Reply Brief — Leavitt v. Tennessee Valley Authority

Supreme Court brief2004

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A. Non-Justiciability

TVA argues (Br. in Opp. 7) that the Article III issue is

“immaterial” here because the presence of the interveners

would keep the case alive even if the dispute between TVA

and EPA were held not to present a case or controversy

under Article III. As the petition explains (Pet. 28), how-

ever, if the dispute between TVA and EPA is nonjusticiable

(and EPA thus lacks the ability to enforce the ACO judicially

against TVA), then all of the petitions for review should be

dismissed, because EPA’s order, which is directed solely to

TVA, would not be final under Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.

154 (1997). Neither TVA nor the interveners dispute that

further Executive Branch review of the order would be

required in these circumstances (see Pet. 28 n.13), and the

order thus would not satisfy the first Bennett prong. 520

U.S. at 177-178 (requiring “consummation” of decisionmak-

ing process).” Accordingly, the Court’s jurisdiction over this

case as a whole depends on whether the intra-governmental

dispute between TVA and EPA presents an Article III case

or controversy.

In support of the court of appeals’ Article III holding,

TVA, as had the court of appeals, relies primarily (Br. in

Opp. 16-17) on United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693

(1974).© The Court in Nixon, however, went to great lengths

5 Similarly, pending such a consummation, the possibility of a citizen

suit against TVA to enforce EPA’s order would not support interveners’

standing, see Br. in Opp. 18 n.13, because the non-final order would not

support such a suit. In any event, citizens may sue for violations of

emissions standards or permit requirements regardless of whether EPA

has issued an order. 42 U.S.C. 7604(a)(1) and (8).

6 TVA asserts (Br. in Opp. 17) that “[t]he [Act] unambiguously

authorizes EPA to sue TVA” in authorizing EPA to file suit against “any

person”—defined elsewhere to include federal agencies—in court. The

cited provision, however, is naturally read to authorize EPA suits only

when Article III jurisdiction is otherwise present, regardless of whether

_ the suit is against a federal agency or a private individual. TVA thus errs

(id. at 18) in claiming that holding this case to be nonjusticiable would “re-

quire treating the civil judicial enforcement provisions of [the Clean Air

9

to emphasize the “unique setting,” id. at 691, of a criminal

prosecution of a sitting President by an independent special

prosecutor with unusual independence from the Attorney

General. As the Court explained, the special prosecutor en-

joyed a tenure tantamount to an independent agency, which

the Court described as

not an ordinary delegation by the Attorney General to a

subordinate officer: with the authorization of the Pre-

sident, the Acting Attorney General provided in the re-

gulation that the Special Prosecutor was not to be re-

moved without the ‘consensus’ of eight designated

leaders of Congress.

Id. at 696. Nixon was not an ordinary case, nor did it

realistically present the possibility that this case does of a

single entity controlling both parties to a justiciable case or

controversy.’ The court of appeals erred in relying on Nixon

to state a broad and generally applicable rule that intra-

agency disputes are justiciable so long as a similar dispute

between private parties would have been justiciable, see

Pet. App. 73a, and the agencies advocate genuinely conflict-

ing points of view, see id. at 74a.

B. TVA’s Independent Litigation Authority

Further review is also warranted of the court of appeals’

conclusion that TVA had authority to litigate this case inde-

pendently and over the objection of the Attorney General.

Pet. 23-27. TVA fails to identify any statutory source creat-

ing an exception to the statutory requirement that “the

Act] as unconstitutional.” Those provisions are susceptible of a perfectly

constitutional construction, regardless of the correct disposition of this

case.

7 Although TVA states (Br. in Opp. 15 n.11) that whether TVA’s

Board members serve at the pleasure of the President is “an issue never

decided by this Court,” TVA conspicuously does not argue that its Board

members could continue to serve despite a decision by the President to

remove them. See Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 293 (1900) (“In the

absence of specific provision to the contrary, the power of removal from

office is incident to the power of appointment.”).

10

conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency,

or officer thereof is a party * * * is reserved to officers of

the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attor-

ney General.” 28 U.S.C. 516. See also 28 U.S.C. 519.

TVA does refer (Br. in Opp. 8-9) to its history of repre-

senting itself in court. Even if TVA’s history compelled rec-

ognition of some sort of implicit delegation of litigating

authority by the Attorney General, however, no such delega-

tion would remain valid when, as here, the Attorney General

has positively objected to the litigation. TVA also cites (id.

at 9 & n.4) the general authority granted to its board of

directors, but that general authority is entirely consistent

with the overriding authority of the Attorney General to

control the “conduct of litigation” of all government agencies

—including TVA—in court. 28 U.S.C. 516. In any event, in

the face of the express statutory committal of litigating re-

sponsibility to the Attorney General, something more than

congressional committee reports (Br. in Opp. 10-12 & n.7) or

a statute disavowing any effect on whatever litigating

authority TVA may have had (id. at 9 n.6) is necessary to

establish that Congress intended an exception.

This case, in which an important part of an Act of Con-

gress was held unconstitutional in a case brought by a fed-

eral agency, is a textbook example of the need for the Attor-

ney General, who represents the overall interests of the fed-

eral government, to control government litigation as pro-

vided by statute. Further review of the court of appeals’

conclusion that TVA has authority to litigate over the

objection of the Attorney General is warranted.

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the petition,

the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

ae

11

THEODORE B. OLSON

ANNA WOLGAST Solicitor General

Acting General Counsel

Environmental Protection

Agency

APRIL 2004

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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