Opposition Brief — Imperial County Air Pollution Control District v. Sierra Club

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Supreme Court, U.S.

(2) FILED

MAY 2 1 2004

No. 03-1334 OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the Anited States

42

Vv

IMPERIAL COUNTY AIR POLLUTION

CONTROL DISTRICT,

Petitioner,

v.

SIERRA CLUB, }

Respondent.

ss

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

—

vw

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

,

Vv

DaviD S. BARON

EARTHJUSTICE

1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Suite 702

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 667-4500

Counsel of Record for

Respondent Sierra Club

May 21, 2004

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the court of appeals properly ruled,

based on the specific record before it and applying the

standards of review established by this Court, that EPA

acted arbitrarily and capriciously in waiving reclassifica-

tion of Imperial Valley to “serious” nonattainment for

particulate pollution.

2. Whether the court of appeals properly directed

EPA to reclassify Imperial Valley to “serious” nonattain-

ment on remand, where the Clean Air Act expressly

mandated such reclassification absent a valid waiver, the

reclassification was already more than eight years over-

due, and the record did not support further consideration

of a waiver on remand.

ii

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Sierra Club has no parent companies, and there are

no publicly-held companies owning any stock in Sierra

Club. Sierra Club is a national nonprofit organization

incorporated in California and dedicated to the protection

and enjoyment of the environment.

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...........cscssescsscccesccscssccvsee i

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Se EE EEE D ccescspencenssenvsocsencsssounsvandzvssese 1

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ............ 3

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY

HELD THAT EPA’S WAIVER ACTION WAS

ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUG.................... 40

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ REMAND

INSTRUCTIONS WERE PROPER.................. 7

III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION DOES

NOT CONFLICT WITH ANY DECISION OF

ANY OTHER COURT OF APPEALG............... 9

IV. NO OTHER FACTORS MAKE THIS CASE

WORTHY OF THE COURT'S ATTENTION... 10

I iithive knasinpnnasntidnddeutvassiviexeveevennccnsnsinnas 11

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES:

Audubon Society of Central Arkansas v. Dailey, 977

Fe Ne CR a tieinadciidehiinstininensineneniesniananncan 9, 10

Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983) .............ccee eee 4

Bell Petroleum Sucs. v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889 (5th

ERR SIU withsnnciie Dads tauadncthananaasindtadebaboaduetiasersiaadieciasiands 9

Chemical Manufacturers Association v. EPA, 28

Pe Sis SR, BID wacressniicnsibsccncsckecsntandicssissevesssiens 9

Connecticut Fund for the Environment v. EPA, 672

ee HE an casaeaccisakeresindiesintictteainnneien 10

Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power &

Light Co., G06 US. SEB CIB S) wecsisecnsssivecsecosissseessecsvens 2,5

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729

TTT diviccccka utd bnndlatiortstioncdmnnndlahipinineckdinkanatiadmiidseinievniadicbenoes 7,10

Hill v. Boy, 144 F.3d 1446 (11th Cir. 1998)... 9

INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) ......cccssersseccccsccesecsssessonss 8

Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490

ee ie ED er iveinedattisanaisdnlaunstieaskcndddealntiaibnaadaanideiesttieds 4

Monsanto Co. v. EPA, 19 F.3d 1201 (7th Cir. 1994)............ 9

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of U.S. v.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,

Re ee Be IEE sian cisentnctinnansesniadiiesinateasanerestons 2, 5,6

Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 478 F.2d

SO ly Ie EE carcateastsesnslbsieaincn tesa bicetnesnatlccesnanielinicanieds 10

Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 790 F.2d

ee isinasiidebeinveniacncitanilninoeaseianianindasiaanapen 9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Reilly, 983

Fe Be a. Seeity SEI sitccesoncusssnamianpieusaueiauseubaasmous 10

Ohio v. EPA, 784 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1986) ............ccceeeeeees 9

Public Citizen v. Mineta, 340 F.3d 39 (2nd Cir.

SD svsscinedjesinunncoipiidiasohensinbdgebacabbenedeamunammaaman cdma 9

Rocky Mountain Helicopters v. FAA, 975 F.2d 736

LRN SAN LIU kiidineseesieilineekiinaiasssesdenmananesseadvuldepheniadasesicas 9

Sierra Club v. EPA, 311 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2002) ............. 10

Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1985)...... 9,10

United States v. F/V Alice Amanda, 987 F.2d 1078

SI. Bi isssivsnconssannctintinmtacnciuniaicemtaameninadlamenenas 9

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S.

RT GRIPE snamonvnissenstsetinemiaaniieipmmaniiadamadiaadiaadnel 8

STATUTES:

COS TR Be WIS. & FOU tinccsisierissisinvestvessincssncesens 3,6

CAA § 179B(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7509a(d) .........e eee eeeeees 1,7,8

CAA §§ 181-185B, 42 U.S.C. § 7511-7511f....... eee 8

CAA § 188(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7513(b)(2)..............00. 1, 3, 7, 8

CAA § 188(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7513(e)(1).............ccceeeeeeeeeee 1,3

CAA § 188(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7513(e) ............... eoumasiimenieanal 9

CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS:

40 C.F.R. § 81.308 ........ sclictanlaceab aati taand ae aera 8

Se See Be IE Heskecssissnieresinisicenatitnssenvenneemananann 1,8

SI BED eishestsirvoncnnomiamiiiabgainenis 8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

MISCELLANEOUS:

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1

COUNTERSTATEMENT

The Imperial Valley Planning Area (Imperial Valley)

has long violated federal health standards for airborne

particulate matter (PM-10), a form of pollution linked to

premature deaths and other severe health impacts. 40

C.F.R. § 81.305 (2003 and prior versions); 66 Fed. Reg.

5002, 5018, 5021 (2001). When Imperial Valley failed to

attain the PM-10 standards by 1994, the Clean Air Act

(the Act) mandated that the area be reclassified from

“moderate” to “serious” nonattainment for PM-10, a step

that would trigger stronger pollution control require-

ments. 42 U.S.C. § 7513(b)(2), (c)(1); Appendix to Petition

for Writ of Certiorari (Pet. App.) 66a. Section 179B(d) of

the Act allowed EPA to waive reclassification only if the

state showed that the area would have timely attained

standards “but for” emissions from outside the United

States. 42 U.S.C. § 7509a(d). Thus, to meet the test, the

state had to show that each and every violation in Impe-

rial Valley as of the attainment deadline would not have

occurred but for foreign emissions — in this case emissions

from Mexico to the south. Pet. App. 11a-12a.

Here, the court of appeals found that EPA acted

arbitrarily and capriciously in waiving reclassification of

Imperial Valley under § 179B(d), when the record showed

that PM-10 violations occurred in Imperial Valley even

when there was no evidence of pollution transport from

Mexico. Undisputed evidence in the record showed that

violations occurred at Brawley, more than 20 miles north

of the border, on days when the air was stagnant, when

what little wind there was came predominantly from the

west, when PM-10 levels were actually lower at locations

closer to border, and when there was no evidence whatso-

ever of any actual transport of pollution from Mexico. Pet.

Team Pi se en = mee

2

App. 10a-13a, 53a-55a. Although there were very slight

west-southwesterly winds for parts of these days, the only

source of Mexican emissions identified by EPA -— the city

of Mexicali — is south-southeast of Brawley, not west-

southwest. Pet. App. 10a-13a.

a

The court of appeals expressly acknowledged that it

owed “significant” deference to EPA’s technical judgment

(Pet. App. 9a), but concluded, after carefully reviewing the

record (including the wind data cited by Petitioner), that

the agency’s finding of “but for” causation on these days :

ran counter to the evidence in the record. Pet. App. 9a-13a.

The court therefore found that EPA’s action was arbitrary |

and capricious under well-settled standards of review

established by this Court. Id., citing, inter alia, Motor

Vehicle Mfrs Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.

Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (agency action is arbitrary and

capricious where based on “clear error of judgment” or an

explanation that “runs counter to the evidence before the

agency”), and Federal Power Comm'n v. Florida Power &

Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972) (courts do not defer to

agency decision that “is without substantial basis in fact”).

Given that the record simply did not support a finding

that Mexican emissions caused all of the violations in

Imperial Valley, the court vacated EPA’s action and re-

manded with instructions for EPA to reclassify the area |

from “moderate” to “serious” as expressly mandated by the

Act. Pet. App. 13a-14a. The court found that no useful

purpose would be served by yet another round of adminis-

trative proceedings because the record was already fully

developed and the conclusions that must follow from it

were clear. Jd. Earlier in its opinion, the court had noted

the long history of delay in implementing the Act’s re-

quirements in Imperial Valley. Jd. 6a. At the time of the

iil aiea

3

court’s remand order, reclassification of Imperial Valley to

“serious” was already more than eight years overdue. 42

U.S.C. §§ 7513(b)(2), (c)(1). The agency had taken no

action when the area missed its 1994 attainment deadline,

and only acted in 2001 after being sued by Sierra Club.

Pet. App. 6a-7a. The consent decree entered in that suit

required EPA to make a reclassification determination for

Imperial Valley by October 9, 2001, unless EPA granted a

§ 179B waiver by then (or took other action not relevant

here). ER 165.’ At the time it proposed to grant the § 179B

waiver for Imperial Valley, EPA itself specifically proposed

in the alternative to reclassify the area to “serious” if it

was determined that the State had not made an adequate

§ 179B demonstration. Pet. App. 20a-21a.

EPA did not petition for rehearing in the court of

appeals, and has not petitioned this Court for a writ of

certiorari in this case.

&

v

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

The court of appeals correctly stated and applied well-

settled principles of administrative law in finding that

EPA’s waiver decision here was arbitrary and capricious.

The court expressly recognized its duty to give significant

deference to EPA technical judgments while also ensuring

that the agency’s decision had a “substantial basis in fact”

and did not run “counter to the evidence.” Petitioner’s

disagreement with the court of appeals’ application of

" “ER” refers to Petitioner’s Excerpts of Record in the Ninth

Circuit.

4

these principles to the specific facts at issue here is un-

supported by the record, and in any event does not present

a matter warranting this Court’s attention. Sup. Ct. R. 10

(certiorari “rarely granted when the asserted error con-

sists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of

a properly stated rule of law”). Likewise, the court of

appeals’ remand instructions were fully justified by the

record and circumstances of this case, and were consistent

both with this Court’s precedent and remand instructions

issued by other circuits. ;

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD

THAT EPA’S WAIVER ACTION WAS ARBI-

TRARY AND CAPRICIOUS

Contrary to Petitioner’s claims, the court of appeals

was fully cognizant of its duty to give substantial defer-

ence to EPA’s technical judgment. At the very outset of its

analysis, the court expressly “recognize[d] that where, as

here, a court reviews an agency action ‘involving primarily

issues of fact,’ and where ‘analysis of the relevant docu-

ments requires a high level of technical expertise,’ we

must ‘defer to the informed discretion of the responsible

federal agencies.’” Pet. App. 9a, quoting Marsh v. Oregon

Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989). The court

further acknowledged that “‘a reviewing court must

generally be at its most deferential’” when examining an

agency's scientific determinations. Pet. App. 9a, quoting

Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). The court of appeals also

recognized, however, that an agency decision must still

have a “‘substantial basis in fact,’” and that a reviewing

court is obliged to “‘consider whether the [agency] decision

was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and

——s

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5

whether there has been a clear error of judgment.’” Pet.

App. 9a, quoting Federal Power Comm’n, 404 U.S. at 463,

and State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. The court also noted that,

under this Court’s precedent, an agency action is arbitrary

and capricious where its rationale “‘runs counter to the

evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it

could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product

of agency expertise.’” Pet. App. 10a, quoting State Farm,

463 U.S. at 43. Petitioner does not and cannot claim that

the court of appeals misstated these well-settled principles

of administrative law, all of which come directly from

decisions of this Court.

The court of appeals properly applied these principles

in holding that EPA’s waiver decision was arbitrary and

capricious. The court carefully reviewed the record and

concluded that EPA’s finding of “but for” causation simply

ran “counter to the evidence” and was “so implausible”

that it could not withstand scrutiny. EPA’s theory was that

all PM-10 violations in Imperial Valley were caused by

PM-10 pollution blown into Imperial Valley from Mexicali,

Mexico. Pet. App. 27a-28a. The undisputed data in the

record showed, however, that on at least two days when

significant PM-10 violations occurred at Brawley (21 miles

north-northwest of Mexicali), the air was stagnant, and

what little wind there was came predominantly from the

west or west-southwest. Pet. App. 10a-13a, 53a-55a. EPA

did not and could not explain how such west or west-

southwesterly winds could conceivably carry PM-10 north-

northwest from Mexicali to Brawley. Moreover, the data

for these days showed higher PM-10 levels at Brawley

than at points south (closer to Mexicali), which under

EPA’s own theory refuted the premise of transport from

6

Mexico. Pet. App. 10a-lla, 27a; ER 34. EPA was com-

pletely unable to reconcile the theory of “but for” causation

with all of the foregoing, although the court gave the

agency multiple opportunities to do so — at oral argument,

and again by allowing the filing of supplemental briefs.’

Pet. App. lla. Nor was EPA able to quantify the transport

of any PM-10 from Mexico to Imperial Valley at any time.

Pet. App. 78a.

The court of appeals thus correctly concluded that

EPA’s decision could not withstand even a highly deferen-

tial standard of review. This was not a matter of the court

conducting a de novo review or substituting its judgment

for the agency’s, but of the agency being unable to offer a

plausible rationale that could reconcile the record with a

finding of “but for” causation.

Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the court did in fact

consider EPA’s other stated bases for decision (Pet. App.

6a-8a), as well as the agency’s § 179B guidance document

(which by its terms was “preliminary” and nonbinding,

Pet. App. 93a). Pet. App. 4a-6a. It was undisputed, how-

ever, that to qualify for a § 179B waiver, the state had to

show that none of the violations in Imperial Valley would

have occurred but for emissions from Mexico. Jd. 1la-12a.

Having properly determined that the record simply did not

support such a showing for the two specific violation days

* Petitioner complains that the court did not consider certain

rainfall data, but EPA itself never deemed that evidence relevant or

probative, and it is on the agency’s rationale that EPA’s action must

stand or fall. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 50.

in Brawley, there was simply no need for the court to

conduct an in-depth review of data for other days.

Il. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ REMAND IN-

STRUCTIONS WERE PROPER

Although the normal course of action when the record

fails to support an agency’s decision is to remand for

additional investigation or explanation, this Court’s

precedent acknowledges the propriety of remanding with

instructions in exceptional cases. Florida Power & Light

Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). Citing that prece-

dent, the court of appeals properly found that this was one

of those special cases warranting remand instructions. The

record was already fully developed, and EPA had been

unable to offer any plausible explanation of that record

that would justify a waiver of reclassification. This was

not a situation where remand for further deliberations

might serve some useful purpose. To the contrary, EPA

took that position that the state had already offered its

best possible case for a waiver given available information,

and that it was “not now possible” to create additional

information from new studies. Pet. App. 76a-77a.

Moreover, at the time of the court’s decision, reclassi-

fication of Imperial Valley to “serious” as mandated by the

Act was already more than eight years overdue. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7513(b)(2). The District Court had previously ordered

EPA to take reclassification action for the area by October

2001 absent a § 179B(d) waiver. EPA itself had expressly

proposed reclassification as the alternative to such a

waiver. Pet. App. 20a-21a. Indeed, where an area has

missed its attainment deadline, the Act requires reclassifi-

cation “by operation of law” — it is not a matter for EPA

8

discretion. 42 U.S.C. § 7513(b)(2)(A). Given this unique

statutory and procedural context, and the history of

extraordinary EPA delay, the court was fully justified in

instructing EPA to proceed with the already long-overdue

reclassification.’ A remand for yet another round of waiver

deliberations would have served only to further nullify the

Act’s precise timetables and requirements for remedying

PM-10 pollution in Imperial Valley. See Whitman v. Ameri-

can Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 481-86 (2001) (stressing

importance of adherence to express antipollution man-

dates in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7511f [which encompass the

PM-10 deadlines and reclassification requirements)).

Contrary to Petitioner’s claims, reclassification to

“serious” will not impose unusual or undue burdens on

Imperial Valley, but rather will simply require the area to

adopt the same level of pollution control already required

in a number of communities that have long been classified

as “serious” for PM-10. These include the Coachella Valley

(immediately north of Imperial Valley), Los Angeles, the

San Joaquin Valley, Reno, and Phoenix. 40 C.F R.

§§ 81.303, .305, .329 (2003). Moreover, § 179B(d) is not the

only avenue of relief for border areas impacted by foreign

pollution. Section 188(e) of the Act allows EPA to extend

the attainment deadline for “serious” PM-10 areas based

on consideration of a variety of factors, including impacts

* This case is therefore readily distinguishable from INS v.

Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002), a case where the circuit court’s remand

order relied on a new theory not previously considered by the agency,

and where both sides agreed that further deliberations were needed on

remand. Nor is there any claim here of recurring error in the scope of

Ninth Circuit remand orders to EPA — as was claimed in Ventura with

respect to INS cases. 537 US. at 16.

ae

el ds

9

from transboundary pollution, without requiring a show-

ing of “but for” causation. 42 U.S.C. § 7513(e).

Ill. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION DOES NOT

CONFLICT WITH ANY DECISION OF ANY

OTHER COURT OF APPEALS

There is no conflict among the circuits that would

militate in favor of granting certiorari in this matter. The

administrative law principles stated and applied by the

Ninth Circuit match those regularly used in all circuits.

Moreover, the level of scrutiny given by the Ninth Circuit

to EPA’s action here is consistent with that applied in

other circuits.‘ Similarly, the Ninth Circuit’s statement of

* E.g., Public Citizen v. Mineta, 340 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding

arbitrary and capricious DOT rejection of more protective tire monitor-

ing systems for new cars); Hill v. Boy, 144 F.3d 1446 (11th Cir. 1998)

(reversing agency finding where record did not support it); Chemical

Mfrs Ass’n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (overturning EPA

listing of pollutant as “high risk” based on a model that the court found

unsupportive); Monsanto Co. v. EPA, 19 F.3d 1201 (7th Cir. 1994)

(reversing EPA decision that was based on technical conclusions not

supported by the record); Bell Petroleum Svcs. v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d

889, 904-06 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that record did not support EPA

decision to furnish alternative drinking water supply to Superfund

site); United States v. F/ V Alice Amanda, 987 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1993)

(holding arbitrary and capricious fishery agency finding that was

“clearly at variance with established facts”); Rocky Mountain Helicop-

ters v. FAA, 975 F.2d 736 (10th Cir. 1992) (reversing FAA safety

requirement that record showed was unnecessary); Audubon Society of

Central Arkansas v. Dailey, 977 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1992) (agency action

reversed where record “gave every reason to doubt” agency’s finding);

Ohio v. EPA, 784 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding EPA reliance on

unvalidated model to be arbitrary and capricious); NRDC v. EPA, 790

F.2d 289, 305-306 (3d Cir. 1986) (rejecting EPA technical rationale that

ran counter to the evidence before the agency); Sierra Club v. Marsh,

(Continued on following page)

10

the law governing remand instructions can hardly create a

conflict with other circuits, as it comes directly from this

Court’s precedent. Pet. App. 13a, quoting Florida Power &

Light, 470 U.S. at 744. The decision on whether a particu-

lar case warrants broader than usual remand instructions

is necessarily a fact-specific one, but the Ninth Circuit’s

remand instructions in this case are well within the range

of those issued by other circuits.” Indeed, the Seventh

Circuit recently entered a virtually identical remand order

in Sierra Club v. EPA, 311 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2002)

(remanding to EPA with instructions to immediately

reclassify St. Louis as a “serious” nonattainment area).

IV. NO OTHER FACTORS MAKE THIS CASE

WORTHY OF THE COURT’S ATTENTION

This case does not present any other issues of federal

law warranting this Court’s review. Rather, Petitioner

merely raises a highly fact-specific disagreement with the

court of appeals’ conclusion that, on the particular record

before it, EPA’s action was arbitrary and capricious. Nor

769 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1985) (record refuted agency’s finding that project

would have no significant impact on the environment).

* E.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Reilly, 983 F.2d 259,

261 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (in addition to vacating unlawful EPA decision not

to regulate, court ordered promulgation of regulations); Audubon Soc’y,

977 F.2d at 436-37 (agency directed to prepare environmental impact

statement on remand); Marsh, 769 F.2d at 882 (same); Connecticut

Fund for the Environment v. EPA, 672 F.2d 998, 1009 n.24, 1014 (2d Cir.

1982) (directing EPA to issue revised order to reimpose construction

ban on remand); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 478 F.2d

875, 888-91 (1st Cir. 1973) (directing EPA on remand to promulgate

federal clean air plans).

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does this case implicate any other matters of pressing or

substantial concern warranting this Court’s attention.

+

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID S. BARON

EARTHJUSTICE

1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Suite 702

Washington, D.C. 20036

Counsel of Record for

Respondent Sierra Club

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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