Opposition Brief — Employers Insurance Company of Wausau v. Johnson Controls, Inc.

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No. 03-1199

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF WAUSAU,

Petitioner,

V.

JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC., et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The Supreme Court Of Wisconsin

RESPONDENT JOHNSON CONTROLS’

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MATTHEW J. FLYNN

Counsel of Record

JEFFREY O. DAVIS

KEITH A. BRUETT

MATTHEW J. DUCHEMIN

QUARLES & BRADY LLP

411 E. Wisconsin Avenue

Milwaukee, WI 53202

(414) 277-5000

Se

COUNTER QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 15.2, Johnson Controls

objects to the question presented by the Petition because it does

not accurately reflect the proceedings below. If this Court

grants the Petition, the following would be an additional

question that the Court would need to address prior to reaching

the issue raised by the petitioner:

DID THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT, IN FACT,

RULE SUA SPONTE THAT A GOVERNMENT “PRP

LETTER” SEEKING AN ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN

UP WAS A “SUIT” TRIGGERING AN INSURER’S

DUTY TO DEFEND WHEN (1) JOHNSON CONTROLS

BROADLY SOUGHT REVIEW OF THE CONTINUING

VIABILITY OF A PRIOR DECISION ADDRESSING

THAT QUESTION, WITHOUT LIMITATION ON

WHAT PORTIONS OF THAT DECISION WERE THE

SUBJECT OF THE PETITION, (2) ALL BRIEFS

SPECIFICALLY RAISED AND ADDRESSED WHY

INSURANCE COVERAGE SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT

DEPEND ON THE EXISTENCE OF A LAWSUIT, (3)

THE CO-DEFENDANTS / CO-RESPONDENTS’

COORDINATED RESPONSE BRIEFS EXPRESSLY

ARGUED THAT A “PRP LETTER” WAS NOT A “SUIT”

AND (4) THE “PRP LETTER AS SUIT” ARGUMENT

WAS EXPRESSLY MADE BY BOTH SIDES DURING

ORAL ARGUMENT?

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Respondent

states that it has no parent corporation, nor does any publicly

held company own 10% or more of its stock.

ll

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

COUNTER QUESTIONS PRESENTED ..0......ccccccccececececeecececee. i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .........cccccccececceseee. ll

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..00............ccccccescssssosssscscsosecececeee. l

A. N@GIPC OF TS Cage...............eccecrsceserseroressecetesacecccsese, I

B. City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Co. and

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C. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ Treatment

of Johnson Controls Under the

Edgerton/Hills Framewotk...............ccccccccsececescseseeeees 3

D. Proceedings Before the Wisconsin Supreme

| itis Aida icdiohepsiviasasicossanioevassodsoninsass 5

! REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION .........ccccccccccececee- 8

A. This Is Not an Appropriate Case for the

Court to Consider Whether Sua Sponte

Decision-Making by an Appellate Court

Constitutes Due Process Violation ..............ccccccce000. 8

B. The Constitution Does Not Prohibit

Appellate Courts from Declaring the Law

I ea Natccasiicsscinieicesdoanesivaconycheriesiisrtevesvecvewsien 13

gle arccdsnansecacyasoensesssiohackonendsasadasnsavs 19

RESPONDENT’S APPENDIX A: Employers Insurance

Company of Wausau’s Motion For

Extension Of Time Filed With Wisconsin

ial os cdc asendianiosiursdpaeninses A-1 -3

RESPONDENT’S APPENDIX B: Excerpts From Brief

And Appendix Of The Travelers Indemnity

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RESPONDENT’S APPENDIX C: Excerpts From

Employers Insurance Of Wausau’s

Memorandum In Support Of Its Motion For

Reconsideration

SPOOR HORE HEHEHE HEHEHE EEE EEE EEE HEHEHE EERE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES

Page

Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 CB PE Rivanvcecxolncnnics 14

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) .c.cccccccccccoceceeeco-cc. 14

Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F.Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1956)......18-19

Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of

Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) coccccccccccccsecececeecececececccc. 16

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 LY | ASR Seas 18

Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 SERRE A et 14

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S.

PED EOE tisesarcenniinaganideae an re eae 16, 17

City of Los Angeles v. David, 123 S.Ct. 1895

AMEE. stinenauiienlewiaisnhaiceb ain eee eee 15

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 CI ceosaioccene 14-15

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 SOD cisinistseateccasne 14

Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526

FID Uivsissidbstede imemuscsicnenieeraaenmen ate ae ene 14

Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374

I evicindiswaagucctlstaehva taba lenght per 9

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) .........0...ceceseccsseseoeeosoee... 14

Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ..cccccccccssccseesceseees 15

Vv

Michelin Tire Corp. v. W.L. Wages, 423 U.S. 276

SPP T TEE vavscvnasieuhisinstadaciiaeundas eaneeaiigl alcakaie aaa ee 14

Sunray Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,

PT BG ORE CU” CW, FOI osc scosccscsisenscavsssietrntie tates 19

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) cecccccccccsscscccsssseesseseee 4

Turn-Key-Tech, LLC v. National Film Lab. Inc., 2003

WL 22097823 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 6, 2003) ............ccccccccecsccssseeeee 16

United States v. International Bus. Machines Corp.,

PF Ss SOP EOD cceissursvicostninisdeslecamradanmninate en 14

Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Century Indemnity

Ce, 190 F6 TOT TT, 19D) otc cticieniae 4

STATE CASES

Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Affiliated FM Insurance Co.,

JOO Ih. W 26 ZES (Wis. CO Amn, 1996). occcccccsecsscésssensesevaivces 3

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Superior

COPE, BOF 36 POC, BOOED crecessicdcntsccrcricues 10

City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d

463 (Wis. 1994) cert. denied 514 U.S. 1017 (1995) wo... ]

D.J.L. v. Armour Pharm. Co., 704 A.2d:104 (N.J.

Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997) ..essecsssssessessesseseeenee suki eaiabiee siden 19

General Casualty Co. v. Hills, 561 N.W.2d 718 (Wis.

PRET iis ssinin is cantons pecan desppbidinsnceh to cini eae a 2

Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, :

OW A BOT COP IB: BOD s jcsnsnccvsncncnnuaticnwaennatiees 2

School District of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins.

Cos. 484 N.W.2d 314 (Wis. 1992) woocccccccccsessesessssescsecseees 11

v1

School District of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins.

Cos., 488 N.W.2d 82 (Wis. 1992) .o..cccccececceesesescssescseceeees 11

State v. Weber, 476 N.W.2d 867 (Wis. 1991) ....cccccccccceeeseceees 9

Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993) .....ccccccceeeeee. 19

DOCKETED CASES

Turn-Key-Tech LLC v. National Film Laboratory Inc.,

No. 03-1138 (pet’n for cert. filed February 3, 2004)............. 16

FEDERAL STATUTES

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STATE STATUTES

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MOE ONCE Ne Be OT BO ORIN LO EERE NOT IE TOE BG RE OE: ONT ITY AES ty

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of this Case

This Petition arises out of a 15 year old environmental

insurance coverage dispute involving the interpretation of

comprehensive general liability (““CGL”) insurance policies

issued to Johnson Controls, Inc. (“Jenson Controls”). Johnson

Controls filed suit in 1989 seeking insurance coverage for

amounts it paid or would have to pay for third party property

damage, including actual and potential claims under the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and

Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), and state law equivalents.

The defendants, including the petitioner, Employers Insurance

Company of Wausau (“Wausau”), were numerous insurance

companies who had issued CGL policies providing primary and

excess liability coverage to Johnson Controls over a 40 year

timeframe. Wausau was one of two “primary” insurers, the

other being Travelers Indemnity Company (“Travelers”). The

underlying liabilities for which coverage was sought arose out

of alleged contamination at 21 separate sites.

B. City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Co. and

Its Progeny

Five years into this case, the Supreme Court of

Wisconsin decided City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Co.,

517 N.W.2d 463 (Wis. 1994), cert. denied 514 U.S. 1017

(1995), in which it held that costs incurred in responding to

property damage caused by environmental contamination were

not “damages” and that a letter from a government agency

identifying the recipient as a “potentially responsible party”

under CERCLA and demanding that it initiate a clean-up

(known as a “PRP letter”) was not a “suit” triggering an

insurer’s duty to defend.

arrears

Relying on Edgerton, the trial court dismissed Johnson

Controls’ lawsuit. Johnson Controls appealed. In the

meantime, Wisconsin law in this area continued to evolve. As

explained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the decision on

which review is sought, Edgerton was flawed in many ways,

and was immediately and strongly criticized in Wisconsin and

across the country. (App. 53a-54a). Edgerton’s flaws were

particularly acute, and obvious, in cases where an insured was

joined in a third party lawsuit seeking clean-up costs under 42

U.S.C. §§ 9607 and 9613 — the notion that a claim for

monetary reimbursement of costs incurred to repair damaged

property was not a claim for “damages” under a liability

insurance policy seemed impossible to square with basic tort

and insurance law principles. (App. 27a). Ultimately, the

Wisconsin Supreme Court decided that Edgerton did not apply

where the insured faced a lawsuit seeking previously incurred

costs. General Cas. Co. v. Hills, 561 N.W.2d 718 (Wis. 1997).

However, rather than overrule Edgerton, the court distinguished

it, stating that Edgerton continued to stand for the proposition

that “receipt of a letter from the EPA or DNR requesting a party

to propose a remediation plan does not constitute a ‘suit seeking

damages’.” Hills, 561 N.W.2d at 725. |

Taken together, Edgerton and Hills meant that insureds

who cleaned up environmental contamination themselves did

not have coverage, while those sued by third parties for the

same type of clean-up costs did have coverage. An anomalous

' The Wisconsin court’s decision to distinguish Edgerton rather than overrule

it, was one the court later came to regret. In Johnson Controls, Justice

Crooks, the author of Hills, separately concurred in the majority opinion to

lament the court’s failure to previously overrule Edgerton, given the

opportunity it had to do so in Hills. Johnson Controls Inc. v. Employers Ins.

Co. of Wausau, 665 N.W.2d 257, 297 (Wis. 2003) (“In retrospect, it seems

quite clear that we should have overruled, not distinguished, Edgerton six

years ago.”). (App. 62a).

consequence of these decisions, at least as they began to be

construed by the lower courts of appeals, was that an insured’s

right to insurance coverage depended on variables that were not

in the policy and seemingly made little sense, such as the

identity of the claimant as a government or non-governmental

party, the stage of the underlying proceedings, and whether the

insured had been joined in an actual lawsuit. See, e.g., Amcast

Indus. Corp. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 584 N.W.2d 218 (Wis.

Ct. App. 1998).

i. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ Treatment

of Johnson Controls Under the Edgerton/Hills

Framework

In 1998, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals issued a

decision that attempted to reconcile Edgerton and Hills as they

applied to this case. The court of appeals created a generic

matrix of site “categories” and remanded the case to the trial

court to apply its analysis to the 21 sites at issue. The

categories were:

Category 1. “[A]n insured who is responsible for the

contamination cleans up the site pursuant to a directive issued

by a government under [CERCLA] ... or its state counterparts.”

Category 2. “[A]n insured is responsible for at least

part of the contamination of a site that it does not own, but has

not been directed by a government to remediate the site. A

governmental agency has, however, directed others responsible

for the contamination ... to clean it up, and they sue the insured

to recover the clean up costs attributed to the insured.”

Categories 3 and 4. “[T]he insured is responsible for at

least part of the contamination of a site that it does not own, and

has been directed by a government to remediate the site but has

not done so. The insured is sued either by the government to

recover money it spent to clean up the site [Category 3], or by

3

the site’s owner or others also responsible for the contamination

who cleaned up the site at the government’s direction

[Category 4].”

(App. 98a-100a).

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that sites falling

into Categories 1, 3 or 4 did not trigger coverage under CGL

policies covering “damages”, while Category 2 sites did trigger

coverage.” The court of appeals remanded this case to the trial

court for fact-finding and entry of a “global judgment”. (App.

103a-104a).

On remand, Johnson Controls supplied a factual record

addressing the four categories. Despite this record, the tnal

court found that none of the 21 sites were covered. As part of

its decision, the trial-court noted that coverage was precluded at

sites involving a PRP letter because “there is no active ‘suit’ or

‘suit for damages’ as defined by Edgerton.” (App. 127a; see

also App. 129a, 133a, 134a, 137a, 138a, 140a).

Johnson Controls appealed the trial court’s ruling as to

application of the categories, but also reserved the right to

appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court the continuing validity

of Edgerton. The court of appeals affirmed, though in doing so

it noted the “arbitrary” distinctions that Edgerton had produced,

* The analysis of categories 3 and 4 relied upon reasoning in a case from the

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Century

Indemnity Co., 130 F.3d 787 (7" Cir. 1997), in which an insured who had not

complied with an administrative order was compared to a life insurance

beneficiary who murders his or her spouse. Based upon this analogy, the

Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that an insured should not be able to

“transmute” a non-covered claim into a covered one through “intentional

wrongdoing” — by disregarding a clean-up “directive” that came before a

“suit” that would have triggered a defense and coverage. /d.

4

while nonetheless acknowledging that it had no choice but to

apply those distinctions, since “this is the law set by our

supreme court and we are obligated to apply this law.”

(App. 88a).

D. Proceedings Before the Wisconsin Supreme

Court

In January 2002, Johnson Controls petitioned the

Wisconsin Supreme Court for review of the court of appeals

decision. In its Petition to the Wisconsin court, Johnson

Controls sought review of the following question (among

others): ?

Should City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Co., 184

Wis.2d 750, 517 N.W.2d 463 (1994) be overruled in

light of the “arbitrary” and “debatable” distinctions it

has produced and the discrediting of authorities upon

which it relied?

(App. 149a-150a).

The Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted the case

without limitation on the issues presented. In the brief it

subsequently filed with that court, Johnson Controls argued that

insurance coverage for environmental liability should not

depend on the existence of an actual lawsuit, the stage of the

underlying claim at the time of any clean-up or settlement for

which coverage was sought, or the identity of the claimant as a

government or non-government party.

The insurers, including Wausau, sought an extension of

time from the Wisconsin Supreme Court to file response briefs.

(R-App. A-1). The insurers informed the court that an

extension was needed to “permit Wausau and the dozens of

other Defendants-Respondents the necessary time to coordinate

5

ee

their briefing efforts.. .” (R-App. A-1). The court granted the

requested extension and the insurers did indeed seem to have

allocated briefing responsibility. | Two principal briefs—

submitted by counsel for each of the “primary” insurers on the

case, Travelers and Wausau—were filed, with joinders filed by

the many excess insurers in the case.

Both respondent briefs expressly argued the reasons

why pre-suit liability should not be covered. Contrary to

Petitioner’s suggestion in its Petition to this Court, the “PRP

letter as suit” issue was expressly briefed. Travelers’ brief

provided a detailed argument that a PRP letter was not a “suit”

in a section of its brief titled: “A PRP Letter Or The State

Agency Equivalent Is Not A Suit”. (R-App. B-1).

Also contrary to Wausau’s suggestion in its Petition to

this Court, the “suit” issue was expressly argued before the

Wisconsin Supreme Court. At oral argument, counsel for

Johnson Controls reiterated the point made in its briefs that

coverage for environmental liability should not depend upon the (1

existence of a lawsuit. Moreover, counsel expressly noted that .

the Court should reconsider its original ruling in Edgerton that a

PRP letter was not a “suit”:

We had a PRP letter. And a PRP letter is the start of

something adversarial and coercive and extremely

dangerous and extremely costly. I commend the Utah

case to you, Quaker State, in which the full panoply of

harsh things that can happen to somebody who ignores

a PRP is set out some detail. The Indiana case,

Travelers Indemnity, who said, you know, the other

half of the CGL policy says, and I just want to read it, it

says, “the company shall have the right and duty to

defend any suit against the insured seeking damages

account of such property damages.” That’s separate

6

from the duty to indemnify, I mean that’s separate from

the duty to pay all sums legally obligated. In this case

you don’t even have to get to the duty to defend in my

judgment because we put our insureds on notice and

they abandoned and therefore we did what we had to

do. But there’s a respectable body of law around the

country which we cited to this Court that increasingly

has been speaking with one voice that says that the

word suit is ambiguous. Justice Abrahamson in dissent,

I believe, in Edgerton made that point and I think that

point’s made by a lot of other judges.

Oral Argument, available at www.wicourts.gov/ra/011193.ram

Counsel for Travelers responded to this portion of

Johnson Controls’ oral argument on the “suit” issue:

In urging the Court to overrule the Edgerton decision,

Johnson Controls is asking the Court to take contract

terms that it has previously found to have clear and

unambiguous meanings, namely suit and damages, and

could now hold these terms mean _ something

completely different than the Court previously said they

meant.... The key dispositive issue before the Court of

Appeals and the precedents of this Court, which the

Court of Appeals faithfully applied, is what do the

terms “suit” and “damages” mean in the context of the

CGL policy. This Court has found that suit means a

lawsuit filed in a Court of law and damages does not

include response costs under CERCLA or similar state

regulatory statutes. It is difficult to imagine anything

that would be more contrary to the principles of stare

decisis than Johnson Controls’ request that this Court

now announce that these terms again mean something

completely different. Jd.

On July 11, 2003, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued

a decision reversing the court below. (App. la — 63a) In its

decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the mere

stage of proceedings of an underlying claim could have no

logical bearing on whether that claim was covered by insurance.

An insurer’s duty to indemnify was triggered once the insured

was required to spend money for a clean-up. Consistent with

this ruling the Wisconsin court went on to observe that an

insurer’s duty to defend was triggered because, given the

practical realities of CERCLA proceedings, a PRP letter should

be considered a “suit” for insurance purposes. (App. 34a —

41a). In short, the court overruled Edgerton in its entirety.

Following the Wisconsin court’s decision, the insurers

filed motions for reconsideration. Amicus briefs were also filed

and accepted by the court. Among the issues extensively

briefed in Wausau’s motion was that the court should

reconsider its holding that a PRP letter was a “suit.”

(R-App. C-5-12). The motion for reconsideration was denied.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE.PETITION

A. This Is Not an Appropriate Case For the Court to

Consider Whether Sua Sponte Decision-Making by

an Appellate Court Constitutes a Due Process

Violation

Petitioner asks this Court to establish a rule that

appellate courts should be prohibited, as a matter of

constitutional law, from ruling on a point of state law unless

that point is presented to the appellate court for review and

briefed and argued by the parties, and the parties have a full

opportunity to be heard on the point. As a preliminary matter,

whatever the merits of such a rule, this is not an appropriate

case for its consideration. The question of whether a PRP letter

is a “suit” was presented to the Wisconsin court for review, it

8

was briefed, it was- argued, and the parties had ample

opportunity to be heard on it. If this Court grants the Petition, it

would likely never reach the issue for which review is sought.

Johnson Controls’ petition for review to the Wisconsin

Supreme Court expressly asked, among other things, whether

Edgerton should be “overruled.” (App. 149a-150a). This

statement of the issue sufficiently raised the continued validity

of that case, including that portion addressing whether a PRP

letter constitutes a “suit” under a standard CGL insurance

policy.’

In its opening brief, Johnson Controls argued at length

that an insurer’s duties arise prior to the filing of an actual

lawsuit. The reasoning in support of this argument applies with

equal force to the specific question of whether a PRP letter is a

“suit” for insurance purposes.*

* The Supreme Court of Wisconsin interprets its appellate rules to

permit consideration of “arguments” not addressed by the parties, as long as

they are fairly contained within the “issue” presented for review. State v.

Weber, 476 N.W.2d 867, 868 (Wis. 1991) (holding that a statement of the

issue permits consideration of all supporting arguments, even if the

supporting argument is not addressed by parties). This Court’s Rule 14.1(a)

addresses the same scenario. Under Rule 14.1(a), this Court may consider

arguments not addressed by the parties if they are “fairly included” within the

question presented in the petition. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.,

513 U.S. 374, 379-80 (1995) (considering an argument fairly included in the

petition although not argued by the parties). Under Johnson Controls’ broad

statement of the issue of whether Edgerton should be overruled, the court

could properly consider all aspects of Edgerton, including the “PRP letter as

suit” portion of that case, even in the absence of argument by the parties.

Although this avenue is available to appellate courts, the Supreme Court of

Wisconsin did not need to rely on this rule of decision-making because the

“suit” argument was actually briefed and argued by the parties.

* The degree to which these issues are intertwined is demonstrated by a

decision by the California Supreme Court, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of

London v. Superior Ceurt (“Powerine”), 16 P.3d 94 (Cal. 2001), where the

9

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That these arguments are related is evidenced by the

insurers’ coordinated response briefs, which expressly

addressed the specific question of what is a “suit.” Petitioner’s

co-defendant, Travelers, devoted an entire section of its brief to

the “suit” argument. In a section of its brief entitled “A PRP

Letter Or The State Agency Equivalent Is Not A Suit”,

Travelers argued at some length that Johnson Controls had

“merely received PRP letters, similar letters or notices

requesting remediation” and that this correspondence did not

constitute a “suit” under Wisconsin law. (R-App. B-1).

Contrary to what is claimed in the Petition, the question

of what is a “suit” was also addressed at oral argument. As

demonstrated by excerpts from oral argument, quoted in the

Statement of the Case above, counsel for both Johnson Controls

and Travelers expressly argued the point. Citing specific case

law, counsel for Johnson Controls argued that the coercive and

costly nature of a PRP letter triggers an adversarial process.

Counsel for Johnson Controls also suggested that a substantial

body of case law has found the word “suit” in a CGL policy

ambiguous. Counsel for the insurers responded to this

argument by noting that the definition of the terms “suit” and

“damages” was the “key dispositive issue” before the Supreme

Court of Wisconsin.? Counsel went on to note that “this Court

California Supreme Court had found that there was no duty to indemnify for

“damages” unless and until there was a duty to defend, which was not

triggered until there was a “suit”, and that since a PRP letter was not a “suit”

an insured receiving such a letter had no coverage. The insurers argued the

Powerine rationale to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which expressly

rejected it. (App. 47a).

° As with briefing, the dozens of insurers in this case delegated their

argument to two attorneys, one representing Wausau and the other Travelers.

Counsel for Travelers made the oral argument regarding “suit.”

10

[the Wisconsin Supreme Court] has found that suit means a

lawsuit filed in court.”

Finally, on reconsideration Wausau (and the other

insurers) had the opportunity to make, and did make, all of the

same arguments Wausau now says it was deprived from making

on the “suit” issue. There is nothing to suggest that the

Wisconsin court refused to reconsider the case for any reason

other than that it did not find those arguments persuasive.°

The issue presented to the Wisconsin Supreme Court

provided notice and opportunity to argue the meaning of the

term “suit,” and that argument was, in fact, made. There is no

basis in the record to suggest otherwise. The facts of this case

do not provide a meaningful opportunity for this Court to clarify

whether sua sponte statements of law by appellate courts are

constitutionally prohibited as violations of due process.

It is thus no answer in this case to suggest, as Wausau

does, that at “some point” there exists an imaginary, ill-defined

* Wausau is simply wrong in claiming that the Wisconsin Supreme Court

may deny such a motion “for any reason, or, as in this case, for no reason at

all.” Pet’n at 19. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s procedures on

reconsideration are set forth in that Court’s internal operating procedures

which provide that reconsideration “will ensue only when the court has

overlooked controlling legal precedent or important policy considerations or

has overlooked or misconstrued a controlling or significant fact appearing in

the record.” Wis. S. Ct. IOP 2 J (emphasis added). There is no basis to

suggest or conclude that the Wisconsin Supreme Court does not follow these

procedures. Indeed, as recounted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in

Johnson Controls (App. 8a), the principal case on which Edgerton had relied

was School Dist. of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 488 N.W.2d 82 (Wis.

1992). That case had originally been decided in favor of the insured. School

Dist. of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 484 N.W.2d 314 (Wis. 1992). Upon

the insurer’s motion for reconsideration, the Wisconsin Supreme Court

withdrew its original decision and issued a decision in favor of the insurer,

without further briefing or re-argument.

11

line that appellate courts cannot constitutionally cross in this

area. Wherever such a line may exist, it was not crossed in this

case. Indeed, it is telling that Wausau also acknowledges that

appellate courts can “undoubtedly” in some situations examine

issues sua sponte, but says little about what those circumstances

are. Pet’n p. 3. Is it where there is no mention of the issue at

any stage of appellate court proceedings? Wausau would fail to

meet such a test, given what was briefed and in the oral

argument transcript. Is it where there is no state law procedure

allowing the point to be addressed at reconsideration? Wausau

would fail here too, since Wausau was afforded every right to,

and did, challenge the court’s “suit” ruling on reconsideration

under Wis. Stat. § 809.64. At bottom, Wausau is left only with

its complaint — the real reason it has come to this Court — that

this decision “might” cost it “tens of millions of dollars” due to

its effect in other cases. But the fact is, the insurer defendants

had the opportunity to argue the issue, they did argue the issue

and the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled against them.

Whatever this Court’s views may be on sua sponte decision-

making, there is no reason for this Court to take review in this

case.’

’ The complexity of the factual record, together with its underlying legal

framework, would also suggest that this is not the right case, from a resource

allocation standpoint, for examination of the due process issue set forth in the

Petition. In order to determine whether any due process violation is so

egregious that it outweighs Wisconsin’s strong interest in developing its law,

this Court would need to gain an understanding of a 15 year old case record,

involving 21 Superfund sites, activities spanning over 40 years, and 30 plus

insurers, involving years of discovery and two trips to the Wisconsin court of

appeals against the backdrop of a ten year on-going legal controversy in

Wisconsin over the Edgerton decision. The Court would be required to

determine whether or not the issue of an insurer’s pre-suit obligations—

which was a primary focus of the parties’ briefing—would fairly encompass

a ruling that a pre-lawsuit PRP letter should constitute a “suit” for insurance

purposes, particularly where the specific “PRP letter as suit” point was

expressly addressed in the insurers’ coordinated briefing effort and by both

12 \

—e a

a

meeeeeinns

B. The Constitution Does Not Prohibit Appellate

Courts from Declaring the Law Sua Sponte

The rule proposed by Wausau—that there should be a

constitutional bar on an appellate court ruling on a point of state

law unless it is fully presented to the court for review through

the written briefs of the parties prior to a motion for

reconsideration—is not a rule that this Court need, or should,

consider adopting at this time. Indeed, such a rule would

deprive appellate courts of needed flexibility in carrying out

their law-making function, and would fly in the face of decades

of judicial practice, including within this Court, where

important points of law have, in the Court’s discretion, long

been crafted without the full, or even any, development of those

points in the parties’ briefs or arguments.

While we are not aware of any recent trend of the type

claimed by Wausau in which this discretion has been expanded,

we are aware that appellate courts—including this Court—have

long felt unconstrained to announce new rules of law without

briefing, where deemed necessary to the orderly and proper

development of the law. No less a rule of law than the Erie

Doctrine was decided without the issue having been raised by

the parties. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 6441938);

accord Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999)

(sua sponte consideration of whether to impute liability for

punitive damages under agency principles); United States v.

International Bus. Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996) (sua

sides at oral argument. This Court would then need to delve into the

underlying policies concerning Wisconsin law, and the extent to which the

Wisconsin Supreme Court’s lawmaking function in this particular case

outweighs any potential concerns of the individual litigants concerning notice

and an opportunity to be heard.

13

sponte decision that federal statute is unconstitutional); Arcadia

v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 (1991) (sua_ sponte

consideration of issue “antecedent to” the dispute); Teague v.

Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (sua sponte consideration of rules

governing habeas review); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79

(1986) (sua sponte consideration of peremptory challenge

framework); Michelin Tire Corp. v. W.L. Wages, 423 U.S. 276

(1976) (sua sponte consideration of whether state statute is

unconstitutional); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (sua

sponte decision that exclusionary rule barring illegally obtained

evidence applies to the states through the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (sua

sponte consideration of issues to avoid reaching constitutional

question).

The most vocal criticisms of sua sponte decisions are

typically found in dissenting opinions. It is notable that, while

dissenting opinions in the cases cited above criticized the sua

sponte decisions of the majority as ill advised, none suggested

the decisions were a violation of due process. See Kolstad, 527

U.S. at 553 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Jnternational Bus.

Machines Corp., 517 U.S. at 863 (Kennedy, J., dissenting);

Batson, 476 U.S. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Teague, 489

U.S. at 330-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting). These dissenting

opinions confirm the absence of any constitutional mandate

prohibiting sua sponte decisions by appellate courts. Justice

Scalia has confirmed this point: “[T]he refusal to consider

arguments not raised is a sound prudential practice, rather than

a statutory or constitutional mandate, and there are times when

prudence dictates the contrary.” Davis v. United States, 512

U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In the absence of a

constitutional question, this Court has no reason, or jurisdiction,

to grant the Petition.

14

,

Even if the Due Process Clause were implicated by sua

sponte decisions of state courts declaring state law, there would

be no violation in this case. Due process is, as Wausau

acknowledges, a flexible concept. A due process analysis

involves the threefold balancing of the private interests affected

by the official action, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of

such interest through the procedures used, and the governmental

interest at stake. Matthews vy. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35

(1976); City of Los Angeles v. David, 123 S. Ct. 1895, 1896

(2003).

When it comes to weighing these interests in the area of

an appellate court’s law-making function, the governmental

interest at stake has always been considered paramount. It is

not a “due process” violation when a court makes new law,

simply because some party who will be adversely affected by

the discharge of that function, claims not to have had an

opportunity to completely “brief” the issue. Indeed, by that

rationale, appellate courts, and legislatures for that matter,

would deprive parties of due process every day, for the law is

constantly evolving in ways that may have an adverse impact on

countless parties, sometimes severely so, without providing any

meaningful input or right to be heard on the issue. This Court

long ago held that such process is not required:

Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few

people, it is impracticable that everyone should have a

direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not

require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an

assembly of the whole. General statutes within the

state power are passed that affect the person or property

of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without

giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are

protected in the only way that they can be in a complex

15

society, by their power, immediate or remote, over

those who make the rule.

Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441,

445 (1915). While this Court’s decision in Bi-Metallic was

applied to administrative action, the reasoning applies with

equal force to appellate courts in the exercise of their law-

making function. Judges of state courts of last resort have the

inherent power to declare the common law of the state.®

In this regard, Wausau’s reliance on what it

characterizes as the “similar” case of Brinkerhoff—Faris Trust &

Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930) is misplaced. In

Brinkerhoff, the Missouri Supreme Court had imposed a newly

created procedural “exhaustion” requirement on the petitioner’s

claim that certain tax levies were being assessed in a

discriminatory manner, then found that the administrative

remedy that had to be exhausted was unavailable due to the

petitioner’s delay in seeking it. The problem was not that the

lower court had imposed the requirement sua sponte, but that

the new requirement in essence acted as an ex post facto

procedural bar. Indeed, in the course of its opinion, this Court

made it plain that this was the “due process” violation, when it

stated that “if the administrative remedy were still available to

the plaintiff, there would be no denial of due process. . .” Id.

at 455 n.9. Of course, to the extent the case could somehow be

8 For at least that reason, this case does not present “a similar action” to that

in Turn-Key-Tech LLC v. National Film Laboratory Inc., No. 03-1138 (pet’n

for cert. filed February 3, 2004). Pet’n at 3, 28. The case at bar involves a

statement of a rule of law by the highest court of a state, whereas Turn-Key-

Tech involves the Federal Circuit’s sua sponte modification of a district

court’s ruling on the facts in an infringement lawsuit. In Turn-Key-Tech, the

Federal Circuit dismissed the district court’s patent claim construction in

favor of its own sua sponte construction. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC v. National

Film Lab. Inc., 2003 WL 22097823 at *2 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 6, 2003).

16

2 Sic A ANN Be arenes Pade!

construed as condemning sua sponte appellate decision-making

as a “due process” violation, it would have been implicitly

overruled by the intervening decades of Supreme Court

precedent described above.

Finally, even if sua sponte decisions in some cases

could implicate the Due Process Clause, there exists no

violation in this case because Wausau does not assert an

adequate interest in “property” under the Fourteenth

Amendment. In that regard, it is important to note that Wausau

is not seeking certiorari review in order to escape the effects of

any money judgment or other specific court action that could

even potentially amount to a taking of a property interest

without an opportunity to be heard. The Wisconsin Supreme

Court did nothing more than declare the law and remand the

case back to the tnal court for further proceedings. Those

proceedings will likely include trial or summary judgment ‘on

numerous contested issues, and perhaps even further

proceedings in the Wisconsin appellate court system, before

there is any final judgment in this case.

Thus, assuming arguendo that the issue of Edgerton’s

continuing validity had not been raised in Johnson Controls’

petition to the Wisconsin court, assuming that the coordinated

briefing effort of the insurers had not raised it, assuming that it

was not raised at oral argument and assuming there was no

reconsideration process available to raise it, there still would be

no due process violation here. That the Wisconsin Supreme

Court, in the process of overturning a bad case precedent that

presented a threshold bar to a claim for insurance coverage, also

took the occasion to re-examine a closely related subsidiary

issue that would likely come to the fore on remand and in other

cases, is hardly remarkable or unprecedented, and nothing more

than an exercise of that court’s institutional power to declare the

17

law and provide guidance to the parties and litigants in other

cases. Such an exercise presents no due process claim.

Due process is not required unless a party is being

deprived of an interest in “property” within the Fourteenth

Amendment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71

(1972). This Court, in Roth, noted that while it “has eschewed

rigid or formalistic limitations on the protection of due process,

it has at the same time observed certain boundaries.” Jd. at 572.

These boundaries require that “[t]o have a property interest in a

benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need

or desire for it. He must have more than a_ unilateral

expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of

entitlement to it.” Jd. at 577.

Applying this definition of “property” to this case,

Wausau must show that it has a “legitimate claim of

entitlement” to a particular interpretation of the word “suit” by

the Wisconsin Supreme Court. It is a showing Wausau cannot

possibly make. A party simply does not have a legitimate

entitlement to have an appellate court declare the law in any

particular manner, even when overruling a prior decision:

There is no vested right in the decisions of a court and a

change of decision does not deprive one of equal

protection of the laws or property without due process

of law. Even though prior decisions of a state court

have established a rule of property, a departure

therefrom in a subsequent decision does not, without

more, constitute a deprivation of property without due

process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617, 625 (D. Kan. 1956)

(citing O'Neil v. Northern Colorado Irrigation Co., 242 U.S.

20, 26-27 (1916)); accord Sunray Oil Co. v. Commissioner of

18

Internal Revenue, 147 F.2d 962, 963-64 (10th Cir. 1945); Ward

v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280, 288 (Ky. 1993); D..L. v. Armour

Pharm. Co., 704 A.2d 104, 115 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.

1997). Wausau has no property interest in the Wisconsin

Supreme Court’s interpretation of “suit” and pronouncement of

state common law. Therefore, under no circumstances could

there be a due process violation, even if the issue had not been

briefed or argued by the parties prior to the Wisconsin Supreme

Court’s decision and on reconsideration.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Johnson Controls

respectfully requests that the Petition be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

MATTHEW J. FLYNN

Counsel of Record

JEFFREY O. DAVIS

KEITH A. BRUETT

MATTHEW J. DUCHEMIN

QUARLES & BRADY LLP

411 E. Wisconsin Avenue

Milwaukee, WI 53202

(414) 277-5000

19

APPENDIX A

SUPREME COURT

OF WISCONSIN

* * * *

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH TO FILE

RESPONDENT’S BRIEFS

Defendant-Respondent Employers Insurance of Wausau A

Mutual Company (“Wausau”) respectfully moves this Court for an

Order, pursuant to Sections 809.14 and 809.82(2) of the Wisconsin

Statutes, granting Wausau and the other Defendant-Respondents a

short extension of time to file Respondent’s Briefs up to and

including July 2, 2002. Presently, Wausau’s Respondent’s Brief and

the Respondent’s Briefs of all of the other Defendant-Respondents are

currently due on June 11, 2002.

Good cause exists for granting Wausau and the other

Defendant-Respondents this short extension of time to respond to

Plaintiff-Appellant Johnson Controls, Inc.’s (“JCI”) Brief and

Appendix. The requested three-week extension will permit Wausau

and the dozens of other Defendant-Respondents the [3]necessary time

to coordinate their briefing efforts and thereby minimize the number

and volume of Respondents’ Briefs filed with the Court.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s grant of

summary judgment to Wausau and the other Defendant-Respondents

on December 27, 2001. JCI filed a Petition for Review, which was

accepted by this Court pursuant to the Order, dated April 22, 2002, in

which JCI raised a number of issues concerning the Court of Appeals

ruling and expressly requested that this Court overturn existing

Supreme Court case law.

This Court’s Order provided that JCI’s Brief was due thirty

days thereafter, or May 22, 2002. The Order also directed that

defendants-respondents’ briefs be filed 20 days thereafter, or June 11,

2002.

This appeal stems from an insurance coverage dispute in

which JCI seeks coverage for costs that it allegedly incurred in

connection with alleged-environmental liabilities arising from

environmental contamination at 21 sites throughout the United States.

In addition to Wausau, more than two dozen other insurance

companies also are Defendants-Respondents in this appeal. In light

of the significance of the issues and the relief requested by JCI, each

of the Defendants-Respondents has a heightened interest in the

briefing of this appeal.

In any multi-party appeal, preparation of Respondents’ Briefs

that may be joined in by numerous Defendants-Respondents

necessarily requires additional time beyond what is typically required

to prepare a Respondent’s Brief in an [4Jappeal in which there is only

one or two Respondents. The additional coordination time is

necessary to allow each Respondent the opportunity to review,

comment upon, revise and approve the brief. Drafts of briefs must be

exchanged, reviewed, revised and approved by each Defendant-

Respondent. This procedure is particularly exacerbated because of

the large number of Defendant-Respondents in this case.

In addition, the final drafts of any Defendant-Respondent

Briefs likely will be subject to approval by one or more of the

Defendant-Respondents’ internal legal staff. This requires even more

additional time and coordination before one or more Defendant-

Respondent Briefs may be approved by all joining parties and filed

with the Court.

If granted this extension will allow Wausau and the more than

two dozen other Defendant-Respondents a total of 51 days to prepare

and file Defendant-Respondent Briefs. In light of the above, this is a

A-2

ah ees aletuln 4 Se datas APe

reasonable time period for Wausau and the Defendant-Respondents to

coordinate and minimize the number of Respondent’s Briefs. These

efforts will simplify and decrease the buraen on this Court because, as

a result, a limited number of Defendant-Respondents’ Briefs will be

filed as opposed to the possibility of dozens of such briefs being filed

if this extension is not granted.

[5]Therefore, based upon the foregoing, Wausau respectfully

requests that the Court grant an extension of time, up to and including

July 2, 2002, for Wausau and the other Defendant-Respondents to file

their Respondent’s Briefs. ;

* * * *

APPENDIX B

SUPREME COU

OF WISCONSIN

* * * *

BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY

COMPANY

pdaliiect Radda

(b) A PRP Letter Or The State Agency

Equivalent Is Not A Suit.

Under the plain language of the CGL policies, an insurer’s

“duty to defend” is not triggered unless and until a “suit” has been

filed. With respect to many of the sites for which JCI seeks

coverage’, no lawsuit has been filed at all. Instead, JCI merely

received PRP letters, similar state letters or notices requesting

remediation. These letters and notices are not “suits,” as that term has

been defined under [33]Wisconsin law, and thus do not give rise to

any defense obligations on the part of the insurers.

The policy term “suit” has a plain and unambiguous meaning

under Wisconsin law. A “suit” is: “any proceeding by one person or

persons against another or others in a court of law in which the

plaintiff pursues, in such court, the remedy which the law affords

him, for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a night, whether

at law or equity.” State v. P.G. Miron Const. Co., Inc., 181 Wis. 2d

1045, 1053, 512 N.W.2d 499, 503 (1994). Thus, as this Court held in

Edgerton: “the primary attribute of a “suit” is that parties to an action

are involved in actual court proceedings, initiated by the filing of a

10

With respect to Travelers policies, no response costs suits have been

filed in connection with the Lakeland, Goshen and Compton Sites. (T-

Ap. 003, 065-067, 069-070)

complaint.” 184 Wis. 2d at 775 (emphasis added). See also

Accounting Data, Inc. v. McMurtrie, 78 Wis. 2d 89, 92, 253 N.W.2d

534, 535 (1977)(the term suit “applies to any proceeding in a court of

justice by which a party pursues the remedy which the law affords for

litigating a subject of controversy between adverse parties’”’)(quoting

Milwaukee L. H. & T. Co. v. Ela Co., 142 Wis. 424, 428, 125 N.W.

903, 905 (1910).

[34] Under this definition, a PRP letter or administrative notice

is not a suit. It is not a proceeding in a court in which the plaintiff

pursues a remedy. Indeed, the Edgerton Court rejected the mere

suggestion that PRP letters were the “functional equivalent” of a suit.

184 Wis. 2d at 776 (quoting Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 916 F.2d

731, 741 (1* Cir. 1990)). Such a status would not be good enough; as

this Court noted in Edgerton, “[either] there is a suit or there is not.”

184 Wis. 2d at 781.

For these reasons, the Court should reaffirm its holding in

Edgerton that the PRP letters and their state equivalent do not

constitute “suits” for purposes of the CGL policies.

* * * *

APPENDIX C

SUPREME COURT

OF WISCONSIN

* * * *

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF

WAUSAU’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION

FOR RECONSIDERATION

kk

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ENT RRODUIC TION . ous sscccrscvcscievcnsvcvsccvrsscscenvensesesansievsnevens l

PIII Ec vikisncvecsccescavasducicnnsipsesevanaseecctaktoniernnnionsies 2

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW..............csccceececceeeseeeeeeees 5

Il. THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS DECISION

ON THE “SUIT” ISSUE. ............sccsecsccescecscscessccenes 6

A. The Court Should Reconsider Its Decision

Because The “Suit” Issue Was Not Before

l. The “suit” issue was not decided by any of the

courts below, was not included in JCI’s

petition for review, and was not briefed or

argued by the parties before this court....... 6

Z The Court’s decision erroneously exceeded

the scope of judicial authority and review....8

B. The Court’s Sua Sponte Decision On The “Suit”

Issue Violates Wausau’s Constitutional Rights

To Due ProcesS..........sceeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeneeenees cess 12

III. | THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER THE DECISION

ON THE “SUIT” ISSUE BECAUSE IT OVERLOOKS

STARE DECISIS, INSURANCE CONTRACT

CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES, |

AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS..........+-- 14

A. The Decision Overlooks The Application

Of Stare Decisis To Edgerton’s Holding

On The “Suit” Issue.............sceeeeeeeeee eee e eee ee ees 14

# The Court’s decision overlooks the absence of

any changes or developments in the law on

whether a PRP letter is a “suit.”............- 15

ya There are no newly ascertained facts

that would require a result different

from Edgerton..........cscceceeeeeere ene ee eee 16

a. There has been no showing that Edgerton's

suit” decision has become detrimental to

coherence and consistency in the law........ 17

hea CREAT LEEPER

Pe 0 Pe ce On Es ten IOS

IV.

B. The Court’s Decision violates Long Established

Wisconsin Insurance Construction Principles......

ae The Court’s Decision Overlooks Important

Policy COMSIGCTANIONS. .........060ccccecscecsevees 21

THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS

DECISION THAT CERCLA RESPONSE COSTS

EE, CI aih x sknkapstacewsaetAlaviwhvaciesscces 23

A. Decision Overturns Established Wisconsin

Law On Insurance Policy Construction and

Fails To Correctly Analyze The Nature of

CERCLA ROGQONGE CORE... ..ssecrscscesecs p£

B. The Court’s Decision On The “Damages”

Issue Violates Principles of Stare Decisis... 28

l. No change or developments in the

law have undermined either the

principle requiring application of

unambiguous policy language or the

rationale of Edgerton's “damages”

DEI ciigiex hb acnaceeasonesadacaseeatied 28

Ya There are no newly ascertained facts

that would require a result different

NG CII ivi inccssttevsscedes 29

V.

The established principles of insurance

contract construction and Edgerton 's

“damages” holding have not become

detrimental to coherence and

consistency in the law.......:-.-.+-+5+++ 29

The Court’s decision upsets

substantial reliance-based interests.... 32

C. The Court’s Decision Creates More

Uncertainty and Arbitrary Results..........--+- 33

::

The Court’s decision creates — rather

than corrects — arbitrary distinctions

regarding coverage for CERCLA

TESPONSE COSTS........--eeeeee reer essere’ 34

The Court’s decision creates arbitrary

distinctions regarding coverage in

other factual settings...........--..+++++36

The Court’s decision will cause

unnecessary litigation over insurance

policy construction.......-...++s+sss 37

THE COURT SHOULD DECLARE THAT THE

DECISION APPLIES PROSPECTIVELY ONLY... 37

CONCLUSION

The Court’s Decision Overrules

Clear Past Precedent On Which

Woarente ROMCG............cccccessccccces. 42

Retroaction Application in this Case

Will Not Further the Operation of

the Counts PRGHGIME............050.00000)00008 42

Retroactive Application of the Court’s

Decision Will Produce Inequitable

ME chaciunteneacssapeseacvayotks nae 43

eoee gt **

Ill. THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS DECISION

ON THE “SUIT” ISSUE BECAUSE IT OVERLOOKS

STARE DECISIS, {NSURANCE CONTRACT

CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES, AND PUBLIC

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS.

A. Tlie Decision Overlooks The Application of Stare

Decisis To Edgerton’s Holding On The “Suit”

Issue.

The decision is extraordinary as well because it overturns

established Wisconsin law on the “suit” issue with no explanation of

why departure from stare decisis was appropriate.

In the context of the “damages” issue, the decision explained

the importance of stare decisis and the standard by which the court

may, in extremely rare circumstances, depart from it. {| 94-95, 98-

99. Despite these statements of the doctrine’s importance and the

rigorous standards that must be met to overcome it, there is no

mention of how the standard is satisfied on the “suit” issue. See

93-119. The only explanation for overturning Edgerton on the

meaning of “suit” is a passing mention that “(t]he Edgerton court’s

definition [15]of “suit” gives us pause.” 4] 76 (emphasis added). At

best, however, that explains only that the present composition of the

Court now disagrees with Edgerton’s holding that a PRP letter is not a

“suit.” See J§ 77-92; J 135 (Wilcox, J., dissenting). Such an

explanation is insufficient, as the Court itself acknowledged in the

context of the “damages” issue. {| 33.

The Court now has made two diametrically opposed

statements concerning an insured’s “reasonable expectations” in

connection with the “suit” issue. Edgerton held that:

[T]he word “suit” is easily understood and

unambiguous to a reasonable policyholder. The proof

is in the decisions that hold that a “PRP letter” is the

“functional equivalent of a suit.” Either there is a suit

or there is not. When there is no suit, there is no duty

to defend.

184 Wis. 2d at 781 (emphasis added). In this case, the Court found

that an insured would have “reasonable expectations” directly

contrary to the holding in Edgerton: “fa] reasonable person in the

position of the insured would expect the insured (sic) to provide a

defense” in the context of a PRP letter.” 4] 85 (emphasis in original).

The Court’s decision overlooks the absence

of any changes or developments in the law

on whether a PRP letter is a “suit.”

There have been no developments or changes in the law of

Wisconsin that would justify a reversal of Edgerton’s “suit” holding.

Numerous well-respected courts have cited Edgerton’s holding on the

“suit” issue and relied upon its [16]rationale in reaching the same

conclusion. See, e.g., Foster Gardner Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins.

Corp., 959 P.2d 265, 281-82 (Cal. 1998); Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp.

v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 655 N.E.2d 842, 847 (Ill. 1995).° Many

other courts have reached the same result.”

é There are no newly ascertained facts that

would require a result different from

Edgerton.

The dissent correctly observe. that “[t]his case does not

present us with a wholly new set of $. ts.” 4 135. The Court’s

decision fails to identify a single new fact since Edgerton that would

justify overturning its “suit” holding.

* See also CIM Ins. Corp. v. Masamitsu, 74 F. Supp.2d 975, 986 (D. Ha. 1999);

Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 418, 420 (Cal. App.

2d Dist. 1999).

” See Barry R.Ostrager & Thomas R. Newman, Handbook on Insurance

Coverage Disputes § 10.04{c][2](11" Ed. 2002), and cases cited therein.

C-7

In fact, although the parties never briefed the “‘suit” issue,

JCY’s brief actually demonstrates the correctness of Edgerton’s

holding and the inaccuracy of this Court’s assumptions concerning an

insured’s reasonable expectations. In arguing on the “damages”

issue, JCI’s brief contrasted PR,’ letters with other forms of

government action and explained that a recipient of a PRP lette? is

“not legally obligated to take any action.” JCI’s Brief at 7. JCI’s

brief further states “Parties receiving this type of preliminary

correspondence. . . are not legally [17]obligated to take any action.”

Id. JCI’s admission is contrary to the Court’s conclusions as to an

insured’s “reasonable expectations.”

a There has been no showing that Edgerton’s

“suit” decision has become detrimental to

coherence and consistency in the law.

Edgerton premised its holding on a plain and unambiguous

interpretation of the word “suit,” which has the same meaning in other

areas of Wisconsin law as it does in the context of insurance law. 184

Wis. 2d at 744 (citing State v. P.G. Miron Constr. Co., Inc.,181 Wis.

2d 1045, 1053 512 N.W.2d 499 (1994)). No Wisconsin decision

since Edgerton has ever suggested that the “suit” rule has been a

problem to apply or is in any way inconsistent with Wisconsin law.

B. The Court’s Decision Violates Long-Established

Wisconsin Insurance Construction Principles.

Not only does the Court’s decision violate principles of stare

decisis with respect to the “suit” issue, it also derogates well-settled

principles of insurance policy construction. It has long been the law

of Wisconsin that, where a provision in an insurance policy is

unambiguous on its face, courts should not engage in construction of

the unambiguous term. As the Court stated 25 years ago in Mercardo

v. Mitchell, 83 Wis. 2d 17, 25, 264 N.W.2d 532 (1978):

When no ambiguity exists, it is equally clear the court

cannot construe the policy. . . to include insurance

coverage that was not agreed to by the parties and for

which no premium was assessed or paid. To do so

would be to re-write the contract of the parties — a

power the court does not have.

{18]The Court confirmed these and other fundamental

principles in Folkman, just days after this decision. Not only did

Folkman confirm that “the first issue in construing an insurance

policy is to determine ‘vhether an ambiguity exists,” but it also cited

with approval other recent holdings of the court confirming that an

insured may not reasonably expect coverage contrary to plain and

ambiguous policy language. Folkman, 2003 WI 116, § 13. Thus,

Folkman quoted from Taylor v. Greatway Ins. Co., 2001 WI 93, 4 26,

245 Wis. 2d 134, 628 N.W.2d 916, as follows:

Because the definition of underinsured vehicle in each

of American Family’s policies is unambiguous

standing on its own and in the context of the whole

policy, we do not need to engage in construction to

determine Taylor’s reasonable expectations.

Folkman, 2003 WI 116, § 25 ar emphasis in original, bold

emphasis added).

In a radical departure from these long-standing rules, the

Court’s decision in this case suggests an entirely different analysis.

Without first finding any ambiguity in the “suit” language or even

addressing the fact that it had previously held the term “suit” to be

plain and ambiguous in various contexts, the Court, instead,

interpreted the terms according to its own conclusions of what JCI

would have “reasonably expected.” The Court’s actions clearly

violated Wisconsin law, as stated in Folkman, that a policyholder may

not have “reasonable expectations” of coverage that are contrary to

plain and unambiguous policy language.

[19]The Court’s conclusion as to the insured’s “reasonable

expectations” was based on the Court's analysis of a “PRP letter’

and several separate policy provisions relating to notice of an

“occurrence,” notice of a claim or suit, cooperation by the insured,

voluntary payments, the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify.

See J4 77-85. However, the Court’s conclusion is premised on

misstatements of Wisconsin law on several issues, disregards critical

language from the Wausau policies, and is contrary to the evidence of

JCI’s actual expectations. {| 84-85. Notably, in incorrectly

concluding that an insurer’s duty to defend is co-extensive with an

insured’s duty to give notice and cooperate, the Court ignores critical

language in the insuring agreement that provides:

[T]he company . . . may make such investigation and

settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient.

Edgerton, 184 Wis. 2d at 750 (emphasis added). Only by overlooking

this language, could the Court mistakenly conclude that the insurer’s

duty to defend “suits” must be interpreted broadly to mirror the

insured’s obligation to provide notice of an “occurrence, claim or

suit.” However, the foregoing policy language demonstrates that the

insured must give notice not only of “suits” so that the insurer may

defend, if necessary, but also of any “occurrence, claim or suit”

[20]so that the insurer can exercise its right to investigate and settle

“claims.” Moreover, by interpreting the term “suit” to include non-

lawsuit “claims,” the decision violates the fundamental principle of

insurance contract construction that all terms must be given meaning

and not be rendered mere surplusage. See Grotelueschen v. American

Family Mut. Ins. Co., 171 Wis. 2d 437, 451, 492 N.W.2d 131 (1992).

Finally, not only is the court’s analysis at odds with basic

principles of Wisconsin insurance law and the plain and ambiguous

0 As explained in the dissent, not all PRP letters are the same. {| 160. However,

because the Court did not cite to any PRP letter in the record issued to JCI or

quote from any of the language of any such PRP letter, the Court must have

been referring to a hypothetical PRP letter.

C- 10

policy language, but its “suit” holding also guarantees additional

litigation, costs, and confusion for litigants and courts. !! Recently,

the Court has seen how just two words, “crystal clear,” in the decision

in Badger Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schmitz, 2002 WI 98, 4] 46, 255 Wis. 2d

61, 647 N.W.2d 223, created a large and “unintended effect.”

Folkman, 2003 WI 116, § 30. Those two words spawned a series of

court of appeals decisions within the span of a year and “reveal[ed]

that our admonition of ‘crystal clarity’ has been used to alter the

analytical focus.” Jd.

The Court’s decision in this case promises much more of the

same. If permitted to stand, the decision will, no doubt, allow

creative lawyers to tie up the courts for years. Moreover, by

apparently allowing unsupported, purported subjective interpretations

to trump unambiguous policy language, the Court’s [21]decision

suggests an unending series of Catch-22 propositions for insurance

companies. Insurers will never be able to evaluate or limit the

coverage they write. Edgerton understood this problem:

Typically insurers assess the extent of the risks

insured under policies issued. The risk of liability

may then be spread among groups of insureds and

premiums assigned only after the extent of the risk is

determined. The original risk assessment becomes a

nullity if the language of the policy is redefined in

order to expand coverage beyond what was planned

for by the insurer in the contract of insurance.

Policies of insurance, premised upon a certain level of

predictability and assessment of risk at the time of

contracting, lose their effect without the inclusion of

certain basic definitions.

'' The Court’s attempt to minimize the fall-out from its decision by limiting its

holding to “PRP letters,” see J 87 n.37, will likely have no effect in restraining

arguments that the Court’s decision supports a new set of interpretations for

insurance policies in Wisconsin.

184 Wis. 2d at 779 n.26 (emphasis added). Contrary to the Court’s

suggestion, insurers and policyholders relied on Edgerton in

connection with liability policies issued decades ago because such

policies provide coverage for liabilities arising from “occurrences”

during the policy period regardless of when the claim is made against

the insured. Thus, these policies are just as available to be called

upon to provide coverage today as they were then they were first

issued.

C. The Court’s Decision Overlooks Important Policy

Considerations.

In addition to the problems enumerated above, the Court

overlooked significant policy considerations when it reversed course

on the “suit” issue. Policyholders may well assert entitlement for all

past “defense costs” allegedly [22]incurred for PRP letters within the

six years preceding the decision.'” In fact, Wausau already has

received numerous claims for defense coverage and been sued by

policyholders within weeks of the decision.

Numerous lawsuits likely will be filed raising the interplay

between the Court’s new “suit” holding and Wisconsin’s duty to

defend case law. See Mowry v. Badger State Mut Cas. Co., 129 Wis.

2d 496, 385 N.W.2d 171 (1986); Newhouse v. Citizens Security Mut.

Ins. Co., 176 Wis. 2d 824, 501 N.W.2d 1 (1993). Under Edgerton,

there was no question when a “suit” — and, therefore, an insurer’s

obligations to defend — began and ended. Now, an insurer faced with

a tender of defense of a PRP letter may find it impossible to satisfy its

obligations under Wisconsin law and thereby risk being found to have

breached its duty to defend and be estopped from asserting coverage

defenses. For example, without a lawsuit, it is difficult to determine

whether costs incurred by an insured are costs of defending the claim

or costs of satisfying any alleged liabilities arising from the claim. In

addition, an insurer may find that stays of regulatory activities

'2 The Wisconsin Statutes provide for a six-year statute of limitations on breach

of contract claims. See sec. 893.43, Stats; see also sec. 631.83(1)(d), Stats.

associated with a “PRP letter” may not be had while coverage

litigation proceeds. A policyholder thus may claim the insurer should

incur hundreds of thousands (if [23]not millions) of dollars in “free

defense” costs while coverage issues are being litigated.'°

In ruling on the “suit” issue, the Court overlooked these

important policy considerations and should reconsider tts decision.

* * *K *

' Similarly, with respect to numerous claims that were properly denied by

insurers over the years based on Edgerton, policyholders now may attempt to

use the decision to improperly assert that such denials constitute breaches of

contract and/or bad faith.

Supreme Coun. U.S. |

FILED

APR 7 - 2004

(4)

No. 03-1199

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF WAUSAU,

Petitioner,

JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC., e¢ al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

SCOTT J. RYSKOSKI SETH P. WAXMAN

GREENBERG TRAURIGLLP Counsel of Record

13155 Noel Road PAUL R.Q. WOLFSON

600 Three Galleria Tower REBECCAJ.K. GELFOND

Dallas, TX 75249 WILMER CUTLER PICKERING LLP

(972) 419-1250 2445 M Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20037

PATRICK J. BOLEY (202) 663-6000

LARSON KING LLP

2800 Wells Fargo Place

30 East 7th Street

St. Paul, MN 55101

(651) 312-6500

eS A ALTACE wm

Phi Sci aie

ee eR ee ee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate J nsurance Co.,

588 N.W.2d 285 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) coohyesnninipelintiiictesnatebis 4

Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 {| 7

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) .ccccccecbececssssscoscoceeceseoses. 7

Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) c.cccccccccsssecdecesee, cosoececeseeseee, 10

Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of

Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) veces. leconcinsgnmnasisninnisens 8

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) .ecccc..\ececosesceoccoeeseees 8

Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) .cccccccccccleccescescoccoeesece. 6

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill,

Bn OFS CEI) nessressosesenosinimosttinanasiipiaamansb ait cacti. 8,9

City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Co.,

517 N.W.2d 463 (Wis. 1994) .......ccccsesseccescesesssesesssseesessecoses 2

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) cecccccccccccoccecocoeees-.. 6

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 I ilicichisnciictdnases: 6

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) ............... 7

General Casualty Co. v.- Hills, 561 N.W.2d 718

LAPD. NPN Divesceevinsh diitensodnnsge naan aan aera 3

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ...ccccccsssssscssescseseccsseoeesees 10

Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526

i sitinnseicntinhuninisceniangiitiniiate ae eee ee 7

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S, 422

CRIA hixsinsicetnansinhersirsnisiciiehaaiilieitneiiea emma ence 10

Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) cccccccccossccsoscoseeceeeceees.. 8

Mapp V. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)....ccscccccsscssssschecssccosceseeccocessees 7

Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976) seccececce..-.... 7

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) .cccccdceccescecoccoceccosees.,, 6

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,

SOO AD Te DE CD sn cciscssniinapinsedaeceescinmstebintmratsiee nase 8

Nelson v. Adams USA, inc., 529 U.S. 460 (2000) ................. 10

Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund

Insurance Co., 868 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Utah

1994), aff'd, 52 F.3d 1522 (10th Cir. 1995)...ccccccccccccoccecoeee. 4-

Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 US. 337

SIPs onicstextnnivincisideisiisideilladupintiaiteto tein irre oar 10

iii

INC., 508 U.S. 439 (1998) ....cccsssssssscsssssssssesssssssssssseccccoseeccess.. 7

United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir.

1999); rev'd, 5380 U.S. 428 (2000) ....ssceccsssecssessssseccceeecsseeccs.. 6

United States v. IBM, 517 U.S. 843 S| eee 6

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety

Co., 874 P.2d 142 (Wash. 1994) 0... .cccccssecsscssessosseeseesseeecces... 4

STATUTES

a ss snchsesienicrcvonsaycssescsnieniveveninehsomemosncenssensaneeesse... 6

Wis. Stat. § 809.62(6) ..2.........corvvcsessessssseserecesssssesseeseeeeeeseossss.,,,. 4

MISCELLANEOUS

Wisconsin Supreme Court Internal Operating Pro-

COGUTES...cecreccesees AaeenaabahieetineNeden ee ebeetanebenswkennvesssersacnss 5

Respondent Johnson Controls, Ine. (JCI) presented to

the Wisconsin Supreme Court only the question whether

JCI’s liabilities for environmental response costs are “dam-

ages” within an insurer’s duty to indemnify under a general

liability insurance policy. Nothing in JGI’s petition for re-

view or briefs on the merits suggested that the court should

also consider whether a PRP letter is a “suit” within an in-

surer’s separate duty to defend. Yet the Wisconsin Supreme

Court decided the “suit” issue without notifying Wausau

that the issue was under consideration or affording it an op-

portunity to be heard on that question.’ JCI’s efforts to ob-

scure matters cannot retroactively alter those historical

facts.”

Those facts—lack of notice or an opportunity -to be

heard—establish that Wausau was denied due process.

JCI’s attempts to avoid that conclusion are based on false

premises. JCI overstates the due process principle that

Wausau advocates and thus never actually confronts the

conduct of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which did not

merely raise an argument not presented by the parties, but

sua sponte decided a matter that was separate and distinct

from the issue before it. As this Court and numerous lower

courts have recognized, such surprise judicial decisionmak-

ing violates due process. JCI also ignores the direct conse-

quences that adjudication, unlike legislation or agency rule-

making, has on the parties before the court. In this case, the

Wisconsin Supreme Court’s action will cause substantial pe-

cuniary harm to Wausau. Wausau was therefore entitled to

' The court’s opinion recognizes that the two issues are separate.

The court addressed them in two separate sections of its opinion, one enti-

tled “Are CERCLA Response Costs Damages?” and the other “Do PRP

Letters Trigger the Insurer’s Duty to Defend?” See Pet. App. 16a, 34a.

: Although JCI suggests that a detailed review of the record would

be needed to determine what issues were before the Wisconsin Supreme

Court (Opp. 12 n.7), JCI itself does not rely on any part of the record not

discussed in the petition for certiorari or reprinted in the appendices al-

ready before this Court.

2

the protections of due process—protections that were de-

nied to it.

1. JCl’s argument that Wausau was aware that the

“suit” issue was presented to the Wisconsin Supreme Court

defies reality and common sense. As amicus curiae CICLA

explains (CICLA Br. 14-15), whether a PRP letter is a “suit”

within the duty to defend is of paramount significance to in-

surers. Unlike the insurer’s indemnity obligation, which is

typically limited by policy limits, the insurer’s defense obli-

gation often is not, and the cost of defending an environ-

mental matter may well meet or exceed the indemnity costs.

Thus, the holding in City of Edgerton v. General Casualty

Co., 517 N.W.2d 463 (Wis. 1994), that a PRP letter is not a

“suit” was of immense importance to Wausau and the other

insurer parties. Any attempt to seek overruling of Edger-

ton’s “suit” holding would have been opposed at least as vig-

orously as Wausau opposed JCI’s effort to overturn Edger-

ton’s “damages” holding. But even though, according to JCI,

this surpassingly important issue was supposedly presented

to the Wisconsin Supreme Court for review, neither JCI nor

Wausau addressed that issue in the briefs, and the court

asked not a single question about it at oral argument.

Stripped to its essence, JCI’s position is that it raised

the “suit” issue in the question presented in its petition for

review and in a few comments by its counsel at oral argu-

ment. Neither contention is credible. JCI certainly did not

“broadly [seek] review of the continuing viability” of Edger-

ton “without limitation” (Opp. i). Rather, JCI’s petition pre-

sented a limited issue: “Should [Edgerton] be overruled in

light of the ‘arbitrary’ and ‘debatable’ distinctions it has pro-

duced and the discrediting of authorities upon which it re-

* JCI does not deny that the “suit” issue was not decided by the Mil-

waukee County Circuit Court nor raised in or decided by the Wisconsin

Court of Appeals, and that under well-settled Wisconsin practice, Wausau

could assume that the “suit” issue would not be decided in the first in-

stance by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Nor does JCI contest that it did

not raise the “suit” issue in its briefs on the merits. See Pet. 7-9, 25 n.25.

is)

&s;

: 3

ied?” Pet. App. 149a-150a. The “ ‘arbitrary’ and ‘debatable’

distinctions” clearly referred only to Edgerton’s “damages”

holding. See Pet. 6-8.’ That point was confirmed in the body

of JCI’s petition, where JCI discussed the “damages” issue

at length, but made no mention of the “suit” issue. See Pet. 9

n.6; Pet. App. 149a-152a.

JCI’s assertion that its counsel’s brief comments at oral

argument—eight sentences of his 30-minute argument—

provided Wausau with notice that the “suit” issue was under

consideration is equally meritless. First, all of counsel’s

comments on which JCI relies were made in response to a

question from the court on the “damages” issue. JCI’s

counsel understood that the question concerned the “dam-

ages” issue, for he reframed it as: “{I]f you... were to con-

sider [overruling Edgerton] in this case, why would you do it

in this case, ... was Edgerton improperly decided, and why

am I right that the CERCLA response costs are damages?”

In fact, no justice requested that counsel address the “suit”

holding of Edgerton.

Second, the few remarks of counsel on which JCI relies

were made (as JCI acknowledges) in support of its argument

that “coverage for environmental liability” (i.e., damages,

not defense costs) “should not depend upon the existence of

* The reference to “discrediting of authorities upon which [Edgerton |

relied” also clearly referred to the “damages” holding in Edgerton. As

explained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in this case (Pet. App. 33a-

34a), two federal court cases on which Edgerton had relied in its “dam-

ages” holding were subsequently rejected by the highest courts of the

states whose laws those courts were applying.

® Justice Ann Walsh Bradley stated, “The argument is advanced that

this court has provided . . . a workable framework for handling these

cases,” and then asked, “why, now, in view of uncertainty and confusion

that may arise from overruling this, we should do it?” Her reference to

the “framework” clearly refers to decisions on the “damages” issue in

Edgerton and General Casualty Co. v. Hills, 561 N.W.2d 718 (Wis. 1997),

and the four-category “damages” framework of the Wisconsin Court of

Appeals in this case. See Pet. 6-7. A recording of the oral argument is

available at http://www. wicourts.gov/opinions/soralarguments.htm.

—

—— See

4

a lawsuit.” Opp. 6; see id. at 5. JCI’s position was that Wis-

consin “damages” case law was flawed and inconsistent be-

cause (under JCI’s interpretation) cleanup costs were

treated as “damages” if incurred in response to a govern-

ment lawsuit, but not as “damages” if incurred in response

to a PRP letter. Thus, JCI’s counsel referred to Weyer-

haeuser Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 874 P.2d 142

(Wash. 1994), for its holding that costs to comply with state

environmental statutes were “damages,” even though no

written demand (much less any lawsuit) was made against

the insured by a government agency. Weyerhaeuser did not

even address whether a PRP letter is a “suit” within an in-

surer’s defense obligation, and so JCI’s citation to it could

not have raised the “suit” issue for review. Indeed, JCI’s

counsel stated that an insurer’s defense obligation is “sepa-

rate from the duty to indemnify,” and that “[i]n this case you

don’t even have to get to the duty to defend.” Pet. 10 n.8."

Third, even if JCI’s counsel might have intended to

raise the “suit” issue, as a matter of law, his sparse com-

ments could not have given notice to Wausau that the issue

was before the court. Under Wisconsin law, issues may not

be raised for the first time at oral argument. See Wis. Stat.

§ 809.62(6); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 588

N.W.2d 285, 293 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). Thus, particularly in

light of the absence of any questioning from the court on the

* The other remarks relied on by JCI also were in support of JCI’s

“damages” argument. JCI’s counsel referred to the discussion in Quaker

State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 868 F. Supp.

1278 (D. Utah 1994), aff'd, 52 F.3d 1522 (10th Cir. 1995), of “the full pano-

ply of harsh things that can happen to somebody who ignores a PRP [let-

ter|” to support JCI’s argument that whether response costs are “dam-

ages” should not depend on whether there is a lawsuit against the insured.

Consistent with oral argument, JCI cited Quaker State in its petition for

review only for its “damages” holding. JCI’s counsel also referred to

“(t]he Indiana case, Travelers Indemnity,” which he described only as

setting forth the terms of an insurer’s defense agreement. But no such

case was cited in JCI’s petition or briefs, and this vague reference could

not have raised the “suit” issue for review. See Pet. 10 n.8.

5

“suit” issue, there was no reason for Wausau to think that,

contrary to the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s own background

principle, JCI had raised that issue to the court.

JCI is thus left to argue (Opp. 5-7, 10) that the actions of

Wausau’s co-respondent, Travelers Indemnity Company,

somehow demonstrate that Wausau had notice. This argu-

ment is meritless. Travelers’ short discussion of the “suit”

holding of Edgerton merely responded to JCI’s argument

that “damages” coverage should not depend on the existence

of a lawsuit by pointing out that the distinction between a

PRP letter and a lawsuit is real and not arbitrary, and in-

deed was supported by the holding in Edgerton, in the con-

text of the duty to defend, that a PRP letter is not a “suit.”

Travelers was not responding to an argument that the court

should overrule its holding that a PRP letter is not a “suit.”

for JCI had made no such argument.”

2. JCI misstates the due process principle that Wau-

sau advocates. Wausau does not contend that courts may

"ICI’s conjecture (Opp. 5-6) that Wausau supposedly “allocated

briefing responsibility” for the “suit” issue to Travelers is simply false.

The three dozen defendant-respondents in the Wisconsin Supreme Court

sought additional briefing time to coordinate so that the court would not

be inundated with a brief from each party. Nonetheless, there was no

“allocatlion] of briefing responsibility” for specific issues as JCI specu-

lates. This is borne out by the fact that Wausau did not join in Travelers’

brief, Travelers did not join in Wausau’s brief, and several defendant-

respondents joined only in Wausau’s brief, but not Travelers’.

* ICI’s suggestion (Opp. 11 & n.6) that Wausau had a constitutionally

adequate opportunity to address the “suit” issue in its motion for recon-

sideration is baseless. JCI relies on a Wisconsin Supreme Court Internal

Operating Procedure that states that the court will grant reconsideration

only when the court has overlooked legal or factual points. That Internal

Operating Procedure—which is not binding on the court, see Wis. S. Ct.

IOP (Introduction)—plainly does not require the court to grant reconsid-

eration even when it has committed legal or factual error. Moreover, the

court is not obligated to give reasons when denying reconsideration, and it

gave none in this case. See Pet. App. 147a. The motion for reconsidera-

tion was ultimately nothing more than a plea to the court to change its

mind—an opportunity that was not a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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