Opposition Brief — Leavitt v. Tennessee Valley Authority
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© ar, ry U.S.
No. 03-1162 MAR 29 2004
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Jn The
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
¢
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, et al.,
Petitioners,
V.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, et al.,
Respondents.
¢
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States
Court Of Appeals For The Eleventh Circuit
yy
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS TENNESSEE VALLEY PUBLIC
POWER ASSOCIATION, MEMPHIS LIGHT, GAS & WATER
DIVISION, ELECTRIC POWER BOARD OF CHATTANOOGA,
MIDDLE TENNESSEE ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP
CORPORATION, NORTH GEORGIA ELECTRIC
MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION AND VOLUNTEER
ENERGY COOPERATIVE IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FORA WRIT OF CERTIORARI
,
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CARLOS C. SMITH, J. MAXWELL WILLIAMS
Counsel of Record CHARLOTTE KNIGHT GRIFFIN
FREDERICK L. HITCHCOCK P.O. Box 430
J. ROBIN ROGERS Memphis, Tennessee 38101-0430
MARK W. SMITH (901) 528-4343
STRANG, FLETCHER, CARRIGER, Co-Counsel for Memphis
WALKER, HODGE & SMITH, PLLC Light, Gas & Water Division
di
cco Rgal Balding rr C. Tunes Je,
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 ee —-
P.O. Box 398
(423) 265-2000 Dalton, Georgia 30722-0398
Counsel for Tennessee Valley (706) 275-7326
Public Power Association, Co-Counsel for North Georgia
Memphis Light, Gas & Water _ Electric Membership Corporation
Division, Electric Power Board
JAMES C. COPE
of Chattanooga, Middle
Tennessee Electric Member- MURFREE, COPE, HUDSON & SCARLETT
; P.O. Box 884
ship Corporation, North
Georgia Electric Membership se np . 37133-0884 ;
Corporation, and Volunteer o-Counsel for Middle Tennessee
: Electric Membership Corporation
Energy Cooperative
BEST AVAILABLE COPY
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioners before this Court are the United States
Environmental Protection Agency and Michael O. Levitt,
Administrator, United States Environmental Protection
Agency.
Respondents are the Tennessee Valley Authority,
Tennessee Valley Public Power Association, Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Division, Electric Power Board of
Chattanooga, Middle Tennessee Electric Membership
Corporation, North Georgia Electric Membership Corpora-
tion, Volunteer Energy Cooperative, Alabama Power
Company, and Duke Energy Corporation.
' A complete listing of the current TVPPA members is contained in
TVPPA App., pp. 12-18.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Tennessee Valley Public Power Association (“TVPPA”)
is a non-profit corporation representing the interests of
108 municipal and 50 rural electric cooperative distribu-
tors of electrical power in a wide range of activities relating
to the Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”). Individually-
named members Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division,
the Electric Power Board of Chattanooga, and 106 other
members of TVPPA are boards or divisions of municipal
governments in Tennessee, Kentucky, Alabama, Missis-
sippi, Georgia, and North Carolina, all but one of which
buy their entire energy and capacity requirements from
the TVA. Individually-named members Middle Tennessee
Electric Membership Corporation, North Georgia Electric
Membership Corporation, Volunteer Energy Cooperative,
and 47 other members of TVPPA are non-profit, member-
owned electric cooperatives that buy virtually all of their
energy and capacity requirements from the TVA.
TVPPA and the named distributors have no parent
corporations, and no publicly held company has a 10
percent or greater ownership interest in any of them.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING............................ 1
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .....000........cccccccccsssceceees il
ep he ee ey) li
TABLE @F AUTHORITIES. ....................ccccssssesecooeee Vv
PRIOR COURT OPINIONS 0.00... cccccccccceseeseeees 1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ...............0c0c000005. 1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..0... ec ecccccccceseeeeees 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT..................cccccecen. 6
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ........... 7
I. This “Bizarre Case” Will Have No General
Impact on the EPA or Those it Regulates......... 7
II. The Court Should Not Grant Certiorari to
Address the Petition’s Second and Third Ques-
tions Because These Issues Apply to Only One
of Nine Respondents, and Resolution of the Is-
sues Would Not Affect the Rights and Standing
of the Other Respondents ......................c.c00005 9
I 0 caica nici cassnniydvasisiindevewseuecusenssocgacess 14
APPENDIX
1. Affidavit of Michael McDowell, dated July 24,
Ma i ates ca vccovcvnidiconavanissGsesesone App. 1
2. Letter from Craven Crowell, Chairman, Board
of Directors TVA, to Hon. Fred Thompson,
United States Senate, November 4, 1999......... App. 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page
Letter from John H. Hankinson, Jr., Regional
Administrator of the EPA, to Edward S. Chris-
tenbury, TVA General Counsel, May 4, 2000.... App. 8
List of current TVPPA members ....................... App. 12
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Department of Commerce v. United States House of
Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999)... eeeeeeeeee 10
Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs
v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297
CRUMNO) xinainnssenciivihanet ileusibarcicansas ntandlie uate een 10
Southwestern Pennsylvania Growth Alliance v.
Browner, 144 F.3d 984 (6th Cir. 1998) .............cccccceeeeee 13
State of New York, et al. v. United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Docket No. 02-1387............... 7
Tennessee Valley Authority v. United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, 278 F.3d 1184 (11th
SAE ROD sansinivindukiiniiescees eee passim
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Whitman, 336 F.3d
ESOC (TIE CA, BOD cosesiinecscssexscevinraactniaeseenn 1, 3, 5, 6, 8
United States v. Duke Energy Corporation, 278
F.Supp. 200 GIO CAD. BUA, DOOD). cssssccceccssesvensersaceseessasnn 7
United States v. Ohio Edison Company, 276 F.Supp.
BE BSP (S.EP. ORS BO Dv cvcrersscevesvaswunexsesenssactatresemencareens 7
STATUTES
BE UGGS. es aisxcionistchsasssondbendvgesaaseensemaaa ee ena 11
GE UI TRI, Fre secvsccosenecvinates eadeueaetecs ae 1
OR BDAS. FF GED cstiisinvdectonecnccncpuaiaaaoee 3
68 Fed.Reg. 61,248-61,280 (October 27, 2008).............0006 7
——— ee
PRIOR COURT OPINIONS
TVPPA and the named distributors request that this '
Court deny this Petition for writ of certiorari seeking
review of the final judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (hereinafter “Eleventh
Circuit”) issued on June 24, 2003. The judgment of the
Eleventh Circuit is reported as Tennessee Valley Authority
v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2003) (TVA ID),
reprinted in Pet. App., pp. 1la-50a. An earlier ruling on key
jurisdictional issues is reported as Tennessee Valley Au-
thority v. U.S. E.P.A., 278 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2002) (TVA
I), reprinted in Pet. App., pp. 51a-99a.
4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petition seeks review of a final judgment issued
on June 24, 2003, by the Eleventh Circuit.
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Petitioner United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (“EPA”) has included pertinent provisions of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7401, et seq., in the appendix
to its Petition.
¢
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
| TVPPA and Distributor Respondents
TVPPA is a nonprofit corporation representing the
interests of 108 municipal and 50 member-owned, non-profit
electric cooperative distributors of electrical power.
(McDowell Aff., 92, TVPPA App., pp. 1-2; Listing of
TVPPA members, TVPPA App., pp. 12-18). All but one of
these municipal and cooperative electrical systems pur-
chase virtually all of their energy and power needs from
the TVA. They resell this electricity to residents and
businesses of the TVA region.” This region includes almost
all of Tennessee and parts of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky,
Mississippi, North Carolina, and Virginia, and contains a
population of nearly 8,000,000 people. (Jd.) TVPPA repre-
sents the interests of its members on a variety of matters
relating to the TVA. (McDowell Aff., 7 3, TVPPA App.,
p. 2).
Respondent Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division is
an agency of the City of Memphis, Tennessee, and Respon-
dent Chattanooga Electric Power Board is an agency of the
City of Chattanooga, Tennessee. Respondents Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Division and Chattanooga Electric
Power Board are two of the largest municipal purchasers
of TVA electric power.
Respondents Middle Tennessee Electric Membership
Corporation, North Georgia Electric Membership Corpora-
tion, and Volunteer Energy Cooperative’ are member-owned,
* TVPPA members provide the electricity needs of all of the
residents and businesses of the TVA region, except for a few extremely
large industrial customers and certain federal facilities that are served
directly by the TVA. In the TVA region, TVA is responsible for genera-
tion and high-voltage transmission of electricity, while the TVPPA
members are responsible for distribution networks that deliver
electricity to the ultimate consumers.
* The name of this cooperative has changed from “Volunteer
Electric Cooperative” since the filing of its petition for review.
non-profit electric cooperatives serving large geographic
areas in Tennessee and Georgia. Respondents Middle
Tennessee Electric Membership Corporation, North
Georgia Electric Membership Corporation, and Volunteer
Energy Cooperative are the three largest purchasers of
TVA power operating as electric cooperatives.
Proceedings Below and Facts of Case
This “bizarre case™ presents a unique set of facts and
issues and a conclusion below that provide no need for the
Court’s review.
This case arose out of an allegation of the EPA begin-
ning in 1999 that efforts by the TVA and other utilities to
repair and replace deteriorating equipment violated the
Clean Air Act’s New Source Review (“NSR”) provisions.
The EPA initiated the enforcement effort after concluding
that power plant maintenance activities undertaken by
the utilities over a twenty-year period violated the NSR
requirements. The EPA brought civil enforcement actions
against all of the targeted utilities other than the TVA.
Instead of initiating a civil enforcement action against the
TVA, the EPA issued a series of Administrative Compli-
ance Orders (“ACOs”) to the TVA under Section 113(a) of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7413(a).
After the sixth amended ACO was issued to the TVA
by the EPA, petitions for review were filed by the TVA,
“The characterization is that of the Eleventh Circuit in its
discussion of the problem of judicial review of the EPA’s attempted use
of Administrative Compliance Orders to enforce the requirements of the
Clean Air Act. TVA IT, 336 F.3d at 1251. (Pet. App., p. 28a).
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TVPPA, Alabama Power Company and Duke Energy
Corporation. After the EPA announced its decision on May
4, 2000 to refuse to stay or withdraw the sixth ACO, the
TVA, TVPPA, Alabama Power Company and Duke Energy
Corporation filed on May 5, 2000, their second petitions for
review of the May 4 ruling. (Pet. App., pp. 54a, n.1, and
90a-98a).°
Although the EPA refused to stay the sixth amended
ACO, the EPA announced in its May 4, 2000 letter that it
would “reconsider” the Compliance Order by creating an
unique administrative review procedure to be undertaken
by the EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board (“EAB”)
(Hankinson Letter, May 4, 2000, TVPPA App., pp. 8-11).
The EAB is comprised of persons appointed by the EPA’s
Administrator. The EAB appointed an administrative law
judge to collect testimony and argument, under a proce-
dure that had never before been used by the EPA.® The
EPA's May 4 letter stated “while this process is proceeding,
the current Order will remain in effect and I fully expect
that TVA will comply with its conditions.” (Id.) The cost to
the TVA for complying with the terms of the Compliance
Order that would “remain in effect” would exceed one
billion dollars ($1,000,000,000). (McDowell Aff., J 7, and
Crowell Letter, November 4, 1999, TVPPA App., pp. 4-7).
* The 158 non-profit municipal and cooperative utilities that
comprise the TVPPA purchase virtually all of their power requirements
from the TVA and would be principally responsible for paying for costs
that TVA would incur for additional emissions control measures
demanded by the EPA. TVA J, 278 F.3d at 1208. (Pet. App., pp. 96a-98a).
_* The administrative law judge later described his task as “an
invented . .. ad hoc procedure .. . [that was] not described in any rule
or regulation or statute.” (Pet. App., p. 18a).
Ys a il
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This additional cost would require a 14 percent increase in
electricity rates charged TVPPA members, and could limit
economic growth in the TVA region. (Jd.)
The EPA’s “invented ... ad hoc procedure” had proce-
| dural limitations that robbed the proceeding of any fun-
damental fairness. (TVA IJ, 336 F.3d at 1245-47). (Pet.
App. pp., 16a-19a). Predictably, the unique proceeding
resulted in the issuance of what the EPA described as a
“final adjudication,” restating most of the substantive
requirements imposed by the first six ACOs. Petitions
challenging the EAB Order were timely filed by the TVA,
TVPPA, TVPPA members Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Division, Electric Power Board of Chattanooga, Middle
Tennessee Electric Membership Corporation, North
Georgia Electric Membership Corporation, and Volunteer
Energy Cooperative (hereinafter “TVPPA Respondents”),
as well as by interconnected utilities Alabama Power
Company and Duke Energy Corporation.
In an initial opinion (TVA J),° the Eleventh Circuit
held that the EAB Order was a final agency action by the
EPA and that the dispute between the EPA and the TVA
was justiciable, in spite of the arguments to the contrary
by the EPA and the Attorney General. The Court corrected
the EPA’s misimpression that it could not bring a civil
enforcement action against the TVA because of the TVA’s
status as a federal corporation. The Court of Appeals held
that the TVPPA Respondents and the interconnected
utilities had standing to bring their separate petitions for
” See the Eleventh Circuit’s discussion of this “final adjudication”
by the EAB at TVA II, 336 F.3d at 1245-47. (Pet. App., pp. 16a-19a).
* TVA I, 278 F.3d 1184 (Pet. App., pp. 51a-99a).
6
review. TVA I, 278 F.3d at 1205-09. (Pet. App., pp. 89a-
98a).
In a second opinion after further briefing and argu-
ment (TVA II), the Eleventh Circuit held that the EPA’s
unique use of ACOs as an enforcement tool against the
TVA was unconstitutional, because there was no meaning-
ful opportunity for the TVA and others affected by the
ACOs to challenge whether the conduct underlying the
ACO actually took place or whether the alleged conduct
amounted to a Clean Air Act violation. Thus, the Court of
Appeals held that the unconstitutional EPA ACO was not
a final order that could be enforced or that could be the
subject of a petition for review. The Eleventh Circuit
dismissed the petitions for review and taxed costs against
the TVA and the other petitioners. TVA IJ, 336 F.3d at
1260- (Pet. App. p. 46a).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Petition for writ of certiorari should be denied
because it seeks review of a fact situation and EPA en-
forcement procedures that are unique and are not likely to
be repeated. This “bizarre case” has no general application
to the EPA’s enforcement authority or procedures.
The Petition’s second and third issues presented for
review, concerning the justiciability of the case and the
TVA’s independent litigating authority, do not even need to
be reached for the Court to conclude its review of the
* TVA II, 336 F.3d 1236. (Pet. App., pp. 1a-50a).
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merits of this case. The presence of TVPPA and its named
members, and of Alabama Power Company and Duke
Energy Corporation, ensure that this litigation would go
forward even without the presence of the TVA in the case.
Consequently, review of these issues should be denied as
well.
+
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
I. This “Bizarre Case” Will Have No General
Impact on the EPA or Those it Regulates.
The unique enforcement strategy pursued by the EPA
against the TVA has not been applied by the EPA in
enforcement actions initiated against other utilities for
similar alleged violations of the EPA’s New Source Review
(“NSR”) regulations.” Indeed, since the EPA initiated its
NSR enforcement actions in 1999, the EPA has issued new
NSR regulations under which the TVA actions that were
challenged by the EPA unquestionably would be lawful.”
Assuming that the new EPA interpretation of the Clean
Air Act’s NSR requirements survives a pending challenge,
there would be no basis for the EPA’s initiation of new
enforcement actions under its previous NSR interpreta-
tions. Nevertheless, should the EPA believe it appropriate
*° See, e.g., United States v. Duke Energy Corporation, 278 F.Supp.
2d 619 (M.D. N.C. 2003) and United States v. Ohio Edison Co., 276
F.Supp. 2d 829 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
" 68 Fed.Reg. 61,248-61,280 (October 27, 2003). The new NSR
Regulations are being challenged in litigation pending in the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. State of New York, et al. v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Docket No. 02-1387.
to continue its prior assertion that the TVA has violated
NSR requirements through past maintenance activities,
the Eleventh Circuit clearly held that the EPA can bring a
civil enforcement action against the TVA, just as it has
done against many other utilities.” The EPA has no need
to use the ad hoc and inadequate ACO procedure that the
Eleventh Circuit found constitutionally wanting.”
The EPA acknowledged in the proceeding below that
its normal procedure was to use an ACO as a vehicle for
asserting its position concerning the existence and nature
of a Clean Air Act violation. If the subject of the ACO
disagreed with the EPA’s position, the EPA would bring a
civil enforcement action under 42 U.S.C. §7413(b). TVA II,
336 F.3d at 1239 n.2, 1245 n.19, and 1260-61 (Barkett
concurring). (Pet. App., pp. 2a, 14a-15a, and 46a-49a). This
is precisely the procedure that the EPA can continue to
pursue under the decision of the court below.
The EPA sought to single out the TVA for the applica-
tion of a unique enforcement procedure. The decision
below addresses no EPA enforcement authority or proce-
dure that has ever been applied to any other party. TVA II,
336 F.3d at 1246. (Pet. App., p. 18a). The decision simply
and correctly held that the EPA cannot use the “ad hoc...
* TVA I, 278 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2002). (Pet. App., pp. 51a-99a).
’* The EPA explained that it normally uses the ACO to assert its
position on an enforcement issue. “In most instances, if a recipient
disputes or defies the [ACO], the EPA can choose to bring a judicial
enforcement action.” TVA II, 336 F.3d at 1245, n.19. (Pet. App., pp. 14a-
15a). The EPA asserted that it invented a unique, new procedure for its
dispute with the TVA, because of its belief that it could not bring a civil
enforcement action against the TVA.
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SRS ‘NC a. RL INIT en smn etm
a RS BI AS AN IEA COE. wa OO ei
9
invented” procedure that deprived the TVA and the other
Respondents of their rights to meaningful due process.
This “bizarre case” established no principle of general
application, other than the principle of fairness.
The EPA achieved the result that it sought below, the
dismissal of the petitions challenging its ACOs, because
the ACOs were not final agency actions. This Court should
not grant the Petition simply to permit the EPA to chal-
lenge the reasoning that the Eleventh Circuit used in
reaching the result that the EPA sought.
II. The Court Should Not Grant Certiorari to
Address the Petition’s Second and Third
Questions Because These Issues Apply to Only
One of Nine Respondents, and Resolution of
the Issues Would Not Affect the Rights and
Standing of the Other Respondents.
The Petition cites as its second question presented for
review whether a dispute between two executive branch
agencies, such as the TVA and the EPA, presents a justici-
able case or controversy. The third question presented in
the Petition is whether the TVA has independent litigating
authority to bring this case. Neither of these issues should
be the basis for the Court’s grant of certiorari, because of
the presence in this case of the TVPPA Respondents and
the interconnected utilities, Alabama Power Company and
Duke Energy Corporation. Each of these non-TVA Respon-
dents was held to have independent standing to challenge
the EPA's orders. TVA I, 278 F.3d at 1205-09. (Pet. App.,
pp. 89a-98a).
As the Supreme Court has previously held, the exis-
tence of a justiciable controversy between at least two of
10
the parties ensures that the case satisfies the Article II
requirements. See, e.g., Department of Commerce v. U.S.
House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 329-30 (1999); and
Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v.
Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 303-305
(1983) (holding that presence of one party with standing
assures that controversy before the court is justiciable).
Even if the TVA were no longer a part~ to this litigation,
the action would have proceeded because of the injury
caused by the EPA’s actions to the TVPPA Respondents,
Alabama Power Company, and Duke Energy Corporation.
The Eleventh Circuit correctly found that the TVPPA
Respondents and the named distributors (and Alabama
Power Company and Duke Energy Corporation) satisfied
the constitutional and prudential standing requirements.
TVA I, 278 F.3d at 1205-09. (Pet. App., pp. 89-98). In its
Petition, the EPA did not present the Eleventh Circuit’s
ruling on the issue of standing as a question for review,
thus conceding the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusions concern-
ing the standing of the non-TVA parties.
The record below was clear that the TVPPA Respon-
dents have standing to pursue correction of the EPA
enforcement action that significantly harmed their inter-
ests. TVPPA and its members submitted to the Eleventh
Circuit the affidavit of Michael McDowell with attach-
ments in support of their position on this issue (McDowell
Aff., TVPPA App., pp. 1-4). This evidence was unchal-
lenged and uncontroverted by the EPA.
The record below established not only the standing of
the individual TVPPA members, but also the representa-
tional standing of TVPPA. TVPPA represents the interests
of the named distributors and its other members in a wide
—
sc A SE RECTORS AMR, CREASE SEES RR ES A APSA SSS ESSE! SPS II ESS PN cone esr
11
range of activities relating to the TVA. (McDowell Aff., J 3,
TVPPA App, p. 2). For example, several TVPPA commit-
tees (comprised of TVPPA member system representatives)
are operated under the direction of the TVPPA Board of
Directors, including (a) TVPPA’s Rates & Contracts Com-
mittee, which handles matters relating to terms, condi-
tions and rates of the power supply contracts between
TVPPA member systems and the TVA; (b) TVPPA’s Power
Supply Planning Committee, which handles matters
relating to short and long-term power supply issues with
the TVA; and (c) TVPPA’s Governmental Relations Com-
mittee, which handles matters relating to state and
federal legislation impacting the TVA and TVPPA member
systems. (Jd.) TVPPA is actively involved in other matters
relating to the TVA as well. These petitions for review filed
_ by TVPPA are germane to and consistent with the long-
standing involvement of TVPPA in representing its mem-
bers in matters relating to the TVA. (/d.)
The TVA is a federal corporation .reated by the 1 \
Act of 1933, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §831, et seq. (the “TVA
Act”). Under the TVA Act, the TVA has a statutory obliga-
tion to provide power at rates that are as low as feasible.
16 U.S.C. $831n-4(f). At the same time, the TVA Act
requires the TVA to charge adequate rates for the energy
and capacity that it supplies. (Id.) The TVA power system
is financed through the issuance of revenue bonds, which
are not obligations of the United States, and from power
revenues; and it receives no federal appropriations for its
programs. 16 U.S.C. §831n-4.
One hundred fifty-eight (158) TVPPA member systems
have entered into long-term wholesale power and supply
contracts with the TVA that require each system to
12
purchase all of its requirements of energy and capacity
from the TVA. (McDowell Aff., | 4, TVPPA App., pp. 2-3).”
In fiscal year 1999, TVPPA members purchased 100
percent of their electric energy requirements from the
TVA, representing approximately 83 percent of the electric
energy produced by the TVA. (McDowell Aff., J 4, TVPPA
App., pp. 2-3). Under these long-term all-requirement
contracts, the TVA has the right to adjust or change
wholesale and retail rates during the term of the contract
in order to assure the TVA’s ability to continue to supply
the power requirements of the TVPPA member systems
and the TVA’s other customers on a financially sound
basis. (McDowell Aff., ] 5, TVPPA App., p. 3).
One hundred and eight (108)"° members of TVPPA are
municipal governments in Tennessee, Kentucky, Alabama,
Mississippi, and North Carolina thai buy energy and
capacity from the TVA. (McDowell Aff., | 6, TVPPA App.,
pp. 3-4). These municipal governments rely upon the
availability of low-cost electricity purchased at wholesale
from the TVA to assist them in economic development
efforts. (/d.) These municipal governments, and the
communities they represent, would suffer an economic
disadvantage compared to other communities by the
increase in the TVA’s power costs if the TVA were required
‘’ The number of TVPPA member systems has changed due to a
merger of two systems since the filing of Mr. McDowell’s affidavit, and
now numbers 158.
° See, footnote 14. There are currently 58 municipal members of
TVPPA.
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carrie a a IY ins ee a IE AD sos Rea > locemaineN ERAN
A a Sati ee SS ee. OE
13
to comply with the EPA ACOs.” (Jd.) This economic disad-
vantage also is concrete and imminent.
The costs of compliance with the EPA ACOs that
TVPPA members would be statutorily and contractually
obligated to pay and the economic disadvantage that
TVPPA members would suffer through increased rates
constitute the concrete and imminent injury to TVPPA
members that TVPPA Respondents sought to redress in
the petitions filed below.”
Therefore, because TVPPA and the named distributors
are proper parties in this litigation, the Supreme Court
need not even consider whether the dispute between the
TVA and the EPA would present a justiciable case or
controversy if the TVA and the EPA were the only parties.
Likewise, the Court need not consider whether the TVA
has independent litigating authority to have brought the
case below, because eight other parties, including the
TVPPA Respondents, unquestionably had standing and
the legal right to pursue this litigation. The procedural
posture of this case makes the review of either of these
latter two issues unnecessary. Accordingly, the Petition
should be denied.
© See, Southwestern Pennsylvania Growth Alliance v. Browner, 144
F.3d 984 (6th Cir. 1998).
’ The Eleventh Circuit found that the increased rates that TVPPA
members would have to pay conferred standing on TVPPA Respondents.
Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit did not need to consider whether
the economic disadvantage to be suffered by communities would also
confer standing. TVA J, 278 F.3d at 1209 n.32. (Pet. App., p. 98a).
14
CONCLUSION
The TVPPA Respondents respectfully request that the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by the EPA be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
CARLOS C. SMITH,
Counsel of Record
FREDERICK L. HITCHCOCK
J. ROBIN ROGERS
MARK W. SMITH
STRANG, FLETCHER, CARRIGER, WALKER,
HODGE & SMITH, PLLC
400 Krystal Building
One Union Square
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402
(423) 265-2000
Attorneys for Tennessee Valley Public
Power Association, Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Division, Electric Power
Board of Chattanooga, Middle Tennessee
Electric Membership Corporation, North
Georgia Electric Membership Corporation,
and Volunteer Electric Cooperative
J. MAXWELL WILLIAMS
CHARLOTTE KNIGHT GRIFFIN
P.O. Box 430
Memphis, Tennessee 38101-0430
(901) 528-4343
Co-Counsel for Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Division
15
HENRY C. THARPE, JR.,
SPONCLER & THARPE, LLC
P.O. Box 398
Dalton, Georgia 30722-0398
(706) 275-7326
Co-Counsel for North Georgia
Electric Membership Corporation
JAMES C. COPE
MURFREE, COPE, HUDSON & SCARLETT
P.O. Box 884
Murfreesboro, Tennessee 37133-0884
Co-Counsel for Middle Tennessee
Electric Membership Corporation
!
LEED A IES LAE, GOINGS SLE AN AAP EERE D8 BONE MCAS SRE ABE NSA RE EE RBIGNY SIE AE ER. EL RAO A HN
App. l
APPENDIX
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
TENNESSEE VALLEY PUBLIC
POWER ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner
Docket No.
i 00-12349-E
)
)
)
)
)
UNITED STATES ENVIRON- )
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
and JOHN H. HANKINSON, JR., ?
Regional Administrator, )
UNITED STATES ENVIRON- )
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ?
REGION IV, |
)
Respondents
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL MCDOWELL
STATE OF TENNESSEE:
COUNTY OF HAMILTON:
Comes the Affiant, being duly sworn, deposes as says
as follows:
1. My name is Mike McDowell. I am over 18 years of
age and have personal knowledge of all matters set forth
herein.
2. I am the Executive Director and Chief Custodian
of Records of the Tennessee Valley Public Power Associa-
tion (“T'VPPA”). TVPPA, a Tennessee non-profit corpora-
tion, represents the interests of the 110 municipal and 50
rural electric cooperative distributors of electrical power
listed on Attachment 1. All but one of these municipal and
—
App. 2
cooperative electrical systems distribute and sell power
purchased from TVA to the residents and businesses of the
TVA area. This area includes almost all of Tennessee and
parts of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North
Carolina, and Virginia, and contains a population of
nearly 8,000,000.
3. TVPPA represents the interests of its members in
a wide range of activities relating to TVA. For example,
several TVPPA Committees (comprised of TVPPA member
system representatives) operate under the direction of the
TVPPA Board of Directors, including (a) TVPPA’s Rates
and Contracts Committee, which handles matters relating
to the terms, conditions and rates of the power supply
contracts between TVPPA member systems and TVA; (b)
TVPPA’s Power Supply Planning Committee, which
handles matters relating to short term and long term
power supply issues with TVA; and (3) TVPPA’s Govern-
mental Relations Committee, which handles matters
relating to state and federal legislation impacting TVA
and TVPPA member systems. TVPPA is actively involved
in other matters relating to TVA as well. These Petitions
for Review are germane to and consistent with the long-
standing involvement of TVPPA in representing its mem-
bers in matters relating to TVA.
4. One hundred fifty-nine (159) TVPPA member
systems have entered into long term wholesale power
supply contracts with TVA that require each system to
purchase all of its requirements of energy and capacity
from TVA, with the remaining one member being eligible
to purchase wholesale power from TVA but not doing so
presently. Copies of the wholesale power contract entered
into by TVA with TVPPA members Memphis Light, Gas &
Water, Joe Wheeler Electric Membership Corporation, and
App. 3
the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson
County are attached as Attachment 2 to my Affidavit. The
wholesale power contracts of other TVPPA are substan-
tially similar to those included in Exhibit 2. While TVA
has recently given TVPPA member systems a limited
opportunity to arrange for the purchase of smal! blocks of
power from sources other than TVA for transmission into
the TVA system, to date no purchases have been made
under that program. During the latest TVA fiscal year,
TVPPA members purchased one hundred percent (100%)
of their electric energy requirements from TVA, represent-
ing approximately eighty-three percent (83%) of the
electric energy produced by TVA. TVA’s remaining output
of electric energy is purchased by very large industrial
customers directly served by TVA, by federal agencies, and
by others located in the same service area as TVPPA
members and which have a major impact upon the econ-
omy and welfare of the region served by TVA and TVPPA
members.
5. Under these long-term all-requirements contracts,
TVA has the right to adjust or change wholesale and retail
rates during the term of the contract in order to assure
TVA’s ability to continue to supply the power require-
ments of the TVPPA member systems and TVA’s other
customers on a financially sound basis, including the
objective that power shall be sold at rates as low as feasi-
ble. As a result, TVPPA member systems and the custom-
ers that they serve are ultimately responsible for paying
for most of the increases in TVA’s costs resulting from
TVA’s compliance with the EPA Order.
6. One Hundred Nine (109) members of TVPPA are
municipa! governments in T2nnessee, Kentucky, Alabama,
Mississippi, Georgia, and North Carolina that buy energy
5
App. 4
and capacity from TVA. These municipal governments rely
upon the availability of low-cost electricity purchased at
wholesale from TVA to assist them in economic develop-
ment efforts and will suffer an economic disadvantage
compared to other communities if TVA complies with the
EPA Order and TVA’s power costs are increased. Busi-
nesses, particularly small businesses, farmers, residential
ratepayers, and municipalities that receive their electric
service from TVPPA member systems organized and
operating as rural electric cooperatives also will be sub-
stantially and adversely affected by compliance with the
EPA Order.
7. TVPPA requested information from TVA relating
to the financial impact of compliance with the EPA Order
and was furnished a copy of the report submitted by TVA
to various members of Congress which is attached as
Attachment 3 to my Affidavit.
/s/ Michael McDowell
Michael McDowell
STATE OF TENNESSEE:
COUNTY OF HAMILTON:
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 24 day of July,
2000.
WITNESS my hand and notarial seal at my office in
Chattanooga, Tennessee, this__ day of July, 2000.
/s/ Marilyn Sartin
Notary Public
My commission expires: 3/7/01
App. 5
[LOGO] ATTACHMENT 3
Tennessee Valley Authority, 400 West Summit Hill
Drive, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902-1499
Craven Crowell
Chairman, Board of Directors
November 4, 1999
The Honorable Fred Thompson
United States Senate
523 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-4204
Dear Fred:
Yesterday, the Environmental Protection Ag ancy an-
nounced that it was taking action to require the instal-
lation of new pollution control equipment on coal fired
power plants operated by seven private utilities and
TVA. We wanted to share with you TVA’s views on this
action.
TVA agrees with EPA that pollution from coal-fired
power plants must be reduced further if the Tennessee
Valley region and the rest of the nation are to continue
to improve air quality. In fact, last summer TVA became
the nation’s first utility to implement an aggressive NOx
reduction strategy which includes installing state-of-
the-art pollution controls on TVA’s largest coal plants.
This enormous investment will help reduce ozone prob-
lems in the Smokies, allow continued purchases of
Kentucky coal, and help Valley states meet their ozone
reduction strategies while allowing continued industrial
and economic development.
App. 6
So while we support EPA’s goal, we disagree with their
means of achieving it.
All utilities, including TVA, routinely repair and replace
broken equipment at their plants. It is through such
activities that we are able to maintain reliable electric
service to the public and why, last summer, TVA was
able to meet record demands for electricity in the Valley
without interrupting service. EPA is now saying that
such maintenance practices trigger the requirement to
install controls designed for new power plants. This is a
dramatic change in how_EPA has applied these re-
quirements in the past. Under this new interpretation,
EPA says that 80 to 90 percent of the utility industry is
in violation of its new source control regulations because
of maintenance projects over the last 20 years.
At TVA, the total cost of complying with this regulation
could exceed $1 billion. Indeed, the combination of
capital costs, interest expense, and ongoing operating
expenses would require a 14-percent rate increase. The
increased costs for every business and residence in the
region could limit economic growth.
Not only does this new interpretation threaten our
ability to continue to maintain reliable operation of our
units, but it potentially limits our ability to put controls
where they will do the most good. In the pollution
reduction plan we announced last summer, we put
control equipment on plants that would most help meet
the needs of the region, such as the efforts by Memphis,
Tennessee, and Louisville, Kentucky, to meet EPA’s air
quality health standards, and to address the problems
in the Smokies. Under EPA’s approach, controls would
be installed on plants where EPA thinks it can make its
App. 7
best legal case — without regard to the region’s air
quality problems.
We hope to be able to work with EPA on a resolution
that will allow us to continue to reduce TVA’s emissions
where and how it makes the most sense. We also want
to reach a resolution that will allow us to maintain unit
reliability and to continue to fully meet the public’s need
for electricity. It is also important that any resolution
treats TVA and our ratepayers no differently than other
utilities and their ratepayers.
I appreciate this opportunity to share our views with
you and will keep you informed of further developments.
Sincerely,
/s/ Craven
Craven Crowell
App. 8
[LOGO]
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
REGION 4
ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8960
May 4, 2000
Via Fax and overnight mail
Mr. Edward S. Christenbury
General Counsel
Tennessee Valley Authority
400 West Summit Hill Drive
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902-1499
Dear Mr. Christenbury:
On November 3, 1999, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (“EPA”) issued an Administrative Complli-
ance Order to the Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”)
pursuant to Sections 113 and 167 of the Clean Air Act
(“Act”). In that Order and its subsequent amendments
(collectively, the “Order”), EPA identified numerous
violations of New Source Review (“NSR”) and New
Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”) of the Clean
Air Act and required that TVA conduct certain actions
to rectify these violations. As provided in Section
113(a)(4) of the Act, TVA requested a conference with
me to discuss the Order and its allegations and a meet-
ing was held on December 20, 1999. At that meeting,
TVA requested that EPA reconsider and stay the Order
based on the facts and legal analysis presented by TVA
during the meeting and the detailed written response
App. 9
submitted to EPA, entitled “TVA response to adminis-
trative order.”
Over the past four months, EPA has met with TVA
to attempt resolution of the differences between our two
agencies regarding the allegations and actions required
by the Order. Based on the discussions to date, we have
not been able to reach a negotiated settlement address-
ing EPA’s allegations. In addition, our agencies have not
been able to agree upon a dispute resolution process
that would provide an analysis of the factual and legal
issues currently in contention in a time frame consistent
with the Act. As you are aware, Section 113(a)(4) of the
Clean Air Act requires that an order issued under this
section shall require the person to whom it was issued to
comply with the requirement within one year of issu-
ance and that the administrative order shall be ngnre-
newable.
I am hereby granting your request to reconsider the
Administrative Compliance Order. It is my understand-
ing that, based on my request, the Administrator has
directed the EAB to conduct the reconsideration pro-
ceedings by completing the factual record collection on
August 1, 2000, and by rendering a decision, including
findings of fact and conclusions of law, no later than
September 15, 2000. I realize that TVA has requested
the opportunity for oral testimony to be included in the
record and the EAB will provide for such an opportu-
nity. While this process is proceeding, the current Order
will remain in effect and I fully expect that TVA will
comply with its conditions. Compliance with the Order
while the administrative process is ongoing is not
burdensome to TVA because compliance in the interim
will not require any capital expenditures by TVA before
5 ee
App. 10
the rendering of a decision on TVA’s challenges to the
Order on September 15th.
The EAB has been asked to schedule an initial
conference with TVA and the EPA enforcement staff as
soon as possible to discuss scheduling of information
exchange and the upcoming hearing in July. We intend
to propose the following schedule to the EAB at the
initial conference: (1) by no later than May 31, 2000,
EPA will provide to TVA a core set of documents rele-
vant to the Order and the issues set forth by TVA on
December 20, 1999; (2) between the date of this letter
and June 30, 2000, TVA and EPA enforcement staff may
exchange document requests and interrogatories, and
take depositions of persons who may have information
relevant to the factual and legal issues surrounding the
Order; (3) on or about July 15th, a hearing no longer
than six days shall occur to adduce relevant oral testi-
mony; and (4) no later than July 31st, the parties shall
' proffer documents and hearing transcripts that form the
basis of their legal and factual arguments as well as
legal memoranda in support of their claims. Of course
there is no assurance that the EAB will accept our
proposed schedule.
This process will provide a fair opportunity for each
agency to present the central facts and legal arguments
to a forum with expertise in this area. In addition, this
process satisfies both TVA’s requests for an opportunity
to conduct discovery of EPA and an opportunity to
present oral testimony relating to its contentions. When
this process is complete, both EPA and TVA will have
had the opportunity to understand each other's claims
and the basis for those claims, and the EAB will have
rendered a decision on the merits of those claims.
App. 11
Members of your staff may contact Gary Guzy,
General Counsel for EPA, to discuss the details of the
federal administrative dispute resolution process set
forth in this letter until the initial scheduling conference
with the EAB. Although this process will involve the
commitment of substantial resources by both our agen-
cies, I believe that the end result will be a full and
complete record and a fair and reasoned decision on the
issues surrounding EPA’s Administrative Compliance
Order.
Sincerely,
/s/ John H. Hankinson, Jr.
John H. Hankinson, Jr.
Regional Administrator
cc: Steve Herman, Assistant Administrator
Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance
Gary Guzy, General Counsel for EPA
App. 12
TVPPA Member List As of March 22, 2004:
COMPANY
Aberdeen Electric Department
Albertville Municipal Utilities
Board
City of Alcoa Electric Department
Alcorn County Electric Power
Association
Amory Water & Electric
Appalachian Electric Cooperative
Arab Electric Cooperative, Inc.
City of Athens Electric Department
Athens Utilities Board
Benton County Electric System
Benton Electric System
Bessemer Electric Service
Blue Ridge Mountain Electric
Membership Corporation
Bolivar Electric Department
Bowling Green Municipal Utilities
Bristol Tennessee Electric System
Brownsville Utility Department
Caney Fork Electric Cooperative,
Inc.
Carroll County Electric
Department
Central Electric Power
Association
Electric Power Board of
Chattanooga
Cherokee Electric Cooperative
Chickamauga Electric System
Chickasaw Electric Cooperative
Clarksville Department of
Electricity
General Manager
Donald M. Jackson
Larry Harvey
Eddie Tramel
James D. Nanney, Jr.,
CPE
Tony Swan
William A. Underwood
Joe Van Bunch
Gary Scroggins
Eric Newberry
Gary L. Stone, CPE
Gray Cassity
Charles W. Nevins, CPE
Roy G. Satterfield, Jr.
John Fortune, AdvCPE
Larry V. Miller, P.E.
Dr. R. Michael Browder,
P.E
John F. Sharpe, CPE
Hubert A. King, III
Lynn D. Compton
Paul D. Long
H.E. DePriest
Jimmy Reeves
John Culpepper
Paul Harris
Kenneth W. Spradlin,
AdvCPE
App. 13
COMPANY General Manager
Cleveland Utilities Tom Wheeler
Clinton Utilities Board Greg Fay
Columbia Power & Water Systems James O. Clark, CPE
Columbus Light & Water Fred M. Hayslette, CPE
Cookeville Electric Department Tony Peek, CPE
Courtland Electric Department Prentiss Morris
Covington Electric System
Cullman Electric Cooperative
Cullman Power Board
Cumberland Electric Membership
Corporation
City of Dayton Electric
Department
Decatur Utilities
Dickson Electric Department
Duck River Electric
Membership Corporation .
Dyersburg Electric System
East Mississippi Electric
Power Association
Elizabethton Electric System
Erwin Utilities
Etowah Utilities
Fayetteville Public Utilities
City of Florence Utilities
Forked Deer Electric --
Cooperative
Fort Loudoun Electric
Cooperative
Fort Payne Improvement
Authority
4-County Electric Power
Association
' :
Robert D. Hagewood,
CPE
Grady Smith
Mike Manning, CPE
Carl W. Wilson
Frank Welch
Kem Carr -
James E. Peeler
James M. Allison
Jimmy Williamson
Albert M. Guy, Jr.
David Phillips Isaacs
Howard C. Brown,
AdvCPE
Gene Fulbright
Wayne D. Landreth
Jack M. Hilliard
Harold Willis
Robert R. Long, CPE
Danny Brisendine, PE
Allegra Brigham
App. 14
COMPANY
Franklin Electric Cooperative
Franklin Electric Plant Board
Fulton Electric System
Gallatin Department of
Electricity
Gibson Electric Membership
Corporation
Glasgow Electric Plant Board
Greeneville Light & Power System
Guntersville Electric Board
Harriman Utility Board
Hartselle Utilities
Hickman Electric Plant Board
Hickman-Fulton Co. Rural
Electric Cooperative Corp.
Holly Springs Electric Department
Holston Electric Cooperative
Hopkinsville Electric System
Humboldt Utilities
Huntsville Utilities
Jackson Energy Authority
Jellico Electric and Water Systems
Joe Wheeler Electric
Membership Corporation
Johnson City Power Board
Knoxville Utilities Board
LaFollette Utilities Board
Lawrenceburg Utility Systems
Lenoir City Utilities Board
Lewisburg Electric System
Lexington Electric System
Loudon Utilities
General Manager
A.H. Akins
Larry K. Musick, P.E.
David T. Moss
William Draper, CPE
Daniel Rodamaker
William J. Ray
William M. Carroll,
AdvCPE
Larry Brown
Charles B. Flora, III,
CPE
George Adair
James H. Eakes
Greg Grissom
Thomas M. Boone, Jr.
Larry E. Elkins
Austin B. Carroll, CPE
Stan Little
William C. Pippin
John W. Williams
John W. Leach
George Kitchens
Homer G’Fellers
Mintha E. Roach
Walter M. (Kenny)
Baird, Jr.
Ronnie Cato
Kenneth Dutton
Richard Turner
Ronnie Davis
W. Barry Baker
7
a ee es
App. 15
COMPANY
Louisville Utilities
City of Macon Electric Cooperative
Marshall-DeKalb Electric
Cooperative
City of Maryville Electric
Department
Mayfield Electric & Water System
McMinnville Electric System
Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Division
Meriwether Lewis Electric
Cooperative
Middle Tennessee Electric
Membership Corporation
Milan Department of
Public Utilities
Monroe County Electric
Power Association
Monticello Electric Plant Board
Morristown Utility Commission
Mountain Electric Cooperative,
Inc.
Mount Pleasant Power System
Murfreesboro Electric
Department
Murphy Power Board
Murray Electric System
Muscle Shoals Electric Board
Nashville Electric Service
Natchez Trace Electric Power
Association
New Albany Light, Gas & Water
Newbern Electric Water & Gas
General Manager
Tommy L. Kirkpatrick
Richard Schimmel
James W. Stewart
Baron Swafford
Marty Ivy
Rodney Boyd
Dr. James L. Netters
Harold G. Womble
Frank Jennings
David E. Scarbrough,
CPE
Hubert Elliott
Gary E. Dishman
William G. Swann
Joseph A. Thacker, III
CPE
Charles Gandy
Larry D. Kirk, CPE
John Carringer
Anthony V. (Tony)
Thompson
Rickey Thomas,
AdvCPE
Donald Kohanski
Joe F. Boehms
Harold G. Smith
Rosalind Green
teach has ee
cn ee
COMPANY
Newport Utilities Board
North Alabama Electric
Cooperative
North East Mississippi Electric
Power Association
North Georgia Electric
Membership Corporation
Northcentral Mississippi Electric
Power Association
Oak Ridge Electric Department
City of Okolona Electric
Department
City of Oxford Electric
Department
Paducah Power System
Paris Board of Public Utilities
Pennyrile Rural Electric
Cooperative Corporation
Philadelphia Utilities
Pickwick Electric Cooperative
Plateau Electric Cooperative
Pontotoc Electric Power
Association
Powell Valley Electric
Cooperative
Prentiss County Electric Power
Association
Princeton Electric Plant Board
Pulaski Electric System
Ripley Power and Light
Rockwood Electric Utility
General Manager
John Leland (Lee)
Baker, CPE
Bruce L. Purdy
Robert A. Collier
Ron Hutchins
Kevin Doddridge
Jack Suggs
Michael E. Parker
Lynn Robbins
David Clark, CPE
Charles R. Perry,
AdvCPE
Eston Glover, AdvCPE
John D. Burt, CPE
Karl Dudley, CPT,
CPE
John B. Seale, Jr.,
AdvCPE
Chuck Howell, CPE,
CPSv
Randell Myers
Ronny Rowland,
AdvCPE
John Humphries, P.E.
Ron Holcomb
Mike Allmand
Kendall Bear
4
RA RRS hl Sa at ARO +
COMPANY
Russellville Electric Board
Russellville Electric Plant Board
Sand Mountain Electric
Cooperative
Scottsboro Electric Power Board
Sequachee Valley Electric
Cooperative
Sevier County Electric System
Sheffield Utilities
Shelbyville Power System
Smithville Electric System
Town of Somerville Utility
Department
Southwest Tennessee Electric
Membership Corporation
Sparta Electric & Water System
Springfield Department of
Electricity
Starkville Electric System
Sweetwater Utilities Board
Tallahatchie Valley Electric
Power Association
Tarrant Electric Department
Tennessee Valley Electric
Cooperative
Tippah Electric Power
Association
Tishomingo County Electric
Power Association
Tombigbee Electric Power
Association
Trenton Light & Water
Department
General Manager
Steve DeFoor
Larry S. Wilcutt
Michael D. Simpson
James B. Sandlin,
AdvCPE
Robert W. Matheny
Howard E. Murrell
Jimmy Barnett, CPE
David Crowell, CPE
James C. Wall
Robert Glover
Jack Fox, CPE
Wayne Rogers, CPE
Robert A. Gardner
Edd Hattaway
Robert S. Bettis
Tom W. Underwood,
Jr., CPE
Rayburn Phillips
Charles Bevis
Sam Buchanan, CPE
Robert F. Grisham
William W. Long
Bret M. Fisher,
AdvCPE
App. 18
COMPANY
Tri-County Electric Membership
Corporation
Tri-State Electric Membership
Corporation
Tullahoma Board of Public
Utilities
City of Tupelo Light & Water
Tuscumbia Electricity
Department
Union City Electric System
Upper Cumberland Electric
Membership Corporation
Volunteer Energy Cooperative
Warren Rural Electric
Cooperative Corporation
City of Water Valley Electric
Department
Weakley County Municipal
Electric System
West Kentucky Rural Electric
Cooperative Corporation
City of West Point Electric
System
Winchester Utilities
General Manager
Paul Thompson
David J. Falls, CPE
Joe Loggins, P.E., CPE
Johnny N. Timmons
David B. Thornton
Jerry Bailey, CPE
Carl V. Brandt
William M. Buchanan
Gerald W. Hayes, CPE
Eddie Magee, CPSv
Faron L. Collins
David Smart
Dewel Brasher
Billy D. Garner
b Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
APR | 4 2004
No. 03-1162
ER: CLERK
Jn the Supreme Court of the Anited States
MICHAEL O. LEAVITT, ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONERS
Vv.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
THEODORE B. OLSON
ANNA WOLGAST Solicitor General
Acting General Counsel Counsel of Record
Environmental Protection Department of Justice
Agency Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
Washington, D.C. 20460 (202) 514-2217
GBE T AVAILABLE COPY
AES NERO CALE LE ERE RT OL PON ME ESSN BE
II.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EPA was not the “prevailing party” .......ccscsssecsssssssssssseeees
The court of appeals held an Act of Congress uncon-
stitutional based on a misinterpretation of the Clean
PEE BE -reirestitdiinialinseomiiamanian pocenboncicintiniaies
ON PE CCT aT
B. TVA’s independent litigation authority ..................
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA,
244 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 124 S. Ct. 983
OPO stcescsninnstnsiauchccshecsiibeiuiitapaisncbaiiihiitiaedasanebaiicibliasise
Allsteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 1994) ............
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) c.ccccccccccsccssssessessssesees
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) ..eccccccccccssesssessees eee
Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290 (1900) ceccccccoscesccssseees
Mathias v. WorldCom. Techs., Inc., 535 U.S. 682
UO csetecniseb atti ntieiasinhiaiitiieanee imminent
SED seecineipicsancntniciens ieinaninineeineneee
Solar Turbines, Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073
Paty TRIITTTE <arsishneiiinieicecelteeshtaciecancbbataeiiiiibncneaneatindnen
‘Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 US.
sl soca eT a
Constitution and statutes:
U.S. Const.:
Eee Oe ee
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.:
STA, PME sesteinipsicinsinndeaiscinetititiataitbtessinninabinoiaiens
(1)
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II
Statutes—Continued: Page
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2B U.S.C. 1252 (1982) ....0...ovsesconisossneessssecsssnevescssesssserssessessssssees 3
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Jn the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 03-1162
MICHAEL O. LEAVITT, ADMINISTRATOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PETITIONERS
Vv.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
The court of appeals held that “[t]he statutory scheme es-
tablished by Congress” on the basis of which the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) issued its Administrative
Compliance Orders (ACOs) in this case “is repugnant to the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,” Pet. App. 43a,
and separation-of-powers principles, id. at 44a. Because of
that constitutional holding, the court concluded that the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority (TVA) is “free to ignore the ACO”
because such orders “are legally inconsequential and do not
constitute final agency action.” Jd. at 3a. The court’s holding
that a substantial part of the EPA enforcement scheme is
unconstitutional rests on a mistaken reading of the Clean Air
Act, threatens the integrity of an important component of
the Act’s enforcement scheme, and conflicts with a decision
of this Court and decisions of two other courts of appeals.
Moreover, the court’s mistaken constitutional holding was
compounded by its error in rejecting two threshold obstacles
to this suit. Further review is warranted.
1 Respondents erroneously suggest (e.g., TVA Br. in Opp. 2 n.1) that
newly promulgated regulations demonstrate that TVA’s conduct did not
violate the Clean Air Act. Those regulations, which have been stayed
(1)
SS
2
I. EPA WAS NOT THE “PREVAILING PARTY”
TVA argues that further review is unwarranted because
the Eleventh Circuit dismissed TVA’s petition for review
and, in TVA’s view, EPA therefore prevailed below. In sup-
port of that contention, TVA cites (Br. in Opp. 7) the Court’s
statement in Mathias v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 535 U.S.
682, 684 (2002) (per curiam), that “[a]s a general rule, a party
may not appeal from a favorable judgment simply to obtain
review of findings it deems erroneous.”
Contrary to TVA’s assertions, however, EPA was not a
prevailing party below in any meaningful sense, and EPA is
not seeking review of a “favorable judgment.” The court of
appeals invalidated a key aspect of EPA’s enforcement
authority under the Clean Air Act. That unfavorable hold-
ing is an integral and essential element of the judgment
entered below.
Moreover, the statute authorizing certiorari jurisdiction in
this case allows “any party” to seek certiorari and is not lim-
ited to non-prevailing parties. 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). In Mathias,
the Court was careful to point out that the petitioners in that
case were “seek[ing] review of uncongenial findings not es-
sential to the judgment and not binding upon them in future
litigation.” 535 U.S. at 684.7 When, as here, the judgment
below is based on adverse holdings that are essential to the
judgment and are binding in future litigation, there is no bar
to this Court’s grant of a petition for certiorari.
This Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), considered an analogous issue in the context of the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction under now-repealed provisions
pending judicial review, have no relevance to this case, because they are
exclusively prospective in effect. See Pet. 3 n.1.
2 The Court in Mathias cited New York Telephone Co. v. Maltbie, 291
U.S. 645 (1934) (per curiam). That case involved an appeal, not a petition
for certiorari. Even in that context, the Court’s rationale for dismissing
the appeal was not unqualified. The Court noted, as it did in Mathias, that
the unfavorable aspects of the judgment sought to be appealed “are not to
be regarded as res judicata” in future proceedings. Ibid.
3
of 28 U.S.C. 1252 (1982).* In that case, certain parties filed a
motion to dismiss the government’s appeal on the ground
that the INS was not an “aggrieved party” because the INS
had “sought the invalidation of [the statute at issue] and the
Court of Appeals granted that relief.” 462 U.S. at 930. The
Court refused to dismiss the appeal, holding that “[w]hen an
agency of the United States is a party to a case in which the
Act of Congress it administers is held unconstitutional, it is
an aggrieved party for purposes of taking an appeal.” Jd. at
931. That principle applies a fortiori to cases involving cer-
tiorari. Indeed, in the context of certiorari before judgment,
the Court has repeatedly construed Section 1254(1) to
authorize review even at the request of a party who has
prevailed. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686 &
n.1 (1974) (citing cases).
Under those principles, EPA is an aggrieved party en-
titled to petition for certiorari in this case. The court of
- appeals held that, although the Clean Air Act authorizes
penalties for violation of ACOs, that portion of the Act is
unconstitutional. That holding was essential to—indeed, it
provided the sole basis for—the court’s dismissal of TVA’s
petition for review, and it effectively precludes EPA from
obtaining civil penalties for violations of Clean Air Act ACOs
in the Eleventh Circuit. Accordingly, there is no bar to
granting EPA’s petition for certiorari in this case.
Il. THE COURT OF APPEALS HELD AN ACT OF
CONGRESS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BASED ON A
MISINTERPRETATION OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The court of appeals’ constitutional decision was based on
its conclusion that “[t]he problem with ACOs stems from
their injunction-like legal status coupled with the fact that
3 Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 70 n.5 (1977)
(noting that grant of certiorari petition at request of prevailing party
“may * * * appear anomalous” but concluding that issue need not be ad-
dressed because of ruling vacating judgment below on certiorari petition
filed by losing party).
4
they are issued without an adjudication or meaningful judi-
cial review.” Pet. App. 6a-7a. As explained in the petition
(at 13-15), the merits of an EPA ACO under the Clean Air
Act are always subject to meaningful judicial review. The
court of appeals erred in finding a preclusion of judicial re-
view in the Clean Air Act, especially in light of the need for
courts to attempt to preserve—not impugn—the constitu-
tionality of statutes.
A. TVA does not defend the court of appeals’ conclusion
that meaningful judicial review of EPA orders is unavailable. |
Instead, TVA argues (Br. in Opp. 23) that “[t]he Eleventh
Circuit’s due process ruling is not premised on the absence of
judicial review,” but rather on “the absence of any statutory
procedures for adjudication before a final ACO that creates
liability for past conduct is issued.” TVA is mistaken.
The court of appeals never suggested that the absence of
statutorily mandated agency procedures alone would have
been sufficient to support its holding of unconstitutionality.
To the contrary, the court repeatedly emphasized that the
lack of opportunity for effective judicial review of EPA
orders under the Clean Air Act was essential to its holding.
The court stated that the problem was that orders are
“issued without adjudication or meaningful judicial review,”
Pet. App. 6a; that, in a judicial proceeding, the recipient of an
order “does not have a chance to contend that the EPA has
an incorrect view of the facts and law,” id. at 11a; that the
recipients of the order therefore “never get.an opportunity
to argue, before a neutral tribunal, that [there has been no
violation],” ibid.; and that “[t]he only real inquiry” in a
Judicial action regarding an EPA order “is whether the Ad-
ministrator possessed ‘any information’—a standard that is
less rigorous than the ‘probable cause’ standard found in the
criminal law setting,” id. at 30a. In the court’s view,
“{w]hether the Administrator’s facts are too thin to warrant
an adjudicated finding” of a violation “is irrelevant as far as
ACOs are concerned.” Jbid.
\ _
5
The court of appeals relied on those descriptions of the
Act’s supposed preclusion of effective judicial review to
reach its ultimate conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional.
As TVA states (Br. in Opp. 25), the court also referred to the
requirement of “a full and fair hearing before an impartial
tribunal.” Pet. App. 43a. But the court found that the op-
portunity for such a hearing was lacking because of its mis-
taken view that no judicial tribunal could meaningfully re-
view the substance of an EPA order under the Clean Air
Act. Moreover, the court’s alternative separation-of-powers
holding was equally clearly based on its conclusion that
“[w]ithout meaningful judicial review, the scheme works an
unconstitutional delegation of judicial power.” Id. at 45a
(emphasis added). See also ibid. (courts may review only
“whether the Administrator based her decision to issue the
ACO based upon ‘any information’ as opposed to no infor-
mation at all.’”). The court of appeals’ constitutional hold-
ings thus rest on its conclusion—not defended by TVA—that
the Act does not permit meaningful judicial review of Clean
Air Act orders.
Perhaps TVA means to argue that the lack of mandatory
statutory procedures for the issuance of Clean Air Act or-
ders is sufficient to establish a violation of the Due Process
Clause, even if meaningful judicial review is available. The
Act itself, however, expressly grants the recipient of an
order “an opportunity to confer with the Administrator con-
cerning the alleged violation” before an order may take ef-
fect, 42 U.S.C. 7413(a)(4); the agency may adopt such further
procedures as are appropriate (especially to save the Act
from unconstitutionality, see Pet. 15 n.5); and the availability
of meaningful (and appropriately tailored) judicial review
would be sufficient to ensure due process for the recipient in
any event. In this case, in particular, TVA’s complaints
about the lack of a statutorily mandated procedure could not
be sufficient to support the court of appeals’ holding, both
because TVA in fact had the benefit of a full agency adjudi-
cation, with substantial procedural protections and hearings,
6
and because TVA is not a “person” protected by the Due
Process Clause. See Pet. 4-5, 15 n.5. In any event, the court
of appeals did not rest its decision on the principle now
advocated by TVA. Further review is warranted to address
the court of appeals’ conclusion—apparently not supported
by any party to this case—that the Clean Air Act’s scheme
for enforcement of administrative orders is unconstitutional
because it precludes effective judicial review of those orders.
B. TVA correctly points out (Pet. 18-19) that, under 42
U.S.C. 7607(a) and (b), if an EPA order is subject to judicial
review in a pre-enforcement action, it is not subject to such
review again in an enforcement action. See Pet. 15 n.4. TVA
argues that the government has taken the position that a
Clean Air Act order is subject to review in-an enforcement
action, and that it follows necessarily that the order in this
case is not subject to review in this pre-enforcement action.
TVA misreads the government’s position. The govern-
ment’s position is that all Clean Air Act orders, including the
one in this case, are subject to meaningful judicial review at
some stage before noncompliance penalties can be imposed.
Insofar as a Clean Air Act order is final, the court may fully
review its validity at the pre-enforcement stage. Indeed, in
direct conflict with the court of appeals’ holding in this case,
the Supreme Court conducted exactly that sort of careful
judicial review in Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation v. EPA, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004). See Pet. 16-17.4
Insofar as an order is otherwise not final, it is subject to re-
view in a subsequent civil enforcement action. See, e.9.,
4 As explained in the petition (at 17-19), the decision in this case also
conflicts with Alisteel, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 1994), and
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 244 F.3d 748
(9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004), each of which held that the
EPA order at issue was final and subject to review. TVA argues (Br. in
Opp. 22) that the conflict is not real, because those courts “fail[ed] to
grapple with the constitutional problems” perceived by the court of ap-
peals in this case. They did not do so, however, because they did not agree
with the implausible conclusion that the Clean Air Act precludes effective
judicial review of EPA orders.
7
Solar Turbines, Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1078 (3d Cir.
1989). Cf. Pet. 14 n.3 (noting that 42 U.S.C. 7413(e)(1) pro-
vides that the district court “shall” before imposing penalties
consider “such * * * factors as justice may require”). In
either event, the court of appeals erred in concluding that an
EPA order under the Clean Air Act is not subject to mean-
ingful judicial review. The fact that in some cases that re-
view occurs at the pre-enforcement stage and in other cases
only in an EPA enforcement action is of no consequence for
the instant dispute.
C. TVA argues (Br. in Opp. 20) that the court of appeals’
decision leaves “EPA’s enforcement powers * * * intact,”
because EPA retains other enforcement mechanisms. Even
the court of appeals, however, recognized the “unavoidable
conclusion that Congress did, in fact, authorize the issuance
of ACOs with the status of law.” Pet. App. 4a. Congress
thus viewed the issuance of compliance orders enforceable
by civil penalties—not merely the ability of EPA “to serve
notice of EPA’s position in order to obtain voluntary compli-
ance with the law,” TVA Br. in Opp. 21—as essential for
EPA’s functions. As the petition notes (Pet. 18), EPA issues
administrative orders under various environmental statutes
more than a thousand times each year. Without the threat of
potential noncompliance penalties for orders under the Clean
Air Act (and perhaps other statutes), the utility of this en-
forcement mechanism would be dramatically reduced or
eliminated. The court of appeals’ holding that, despite Con-
gress’s clear intent, order recipients are “free to ignore”
ACOs (Pet. App. 3a) warrants further review.
III. THE THRESHOLD ISSUES ALSO MERIT REVIEW
Further review is also warranted of the two threshold
issues resolved by the court of appeals: whether this dispute
between TVA and EPA presents an Article III case or con-
troversy, see Pet. 18-23, and whether TVA had independent
litigating authority to file the petition for review in this case
over the objection of the Attorney General, see Pet. 23-27.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.