, 1993, were caused by

emissions from Mexico. See Pet. App. 75a-76a. EPA

promulgated a final rule on October 19, 2001, finding that

California had made the requisite showing under CAA

Section 179B(d) and thus Imperial County would not be

reclassified. Jd. at 65a-91a.

; Adjusting the two actual exceedances to account for days not

sampled, 40 C.F.R. Pt. 50, App. K, established that the expected

number of exceedances was 4.3 days per year, which is above the

regulatory standard of one day per year and would ordinarily require

reclassification as a serious nonattainment area. Pet. App. 11a; see 40

C.F.R. 50.6(a).

]

7

With respect to the PM-10 exceedances, the final rule

concluded that “given the available information,” the

State’s analysis “of spatial plots, wind roses, and back

trajectories provides the best determination of PM-10

emissions transport from Mexico.” Pet. App. 76a-77a.

EPA recognized that one study—the “Imperial Valley/

Mexicali Cross Border PM-10 Transport Study”—had

analyzed the air quality and wind direction and speed on

the days on which the NAAQS had been exceeded, in-

cluding January 19 and 25, 1993, and found the air stagnant

on those days. Jd. at 77a. But EPA concluded that “the

State’s demonstration uses more meteorological data and

finds evidence that transport [of PM-10] from Mexico is

likely even with the stagnant conditions at the surface.”

Ibid. Although EPA “concedefd] that informa-tion is not

available to determine with confidencethe exact quantity of

PM-10 coming from Mexico,” EPA found that “the State

has diligently collected and analyzed available evidence and

has successfully demonstrated for each of the exceedance

days the probability that Imperial County would not have

violated the NAAQS but for the emissions emanating from

Mexico.” Jd. at 78a.

3. Pursuant to CAA Section 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.

7607(b)(1), the Sierra Club petitioned for review of EPA’s

final rule, raising the same challenges to EPA’s decision as

in its comments. Pet. App. 8a. The court of appeals

granted the petition and remanded with instructions that

Imperial County be reclassified as “serious.” Jd. at 14a.

The court of appeals recognized that where “a court

reviewsan agency action ‘involving primarily issues of fact,’

and where ‘analysis of the relevant documents requires a

high level of technical expertise,’ we must ‘defer to the

informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies.’ ”

Pet. App. 9a (quoting Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res.

8

Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)). The court also con-

cluded, however, that it “may not defer to an agency de-

cision that ‘is without substantial basis in fact.’ ” Ibid.

(quoting Federal Power Comm’n v. Florida Power &

Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972)).

Having articulated those standards, the court inquired

whether the record supported the conclusion that the

exceedances of the PM-10 standard on Jamary 19 and 25,

1993, at the Brawley monitors were caused by emissions

from Mexico. The court concluded that the record showed

that on the days PM-10 exceedances were recorded at the

Brawley monitors, the winds in the County were blowing,

not from Mexico, but from another direction. Pet. App.

12a-13a. The court found that “EPA’s notion of what

constitutes a southerly wind [2.e., a wind from Mexico] is,

at the least, expansive and, at most, positively incorrect.”

Id. at 12a. Moreover, the court found that even if there

were a southerly component in the wind on those days, it

would be “of the west-southwesterly variety and thus does

not support [EPA’s] theory of transport from Mexico.” Jd.

at 18a. Finally, the court stated that, in its view, the record

also showed that County monitoring stations located

between the Brawley monitors and Mexico (and thus closer

to Mexico), rather than showing similar exceedances,

recorded much lower PM-10 levels than the Brawley

monitors. /d. at 10a-1la.

Based on its review of the record, the court concluded

that “there simply [was] no possibility that Mexican

transport could have caused the observed PM-10 ex-

ceedances” on the two days. Pet. App. 18a. The court

determined that, “{a]lthough the normal course of action

when the record fails to support an agency’s decision ‘is to

remand to the agency for additional investigation or

explanation,’ ” ibid. (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v.

re |

9

Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985)), this was an “exceptional

case” in which a remand with instructions was appropriate.

The court stated that it “failfed] to see how further

administrative proceedings would serve a useful purpose;

the record here has been fully developed, and the

conclusions that must follow from it are clear.” Jd. at 13a-

14a. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions

“that the EPA classify Imperial Valley as a ‘serious’

nonattainment area.” Jd. at 14a.

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals, although incor-

rect, was primarily based on an analysis of the particular,

highly technical facts of this case. It does not conflict with

any decision of this Court or any other court of appeals, and

it presents no issue of exceptional importance. Further

review is therefore unwarranted.

1. The court of appeals’ primary conclusion—that the

record was insufficient to support EPA’s condlusion that

the January 19 and 25 exceedances were caused by

transport of PM-10 emissions from Mexico—was mistaken.

Because reliable PM-10 emissions data from Mexico were

not available, EPA was not able precisely to quantify those

emissions and track their exact course to monitors in

Imperial County. Pet. App. 27a, 78a. Nonetheless, the city

of Mexicali just south of the border is a very substantial

source of PM-10, with emissions estimated to be equal to

the total for all of Imperial County. /d. at 29a. In addition,

EPA noted that the amount of the exceedances—162

micrograms per cubic meter on January 19 and 175 on

January 25, as compared with the NAAQS of 150—were

slight. Finally, EPA concluded in its initial analysis, which

formed the basis for its final rule, see zd. at 76a-78a, that

there was some wind from a southerly direction on the two

days. /d. at 53a, 54a.

10

EPA is entitled to substantial deference on highly

technical factual issues of this sort. The statute expressly

recognizes the need to grant EPA deference by requiring

the State to make a showing only “to the satisfaction of the

Administrator” that the NAAQS would have been satisfied

absent “emissions emanating from outside the United

States.” 42 U.S.C. 7509a(d). Especially in light of that

highly deferential standard, the court of appeals erred in

overturning EPA’s determination that the exceedances

were caused by transport of PM-10 from Mexico.

2. Although the court of appeals erred in concluding

that the record in this case was insufficient to support

EPA’s conclusion that emissions from Mexico caused the

PM-10 exceedances on January 19 and 25, further review

of that conclusion is not warranted. The court of appeals

correctly identified the governing legal standard. The

court noted that “where, as here, a court reviews an agency

action ‘involving primarily issues of fact,’ and where

‘analysis of the relevant documents requires a high level of

technical expertise, [the court] must ‘defer to the informed

discretion of the responsible federal agencies.’ ” Pet. App.

9a (quoting Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490

U.S. 360, 377 (1989)); see zbid. (quoting Baltimore Gas &

Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def: Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103

(1983), for the proposition that “[w]hen examining this kind

of scientific determination . . . a reviewing court must

generally be at its most deferential”). As the court of

appeals recognized, however, if “the agency offer[s] an

explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evi-

dence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could

not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of

agency expertise,” then the court may correct the agency’s

“clear error of judgment.” Jd. at 10a (quoting Motor

11

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).

Because the court started from those correct legal

premises governing the standard of review in cases of this

sort, petitioner is mistaken in contending (Pet. 26) that

“{ajllowing the decision below to stand would pose a grave

threat to decades of jurisprudence founded on the basic

principle of judicial respect for agency expertise.” The

decision of the court of appeals rests primarily on the

court’s conclusionthat, “[b]ased onthe data and the reports

in the record, there simply is no possibility that Mexican

transport could have caused the observed PM-10 ex-

ceedances on January 19 and January 25.” Pet. App. 13a.

Although that analysis of the facts is mistaken, the mistake

is rooted in the highly technical factual record in this

particular case, and the effect of the court’s decision is

likely to be similarly limited. Further review is therefore

not warranted.

3. In addition to concluding that EPA had erred in

concluding that the January 19 and 25 exceedances were

caused by PM-10 emissions from Mexico, the court of

appeals took the unusual step of remanding with in-

structions “that the EPA classify Imperial Valley as a

‘serious’ nonattainment area.” Pet. App. 14a. That dis-

position was error. Nonetheless, because that error too is

largely fact-based and limite¢c °o the particular situation

present in this case, further » 7iew of the court’s deter-

mination to remand with instructions is not warranted.

a. This Court has explained that “[ilf the record before

the agency does not support the agency action, * * * the

proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand

to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.”

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744

(1985). Therefore, even if the court of appeals were correct

12

that EPA had erred in concluding that there was sufficient

evidence of winds blowing from the direction of Mexico to

support the conclusion that transport of PM-10 emissions

from Mexico had caused the exceedances on January 19

and 25, the court of appeals should have remanded the case

to EPA. In that way, the agency could have made the two

vital remaining determinations in this case with the benefit

of the court of appeals’ conclusion that its analysis of the

wind direction data had been mistaken. First, the agency

could have determined whether the remaining data in the

record were sufficient to support the State’s conclusion that

the emissions on January 19 and 25 had been caused by

transport of PM-10 from Mexico. Second, the agency could

have determined whether reopening the proceedings to

allow for further development of the record was

appropriate. Both of those determinations should have

been made in the first instance by the agency and not by

the court.

b. Although the court of appeals should have allowed

the agency, in the first instance, to reevaluate its decision

in view of the court’s rejection of its initial determination,

the court’s error was again largely factual. If the court of

appeals were correct that “there simply is no possibility

that Mexican transport could have caused the observed

PM-10 exceedances on January 19 and 25,” Pet. App. 13a,

then the court’s failure to allow the agency to re-examine

the record in the first instance on remand would be of no

significance. Indeed, petitioner’s argument that the court

of appeals’ instruction on remand was erroneous is based

on the premise (Pet. 30) that “the totality of record

evidence * * * more than adequately supports EPA’s

expert decision that Mexican PM-10 emissions provided at

least that smallamount of influence necessary to cause the

slight ex-ceedances observed.” Further review is not

13

warranted to resolve the question whether petitioner or the

court of appeals is correct about that premise.

Moreover, it is unlikely that a remand would have led

the agency to reopen the proceedings in this case to permit

further development of the facts. The parties had a full

opportunity to develop the administrative record in this

case, and the courtof appeals’ decision turned on particular

historical events that occurred in January 1993, almost ten

years before te court of appeals’ decision. In those

circumstances, it is doubtful that the agency would have

found it useful to reopen the record to uncover new facts

that could influence the outcome in this case. Petitioner

itself does not identify any further useful data that likely

could have been obtained through further investigation.

For that reason as well, the court of appeals’ failure to

permit further development of the record in this case was

of limited significance.

c. Petitioner contends (Pet. 28-29) that the court of

appeals’ decision conflicts with this Court’s decision in

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Ventura, 537

U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam). In that case, the court of

appeals had reversed a determination of the Board of

Immigration Appeals(BIA) that an alien did not qualify for

political asylum because hehad not faced persecution when

he left his home country “on account of ” a political opinion.

Id. at 18. Having reached that conclusion, the court of

appeals went on to decide an issue that the BIA had not

reached—whether “conditions in [the home country] had

improved to the point where no realistic threat of per-

secution currently existed.” Jbid. The court of appeals

held that the conditions had not soimproved. This Court

reversed, holding that because “[t]he BIA has not yet

considered the ‘changed circumstances’ issue,” the court

of appeals “committed clear error” in making that deter-

14

mination itself in the firstinstance. Jd. at 17. The court of

appeals should have “giv[en] the BIA the opportunity to

address the matter in the first instance in light of its own

expertise.” [bid.

The Court’s holding in Ventwra is inapplicable here.

The issue the court of appeals decided in framing its

remand—whether the record supported a conclusion that

the two exceedances were caused by PM-10 transported

from Mexico—was not one that EPA had not yet had the

chance to address, as in Ventura. To the contrary, EPA

had considered and ruled on that issue in the decision under

review. Although, as argued above, the court of appeals

erred in reversing EPA’s determination on that issue, the

court’s error has little to do with the error identified in

Ventura.”

» The other two. decisions of this Court cited by petitioner (Pet. 26

n.8) are also inapposite. In /mmigration & Naturalization Service v.

Yi Quan Chen, 537 U.S. 1016 2002), the Court simply issued an order

vacating and remanding the lower court’s decision for further con-

sideration in light of Ventura. In Immigration & Naturalization

Service v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992), the Court held that

the court of appeals erred in finding that a decision of the BIA was not

“supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the

record considered as a whole” under 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)(4) (1994)

(repealed by Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L.

No. 104-208, Div. C, Tit. III, § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612). The Court’s

decision had nothing to do with the circumstances under which a court

may remand a case to an agency with specific instructions after finding,

as the court did here, that the agency had erred.

15

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

THEODORE B. OLSON

Solicitor General

THOMAS L. SANSONETTI

Assistant Attorney General

D. JUDITH KEITH

Attorney

May 2004

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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