Reply Brief of Petitioner — Hyun v. Landon
Supreme Court brief1956
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SUBJECT INDEX
"AGE
L
Respondent misconceives and avoids, and defaults in making re-
ply to, the central and primary issue at bar—tight of manda-
tory, secured presence at a due process condition of fair trial
wherever liberty or life are put in balance by government... 1
IL,
The record demonstrates weakness not on the part of petitioner
but of respondent—for undertaking the use of depositions, in
denial of presence utterly needlessly, and for convenience only 16
Respondent’s record ............
POLI LODIISISDI DIOS DISD IDIODIIIOIIIIONO OOO benennne 22
IIL.
The Service's regulations and past administrative practice 24
IV.
Aggravated circumstances at bar... oe
ii.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases
Allen, Ex parte, 82 Vt. 365
Andrews v. McCann, 317 U. S. 269
Barry v. Hall, 98 F. 2d 222
Berkman v. Tillinghast, 58 F. 2d 621
Bhagat Singh v. McGrath, 104 F. 2d 122.
Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149
Brewer v. Valk, 204 N. C. 186.
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135.
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524.
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227
Chan Foo Lin, In re, 243 Fed. 137
Channan Singh v. Haff, 103 F. 2d 303
Choy Gum v. Backus, 223 Fed. 487
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U. S. 325
Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting
Co., 309 U. S. 134.
Gitto v. “Italia,” 28 F. Supp. 309
Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60
Gonzales v. Zurbrick, 45 F. 2d 934
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580
Hays v. Sesto, 12 F. 2d 698.
Hays v. Zahariades, 90 F. 2d 3
Hepner v. United States, 213 U. S. 103
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574
Hyam vy. American Export Lines, 213 F. 2d 221
LOG CO NPI POE Mager pom e en > _ weret ye
PAGE
Hyun v. Landon, 219 F. 2d 404.___ 22
Impastato v. O’Rour'se, 211 F. 2 609... 24, 25
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458. 17
Kishan Singh v. District Director, 83 F. i csi sashaisictinna 24
Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291... is
Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U. S. 460 3, 5, 12
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32... es
Maltez v. Nagle, 27 F. 2d 835. 18, 25
mete v. Ree, 17.2 16
Mommy v. Helolen, 28U.S. 08. 6,7, &
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86... a2 8
Moynihan, In re, 332 Mo. Miata 14
Ng Wing v. Brough, 15 F. 2d 377... 24, 25
Naranjan Singh y. District Director, 96 F. 2d 969.0 24
Navarrette-Navarrette v. Landon, 223 F. 2d 234... 24, 25
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 a §
Patapsco Insurance Co. v. Southgate, 5 Pet. 604.000 9
Pettibone v. Derringer, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 215, a
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 ht, 7, 33
Ranieri v. Smith, 49 F. ict m Ba
Rochin vy. “Ge MEU Si 6, 7
Sardo v. McGrath, 196 F. 2d 20. a
Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U. S. 442 7, 9
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. ne ap TD 15
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. _, ~2, 3, 4, 7, 13
Svarney v. United States, 7 F. 2d 515 as
The Argo, 2 Wheat. 287 sikbdiaiasidaae 9
Tumey vy. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510. Sireeplatiaddiapieinda= 6,7, 8
Ungar v. Seaman, 4 F, 2d 80... 25
—
iv.
PAGE
United States v. Goldstein, 271 Fed. 838 17
United States v. Zucker, 161 U. S. 475 ll
United States ex rel. Diamond v. Uhl, 266 Fed. 34...17, 24, 25, 25
United States ex rel. Karpathion v. Schlotfeldt, 106 F. 2d 928... 16
Weinbrand v. Prentis, 4 F. 2d 778... 2%
Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745 25
Whitford v. Clark County, 119 U. S. 522. 9
Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272 3, 5
STATUTE :
United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment. ;
IN THE
- ‘Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1955
No. 201
Davip Hyun,
Petitioner,
vs.
HERMAN R. Lanpon, District Director, Immigration and
Naturalization Service,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.
PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF.
_
I,
Respondent Misconceives and Avoids, and Defaults
in Making Reply to, the Central and Primary Is-
sue at Bar—Right of Mandatory, Secured Pres-
ence as a DUE PROCESS CONDITION OF
FAIR TRIAL Wherever Liberty or Life Are Put
in Balance by Government.
The first and primary thing to Say about the Respon-
dent’s Brief is that it does not meet the issue of the
cause,
Petitioner's central thesis is not replied to. That thesis
is and ever has been that as a matter of DUE PROCEss,
mandatory, secured right of presence is protected and se-
cured in deportation causes affecting grievously liberty
and life because, under now established law, a condition
of fair trial. The right of secured presence was specifi-
cally NOT urged by petitioner as arising from or secured
by the Sixth Amendment and its criminal-cause provi- |
sions, but, in critical difference, as a DUE PROCESS |
right of fair hearing affecting liberty or life, as confirmed
and borne witness to in principle and in precedent by
criminal state-trial cases before this Court issuing due
process rights and contents, and due process only, and as
confirmed further by due process cases affecting liberty
or life without criminal character of any manner, as in
insanity confinement proceedings and asexual operations.
To all these matters, at the core of the issue of fair
trial and right of presence at bar, the Respondent makes
no reply.
Respondent ignores Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S.
97, and all of petitioner’s basic fair-trial due process cases,
and suggests, improperly and incorrectly, that petitioner
relies “on the Sixth Amendment guaranty of confronta-
tion available to an accused in a criminal proceeding,”
either directly or “by analogy.” (Resp. Br. p. 23.)
NO. Petitioner urges safeguarded, secured right of pres-
ence not by right of the Sixth Amendment guaranty of
confrontation, directly nor “by analogy”; petitioner urges
such right by due process.
Respondent, thus, at page 43 of its Brief, states: “The
right of confrontation of witnesses guaranteed the ac-
cused in a criminal trial derives not from any fundamental
notions of fairness, implicit in the due process secured by
the Fifth Amendment to a litigant in any proceeding, but
directly from the Sixth Amendment, which applies by its
terms only to ‘criminal proceedings.’ (Emphasis added.)
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This assertion in very words is contradictory to the
contrary declaration of this Court in Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, where right of presence is assumed to be a condi-
tion of “the fundamental justice” (emphasis added) se-
cured by due process, and where the right could not possi-
bly have been urged as a right drawn from the Sixth
Amendment since there a state prosecution only was in-
volved. This Court there stated, in language directly con-
tradicting Respondent here:
“[Under] the Fourteenth Amendment . . . the
presence of a defendant is a condition of due process
to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be
thwarted by [his] absence. . . . [It is indispensa-
ble to a fair trial to the extent that it] satisfies the
test . . . basic and decisive, [that] it bears, or
may fairly be assumed to bear, a relation, reasonably
substantial, to . . . opportunity to defend. [To
thai extent it is an indispensable part of] the funda-
mental justice assured . . . by the Constitution
of the United States.”
—Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, at 107-
108 and at 106, and again at 108.
In like misconception of the issues at bar, Respondent
cites Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580; Carlson
v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524; Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32;
Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149; Lewis v. Frick, 233
U. S. 291; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585; Zako-
naite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272: Low Wah Suey v. Backus,
225 U. S. 460, and Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142
U. S. 651, for the declared proposition assertedly opposing
petitioner’s brief, that: “This attempt to impose on the
deportation process the restrictions which the Constitution
impresses on a criminal trial has been forclosed by well-
established precedents of this Court to the contrary.”
fae
a ee
(Resp. Br. pp. 41-42.) But petitioner attempted no such
importing of constitutional criminal-rights provisions or
restrictions into deportation, but only application of the
fundamentals of due process. Respondent’s cited cases
are not in point; they deal merely with the criminal-rights
provisions made applicable by the Constitution only to
criminal proceedings or causes; they do not deal with the
issue of the content and requirements of due process
“fundamentals of fair hearing.” That is a far different
matter. Due process does not reach jury trial, self-in-
crimination, ex post facto and many other matters, and
decisions respecting such, in turn, do not reach due process.
As this Court succinctly stated in Snyder v. Massachu-
setts:
“The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is free to
regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance
with its own conception of policy and fairness, [un-
der due process] unless in so doing it offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental [citing cases]. Its procedure does not run
foul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another
method may seem to our thinking to be securer or
wiser or to give surer promise of protection to the
prisoner at the bar. Consistently with that amend-
ment trial by jury may be abolished [citing cases].
Indictments by a grand jury may give way to in-
formations by a public officer [citing cases]. The
privilege against self-incrimination may be withdrawn
and the accused put upon the stand as a witness for
the state [citing cases]. What may not be taken
away is [due process of law].”
Respondent’s cases involve only criminal-rights issues
not reaching to due process. Harisiades dea!c only with
—s—
the subject of ex post facto. Carlson dealt only with jury
trial and with the Eighth Amendment right to criminal
bail. Mahler v. Eby treated of ex post facto, again, and
Bilokumsky v. Tod dealt only with applicability of the
principle of self-incrimination. Lewis v. Frick concerned
matters only of res judicata, and Bugajewitz v. Adams
dealt, again, only with ex post facto. Zakonaite v. Wolf
treated only of jury trial and ex post facto, and Nishi-
mura Ekiu v. United States was an exclusion case and
without reach at all to deportation. Low Wah Suey v.
Backus is hereafter discussed.
Petitioner had distinguished these cases in category in
advance (Pet. Br. pp. 68-69), stating:
“It is to be emphasized and underlined that peti-
tioner seeks right of presence in deportation as a due
process right—NOT as a matter of right derived
from the Federal Criminal trial right provisions of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. It is the Fifth
Amendment’s command, ‘No person . . .- shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law,’ which petitioner invokes—not the
provisions in that Amendment and in the Sixth
Amendment securing specific rights of procedure in
Federal criminal proceedings as such, as the pro-
visions that ‘in all [Federal] criminal proceedings’
there shall be secured right of jury trial, public hear-
ing, right of counsel and confrontation, the privilege
against self-incrimination, and other rights. While
some of these rights are also components of due
Process, not all of them are, and petitioner invokes
none of them as direct sources of right in deporta-
tion. Petitioner presses, solely, due process of law.
By reason of the distinction just stated the
instant case is not within the principle of those prior
decisions of this Court which have held that deporta-
a a ”
—
tion proceedings are not within the scope and pro-
tection of any of the strictly criminal rights provi-
sions of the Constitution [such as cases asserting]
that right of jury trial is not secured in
deportation causes (Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. §S.
524, 537), or that the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation does not operate there (United States ex rel.
Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149; United States
ex rel. Vaitauer v. Commissioner, 273 U. S. 103),
or that the prohibition against ex post facto laws is |
not applicable there (Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S, |
585; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580), nor
the prohibition against Criminal Bills of Attainder
(Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, supra; Galvan v. Press,
347 U. S. 522).”
Respondent’s preoccupation with inapplicable matters,
as ex post facto, jury trial and the like, make no less evi-
dent, and tends even to emphasize, its total ignoring of,
and failure to treat of or discuss, the due process prin- 4
ciples and cases truly in issue at bar. Thus petitioner’s |
basic cases of fair-trial due process law, enunciating the |
minimum contents of a fair hearing where liberty or life
is jeopardized, and the reasons therefor, are ignored.
Sb ae VO
Petitioner urged that the landmark due process cases
of present day procedural Constitutional law—Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (no mob intimidation) ; Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (no self-interested judge) ; Mooney
v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (no state-suborned perjured
testimony) ; Chamibers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (no use
of torture, violence or coercion to extract confessions);
Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (no state acts of
violence or brutality, as stomach pumping); Hernandez
v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475 (no discriminatory jury if jury
be had) ; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (right to coun-
— — ——
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--
ated sah cee Wee can:
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sel and to opportunity to confer and prepare) ; De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (right to notice of charge laid) ;
and like cases—were all mated in principle one to another,
and all in whole, as well, to right of presence. Petitioner
urged that the minimum rights in these basic cases were
themselves secured, and confirmed that the right of pres-
ence equally was and should be secured, as parts of a
structure of a fair trial indispensable to public confidence
and security in serious judgments and hearings affecting
liberty and life.
Moreover, petitioner pressed Snyder v, Massachusetts,
as heretofore emphasized, confirmed and supported by
such companion decisions as Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S.
574; Dowdell v. United § tates, 221 U. S. 325; and Schwab
v. Berggren, 143 U. S. 442, all as affirming expressly
the foregoing thesis, and as stating and declaring the
right of presence as a required element of due process
fair hearing where affecting liberty or life,
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in Respondent's Brief:
Snyder v. Massachusetts is not mentioned ;
Hopt v. Utah is not mentioned ;
Dowdell v. United States is not mentioned;
Moore v. Dempsey is not mentioned ;
Tumey v. Ohio is not mentioned ;
Mooney v. Holohan is not mentioned ;
Chambers v. Florida is not mentioned ;
Rochin v. California is not mentioned ;
Hernandez v. Texas is not mentioned;
Powell v. Alabama is not mentioned;
DeJonge v. Oregon is not mentioned.
The requirements of due process affecting fair trial of
liberty or life are but the requirements of the minimums
ma Re mitra
of civilization, as this Court has declared. Can Respon-
dent contend deportation, because it is not “criminal”
and is outside the strict protection of ex post facto, jury
trial, criminal bail and other criminal-cause rights only,
is outside as well the requirements of the minimums of
civilization respecting fair trial for life and liberty as
secured by due process of law?
Can deportation be had by a mob hearing, despite
Moore v. Dempsey?
Can deportation hearing be based on perjured testi-
mony knowingly suborned by the State, despite Mooney
v. Holohan?
Or, if a jury should be extended in deportation, could
deportation be had by a racially-discriminated jury, de-
spite Hernandez v. Texas?
Or, could a deportation hearing be conducted by a self-
interested judge, compensated in ratio directly to the
number of deportees condemned, despite Tumey v. Ohio?
In short, can fair trial for liberty or life be denied in
deportation, and the standards of law be abandoned?
This is the suggestion sub silento of Respondent’s Brief.
If the foregoing cannot be done, how then can it be
suggested that consistent with due process and fair trial
there may be abandoned in deportation the single right
of an accused person perhaps the most fundamental of
all, the elementary right to be present at trial and judg-
ment, the requirement that hearing reaching to liberty,
body or life be had and conducted only to the face of the
accused, and in his presence. This Court has said that
such right is “scarcely less important to the accused than
the right of trial itself” (Diaz v. United States), that it
st 25 Sl POSER Sia:
ee
ithe.
is a right which “cannot be dispensed with” (Schwab v,
Berggren), and, that, “If [a man] be deprived of his
life or liberty without being so present, such deprivation
would be without that due process of law required by the
Constitution.” (Hopt v. Utah.)
Respondent does not even reply to these due process
fundamentals.
Respondent’s thesis remains that of the Service and
the court below that private, civil property process is due
enough process for deportation, notwithstanding that
liberty, and even jeopardy to life, are in balance, because
only the proceedings are denominated “civil” in name
and form. Respondent cites cases (Resp. Br. pp. 49-50)
and statutory examples (Resp. Br. p. 51), to evidence that
in other, various civil matters, where property alone is in
issue,* the law has liberally accepted use of deposition
testimony, without confrontation or necessary right of
presence, upon a showing only of balance of convenience.
Petitioner does not gainsay this as to such matters. The
difference is between hearing fair enough to settle and
balance property disputes affecting purely private interests
and process fair and sufficient under the Constitution upon
which to depend human life, body or liberty.
In example Respondent’s cited case Whitford v. Clark
County, 119 U. S, 522, involved only BFP rights as to
fraudulently issued county bonds; Patapsco Insurance Co.
v. Southgate, 5 Pet. 604, concerned boat damages suffered
in an ocean gale; The Argo, 2 Wheat. 287, involved a suit
in admiralty for property rights and restitution after a
_
*Or regulatory matters only, not reaching to liberty-imprison-
ment, body or life.
PERI EN RNC I On FEE FS AN: " pone
= om
forfeiture for a false importation; Pettibone v. Derringer,
4 Wash. C. C. R., 215, was a patent cause; Hyam v.
American Export Lines, 213 F. 2d 221, was an action for
damages to a tinplate cargo suffered in ocean transporta-
tion; and Gitto v. “Italia,” 28 F. Supp. 309, was a tort
cause for damages arising from accidental injury. Such l
cases are no measure for fairness and due process as to |
judgments affecting body, liberty or life, whether as to
deposition subjects or any other.
ala Ea ec et ERT
|
Respondent’s statutory deposition examples are com-
parably revealing. (Resp. Br. p. 51, n. 8.) Thus Re
spondent cites the deposition rights of the Secretary of
the Department of the Interior; that Department has
jurisdiction over public lands, mines, Indian claims, and
land bounties! Respondent cites the Perishable Commo- _
dities Act; this Act affects the labeling and purities of
seeds and hays! The Federal Trade Commission, cited
by Respondent, is concerned with unfair acts of compe-
tition in the conduct of commerce. The Natural Gas Act
relates to regulation of reasonable rate charges for
natural gas. The Federal Power Act affects like regula-
tion respecting electricity. The Interstate Commerce Com- i
mission governs rates and the regulation of interstate |
railways. And thus with other of Respondent’s examples.
The Coal Mine Safety Act is directed at closing unsafe
mines as accident hazards; the Longshoremen’s and Har- _
bor Workers Act administers a workmen’s compensation |
program; the Federal Communications Commission is |.
established to regulate and prevent monopoly in radio
broadcasting. The Civil Aeronautics Act regulates pilots,
planes and landing strips in travel by air.
The difference between procedure fair enough to suit
these civil, regulatory ends and purposes, and process
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safeguarded and sufficiently protected in fairness and
rights to permit judgment of liberty, body and life is
manifest upon merest statement. Perishable seeds, in
example, are no standard for comparison to the perishable
human: items of liberty, body and life.
In like vein and tone Respondent cites Federal Com-
munications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,
309 U. S. 134* (Resp. Br. p. 51), for the principle, sound
as applied there, that administrative agencies should be
accorded broad discretion to shape their procedures, in-
cluding the procedures of hearings. But there the ad-
ministrative issue concerned was the very antithesis of
human rights reaching to life or liberty, and affected
only the highly discretionary question of allocating air
wave rights between competing applicants for radio broad-
casting stations, an area where public-purpose regula-
tion is at maximum weight and individual interests—
property in character, only—count in whatever measure
for very little. Such a cause ill makes for comparison in
rights of procedure to a hearing safeguarded by the
Constitution in manner sufficient to determine and judge
the fate of a human being.
Respondent cites and lays special reliance upon United
States v. Zucker, 161 U. S. 475, and on Hepner v. United
States, 213 U. S. 103, following it. (Resp. Br. pp. 43-45.)
But United States v. Zucker was a property-matter case,
as the Court there pointedly took note of, and involved
solely a government suit for a civil money-judgment—a
money debt to the government measurable by the value
_
. *Cella v. United States, cited in Respondent's Brief at page 61,
1s similar in character and effect,
=
of property claimedly imported under false entries made
in customs statements. The Court there, while holding
the right of confrontation of the Sixth Amendment did
not apply because the case there while involving a penalty
was a property matter only and was not “criminal,” twice
observed that the action there involved sought “a judg-
ment for money only” and did not affect or involve “the
personal safety of the defendant.” (161 U. S. at p. 481,
and again at p. 482.) In that case there was issued only
an effort to extend—and as such—the criminal-rights
provision of the Sixth Amendment granting confrontation
to a civil-penalty, property cause. There was not tested
there, and could not be, the right of presence as a condi-
tion of due process fair trial where proceedings reach in
jeopardy directly to liberty, body or life.
So, too, with Hepner. It, as well, was but a civil prop-
erty penalty case, and no more. It is without consequence
at bar.
Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U. S. 460 (Resp. Br.
p. 45), although a deportation case, did not involve any
issue of right of presence, and was decided, indeed, be-
fore the deciding of the basic cases affecting and giving
content to due process of procedural law, including pres-
ence as an element, relied upon by petitioner in the in-
stant cause. More, the decision appears to have been
at least partly disposed of on the basis of ill-pleading, it
being observed there the petition made no allegations
about desired witnesses save “on information and belief,”
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and did not in any manner declare “the nature and char-
acter” of the testimony not produced. (225 U. S. at p.
470.) Additionally, to the extent that such case suggests
a person on trial today in a hearing jeopardizing life,
body or liberty might, under present day due process of
law, be denied right to compulsory process to secure wit-
nesses in his behalf, it is probably subject itself to recon-
sideration in the light of later Statements by this Court
in contrary vein in such cases as Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, and Andrews v. McC aun, 317 U. S. 269, 279,
In presenting its blunt, over-simple thesis at bar that
private, civil-property process is due enough process for
deportation—however liberty or life may be affected there-
by—and that, in consequence, civil-property trial right to
free use of deposition testimony should be deemed valid
there, Respondent, in addition to ignoring petitioner's
basic due process cases and the pointed authority of the
right-of-presence decision of Snyder v, Massachusetts,
has ignored also, and totally, the very significant area
of due process law affecting the subjects of insanity pro-
ceedings and asexualization operations. Upon these issues
Respondent makes practically no comment—notwithstand-
ing that such proceedings are fully as “civil” (and even
as “administrative,” under many statutes) a class of pro-
ceedings as ever deportation might be classed, and not-
withstanding that such Proceedings are conceded by all
to be curative and regulative in purpose, and not directed
at imposing criminal punishment. In principle, and under
due process, as demonstrated in Petitioner's Opening
lites |
Briei, insanity and asexualization proceedings—despite
being civil and curative, require full observation of the
fundamental requirements of due process fair trial, in-
cluding full right of safeguarded presence of the accused.
And this, because, as previously quoted in Petitioner’s
Opening Brief:
a oe Ee
“However, even though an insanity proceeding is
{civil in character, and is] primarily for the benefit
of the person suspected of being insane, nevertheless
depriving a person of his liberty and his freedom
and putting him under the stigma of irra-
tionalism is such a serious matter that there should
be [required] every proper safeguard.”
—In re Moynihan, 332 Mo. 1022, 1028 et seq.
“Almost as well might we convict a man of crime
—Ex parte Allen, 82 Vt. 365, 473: |
“Insanity is not a crime . . ., nevertheless,
confinement in a mental hospital is as full and effec-
tive a deprivation of personal liberty as is confine.
ment in jail. The Fifth Amendment is applicable —
—Barry v. Hall, 98 F. 2d 222, 225. F
“If the Constitution and laws in relation to due
process . . . apply to a material thing, they should
more so apply to the human element. ‘And He said
unto them, What man shall there be among you that
shall have one sheep, and if it fall into a pit on the
Sabbath Day, will he not lay hold on it and lift it
out? How much, then, is a man better than a
sheep ?”
—Brewer v. Valk, 204 N. C. 186, 191.
Sead < iii
ey
—15—
“We are dealing here with legislation which in-
volves one of the basic civil rights of man. ;
The power to sterilize [is a very serious one].
There is no redemption for the individual whom the
law touches. Any experiment which the State con-
ducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever
deprived of a basic liberty.”
—Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541.
Upon the score of fair hearing and the secured right
of presence in insanity proceedings and asexualization
cases, Respondent is notably silent and without comment.
Plainly Respondent dares not even suggest that under
the law full right of presence might be denied or dis-
allowed in such proceedings, notwithstanding their “civil”
character, any more than such right might be disallowed
in a criminal cause of kindred consequence to the indi-
vidual. Respecting such proceedings Respondent says
only that they “arise under special legislation [and]
involve problems of state court supervision of defectives
who are incapable of managing their own affairs.”
(Resp. Br. p. 24, and see p. 45), a statement which passes
totally the significance of such decisions in the instant
premises—the security by due process in such “civil”
causes of full, mandatory right of presence because of the
Consequences there of judgment upon liberty, body or life.
ae”
II.
The Record Demonstrates Weakness Not on the Part
of Petitioner but of Respondent—for Undertaking
the Use of Depositions, in Denial of Presence
Utterly NEEDLESSLY, and for CONVEN-
IENCE Only.
Respondent adverts to the Record at some length (Resp.
Br. pp. 29-41, 4-23) and seeks to belittle and minimize
petitioner’s objections to the deposition-procedure had
below. Respondent suggests and intimates petitioner did
not object soon enough and long enough to the deposition
taking, did not make sufficient or early enough claim
that he was without financial capacity to pay for the
moving of guards, himself and counsel to Hawaii to
register presence there, did not “make any showing” of
“any special reason why it was necessary that [he] con-
front the witnesses” (Resp. Br. pp. 21, 32), nor any
“showing” why it was “impractical” for him to use cross
interrogatories in writing in place of presence and cross-
examin:tion or to associate counsel in Hawaii to cross-
examine without him and to take his place in terms of
presence and confrontation. (Resp. Br. pp. 34-35.) From
such supposed factors Respondent suggests this Court
should conclude that petitioner was “less interested in
meeting the thrust of the deposition testimony than in
attempting to create a situation on which he could later
build an argument of prejudicial error” and that “the
weakness of his case before the Service arose, not out of
any denial of procedural fairness, but because he elected
not to contest on its merits the case against him.” (Resp.
Br. pp. 40-41.) Respondent cites waiver cases (Resp.
Br. p. 64, n. 18); Moncado v. Ramsey, 167 F. 2d 191;
United States ex rel. Karpathiou v. Schlotfeldt, 106 F. 2d
—
—_
online
928; Ranieri v. Smith, 49 F. 24 537 ; United States v.
Goldstein, 271 Fed. 838, and United States ex rel. Dia-
mond v. Uhl, 266 Fed. 34. The cited cases affect real
election—with full, free choice—to forego cross-examina-
tion, by aliens present and confronted by, or offered and
tendered confrontation of, the witnesses concerned. Such
is in no manner the case at bar.
Petitioner was not required or called on to show a
“special” reason why he should be accorded at all times
in his hearing the minimum, basic trial right of presence.
Petitioner’s objection to being denied right of presence
by the Hawaiian depositions as violating and denying
due process. and as denying right to be present, right to
confrontation of witnesses, and to cross-examination, and
denying right to representation by, and consultation with,
counsel and petitioner’s repeated request that either the
witnesses be ordered produced at the Los Angeles hear-
ings or that he and his counsel be transported, at minimum
cost and burden to the government, to Hawaii to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses [Pet. Op. Br. p. 8;
R. 114-119, 122, 123, 129, 133 and 216-220], were a
more than sufficient raising of objections and of claim
of constitutional rights and privileges. Waiver is not
lightly or artificially inferred where deep and fundamental
constitutional rights are at stake. (Johnson v,. Zerbst,
304 U. S. 458, 464; Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S.
60.) The fair and real test of the sufficiency of the
making of objections by petitioner to the depositions below
is the circumstance that it is plain beyond cavil upon
the Record that no one on the government’s part failed
fully to understand petitioner’s several objections as above
stated, or failed to realize his insistent declaration of his
claim of right that either the witnesses be produced to
Hs, O15
ee
—13—
confront him or that he and counsel be produced by the
government in Hawaii to confront the witnesses. There
was no absence of understanding, there was simply a re-
peated ruling by the Government Hearing Officer that in
deportation right of confrontation and presence need not
and would not be respected, and that petitioner would nof
be accorded, on any basis, either of his requests. [ Pet.
Op. Br. p. 8; R. 117, 119, 130, 132-133, 216 and 220.]
Respondent objects that petitioner did not protest the
taking of the depositions in a full or complete statement
of objections at the hearing meeting preceding their
taking, and suggests further that petitioner was there
“given the opportunity to expand his objections in a
written brief” but “failed to do” so (Resp. Br. p. 6),
inferring this handicapped the Hearing Officer by depriv-
ing him of a full statement of petitioner’s claim of rights.
But the Record at pages 118-119 makes the explanation
very evident—counsel was not permitted by the Hearing
Officer to finish stating his objections at such opening
hearing, and the “written brief” adverted to by Respon-
dent was a brief to be directed (by statement of the
Hearing Officer himself) not to the Hearing Officer but
to the Commissioner of Immigration after the hearings
should be completed. Witness the Record at pages J18-
119:*
“By Counsel:
I want to state at this time, Mr. Hearing Officer,
that this is an arbitrary and an unjust and undemo-
*The Court below has noted the practice in immigration hearings
of discouraging and preventing full statement of objections at
administrative hearings in Maltez v. Nagle (C. C. A. 9th), 27
F. 2d 835, 837, stating, “Under some general rule of practice
before the inspector the alien is discouraged from particularizing
his objections or stating the reasons therefor. Counsel was s0
admonished again and again in this case.”
A AD BSA att in tit Sey, Sak Sh AHA
—19—
cratic ruling, and one of the most unjust I have had
the displeasure of having before any court that pur-
ported to deal out justice. [Fol. 94.] The Exam-
ining Officer has merely made a motion to take depo-
sitions of certain named persons, has not stated what
he expects to obtain in those depositions, has not
stated why those depositions cannot be taken here
in Los Angeles, why the persons cannot be present,
has not offered to have counsel or the respondent or
both present at the Government’s expense—no reason
whatsoever offered. You haven't even listened to
my objection to the motion, and yet you grab the
motion and overlook my objections, notwithstanding
that I haven’t even finished making them.
By Hearing Officer:
The ruling still stands. Counsel may enlarge on
his exceptions in his brief.
By Counsel:
Q. To who, may I ask!
By Hearing Officer:
A. It will go to the Commissioner of the United
States Immigration and Naturalization Service—
By Counsel:
Who has already stated that he has no authority to
change that ruling, pending a final order of deporta-
tion! The ruling lies solely and exclusively with
you, Mr. Hearing Officer. The responsibility is yours!
4
Ba
Set Fhe Sass Ald Cobia ace 2
isi tao Bameais Wey sects
(Ai BERET Sy
iE BRR cee.
oo. ae 2
es Sa. he
ote si Ss
Eden, LORE ET Ses
[Fol. 96.] By Hearing Officer:
The hearing is continued, and counsel and the
Examining Officer will be notified of the date of the
resumed hearing. Adjourned: 11:50 A. M.”
More, by the time the hearings were completed the
Hearing Officer was several times, indeed repeatedly,
directed to petitioner’s several constitutional objections
—20— Bs
to the taking of the depositions or their introduction
against him without his presence, and was asked again
and again to either produce the witnesses at Los Angeles
or to produce petitioner and counsel at Hawaii, at least
for cross-examination. [Pet. Op. Br. p. 8; R. 114
119, 122, 123, 129, 133.] The rulings of the Hearing |
Officer uniformly denied these motions and objections, and
on their merits, not on procedural basis or on any matter
of form or time. [Pet. Op. Br. p. 8; R. 117, 119, 130,
132-133, 216 and 220.]
Respondent complains petitioner did not show that he
was without financial ability to pay to privately transport
himself, guards and his attorney to Hawaii, prior to the
argument made before the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The reply is plain. Firstly, such showing or claim by
petitioner should be needless in law to secure grant of a
matter fully of right, such as is security of presence, and
in any event, at the initial administrative hearing level
the circumstance of such inability on petitioner’s part
was so evident to all concerned as to have been ques-
tioned by no one and to have been assumed by all.
DN ee ee
More, petitioner did specifically assert his financial
inability so to act, as a circumstance of aggravation, in
his argument before the Board of Immigration Appeals
[R. 63], as Respondent concedes. Objection to the Board
of Immigration Appeals, which is objection as well to
the Attorney General, is a timely enough raising of an
objection because addressed to the body possessed with
ultimate authority, as this Court determined and held in
comparable premises in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135.
Additienally, the Board of Immigration Appeals enter-
tained the objection of financial inability, whether strictly
timely or not, and passed and ruled thereupon on the
,
nie
—2|]—
merits. The Board disallowed such objection and factor
not on procedural or formal grounds, but on substantive
basis directly:
“Counsel now contends that the alien is not finan-
cially able to send a representative to Honolulu to
appear for him, and was not able to do so in November
or December of 1950. There is no provision of
law or regulations which requires that the United
States Government Provide transportation for an
alien or counsel to the place of hearing in a situation
such as in this case where the respondent resides in
the State of California and depositions were taken
in Hawaii.”
—Opinion of Board of Immigration Appeals,
Record p. 58.
The Court of Appeals below also considered and re-
jected the objection of financial inability on the merits.
“It is contended by appellant that the action of
the Immigration Service in taking the depositions
of Uesugi and Izuka in Honolulu, while he was in
custody in California, deprived him of the essential
ingredients of due process of law. The argument
is that not only was Hyun in the custody of appellee
at the time the depositions were taken but that he
was financially unable to transport his counsel to
Honolulu or procure Honolulu counsel to represent
him at the depositions, In view of the comparative
financial resources of Hyun and the Government of
the United States, and in further consideration of
the plethora of government transportation between
Hawaii and the West Coast, it is appellant’s con-
tention that the Government should have transported
the witness to the West Coast for the depositions,
or in the alternative provided transportation to Hawaii
7
for Hyun and his attorney. * * * This Court
has repeatedly held that financial inability of an
alien to insure attendance of himself or his attorney,
or both at the place where depositions are being
taken is not a denial of due process. As was stated
in Bhagat Singh v. McGrath, 1939, 9 Cir., 104 F. 2d
122, 123: ‘Deportation hearings are civil in nature
and the alien need not be confronted by the wit-
nesses; evidence may be obtained by deposition. * * *
We have heretofore decided that the fact that an
alien is financially unable to travel to a place where
he could cross-examine the witnesses, or send an
attorney is not a denial of the right of cross-exam-
ination.’ ”
—Hyun v. Landon, 219 F. 2d 404, 406-7, R.
45, 47-8.
= ~o—
Indeed, as the statement of the Court below makes evi-
dent, that Court had previously ruled to like effect and
had made financial inability a determined issue within its
circuit by decisions long predating the hearing below.
Respondent’s Record.
Actually, in terms of the Record, the true weakness re-
vealed below, and which Respondent cannot avoid, is the
utter poverty of cause on Respondent’s part for undertak-
ing the depositions below in denial of right of presence.
The witnesses whose depositions were taken were all alive,
and upon the Record were all well and hearty, and they
all resided within the Federal jurisdiction of the United
States and were fully answerable to Federal process. It
does not even appear Respondent so much as asked the
witnesses to appear in Los Angeles before moving to
hold the foreign depositions. Now Respondent is reduced
to speculating and imagining that perhaps one or more
——
— a
of the witnesses might have been sick and unable to
travel, or been too old and infirm to be so transported.
(Resp. Br. p. 33.) Such imaginings are without basis
whatever in fact in the Record and are without weight
or avail now; they but disclose Respondent’s weakness
and absence of right in its action below. Where secured
by right to fair trial, and by due process, the right of
presence yields to deposition testimony only where a wit-
ness is deceased, sick, insane, incompetent, or is beyond
the jurisdiction and reach of process of the government—
all circumstances of true impossibility of production, None
of these obtained or were suggested as obtaining below.
No cause was suggested, at the time of taking the deposi-
tions, or ever, below, save that the witnesses resided in
Hawaii and it would better suit, presumably, the con-
venience of government or of the witnesses, or both, to
have trial without presence in Hawaii 3,000 miles from
petitioner’s point of incarceration and of his hearing. [ Pet.
Br. p. 5; R. 118.]
The Record points unalterable responsibility at Respon-
dent. Due process is not the process had below, with the
fundamental of presence sacrificed for convenience only,
where life and liberty are in balance.
The full and perfect answer to the question of strength
and weaknesses in the Record as stirred by Respondent
in its Reply Brief, is simply this—this identical record,
altered in no particular whatever, would be stricken down
under due process out of hand if such record had occurred
in an insanity proceeding, a bodily operation cause, or in
criminal hearing for even the meanest of misdemeanors.
This is not, in any view, a Record upon which liberty and
life can by due process be made forfeit,
Pe. ee
mise renee eS SN SAE eid
Se RAG ey Ee I
="
III.
The Service's Regulations and Past Administrative
Practice.
ther matters Respondent points also to
vi yaben on its present and prior administrative regu-
lations to take and use depositions, and even to take and
employ for evidence purposes ex parte statements and af-
fidavits completely privately taken, and urges that in in-
stances in the past Circuit Court cases have sustained use
in deportation either of depositions or of such completely
privately taken ex parte statements or affidavits. Re-
spondent cites (Resp. Br. pp. 55, 56, 46, 64), the de-
cisions: Bhagat Singh v. McGrath, 104 F. 2d 122 (C. A.
9); Naranjan Singh v. District Director, 96 F. 2d 969
(C. A. 9); Kishan Singh v. District Director, 83 F. 2d
95 (C. A. 9); Channan Singh v. Haff, 103 F. 2d 303
(C. A. 9); Navarrette-Navarrette v. Landon, 223 F. 2d
234 (C. A. 9); and Choy Gum v. Backus, 223 Fed. 487
(C. A. 9). Also: Berkman v, Tillinghast, 58 F. 2d 621
(C. A. 1); Ng Wing v. Brough, 15 F. 2d 377 (C. A.
2); Diamond v. Uhl, 266 Fed. 34 (C. A. 2), and Jm-
pastato v. O’Rourke, 211 F. 2d 609 (C. A. 8).
It is true that the Court below (Ninth Circuit) has
ruled depositions, and even ex parte statements, admissible
in deportation on the principle merely that such proceed-
ings are “civil.” The several Singh decisions, and the
Choy Gum case, illustrate this, as does the case at bar.
And, following .such thesis to its ultimate, in the Bhagat
Singh and Kishan Singh cases, and the case at bar, that
Court, and in the Berkman v. Tillinghast case, the First
Circuit, has held even that depositions in deportation are
admissible though taken at any distant point and for
whatever reason, and despite even financial inability by the
-
—25—
accused alien to travel with or without counsel to the situs.
The validity of such thesis is the issue in the cause on
review here.
In many other Circuit Court decisions a quite contrary
view is represented and expressed, and right to cross-
examination and confrontation is asserted as indispensable
utterly to fair deportation trial, at least where affecting
any substantial and material portion of the evidence and
cause: (Sardo v. McGrath, 196 F. 2d 20, 22 (C. A. D.
C.); Gonzales v. Zurbrick, 45 F. 24 934, 937 (C. A. 6);
In re Chan Foo Lin, 243 Fed. 137, 142 (C. A. 6);
Svarney v. United States, 7 F. 2d 515, 517-518 (C. A.
8); Ungar v. Seaman, 4 F. 2d 80, 82, 84-85 (C. A. 8);
Hays v. Sesto, 12 F. 2d 698, 700 (C. A. 8); Hays v.
Zahariades, 90 F. 2d 3, 6 (C. A. 8); Whitfield v, Hanges,
222 Fed. 745, 749, 752-755 (C. A. 8); cf. even the Ninth
Circuit decision in Maltes v. Nagle, 27 Fed. 835, 837 i.
A. 9)).
In Respondent’s remaining cited cases, Ng Wing v.
Brough, Diamond v. Uhl, Impastato v. O’ Rourke and the
Navarrette-Navarrette case, the question of use of state-
ments or depositions were not squarely reached, at least not
as at bar, since in each such case there was more than
ample evidence and basis to sustain the deportation con-
cerned without reaching the questioned matters. In the
Navarrette case the alien made a complete case for his
deportation in his own admissions and testimony. In
Impastato v. O’Rourke the questioned matters related only
to alienage and there was evidence of such in public docu-
ments produced under seal from Italy, and also in the
statutory burden imposed on the alien respecting alienage
and in contradictions and unconvincing explanation of cir-
cumstances given by him in his own testimony. In Ng
Wing v. Brough the testimony of the arresting officers
—26—
made a more than full and sufficient case against the alien,
and the questioned matters were matters of surplusage
only. Similarly in Diamond v. Uhl the alien made a real
and actual waiver as to production and cross-examination
of the witness whose statement without confrontation and
cross-examination was later complained of, since several
identical witnesses were confronted and cross-examined
freely and the alien made no request for production of
the one witness not thus produced, though opportunity so
to do existed at two different times of hearing. In Wein-
brand v. Prentis, 4 F. 2d 778 (C. A. 6), cited Respon-
dent’s Brief, page 64, there was an express waiver en-
tered by the attorney for the alien, and, additionally,
there was more than ample independent evidence to sepa-
rately establish deportability.
Petitioner does not endorse the procedure in the cases
above permitting use of statements followed by direct
confrontation and cross-examination at the deportation
hearing, a practice which happily now seems to have ceased
to be employed by the Service for some time; but the
observation is here made that the actual production of the
witness for confrontation and cross-examination avoids in
great part the objections to use of statements or deposi-
tions and certainly removes such cases from comparison
to such cases as at bar where presence, confrontation and
cross-examination are never afforded or extended.
The short and complete answer to Respondent’s reliance
on past practices and its own Regulations is that the Regu-
lations cannot modify, alter or amend the Constitution,
nor its requirements, and as to the past decisions of lower
courts, few such reach the cause at bar, save those of the
Court below, since most were avoided by other, curative
acts, or by independent evidence or the testimony of the
alien himself, and such decisions as suggest approval in
—27—-
any measure of the procedure below are in conflict with
the highest authority of the land—the Constitution.
Declaration so is required.
IV.
Aggravated Circumstances at Bar.
In addition to avoiding the basic Constitutional thesis
of right of presence as a condition and requirement of due
process fair trial where affecting liberty or life, Respon-
dent avoids as well, and makes no response to, special and
particular circumstances of the cause at bar aggravating
the Constitutional wrong and injury:
1. The depositions were the sole evidence against
petitioner. To this extreme circumstance of aggrava-
tion, separating petitioner’s case from every case of
lesser degree, Respondent makes, and can make no
response. Petitioner’s cause violates constitutional
right unless in a life and liberty matter, due process
can suffer the extreme circumstance of total trial in
absentia.
Moreover, identification was had only by a pass-
port photo bearing on its face petitioner’s name. Re-
spondent suggests this caused no harm because pe-
titioner himself testified the picture was of him.
This does not reach the error of the manner of identi-
fication complained of. To that error Respondent
makes, and can make, no reply.
2. The depositions were had and ordered need-
lessly, and for the government convenience only. The
witnesses were alive, and well and hearty, and within
the jurisdiction, and no consideration save mere con-
venience only, of witnesses or of the Government,
existed and was even Suggested to support or justify
a
—
the use of the depositions below. Respondent cannot
and does not respond to this,
3. The jeopardy of deportation at bar includes a
jeopardy to life or of physical persecution. Respon-
dent cannot and does not respond to this aggravated
circumstance, save only to Suggest the granting in
the instant cause, at present, of an administrative stay
reduces the jeopardy. But the jeopardy nonetheless
remains, for such administrative stay is imperma-
nent and without statutory security.
4. The depositions were abusively conducted, and
were without restraint by the Hearing Officer in
Hawaii. Respondent suggests such officer could have
exercised judicial restraining force, and was not “a
mere notary” in power (Resp. Br. p. 63); but the
relevant circumstances is not that such officer could
have, but that on the plain Record he did not exercise
restraining force. Respondent makes no response to
this.
5. The area of the depositions was within the area
of freedom of speech and association particularly re-
quiring careful trial of fact, as well as careful en-
acting and applying of rules and standards of law,
by this Court’s decisions,
Wherefore, for all of the reasons contained in Peti-
tioner’s Opening Brief and set forth above, the judgment
below should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Joun W. Porter,
Attorney for Petitioner,
WIL.1AM B. Murrisu,
Hersert W. Simmons, Jr.,
Of Counsel.
We
SUBJECT INDEX
PAGE
An alien is entitled as a matter of constitutional right to a
reasonable opportunity to confront and cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses in deportation henna, __ RAITT 1
A.
The mere fact that deportation is a civil matter does not re-
duce the alien’s constitutional right to procedural due
lal 1
Wherein the slate is clean: The right of confrontation
and cross-examination is inherent in the constitutional
Ceet CC Cee proces ef teow - =
II,
The opportunity for cross-examination in the instant case, if
it existed at all, was csp, sagas 7
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Cases PAGE
Anderson v. Snyder, 91 Conn. 404, 99 Atl. 1032 oa
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135 2, 3
Crowe v. Peters, 63 Mo. 429 sa
Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388...............ccsceccssesssesessesesesece 3
Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522 ey Se oe
Gonzales v. Zurbrick, 45 F. 2d 934 9, 10
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580........ 3
Hays v. Sesto, 12 F. 2d 698 9
Hyun v. Landon, 187 F. 2d 991, 343 U. S. 524 a
5
2
Japanese Immigration case, 189 U. S. 86
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763..........:cccceceseeeeseeees
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S.
123 4
Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454........ 4, 6
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590... ccccecccccceeee 2, 6
Maltez v. Nagle, 27 F. 2d 835 9
Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. donc cccccceccceeeceeeeeees l
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 11
Ngo Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276. a 3
Peters v. Hobby, ...... iS , 23 Law Week. 4311.00.00. 4
Sardo v. McGrath, 196 F. 2d 20. ‘ one
eg ne eee 8
Svarnly v. United States, 7 F. 2d 515 9
Whitfield, et al. v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745... occcccccccccccceccecccceeeeeee 9
Wong Yong Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33.00... 2,6, 7
—
STATUTES
Act of June 11, 1946, Title 5, Sec. 1001
Act of June 11, 1946, Title 5, Sec. 1005
Act of June 11, 1946, Title 5, Sec. 1006(c)
Act of June 11, 1946, Title 5, Sec. 1007
Act of June 11, 1946, Title 5, Sec. 1008
Administrative Procedure Act, Sec. 5
Wigmore on Evidence (3d Ed.), Sec.
Wigmore on Evidence (3d Ed.), Sec
Wigmore on Evidence (3d Ed.), Sec.
ae:
TOPO een ee we we eesewees
POwoer coeocecosereoccecceccecs
Cveeerovecoveveserccocescceces
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1955.
No. 201.
Davip Hyun,
Petitioner.
VS.
HERMAN R. Lanpon, District Director, Immigration and
Naturalization Service,
Appellee.
el!
Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, Southern
California Branch, Amicus Curiae.
pe
ARGUMENT.
I.
An Alien Is Entitled as a Matter of Constitutional
Right to a Reasonable Opportunity to Confront
and Cross-Examine Adverse Witnesses in De-
portation Proceedings.
A.
: The Mere Fact That Deportation Is a Civil Matter Does
Not Reduce the Alien’s Constitutional Right to Proce-
dural Due Process of Law.
The right of a resident alien to a full and fair hearing
is, by now, firmly fixed in our constitutional constellation
en
(Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590; Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763, 770, 771; Wong Yong
Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 50, 51; Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U. S. 135).
Yet, the purpose and spirit of this fundamental prin-
ciple seems to have utterly eluded the Attorney General
and the Courts below.
The primary objective of a hearing is to pursue, dis-
cover and expose truth, that justice might be done. Due
process of law is simply a recognition that truth is seldom,
if ever, revealed ex parte. Therefore, if due process
rises to the stature of a constitutional right, then obvi-
ously it belongs to all who fall within its orbit.
Even if our Constitution does not protect from deporta-
tion the alien who was formerly a member of the Com-
munist Party (Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522), it should,
and does, guard his right to disprove that charge.
Throughout these proceedings, however, procedural Due
Process seems to have been regarded as a dichotomous
formula which somehow earns judicial cognizance only
in criminal cases (see, for example, the opinion of the
Court of Appeals below, in 219 F. 2d 404, 406). It is
not clearly understood by Amicus—perhaps because it
is not fully comprehended by its advocates—just why
truth and justice should be pursued with any less fervency
in a civil suit, unless it is felt that a defendant accused
of committing a crime is in jeopardy of life or liberty,
rather than the mere loss of his property. If this is the
key which opens the door to the hearing room wherein
is dispensed a “fuller and fairer” justice, then manifestly
the petitioner qualifies for admission: throughout the
me
administrative proceedings he was detained in the custody
of the Attorney General, without right of bail [S. R.
325, 106, 109, 110: see also, Hyun v,. Landon, 187 F. 2d
991, 342 U. S. 524]. He is at all times subject to
rearrest, and detention, if the Attorney General, in his
discretion decides upon this course (Title 8, U. S.C. A,
§1252(a), (c); Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, Section 242(a), (c), Public Law 414, 82nd Con-
gress, 2nd Session, Ch. 477), Moreover, petitioner risks
being returned to a country where he may suffer and
expect persecution (see Petition for Certiorari herein,
footnote p. 28),
This Court has sometimes had occasion to comment
upon the severity of our deportation laws, especially where
expulsion is attributable to past political associations.
It has described deportation as “a practice that bristles
with severities,” (Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U, S.
580, 587); as the “equivalent of banishment or exile”
(Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388, 391): and
which “may result in the loss of all that makes life
worth living’”’ (Ngo Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276,
284; Bridges v. W ixon, 326 U. S. 135, 147 ); and that
the “intrinsic consequences of deportation are—close to
punishment for crime . . . (Galvan v. Press, 347
U. S. 522, 531). Unfortunately, however. this Court
has declined to qualify the power of Congress to regulate
the entry and expulsion of aliens by application of the
Due Process Clause. because “the slate is not clean.”
(Galvan v. Press, supra, at p. 531.)
ll
'S. R. refers to the record of the proceedings before the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service; the page of such reference
follows,
er ees
But with respect to procedural Due Process, the slate
is very clean (Galvan v. Press, supra, at p. 531); and it
is respectfully urged that upon it should be enscribed the
same vigorous caveat which has been postulated for
other civil proceedings affecting the life, liberty and con-
science of individuals (cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123; Kwock Jan Fat
v. White, 253 U. S. 454; Morgan v. United States, 304
U. S. 1; compare Peters v. Hobby, ...... | i. Sean a
L. W. 4311).
B.
Wherein the Slate Is Clean: The Right of Confrontation
and Cross-Examination Is Inherent in the Constitutional
Concept of Due Process of Law.
Cross-examination has been described by one writer
as “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the dis-
covery of truth.” Certainly, it forms the essence of
any hearing which seeks recognition by the Constitution.
Historically, the concept of cross-examination in Anglo-
American jurisprudence has its origin in the gradual
evolution of the Hearsay Rule. It is an interesting coin-
cidence that the Rule was first pressed into service at
a time when Englishmen were banished for political
“crimes” by attainder, simply upon the strength of an
ex parte deposition read in Parliament.®
This led Parliament, during the reign of Edward VI,
to enact a law providing “that accusers (that is, wit-
*Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Edition, §1367, p. 29.
3] bid., §1364, p. 19, where Wigmore reports the following account
of Henry VIII's reign:
“1696, Bishop Burnet, arguing in the House of Lords, at
Fenwick’s trial, 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 752:
‘there passed many attainders in that reign (of Henry VIII),
only upon depositions that were read in both houses of Par-
—5—
nesses) should be examined face to face, if they were
alive.”* A similar statute was enacted in 1554, but there-
after both fell into obscurity until the early 18th Century.®
In the meanwhile, history recorded the lessons of the
trials of men like Sir Walter Raleigh, who was tried,
convicted and executed without opportunity for first con-
fronting Lord Cobham, his accuser:* the Chief Justice
presiding over Raleigh’s trial contending that “he had no
law for it.”
In the middle of the 1600’s, however, the notion came
gradually to prevail that even an extra-judicial statement,
under oath, should not be used if the deponent was un-
available for trial.* Significantly, this idea took hold
in both criminal and civil trials, until, by the time of
the American Revolution, confrontation was an accepted
principle of law with which the framers of our Consti-
tution were thoroughly familiar (compare Japanese Immi-
gration case: 189 U. S. 86, 100, 101).
Confrontation is not sought simply to gaze upon the
countenance of the witness, or to be gazed upon by him,
liament. It is true there were much blamed, and there was
great cause for it . . . In Edward VI's trial, the lord
Seymour was attained in the same manner (sc. without be-
ing heard), only with this difference. that the witnesses were
brought to the bar and there examined, whereas formerly
they proceeded upon some depositions that were read to them.
At the Duke of Somerset's trial (in 1551), which was both
for high treason and for felony, depositions were only read
against him, but the witnesses were brought face to face, as
he pressed they might be . . .”
‘Tbid., at §1364, p. 19,
"Ibid., at §1364, p. 20.
William O. Douglas, An Almanac of Liberty, p. 144.
"Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., §1364, p. 20.
*Ibid., §1364, p. 21 (see also footnote 47 therein).
=
but rather for the purpose of cross-examination which
can effectively be had only by putting to the witness
directly and personally questions involving facts with
which he is intimately familiar, and to secure immediate
answers to those questions.’ It is obvious that the appear-
ance of counsel only at a deposition proceeding, or the
submission of written interrogatories, in no way comports
with the virtue or the aims of confrontation (Kwock Jan
Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454, 464; Crowe v. Peters, 63
Mo. 429, 433; Anderson v. Snyder, 91 Conn. 404, 99
Atl. 1032).
While there may well be circumstances in which the
enforcement of this right is superseded by other consid-
erations, where life or liberty are at stake the full oppor-
tunity of confrontation is indispensable (Cf. Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 50, 51; Kwong Hai
Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 598; Kwock Jan Fat
v. White, supra, p. 464). Indeed, the foremost authority
in the field of evidence has observed that:
“The whole practice and spirit of our statutes and
decisions insists on this principle (of confrontation)
as a fundamental one. In civil cases every statute
dealing with depositions . . . and in judicial
decisions not controlled by statute . . . this re-
quirement has been deemed essential in every court
and in every forum of proceeding. . . . In short,
however, radically the jury-trial rules of Evidence
may be dispensed with . . ., this one at least
remains as ‘a fundamental of fair and intelligent
investigation of disputed facts.’®
*Tbid., §1395, p. 123.
1°7bid., $1400, pp. 144, 145.
— .
I]
The Opportunity for Cross-Examination in the Instant
Case, if It Existed at All, Was Inadequate.
Up to this point, it has been urged that an alien is
entitled as a matter of constitutional right to a full and
fair hearing; and that such a hearing includes the op-
portunity to confront and cross-exzmine adversary wit-
nesses. Yet, it is axiomatic that unless the opportunity
for confrontation is adequate, and is offered in good faith,
then there is really no Opportunity at all. Amicus believes
that opportunity in the sense used here must be realistic,
not a sham; that it must be fair in the light of the cir-
cumstances in the case, and not a mere pretense. Amicus
believes further that this interpretation is blessed with
Congressional as well as Constitutional expression in the
deportation field.
When the administrative Proceedings below were com-
menced late in 1950, the Administrative Procedure Act™
was still in operation (Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,
339 U. S. 33). The Provision peculiarly in point was
section 6(c) (1006(c)), the relevant portion of which
reads as follows:
(c) Evidence.—Every party shall have the right
to present his case of defense by oral or documentary
evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct
such cross-examination as may be required for a
full and true disclosure of the facts Pg
Within six months of the Sung decision, Congress en-
acted a rider to an appropriation bill which expressly ex-
empted deportation procedures from application of sec-
_—_
"Title 5, section 1001, et seq., Act of June 11, 1946,
=o
tions 5, 7 and 8 (1005, 1007, 1008) of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (64 Stat. 1048); but by the same
action. left section 6 in force.
It is true that there is nothing in the language of sec-
tion 6 suggesting the scope of the term “opportunity,” al-
though unquestionably it creates a right to cross-examina-
tion in order to disclose the true facts. Congress does not
invest “rights” in aliens lightly. The term must have
some significance. Moreover, Congress apparently em-
ployed that term in the interest of promoting truth. If
truth is the criterion of justice, and the objective Con-
gress is seeking, then it is incumbent upon the Hearing
Officer in a deportation proceeding to cause witnesses to
be available to the alien for cross-examination, and, in-
cidentally, that he himself might observe their demeanor.
What other meaning, what other function, can a “right”
serve but to assure the alien of due and fair process in
the presentation of his defense.
In any event, the language of section 6 was approved
and adopted by Congress, in the face of considerable
judicial authority on this issue. As the opinion of the
Court of Appeals below indicates, this authority is di-
vided. None of it, so far as amicus could ascertain, dis-
cusses the application of section 6 to the problem. On
the other hand, the decisions declaring the alien’s right to
cross-examination appear to have been affirmed by Con-
gress when it left section 6 intact. Thus, a denial of an
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses was held to vio-
late due process in Sardo v. McGrath, 196 F. 2d 20, 22
(1951); and was regarded as arbitrary, unfair and viola-
tive of constitutional rights in Jn re Sugano, 40 F. 2d
961, 962. The admission into evidence, even without
objection, of an ex parte affidavit was deemed a denial
a
of justice in Svarnly v. United States, 7 F. 2d 515, 517,
and in Maltez v. Nagle, 27 F. 24 835, 837; while in Gon-
gales v. Zurbrick, 45 F. 2d 934, a court deemed the hear-
ing unfair where the hearing officer failed to specifically
offer to the alien the opportunity to cross-examine a wit-
ness.
If Congressional intention is not clearly evidenced by
judicial precedent preceding section 6 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, surely that intent comes to the fore
with the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1942, section 242(b) 3 (Title 8, §1252(b)(3)). That
: subsection reads:
“The alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to
examine the evidence against him, to present evi-
dence in his own behalf. and to cross-examine wit-
nesses presented by the government . . .” (Italics
ours. )
The language of the new law does nothing to devitalize
| section 6 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which it
replaced, nor the judicial precedent just discussed. In-
deed, Congress seemingly has crystallized the judicial for-
mula expressed in Whitfield, et al. v. Hanges, 222 Fed.
745, 749, and later adopted in Hays v, Sesto, 12 F. 2d
698, at p. 699:
“Indispensable requisites of a fair hearing, accord-
ing to those fundamental principles, are that the
course of the proceeding shall be appropriate to the
cases and just to the party affected” ;
which includes the
“opportunity to be heard that he may if he chooses,
cross-examine the witness against him.” (Italics
supplied. )
eh tae
a
In the light of the foregoing, it is difficult to see how
the conduct of the administrative proceedings below
achieves any semblance of fair play and decency. If the
objective of a hearing is to discover the truth of the
matter, then that purpose escaped the attention of the
Hearing Officer. He exhibited not the slightest concern
as to how the petitioner might confront the government
witnesses, either in Los Angeles or Hawaii [S. R. 89-95].
He appeared wholly disinterested in whether petitioner
was aware of his right to appear personally in Hawaii,
assuming such was the case (Gonzales v. Zurbrick, 45
F. 2d 934).”
Yet, this callous disregard of the petitioner’s rights is
defended on the ground that he failed to indicate a desire
to appear at the taking of the depositions [S. R. 244]."
Although the appellant was held in custody by the At-
torney General, the Hearing Officer did not even bother
to explore the possibility of arranging for the transpor-
tation of the witnesses to Los Angeles, or, in the alterna-
tive, of the petitioner to Hawaii. The Attorney General,
and the Courts below, endeavor to support this position
with the claim that “there is no law for it.” It is re-
spectfully submitted tiat “the law for it’ is embodied in
the Censtitutional right to Due Process of Law, and in
the ordinary precepts of fair play and common sense.
Particularly is this so where, as here, important Consti-
An inquiry into petitioner's right to appear in Hawaii was cer-
tainly in order inasmuch as he received, while in custody of the
Attorney General, a written notice of time and place of the taking
of depositions, the language of which leaves the strong impression
that only his counsel would be allowed to attend.
MBRut see S. 94, where counsel's objections to the motion for
leave to take depositions are placed on this very ground, and left
unanswered.
14},
———
er
tutional rights of speech and association are being adjudi-
cated. The Attorney General's argument secures justice
only for the alien of means. But Due Process of Law
should be available to all, “not merely to those who can
pay their own way.’
Respectfully submitted.
A. L. Wirrn,
Hucu R. Manes,
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae.
—
“Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 111.
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