Appellees Brief — United States v. Williams

Supreme Court brief1951

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IN THE ee ee

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1951

No. 134

A/S. J. Lupwie Mowrnexers Revert, er an. Appellants,

v.

IsBRANDTSEN COMPANY, INc., ET AL.

No. 135

Feperat Maritime Boarp, A ppellant,

v.

Tue Unirep States or Am ERICA, ET AL.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York.

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, ISBRANDTSEN COMPANY

INC.

___.

’

Vv Jonn J. O'Connor

Washington Building

Washington, D. (.

J Whuiam L. McGovern

1200 Kighteenth Street, N. W.

Washington 6, D. ¢.

Counsel for Appellee

Arxoup, Forras & Porter

1200 Kighteenth Street, N. W.

Washington 6, D. C.

OF Counsel

Press oF Byron S. Apams, Wasnincton, D.C.

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INDEX.

Page

Gurmionme BROW . ooo c ccc cn cececses abseil @ pacts Goh eA 1

Bo EV ree re mee Ee ry rer ey emt ee 2

CMI IORI oo a 55 ki des hehe ew cee imesinas 2

eer eee eee er eee ee Tee ee 3

at IE acs sv eee DM WAS VERO cue Cea Kew 3

2) The Exclusive Patronage Contract System..... 7

a) Increased Rate for Identical Transportation

(NN REGS NSP pen We OP here eee Ra

Conference Assumed No Obligation to Sup-

Og a ORS ee Se FO oe a ee

Inadequate Rate Protection Offered Shipper

Shipper Subject to Severe Penalties......

Contract Made Shipper Continually Depen-

ey Ser CONN i iio 25a he wan ee ae bs

Contract System Created Power to Dis-

OE es orange Vac RT yes te een 4

e) Record Silent as to Reasons for Use of Sys-

tem in this Particular Trade..............

h) Exelusive Patronage System Coercive.....

Dei Pe SEMIN Sg oaks wane adnicua pa ceeann

Oe. Be Es og cn ss «Gawkers OAS eee

OS oc cube era a ee CL SALLE EONS Cate

') Contract System, Not Conference System, in

Pe eee ee ere rer ge serene

Bh We SIOOIU 6 one keene ekg eeen

5) Charaeteristies of Contract System .........

Gap etarccontstimen eer nes

Fi see

SAG Dombng Insets. ne

ii Index Continued.

Page

I. THe Surprine Act or 1916 Was Desicnep To Pre-

SERVE INDEPENDENT COMPETITION

4%, 0 6h @ 6 '@ SO @ce

1) Alexander Committee recommended and

Congress Adopted Ban Against Any Type

of Conference Activity Designed to Elimi-

nate Independent Competition ............

2) Ban Against Elimination of Non-Conference

Competition Required by Regulatory Scheme

Il. THe Exciusive Parronace Contract System Re-

TALIATES AGAINST A SHIPPER FOR PATRONIZING

I rig 0's 365 6 ow bik woe eens

Ill. Tue Exctusive Patronace Contract System Is

a Discriminatory Metuop Deresicgnep to RetTa.i-

ATE AGAINST A SHIPPER FOR PATRONIZING ANOTHER

ee oete ts Teen Se Sh GA ae ele hblea ee & ic

IV. Concress Lert tHe Commission No Discretion

To Approve A Dua Rate System Wuicu Works

A Retauiarory Discrimination AGAINST A Suip-

PER FOR PatvTpoNnizinc ANOTHER CARRIER.........

ACT IN slg ob AE re OR A 4S EMA SAREE COS

al te i cals Gk wine le a OO cae oR

UI I tr Oe ed wee awa a4

‘

pS aE Sat 05 Se EE Sea Pe a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.

CASES:

Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. United States,

gD eT

American Surety v. Bethlehem Bank, 314 U. S. 314

oe WRB aged ata ORR NICS Se paca aa

Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 22 F.

EA le Git BA is. Ba BOOED ven sciccessiececs

Contract Routing Restrictions, 2 U. S. M. C. 220

Caw eeu coe cn coe cer cuk naae encase

Eastern States Retail Lumber Assn. v. United

oe Be reer

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99

29

+0)

45

Index Continued. ili

Page

den Mining Co. v. Bluefields Fruit & S. S. Co., 1

U.S. S. B. We PEE ies Sis coe ae Uri ue cea 45, 51

Gulf Intercoastal Contract Rates, 1 U. S. S. B. B.

GREER ES SG Sew orton Ce tae Sires sir es al 52

Hocking Valley v. United States, 210 Fed. 735 (6th

Cir. 1 J14), cert. den. 234 U. &. 757 (1919)........ 48

letstcmaneel Investigation, 1 a2. & BB 400

SNE alae wedge uaa sean kak eERds oo coon As 52

International Business Machines Corp. v. United

ORM Alc Wh BOE LAOEMOD oo va vn cacsicccesecs 42

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Mechling, 300

ras CM TU er ie ia RN ee Se 46, 50

Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345 (1948) ...... 45

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 137 (1803).......... 49

Menacho v. Ward, 27 Fed. 529 (C. C. N. Y. 1886). .43, 45

Mitchell v. United States, 314 U.S. s0 goes Uo Bee a+

Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 88 (1940).... 54

Pacifie Coast European Conference, 3 U.S. M. C. 11

CROOU Fara Sei aNel nate ceuace bw eceuceeegs 45, 53

Pacific Westbound Conference, et al. v. Laval & Co.,

Ine., — 16, 1951, 4192-485, Circuit Court, Ore-

wt

ON aa Pid ela ane hye cr Sal wre ask eee ow sae ara eee eek 11

Rawleigh v. Stoomvaart, et al., 1 U. S. S. B. B. 285

eg a ee 53

Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226

ans Ce raat ce Ug rc ha ghee Og A on °6

Standard Oil of California v. United States, 3237

SMC CER 33

State of New York v. United States, 311 U. YS4

i | HERR RSE CELE wind rah ce BER. CUT AUER ne en aN NT 48

Swayne & Hoyt v. United States, 300 UL S. 297

CE a Ca era yee oie cy foe 2 On i

United States v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co., 294 U.

a I esa ok keh ead Oss kx bu od oem ns 25

United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 210

Riaraee GER ra ee wate ie oo 54

United States v. Masonite, 316 U. S. 265 (1942).... 26

United States v. Missouri Pacifie R. Co.. 278 U.S.

EE a ca dco diee cas ose veal via aeec oe

United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard, 50 F. 2d

33 (2d Cir., 1931), aff'd 264 U.S. 474... 2.25.5... 27

United States v. Standard Oil, 221 U. S. 1 (1911)... 35

PRE re OBE AD NE ARE EM ale e ia Oa AS 6 IT hee Los eA Ae SWS ca taceshd PEET II RS As LEB ANP

eR a a RE I air 62:

| aan BN eT FM

3

iv Index Continued.

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES: Page

Constitution: Fifth Amend., Art. 1, §$ 1, 8........ 19

Statutes:

Shipping Act of 1916 (46 U.S. C. § 801 et seq.) ..3, 22

TB RR er ee Re rie pny eres 19, 22, 27, 35, 48

Da ah earl oa wt ae aaa ae cae hace wie oot 0 22, 27

re OM an a eh aN wa ere ees re 45, 47

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S. C. § 1009... 17

Interstate Commerce Act ....................39, 49

Urgent Deficiences Act of 1913, 28 U. S.C. $§ 2284,

UM eTa sss <p pdainera nein ae ab Ws. donee ks 17

Shipping Act of 1916 as amended, 46 U.S.C.$ 830 17

Code of Fed. Reg., Title 46, §§ 235.1, 235.2....... 38

MISCELLANEOUS:

Investigation of Shipping Combinations, House

Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,

H. BR. Doce. 805, Gard Cong., 2d Sese. ............ 17, 37

bagi Aare

| aoe eabih

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a seas

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

OcrospEr Term, 1951

No. 134

A/S. J. Lupwic Mowrnckets Repent, er au., Appellants,

v.

IsBRANDTSEN ComPANny, INC., ET AL.

No. 135

FeperaL Maritime Boarp, Appellant,

v.

Tue Unrrep States or AMERICA, ET AL.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York.

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, ISBRANDTSEN COMPANY,

INC.

—_—_

OPINIONS BELOW

The final opinion of the District Court (R. 118) is re-

ported at 96 F. Supp. 883 (S. D. N. Y. 1950). The

opinion of the District Court in connection with the grant-

ing of the temporary injunction is reported at 81 F. Supp.

i444 (S. D. N. Y. 1949). The report and order of the

Federal Maritime Board (R. D1, 67) are reported at 3

Fe ae,

»

~~

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the District Court was entered on April

d, 1951 (R. 148). The petitions for appeal w presented

on May 16, 1951 (R. 150, 155), and were alle ed on May

17, 1951 (R. 151, 155). The jurisdiction of this Court is

conferred by 28 U.S. C. § 1253.

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Federal Maritime Board and its predecessors souglit

to authorize two Conferences of common carriers operating

in the North Atlantic trade to employ the exclusive patron-

age contract, or dual rate, system, under which the car-

riers established and proposed to effectuate two rate scales,

one of which represents an increase over the other by the

addition of an arbitrary differential of 20 percent.’ Both

rate scales are applicable to precisely the same transpor-

tation service, but the lower rate seale is made available

only to shippers who contract in advance to route all of

their shipments exclusively via the Conference lines; the

higher non-contract rates are charged all shippers in the

trade who decline to sign an exclusive patronage contract,

or who breach the contract by patronizing another carrier.

No question is presented here as to the Conference system

as distinguished from the contract system. The principal

question raised as to the contract system is:

1. Does the exelusive patronage contract system, by

charging a substantially higher rate for identical transpor-

tation services to any shipper who insists npon his right

to patronize an independent carrier, retaliate and discrim-

inate against such shipper for patrenizing another earrier

' Because the non-contract rates were arrived at by rounding out

to the nearest five cents a 20 percent increase over the preexisting

rates, for various commodities the actual differential varied from

20 to 30 percent (R. 861).

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3

in violation of Section 14(3) (46 U.S. C. § 812(3)) of the

Shipping Act of 1916, which provides in pertinent part:

No common carrier by water shall, directly or in-

directly * * *

Third. Retaliate against any shipper by refusing,

or threatening to refuse, space accommodations when

such are available, or resort to other discriminating

or unfair methods, because such shipper has patron-

ized any other carrier or has filed a complaint charging

unfair treatment, or for any other reason.

STATEMENT

This case is on appeal from a final order of a three-judge

statutory court which permanently enjoined the institution

by appellant Conferences of the exclusive patronage con-

tract system in trade between ports on the North Atlantic

coast of the United States and continental ports in Bel-

gium, Holland and Germany, commonly known as_ the

North Atlantie trade (R. 148-149).

1) The Parties

Appellee, Isbrandtsen Company, Inc., organized under

the laws of the state of New York, is an American-flag car-

rier by water in the transportation of property between

ports on the North Atlantic coast of the United States and

the Gulf of Mexico and ports in various parts ef the world,

including continental ports in Belginm, Holland, and Ger-

many. For more than. twenty years Isbrandtsen has been

engaged in regularly-scheduled common carrier service in

the North Atlantie trade. Since 1933, appellee has main-

tained a miaimum of twice-monthly berth sailings on this

trade route, and since the end of government control on

March 2, 1946, Isbrandtsen has operated such berth service

in the North Atlantic trade exclusively as an American-flag

common carrier (R. 255).

Appellants are two voluntary associations of eommon

‘arrier steamship lines organized under Section 15 of the

SHARE A eh Da TaN ah NRE DMI RR lt A eI ATE LS A ERED GARTER

Shipping Act of 1916 (46 U.S. C. $ 814) into two steamship

conferences, the North Atlantic Continental Freight Con-

ference and the Continental North Atlantic Westbound

Freight Conference, operating east and west bound, respec-

tively, in the North Atlantic trade (R. 256). Apart from

Isbrandtsen, during the entire period since 1931, all of the

other common earriers regularly in the North Atlantic

trade, both foreign-flag and American flag, have been mem-

hers of one or the other of the appellant conferences (R.

386).

The conferences exist primarily as rate-fixing mech-

anisms. By consultation among themselves, the member

lines agree upen a single joint tariff to be filed with the

Board by each conference on behalf of all of its member

lines. The shipper pays the rate specified in the Confer-

ence Tariff regardless of the particular conference line

that may carry his freight. Any shipper desiring to alter

the published conference rate must have the matter re-

ferred via an individual conference carrier or the confer-

ence chairman to the conference rate committee (R. 669).

Rach of the conferences involved here operate pursuant to

a unanimous voting provision under which any line, for-

eign-flag or Ameriean-flag, may veto any proposed rate

change (R. 1074).2. Beeause the voting is confidential,

“Tt is this very surrender of control over its own rates entailed

in conference rate-making procedures that render the conferences

peculiarly obnoxions to [sbrandtsen. As appellee’s Vice President

Crinkley described the result of conference rate-making procedures

(R. 411):

A. No, T am coming smack on to the other thing, and that

is this: Why don’t we join these groups? When we join, or

if we join this group, at that instant two things would happen

concerning freight rates. From that point on, we, as a carrier,

would never have anything to do with what freight rates

were applied on shipments moving on our ships. We might

have a voice in the Rate Committee Burean—we would be

one of 14 lines, with the rates being fixed on majority vere.

QO. (Mr. Hupper) You know it is done by unanimous vote.

don’t you?

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5)

neither the shipper nor the Board knows which individual

line vetoed a proposed rate adjustment (R. 668).

Since the inception of this case, these conferences have

been composed of seven foreign-flag lines and four Ameri-

can-flag lines (R. 594). However, ‘‘carriers may enter or

withdraw from the conference at will’? (R. 213), and con-

ference membership entails no continuing obligation to stay

in the trade, Consequently, the international complexion

of conference membership alters from time to time as lines

enter and depart the trade, join and leave the conferences.

For example, only four present members of the Kastbound

Conference were members prior to World War I]; six car-

riers Joined since March 2, 1946: and three Canadian lines

A. | don’t know that.

Q. I think you will find out that is right.

A. That makes it much weerxe, in my opinion, for then the

American shipping interests may be seriously endangered by

some one line that has no interest in this business whatever.

Some of the lines don’t call at all of the ports, and yet one

line calls at this port, and by his single vote could upset

another port.

But let me finish what I was saying, and that is this: When

we join a Conference, if we did that, at that minute. even

with the unanimous vote there, we would lose control of

what we might charge. We might upset somethine the others

were doing, but we have nothing to do with what we charge.

And at that minute the shippers would not see any oceasion

when there was any competitive foree brought to play on the

rail (sie) level.

Q. Well, you are aware that this entire Conference situ-

ation and rate situation is policed actively by the United

States Maritime Commission, aren’t you?

A. I wish I could say I agree with you, but T don’t believe

it, sir. I don’t believe it is policed. Sufficiently, let me add

that—sufficiently.

* A/S. J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi, Black Diamond Steamship

Corporation, Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, Compagnie

Maritime Belgie, Cunard White Star, Ltd.. Ellerman’s Wilson

Line Ltd., Dampskibsselskabet af 1912 A/S. A/S Dampskibsselska-

bet Svendborg, United States Lines Company, N. V. Neder-

landsche-A merikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij. Waterman

Steamship Corporation, and South Atlantic Steamship Lines, Ine.

withdrew in 1948 (R. 212-213). In the aggregate, the East-

bound Conference offered 498 berth sailings in 1947, and

518 in 1948 (R. 255-56).

Isbrandtsen, which the Board noted (R. 03 ‘had a his-

tory of ocean shipping operation independent from con-

ference ties’’, is not a member of either conference but is in

competition with both in the North Atlantic t ‘ade, in whic?

it operated 38 berth sailings in 1948. Down through the

years, as the only regularly scheduled non- -conference com-

mon ¢arrier continuously in the trade (R. 386), Isbrandt-

sen, the Examiner found, ‘‘has effectively acted as a check

on respondents’ [Conferences’] rates and services”’ (R.

261).

At the time this suit was instituted, the Conferences had

in effect conference tariffs constructed on a single rate scale

which largely represented the War Shipping Administra-

tion’s wartime rate seale (R. 258). While some adjust-

ments had been made sinee March 2, 1948, the rate level

on October 1, 1948 was substantially Taritf No. 17, which

had been approved for wartime operation by the War Ship-

ping Administration and which made allowance for many

war-inflated cost factors such as war risk insurance, bonus

payments to seamen and high oil charges. Tariff No. 17

also ineluded a flat surcharge of 15 percent, which was

likewise continued in effect in the Conference Tariff after

return of shipping to private operation on Mareh 2, 1946.'

* The Examiner found that on 581 commodities, Isbrandtsen’s

rates were ‘from 3.3 percent to 53.4 percent lower than the con-

ference rates’? (R. 236-237). A measure of the level of existing

tariff rates which the Confefences proposed to convert into con-

tract rates on and after Nov. 1, 1948, is afforded by a comparison

of the rates that prevailed before and after World War II. Mr.

Crinkley, Isbrandtsen Vice President in Charge of Traffic, com-

pared the pre-war and post-war rate situation (R. 379-380) :

A. Let me say that T have no reverence whatsoever for a

Conference rate as such. T don’t believe the time has ever

been in the commerce of this country when anybody could say

that the Conferences, any one of them or all of them, have set

up a tariff where the rates are very reasonable and take into

CODY ROTINIDN CTOeCre INI CONTE

~

2) The Exclusive Patronage Contract System

On October 1, 1948, appellant carriers summarily noti-

fied all known shippers in the North Atlantic trade that,

effective November 1, 1948, the exclusive patronage con-

tract-non-contract rate system would be insti:ted simul-

taneously in both east- and westbound trades covering all

commodities transported in those trades, with insignificant

exceptions.” Under the exclusive patronage system thus

held out to the public, the conferences proposed to create

dual rate seales by adding an arbitrary differential of 20

consideration all of the factors of trade. T don’t believe any-

think like that has ever happened, and accordingly, fer

semebody to assume that because a Conference has got a rate

here, and | quote this, that we are necessarily cutting their

rate. That is just foolishness.

Before the war, the rate on leaf tobacco to Hamburg and

Antwerp was 50 cents a hundred pounds with independent

competition, On January 1, 1948 it was $5.20. Then the

JETA (sic: JELA, ie. Joint Export Import Agency, R. 444)

came in the market with 30,000 tons of tobacco and asked for

a quotation. The Conference qnoted $3.20. 0 My quotation

was $2.25, $20 a ton less.

Now, mind you, to England at the same time, where it is

more expensive to carry tobacco since the lines have to deliver

to the government warehouses, $2 was the rate. So to Ene-

land high ports it was $2, Hamburg and Bremen $3.20, Ant-

werp and Rotterdam $2.90, and for somebody to say that

rate is reasonable and if IT quote under it IT am a chiseler, it

is foolishness.

If I quoted the same thing, I would be guilty of embezzle-

ment. 1 quoted two and a quarter based on American opera-

tion, high cost operation, with a good profit.

Now, what could be done with a cheaper operating foreign

business is something else. Two and + quarter was ao eood

rate, very satisfactory. I quoted it. We carried a substantial

part of the business. The Conference met the rate. The tex-

payers of this country saved S600.000 on that transaction

because of good, clean competition that was there working, net

chiseling the Conference rate, but setting rates that were

very fair and quite profitable.

*T.e.. human ashes, coal and coke in bulk, corpses, household or

personal eifects, explosives, grain in bulk, livestock, and lift vans

R. 257).

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pereent to the existing rate scale. No reduction under the

existing rates was involved (R. 454). The higher, so-called

non-contraet rate scale, was to be applied to any shipper

who continued after November 1, 1948 to patronize inde-

pendent non-conference carriage such as that supplied by

Isbrandtsen. The existing so-called contract scale, which

prior to November 1, 1948, had been applied uniformly to

all Cargo in the trade moving on Conference vessels, was

to be available after November 1, only to shippers who con-

tracted in advance to confine all their shipments in the

North Atlantic trade to conference vessels (R. 258).

a) Inereased Rate for Identical Transportation Service,

While undertaking to differentiate between ‘‘contract”’

and **non-contract’’ shippers, the conference lines did not

undertake to tender to the trade any different transporta-

tion services after November 1, 1948 than had been pur-

veyed prior to that date, and the notice to the shipping pub-

lie made it perfectly clear that precisely the same trans-

portation services would be furnished the shipper, irre-

spective of whether he paid the contract rate or the newly

established, higher non-contract rate. The proposed sys-

tem, therefore, contemplated that two shippers seeking to

ship the same articles, on the same vessel, on the same day,

between the same two ports, might well be charged different

rates, depending entirely on whether each had agreed to

patronize the conference lines exelusivly (R. 456).6 The

® Appellants’ witness, Mr. Rosenthal, conceded the absence of any

other basis for the application of different rates (R. 793-794) :

Q. Now, is it your understanding that under the dual rate

system maintained by the Conference in connection with the

contract rate, that the sole distinction there with respect. to,

and as a basis for, the applicability of the higher rate, is

whether or not you have agreed as a shipper to confine your

patronage to Conference Lines exclusively?

A. Yes. As T understand it, if | do not sign a contract in

which I agree to confine my business to Conference Lines, if

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

y

non-contract shipper might tender several times as much

tonnage as the contract shipper and still be assessed the

higher rate. Regardless of which rate was paid, the Ex-

aminer found that ‘tthe cargo of both are transported on

the same vessel and with the same degree of care, and the

paper work incidental thereto is the same’? (R. 237).

b) Conference Assumed No Obligation to Supply Car-

riage,

While the exelusive patronage contract tendered the

trade on October 1, 1948 (Appendix A to this Brief), was

principally remarkable for its establishment of different

rates for identical transportation services, the contract was

also striking in several other respects. Notably, the pro-

posed contract merely obligated the merchant to effect, vin

conference lines, all of such export shipments as he might

make in the North Atlantic continental trade. There was

no obligation on the merchant to export any commodities

at all (R.259). By the same token, under the proposed con-

tract, the conference lines agreed to furnish the merchant at

contract rates only that “space in such vessels as they may

respectively load at said loading ports for transportation

and dispatch at the ports desired, provided that suitable

unbooked space is available therein when the merchant

makes applieation’’ (R, 259). As the court below in-

terpreted this provision (R. 128), “This apparently means

that, to a shipper who signs an exclusive patronage con-

tract, the conference carriers agree to supply no‘transporta-

tion facilities, exeept as the conference members may sce

lit to provide them from time to time.” Certainly, no in-

dividual conference line undertook to make available any

I then ship over a Conference Line, 1 pay the non-contract

rate.

Q. The reason for that being no other than the fact that you

have not agreed to confine your patronage to the Conference

vessels ?

A. Yes.

Shs ho ORRR ease

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10

unbooked space, or, indeed, to stay in the trade at all, even

during the life of the contract. It is true that the contract

left the shippers ‘*free’? to seeure space elsewhere if the

Conference failed to provide it, but the shippers were well

aware that this freedom was meaningful only if non-con-

ference carriage Was available.’

¢) Inadequate Rate Protection Offered Shipper.

Respecting rates, the contract provided that the rates

specified therein, which were the then existing Conference

Tariff, might be increased from time to time during ‘he life

of the contract. Any notice of such an increase was to he

deemed accepted by the merchant unless he notified the

conference of his non-acceptance within 20 days. In such

event, the conferences reserved the right to cancel the

merchant’s contract on GO days’ written notice (R. 259-

260). At best, this provision assured the shipper of rate

protection for only eighty days, although the Conference

experts, themselves, maintained that protection for a year

Was necessary to provide adequate opportunity for for-

ward trading (R. 785). Of course, the cancellation priv-

ilege was of real benefit to the Conferences, but, again, the

merehants were aware that it was meaningless to them in

the absence of non-conference carriers.

Furthermore, the coutract to be effectuated on November

1, 1948, was, as the Examiner described it, ‘tan all-com-

TAs appellants’ own transportation expert conceded (R. 777,

iS3):

Q. You appreciate, do yon not, that the provision allowing

vou to secure space elsewhere is meaningful for a shipper

only in the event there is an independent in the trade?

A. Yes, sir.

al * «

Q. 1 asked you earlier whether you saw any obligation on

the part of the Conference Lines to carry cargo, and you

said no. ITs that right?

A. I said no, based on the fact that if they wished te with-

craw all their sailings, there is nothing under this contract

that would compel them to put a sailing on berth.

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

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11

modity agreement, i.e., the shipper is obligated to use the

conference lines for all his cargo. The net result is that

if the conference gives notice of an increase in rates on

any of the commodities covered by the contract the shipper

must agree thereto or else he loses the benefit of the con-

tract rates on his other commodities. For example, if the

shipper were to export 25 commodities and the increase is

on one only, his position on the other 24 would be jeopar-

dized if he failed to accept the increase on the one. This

would be a clear-cut case of the tail wageing the dog, and

it would be manifestly unfair to saddle the shipper with

this choice’? (R. 246). Despite this biting criticism of the

proposed contract system by the Examiner, the Board ap-

proved this aspect of the proposed contract system without

even discussing the matter.

d) Shipper Subject to Severe Penalties.

Among other jeopardies to which the proposed contract

subjected the shipper was the threat that, if the merchant

made a shipment in a non-conference line in violation of

the contract, the shipper would be liable for twice the

amount of freight that would have been payable if the

shipment had been effected under the contract over con-

ference lines.* The contract also conveyed to the carriers

the option to terminate the agreement for such a violation.

thereby rendering the shipper liable for the higher non-

contract rates on future shipments effected via conference

lines (R. 259). The contract imposed no reciprocal penalty

for breach on the part of the conference lines presumably

because they assumed no obligation ‘capable of being

breached (R. 776). Curiously enough, the option reserved

to the Conferences to impose the penalties for breach was

the only feature of the proposed system which the Board

“In Pacific Westbound Conference et al v. Leval & Co., Ine.,

Jaly 16, 1951, 192-485, a Circuit Court of the State of Oregon re-

fused enforcement of a similar conference contract penalty.

eee”

i AE sechiSN eas Ap Ten TR RE as

12

found objectionable. The Board required that the imposi-

tion of the penalties be made mandatory (R. 65).

e) Contract Made Shipper Continually Dependent on

Conference.

Respecting the term of the exclusive association, the

contract provided that it should continue in effect for a

period of 14 months from November 1, 1948 to December 31,

1949, and thereafter, in the words of the Board, ‘* the agree-

ment shall continue in effect throughout consecutive subse-

quent years subject to the right of either the shipper or the

carriers to terminate it as of December 31 in any year by

giving the other party 9) days’ written notice of termina-

tion’? (R. 56). This “right”? of termination was also of

substance to the shipping public only in the event that, at

the end of any contract year, non-conference carriage Was

actually available in the trade as an alternative to conter-

ence services.

f) Contract System Created Power to Discriminate.

Finally, the projeeted dual rate system was peculiar in

that it was not proposed to apply to all shippers alike, big

and small, public and private, as had been the case with the

single rate system. Because governmental agencies were

prevented by law from entering into any arrangement which

interfered with the competitive purchase of transportation

service, the Government, which was one of the largest ex-

porters in the trade and which was competing with private

exporters (R. 639), was not to be compelled to sign a con-

tract in order to enjoy the lower contract rates (R. 42").

Neither was the powerful Automobile Manufacturers’ Ass0-

ciation which declined to sign the contract when it was pre-

sented to it, but which was informed by the Conference thiat

it would be eligible fo* contract rates nonetheless (R. 224,

898-903).

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g) Record Silent As to Reasons for Use of System In

This Particular Trade.

At the time of the attempted institution of the contraet

system involved here, the Board had approved approxi-

mately 100 conferences in various trades around the world.

Of this number, only 24 conferences were attempting to

make active use of the dual rate system at the time of the

Board’s decision challenged here. While the conferences

had employed the dual rate system in the North Atlantie

trade toa limited extent prior to World War II, they had

never applied it to more thay approximately 360 commod-

ities out of the total of approximately 1800 commodities

moving in the trade." Consequently, the attempt of the

conferences to apply the system straight across the hoard

to all commodities moving in the trade represented a sharp

departure from the usual practice in the North Atlantic

trade,

The record preserves an eloquent silence as to the rea-

sous which motivated the Conferences jn seckinge for the

lirst time to institute the system on November 1, 1948 on

substantially all commodities moving in the trade. and the

conditions in the trade which might be thought to have justi-

fied the inauguration of the system at that time. At no

place on the face of the Conferences’ minutes on file with

the Commission was there any showing of the reason for

the adoption of the contract system in the North Atlantic

trade at this time, or any other time (R. 909-911), While

the Chairman of the Kastbound Conference, who Was the

only witness from the trade to testify for the Conferences

concerning the dual rate system, indieated there may have

heen a possibility of the trade becoming unstabilized. he

Was unable to point to any factors in the trade which were

contributing to such ** possible’? instability (R. 911). How-

ever, if the record is silent as to the reasons which nnderlay

"The Examiner found that out of a total of 1700-1900 items in

the Tariff, only 706 were under contract (R. 257), and the

Chairman of the Conference testified that of these 796 items, no

dual rate features were involved in 345 items (R. 740),

14

the proposed adoption of the contract system on November

1, 1948, the record leaves no doubt of the effect of that

adoption.

h) Exclusive Patronage System Coercive.

During 1948, Isbrandtsen offered 38 sailings in the North

Atlantic trade, while the Conferenee lines in the aggregate

offered 518 sailings (R. 255-56). Most important shippers

in the North Atlantic trade who desire to ship a portion of

their cargo via Isbrandtsen have need of more frequent

service than Isbrandtsen supplies, and each such shipper

in the trade must normally secure a part of his transporta-

tion requirements from member lines of the Conferences,

If the dual rate provisions went into effect, therefore, such

shippers would be compelled to sign Conference contracts

in order to escape paying the higher non-contraet rate on

that portion of their cargo which business exigencies re-

quired them to ship via Conference lines from time to

time.'°

™ As appellee’s Vice President described the dilemma confront-

ine shippers (R. 468):

A. That is the element of force that I have referred to quite

often at this hearing, whereby, in these trades where the Con-

ferences attempt to use this exclusive patronage rate system,

such shippers as require more service than my company pro

vides consider they do not have any choice, they are forced to

sign these exclusive patronage contracts: and obviously, thes

could not afford to ship with these Conference lines and pay

the non-con ract rates. IT don’t think anybody ever pays the

non-contrac’? rates.

Indeed, appellants’ own transportation expert eandidly con-

ceded the economic coercion to which the contract system subjected

the shipper (R. 75) :

Q. Of course, if they (non-conference lines) weren't able

to satisfy you, then to the extent you used them (Conference

lines) vou would have to pay the higher rate?

A. Correet. And if they (non-conference lines) coutdn't

satisfy me, after all, it probably would be an economic neces

sity for me to aecept the conference contract, and to pay the

conference rate on all of my shipments, even if they were

higher than the non-conference rate. (Parentheses supplied. |

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15

Thus, the necessary effect of requiring such shippers in

the North Atlantic trade, on or after November 1, 14s, to

secure all or none of their transportation requirements

from member lines of the conferences was to compel such

shippers to cease patronizing Isbrandtsen. In faet, iminedi-

ately upon conference announcement of the proposed insti-

tution of the contract system, many such important ship-

pers, Who in the past had shipped part of their cargo with

Isbrandtsen, notified the appellee that, when the exclusive

patronage contract system went into effect, they would be

compelled to cease patronizing Isbrandtsen and to confine

all of their shipments to the conference lines."’ Indeed, out

"While appellants have sought to create the impression that

shippers hailed the contract system, the ‘ecord contains ample

evidence of bitter shipper opposition. The ouly shipper inter-

venors, Department of Agriculture, Himila International, and

Pacitie Coast Borax Company, supported appellees opposition to

the system (R. 204). From his long experience with shippers,

appellee’s Vice President testified (R. 431):

A. My personal feeling, and I feel it very strongly, and

it is based on a long experience and a very wide acquaintance

with shippers, is that 90 percent or more of the shippers

don’t like the conference contract system, and if they didn't

feel that they were forced to sign it. they would never sign it.

I don’t know the exact figures, of course, but it is my impres-

sion that 90 percent or more do not care for the conference

contract system. They think it is an imposition.

This testimony was documented by written communications from

slippers opposing the system (R. 1122-1125). Indeed, the penalty

imposed by the differential is so severe that Mir. Isbrandtsen testi-

tied that his own company was, itself, forced to sign contracts in

trades where it was shipping for its own account and did not sappy

carriage (R. 321):

Q. (Mr. Hupper) As a shipper, your company has entered

into contracts with the Conference lines, has it not?

A. Yes—in each ease under protest.

q. You were a free agent, weren't you?

A. No.

Q. You signed the contracts, your company did?

A. Under coercion,

Q. Who coerced you?

A. The Conference.

ENE PROT TT PO EERE GY

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of a total of approximately 4500 shippers solicited, approxi-

mately 3000 shippers in the North Atlantie continental

trade had executed the exclusive patronage eoentracts prior

to the issuance of an injunction by the United States Dis-

trict Court for the Southern District of New York which

enjoined the further solicitation of such contracts pending

the determination of this proceeding.

In the present posture of the case, the fact that the

patronage system is coercive is conceded on the face of the

record. The Examiner found that ‘tit is true, as urged by

complainant, that shippers are compelled to sign contracts

through economie coercion’’(R. 237); and the Board con-

cluded that the conferences realized ‘****something more

than voluntary shipper cooperation must be agreed to”

(R. 64). Similarly, on the present record it is admitted

that, through the coercion practiced by it upon the shipping

public, the exclusive patronage dual rate system would en-

able the Conferences to monopolize carriage in the North

Atlantie trade by forcing independent non-conference car-

riage out of the trade or into the conference. The Examiner

found that **There can be little doubt that the contract

system in the present trades, if allowed to become effective,

would create a virtual monopoly’? (R. 221); and in the

Q. They threatened you?

A. An inferred threat.

@. You signed them so as to get the lower rate, didn’t you!

A. No.

Q. Why did you sign them?

A. Oh, pardon me, I didn’t understand that question.

Q). You signed those contracts, your company did, so as

to get the lower rate?

A. I signed them so we wouldn't be penalized by paying

the higher rates. That is the way | like to put it.

@. You wanted the lower rate?

A. I didn’t want the higher rate.

Q. That is the way with every shipper of a sane mind, he

wants the lower rate effective if he can get it.

A. Lam afraid that the other shippers look upon it the same

way. They don’t want to pay the higher rate; they don’t

want to be penalized.

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17

court below Board counsel conceded that ‘‘whether the

coutraet system in a particular case actually has the effect

of producing a complete monopoly (i.e., control of a trade)

depends upon how well it works; admittedly, it is monopo-

listie in prrpose. The extent to which it is monopolistic in

effeet depends upon how suecessfully that purpose is

achieved’? (R. 124-125).""

3) Proceedings Below.

Faced with exclusion from access .o the patronage which

it had developed and serviced over a period of more than

two decades through the threatened imposition of the ex-

elusive patronage contraet system, Isbrandtsen invoked the

jurisdiction of a statutory United States court in the

Southern Distriet of New York on October 28, 1948, pur-

suant to the provisions of the Shipping Act of 1916, as

amended, 46 UL S.C. § _. “9 Urgent Deficiencies Act of

1913, as amended, 28 U. . $$ 2284, 2321-2225, and the

Administrative = fehl Pa of 1946,5 U.S. C. § 1009, to

enjoin, set aside, annul and suspend orders and approvals

of the Board dated January 2, 1948, approving conference

agreement designated by the Board as Conference Agree-

ment No. 4490-6, and August 24, 1948, approving conference

agreement designated by the Board as Conference Agree-

ment No. 7920-1. The complaint (R. 1-9) set forth that

such approvals had been entered without notice or hearing,

and alleged that so much of such Board orders and ap-

provals as purported to authorize appellant steamship

lines operating in the North Atlantie trade concertedly to

coerce shippers in such trade to patronize such lines exeln-

‘ively, through use of the exelnsive patronage contract sys-

tem, and to retaliate against shippers in such trade who

"These admissions were justified by the state of the reeord.

Por example, appellants’ own transportation expert testified (R.

786) -

I would coneede it would make it much more difficut for the

independents to stay in business.

ee

18

patronize Isbrandtsen, violated Section 14 of the Shipping

Act, and were null and void.

Simultaneously with the filing of its verified Complaint

in the District Court, Isbrandtsen moved the Court for a

temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction

to maintain the status quo in the North Atlantic trade,

until such time as the Court could hear and finally deter-

mine the issues.

The District Court found (Opinion, per Rifkind, J. $1

F. Supp. 544) that if the Conferences were permitted to

effectuate the dual rate tariff system, Isbrandtsen would

be ‘‘gravely prejudiced’? and on January 13, 1949, the

Court granted the temporary injunction prayed for. How-

ever, because the Board had approved the contract system

without notice and hearing and had indicated to the Court

that it would like an opportunity to review the question on

a full record, the Distriet Court conditioned its temporary

injunetion upon the filing by Isbrandtsen of a complaint

with the Board challenging the validity of Conference

Agreements 4490-6 and 7920-1.

In accordance with that condition, Isbrandtsen filed its

Complaint before the Board on February 1, 1949, challeng-

ine the validity of so much of the said conference agree-

ments Nos. 4490-6 and 7920-1 as purported to authorize ap-

pellant steamship lines, named as members of appellant

conferences, to use the exclusive patronage contract-non

contract rate system, on the grounds that:

a) Such purported authorizations exceeded the authority

of the Commission under Section 15 of the Shipping Act of

1916, as amended (46 U. S. C. § 814) and were absolutely

null and void;

b) Such purported authorizations contravened the spe-

cific provisions contained in Section 14 of the Shipping

Act of 1916 (46 U.S. C. § 812) prohibiting retaliations or

discriminations against a shipper for patronizing any other

carrier; and

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19

ce) Under Article I, Sec. 1 and Article I See. 8, para-

eraph 18 of the Constitution of the United States, no

legislative authority was, or could be, delegated to the

Federal Maritime Board to authorize said Conferences, by

the use of said contract-non-contract rate system, to ex-

elude Isbrandtsen, or any other person, from engaging I

trade or commerce, and under the Fifth Amendment, the

authorizations were invalid because they deprived appellee

of its property without due process of law.

The Board set the complaint down for hearing before

an Examiner who filed his recommended decision on Octo-

hey 5, 1949. This first Recommended Decision made no

Findings of Fact, denominated as such, but confined itself

to a discussion of the lawfulness, per se, of the exclusive

patronage contract system, under Section 14(3) of the

Shipping Act of 1916. On the latter point, the Examiner

concluded that, despite the explicit language of the Section,

it did not ban all diserimination, but only ‘‘unjust’’ dis-

crimination, and he further concluded that ‘*the contract

system is not unlawful, per se, and that it is within the

administrative diseretion of the Commission, when sup-

ported by substantial evidence, to determine in each case

whether the system violates one or more sections of the

Act.” Having concluded that the exclusive patronage

system was not unlawful, per se, under Section 14, the

Examiner recommended that the use of the system in the

North Atlantic trades be approved without supporting this

recommendation with the ‘substantial evidence’*’ by which

the Board was, in the Examiner’s own words, ‘*to deter-

mine in each ease whether the system violates one or more

sections of the Act.”’

Presumably because of the failure of the Examiner's

original recommended decision to supply a solid basis of

fact on which the Board could determine whether the use

of the exelusive patronage system, in the North Atlantie

trades, was violative of any sections of the Shipping Act

of 1916, the Board, after oral argument and on December

ERTS TEA 2 4

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20

19, 1949, entered an order remanding the ease to the Ex-

aminer for further Findings of Fact. Upon the petition of

complainant, the scope of the remand was enlarged by the

following Supplemental Order of the Board, dated January

15, 1950, which, in effect, superseded the order of Decem-

ber 19, 1949 (R. 229):

Orverep that the record herein be and it is hereby re-

manded to Examiner C. W. Robinson

A. With instructions to prepare, serve, and file pro-

posed findings of fact supplemental to his recom-

mended decision served Oetober 5, 1949, as to whether

the exelusive patronage contract system proposed to

be instituted by respondents, and the forms of exclu-

sive contracts to be employed therewith, (1) are un-

justly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers

shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between

exporters from the United States and their foreign

competitors, or (2) operate to the detriment of the

commerce of the United States, or (3) are in violation

of the provisions of the Shipping Act, 1916, and par-

ticularly whether they constitute a resort to other dis-

criminative or unfair methods, beeause such shipper

has patronized any other carrier or has filed a com-

plaint charging unfair treatment, or for any other

reason (Emphasis supplied.)

B. With instructions to rule upon the proposed find-

ings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the

Complainant * * *

On February 21, 1950, the Examiner’s recommended sup-

plemental decision was filed, presumably in accordance

with the foregoing mandate of the Board, which required

him to file proposed Findings of Facet. Like its prede-

cessor, however, the supplemental decision failed to make

proposed Findings of Fact, ascertainable as such. The

Examiner did, however, pass on the Findings proposed by

Isbrandtsen which he, by and large, adopted. These Find-

ines were not, of course, designed to support the contract

<ystem. But, despite the absence of findings to support the

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

21

system, the Examiner again concluded that it did not vio-

late the Act, nor Section 15 thereof,

Before the old Commission could pass upon the recom-

mended supplemental decision of the Examiner, the Com-

mission was abolished. The temporary Federal Maritime

Board, which was appointed to succeed the Commission,

deferred decision in the case until its permanent successor

could be appointed. On October 18, 1950, final argument

in the matter was had before the permanent Board, and

the Board’s decision of December 1, 1950 was served on

the parties hereto on December 5, 1950.

At a hearing before the Court below on December 11,

1950, the Court ordered the complaint amended to bring

before the Court the Board’s order dismissing the ecom-

plaint, the filing of answers, and the matter set for final

argument on December 20, 1950. Pur-nant to the order of

the Court, Isbrandtsen amended its complaint to challenge

the order of dismisal contained in the Board’s decision of

December 1, as well as the earlier orders of January 2,

1948 and August 24, 1948, purporting to authorize the use

of the exclusive patronage contract system in the North

Atlantic trades.

The Secretary of Agriculture intervened in support of

Ishrandtsen’s amended complaint.

The United States answered the amended complaint as

statutory defendant (28 U.S.C. § 2322), and confessed er-

ror in the Maritime Board’s order.

The ease was heard on motion by Ishrandtsen for a per-

manent injunction and on motions by the Conferences and

the Board to dismiss Isbrandtsen’s amended complaint.

On Mareh 20, 1951, the three-judge District Court denied

these motions to dismiss and granted the prayer for a per-

manent injunction.

4) Decision Below.

In the court below, Ishbrandtsen contended that the

Board’s authorizations of the Conference Agreements

Sa aes |

oe)

were absolutely null and void because they exceeded the

authority conferred on the Board by the statute. These

authorizations were issued pursuant to Section 15 of the

Shipping Act of 1916 (46 U.S. C. § S14) under which the

Board is authorized to approve and immunize, to a limited

extent, under the antitrust laws, conferences of shipping

lines. The Section provides that ‘* the Commission may by

order disapprove, cancel, or modify any agreement, or any

modification or cancellation thereof, whether or not previ-

ously approved by it, that it finds ... fo be violation of

this chapter and shall approve all other agreements, modi-

fientions, or cancellations.’? (Emphasis supplied)

Section 14 of the Shipping Act of 1916 (46 UL S.C. S812),

however, provides that no common varrier shall directly

or indirectly (1) pay or allow a deferred rebate; (2) use

a fighting ship; (8) retaliate against any shipper or resort

‘to other discriminatory or unfair methods because such

shipper has patronized any other ‘arrier”’.

It was Isbrandtsen’s position below that Section 14 was

the Shipping Aet’s ‘‘charter of freedom’’; that the See-

tion was explicitly framed by Congress to preserve the

opportunity for independent competitive earriage in for-

eien trade; that Section 15 was designed to permit coop-

erative arrangements among carriers who voluntarily

avreed to associate themselves in conferences and to sub-

ject themselves to public regulation; and that the two sec-

tions read together embodied a Congressional scheme te

permit regulated cooperation but to forbid the employment

of any coercive weapon designed to monopolize the trade

by eliminating independent carrier competition.

The District Court noted that both the Examiner and the

Board had found that the dual rate system established a

differential of between 20 and 30 percent for identical

transportation services and that apparently the only justi-

feation for such an arbitrary differential was its tendency

‘to drive competing non-conference carriage into the con-

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

ference or out of business’? (R. 128).'* Consequently, the

Court concluded, ‘there the rates proposed to be charged

shippers who do not sign contracts are unreasonably, and

therefore unjustly, discriminatory; and the dual-rate pro-

visions Which permit such rates are invalid.’? (R. 127).

' Appellants have questioned whether the District Court was

correct in holding that the Examiner and the Board had found

the system arbitrary.

At the request of Isbrandtsen, the Examiner found (R. 258) :

14. Shippers were informed that failure to sign such a eon-

tract would entail application of their shipments by respon-

dents’ lines after November 1, 1948 of non-contract rates

which were fixed by means of an arbitrary differential at a

level 20 to 30% higher than the currently existing scale.

(Emphasis supplied.)

In view of this finding, Isbrandtsen filed an exception to the

failure of the Examiner to conclude that the system was not unrea-

sonably discriminatory :

21. Page 16. Complainant excepts to the Examiner's hold-

ing ‘*there is no evidence in this proceeding as to the reason-

ubleness of the two types of rates’’. As indicated above, the

Non-contract rates are obviously unreasonable because estal-

lished on the basis of an arbitrary differential.

While the Board’s opinion did not specifically discuss the Ex-

aminer’s findings and conclusions or Isbrandtsen’s exceptions,

counsel for the Board in oral argument before the court construed

the Board’s decision as accepting the Examiner's findings insofar

as they were not inconsistent with its own report (R. 75), and

the Board’s report, itself, recites (R. 66):

We find as follows:

1. The findings contained in the report of the examiner

are a substantial compliance with the orders of reference of

the Commission of December 19, 1949 and Januray 13, 1950.

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ARGUMENT.

Introduction.

The principal inquiry here is whether the exclusive pat-

ronage contract system, by charging a higher rate for iden-

tical transportation services to a shipper who patrouizes a

non-conference carrier, violates the statutory proscription

against retaliation by resort. to discriminatory methods

against such shipper for patronizing any other earrier.

1. Contract System, Not Conference System, in Issue.

To escape the force of the statutory prohibition, the pro-

ponents of the contract system have, from time to. time

throughout the proceedings below, sought to sanction the

system by tying it to the conference system (R. 63). How-

ever, only the lawfulness of the contract system is in-

volved here, and the lawfulness of that device must be

measured by the statutory eviteria regardless of the im.

pact on the conference system.

Nothing in the record lends credence to the proposition

that the contract system is essential to the continued vi-

tality of the conference system.’ In the North Atlantic

trade, as noted in the Statement. supra, the Conferences

"Tt is Isbrandtsen’s view that in permitting Conferences com-

posed of 7 foreign lines and only 4 American lines to use the dual-

rate system to maintain rates at the high American eost level, the

Board is compelling American shippers to subsidize all lines, for-

eign and American, instead of the soard subsidizing only American

lines in accordance with the spirit of the Merchant Marine Act,

1936 (46 U.S. C. § 1101) As the Examiner summarized these

Views (R. 211-212):

Conference rates, according te complainant, generally repre-

sent the ceiling of cost of American operation, and therefore

the level of conference rates in the present trades is unduly

high. There is no objection to American carriers having rates

that will enable them to stay in business. Since the cost of

foreign-flag operation is lower, a rate level satisfactery to

American lines should be even more satisfactory to the foreign

lines, and to that extent the foreign lines enjoy a subsidy. It

is contended that the American ceiling is an umbrella for

COPY BOUND CLOSE [N CENTER

Soren

a.

22

have flourished although they have never applied dual

rates to more than 20 percent of the commodities in the

tariff, and they have not employed the system at all since

1959. Out of more than 100 conferences presently au-

thorized by the Board, not more than 24 are attempting to

make active use of the system in any deeree. lronically

enough, the only example furnished by the record here of

the **eut-throat”’ competition which the system is supposed

toavoid was the rate war Which developed among the mem-

hers of the India-European and United Kingdom Confer-

ence, Which was employing the exclusive patronage deferred

rebate svstem and had monopolized the trade at the time

the internal war was started (R. 495).

In any case, the threat of chaos engendered by rate wars,

even if real, could not serve to nullify a clearly expressed

Congressional mandate.” No one has had the temerity to

a ene

foreign operators and not for complainant, and that if the

conference rates are based on American costs and there are a

number of foreign lines With lower costs, the foreign lines

“have quite a bonanza.”’ Under such a set-up complainant

thinks foreien vessels will gradually push American vessels to

one side, and as cargo falls off the foreign lines ean stay in the

trade longer and may also increase their service.

If conferences are well run complainant believes that the

Weight of the membership would always be an influence to

attract business without the use of the contract system, and

that American lines are incurring a certain amount of ill will

by using it. In complainant's opinion, the advent of the system

Was an important factor in decreasing American participa-

tion in the various trade routes, and it has not benefited the

commerce of the United States or contributed to the develop-

ment of the American merchant marine. Furthermore, it

does not foster the American) merchant marine to make it

difficult for an American carrier to Stay in the trade unless

he chooses to accept the terms of a group of lines. Prior to

1935 American vessels were decreasing in number in competi-

tion with foreign Vessels, and at the present time foreign lines

are putting on additional vessels in our trade routes When

American lines are not able to do so,

" United States vy. Chicago. M. & St. P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 449.

906-510 (1935),

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26

sugvest that the Board could approve the deferred rebate or

the fighting ship because of the supposed essentiality of

those prohibited devices to the survival of the conference

system. No more ean a violation of Section 14(5) of the

Aet, which outlaws retaliation and discrimination against a

shipper for patronizing another carrier, be justified by

some supposed accommodation of the evils prohibited hy

that section to the needs of the Conference system." If

the contract system retaliates or discriminates against a

shipper for patronizing any other earrier, then Congress

with plenary power to decide the conditions under which

Conferences should operate, has determined that confer.

enees should be denied the privilege of employing sue!) a

weapon against non-conference competition. — Private

choice of means necessarily yields to the national authority

thus exerted, and it is outside the competence of the Board

to inquire whether the legislative determination was beneti-

cent or harmful. Eastern States Retail Lumber Associa-

tion v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 613 (1914): Uaited

States v. Masonite. 316 U.S. 265, 281 (1942). It follows

that the Board is preeluded from authorizing for any rea-

son any of the practices or devices specitically proseribed

hy Congress, and that, whatever the virtues or viees of the

conference system, the contract system must here be inde-

pendently serutinized to determine its lawfulness under

Section 14.

2. Statutory Criteria.

The major question of statutory construction involved in

this case ts whether the exclusive patronage contract sys-

WEP Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20,

49 (1912):

* * * The law is its own measure of right and wrong, of what

it permits, or forbids, and the judgment of the courts can-

not be set up against it in a supposed accommodation of it

policy with the good intention of parties, and, it may be, 0!

some good results.’’

s

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

.

‘

erm

Sy

27

tem constitutes a violation of Section 14 of the Shipping

Act of 1916. Tf it does, it may not be approved under

Section 16 of the Act which provides in pertinent part:

The Board may by order disapprove, cancel, or

modify any agreement, or any modification or cancel-

lation thereof, whether or not previously approved by

it, that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair

as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or

ports, or between exporters from the United States

and their foreign competitors, or to operate to the

detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to

be in violation of this Act, and shall approve all other

agreements, modifications, or caneellations. = (Ei-

phasis supplied.)

* * .

All agreements, modifications, or cancellations made

after the orgainzation of the Board shall be lawful

only when and as long as approved by the board, and

before approval or after disapproval it shall be un-

lawful to earry out in whole or in part, directly or in-

directly, any such agreement, modification, or cancel-

lation.

Under Section 15, every conference agreement is unlaw-

ful until approved, and the Board is authorized to ap-

prove only *tsuch agreements as it does not find’’ to be

in violation of the Act. Unite Jd States Navigation (on. ¥.

Cunard, 50 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1931), aff'd, 284 U.S. 474

(1952). Tf, therefore, the dual rate svstem constitutes a

Violation of any of the regulatory provisions of the Ship-

ping Act, the board is powerless to approve it under See-

tion 15.

Section 14 of the Act defines three violations whieh are

made erimes: Subsection (1) defines and prohibits the use

of ‘deferred rebates’’; Subsection (2) defines and inter-

diets the use of a ‘fighting ship*’; and Subsection (3) for-

hids any carrier **directly or indireetly”’ to

Retaliate against any shipper by refusing. or threat-

ening to refuse, space accommodations when snel) are

available, or resort to other discriminating or unfair

bic

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28

methods, beeause such shipper has patronized any

other carrier or has filed a complaint charging unfair

treatment, or for any other reason.

The inquiry which naturally emerges from thus contrast-

ing the statutory criteria with the practice and effect of

the exclusive patronage contract system is whether the

Board could authorize a coercive rate differential designed

to drive independent competition out of business in the

teeth of a clearly expressed Congressional determination

to preserve independent carriage in our foreign trade.

3. Characteristics of Contract System.

In applying the statutory eriteria to the contract system,

this brief will be addressed to the following characteris

tics of that system which stand conceded on the present

record:

a. For precisely the same transportation service, the

exclusive patronage contract system establishes two sets of

“ates, one of Which is higher by an arbitrary differential of

20 percent ;

b. The sole consideration entitling a shipper to the lower

contract rate in his agreement not to patronize another car-

11er;

c. The higher non-coatract rate is charged a shipper tor

identical transportation service solely b cause he reserves

the right to patronize another carrier ;

d. The shipper is coerced into signing the exelusive pat-

ronage contract to eseape the imposition of the higher nou-

contract rates on that part of his transportation require-

ments which business exigencies require him to seek from

conference carriers using the system; and

e. The effect of the application of the exclusive patronage

system to all commodities moving in the North Atlantic

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

99

trade is to monopolize the trade in the hands of the carriers

employing the system.

I.

The Shipping Act of 1916 Was Designed to Preserve

Independent Competition.

The Shipping Act of 1916 represented an attempt by Con-

vress to permit voluntary conferences of carriers subject

to government regulation while at the same time forbidding

indulgence by such conferences in coercive practices de-

signed to eliminate independent aon-conference competi-

tion.

1. Alevander Committee Recommended and Congress

Adopted Ban Against Any Type of Conference Ae-

tivity Designed to Eliminate Independent Competition.

A comparison of the report of the Alexander Committee,”

which conducted the investigation leading to the passage of

the Act, with the statutory prohibitions in Section 14 of

the Act compels the conclusion that the Committee and the

Congress intended to outlaw every type of conference ae-

tivity that might possess utility for eliminating indepen-

dent competition, In its discussion of the subject ‘* Meeting

the Competition of Lines Outside the Conference,’’ the Com-

mittee set forth various methods utilized by conferences to

accomplish this purpose:

a) the deferred rebate system (p. 287);

b) collective competition against a single carrier

through the use of fighting ships (p. 289);

¢) the use of contracts, either jointly or individually

by conference members, which provided preferen-

tial rates in exchange for the shipper’s agreement

not to patronize another earrier (p. 290); and

“Investigation of Shipping Combinations, House Committe

on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, H. Ro Dov. 805, 63d Cong

2d Sess. p. 287.

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30

d) the use of contracts providing preferential rates

based on the volume of shipments (p. 291).

The specific practices outlawed as crimes in Section 14 of

the Act are patterned precisely, both in substane and «

quenee, after the Committee’s enumeration ox deviecs to

eliminate competition:

a) deferred rebates are barred by subsection (1);

b) use of the fighting ship is outlawed in subsection

(2);

¢) discrimination against a shipper for patronizing a

non-conference carrier is prohibited in subsection

(5); and

d) unjust discrimination based on volume of shipments

is forbidden in subsection (4).

In view of this close correlation between Report and Act,

it would appear clear that Congress adopted a scheme of

regulation intended to deal with each of the devices which

had been presented to the Committee as methods for elim-

inating non-Conference competition.

This view is confirmed when the Report of the Committee

is considered in the context of its time. The two standard

techniques for monopetizing ocean earriage prior to World

War I were the exclusive patronage deferred rebate system

and the fighting ship. Of the deferred rebate, the Aley-

ander Committee observed (p. 287), ‘Judging from the

facts produced in the foregoing pages, this method has

proved by far the most effective device for the control of

The hearings and report of the Committee were

.

trade."

largely pre-oceupied with condemning such coercive prae-

tices and devising means for outlawine them. As a result

of the Committee's deliberations and recommendations, the

exclusive patronage deferred rebate and the fighting ship

were categorically banned in Subsections 1 and 2 of Section

14 of the Shipping Aet of 1916."

"In the light of the arguments advaneed here to support the

dual rate system, it is interesting to note that the Alexander

Committee recommended the prohibition of deferred rebates de-

LS ——<£_ << «=< rs

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31

Just prior to the Alexander Committee’s investigation,

however, the Conferences had become concerned lest the ex-

clusive patronage deferred rebate system be held unlawful

in American foreign trade. Consequently, as the Commit-

tee noted (p. 288), ‘tin some eases where such rebates for-

merly existed they have been abandoned*’. As the deferred

rebate system was gradually dropped in our foreign trade,”

it came to be replaced by simple contracts of carriage.

Because of the novelty of such contracts, only sporadic

examples of them were before the Alexander Committee.

Even these few samples appear to be informal memoranda

which ditfered widely one from the other,’ unlike the for-

mal printed instruments employed here.’ In sharp contra-

distinction to the contracts involved in this case, each of

the agreements before the Alexander Committee was an

actual contract of carriage entered into between one or

more carriers and a shipper, which imposed upon the car-

rier (a) a definite obligation to earry, (b) at a rate which

could not be increased for the contract period, often one

year. In many instances, the total tonnage to be carried

Was estimated, and the commodities to which the con-

tract was applieable were named, unlike the contracts here

which are blanket all-commodity contracts. In no instance

did these contraets of carriage impose a penalty of double

freight in the event of breach by the shipper, nor did they

held out the further penalty of automatic application of

spite the faet that it found (p. 288), ‘‘the deferred rebate systems

now in use are equally open to all shippers who agree to give

exclusive patronage, and are granted without discrimination as

regards the size of individual or total shipments.”’

It was never abandoned in other trades and is still, today. the

favorite monopolistic device around the world in trades which do

not touch American shores (R. 314).

“See examples in Appendix B to this Brief.

“The Record reflects that the same printed form was used

miformly not only in this trade, but in all Trans-Atlantic Trades

R. 874-875).

5

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higher non-contract rates, as do the dual rate contracts

here”?

Because such actual contracts of carriage imposed a

heavy obligation on the carrier to carry the proffered ton-

nage ata fixed rate, they were necessarily of limited utility.

In a calling where charter rates vary widely with the sup-

ply of cargo and bottoms available, it would be inviting

hankruptey for any carrier or group of carriers to contract

in advance to carry the entire tonnage moving in a trade

for any length of time at a fixed rate. Such a burden in

effect tends to operate as an automatie limit on the spread

of such exclusive contracts because good business judgment

militates against carriers obligating themselves to carry

voods beyond their capacity or at rates which could prove

uneconomic. Suel considerations could very well explain

why Congress felt no necessity to outlaw in haee verba

*2 Oveasionally in the 30's Isbrandsten employed simple memo-

randa contracts of earriage of this nature to fight conter-

ence exclusive arrangements. Isbrandtsen discovered — that

after reducing an existing ‘‘paper’’ rate to enable some shipper to

engage in trade, the Conference would steal the fruits of Ishrandt-

sen’s enterprise by granting the shipper a similar rate and tying

him up with an exclusive contract (R. 441-442). To protect

itself, appellee in a few instances asked the shipper to ‘‘confirm”

that in consideration of an actual productive rate, appellee would

receive his business. Thereafter, this reduced rate was available

to all other shippers, regardless of patronage. As Mr. Crinkley tes-

tified (R. 422):

Now, we established this special rate, and this man assures

us of his business. Sooner or later some other company is

eoing to want to ship also, and there is a lot of digging around

about that fact. We establish this rate, and then anybody—

anybody that comes along shipping that commodity gets that

rate. There is no question about it—there cannot be. We have

been in business about 21 or 22 years. TI have been with the

company 19 years. And as an independent carrier, there has

been no time that anybody to my knowledge has ever brought

any complaint, directly or indirectly, that we have been charg-

ine different rates to different shippers on the same commodity

and in the same trade. The Maritime Commission has never

had any complaint to that extent. IT have never had any

complaint made to me.

oe

COPY ROLIND CLOSE IN CENTER

33

exclusive contracts of carriage in the same manner as it

had outlawed deferred rebates and fighting ships.**

It remained for a later generation of carrier interests to

circumvent the prohibition against the exclusive patronage

deferred rebate system by perfecting the present exclusive

patronage contract system as a coercive device for forcing

a slipper to cease patronizing independent carriage. As

the Board, itself, characterized this development (R. 64),

“the dual rate system is the device which has been devel-

oped for that purpose’’, Le, to achieve ‘*something more

than voluntary shipper cooperation”’

Ii any case, the nature of the contracts of carriage be-

fore the Alexander Committee rendered them easily dis-

tinguishable from the pure monopolistic instruments be-

fore this Court. But even as to such Lona fide contracts of

carriage, not one word of approbation appears on the face

of the Alexander Committee's Report. And appellants

have been driven to seeking support in the Committee’s re-

mark (P. 307), “It is argued that the ordinary contract

system does not place the shipper in the position of con-

tinnal dependence that results from the deferred rebate

system’? (emphasis supplied). There is no evidence that

the Committee took any stoek in such an argument even as

ipplied to the simple contracts of carriage before it. As

applied to the formidable dual rate system before this

Court, such an argument is completely unfounded.

If the exclusive patronage contract system accomplishes

its admitted purpose to eliminate independent competition,

it manifestly renders the shipper utterly dependent upon

the conferences for as long as the system funetions. And

such continued dependence would seem to be contemplated

by the contracts themselves. As the Board characterized

the term of these agreements (R, 56): ‘*The agreements

* Of course, absent the invidious features of the system involved

here, full requirements contracts may have legitimate utility in

foreign trade as in other fields. Cf. Standard Oil of Cal. v. United

States, 337 U. S. 293, 306 (1949).

34

shall continue in effect throughout consecutive subsequent

years subject to the right of either the shipper or the ear-

rier to terminate it as of December 31 in any year by giving

the other party 90 days’ written notice of termination”.

““But’’, as the court below noted (R. 128) ‘‘the very pur-

pose of the dual rate provisions is, if possible, to compel

independent shippers (sic: carriers) to join the conference

or go out of business. If, then, the dual rate system pro-

vision is successful, there will be no independent carriers”.

Absent independent carriage in the trade, the ‘‘right’’ of

the shipper to cancel is completely lacking in substance.

Furthermore, because the exclusive patronage dual rate

system holds out to the shipper the promise of an advance

discount, its impact upon the trade is more immediate than

that of the deferred rebate. Many a small shipper finds a

discount in hand worth two in the future. Consequently,

the effect of the exclusive patronage contract system in

foreclosing the market to the independent carrier is, if

anything, more devasting than the impact of the deferred

rebate, and the result of its suecessful functioning is to

leave the shipper, if possible, more dependent on the cor-

ferences.

Thus, even if Congress had done no more in the Shipping

Act of 1916 than outlaw the exclusive patronage deferred

rebate system, its modern counterpart, the exclusive pa-

tronage dual rate system, would enjoy a very dubious

legitimacy. On the record here, the difference between the

exclusive patronage deferred rebate and the exclusive pa-

tronage contract system is largely a difference between &

deferred rebate and a preferred rebate. As this Court ree

ognized in Swayne & Hoyt v. United States, 300 U. S. 2%,

207 (1927), the operation of the exclusive patronage colt

tract system ‘‘does not differ substantially from that ot

‘deferred rebates’ ”’.

Forearmed with knowledge of man’s inventive genius,

however, Congress did not rest content with simply out-

lawing explicitly the two practices which bulked large 1

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

30

‘ts consciousness in 1916 and trusting to judicial alertness

co outlaw similar practices by implieation. It went further

and outlawed every other method that might conceivably

he devised to penalize a shipper for patronizing any other

carrier. After the notable example of the suecessful statu-

‘ory attempt to outlaw restraints of every type and kind

in the Sherman Act,** Congress, in the first two subsections

of Section 14 of the Shipping Act of 1916, forbade the

known means of monopolizing trade, the fighting ship and

the deferred rebate, and in the third subsection sought to

‘nsure the effectiveness of these prohibitions by banning

any other attempts to reach the same end, even though such

attempts might not have been wholly embraced in subsec-

tions Land 2. In subsection 3, the Congress provided that:

No common earrier by water shall, directly or indi-

rectly * * *

Third. Retaliate against any shipper by refusing, or

threatening to refuse, space accommodations when

such are available, or resort to other diseriminating or

unfair methods, because such shipper has patronized

any other carrier or has filed a complaint charging un-

fair treatment, or for any other reason.

Under this subsection, the Congress soueht to outlaw

every attempt to penalize a shipper for patronizing an

independent carrier. While the dual-rate system had not

(Ff. United States V. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911) where

this Court harmonized Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act in the

following terms:

In other words, having by the first section forbidden all means

of monopolizing trade, that is, unduly restraining it by means

of every contract, combination, ete., the second section seeks, if

possible, to make the prohibitions of the act all the more coi-

plete and perfect by embracing all attempts to reach the end

prohibited by the first section, that is, restraints of trade, by

any attempt to monopolize, or monopolization thereof, even

although the acts by which such results are attempted to be

brought about be not embraced within the genera’ enumera-

tion of the first section.

eee. |

SRI ETS Oh TEE EIS

ofRron

36

in 1916 matured to the point where experience revealed to

Congress its identity with the deferred rebate system, nev-

ertheless in the blanket prohibition in Subsection 3 against

every form of retaliatory discrimination, the Congress

sought to reach every adaptation of the deferred rebate

designed to produce the same result. And insofar as the

‘ordinary’? contracts of carriage before the Alexander

Cominittee alerted it to their possible future use as a sub-

terfuge to eseape the ban against deferred rebates, the

Congressional history reveals that Section 14(3) was

drafted to prevent the metamorphosis of such “ordinary”

contracts of carrfage into the monopolistic devices before

this Court.

Of course, the Committee could not interdict every ‘“‘ordi-

nary contract of carriage’? because every bill of lading is

a contract of carriage, and, as we have seen, the contracts

employed prior to 1914 had not risen to the indignity of

the modern exclusive patronage dual rate system. The

lack of an invidious label to pinpoint the object of its solici-

tude did not, however, make the Congressional interest any

less keen or its intent any less clear: in Section 14(3) it

sought to reach every discriminatory device, contract or

otherwise, designed to retaliate against a shipper for pa-

tronizing any other carrier or for any other reason, In

fact, if the reference in the section to retaliation by ‘resort

to other discrimintatory or unfair methods’? is not to be

disregarded as surplusage, it must necessarily be read as

covering practices not prohibited by name. No other view

is consistent with the remarkable correlation between the

four types of devices considered by the Committee under

the caption ** Meeting the Competition of Lines Outside the

Conference?’ and the four types of devices banned by Con-

eress in Seetion 14.

Thus, in Section 14, read in its entirety, the Congress

embodied a mandate to its administrative agents to pre-

serve independent non-conference carriage against each

and every device that might be employed by a conference

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

37

to eliminate such competition. In short, the Congressional

scheme contemplated the establishment of voluntary con-

ference arrangemeuts, but absolutely forbade the conver-

sion of such voluntary agreements into involuntary ones

through the use of coercive devices with the purpose and

effect of eliminating independent non-conference compe-

tition.

2. Ban Against Elimination of Non-Conference Competi-

tion Required by Regulatory Scheme.

This legislative and administrative scheme was required

by the facts. For a host of reasons Congress deliberately

abandoned the attempt to impose upon ocean trade the

same discipline of detailed government regulation that it

had adopted for common carriers in the domestic field.

The Alexander Report (pp. 420-421) had recommended that

the Interstate Commerce Commission be authorized to

investigate the rates of all carriers, including those in for-

eign commerce, and to order their ‘‘rates changed if con-

vinced that the rate under consideration is unreasonably

high". The Report explained this recommendation by

saying that ‘‘the Committee feels that in the absence of

government control steamship combinations may in many

instances have it within their power to arbitrarily raise

rates to an unreasonable degree both as regards the gen-

eral level and in the case of particular commodities * * * .

(The) purpose of the law should be to protect the shipper

against any unreasonably high rate whieh the combination

lines may have within their power, by virtue of their agree-

ments and conference arrangements, arbitrarily to impose

in the absence of government supervision and control.”

Congress partly accepted this recommendation in See. 817,

by there giving the original Shipping Board the express

power to order just and reasonable maximum rates with

respect to interstate water-carriers. But Congress omitted

any such provision as to carriers in foreign commerce: as

ihe

2

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38

to such carriers, there is only the statutory power to for-

bid discrimination in rates.

On the face of the Shipping Act, Congress thus endowed

the administrative agents with no authority to pass upon

the reasonableness of rates. Unlike the practice under the

Interstate Commeree Act, regulation under the Shipping

Act requires only that rates on cargo outbound from the

United States shall be filed with the Board within 30 days

after the effective date thereof While the Board has

from time to time contended for an implied power under

Section 15 to regulate the reasonableness of conference

rates, **there are no decisions of the Board or its prede-

cessors which imposed maximum rates on conference ear-

riers engaged in foreign commerce’’.*° Failing to place

plenary rate powers in the hands of its administrative

agents, the solicitude of Congress to protect the continued

existence of independent non-conference competition is

understandable. That Congress’ purpose in this respect

has been largely fulfilled is confirmed by the Examiner, who

found that down through the years Isbrandtsen “has

effectively acted as a check on respondents’ [Conferences]

rates and services’? (R. 261).

Approval of the exclusive patronage contract system

would thus eliminate the last effective independent check

on conference rates and services without any substitute

therefor in the Congressional scheme of regulation. Such

2 result would do violence to all our traditienal notions of

‘usiness morality. As Judge Frank commented in his

appendix to the decision below (R. 138):

Competition is cherished by the common law (and

safeguarded by the anti-trust laws) in large part for

the purpose of protecting consumers from unreason-

ably high prices or rates likely to result from monop-

oly or unreasonable restraint of trade. Therefore,

46 C.F. R. 235.1, 235.2; no similar requirement applies to in-

1

bound cargo,

“* Letter of Board to Court below (R. 144).

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

39

whenever any of our governments has, by statute, insu-

lated anyone from all competition in the same indus-

try—as, for example, by a grant of an exclusive fran-

chise—it has coupled the grant with the establishment

—as a substitute for competition as a price-regulator—

of a governmental agency empowered to fix reasonable

inaxiimum prices or rates. A legally sanctioned com-

plete monopoly, minus such regulation, is virtually un-

precedented.

The most recent Congressional solution of the thorny

problem posed by the attempt to regulate monopolies

merely confirms this view. In adopting the Bulwinkle Bill

(49 U.S. C. $ 5b), which authorized regulated rate confer-

ences of domestie common carriers, the Congress specifi-

‘ally prohibited the employment of coercive devices by such

conferences by forbidding the Interstate Commerce Com-

mission to approve any agreement which did not preserve

to each party ‘‘the free and unrestrained right to take in-

dependent action’? at any time. The Bulwinkle Bill merely

represents the latest declaration by Congress that coercive

activities by private groups will not be countenanced—even

in a field of regulation where the activities of those groups

is supervised by administrative authority in the most

minute detail. It is a singular argument, indeed, that would

suggest that Congress would approve such coercive activity

in a field where the supervisory powers of the public reeu-

latory body are as limited as those of the Board under the

Shipping Act. A decent respect for the history of the legis-

lative process in these matters, as well as for the explicit

statutory language of Section 14, compels the conclusion

that the Shipping Act of 1916 was purposely designed by

Congress to preserve non-conference competition. As

James F. Byrnes, a member of the Alexander Committee,

characterized the purpose of the Act during the debates on

the floor 7

764 Core Ree. 8057.

NRE LM el

SERS RUE RPO ees

40

The regulatory features of this bill are agreed to by

all fair-minded men. They are designed simply to en-

able an independent ship-owner to carry on his busi-

ness, wihiout having the shipping trust drive him out

by discriminatory or unfair practices.

It is incredible to suppose, as appellants argue, that Con-

gress should go to extremes in condemning deferred rebates

and fighting ships and at the same time authorize an even

more subtle and effective monopolistic weapon in the form

of the exclusive patronage dual rate system. As this Court

remarked in Swayne & Hoyt v. United States, 300 U.S. 297,

307 :

The policy of the statute may properly be applied

where, as in the cireumstances of this case, the contract

system must be taken as actually operating to effect a

monopoly.

5 II.

The Exclusive Patronage Contract System Retaliates

Against a Shipper for Patronizing Other Carriers.

It is almost a work of pure supererogation to arene the

application to the facts of this case of the Shippine Act's

express prohibition against retaliation or resort to diserim-

inatory methods against a shipper ‘because such shipper

has patronized any other carrier.’ Because the svstem,

under examination here, proposed on and after November

1, 1948 to impose an arbitrary 20 percent increase in

rates upon any shipper who continued after that date to

patronize a non-conference line, the proposed system clearly

undertook to impose a retaliatory discrimination against

such shipper for patronizing a non-conference carrier.

The sole function of the dual rate system is to prevent

shippers who would otherwise patronize Isbrandtsen frem

doing so. While the Board has conjured up a mythical

shipper, unnamed by the Board and unidentified in the ree-

ord, who would refuse to contract while continuing to deal

CODY ROMIAIM CR MoOCO ral Co ereoceo

ae

41

with the Conference lines exclusively, the dual rate system

is plainly devised to deal with those shippers whom ex-

perience has shown would deal with Isbrandtsen if allowed

a free choice of carriage. As to such shippers, the mere

establishment of the system would have been retaliation for

their past independence. The system is further designed

to hold them in line thereafter by threatening them with

retaliation if they again patronize Isbrandtsen and by

actually retaliating against them if they do. Thus, a ship-

per who has been induced to sign a contract is on notice that

if he patronizes an independent he will thereafter be sub-

jected to the higher rates The subsequent exaction of the

higher rate from a shipper who breaches his contraet can

only be regarded as retaliation for patronizing another

arrier.”

Moreover, the system not only retaliates against a ship-

per for patronizing an independent: it undertakes to punish

the shipper who even contemplates the possibility of pa-

tronizine such a earrier, By undertaking actually to im-

pose a substantially increased rate on shippers who refuse

to agree not to patronize Isbrandtsen, the system practices

a clear retaliation for their act of independence. And since

this act of independence consists only of the shippers’ in-

sistence upon their right to deal with an independent, re-

taliation for such insistence is clearly retaliation under a

statute which prohibits earriers from “directly or indi-

“And it should be remembered that the Board made such retalia-

tion mandatory (supra, p. 12).

“The Examiner sought to escape the dilemma posed by the

shipper who is compelled to pay the higher non-contract rate as a

“onsequence of breaching his contract. by suggesting that sueh sub-

sequent imposition ef the higher rate was merely a penalty for

breach of contract (R. 217). The appellee, however, pointed out

that the contract provided its own penalty for breach, namely,

twice the freight that would have been paid under the contract,

and that such double freight penalty could not be construed as

“liquidated damages’’ for breach, if other penalties were lurking

about in the system. Thereupon, the Examiner dropped the argu-

ment and the Board did not mention it.

42

rectly’ retaliating against a shipper for patronizing any

other carrier.

The Board sought to escape the force of the statutory

prohibition by resort to a sheer verbalization: that the

higher rate was charged for refusal to sign a contract,

rather than as retaliation for ‘patronizing any other car-

rier.’ The Board could searcely be serious in suggesting

that the Conferences regard the mere signing of the exclu-

sive contracts as significant. Of course, the Conference

members are uot interested in a mere paper transaction—

they are concerned only in preventing shippers from pa-

tronizing their non-Conference competitors. In essence,

the argument comes down to this: The Conferences do

not charge a shipper the higher rate because he deals with

a competitor; they simply charge the higher rate because

he will not agree to deal with them exclusively. It is a suf-

ficient response to this contention to refer to the Act itself,

which not only prohibits retaliation because the shipper

deals with another carrier, but prohibits as well retaliation

“for any other reason,”’

The argument of the Board scarcely merits more consid-

eration here than did a similar argument advanced to this

Court in International Business Machines Corp. v. United

States, 298 U.S. 131, 135 (1936). There the defendant con-

tended that it had not violated the Clayton Act’s prohibi-

tion against leasine machines on the condition that the les-

see “not deal in the goods of a competitor’? because it only

leased its machines on the simple condition that the lessee

purchase all of his requirements from the defendants. In

dismissing such a contention, this Court observed:

Little need be said of the contention that the condi-

tion of appellant’s leases does not infringe these prohi-

tions. It is true that the condition is not in so many

words against the use of the cards of a competitor, but

is affirmative in form, that the lessee shall use only ap-

pellant’s eards in the leased machines. But as the les-

see can make no use of the cards except with the leased

machines, and the specified use of appellant’s cards

PFPrmDYyY DOMIIAIM @RrMCO th CoC aro oO

43

precludes the use of the cards of any competitor, the

condition operates in the manner forbidden by the

statute.

If it be assumed, as the Board suggested (R. 61-62), that

in Section 14(5) Congress meant to codify the common law

set forth in Menacho v. Ward, 27 Fed, 529, 533 (C. C. N. Y.,

1886), the Board’s position becomes completely indefen-

sible, for in the Menacho case the Circuit Court held:

The proposition is speciously put that the carrier

may reasonably discriminate two classes of shippers,

the regular and the casual; and that such is the only

discrimination here. Undoubtedly the carrier may

adopt a commutative system, whereby those who fur-

nish him regular traffic may obtain reduced rates, just

as he may properly regulate his charges upon the basis

of the quantity of traffic which he receives from differ-

ent classes of shippers. But this is not the proposition

to be discussed. The defendants assume to discrimi-

nate against the complainants, not because they do ne

furnish them a regular business, or a given number of

shipments, or a certain quantity of merchandise to

carry, but because they refuse to patronize the defen-

dants exclusively, * * *

The vice of discrimination here is that it is ealeu-

lated to coerce all those who have occasion to employ

common carriers between New York and Cuba from

employing such agencies as may offer. Its tendency

ix to deprive the public of their legitimate opportunities

to obtain carriage on the best terms they can. If it is

tolerated, it will result practically in giving the defen-

dants a monopoly of the carrying trade between these

places. Manifestly, it is enforced by the defendants in

order to discourage all others from attempting to serve

the publie as carriers between these places. Suel dis-

crimination is not only unreasonable, but is odious.

The Board purported to take some comfort from the fact

that in the Menacho ease, tie Cireuit Court further ob-

served:

The defendants, to maintain the affirmative, assert that

their charges are fair because they do not have the

_—

a LA aT ELA Ree A AOU BE ABE AA be een ee ee ee

44

whole of the complainants’ carrying business. But it

can never be material to consider whether the carrier

ix permitted to enjoy a monopoly of the transportation

for a particular individual, or class of individuals, in

ascertaining what is reasonable compensation for serv-

ices actually rendered to him or them. Such a consid

eration might be influential in inducing parties to con-

tract in advance; but it has no legitimate bearing upon

the value of services rendered without a special con-

tract, or which are rendered because the law requires

them to be rendered for a fair remuneration.

‘

The Board emphasized the phrase “‘such a contract

might be influential in inducing parties to contract in ad-

rance’ and construed it as an acknowledgment by the

Court of the lawfulness of the dual rate system However,

the Board ignored the phrase ‘‘or which are rendered be-

cause the law requires them to be rendered for a fair re-

muneration’’. It would seem clear that the Cireuit Court

was distinguishing between private commercial dealings

and those pertaining to common carriers whose obligation

it is to serve all comers equally. This view is confirmed by

the context in which the Cireuit Court made the observa-

tion relied on by the Board. Immediately following the

section of the opinion quoted by the Board, the Court re-

marked :

A common carrier ‘‘is in the exercise of a sort of

public office, and has publie duties to perform, from

which he should not be permitted to exonerate him-

self,’’ Nelson, J., in New Jersey Steam Nar. Co. ¥.

Merchants’ Bank, 6 How. 344. His obligation and lia-

bilities are not dependent upon contract, though they

may be modified and limited by contract. * * * It is

upon this foundation, and not alone because the husi-

ness of common carriers is so largely controlled by

corporations exereising under franchises the privi-

leges which are held in trust for the public benefit,

that the courts have so strenuously resisted their at-

tempts, by special contracts or unfair preferences, 10

discriminate between those whom it is their duty te

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

45

serve impartially. And the courts are especially so-

licitous to discountenance all contracts or arrange-

ments by these public servants which savor of a pur-

pose to stifle competition or repress rivalry in the de-

partments of business in which they ply their vocation.

The Menacho ease manifestly stands for the proposition

for which the Board’s predecessor, the Shipping Board,

cited it in Eden Mining Co. y. Blucfields Fruit & S. S. Co..

1U.S.S. B. 41 (1922) in construing Sections 16 and 17 of

the Shipping Act of 1916: ‘* the purpose of Coneress in

enacting these provisions of the statute was to impose upon

common carriers within the purview thereof the duty of

charging uniform rates to all shippers who receive a simi-

lar transportation service.’™

In sum, it is difficult to believe that rational beines could

differ as to whether the charging of a hicher rate for simi-

lar transportation service against a shipper who continues

to deal with a non-conference carrier violates the policy of

the Act to prevent retaliation against a shipper for pa-

tronizing such independent exrriet

ee

.. there is no canon

against using common sense in reading a criminal] law, so

that strained and technieal constructions do not defeat its

purpose ...’" (Kordel v. U. S., 335 U.S. 345, 349 (1948).

III.

The Exclusive Patronage Contract System Is a Discrimina-

tory Method Designed to Retaliate Against a Shipper

for Patronizing Another Carrier.

It is conceded that the exclusive patronage dual rate sys-

tem establishes different rates for identical transportation

The Menacho ease has had a variable experience before the

Board and its predecessors. As noted, the Eden case velied upon it

for the proposition that the dual rate system was. unlawful: in

Pacifie Coast European Conference, 3 USMC 11 (1947). the Com-

mission treated the Menacho case as having been made irrelevant by

the statute; and, in the instant ease, it is cited by the Board as

authority for the proposition that the dual rate system is lawful.

ne Na Le SE ee as MESS PR EC Se

46

services. That such a system discriminates against the nop.

contract shipper who is charged a higher rate is scarcely

open to argument. Interstate Commerce Commission y.

Mechling, 830 U.S. 567, 581 (1947). As this Court recently

observed in Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. United

States, 340 U.S. 216, 227 (1951):

In the Mechling case, the Commission had fixed a

rate for transportation of wheat east by rail from Chi-

cago at a rate higher if it arrived in Chieago by barge

than if by rail or lake. This was a plain case of dis-

crimination, There were different rates provided for

equal service without any showing that any additional

service was rendered for the additional charge.

Furthermore, the precise type of differential involved here

was held in Swayne d& Hoyt v. United States, supra," to be

‘prima facie discriminatory since the two rates were

charged for identical services and facilities.’

This was the precise issue tendered by respondent to the

Board. As the Board observed (R. 56):

The gist of Ishrandtsen’s argument is that the system

Violates statutory provisions in that it sets up dual

rates for the same service and thereby necessarily ere-

ates discrimination between those shippers who sign

and those who refuse. Isbrandtsen claims that it makes

no difference that such discrimination may not be w-

reasonable or unjust, contrary to the requirements of

sections 15, 16, and 17 of the Act. It points ont that

the language of Section 14(3) of the Act, unlike that of

the other sections referred to, outlaws not only wired:

sonable discrimination but all discrimination. Relying

on dicta of the Supreme Court in Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd.

* Because the Swayne & Hoyt ease involved an administrative

holding that the dual rate system was unreasonably discriminatory

in violation of Section 16 of the Act, this Court could not rest in

that case on a holding that the system was discriminatory but was

compelled to go further and hold it unreasonably so. A lesser

burden is obviously involved here under 14(3) whieh forbids any

discrimination which retaliates against a shipper for patronizing

another carrier,

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

47

v. U. S., 800 U.S. 297, complainant concludes that a

prima facie case of discrimination has been made out,

which may not be excused on any showing of reason-

ableness.

This was a correct statement of the contentions of appel-

lee. However, instead of deciding whether the exclusive

patronage contract system was discriminatory, in violation

of Section 14, sub-section 3, as distinguished from Sections

16 and 17, the Board actually decided, in effect, that the

system did not violate Sections 16 and 17. This the Board

accomplished by the simple expedient. of importing the

qualifying adverb ‘‘unduly’’ from Sections 16 and 17 and

insinuating it into Section 14(3)—an unwarranted qualifi-

cation which Congress specifically omitted from Section

14(3) at the time of its enactment.

The fact is that, in this very respect, Congress sienifi-

cantly deviated from the Alexander Report’s recommenda-

tions. The Report (p. 421) recommended that “all car-

riers should be prohibited from retaliatine awainst any

shipper by refusing space accommodations when such are

available, or by resorting to other unfair methods of dis-

“rimination, beeause such shipper has patronized an inde-

pendent line, or has filed a complaint charging unfair treat.

nent, or for any other reason’’, This recommendation was

‘efore the Committees which, in the next session, brought

out the bill which became the 1916 Act. Sut the bill and

the Act importantly departed from the recommendation of

the Alexander Report. Section S14(3) substituted for the

recommended words ‘other unfair methods of diserin:ina-

tion’ the words ‘other discriminating or unfair methods ‘

And confirming the fact that this alteration was not inad-

vertent, this chanee in language was concomitant with

‘nother important deviation from the Alexander Report.

In its fourth recommendation to Congress, the Committee

had advised:

—_.,

* See Sen. Rep. No, 689, 64th Cong., Ist Sess., 10-11,

= ee ee Se ae Ae A Ne LDA AGO GALE A PRIS Ss LE a AAPL D LE LSA i ee

48

In this connection, it is the belief of the Committee

that water carriers should be required to charge equal

rates to all shippers irrespective of the volume of

freight offered for shipment.

In short, the Committee omitted from its fourth recom-

mendation the reasonableness concept imported by the

words ‘undue’? and ‘‘unjust’’, and recommended the pro-

hibition of any inequality of rates. However, the bill which

was introduced and enacted by Congress significantly de-

parted from this advice by incorporating the reasonable-

ness concept into Section 14(4):

Fourth. (No earrier) shall make any unfair or un-

justly discriminatory contract with any shipper based

on the volume of freight offered, or unfairly treat or

5 unjustly diseriminate against any shipper.

In this fashion, Congress made the prohibition against

discrimination in 14(3) peremptory bat required that the

diserimination in 14(4) be unjust, in both cases contrary to

the recommendation of the Alexander Report—thus demon-

stratine that it knowingly and deliberately deleted ‘un-

fair’’ in Section 14(3). In the face of this clear-cut expres-

sion of Congressional intent, the Board’s reinsertion in

a Section 14(3) of the qualification which Congress omitted

represented a usurpation by the Board of legislative au-

thority.

Of course, the distinetion between discrimination and un-

due or unjust discrimination is a familiar one in the field

ef common carrier regulation. Hocking Valley v. United

* States, 210 Fed. 735 (6th Cir., 1914), cert. den. 234 U.S. 757

4 (1919): Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 22 F.

3 Supp. 533, 538 N. D. N. Y. (1937); State of New York v.

United States, 331 U. S. 284 (1947). As Judge Learned

Hand, speaking for a three-judge statutory court, observed

in the Baltimore & Ohio ease, supra, which involved a simi-

lar distinetion under the Interstate Commerce Act:

COPY ROLIND CLOSE IN CENTER

49

Subdivision 1, as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 3(1), gen-

erally forbids a carrier to discriminate unduly or

unreasonably in any way between one person, ‘‘loeal-

ity, port, port district, gateway, transit point’? and

another. It does not, and could not, impose a peremp-

tory prohibition in such cases; the discrimination must

be ‘undue or unreasonable’’; discriminations are not

per se unlawful, their occasion must be examined. That

is not true of discriminations under subdivision three,

which is peremptory, and admits no excuses; carriers

must not discriminate in rates between connecting

lines.

The Board sought to justify this unwarranted tampering

with the statutory language by suggesting that such a

joard amendment of the statute was ‘‘possibly’’ in the

interest of harmonizing 14(3) with the language in other

sections of the statute (R. 60). But the Board achieved

such harmony only at the cost of reading 14(3) completely

out of the Act. If the discrimination is undue under See-

tions 16 or 17, nothing is added by the fact that it is also re-

taliatory under Section 14. The only way Section 14(3) can

he accorded independent vitality in harmony with the other

sections of the Act is to read it as Congress wrote it—to

prohibit any retaliatory discrimination whatsoever against

a shipper for patronizing another carrier or for any other

reason. Thus read, the section engenders no conflict with

Sections 15, 16 or 17 of the Act, each of which were designed

to incorporate the ordinary regulatory provisions against

unjust or undue preference or prejudice between shippers,

ports and localities.

To read the Act as the Board suggested would he to rob

Section 14(3) of all meaning in violation of the familiar

canon of construction that no clause of an Aet ean be pre-

‘med to he without effect. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.

87 (1803). To convert the peremptory prohibition in

14(3) into the qualified prohibitions in 15, 16 and 17, is

flatly to ignore the clearly expressed Congressional pro-

hibition axainst retaliatory discrimination of every type

5 DL GEL OR A PAR Ie CA Se RR ETA AOS ONAN AES OMIA S TE GEL A Bs

00

and kind and to attempt to shelter behind administrative

expertise a flatly forbidden discrimination. Jxterstat

Commerce Commission v. Mechling, supra. To read the

Act as Congress wrote it permits the Shipping Act of 1916

to remain as a harmonious whole. More importantly, such

an interpretation of the Act permits the ready effectuation

of the Congressional policy, to protect independent ear-

riage by outlawing all relatiatory discriminations against

shippers seeking to patronize such carriage.

But even if the Board’s reconstruction of Section 14(5)

be aceepted and the Section be interpreted as prohibiting

only retaliation which is unjustly discriminatory, the

Loard’s position is scarcely improved. For then the Board

is faeed with the question that troubled the court below:

how ean a dual rate system constructed by means of an

arbitrary differential be just or reasonable in any cireum-

stances. The only permissible answer is the one supplied

by the Chairman of the very Conferences responsible for

the dual rate system involved here (R. 861):

I do not think the making of rates by differential is a

proper basis, for that is an arbitrary basis.

IV.

Congress Left the Commission No Discretion to Approve a

Dual Rate System Which Works a Retaliatory Dis-

crimination Against a Shipper for Patronizing Another

Carrier.

While the Board sought support for its position in reli-

ance on the decisions of its predecessors, those decisions,

as the Court below noted (R. 130) ‘‘have lacked uniform-

ity and consisteney.’? Of the seven decisions in which the

Board and its predecessors dealt principally with the law-

fulness of the dual rate system,** four have held the system

unlawful.

38 Ay distinguished from several other decisions where the law-

fulness of the system was only ancillary to the right of a com-

plaining carrier to gain admission to the Conference.

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

ew

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ol

The first case to consider the question was Eden Mining

Co. v. Bluefield’s Fruit, supra, decided in 1922, at a time

when the Board’s predecessors were considerably closer

than the present Board to the Congressional response to

the public indignation which led to the passage of the Ship-

ping Act of 1916. In the Eden case, the Shipping Board

held:

It is evident that the purpose of Congress in enact-

ing these provisions of the statute was to impose upon

common earriers within the purview thereof the duty

of charging uniform rates to all shippers receiving a

similar trans’ ~rtation service. The duty of the re-

spondent uw ¢ these sections was to serve the public

impartially ad we think the language used in W. U.

Tel. Co. vs all Pub. Co., 181 U.S. 92, in dealing with

a similar statute, is entirely applicable to the case in

hand. The court there said: ‘All individuals have

equal rights both in respect to service and charges.

Of course such equality of right does not prevent dif-

ferences in the modes and kinds of service and different

charges based thereon. But that principle of equality

does forbid any difference in charge which is not based

upon difference in service, and even when based upon

differences of service must have some reasonable rela-

tion to the amount of difference and cannot he so great g

as to produce an unjust discrimination.’’ From the .

facts of record in the ease before us it is manifest that B

the transportation service furnished the complainants i

and contract shippers was in all respects identical. ¢

Tt is suggested on behalf of the carrier that as the

complainants were extended full opportunity to avail

themselves of the lower rates by agreeing to the same

condition which contract shippers had aeeepted, they

were accorded the substantial eaualitv of treatment

contemplated by sections 16 and 17 of the Act. This

contention, however, is as uneonvineing here as when

used in support of other kinds of nnjust disertmination

resulting from unfair conditions imposed hv carriers

unon shippers. Under the statute, the complainants,

as memhers of the shipping public, were entitled to

have their shipments earried at the same rates as other

patrons who received identical service. This rieht at-

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tached to each individual transportation transaction as

such, and was not to be predicated upon any condition

imposed by the respondent restricting the complain-

ants’ freedom of choice as to what carrier or earriers

they should elect to patronize in connection with sub-

sequent shipments.

The Shipping Board’s condemnation of the exclusive

patronage contract system in the Eden case was followed

by the Shipping Board Bureau in Intercoastal Investiga-

tion, 1 U.S.S.B.B. 400 (1935), where it was held:

An underlying purpose of the Shipping Act, 1916,

is to prevent every form of favoritism based upon the

relations of the shipper with the carrier as a customer

and to place all shippers, the large and small, the

steady and occasional, upon a plane of equality in the

right to service, For this reason that Act condemns

and makes unlawful every regulation, device, or subter-

fuge which undertakes to give to anyone an advantage

based upon conditions other than those inhering in the

transportation itself and alone. Contracts of the char-

acter in question do not constitute a transportation

condition as to warrant a difference in transportation

rates,

The prohibition of discrimination means, among

other things, that no difference or distinetion shall be

made in rates that coerce the public to employ one com-

petitor to the exclusion of another, or deprive one com-

petitor of business which under freedom of selection

by the publie would be given to it, and thus create a

monopoly in favor of another competitor.

To the same effect as the holding in the Intercoastal In-

vestigation was the decision of the same Bureau in Gulf

3 Intercoastal Contract Rates, 1 U.S.S.B.B. 524, which was

3 affirmed by this Court sub nom Swayne & Hoyt, supra.

: Relying on the decisions of its predecessors set forth

5 ahove, the Commission in Contract Routing Restrictions.

& 2 U.S.M.C. 220 (1939), again held that the contract rate

oI

at

system in foreign commerce was unlawful:

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Since they carry more than 80 percent of the traffic

from the Great Lakes area, it is obvious that respond-

ents, for all practical purposes, have a monopoly. A

difference in rates for identical services based solely

upon whether or not the carrier secures the shipper’s

entire patronage is prima facie discriminatory. (Em-

phasis supplied.)

As the Contract Routing case demonstrated, the criterion

employed by the Board’s predecessors in outlawing the

exclusive patronage contract system has been, not the na-

ture of the commerce, whether foreign or intercoastal. but

the monopolistic nature of the system. If, as the Commis-

sion held in the Contract Routing Restrictions case, ‘a

difference in rates for identical services based solely upon

whether or not the carrier secures the shipper’s entire pa-

tronage is prima facie discriminatory,’’ then the exclusive

patronage contract system is necessraily discriminatory,

and in violation of Section 14 of the Act.

With scarcely more than a passing nod at the four clear-

eut holdings by its predeeessors against the exclusive pa-

tronage contract system (R. 59), the Board singled out for

emphasis two other decisions, Rawleigh v. Stoomvaart, et

al. 1 U.S.S.B.B. 285 (1933) and Pacific Coast European

Conference, 3 U.S.M.C. 11 (1948), which held the dual rate

system lawful. In fact, the Board substantially adopted

the rationalization of the Pacific Coast ease as a basis for

its decision here (R. 57, 58).

Whatever the respective merits of these contradictory

holdings by the Board’s predecessors may be, they at least

establish such an inconsistent course of administrative ac-

tion as to render the administrative interpretations of little

weight here. American Surety v. Bethlehem Bank. 314

U.S. 314, 319 (1941); United States v. Missouri Pacific R.

Co., 278 U.S. 269, 280 (1929).

However, even if the course of administrative interpre-

tation had been completely unambiguous, uniform, and con-

sistent in its support of the dual rate svstem, the decision

of the Board here could not stand in the teeth of the clear

pea aaitna, ike Ie 3

statutory proscription of retaliation through the use of dis-

criminatory methods against a shipper for patronizing an-

other carrier. United States v. Missourt Pacific R. Co.,

supra; Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 88, 89 (1940);

Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 97 (1941). As this

Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, ob-

served in the Mitchell case, supra:

On the facts here presented, there is no room, as the

Government properly says, for administrative or ex-

pert judgment with respect to practieal difficulties. It

is enough that the discrimination shown was palpably

unjust and forbidden by the Act.

As noted above, the determinative facts are largely ad-

mitted on the record, and accordingly there is no factual

issue here on which this Court might feel bound by the

administrative judgment as was the ease in United States

v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 310 U. S. 344 (1940).

In this case, we have a dual rate system which can

have no conceivable function except to force shippers

to use conference lines instead of independent earriers.

There may be reasonable differences of opinion as to the

wisdom of such a policy, but not as to the certainty of its

result; and Congress, as noted above, has 1aade the policy

judgment and has flatly forbidden the Board to do what it

has done. Here the situation is analogous to Mitchell v.

United States, supra, where another administrative body

sought to shelter a flatly forbidden discrimination behind

the cloak of expertise. There, as here, the Court was re-

ferred to United States v. Chicago Heights, supra, and a

host of other decisions upholding the right of administra-

tive agencies to make factual judgments. But, as noted

above, this Court answered that no administrative or ex-

pert judgment could serve to justify a discrimination for-

bidden by the Act. And such, it is submitted, must be the

answer of the Court here.

a3)

CONCLUSION.

Since 1931, Isbrandtsen has been engaged in plying the

North Atlantic trade routes as an independent common

carrier. During the entire period, Isbrandtsen has been

engaged in fair and open competition with the Conference

lines, and the shipping publie has been well served by the

presence in the trade of this independent check on confer-

ence rates and services. In the light of this history, it

would seem rather late in the day for the Conferences to

come forward with the suggestion that it is in the in-

terest of an independent American Merchant Marine for

a foreign-flag dominated conference to be endowed with

power to deny an American flag carrier equal access to

American shippers—and this in the teeth of the Shipping

Act of 1916, in which Congress embodied a policy designed

to preserve independent non-Conference carriage. To ef-

fectuate this policy, as well as to preserve the benefits of

independent competition for the shipping public, this Court

should affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Respectfully submitted,

Joun J. O’Connor

Washington Building

Washington 5, D. C.

Witiuiam L. McGovern

1200 Eighteenth Street, N. W.

Washington 6, D. C.

Counsel for Appellee

Arxoutp, Forras & Porter

1200 Eighteenth Street, N. W.

Washington 6, D. C.

Of Counsel

January 21, 1952.

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APPENDIX A.

North Atlantic Baltic Freight Conference

North Atlantie Continental Freight Conference

North Atlantic French Atlantic Freight Conference

North Atlantie U. K. Freight Conference

SO Broad Street

New York 4, N. Y.

Telephone Whitehall 4-0990 Cable Tranconfer

October 1, 1948

To Merchant Shippers:

(ientlemen:

Enclosed please find, for your prompt acceptance, offer

of contracts for the period November 1, 1948 to December

1, 1949.

It is important that advice of acceptance of these con-

tracts is in the hands of the Carriers promptly. This will

avoid application of the higher non-contract rates of the

Carriers tariff and to accomplish this we therefore urge that

you sign and return the enclosed forms to us by return mail.

Please sign and return all copies and do not remove anu

classifications that may be attached. We will promptly

execute and return one complete copy of each contract for

your files.

If you have ceased exporting to the ports covered by these

contracts or do not desire to sign them kindly return the

forms to us with vour advices so as to clear our records.

Tf the name of firm or address appearing in the contract

ix not correct, please correct same defore returning the

forms.

Very truly yours, (S.) C. R. Andrews, Chairman.

(fol. 51] North Atlantie Continental Freight Conference

80 Broad Street, New York 4, N.Y.

The Canadian Continental Eastbound Freigcht Conference

315 St. Sacrement Street, Montreal 1, Canada

Memorandum of Agreement, made this — d: iv of —, 19--

hetween — hereinafter called the Merchant (66) Mer-

chant’? ine aaa. subsidiaries, affiliates and agents of any of

them), and the several Steamship Lines named below

ele AOU AAAS BIE LE EOL AAA, WI DOES FB EP AIRTER INS IT 8 SEA

57

members of the North Atlantic Continental Freight Confer-

ence and The Canadian Continental Eastbound Freight

Conference, hereinafter called the Carriers. It is under-

stood and agreed that if any additional Line or Lines be-

come members of the North Atlantic Continental Freight

Conference or the The Canadian Continental Kastbound

Freight Conference, respectively, such Line or Lines shall

thereby and thereupon become parties to this agreement as

Carriers, and the Merchant shall have the right to ship on

such Line or Lines to the same extent as on the other Car-

riers and should any Line or Lines cease to be Members of

said Conferences, they shall simultaneously cease to be Car-

riers hereunder and this agreement shall thereupon termi-

nate and expire as between the Merchant and sueh Line or

Lines, but shall continue in full foree and effect according to

its terms as between the Merchant and the Lines still re-

maining Members of said Conferences.

1. In consideration of the rates and other conditions

stated herein, the Merchant agrees to offer or cause to he

offered to the Carriers for transportation by them to Bel-

gium, Germany and Holland and discharge at such ports of

said countries served by the Carriers as may be designated

hy the Merchant, all shipments of the commodities men-

tioned (or provided) below.

2. This contract covers all export shipments of the Mer-

chant of the herein named (or provided for) commodities

moving out of United States North Atlantie and Canadian

ports to or through ports of the aforesaid countries, and

all said shipments shall be tendered to the Carriers for their

Vessels which may load at the ports of Norfolk, Newport

News, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York. Boston, Portland

aud Canadian ports Montreal and East thereof and sched-

nled to sail to the port of destination designated by the

Merchant, and failure so to tender any such shipments to

the Carriers or shipment of them by vessels other than

those of the Carriers shall be a violation of this contract.

The Carriers agree, subject to provisions hereof, to trans-

hort said shipments on their vessels sailing to the aforesaid

countries,

a) *. . :

’. The Merchant has the option of selecting any of the

vessels operated by the respective Carriers to the countries

herein mentioned subject to agreement with the particular

r on

Carrier as to the quantity, but it is the spirit of this agree-

# ment that the Merchant, so far as convenient to him, will

distribute shipments equitably between the several Carriers.

The Merchant agrees to make application for space as early

as practicable before the vessel’s advertised sailing date.

If the Carriers fail to name space within three business

days after the Merchant duly applies therefor, on a vessel

<cheduled to sail from the port of shipment selected within

fifteen days after the seaboard clearance date desired, the

Merchant shall be free with respect to such shipment to

secure space elsewhere without prejudice to his right to

future shipment under this agreement but before making

such arrangement the Merchant shall first give the office of

the Conference an opportunity to arrange space.

4. The Carriers severally agree to furnish the Merchant

at the rate or rates named or provided for herein space in

such vessels as they may respectively load at said loading

ports for transportation and discharge at the ports desired,

provided that suitable unbooked space is available therein

when the Merchant makes application. If the Merchant

shall make shipment hereunder for the benefit of some party

not holding or conforming to a similar agreement, or shall

make shipment in violation hereof, then the Carriers shall

have the option at any time to declare this agreement termi-

nated, and the Merchant shall be liable to the Carriers for

liquidated damages equal to twice the amount of freight

that would have been payable under this contract in respect

of the shipment constituting the violation. The Merchant

[ fol. 32] agrees to furnish to the Carriers, through the office

of the Conference, full information concerning propriety

of any shipment made or not made by the Merchant under

the agreement and failure to furnish such information

promptly after request shall entitle the Carriers to cancel

this agreement on ten days’ written notice.

5. The commodities and the rates thereon to which this

agreement applies are:

As per Reverse Side or Attached

Other commodities as may be shipped by the Merchant

from time to time, which shall be deemed covered by this

agreement, at the lowest rates then in effect for the par-

ticular commodity.

59

The minimum charge on any one bill of lading or per

package shall conform to the Carriers’ charges in connec-

tion with the particular commodity in effect at time of

~hipment.

Unless otherwise specifically stated herein packages or

pieces exceeding 4480 pounds or 30 feet in length will take

the additional Heavy Lift Charges and Extra Length

Charges in effect at time shipments are made,

Rates quoted herein are in United States currency on

shipments originating in United States moving either

through United States Ports or through Canadian Ports,

and are in Canadian currency on shipments originating in

Canada, moving either through Canadian Ports or through

United States Ports.

The rates herein specified are subject to be increased

reasonably from time to time. Any notice of increase shall

te deemed accepted by the Merchant unless within 20 days

after his receipt of the notice of increase he gives the Car-

riers written notice of non-aceeptance. In event of such

non-aecceptance the Carriers shall have the option at any

time within 20 days after receipt of the Merchant’s notice

to cancel this agreement on giving the Merchant at least 60

days written notice, but if such notice is not given this

agreement shall remain in effect.

The Carriers have the option to reduce their rates, and

should they during the term of this agreement reduce their

rates on the commodities herein named (or provided for)

helow the rates herein agreed, the Merchant, under like

conditions, shall be given the full benefit of suck reduced

rates during the period same remain in effect.

f. Shipments are subject to all the provisions of the per-

mit dock receipt, and bill of lading in use by the Carrier

when shipment is tendered. If valuation higher than that

provided by the regular form of bill of lading is desired hy

the Merchant it must be declared before shipment and, in

accordance with tariff provisions, a higher rate paid than

stated in this agreement.

7. In ease of dispute under this agreement the Merchant

and Carrier(s) each agree to submit the matter to arbitra-

tion at New York, or Montreal if the Merchant is domiciled

in Canada, each appointing an arbitrator and the two so

chosen shall select an umpire to which arbitration committee

. _ ‘ dn RO NE : PRaaEd SENNA TE ns Ls wna S N eaten’

ar Se ERRAND LILLE EOE pn Re! Oe

ia alii -

60

all data requested in connection with the matter in dispute

shall be made available. Decision of two or more members

of said Committee shall be binding on the parties.

. This agreement shall cover shipments as above speci-

fied on vessels scheduled to sail from port at which shipment

is loaded during the period from November 1, 1948, to De-

cember 31, 1949, both dates inclusive and shall continue in

effect on the same terms and conditions throughout consecu-

tive subsequent years, subject to the right of either the

lerchant or the Carriers to terminate the same as of De-

cember 31 in any year by giving the other party ninety days

33 written notice of termination.

: ‘fol. 38] 9. In the event of the imminence or existence of |

var, hostilities or warlike operations between any Nations,

4 blockades, embargoes, regulations of any government av-

‘ thority, or any official interference with commercial inter-

: course, affecting the operations of the Carriers, or any of

them in the trade covered by this agreement, the Carriers

¢ or any one or more of them shall at their option have the

9

right to cancel this agreement.

Members of:

North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference operating

e services from United States North Atlantie Ports:

4 A/S J. Ludwig \Mowinekels Rederi (Cosmopolitan Line):

% Black Diamond Steamship Corp. (Black Diamond Lines):

s Compagnie renerale Transatlantique (French Line)

A Compagnie Maritime Belge (Lloyd Royal) S. A.;

F Cunard White Star Limited;

@ Dampskibsselskabet af 1912 A/S, A/S Dampskibsselska-

3 het Sv endborg, A. P. Moller, Maersk Line;

3 Ellerman’s Wilson Line, Limited (Wilson Line) :

N. V. Nederlandseh-Amerikaansche Stoomvanrt-Maat-

schappij (Holland America Line) ;

Sonth Atlantie Steamship Line, Ine. ;

United States Lines Company (U nited States Lines):

Waterman Steamship Corporation,

The Canadian Continental Eastbound Freieht Conference

operating services from Canadian Ports Montreal and east

Ty

nee

PEERED Sire Ae eS

thereof:

4 Canadian Shipowners Ltd., Montship Lines Ltd., (Canada

a Continental Line) ;

Canadian Pacific Steamships Limited ;

hehe BAPE LSI ERD ARN DAE Voateatrnal tr i de

PBs gd 20) PR a SION FP med + aa BaD

i 7

61

Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (French Line) ;

County Line Ltd. (County Line) ;

Cunard White Star Limited (Cunard White Star Line) ;

N. V. Nederlandsch-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maat-

sthappij ‘*Holland-Amerika Lijn’’ (Holland America

Line

Swedish American Line Continental Service (Swedish

American Line) ;

Watts & Co, Ltd. (Watts Watts Line).

SUL ECO0 OSES OE COS O'S OH OE HE &9 4S bk @ OE cele e 8 4b es

(Signature for and on behalf of the

above mentioned Steamship Lines)

Please return to North Atlantie Continental Freight

Conference, 80 Broad Street, New York 4, N.Y.

Preheat” se

aren:

pews Sok

eS Sen Geer S A Pak ek tae he eS

A tia OR Ne Site ee

62

APPENDIX B.

Specimen Contracts Introduced as Exhibits During

Hearings of Alexander Committee.

Exhibit 26, Vol. I, p. 97.

Memorandum of freight contract made this 1st day of

May, 1912, between the R. P. Houston & Co., party of the

first part, and Messrs. Arkell & Douglas (Inc.), party of

the second part, for their entire shipments from New York

to Montevideo, La Plata, Buenos Aires, Rosario, and Bahia

Blanea from date to April 30, 1913, included.

Party of the tirst part agrees to provide tonnage for all

shipments which party of the second part has for shipment,

provided reasonable notice of intention to ship (I say 20

days) is given, at the following rates of freight:

Cents

1. Harvesters, headers, binders, header binders,

reapers, mowers, hay rakes, drills, stackers, seed

sowers, corn pickers, hand grain shellers and

parts thereof, carts, harrows, plows (except trac-

tion engine gang plows) ...............-e.e000:: 16

2. Cleaners, hay presses, grain mills, grain planters,

DMM POMMOTS, FOIVOTIMOTS.. . 2 2 occ cece sc ceeeees 18

3. Wheelbarrows, shovels, spades, hay forks ...... 20

Chairs, desks, and common furniture .......... 1714

ie Is aa doh a's padekcevbiceknes avi 19

5. Agricultural engines and thrashers, including gas

engines, traction and gang plows:

I ii ald Salada a swaps eda vac Ads 8's 20

a a daa weds :k tw leh oaby ks 22

ee CU I ON cs iene ke cect reuse succes 28

ee eens 20)

8. Lubricating oil (till Dee. 31) .................. 15

9% Automobiles:

Not exceeding 2 tons (till Dee. 31) 2... ...0..... 15

OO Sr Oe RPE OU SED onc noc ccc ccw ce cecuss 18

10. Sewing machines (till Dee. 31) ..........0..... 14

11. General cargo not otherwise enumerated, current

rates at time of shipment.

All the above rates are to Montevideo and Buenos Aires

and are per cubic foot or 56 pounds at steamer’s option un-

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

5

ape eae:

page

less otherwise specified and on pieces not over 2 tons weight

unless otherwise specified, but it is understood and agreed

that it is not permissible to separate parts of one machine

or more of the same class—in other words, if part of a

machine is taken at the measurement rate, the machine en-

tire must be carried on this basis, the same with weight

freight.

It is agreed that the rates of freight to Rosario and Bahia

Blanea for all shipments irrespective of quantity by any

steamer shall be + cents per cubie foot, or 56 pounds over

the Buenos Aires rates, whether sailing direct or to Buenos

Aires first. The rates to La Plata shall be 3 cents per

cubic foot, or 56 pounds over the Buenos Aires rates,

The rate on binder twine to Rosario, Bahia Blanea, and

La Plata shall be 6 cents per bale ove: the Buenos Aires

rate.

Rates on goods not covered by above agreement weighing:

over 4,400 pounds are to be mutually agreed to between the

parties hereto.

Parts of any of the above-mentioned articles to take the

rate of the complete machine.

All freights to be prepaid.

All shipments are subject to the terms and conditions of

the Houston Line’s River Plate bills of lading,

Kerosene, naphtha, lumber, rosin, and other rough or

dangerous cargo to be subject to special arrangement,

It is mutually agreed and understood that this contract

covers the entire shipments of Messrs, Arkel] & Donelass

(Ine.), estimated to amount to about — tons from New

York to the River Plate ports, and shipments shall only he

made by steamers designated by R. P. Houston & Co.

It is further agreed that in ease R. P. Houston & Co, re-

duce the rates of freight to any other shipper or shippers

on any of the articles above mentioned durine the period

covered by this contract, then Messrs. Arkell & Donelas

(Ine.) to he accorded the benefit of all such rednetions dyy-

ing the period that said rates are reduced.

Exhibit 34, p. 247

New York, November 12, 1910

The Barber Asphalt Paving Co.

Land Title Building, Philadelphia, Pa,

' .

Gentlemen: We beg to confirm contract made with you to-

day for all shipments of asphalt and residuum (in custody

QE ———IEE

er a ey

;

zg

‘.

%

ee ee SL ae SELLER meee

barrels) under your control from New York to Rio de

Janeiro during the next three months, and contract to con-

tinue thereafter, subject to 30 days’ notice by either party,

on the following terms:

By steamers of the Prince Line and Hamburg South

American Line and Hamburg American Line, $5.50 net.

By steamers of the Lamport & Holt Line, $5.50 net and

10 per cent primage.

All per ton of 2,240 pounds, gross weight; all prepaid on

signing of bills of lading and free from alongside.

Please note that the following clause will be inserted in

all bills of lading, to be signed by you, viz:

To be taken from alongside the steamer by consienees of

goods at their own risk and expense immediately the

steamer is ready to deliver. Consignees to send a competent

representative, who will sign receipts for each lighter load

before it leaves the steamer’s side, otherwise the steamer

will not be responsible for any claims on the cargo. In

default the goods to be landed by the agents of the steamer

at expense (including dock dues) and risk of the consignees.

In the event of the consignees failing to carry out this

clause, the shipper shall be held, and hereby holds, himself

responsible for all expenses incurred thereby.

We have written this letter in duplicate; kindly keep one

and return the other approved by you.

Yours faithfully,

Pavuu F. Gernarp & Co.

General Agents

Accepted by cable authority dated October 28, from Carlos

A. de Miranda Jordao,

Tue Barser AspHact Pavine Co.

By F. J. Buxron, Agents

Exhibit 34, p. 248

New York, January 21, 1910

Messrs. Guinle & Co.

New York City

Dear Sirs: We hereby beg to confirm freight agreement

made with you by us, acting for the Prinee Line, Lamport

Pee Ore et ee So ee Oe Te St ed ma kes I

PRAIA ih in wi Ne hc TRI LCi FARR Ye LY pc SN Ahab Hons, 6 oP ALE EAE” HD

65

& Holt Line, and Hamburg-South American Steamship Co.,

and Hamburg-American Line (joint service). This agree-

ment to cover the transportation of your entire shipments

of lawful merchandise from New York to ports in Brazil

named below, on the following terms:

For Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, and Santos: Electrical

and other machinery (electrical fittings), $7 per ton, weight

or measurement, ship’s option; transmission towers (struc-

tural material), $6 per ton, weight or measurement, ship’s

option; curved plates $6 per ton, weight or measurement,

ship’s option; car material, $6 per ton, weight or measure-

ment, ship’s option; paint and varnish, $7.50 per ton, weight

or measurement, ship’s option; copper wire, $7.50 per ton,

weight or measurement, ship’s option; lubricating oil, 15

cents per cubic foot—landed.

Above rates apply to pieces not exceeding 2 tons.

Pieces in excess of 2 tons to pay tariff rates for heavy

lifts, less 10 per cent.

Locomotives up to 10 tons, 18 cents per cubic foot, F. F. A.

Bahia to pay above rates F. F. A. or $1.80 per ton addi-

tional if landed.

No F. F. A. bill of lading to be signed for less than 40

tons.

Coods not provided for in this agreement to pay tariff

rates of steamer carrying the goods.

Rio Grande do Sul: To pay 25 per cent over the con-

tract Rio de Janeiro landed rates, F. F. A.

Porto Alegre: To pay $4 per ton weight or measurement,

ship's option, over Rio Grande do Sul rates: all landed.

Freight to be prepaid against delivery of hills of ladine

and not subject to any return whatsoever.

K.P. A. eargo to bear the usual signed clause in bills of

lading,

Shipments by Prince Line and Hambure Lines to he with-

ont primage.

Lamport & Holt Line to have option of chargine 10 per

cent primage in addition to the above rates.

The steamship lines agree to provide space on receipt of

ample notice of your requirements by steamers of. the

Prince Line, Lamport & Holt Line and Hambure-Sonth

\merican Steamship Co., and Hambure-Ameriean Line

(jomt service).

Pieces too large to go below deck to go on deck at ship-

per’s risk.

Ee”

66

It is further agreed that no single piece shall be tendered

under this contract exceeding steamers’ or ports’ handling

facilities.

Shipments subject to all conditions of companies’ regular

bills of lading.

This contract to run during the current month and the

three following months and to run thereafter subject to 30

days’ notice of withdrawal on the part of either party, but

such notice not to be given before April 1, 1910.

Yours faithfully,

Pau F. Geruarp & Co.

General Agents

Accepted:

Guinle & Co.

This contract was canceled December 6, 1910.

Exhibit 35, p. 249

New York, October 2, 1912

Messrs. Enoch Morgan Sons & Co.

439 West Street, New York City

Dear Sirs: We beg to confirm contract made with you

today covering all your shipments of Sapolio, whieh yon

control (approximately 250 tons), hence to Montevideo and

Buenos Aires, from date to January 31, 1913, inclusive, at

the following rates of freight, viz: Montevideo, $10 net per

ton; Buenos Aires, $11 net per ton.

All per ton of 40 cubic feet, or 2,240 pounds, steamer’s op-

tion.

Freight is to be prepaid, and all shipments are subject

to the terms and conditions of the regular carrying line's

River Plata bills of lading.

We agree that in case the rate of freight on Sapolio is re-

duced you are to receive the benefit of such reduced rates

during the period of such reduction.

Yours faithfully,

Paci F. Gernarp & Co.

Per F. Scuarpine

General Agents

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

67

Exhibit 34, p. 251

New York, May 31, 1912

The Ansonio Clock Co.

99 John Street, New York City

Gentlemen: We beg to confirm contract made with you

today covering all your shipments of clocks (approximately

10,000-15,000 cubic fi=t) hence to Montevideo, Buenos

Aires, and Rosario froin date to April 30, 1913, inclusive, at

the following rates of freight, viz: Montevideo, 25 cents per

cubic foot ; Buenos Aires, 271% cents per cubic foot; Rosario,

3115 cents per cubic foot.

All freight is to be prepaid and all shipments subject to

terms and conditions of the regular carrying line’s River

Plata bill of lading.

We agree that in case the Prince Line reduce the rates

of freight to any other shipper or shippers on clocks you

are to receive the benefit of such reduced rates during the

period of such reduction.

Yours faithfully,

Paut F. Geruarn & Co.

Per H. Connor

General Agents

Accepted:

Tue Ansonia Crock Co.

Raymonp J. Scuweizer

Exhibit 34, p. 251

Memorandum of freight contract made this 28th day of

May, 1912, between Paul F. Gerhard & Co., agents of Prince

Line, party of the first part, and Messrs. Heywood Bros.

& Wakefield Co., party of the second part, for their entire

shipments of lawful merchandise, which they control, from

New York to Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Rosario from

date to April 30, 1913, inclusive, for which the party of the

first part agrees to provide tonnage, provided reasonable

hotice is given.

Rates of freight as follows:

Cane and wood seat and folding chairs, children’s ve-

hicles, hentwood chairs, rattan mats, chair cane, car seats,

woven cane web seating, reed and rattan specialties, Mon-

tevideo, 171% cents; Buenos Aires, 171% cents; Rosario,

21% cents.

Booogie?

A te Ay pxioe Corse

Rei WO ee Et

se

se a A

erm

.

“ith

Epi ueT A

¢

2

ys

vr.

%

7 cotta naaateceicas seta . ‘ ARIE LALLA CAEN ce oh 280 BLN

Wits Ceres : é me Oaks

68

All per cubic foot; all freight prepaid; all shipments sub-

ject to the carrying line’s regular bill of lading.

Other articles to be charged at current tariff rates.

It is further agreed that in case the Prince Line reduces

the rates of freight to any other shipper or shippers on any

articles named in this contract the party of the second part

shall have the benefit of such reduced rates during the

period of such reduction.

Paux F. Geruarp & Co.

Agents of Prince Line

Hrywoop Brotuers & WAKEFIELD (‘o.

Henry H. Morreii

Exhibit 34, p. 258

Memorandum of freight contract, made this 20th day of

September, 1911, between Paul F. Gerhard & Co., agents

for the Prince Line, party of the first part, and Brown

Portable Elevator Co., party of the second part, for their

entire shipments of portable elevators from New York to

Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Rosario from date to May

1, 1912, inclusive, at the following rates of freight, viz:

To Montevideo and Buenos Aires, $8 per ton; to Rosario,

£9.60 per ton.

All the above per ton of 40 eubie feet, or 2,240 pounds,

steamer’s option, prepaid as customary, and no package to

exceed 2 tons in weight.

The Prince Line agree to furnish not less than one

steamer per month; all shipments subject to terms and con-

ditions of the regular Prinee Line bill of lading.

Pau F. Gernarp & Co.

Per H. Connor

yeneral Agents Prince Line

Accepted.

Tur Brown Portasite Evevator (Co.

COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER

BSE hae Ribena 8s:

69

APPENDIX C.

Sections 14 and 15, Shipping Act, 1916.

Sec. 14 (46 U.S. C. 812). That no common earrier by

water shall, directly or indirectly, in respect to the trans-

portation by water of passengers or property between a

port of a State, Territory, District, or possession of the

United States and any other such port or a port of a for-

eign country—

First. Pay, or allow, or enter into any combination,

agreement, or understanding, express or implied, to pay

or allow, a deferred rebate to any shipper. The term ‘de-

ferred rebate’? in this Act means a return of any portion

of the freight money by a carrier to any shipper as a con-

sideration for the giving of all or any portion of his ship-

ments to the same or any other carrier, or for any other

purpose, the payment of which is deferred beyond the ecom-

pletion of the service for which it is paid, and is made only

if, during both the period for which computed and the

period of deferment, the shipper has complied with the

terms of the rebate agreement or arrangement.

Second. Use a fighting ship either separately or in eon-

junction with any other carrier, through agreement or

otherwise. The term ‘fighting ship’’ in this Act means

a vessel used in a particular trade by a earrier or group

of carriers for the purpose of excluding, preventing, or re-’

ducing competition by driving another carrier out of said

trade.

Third. Retaliate against any shipper by refusing, or

threatening to refuse, space accommodations when such

are available, or resort to other discriminating or unfair

methods, because such shipper has patronized anv other

‘arrier or has filed a complaint charging unfair treatment,

or for any other reason.

Fourth. Make any unfair or unjustly discriminatory con-

tract with any shipper based on the volume of freight of-

fered, or unfairly treat or unjustly discriminate against

any shipper in the matter of (a) eargo space acecommoda-

tions or other facilities, due regard being had for the proper

loading of the vessel and the available tonnage; (b) the

loading and landing of freight in proper condition; or

(c) the adjustment and settlement of claims.

Pei < sat a Me

70

Any carrier who violates any provision of this section

shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of

not more than $25,000 for each offense.

Sec. 15 (46 UL S.C. 814). That every common carrier

by water, or other person subject to this Act, shall! file im-

mediately with the board a true copy, or, if oral, a true and

complete memorandum, of every agreement with another

such carrier or other person subject to this Act, or tmodi-

fication or cancellation thereof, to which it may be a party

or conform in whole or in part, fixing or regulating trans-

portation rates or fares; giving or receiving special rates,

accommodations, or other special privileges or advantages;

controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroying competi-

tion; pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, or traffic;

allotting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the

number and charaeter of sailings between ports; limiting

or regulating in any way the volume or character of freight

or passenger traffie to be earried; or in) any manner

providing for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative

working arrangement. The term ‘tagreement’’ in this

section includes understandings, conferences, and other

arrangements.

The board may by order disapprove, eancel, or modify

any agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof,

whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to

be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers,

shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between ex-

porters from the United States and their foreign competi-

tors, or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the

United States, or to be in violation of this Aet, and shall

approve all other agreements, modifications, or can-

cellations.

Agreements existing at the time of the organization of

the board shall be lawful until disapproved by the board.

It shall be unlawful to carry out any agreement or any por-

tion thereof disapproved by the board.

All agreements, modifications, or cancellations made

after the organization of the board shall be lawful only

when and as long as approved by the board, and before

approval or after disapproval it shall be unlawful to carry

out in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, any such

agreement, modification, or cancellation.

Every agreement, modification, or cancellation lawful un-

der this section shall be excepted from the provision [sic]

i, ti mee na inn ahi nobtina te ehee eee «<n |} eee eee

_—_

of the Act approved July second, eighteer, hundred and

ninety, entitled, “*An Aet to protect trade and commerce

against unlawful restraints and monopolies,’? and amend-

ents and acts supplementary thereto, and the provisions

of sections seventy-three to seventy-seven, both inclusive,

of the Act approved August twenty-seventh, eighteen hun-

dred and ninety-four, entitled “An Act to reduce taxation,

to provide revenue for the Government, and for other pur-

poses,’ and amendments and acts supplementary thereto.

Whoever violates any provision of this section shall be

liable toa penalty of $1,000 for each day such violation eon-

tinues, to be recovered by the United States in a civil action,

71

.

mY

r} 42

; APPENDIX D.

ee Excerpt from “Summary of Conferences and Agreements”,

Alexander Committee Report, Vol. IV, pp. 287-292.

; Il. Meeting the competition of lines outside of the cop.

ference.—While the conference lines regulate competition

‘ between themselves through one or more of the above-

" mentioned methods, and agree not to aid or encourage a

Fi nonconferenee line, nearly all the agreements which do not

: contain a deferred rebate system make no direct reference §

i to the methods which should be adopted for meeting the

a competition of outside lines, this matter apparently be-

f ing reserved entirely for conference action. In this re-

% speet the agreements frequently provide that the signa-

¥ tories must take joint action to defend their mutual inter.

ests in the event of competition from other lines. Three

am

methods seem to have been adopted to accomplis!) this

£ purpose, viz:

2 1. Deferred rebate systems, whereby shippers, who agree

; to employ exclusively the steamers of the conference lines

in a given trade, are allowed a rebate of a certain per-

centage of their freight payments (usually 5 or 10 per

* cent), which rebate is computed for a designated period

(usually every three, six, or twelve months), but v hich is

not paid until after a certain number of months (usually

a six months) following the period for which it is computed,

; and only on the condition that during the entire time, in-

; cluding both the period for which the rebate was computed

C as well as the time of deferment, the shipper has given his

crclusive support to the conference lines. Since the time

of payment of the rebate follows the period for which it's

computed, the shipper, if he desires to obtain the rebate.

* is under constant obligations to the conference lines. and

ix prevented from patronizing any other service since that

act would mean the forfeiture of all aceumulated rebates.

{ JIndging from the faets produced in the foregoing pages.

4 this method has proved by far the most effective device for

; the control of a trade, and is being used principally in the

5 long-distance trades (such as, for example, the westhound

trade from the Orient' and most South American port~)

‘1 Chapter V, p. 118.

2Chapter VI, pp. 153-188.

73

where the regular lines feel that they can assure to ship-

pers a regular and efficient service only on condition of

exclusive support. The system has proved especially effec

tive where American importers are also importers in

Europe and the same conference lines serve both the

American and European trade, and where (as in the cotfee

trade from Brazil to Europe and the United States’) the

deferred rebate agreement stipulates that the payment of

the rebates is dependent upon the shippers’ exclusive use

of the conference lines for all shipments destined to either

the United States or Europe, thus making it impossible for

an independent line to seeure freight unless it stands in a

position to protect the shipper in both his American and

European shipments. Moreover, as has been repeatedly

pointed out in this volume, shippers require, above all else,

a regular service, and in this connection the testimony

shows that by patronizing an outside line the shipper would

not only forfeit his rebates but could be penalized by being

denied accommodations for future shipments even at the

full rates of freight. Such retaliation would leave the ship-

per unprotected since an independent line is not large

enough to supply him with tonnage at all times. In other

words, the conference lines, by rotating the sailings of

their steamers, can give a regular and frequent service,

whereas the independent line with its fewer steamers can

only offer sailing at less frequent intervals.

With the exeeption of the rebates to Bermuda. Mar-

tingne and Guadeloupe? (where, however, the rebates aro

not deferred, but depend upon t! size of the shipper’s total

shipments), the deferred rebate systems now in use are

equally open to all shippers who agree to give exclusive pa-

tronage, and are granted without discrimination as regards

the size of individual or total shipments. Moreover, near-

ly all the rebate systems apply only to the American im-

port trade, only four instances having been found where

such rebates are granted in the export traffic from Amer.

iean ports, viz, in the New York-Bermuda. Martingue and

(inadelouve trade (which, as noted, are not strictly de-

erred)? in the New York-Colombian trade. in the New

‘Chapter VT, pp. 157, 158.

*Ch. VITT. p. 219-221.

*Ch. VI, p. 178.

ieee —— . eee Deer AOS E TOD OE! rn at pbs Nigel ees

nr nd laps si

74

York-Kingston (Jamaica) trade,t and in the trade from

the United Kingdom to certain American-Pacifie coast

ports.” With reference to the Ameriean export trade jt

seems that the lines are laborine under the assumption

that deferred rebates are illegal; and in some eases where

such rebates formerly existed they have been abandoned,

and where their adoption has been taken wider considera-

tion, a decision was reached not to establish the same. Ty

the import trade, on the contrary, the lines appear to eo oy

the theory that this country has no jurisdiction ever the

matter, and that such rebates may be freely granted if

the arrangement is made abroad and if. the rebates are

paid at a foreign port. But in this conneetion it should be

noted that the deferred rebate system, although applied

only to the import traffic, is, nevertheless, a very effective

device for the control of the trade, since to make the trade

profitable an independent line must have cargo in both di-

rections.

2. The use of fighting ships, or collective competition

aaaimst a single competing line.—To what extent this prac.

tice prevails at present is difficult to ascertain, practically

all of the steamship line representatives who testified he-

fore the Committee having denied the existence of the prae-

tice. But the facts obtained by the Committee show clearly

that this method has been used in recent vears. Thus, in

the North Atlantic passenger traffic, the evidence pre-

sented in the suit against the Hambure-Ameriean Line

et al. shows that in about the year 1908 the conference

lines authorized the appointment of a committee for the

purpose of seleeting fighting steamers to destroy the com. |

petition of nonconference lines. This committee, secord-

ing to the evidence, would select suitable steamers from

“uv of the conference lines to sail on the same days and

hetween the same ports, the regular rates heine redueed to

® point sufficiently low to secure the traffic, As already

stated in this volume (p. 46) ‘‘the evidence in the Govern-

ment’s suit shows that such opposition sailines were re-

neatedly instituted against certain independent lines. * * *

Any surplus of passengers which were hooked for the fight-

ine steamer, but which could not be carried by the same,

*Ch. VIIT, p. 215.

* (Ch. II, p. 89.

a ee ee ed

4 Ret,

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75

would be transferred to other conference line steamers at

the reduced rates. The expenses and loss from the lower

rates, resulting to any line whose vessels had been selected,

yore distributed over the members of the conference. It

was thus a ease of all the lines, united in conference, op-

posing every sailing of a single opposition line. By dis-

‘ributing the loss over the several members of the confer-

enee, each constituent line would sutfer proportionately

much less than the one line which was fighting the entire

vroup, and which would inevitably soon exhaust its re-

sources in the conflict with the combined power of the large

lines with their superior speed and better third-class ac-

commodations.’? Again, in the freight traffic, It appears

that six leading German lines established a ‘*fiolting cor-

poration,’’ called the Syndikats-Rhederei, the shares of

which were opportioned among the rarious lines with ref-

erence to the tonnage of the companies. This fighting cor-

poration was organized toward the close of 1905, and ae-

cording to the report of Mr. Robert P. Skinner, Ameri-

can Consul General at Hamburg, ‘‘four comparatively small

and inexpensive steamers were purchased, and these, with

such others as may be chartered frem time to time, are

hired out to the six owners of the company to meet dan-

verous competition and to drive it away. The fighting ships

handle chiefly bulk goods, leaving merehandise which re-

quires prompt transportation to the care of the parent com-

pany, Which maintains its nominal rates as far as possible,

the stress of competition being borne by the fighting ships

principally. In times of peace the fighting ships engage

in regular trade on time charters. As this corporation is

vot one for profit primarily, the investment in reality. is a

new sort of insurance.’’ (Vol. 3, pp. 53-54.) Mr. W. G.

Sickel, Viee-Director in charge of the Hamburg-Ameriecan

Line. testified before the Committee that ‘it is a well-

known fact that the Syndikats-Rhederi does exist,”” and

that he believed that its purpose is as stated above, (Vol. 2,

»). 826.)

3. Contracts with shippers which may be classified as:

(a) Joint contracts made by the conference as a whole.—

Such contracts are made for the account of all the lines in

the agreement, each carrying its proportion of the contract

freight as tendered from time to time. The contracting lines

agree to furnish steamers at regular intervals and the

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