Appellees Brief — United States v. Williams
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IN THE ee ee
Supreme Court of the United States
Ocroser Term, 1951
No. 134
A/S. J. Lupwie Mowrnexers Revert, er an. Appellants,
v.
IsBRANDTSEN COMPANY, INc., ET AL.
No. 135
Feperat Maritime Boarp, A ppellant,
v.
Tue Unirep States or Am ERICA, ET AL.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, ISBRANDTSEN COMPANY
INC.
___.
’
Vv Jonn J. O'Connor
Washington Building
Washington, D. (.
J Whuiam L. McGovern
1200 Kighteenth Street, N. W.
Washington 6, D. ¢.
Counsel for Appellee
Arxoup, Forras & Porter
1200 Kighteenth Street, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.
OF Counsel
Press oF Byron S. Apams, Wasnincton, D.C.
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INDEX.
Page
Gurmionme BROW . ooo c ccc cn cececses abseil @ pacts Goh eA 1
Bo EV ree re mee Ee ry rer ey emt ee 2
CMI IORI oo a 55 ki des hehe ew cee imesinas 2
eer eee eee er eee ee Tee ee 3
at IE acs sv eee DM WAS VERO cue Cea Kew 3
2) The Exclusive Patronage Contract System..... 7
a) Increased Rate for Identical Transportation
(NN REGS NSP pen We OP here eee Ra
Conference Assumed No Obligation to Sup-
Og a ORS ee Se FO oe a ee
Inadequate Rate Protection Offered Shipper
Shipper Subject to Severe Penalties......
Contract Made Shipper Continually Depen-
ey Ser CONN i iio 25a he wan ee ae bs
Contract System Created Power to Dis-
OE es orange Vac RT yes te een 4
e) Record Silent as to Reasons for Use of Sys-
tem in this Particular Trade..............
h) Exelusive Patronage System Coercive.....
Dei Pe SEMIN Sg oaks wane adnicua pa ceeann
Oe. Be Es og cn ss «Gawkers OAS eee
OS oc cube era a ee CL SALLE EONS Cate
') Contract System, Not Conference System, in
Pe eee ee ere rer ge serene
Bh We SIOOIU 6 one keene ekg eeen
5) Charaeteristies of Contract System .........
Gap etarccontstimen eer nes
Fi see
SAG Dombng Insets. ne
ii Index Continued.
Page
I. THe Surprine Act or 1916 Was Desicnep To Pre-
SERVE INDEPENDENT COMPETITION
4%, 0 6h @ 6 '@ SO @ce
1) Alexander Committee recommended and
Congress Adopted Ban Against Any Type
of Conference Activity Designed to Elimi-
nate Independent Competition ............
2) Ban Against Elimination of Non-Conference
Competition Required by Regulatory Scheme
Il. THe Exciusive Parronace Contract System Re-
TALIATES AGAINST A SHIPPER FOR PATRONIZING
I rig 0's 365 6 ow bik woe eens
Ill. Tue Exctusive Patronace Contract System Is
a Discriminatory Metuop Deresicgnep to RetTa.i-
ATE AGAINST A SHIPPER FOR PATRONIZING ANOTHER
ee oete ts Teen Se Sh GA ae ele hblea ee & ic
IV. Concress Lert tHe Commission No Discretion
To Approve A Dua Rate System Wuicu Works
A Retauiarory Discrimination AGAINST A Suip-
PER FOR PatvTpoNnizinc ANOTHER CARRIER.........
ACT IN slg ob AE re OR A 4S EMA SAREE COS
al te i cals Gk wine le a OO cae oR
UI I tr Oe ed wee awa a4
‘
pS aE Sat 05 Se EE Sea Pe a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.
CASES:
Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. United States,
gD eT
American Surety v. Bethlehem Bank, 314 U. S. 314
oe WRB aged ata ORR NICS Se paca aa
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 22 F.
EA le Git BA is. Ba BOOED ven sciccessiececs
Contract Routing Restrictions, 2 U. S. M. C. 220
Caw eeu coe cn coe cer cuk naae encase
Eastern States Retail Lumber Assn. v. United
oe Be reer
COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER
99
29
+0)
45
Index Continued. ili
Page
den Mining Co. v. Bluefields Fruit & S. S. Co., 1
U.S. S. B. We PEE ies Sis coe ae Uri ue cea 45, 51
Gulf Intercoastal Contract Rates, 1 U. S. S. B. B.
GREER ES SG Sew orton Ce tae Sires sir es al 52
Hocking Valley v. United States, 210 Fed. 735 (6th
Cir. 1 J14), cert. den. 234 U. &. 757 (1919)........ 48
letstcmaneel Investigation, 1 a2. & BB 400
SNE alae wedge uaa sean kak eERds oo coon As 52
International Business Machines Corp. v. United
ORM Alc Wh BOE LAOEMOD oo va vn cacsicccesecs 42
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Mechling, 300
ras CM TU er ie ia RN ee Se 46, 50
Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345 (1948) ...... 45
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 137 (1803).......... 49
Menacho v. Ward, 27 Fed. 529 (C. C. N. Y. 1886). .43, 45
Mitchell v. United States, 314 U.S. s0 goes Uo Bee a+
Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 88 (1940).... 54
Pacifie Coast European Conference, 3 U.S. M. C. 11
CROOU Fara Sei aNel nate ceuace bw eceuceeegs 45, 53
Pacific Westbound Conference, et al. v. Laval & Co.,
Ine., — 16, 1951, 4192-485, Circuit Court, Ore-
wt
ON aa Pid ela ane hye cr Sal wre ask eee ow sae ara eee eek 11
Rawleigh v. Stoomvaart, et al., 1 U. S. S. B. B. 285
eg a ee 53
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226
ans Ce raat ce Ug rc ha ghee Og A on °6
Standard Oil of California v. United States, 3237
SMC CER 33
State of New York v. United States, 311 U. YS4
i | HERR RSE CELE wind rah ce BER. CUT AUER ne en aN NT 48
Swayne & Hoyt v. United States, 300 UL S. 297
CE a Ca era yee oie cy foe 2 On i
United States v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co., 294 U.
a I esa ok keh ead Oss kx bu od oem ns 25
United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 210
Riaraee GER ra ee wate ie oo 54
United States v. Masonite, 316 U. S. 265 (1942).... 26
United States v. Missouri Pacifie R. Co.. 278 U.S.
EE a ca dco diee cas ose veal via aeec oe
United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard, 50 F. 2d
33 (2d Cir., 1931), aff'd 264 U.S. 474... 2.25.5... 27
United States v. Standard Oil, 221 U. S. 1 (1911)... 35
PRE re OBE AD NE ARE EM ale e ia Oa AS 6 IT hee Los eA Ae SWS ca taceshd PEET II RS As LEB ANP
eR a a RE I air 62:
| aan BN eT FM
3
iv Index Continued.
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES: Page
Constitution: Fifth Amend., Art. 1, §$ 1, 8........ 19
Statutes:
Shipping Act of 1916 (46 U.S. C. § 801 et seq.) ..3, 22
TB RR er ee Re rie pny eres 19, 22, 27, 35, 48
Da ah earl oa wt ae aaa ae cae hace wie oot 0 22, 27
re OM an a eh aN wa ere ees re 45, 47
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S. C. § 1009... 17
Interstate Commerce Act ....................39, 49
Urgent Deficiences Act of 1913, 28 U. S.C. $§ 2284,
UM eTa sss <p pdainera nein ae ab Ws. donee ks 17
Shipping Act of 1916 as amended, 46 U.S.C.$ 830 17
Code of Fed. Reg., Title 46, §§ 235.1, 235.2....... 38
MISCELLANEOUS:
Investigation of Shipping Combinations, House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
H. BR. Doce. 805, Gard Cong., 2d Sese. ............ 17, 37
bagi Aare
| aoe eabih
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a seas
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
OcrospEr Term, 1951
No. 134
A/S. J. Lupwic Mowrnckets Repent, er au., Appellants,
v.
IsBRANDTSEN ComPANny, INC., ET AL.
No. 135
FeperaL Maritime Boarp, Appellant,
v.
Tue Unrrep States or AMERICA, ET AL.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, ISBRANDTSEN COMPANY,
INC.
—_—_
OPINIONS BELOW
The final opinion of the District Court (R. 118) is re-
ported at 96 F. Supp. 883 (S. D. N. Y. 1950). The
opinion of the District Court in connection with the grant-
ing of the temporary injunction is reported at 81 F. Supp.
i444 (S. D. N. Y. 1949). The report and order of the
Federal Maritime Board (R. D1, 67) are reported at 3
Fe ae,
»
~~
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the District Court was entered on April
d, 1951 (R. 148). The petitions for appeal w presented
on May 16, 1951 (R. 150, 155), and were alle ed on May
17, 1951 (R. 151, 155). The jurisdiction of this Court is
conferred by 28 U.S. C. § 1253.
QUESTION PRESENTED
The Federal Maritime Board and its predecessors souglit
to authorize two Conferences of common carriers operating
in the North Atlantic trade to employ the exclusive patron-
age contract, or dual rate, system, under which the car-
riers established and proposed to effectuate two rate scales,
one of which represents an increase over the other by the
addition of an arbitrary differential of 20 percent.’ Both
rate scales are applicable to precisely the same transpor-
tation service, but the lower rate seale is made available
only to shippers who contract in advance to route all of
their shipments exclusively via the Conference lines; the
higher non-contract rates are charged all shippers in the
trade who decline to sign an exclusive patronage contract,
or who breach the contract by patronizing another carrier.
No question is presented here as to the Conference system
as distinguished from the contract system. The principal
question raised as to the contract system is:
1. Does the exelusive patronage contract system, by
charging a substantially higher rate for identical transpor-
tation services to any shipper who insists npon his right
to patronize an independent carrier, retaliate and discrim-
inate against such shipper for patrenizing another earrier
' Because the non-contract rates were arrived at by rounding out
to the nearest five cents a 20 percent increase over the preexisting
rates, for various commodities the actual differential varied from
20 to 30 percent (R. 861).
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3
in violation of Section 14(3) (46 U.S. C. § 812(3)) of the
Shipping Act of 1916, which provides in pertinent part:
No common carrier by water shall, directly or in-
directly * * *
Third. Retaliate against any shipper by refusing,
or threatening to refuse, space accommodations when
such are available, or resort to other discriminating
or unfair methods, because such shipper has patron-
ized any other carrier or has filed a complaint charging
unfair treatment, or for any other reason.
STATEMENT
This case is on appeal from a final order of a three-judge
statutory court which permanently enjoined the institution
by appellant Conferences of the exclusive patronage con-
tract system in trade between ports on the North Atlantic
coast of the United States and continental ports in Bel-
gium, Holland and Germany, commonly known as_ the
North Atlantie trade (R. 148-149).
1) The Parties
Appellee, Isbrandtsen Company, Inc., organized under
the laws of the state of New York, is an American-flag car-
rier by water in the transportation of property between
ports on the North Atlantic coast of the United States and
the Gulf of Mexico and ports in various parts ef the world,
including continental ports in Belginm, Holland, and Ger-
many. For more than. twenty years Isbrandtsen has been
engaged in regularly-scheduled common carrier service in
the North Atlantie trade. Since 1933, appellee has main-
tained a miaimum of twice-monthly berth sailings on this
trade route, and since the end of government control on
March 2, 1946, Isbrandtsen has operated such berth service
in the North Atlantic trade exclusively as an American-flag
common carrier (R. 255).
Appellants are two voluntary associations of eommon
‘arrier steamship lines organized under Section 15 of the
SHARE A eh Da TaN ah NRE DMI RR lt A eI ATE LS A ERED GARTER
Shipping Act of 1916 (46 U.S. C. $ 814) into two steamship
conferences, the North Atlantic Continental Freight Con-
ference and the Continental North Atlantic Westbound
Freight Conference, operating east and west bound, respec-
tively, in the North Atlantic trade (R. 256). Apart from
Isbrandtsen, during the entire period since 1931, all of the
other common earriers regularly in the North Atlantic
trade, both foreign-flag and American flag, have been mem-
hers of one or the other of the appellant conferences (R.
386).
The conferences exist primarily as rate-fixing mech-
anisms. By consultation among themselves, the member
lines agree upen a single joint tariff to be filed with the
Board by each conference on behalf of all of its member
lines. The shipper pays the rate specified in the Confer-
ence Tariff regardless of the particular conference line
that may carry his freight. Any shipper desiring to alter
the published conference rate must have the matter re-
ferred via an individual conference carrier or the confer-
ence chairman to the conference rate committee (R. 669).
Rach of the conferences involved here operate pursuant to
a unanimous voting provision under which any line, for-
eign-flag or Ameriean-flag, may veto any proposed rate
change (R. 1074).2. Beeause the voting is confidential,
“Tt is this very surrender of control over its own rates entailed
in conference rate-making procedures that render the conferences
peculiarly obnoxions to [sbrandtsen. As appellee’s Vice President
Crinkley described the result of conference rate-making procedures
(R. 411):
A. No, T am coming smack on to the other thing, and that
is this: Why don’t we join these groups? When we join, or
if we join this group, at that instant two things would happen
concerning freight rates. From that point on, we, as a carrier,
would never have anything to do with what freight rates
were applied on shipments moving on our ships. We might
have a voice in the Rate Committee Burean—we would be
one of 14 lines, with the rates being fixed on majority vere.
QO. (Mr. Hupper) You know it is done by unanimous vote.
don’t you?
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5)
neither the shipper nor the Board knows which individual
line vetoed a proposed rate adjustment (R. 668).
Since the inception of this case, these conferences have
been composed of seven foreign-flag lines and four Ameri-
can-flag lines (R. 594). However, ‘‘carriers may enter or
withdraw from the conference at will’? (R. 213), and con-
ference membership entails no continuing obligation to stay
in the trade, Consequently, the international complexion
of conference membership alters from time to time as lines
enter and depart the trade, join and leave the conferences.
For example, only four present members of the Kastbound
Conference were members prior to World War I]; six car-
riers Joined since March 2, 1946: and three Canadian lines
A. | don’t know that.
Q. I think you will find out that is right.
A. That makes it much weerxe, in my opinion, for then the
American shipping interests may be seriously endangered by
some one line that has no interest in this business whatever.
Some of the lines don’t call at all of the ports, and yet one
line calls at this port, and by his single vote could upset
another port.
But let me finish what I was saying, and that is this: When
we join a Conference, if we did that, at that minute. even
with the unanimous vote there, we would lose control of
what we might charge. We might upset somethine the others
were doing, but we have nothing to do with what we charge.
And at that minute the shippers would not see any oceasion
when there was any competitive foree brought to play on the
rail (sie) level.
Q. Well, you are aware that this entire Conference situ-
ation and rate situation is policed actively by the United
States Maritime Commission, aren’t you?
A. I wish I could say I agree with you, but T don’t believe
it, sir. I don’t believe it is policed. Sufficiently, let me add
that—sufficiently.
* A/S. J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi, Black Diamond Steamship
Corporation, Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, Compagnie
Maritime Belgie, Cunard White Star, Ltd.. Ellerman’s Wilson
Line Ltd., Dampskibsselskabet af 1912 A/S. A/S Dampskibsselska-
bet Svendborg, United States Lines Company, N. V. Neder-
landsche-A merikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij. Waterman
Steamship Corporation, and South Atlantic Steamship Lines, Ine.
withdrew in 1948 (R. 212-213). In the aggregate, the East-
bound Conference offered 498 berth sailings in 1947, and
518 in 1948 (R. 255-56).
Isbrandtsen, which the Board noted (R. 03 ‘had a his-
tory of ocean shipping operation independent from con-
ference ties’’, is not a member of either conference but is in
competition with both in the North Atlantic t ‘ade, in whic?
it operated 38 berth sailings in 1948. Down through the
years, as the only regularly scheduled non- -conference com-
mon ¢arrier continuously in the trade (R. 386), Isbrandt-
sen, the Examiner found, ‘‘has effectively acted as a check
on respondents’ [Conferences’] rates and services”’ (R.
261).
At the time this suit was instituted, the Conferences had
in effect conference tariffs constructed on a single rate scale
which largely represented the War Shipping Administra-
tion’s wartime rate seale (R. 258). While some adjust-
ments had been made sinee March 2, 1948, the rate level
on October 1, 1948 was substantially Taritf No. 17, which
had been approved for wartime operation by the War Ship-
ping Administration and which made allowance for many
war-inflated cost factors such as war risk insurance, bonus
payments to seamen and high oil charges. Tariff No. 17
also ineluded a flat surcharge of 15 percent, which was
likewise continued in effect in the Conference Tariff after
return of shipping to private operation on Mareh 2, 1946.'
* The Examiner found that on 581 commodities, Isbrandtsen’s
rates were ‘from 3.3 percent to 53.4 percent lower than the con-
ference rates’? (R. 236-237). A measure of the level of existing
tariff rates which the Confefences proposed to convert into con-
tract rates on and after Nov. 1, 1948, is afforded by a comparison
of the rates that prevailed before and after World War II. Mr.
Crinkley, Isbrandtsen Vice President in Charge of Traffic, com-
pared the pre-war and post-war rate situation (R. 379-380) :
A. Let me say that T have no reverence whatsoever for a
Conference rate as such. T don’t believe the time has ever
been in the commerce of this country when anybody could say
that the Conferences, any one of them or all of them, have set
up a tariff where the rates are very reasonable and take into
CODY ROTINIDN CTOeCre INI CONTE
~
2) The Exclusive Patronage Contract System
On October 1, 1948, appellant carriers summarily noti-
fied all known shippers in the North Atlantic trade that,
effective November 1, 1948, the exclusive patronage con-
tract-non-contract rate system would be insti:ted simul-
taneously in both east- and westbound trades covering all
commodities transported in those trades, with insignificant
exceptions.” Under the exclusive patronage system thus
held out to the public, the conferences proposed to create
dual rate seales by adding an arbitrary differential of 20
consideration all of the factors of trade. T don’t believe any-
think like that has ever happened, and accordingly, fer
semebody to assume that because a Conference has got a rate
here, and | quote this, that we are necessarily cutting their
rate. That is just foolishness.
Before the war, the rate on leaf tobacco to Hamburg and
Antwerp was 50 cents a hundred pounds with independent
competition, On January 1, 1948 it was $5.20. Then the
JETA (sic: JELA, ie. Joint Export Import Agency, R. 444)
came in the market with 30,000 tons of tobacco and asked for
a quotation. The Conference qnoted $3.20. 0 My quotation
was $2.25, $20 a ton less.
Now, mind you, to England at the same time, where it is
more expensive to carry tobacco since the lines have to deliver
to the government warehouses, $2 was the rate. So to Ene-
land high ports it was $2, Hamburg and Bremen $3.20, Ant-
werp and Rotterdam $2.90, and for somebody to say that
rate is reasonable and if IT quote under it IT am a chiseler, it
is foolishness.
If I quoted the same thing, I would be guilty of embezzle-
ment. 1 quoted two and a quarter based on American opera-
tion, high cost operation, with a good profit.
Now, what could be done with a cheaper operating foreign
business is something else. Two and + quarter was ao eood
rate, very satisfactory. I quoted it. We carried a substantial
part of the business. The Conference met the rate. The tex-
payers of this country saved S600.000 on that transaction
because of good, clean competition that was there working, net
chiseling the Conference rate, but setting rates that were
very fair and quite profitable.
*T.e.. human ashes, coal and coke in bulk, corpses, household or
personal eifects, explosives, grain in bulk, livestock, and lift vans
R. 257).
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5
pereent to the existing rate scale. No reduction under the
existing rates was involved (R. 454). The higher, so-called
non-contraet rate scale, was to be applied to any shipper
who continued after November 1, 1948 to patronize inde-
pendent non-conference carriage such as that supplied by
Isbrandtsen. The existing so-called contract scale, which
prior to November 1, 1948, had been applied uniformly to
all Cargo in the trade moving on Conference vessels, was
to be available after November 1, only to shippers who con-
tracted in advance to confine all their shipments in the
North Atlantic trade to conference vessels (R. 258).
a) Inereased Rate for Identical Transportation Service,
While undertaking to differentiate between ‘‘contract”’
and **non-contract’’ shippers, the conference lines did not
undertake to tender to the trade any different transporta-
tion services after November 1, 1948 than had been pur-
veyed prior to that date, and the notice to the shipping pub-
lie made it perfectly clear that precisely the same trans-
portation services would be furnished the shipper, irre-
spective of whether he paid the contract rate or the newly
established, higher non-contract rate. The proposed sys-
tem, therefore, contemplated that two shippers seeking to
ship the same articles, on the same vessel, on the same day,
between the same two ports, might well be charged different
rates, depending entirely on whether each had agreed to
patronize the conference lines exelusivly (R. 456).6 The
® Appellants’ witness, Mr. Rosenthal, conceded the absence of any
other basis for the application of different rates (R. 793-794) :
Q. Now, is it your understanding that under the dual rate
system maintained by the Conference in connection with the
contract rate, that the sole distinction there with respect. to,
and as a basis for, the applicability of the higher rate, is
whether or not you have agreed as a shipper to confine your
patronage to Conference Lines exclusively?
A. Yes. As T understand it, if | do not sign a contract in
which I agree to confine my business to Conference Lines, if
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y
non-contract shipper might tender several times as much
tonnage as the contract shipper and still be assessed the
higher rate. Regardless of which rate was paid, the Ex-
aminer found that ‘tthe cargo of both are transported on
the same vessel and with the same degree of care, and the
paper work incidental thereto is the same’? (R. 237).
b) Conference Assumed No Obligation to Supply Car-
riage,
While the exelusive patronage contract tendered the
trade on October 1, 1948 (Appendix A to this Brief), was
principally remarkable for its establishment of different
rates for identical transportation services, the contract was
also striking in several other respects. Notably, the pro-
posed contract merely obligated the merchant to effect, vin
conference lines, all of such export shipments as he might
make in the North Atlantic continental trade. There was
no obligation on the merchant to export any commodities
at all (R.259). By the same token, under the proposed con-
tract, the conference lines agreed to furnish the merchant at
contract rates only that “space in such vessels as they may
respectively load at said loading ports for transportation
and dispatch at the ports desired, provided that suitable
unbooked space is available therein when the merchant
makes applieation’’ (R, 259). As the court below in-
terpreted this provision (R. 128), “This apparently means
that, to a shipper who signs an exclusive patronage con-
tract, the conference carriers agree to supply no‘transporta-
tion facilities, exeept as the conference members may sce
lit to provide them from time to time.” Certainly, no in-
dividual conference line undertook to make available any
I then ship over a Conference Line, 1 pay the non-contract
rate.
Q. The reason for that being no other than the fact that you
have not agreed to confine your patronage to the Conference
vessels ?
A. Yes.
Shs ho ORRR ease
a):
erinr es
serene str SGD Face
ea s,%
TPS sh
10
unbooked space, or, indeed, to stay in the trade at all, even
during the life of the contract. It is true that the contract
left the shippers ‘*free’? to seeure space elsewhere if the
Conference failed to provide it, but the shippers were well
aware that this freedom was meaningful only if non-con-
ference carriage Was available.’
¢) Inadequate Rate Protection Offered Shipper.
Respecting rates, the contract provided that the rates
specified therein, which were the then existing Conference
Tariff, might be increased from time to time during ‘he life
of the contract. Any notice of such an increase was to he
deemed accepted by the merchant unless he notified the
conference of his non-acceptance within 20 days. In such
event, the conferences reserved the right to cancel the
merchant’s contract on GO days’ written notice (R. 259-
260). At best, this provision assured the shipper of rate
protection for only eighty days, although the Conference
experts, themselves, maintained that protection for a year
Was necessary to provide adequate opportunity for for-
ward trading (R. 785). Of course, the cancellation priv-
ilege was of real benefit to the Conferences, but, again, the
merehants were aware that it was meaningless to them in
the absence of non-conference carriers.
Furthermore, the coutract to be effectuated on November
1, 1948, was, as the Examiner described it, ‘tan all-com-
TAs appellants’ own transportation expert conceded (R. 777,
iS3):
Q. You appreciate, do yon not, that the provision allowing
vou to secure space elsewhere is meaningful for a shipper
only in the event there is an independent in the trade?
A. Yes, sir.
al * «
Q. 1 asked you earlier whether you saw any obligation on
the part of the Conference Lines to carry cargo, and you
said no. ITs that right?
A. I said no, based on the fact that if they wished te with-
craw all their sailings, there is nothing under this contract
that would compel them to put a sailing on berth.
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[> “|
Ln Sag
11
modity agreement, i.e., the shipper is obligated to use the
conference lines for all his cargo. The net result is that
if the conference gives notice of an increase in rates on
any of the commodities covered by the contract the shipper
must agree thereto or else he loses the benefit of the con-
tract rates on his other commodities. For example, if the
shipper were to export 25 commodities and the increase is
on one only, his position on the other 24 would be jeopar-
dized if he failed to accept the increase on the one. This
would be a clear-cut case of the tail wageing the dog, and
it would be manifestly unfair to saddle the shipper with
this choice’? (R. 246). Despite this biting criticism of the
proposed contract system by the Examiner, the Board ap-
proved this aspect of the proposed contract system without
even discussing the matter.
d) Shipper Subject to Severe Penalties.
Among other jeopardies to which the proposed contract
subjected the shipper was the threat that, if the merchant
made a shipment in a non-conference line in violation of
the contract, the shipper would be liable for twice the
amount of freight that would have been payable if the
shipment had been effected under the contract over con-
ference lines.* The contract also conveyed to the carriers
the option to terminate the agreement for such a violation.
thereby rendering the shipper liable for the higher non-
contract rates on future shipments effected via conference
lines (R. 259). The contract imposed no reciprocal penalty
for breach on the part of the conference lines presumably
because they assumed no obligation ‘capable of being
breached (R. 776). Curiously enough, the option reserved
to the Conferences to impose the penalties for breach was
the only feature of the proposed system which the Board
“In Pacific Westbound Conference et al v. Leval & Co., Ine.,
Jaly 16, 1951, 192-485, a Circuit Court of the State of Oregon re-
fused enforcement of a similar conference contract penalty.
eee”
i AE sechiSN eas Ap Ten TR RE as
12
found objectionable. The Board required that the imposi-
tion of the penalties be made mandatory (R. 65).
e) Contract Made Shipper Continually Dependent on
Conference.
Respecting the term of the exclusive association, the
contract provided that it should continue in effect for a
period of 14 months from November 1, 1948 to December 31,
1949, and thereafter, in the words of the Board, ‘* the agree-
ment shall continue in effect throughout consecutive subse-
quent years subject to the right of either the shipper or the
carriers to terminate it as of December 31 in any year by
giving the other party 9) days’ written notice of termina-
tion’? (R. 56). This “right”? of termination was also of
substance to the shipping public only in the event that, at
the end of any contract year, non-conference carriage Was
actually available in the trade as an alternative to conter-
ence services.
f) Contract System Created Power to Discriminate.
Finally, the projeeted dual rate system was peculiar in
that it was not proposed to apply to all shippers alike, big
and small, public and private, as had been the case with the
single rate system. Because governmental agencies were
prevented by law from entering into any arrangement which
interfered with the competitive purchase of transportation
service, the Government, which was one of the largest ex-
porters in the trade and which was competing with private
exporters (R. 639), was not to be compelled to sign a con-
tract in order to enjoy the lower contract rates (R. 42").
Neither was the powerful Automobile Manufacturers’ Ass0-
ciation which declined to sign the contract when it was pre-
sented to it, but which was informed by the Conference thiat
it would be eligible fo* contract rates nonetheless (R. 224,
898-903).
PADV ROAIIND CIOSE IN CENTER
sages
aa ey
13
g) Record Silent As to Reasons for Use of System In
This Particular Trade.
At the time of the attempted institution of the contraet
system involved here, the Board had approved approxi-
mately 100 conferences in various trades around the world.
Of this number, only 24 conferences were attempting to
make active use of the dual rate system at the time of the
Board’s decision challenged here. While the conferences
had employed the dual rate system in the North Atlantie
trade toa limited extent prior to World War II, they had
never applied it to more thay approximately 360 commod-
ities out of the total of approximately 1800 commodities
moving in the trade." Consequently, the attempt of the
conferences to apply the system straight across the hoard
to all commodities moving in the trade represented a sharp
departure from the usual practice in the North Atlantic
trade,
The record preserves an eloquent silence as to the rea-
sous which motivated the Conferences jn seckinge for the
lirst time to institute the system on November 1, 1948 on
substantially all commodities moving in the trade. and the
conditions in the trade which might be thought to have justi-
fied the inauguration of the system at that time. At no
place on the face of the Conferences’ minutes on file with
the Commission was there any showing of the reason for
the adoption of the contract system in the North Atlantic
trade at this time, or any other time (R. 909-911), While
the Chairman of the Kastbound Conference, who Was the
only witness from the trade to testify for the Conferences
concerning the dual rate system, indieated there may have
heen a possibility of the trade becoming unstabilized. he
Was unable to point to any factors in the trade which were
contributing to such ** possible’? instability (R. 911). How-
ever, if the record is silent as to the reasons which nnderlay
"The Examiner found that out of a total of 1700-1900 items in
the Tariff, only 706 were under contract (R. 257), and the
Chairman of the Conference testified that of these 796 items, no
dual rate features were involved in 345 items (R. 740),
14
the proposed adoption of the contract system on November
1, 1948, the record leaves no doubt of the effect of that
adoption.
h) Exclusive Patronage System Coercive.
During 1948, Isbrandtsen offered 38 sailings in the North
Atlantic trade, while the Conferenee lines in the aggregate
offered 518 sailings (R. 255-56). Most important shippers
in the North Atlantic trade who desire to ship a portion of
their cargo via Isbrandtsen have need of more frequent
service than Isbrandtsen supplies, and each such shipper
in the trade must normally secure a part of his transporta-
tion requirements from member lines of the Conferences,
If the dual rate provisions went into effect, therefore, such
shippers would be compelled to sign Conference contracts
in order to escape paying the higher non-contraet rate on
that portion of their cargo which business exigencies re-
quired them to ship via Conference lines from time to
time.'°
™ As appellee’s Vice President described the dilemma confront-
ine shippers (R. 468):
A. That is the element of force that I have referred to quite
often at this hearing, whereby, in these trades where the Con-
ferences attempt to use this exclusive patronage rate system,
such shippers as require more service than my company pro
vides consider they do not have any choice, they are forced to
sign these exclusive patronage contracts: and obviously, thes
could not afford to ship with these Conference lines and pay
the non-con ract rates. IT don’t think anybody ever pays the
non-contrac’? rates.
Indeed, appellants’ own transportation expert eandidly con-
ceded the economic coercion to which the contract system subjected
the shipper (R. 75) :
Q. Of course, if they (non-conference lines) weren't able
to satisfy you, then to the extent you used them (Conference
lines) vou would have to pay the higher rate?
A. Correet. And if they (non-conference lines) coutdn't
satisfy me, after all, it probably would be an economic neces
sity for me to aecept the conference contract, and to pay the
conference rate on all of my shipments, even if they were
higher than the non-conference rate. (Parentheses supplied. |
COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER
15
Thus, the necessary effect of requiring such shippers in
the North Atlantic trade, on or after November 1, 14s, to
secure all or none of their transportation requirements
from member lines of the conferences was to compel such
shippers to cease patronizing Isbrandtsen. In faet, iminedi-
ately upon conference announcement of the proposed insti-
tution of the contract system, many such important ship-
pers, Who in the past had shipped part of their cargo with
Isbrandtsen, notified the appellee that, when the exclusive
patronage contract system went into effect, they would be
compelled to cease patronizing Isbrandtsen and to confine
all of their shipments to the conference lines."’ Indeed, out
"While appellants have sought to create the impression that
shippers hailed the contract system, the ‘ecord contains ample
evidence of bitter shipper opposition. The ouly shipper inter-
venors, Department of Agriculture, Himila International, and
Pacitie Coast Borax Company, supported appellees opposition to
the system (R. 204). From his long experience with shippers,
appellee’s Vice President testified (R. 431):
A. My personal feeling, and I feel it very strongly, and
it is based on a long experience and a very wide acquaintance
with shippers, is that 90 percent or more of the shippers
don’t like the conference contract system, and if they didn't
feel that they were forced to sign it. they would never sign it.
I don’t know the exact figures, of course, but it is my impres-
sion that 90 percent or more do not care for the conference
contract system. They think it is an imposition.
This testimony was documented by written communications from
slippers opposing the system (R. 1122-1125). Indeed, the penalty
imposed by the differential is so severe that Mir. Isbrandtsen testi-
tied that his own company was, itself, forced to sign contracts in
trades where it was shipping for its own account and did not sappy
carriage (R. 321):
Q. (Mr. Hupper) As a shipper, your company has entered
into contracts with the Conference lines, has it not?
A. Yes—in each ease under protest.
q. You were a free agent, weren't you?
A. No.
Q. You signed the contracts, your company did?
A. Under coercion,
Q. Who coerced you?
A. The Conference.
ENE PROT TT PO EERE GY
4
y
%
&
Kj
A
*
ESS
16
of a total of approximately 4500 shippers solicited, approxi-
mately 3000 shippers in the North Atlantie continental
trade had executed the exclusive patronage eoentracts prior
to the issuance of an injunction by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York which
enjoined the further solicitation of such contracts pending
the determination of this proceeding.
In the present posture of the case, the fact that the
patronage system is coercive is conceded on the face of the
record. The Examiner found that ‘tit is true, as urged by
complainant, that shippers are compelled to sign contracts
through economie coercion’’(R. 237); and the Board con-
cluded that the conferences realized ‘****something more
than voluntary shipper cooperation must be agreed to”
(R. 64). Similarly, on the present record it is admitted
that, through the coercion practiced by it upon the shipping
public, the exclusive patronage dual rate system would en-
able the Conferences to monopolize carriage in the North
Atlantie trade by forcing independent non-conference car-
riage out of the trade or into the conference. The Examiner
found that **There can be little doubt that the contract
system in the present trades, if allowed to become effective,
would create a virtual monopoly’? (R. 221); and in the
Q. They threatened you?
A. An inferred threat.
@. You signed them so as to get the lower rate, didn’t you!
A. No.
Q. Why did you sign them?
A. Oh, pardon me, I didn’t understand that question.
Q). You signed those contracts, your company did, so as
to get the lower rate?
A. I signed them so we wouldn't be penalized by paying
the higher rates. That is the way | like to put it.
@. You wanted the lower rate?
A. I didn’t want the higher rate.
Q. That is the way with every shipper of a sane mind, he
wants the lower rate effective if he can get it.
A. Lam afraid that the other shippers look upon it the same
way. They don’t want to pay the higher rate; they don’t
want to be penalized.
COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER
17
court below Board counsel conceded that ‘‘whether the
coutraet system in a particular case actually has the effect
of producing a complete monopoly (i.e., control of a trade)
depends upon how well it works; admittedly, it is monopo-
listie in prrpose. The extent to which it is monopolistic in
effeet depends upon how suecessfully that purpose is
achieved’? (R. 124-125).""
3) Proceedings Below.
Faced with exclusion from access .o the patronage which
it had developed and serviced over a period of more than
two decades through the threatened imposition of the ex-
elusive patronage contraet system, Isbrandtsen invoked the
jurisdiction of a statutory United States court in the
Southern Distriet of New York on October 28, 1948, pur-
suant to the provisions of the Shipping Act of 1916, as
amended, 46 UL S.C. § _. “9 Urgent Deficiencies Act of
1913, as amended, 28 U. . $$ 2284, 2321-2225, and the
Administrative = fehl Pa of 1946,5 U.S. C. § 1009, to
enjoin, set aside, annul and suspend orders and approvals
of the Board dated January 2, 1948, approving conference
agreement designated by the Board as Conference Agree-
ment No. 4490-6, and August 24, 1948, approving conference
agreement designated by the Board as Conference Agree-
ment No. 7920-1. The complaint (R. 1-9) set forth that
such approvals had been entered without notice or hearing,
and alleged that so much of such Board orders and ap-
provals as purported to authorize appellant steamship
lines operating in the North Atlantie trade concertedly to
coerce shippers in such trade to patronize such lines exeln-
‘ively, through use of the exelnsive patronage contract sys-
tem, and to retaliate against shippers in such trade who
"These admissions were justified by the state of the reeord.
Por example, appellants’ own transportation expert testified (R.
786) -
I would coneede it would make it much more difficut for the
independents to stay in business.
ee
18
patronize Isbrandtsen, violated Section 14 of the Shipping
Act, and were null and void.
Simultaneously with the filing of its verified Complaint
in the District Court, Isbrandtsen moved the Court for a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction
to maintain the status quo in the North Atlantic trade,
until such time as the Court could hear and finally deter-
mine the issues.
The District Court found (Opinion, per Rifkind, J. $1
F. Supp. 544) that if the Conferences were permitted to
effectuate the dual rate tariff system, Isbrandtsen would
be ‘‘gravely prejudiced’? and on January 13, 1949, the
Court granted the temporary injunction prayed for. How-
ever, because the Board had approved the contract system
without notice and hearing and had indicated to the Court
that it would like an opportunity to review the question on
a full record, the Distriet Court conditioned its temporary
injunetion upon the filing by Isbrandtsen of a complaint
with the Board challenging the validity of Conference
Agreements 4490-6 and 7920-1.
In accordance with that condition, Isbrandtsen filed its
Complaint before the Board on February 1, 1949, challeng-
ine the validity of so much of the said conference agree-
ments Nos. 4490-6 and 7920-1 as purported to authorize ap-
pellant steamship lines, named as members of appellant
conferences, to use the exclusive patronage contract-non
contract rate system, on the grounds that:
a) Such purported authorizations exceeded the authority
of the Commission under Section 15 of the Shipping Act of
1916, as amended (46 U. S. C. § 814) and were absolutely
null and void;
b) Such purported authorizations contravened the spe-
cific provisions contained in Section 14 of the Shipping
Act of 1916 (46 U.S. C. § 812) prohibiting retaliations or
discriminations against a shipper for patronizing any other
carrier; and
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19
ce) Under Article I, Sec. 1 and Article I See. 8, para-
eraph 18 of the Constitution of the United States, no
legislative authority was, or could be, delegated to the
Federal Maritime Board to authorize said Conferences, by
the use of said contract-non-contract rate system, to ex-
elude Isbrandtsen, or any other person, from engaging I
trade or commerce, and under the Fifth Amendment, the
authorizations were invalid because they deprived appellee
of its property without due process of law.
The Board set the complaint down for hearing before
an Examiner who filed his recommended decision on Octo-
hey 5, 1949. This first Recommended Decision made no
Findings of Fact, denominated as such, but confined itself
to a discussion of the lawfulness, per se, of the exclusive
patronage contract system, under Section 14(3) of the
Shipping Act of 1916. On the latter point, the Examiner
concluded that, despite the explicit language of the Section,
it did not ban all diserimination, but only ‘‘unjust’’ dis-
crimination, and he further concluded that ‘*the contract
system is not unlawful, per se, and that it is within the
administrative diseretion of the Commission, when sup-
ported by substantial evidence, to determine in each case
whether the system violates one or more sections of the
Act.” Having concluded that the exclusive patronage
system was not unlawful, per se, under Section 14, the
Examiner recommended that the use of the system in the
North Atlantic trades be approved without supporting this
recommendation with the ‘substantial evidence’*’ by which
the Board was, in the Examiner’s own words, ‘*to deter-
mine in each ease whether the system violates one or more
sections of the Act.”’
Presumably because of the failure of the Examiner's
original recommended decision to supply a solid basis of
fact on which the Board could determine whether the use
of the exelusive patronage system, in the North Atlantie
trades, was violative of any sections of the Shipping Act
of 1916, the Board, after oral argument and on December
ERTS TEA 2 4
QE GRR AWE SEAS
20
19, 1949, entered an order remanding the ease to the Ex-
aminer for further Findings of Fact. Upon the petition of
complainant, the scope of the remand was enlarged by the
following Supplemental Order of the Board, dated January
15, 1950, which, in effect, superseded the order of Decem-
ber 19, 1949 (R. 229):
Orverep that the record herein be and it is hereby re-
manded to Examiner C. W. Robinson
A. With instructions to prepare, serve, and file pro-
posed findings of fact supplemental to his recom-
mended decision served Oetober 5, 1949, as to whether
the exelusive patronage contract system proposed to
be instituted by respondents, and the forms of exclu-
sive contracts to be employed therewith, (1) are un-
justly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers
shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between
exporters from the United States and their foreign
competitors, or (2) operate to the detriment of the
commerce of the United States, or (3) are in violation
of the provisions of the Shipping Act, 1916, and par-
ticularly whether they constitute a resort to other dis-
criminative or unfair methods, beeause such shipper
has patronized any other carrier or has filed a com-
plaint charging unfair treatment, or for any other
reason (Emphasis supplied.)
B. With instructions to rule upon the proposed find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the
Complainant * * *
On February 21, 1950, the Examiner’s recommended sup-
plemental decision was filed, presumably in accordance
with the foregoing mandate of the Board, which required
him to file proposed Findings of Facet. Like its prede-
cessor, however, the supplemental decision failed to make
proposed Findings of Fact, ascertainable as such. The
Examiner did, however, pass on the Findings proposed by
Isbrandtsen which he, by and large, adopted. These Find-
ines were not, of course, designed to support the contract
<ystem. But, despite the absence of findings to support the
COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER
21
system, the Examiner again concluded that it did not vio-
late the Act, nor Section 15 thereof,
Before the old Commission could pass upon the recom-
mended supplemental decision of the Examiner, the Com-
mission was abolished. The temporary Federal Maritime
Board, which was appointed to succeed the Commission,
deferred decision in the case until its permanent successor
could be appointed. On October 18, 1950, final argument
in the matter was had before the permanent Board, and
the Board’s decision of December 1, 1950 was served on
the parties hereto on December 5, 1950.
At a hearing before the Court below on December 11,
1950, the Court ordered the complaint amended to bring
before the Court the Board’s order dismissing the ecom-
plaint, the filing of answers, and the matter set for final
argument on December 20, 1950. Pur-nant to the order of
the Court, Isbrandtsen amended its complaint to challenge
the order of dismisal contained in the Board’s decision of
December 1, as well as the earlier orders of January 2,
1948 and August 24, 1948, purporting to authorize the use
of the exclusive patronage contract system in the North
Atlantic trades.
The Secretary of Agriculture intervened in support of
Ishrandtsen’s amended complaint.
The United States answered the amended complaint as
statutory defendant (28 U.S.C. § 2322), and confessed er-
ror in the Maritime Board’s order.
The ease was heard on motion by Ishrandtsen for a per-
manent injunction and on motions by the Conferences and
the Board to dismiss Isbrandtsen’s amended complaint.
On Mareh 20, 1951, the three-judge District Court denied
these motions to dismiss and granted the prayer for a per-
manent injunction.
4) Decision Below.
In the court below, Ishbrandtsen contended that the
Board’s authorizations of the Conference Agreements
Sa aes |
oe)
were absolutely null and void because they exceeded the
authority conferred on the Board by the statute. These
authorizations were issued pursuant to Section 15 of the
Shipping Act of 1916 (46 U.S. C. § S14) under which the
Board is authorized to approve and immunize, to a limited
extent, under the antitrust laws, conferences of shipping
lines. The Section provides that ‘* the Commission may by
order disapprove, cancel, or modify any agreement, or any
modification or cancellation thereof, whether or not previ-
ously approved by it, that it finds ... fo be violation of
this chapter and shall approve all other agreements, modi-
fientions, or cancellations.’? (Emphasis supplied)
Section 14 of the Shipping Act of 1916 (46 UL S.C. S812),
however, provides that no common varrier shall directly
or indirectly (1) pay or allow a deferred rebate; (2) use
a fighting ship; (8) retaliate against any shipper or resort
‘to other discriminatory or unfair methods because such
shipper has patronized any other ‘arrier”’.
It was Isbrandtsen’s position below that Section 14 was
the Shipping Aet’s ‘‘charter of freedom’’; that the See-
tion was explicitly framed by Congress to preserve the
opportunity for independent competitive earriage in for-
eien trade; that Section 15 was designed to permit coop-
erative arrangements among carriers who voluntarily
avreed to associate themselves in conferences and to sub-
ject themselves to public regulation; and that the two sec-
tions read together embodied a Congressional scheme te
permit regulated cooperation but to forbid the employment
of any coercive weapon designed to monopolize the trade
by eliminating independent carrier competition.
The District Court noted that both the Examiner and the
Board had found that the dual rate system established a
differential of between 20 and 30 percent for identical
transportation services and that apparently the only justi-
feation for such an arbitrary differential was its tendency
‘to drive competing non-conference carriage into the con-
COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER
ference or out of business’? (R. 128).'* Consequently, the
Court concluded, ‘there the rates proposed to be charged
shippers who do not sign contracts are unreasonably, and
therefore unjustly, discriminatory; and the dual-rate pro-
visions Which permit such rates are invalid.’? (R. 127).
' Appellants have questioned whether the District Court was
correct in holding that the Examiner and the Board had found
the system arbitrary.
At the request of Isbrandtsen, the Examiner found (R. 258) :
14. Shippers were informed that failure to sign such a eon-
tract would entail application of their shipments by respon-
dents’ lines after November 1, 1948 of non-contract rates
which were fixed by means of an arbitrary differential at a
level 20 to 30% higher than the currently existing scale.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In view of this finding, Isbrandtsen filed an exception to the
failure of the Examiner to conclude that the system was not unrea-
sonably discriminatory :
21. Page 16. Complainant excepts to the Examiner's hold-
ing ‘*there is no evidence in this proceeding as to the reason-
ubleness of the two types of rates’’. As indicated above, the
Non-contract rates are obviously unreasonable because estal-
lished on the basis of an arbitrary differential.
While the Board’s opinion did not specifically discuss the Ex-
aminer’s findings and conclusions or Isbrandtsen’s exceptions,
counsel for the Board in oral argument before the court construed
the Board’s decision as accepting the Examiner's findings insofar
as they were not inconsistent with its own report (R. 75), and
the Board’s report, itself, recites (R. 66):
We find as follows:
1. The findings contained in the report of the examiner
are a substantial compliance with the orders of reference of
the Commission of December 19, 1949 and Januray 13, 1950.
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ARGUMENT.
Introduction.
The principal inquiry here is whether the exclusive pat-
ronage contract system, by charging a higher rate for iden-
tical transportation services to a shipper who patrouizes a
non-conference carrier, violates the statutory proscription
against retaliation by resort. to discriminatory methods
against such shipper for patronizing any other earrier.
1. Contract System, Not Conference System, in Issue.
To escape the force of the statutory prohibition, the pro-
ponents of the contract system have, from time to. time
throughout the proceedings below, sought to sanction the
system by tying it to the conference system (R. 63). How-
ever, only the lawfulness of the contract system is in-
volved here, and the lawfulness of that device must be
measured by the statutory eviteria regardless of the im.
pact on the conference system.
Nothing in the record lends credence to the proposition
that the contract system is essential to the continued vi-
tality of the conference system.’ In the North Atlantic
trade, as noted in the Statement. supra, the Conferences
"Tt is Isbrandtsen’s view that in permitting Conferences com-
posed of 7 foreign lines and only 4 American lines to use the dual-
rate system to maintain rates at the high American eost level, the
Board is compelling American shippers to subsidize all lines, for-
eign and American, instead of the soard subsidizing only American
lines in accordance with the spirit of the Merchant Marine Act,
1936 (46 U.S. C. § 1101) As the Examiner summarized these
Views (R. 211-212):
Conference rates, according te complainant, generally repre-
sent the ceiling of cost of American operation, and therefore
the level of conference rates in the present trades is unduly
high. There is no objection to American carriers having rates
that will enable them to stay in business. Since the cost of
foreign-flag operation is lower, a rate level satisfactery to
American lines should be even more satisfactory to the foreign
lines, and to that extent the foreign lines enjoy a subsidy. It
is contended that the American ceiling is an umbrella for
COPY BOUND CLOSE [N CENTER
Soren
a.
22
have flourished although they have never applied dual
rates to more than 20 percent of the commodities in the
tariff, and they have not employed the system at all since
1959. Out of more than 100 conferences presently au-
thorized by the Board, not more than 24 are attempting to
make active use of the system in any deeree. lronically
enough, the only example furnished by the record here of
the **eut-throat”’ competition which the system is supposed
toavoid was the rate war Which developed among the mem-
hers of the India-European and United Kingdom Confer-
ence, Which was employing the exclusive patronage deferred
rebate svstem and had monopolized the trade at the time
the internal war was started (R. 495).
In any case, the threat of chaos engendered by rate wars,
even if real, could not serve to nullify a clearly expressed
Congressional mandate.” No one has had the temerity to
a ene
foreign operators and not for complainant, and that if the
conference rates are based on American costs and there are a
number of foreign lines With lower costs, the foreign lines
“have quite a bonanza.”’ Under such a set-up complainant
thinks foreien vessels will gradually push American vessels to
one side, and as cargo falls off the foreign lines ean stay in the
trade longer and may also increase their service.
If conferences are well run complainant believes that the
Weight of the membership would always be an influence to
attract business without the use of the contract system, and
that American lines are incurring a certain amount of ill will
by using it. In complainant's opinion, the advent of the system
Was an important factor in decreasing American participa-
tion in the various trade routes, and it has not benefited the
commerce of the United States or contributed to the develop-
ment of the American merchant marine. Furthermore, it
does not foster the American) merchant marine to make it
difficult for an American carrier to Stay in the trade unless
he chooses to accept the terms of a group of lines. Prior to
1935 American vessels were decreasing in number in competi-
tion with foreign Vessels, and at the present time foreign lines
are putting on additional vessels in our trade routes When
American lines are not able to do so,
" United States vy. Chicago. M. & St. P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 449.
906-510 (1935),
a
26
sugvest that the Board could approve the deferred rebate or
the fighting ship because of the supposed essentiality of
those prohibited devices to the survival of the conference
system. No more ean a violation of Section 14(5) of the
Aet, which outlaws retaliation and discrimination against a
shipper for patronizing another carrier, be justified by
some supposed accommodation of the evils prohibited hy
that section to the needs of the Conference system." If
the contract system retaliates or discriminates against a
shipper for patronizing any other earrier, then Congress
with plenary power to decide the conditions under which
Conferences should operate, has determined that confer.
enees should be denied the privilege of employing sue!) a
weapon against non-conference competition. — Private
choice of means necessarily yields to the national authority
thus exerted, and it is outside the competence of the Board
to inquire whether the legislative determination was beneti-
cent or harmful. Eastern States Retail Lumber Associa-
tion v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 613 (1914): Uaited
States v. Masonite. 316 U.S. 265, 281 (1942). It follows
that the Board is preeluded from authorizing for any rea-
son any of the practices or devices specitically proseribed
hy Congress, and that, whatever the virtues or viees of the
conference system, the contract system must here be inde-
pendently serutinized to determine its lawfulness under
Section 14.
2. Statutory Criteria.
The major question of statutory construction involved in
this case ts whether the exclusive patronage contract sys-
WEP Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20,
49 (1912):
* * * The law is its own measure of right and wrong, of what
it permits, or forbids, and the judgment of the courts can-
not be set up against it in a supposed accommodation of it
policy with the good intention of parties, and, it may be, 0!
some good results.’’
s
COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER
.
‘
erm
Sy
27
tem constitutes a violation of Section 14 of the Shipping
Act of 1916. Tf it does, it may not be approved under
Section 16 of the Act which provides in pertinent part:
The Board may by order disapprove, cancel, or
modify any agreement, or any modification or cancel-
lation thereof, whether or not previously approved by
it, that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair
as between carriers, shippers, exporters, importers, or
ports, or between exporters from the United States
and their foreign competitors, or to operate to the
detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to
be in violation of this Act, and shall approve all other
agreements, modifications, or caneellations. = (Ei-
phasis supplied.)
* * .
All agreements, modifications, or cancellations made
after the orgainzation of the Board shall be lawful
only when and as long as approved by the board, and
before approval or after disapproval it shall be un-
lawful to earry out in whole or in part, directly or in-
directly, any such agreement, modification, or cancel-
lation.
Under Section 15, every conference agreement is unlaw-
ful until approved, and the Board is authorized to ap-
prove only *tsuch agreements as it does not find’’ to be
in violation of the Act. Unite Jd States Navigation (on. ¥.
Cunard, 50 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1931), aff'd, 284 U.S. 474
(1952). Tf, therefore, the dual rate svstem constitutes a
Violation of any of the regulatory provisions of the Ship-
ping Act, the board is powerless to approve it under See-
tion 15.
Section 14 of the Act defines three violations whieh are
made erimes: Subsection (1) defines and prohibits the use
of ‘deferred rebates’’; Subsection (2) defines and inter-
diets the use of a ‘fighting ship*’; and Subsection (3) for-
hids any carrier **directly or indireetly”’ to
Retaliate against any shipper by refusing. or threat-
ening to refuse, space accommodations when snel) are
available, or resort to other discriminating or unfair
bic
ORE
i a ae Baik
Bes
SCOR Ra
EARLE RUSLAN, Oe FROIN gE
hs Gael hale Pon Re Br Ae
28
methods, beeause such shipper has patronized any
other carrier or has filed a complaint charging unfair
treatment, or for any other reason.
The inquiry which naturally emerges from thus contrast-
ing the statutory criteria with the practice and effect of
the exclusive patronage contract system is whether the
Board could authorize a coercive rate differential designed
to drive independent competition out of business in the
teeth of a clearly expressed Congressional determination
to preserve independent carriage in our foreign trade.
3. Characteristics of Contract System.
In applying the statutory eriteria to the contract system,
this brief will be addressed to the following characteris
tics of that system which stand conceded on the present
record:
a. For precisely the same transportation service, the
exclusive patronage contract system establishes two sets of
“ates, one of Which is higher by an arbitrary differential of
20 percent ;
b. The sole consideration entitling a shipper to the lower
contract rate in his agreement not to patronize another car-
11er;
c. The higher non-coatract rate is charged a shipper tor
identical transportation service solely b cause he reserves
the right to patronize another carrier ;
d. The shipper is coerced into signing the exelusive pat-
ronage contract to eseape the imposition of the higher nou-
contract rates on that part of his transportation require-
ments which business exigencies require him to seek from
conference carriers using the system; and
e. The effect of the application of the exclusive patronage
system to all commodities moving in the North Atlantic
COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER
99
trade is to monopolize the trade in the hands of the carriers
employing the system.
I.
The Shipping Act of 1916 Was Designed to Preserve
Independent Competition.
The Shipping Act of 1916 represented an attempt by Con-
vress to permit voluntary conferences of carriers subject
to government regulation while at the same time forbidding
indulgence by such conferences in coercive practices de-
signed to eliminate independent aon-conference competi-
tion.
1. Alevander Committee Recommended and Congress
Adopted Ban Against Any Type of Conference Ae-
tivity Designed to Eliminate Independent Competition.
A comparison of the report of the Alexander Committee,”
which conducted the investigation leading to the passage of
the Act, with the statutory prohibitions in Section 14 of
the Act compels the conclusion that the Committee and the
Congress intended to outlaw every type of conference ae-
tivity that might possess utility for eliminating indepen-
dent competition, In its discussion of the subject ‘* Meeting
the Competition of Lines Outside the Conference,’’ the Com-
mittee set forth various methods utilized by conferences to
accomplish this purpose:
a) the deferred rebate system (p. 287);
b) collective competition against a single carrier
through the use of fighting ships (p. 289);
¢) the use of contracts, either jointly or individually
by conference members, which provided preferen-
tial rates in exchange for the shipper’s agreement
not to patronize another earrier (p. 290); and
“Investigation of Shipping Combinations, House Committe
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, H. Ro Dov. 805, 63d Cong
2d Sess. p. 287.
|
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Shay. ad
1 Pe
te BE AK — 2 ha Nem Samet we -~ ries ~yq
30
d) the use of contracts providing preferential rates
based on the volume of shipments (p. 291).
The specific practices outlawed as crimes in Section 14 of
the Act are patterned precisely, both in substane and «
quenee, after the Committee’s enumeration ox deviecs to
eliminate competition:
a) deferred rebates are barred by subsection (1);
b) use of the fighting ship is outlawed in subsection
(2);
¢) discrimination against a shipper for patronizing a
non-conference carrier is prohibited in subsection
(5); and
d) unjust discrimination based on volume of shipments
is forbidden in subsection (4).
In view of this close correlation between Report and Act,
it would appear clear that Congress adopted a scheme of
regulation intended to deal with each of the devices which
had been presented to the Committee as methods for elim-
inating non-Conference competition.
This view is confirmed when the Report of the Committee
is considered in the context of its time. The two standard
techniques for monopetizing ocean earriage prior to World
War I were the exclusive patronage deferred rebate system
and the fighting ship. Of the deferred rebate, the Aley-
ander Committee observed (p. 287), ‘Judging from the
facts produced in the foregoing pages, this method has
proved by far the most effective device for the control of
The hearings and report of the Committee were
.
trade."
largely pre-oceupied with condemning such coercive prae-
tices and devising means for outlawine them. As a result
of the Committee's deliberations and recommendations, the
exclusive patronage deferred rebate and the fighting ship
were categorically banned in Subsections 1 and 2 of Section
14 of the Shipping Aet of 1916."
"In the light of the arguments advaneed here to support the
dual rate system, it is interesting to note that the Alexander
Committee recommended the prohibition of deferred rebates de-
LS ——<£_ << «=< rs
aaa ~ e
i
31
Just prior to the Alexander Committee’s investigation,
however, the Conferences had become concerned lest the ex-
clusive patronage deferred rebate system be held unlawful
in American foreign trade. Consequently, as the Commit-
tee noted (p. 288), ‘tin some eases where such rebates for-
merly existed they have been abandoned*’. As the deferred
rebate system was gradually dropped in our foreign trade,”
it came to be replaced by simple contracts of carriage.
Because of the novelty of such contracts, only sporadic
examples of them were before the Alexander Committee.
Even these few samples appear to be informal memoranda
which ditfered widely one from the other,’ unlike the for-
mal printed instruments employed here.’ In sharp contra-
distinction to the contracts involved in this case, each of
the agreements before the Alexander Committee was an
actual contract of carriage entered into between one or
more carriers and a shipper, which imposed upon the car-
rier (a) a definite obligation to earry, (b) at a rate which
could not be increased for the contract period, often one
year. In many instances, the total tonnage to be carried
Was estimated, and the commodities to which the con-
tract was applieable were named, unlike the contracts here
which are blanket all-commodity contracts. In no instance
did these contraets of carriage impose a penalty of double
freight in the event of breach by the shipper, nor did they
held out the further penalty of automatic application of
spite the faet that it found (p. 288), ‘‘the deferred rebate systems
now in use are equally open to all shippers who agree to give
exclusive patronage, and are granted without discrimination as
regards the size of individual or total shipments.”’
It was never abandoned in other trades and is still, today. the
favorite monopolistic device around the world in trades which do
not touch American shores (R. 314).
“See examples in Appendix B to this Brief.
“The Record reflects that the same printed form was used
miformly not only in this trade, but in all Trans-Atlantic Trades
R. 874-875).
5
Be
:
#
Pitstop eS
Soe
F, REAR RSS ee
a ES!
j2
higher non-contract rates, as do the dual rate contracts
here”?
Because such actual contracts of carriage imposed a
heavy obligation on the carrier to carry the proffered ton-
nage ata fixed rate, they were necessarily of limited utility.
In a calling where charter rates vary widely with the sup-
ply of cargo and bottoms available, it would be inviting
hankruptey for any carrier or group of carriers to contract
in advance to carry the entire tonnage moving in a trade
for any length of time at a fixed rate. Such a burden in
effect tends to operate as an automatie limit on the spread
of such exclusive contracts because good business judgment
militates against carriers obligating themselves to carry
voods beyond their capacity or at rates which could prove
uneconomic. Suel considerations could very well explain
why Congress felt no necessity to outlaw in haee verba
*2 Oveasionally in the 30's Isbrandsten employed simple memo-
randa contracts of earriage of this nature to fight conter-
ence exclusive arrangements. Isbrandtsen discovered — that
after reducing an existing ‘‘paper’’ rate to enable some shipper to
engage in trade, the Conference would steal the fruits of Ishrandt-
sen’s enterprise by granting the shipper a similar rate and tying
him up with an exclusive contract (R. 441-442). To protect
itself, appellee in a few instances asked the shipper to ‘‘confirm”
that in consideration of an actual productive rate, appellee would
receive his business. Thereafter, this reduced rate was available
to all other shippers, regardless of patronage. As Mr. Crinkley tes-
tified (R. 422):
Now, we established this special rate, and this man assures
us of his business. Sooner or later some other company is
eoing to want to ship also, and there is a lot of digging around
about that fact. We establish this rate, and then anybody—
anybody that comes along shipping that commodity gets that
rate. There is no question about it—there cannot be. We have
been in business about 21 or 22 years. TI have been with the
company 19 years. And as an independent carrier, there has
been no time that anybody to my knowledge has ever brought
any complaint, directly or indirectly, that we have been charg-
ine different rates to different shippers on the same commodity
and in the same trade. The Maritime Commission has never
had any complaint to that extent. IT have never had any
complaint made to me.
oe
COPY ROLIND CLOSE IN CENTER
33
exclusive contracts of carriage in the same manner as it
had outlawed deferred rebates and fighting ships.**
It remained for a later generation of carrier interests to
circumvent the prohibition against the exclusive patronage
deferred rebate system by perfecting the present exclusive
patronage contract system as a coercive device for forcing
a slipper to cease patronizing independent carriage. As
the Board, itself, characterized this development (R. 64),
“the dual rate system is the device which has been devel-
oped for that purpose’’, Le, to achieve ‘*something more
than voluntary shipper cooperation”’
Ii any case, the nature of the contracts of carriage be-
fore the Alexander Committee rendered them easily dis-
tinguishable from the pure monopolistic instruments be-
fore this Court. But even as to such Lona fide contracts of
carriage, not one word of approbation appears on the face
of the Alexander Committee's Report. And appellants
have been driven to seeking support in the Committee’s re-
mark (P. 307), “It is argued that the ordinary contract
system does not place the shipper in the position of con-
tinnal dependence that results from the deferred rebate
system’? (emphasis supplied). There is no evidence that
the Committee took any stoek in such an argument even as
ipplied to the simple contracts of carriage before it. As
applied to the formidable dual rate system before this
Court, such an argument is completely unfounded.
If the exclusive patronage contract system accomplishes
its admitted purpose to eliminate independent competition,
it manifestly renders the shipper utterly dependent upon
the conferences for as long as the system funetions. And
such continued dependence would seem to be contemplated
by the contracts themselves. As the Board characterized
the term of these agreements (R, 56): ‘*The agreements
* Of course, absent the invidious features of the system involved
here, full requirements contracts may have legitimate utility in
foreign trade as in other fields. Cf. Standard Oil of Cal. v. United
States, 337 U. S. 293, 306 (1949).
34
shall continue in effect throughout consecutive subsequent
years subject to the right of either the shipper or the ear-
rier to terminate it as of December 31 in any year by giving
the other party 90 days’ written notice of termination”.
““But’’, as the court below noted (R. 128) ‘‘the very pur-
pose of the dual rate provisions is, if possible, to compel
independent shippers (sic: carriers) to join the conference
or go out of business. If, then, the dual rate system pro-
vision is successful, there will be no independent carriers”.
Absent independent carriage in the trade, the ‘‘right’’ of
the shipper to cancel is completely lacking in substance.
Furthermore, because the exclusive patronage dual rate
system holds out to the shipper the promise of an advance
discount, its impact upon the trade is more immediate than
that of the deferred rebate. Many a small shipper finds a
discount in hand worth two in the future. Consequently,
the effect of the exclusive patronage contract system in
foreclosing the market to the independent carrier is, if
anything, more devasting than the impact of the deferred
rebate, and the result of its suecessful functioning is to
leave the shipper, if possible, more dependent on the cor-
ferences.
Thus, even if Congress had done no more in the Shipping
Act of 1916 than outlaw the exclusive patronage deferred
rebate system, its modern counterpart, the exclusive pa-
tronage dual rate system, would enjoy a very dubious
legitimacy. On the record here, the difference between the
exclusive patronage deferred rebate and the exclusive pa-
tronage contract system is largely a difference between &
deferred rebate and a preferred rebate. As this Court ree
ognized in Swayne & Hoyt v. United States, 300 U. S. 2%,
207 (1927), the operation of the exclusive patronage colt
tract system ‘‘does not differ substantially from that ot
‘deferred rebates’ ”’.
Forearmed with knowledge of man’s inventive genius,
however, Congress did not rest content with simply out-
lawing explicitly the two practices which bulked large 1
COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER
30
‘ts consciousness in 1916 and trusting to judicial alertness
co outlaw similar practices by implieation. It went further
and outlawed every other method that might conceivably
he devised to penalize a shipper for patronizing any other
carrier. After the notable example of the suecessful statu-
‘ory attempt to outlaw restraints of every type and kind
in the Sherman Act,** Congress, in the first two subsections
of Section 14 of the Shipping Act of 1916, forbade the
known means of monopolizing trade, the fighting ship and
the deferred rebate, and in the third subsection sought to
‘nsure the effectiveness of these prohibitions by banning
any other attempts to reach the same end, even though such
attempts might not have been wholly embraced in subsec-
tions Land 2. In subsection 3, the Congress provided that:
No common earrier by water shall, directly or indi-
rectly * * *
Third. Retaliate against any shipper by refusing, or
threatening to refuse, space accommodations when
such are available, or resort to other diseriminating or
unfair methods, because such shipper has patronized
any other carrier or has filed a complaint charging un-
fair treatment, or for any other reason.
Under this subsection, the Congress soueht to outlaw
every attempt to penalize a shipper for patronizing an
independent carrier. While the dual-rate system had not
(Ff. United States V. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911) where
this Court harmonized Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act in the
following terms:
In other words, having by the first section forbidden all means
of monopolizing trade, that is, unduly restraining it by means
of every contract, combination, ete., the second section seeks, if
possible, to make the prohibitions of the act all the more coi-
plete and perfect by embracing all attempts to reach the end
prohibited by the first section, that is, restraints of trade, by
any attempt to monopolize, or monopolization thereof, even
although the acts by which such results are attempted to be
brought about be not embraced within the genera’ enumera-
tion of the first section.
eee. |
SRI ETS Oh TEE EIS
ofRron
36
in 1916 matured to the point where experience revealed to
Congress its identity with the deferred rebate system, nev-
ertheless in the blanket prohibition in Subsection 3 against
every form of retaliatory discrimination, the Congress
sought to reach every adaptation of the deferred rebate
designed to produce the same result. And insofar as the
‘ordinary’? contracts of carriage before the Alexander
Cominittee alerted it to their possible future use as a sub-
terfuge to eseape the ban against deferred rebates, the
Congressional history reveals that Section 14(3) was
drafted to prevent the metamorphosis of such “ordinary”
contracts of carrfage into the monopolistic devices before
this Court.
Of course, the Committee could not interdict every ‘“‘ordi-
nary contract of carriage’? because every bill of lading is
a contract of carriage, and, as we have seen, the contracts
employed prior to 1914 had not risen to the indignity of
the modern exclusive patronage dual rate system. The
lack of an invidious label to pinpoint the object of its solici-
tude did not, however, make the Congressional interest any
less keen or its intent any less clear: in Section 14(3) it
sought to reach every discriminatory device, contract or
otherwise, designed to retaliate against a shipper for pa-
tronizing any other carrier or for any other reason, In
fact, if the reference in the section to retaliation by ‘resort
to other discrimintatory or unfair methods’? is not to be
disregarded as surplusage, it must necessarily be read as
covering practices not prohibited by name. No other view
is consistent with the remarkable correlation between the
four types of devices considered by the Committee under
the caption ** Meeting the Competition of Lines Outside the
Conference?’ and the four types of devices banned by Con-
eress in Seetion 14.
Thus, in Section 14, read in its entirety, the Congress
embodied a mandate to its administrative agents to pre-
serve independent non-conference carriage against each
and every device that might be employed by a conference
COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER
37
to eliminate such competition. In short, the Congressional
scheme contemplated the establishment of voluntary con-
ference arrangemeuts, but absolutely forbade the conver-
sion of such voluntary agreements into involuntary ones
through the use of coercive devices with the purpose and
effect of eliminating independent non-conference compe-
tition.
2. Ban Against Elimination of Non-Conference Competi-
tion Required by Regulatory Scheme.
This legislative and administrative scheme was required
by the facts. For a host of reasons Congress deliberately
abandoned the attempt to impose upon ocean trade the
same discipline of detailed government regulation that it
had adopted for common carriers in the domestic field.
The Alexander Report (pp. 420-421) had recommended that
the Interstate Commerce Commission be authorized to
investigate the rates of all carriers, including those in for-
eign commerce, and to order their ‘‘rates changed if con-
vinced that the rate under consideration is unreasonably
high". The Report explained this recommendation by
saying that ‘‘the Committee feels that in the absence of
government control steamship combinations may in many
instances have it within their power to arbitrarily raise
rates to an unreasonable degree both as regards the gen-
eral level and in the case of particular commodities * * * .
(The) purpose of the law should be to protect the shipper
against any unreasonably high rate whieh the combination
lines may have within their power, by virtue of their agree-
ments and conference arrangements, arbitrarily to impose
in the absence of government supervision and control.”
Congress partly accepted this recommendation in See. 817,
by there giving the original Shipping Board the express
power to order just and reasonable maximum rates with
respect to interstate water-carriers. But Congress omitted
any such provision as to carriers in foreign commerce: as
ihe
2
5
F
bs
4
Press"
Fre ee ae
ANSE
Td SA tts es
OP RRS LIRR ILE IND SF,
38
to such carriers, there is only the statutory power to for-
bid discrimination in rates.
On the face of the Shipping Act, Congress thus endowed
the administrative agents with no authority to pass upon
the reasonableness of rates. Unlike the practice under the
Interstate Commeree Act, regulation under the Shipping
Act requires only that rates on cargo outbound from the
United States shall be filed with the Board within 30 days
after the effective date thereof While the Board has
from time to time contended for an implied power under
Section 15 to regulate the reasonableness of conference
rates, **there are no decisions of the Board or its prede-
cessors which imposed maximum rates on conference ear-
riers engaged in foreign commerce’’.*° Failing to place
plenary rate powers in the hands of its administrative
agents, the solicitude of Congress to protect the continued
existence of independent non-conference competition is
understandable. That Congress’ purpose in this respect
has been largely fulfilled is confirmed by the Examiner, who
found that down through the years Isbrandtsen “has
effectively acted as a check on respondents’ [Conferences]
rates and services’? (R. 261).
Approval of the exclusive patronage contract system
would thus eliminate the last effective independent check
on conference rates and services without any substitute
therefor in the Congressional scheme of regulation. Such
2 result would do violence to all our traditienal notions of
‘usiness morality. As Judge Frank commented in his
appendix to the decision below (R. 138):
Competition is cherished by the common law (and
safeguarded by the anti-trust laws) in large part for
the purpose of protecting consumers from unreason-
ably high prices or rates likely to result from monop-
oly or unreasonable restraint of trade. Therefore,
46 C.F. R. 235.1, 235.2; no similar requirement applies to in-
1
bound cargo,
“* Letter of Board to Court below (R. 144).
COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER
39
whenever any of our governments has, by statute, insu-
lated anyone from all competition in the same indus-
try—as, for example, by a grant of an exclusive fran-
chise—it has coupled the grant with the establishment
—as a substitute for competition as a price-regulator—
of a governmental agency empowered to fix reasonable
inaxiimum prices or rates. A legally sanctioned com-
plete monopoly, minus such regulation, is virtually un-
precedented.
The most recent Congressional solution of the thorny
problem posed by the attempt to regulate monopolies
merely confirms this view. In adopting the Bulwinkle Bill
(49 U.S. C. $ 5b), which authorized regulated rate confer-
ences of domestie common carriers, the Congress specifi-
‘ally prohibited the employment of coercive devices by such
conferences by forbidding the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission to approve any agreement which did not preserve
to each party ‘‘the free and unrestrained right to take in-
dependent action’? at any time. The Bulwinkle Bill merely
represents the latest declaration by Congress that coercive
activities by private groups will not be countenanced—even
in a field of regulation where the activities of those groups
is supervised by administrative authority in the most
minute detail. It is a singular argument, indeed, that would
suggest that Congress would approve such coercive activity
in a field where the supervisory powers of the public reeu-
latory body are as limited as those of the Board under the
Shipping Act. A decent respect for the history of the legis-
lative process in these matters, as well as for the explicit
statutory language of Section 14, compels the conclusion
that the Shipping Act of 1916 was purposely designed by
Congress to preserve non-conference competition. As
James F. Byrnes, a member of the Alexander Committee,
characterized the purpose of the Act during the debates on
the floor 7
764 Core Ree. 8057.
NRE LM el
SERS RUE RPO ees
40
The regulatory features of this bill are agreed to by
all fair-minded men. They are designed simply to en-
able an independent ship-owner to carry on his busi-
ness, wihiout having the shipping trust drive him out
by discriminatory or unfair practices.
It is incredible to suppose, as appellants argue, that Con-
gress should go to extremes in condemning deferred rebates
and fighting ships and at the same time authorize an even
more subtle and effective monopolistic weapon in the form
of the exclusive patronage dual rate system. As this Court
remarked in Swayne & Hoyt v. United States, 300 U.S. 297,
307 :
The policy of the statute may properly be applied
where, as in the cireumstances of this case, the contract
system must be taken as actually operating to effect a
monopoly.
5 II.
The Exclusive Patronage Contract System Retaliates
Against a Shipper for Patronizing Other Carriers.
It is almost a work of pure supererogation to arene the
application to the facts of this case of the Shippine Act's
express prohibition against retaliation or resort to diserim-
inatory methods against a shipper ‘because such shipper
has patronized any other carrier.’ Because the svstem,
under examination here, proposed on and after November
1, 1948 to impose an arbitrary 20 percent increase in
rates upon any shipper who continued after that date to
patronize a non-conference line, the proposed system clearly
undertook to impose a retaliatory discrimination against
such shipper for patronizing a non-conference carrier.
The sole function of the dual rate system is to prevent
shippers who would otherwise patronize Isbrandtsen frem
doing so. While the Board has conjured up a mythical
shipper, unnamed by the Board and unidentified in the ree-
ord, who would refuse to contract while continuing to deal
CODY ROMIAIM CR MoOCO ral Co ereoceo
ae
41
with the Conference lines exclusively, the dual rate system
is plainly devised to deal with those shippers whom ex-
perience has shown would deal with Isbrandtsen if allowed
a free choice of carriage. As to such shippers, the mere
establishment of the system would have been retaliation for
their past independence. The system is further designed
to hold them in line thereafter by threatening them with
retaliation if they again patronize Isbrandtsen and by
actually retaliating against them if they do. Thus, a ship-
per who has been induced to sign a contract is on notice that
if he patronizes an independent he will thereafter be sub-
jected to the higher rates The subsequent exaction of the
higher rate from a shipper who breaches his contraet can
only be regarded as retaliation for patronizing another
arrier.”
Moreover, the system not only retaliates against a ship-
per for patronizing an independent: it undertakes to punish
the shipper who even contemplates the possibility of pa-
tronizine such a earrier, By undertaking actually to im-
pose a substantially increased rate on shippers who refuse
to agree not to patronize Isbrandtsen, the system practices
a clear retaliation for their act of independence. And since
this act of independence consists only of the shippers’ in-
sistence upon their right to deal with an independent, re-
taliation for such insistence is clearly retaliation under a
statute which prohibits earriers from “directly or indi-
“And it should be remembered that the Board made such retalia-
tion mandatory (supra, p. 12).
“The Examiner sought to escape the dilemma posed by the
shipper who is compelled to pay the higher non-contract rate as a
“onsequence of breaching his contract. by suggesting that sueh sub-
sequent imposition ef the higher rate was merely a penalty for
breach of contract (R. 217). The appellee, however, pointed out
that the contract provided its own penalty for breach, namely,
twice the freight that would have been paid under the contract,
and that such double freight penalty could not be construed as
“liquidated damages’’ for breach, if other penalties were lurking
about in the system. Thereupon, the Examiner dropped the argu-
ment and the Board did not mention it.
42
rectly’ retaliating against a shipper for patronizing any
other carrier.
The Board sought to escape the force of the statutory
prohibition by resort to a sheer verbalization: that the
higher rate was charged for refusal to sign a contract,
rather than as retaliation for ‘patronizing any other car-
rier.’ The Board could searcely be serious in suggesting
that the Conferences regard the mere signing of the exclu-
sive contracts as significant. Of course, the Conference
members are uot interested in a mere paper transaction—
they are concerned only in preventing shippers from pa-
tronizing their non-Conference competitors. In essence,
the argument comes down to this: The Conferences do
not charge a shipper the higher rate because he deals with
a competitor; they simply charge the higher rate because
he will not agree to deal with them exclusively. It is a suf-
ficient response to this contention to refer to the Act itself,
which not only prohibits retaliation because the shipper
deals with another carrier, but prohibits as well retaliation
“for any other reason,”’
The argument of the Board scarcely merits more consid-
eration here than did a similar argument advanced to this
Court in International Business Machines Corp. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 131, 135 (1936). There the defendant con-
tended that it had not violated the Clayton Act’s prohibi-
tion against leasine machines on the condition that the les-
see “not deal in the goods of a competitor’? because it only
leased its machines on the simple condition that the lessee
purchase all of his requirements from the defendants. In
dismissing such a contention, this Court observed:
Little need be said of the contention that the condi-
tion of appellant’s leases does not infringe these prohi-
tions. It is true that the condition is not in so many
words against the use of the cards of a competitor, but
is affirmative in form, that the lessee shall use only ap-
pellant’s eards in the leased machines. But as the les-
see can make no use of the cards except with the leased
machines, and the specified use of appellant’s cards
PFPrmDYyY DOMIIAIM @RrMCO th CoC aro oO
43
precludes the use of the cards of any competitor, the
condition operates in the manner forbidden by the
statute.
If it be assumed, as the Board suggested (R. 61-62), that
in Section 14(5) Congress meant to codify the common law
set forth in Menacho v. Ward, 27 Fed, 529, 533 (C. C. N. Y.,
1886), the Board’s position becomes completely indefen-
sible, for in the Menacho case the Circuit Court held:
The proposition is speciously put that the carrier
may reasonably discriminate two classes of shippers,
the regular and the casual; and that such is the only
discrimination here. Undoubtedly the carrier may
adopt a commutative system, whereby those who fur-
nish him regular traffic may obtain reduced rates, just
as he may properly regulate his charges upon the basis
of the quantity of traffic which he receives from differ-
ent classes of shippers. But this is not the proposition
to be discussed. The defendants assume to discrimi-
nate against the complainants, not because they do ne
furnish them a regular business, or a given number of
shipments, or a certain quantity of merchandise to
carry, but because they refuse to patronize the defen-
dants exclusively, * * *
The vice of discrimination here is that it is ealeu-
lated to coerce all those who have occasion to employ
common carriers between New York and Cuba from
employing such agencies as may offer. Its tendency
ix to deprive the public of their legitimate opportunities
to obtain carriage on the best terms they can. If it is
tolerated, it will result practically in giving the defen-
dants a monopoly of the carrying trade between these
places. Manifestly, it is enforced by the defendants in
order to discourage all others from attempting to serve
the publie as carriers between these places. Suel dis-
crimination is not only unreasonable, but is odious.
The Board purported to take some comfort from the fact
that in the Menacho ease, tie Cireuit Court further ob-
served:
The defendants, to maintain the affirmative, assert that
their charges are fair because they do not have the
_—
a LA aT ELA Ree A AOU BE ABE AA be een ee ee ee
44
whole of the complainants’ carrying business. But it
can never be material to consider whether the carrier
ix permitted to enjoy a monopoly of the transportation
for a particular individual, or class of individuals, in
ascertaining what is reasonable compensation for serv-
ices actually rendered to him or them. Such a consid
eration might be influential in inducing parties to con-
tract in advance; but it has no legitimate bearing upon
the value of services rendered without a special con-
tract, or which are rendered because the law requires
them to be rendered for a fair remuneration.
‘
The Board emphasized the phrase “‘such a contract
might be influential in inducing parties to contract in ad-
rance’ and construed it as an acknowledgment by the
Court of the lawfulness of the dual rate system However,
the Board ignored the phrase ‘‘or which are rendered be-
cause the law requires them to be rendered for a fair re-
muneration’’. It would seem clear that the Cireuit Court
was distinguishing between private commercial dealings
and those pertaining to common carriers whose obligation
it is to serve all comers equally. This view is confirmed by
the context in which the Cireuit Court made the observa-
tion relied on by the Board. Immediately following the
section of the opinion quoted by the Board, the Court re-
marked :
A common carrier ‘‘is in the exercise of a sort of
public office, and has publie duties to perform, from
which he should not be permitted to exonerate him-
self,’’ Nelson, J., in New Jersey Steam Nar. Co. ¥.
Merchants’ Bank, 6 How. 344. His obligation and lia-
bilities are not dependent upon contract, though they
may be modified and limited by contract. * * * It is
upon this foundation, and not alone because the husi-
ness of common carriers is so largely controlled by
corporations exereising under franchises the privi-
leges which are held in trust for the public benefit,
that the courts have so strenuously resisted their at-
tempts, by special contracts or unfair preferences, 10
discriminate between those whom it is their duty te
COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER
45
serve impartially. And the courts are especially so-
licitous to discountenance all contracts or arrange-
ments by these public servants which savor of a pur-
pose to stifle competition or repress rivalry in the de-
partments of business in which they ply their vocation.
The Menacho ease manifestly stands for the proposition
for which the Board’s predecessor, the Shipping Board,
cited it in Eden Mining Co. y. Blucfields Fruit & S. S. Co..
1U.S.S. B. 41 (1922) in construing Sections 16 and 17 of
the Shipping Act of 1916: ‘* the purpose of Coneress in
enacting these provisions of the statute was to impose upon
common carriers within the purview thereof the duty of
charging uniform rates to all shippers who receive a simi-
lar transportation service.’™
In sum, it is difficult to believe that rational beines could
differ as to whether the charging of a hicher rate for simi-
lar transportation service against a shipper who continues
to deal with a non-conference carrier violates the policy of
the Act to prevent retaliation against a shipper for pa-
tronizing such independent exrriet
ee
.. there is no canon
against using common sense in reading a criminal] law, so
that strained and technieal constructions do not defeat its
purpose ...’" (Kordel v. U. S., 335 U.S. 345, 349 (1948).
III.
The Exclusive Patronage Contract System Is a Discrimina-
tory Method Designed to Retaliate Against a Shipper
for Patronizing Another Carrier.
It is conceded that the exclusive patronage dual rate sys-
tem establishes different rates for identical transportation
The Menacho ease has had a variable experience before the
Board and its predecessors. As noted, the Eden case velied upon it
for the proposition that the dual rate system was. unlawful: in
Pacifie Coast European Conference, 3 USMC 11 (1947). the Com-
mission treated the Menacho case as having been made irrelevant by
the statute; and, in the instant ease, it is cited by the Board as
authority for the proposition that the dual rate system is lawful.
ne Na Le SE ee as MESS PR EC Se
46
services. That such a system discriminates against the nop.
contract shipper who is charged a higher rate is scarcely
open to argument. Interstate Commerce Commission y.
Mechling, 830 U.S. 567, 581 (1947). As this Court recently
observed in Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. United
States, 340 U.S. 216, 227 (1951):
In the Mechling case, the Commission had fixed a
rate for transportation of wheat east by rail from Chi-
cago at a rate higher if it arrived in Chieago by barge
than if by rail or lake. This was a plain case of dis-
crimination, There were different rates provided for
equal service without any showing that any additional
service was rendered for the additional charge.
Furthermore, the precise type of differential involved here
was held in Swayne d& Hoyt v. United States, supra," to be
‘prima facie discriminatory since the two rates were
charged for identical services and facilities.’
This was the precise issue tendered by respondent to the
Board. As the Board observed (R. 56):
The gist of Ishrandtsen’s argument is that the system
Violates statutory provisions in that it sets up dual
rates for the same service and thereby necessarily ere-
ates discrimination between those shippers who sign
and those who refuse. Isbrandtsen claims that it makes
no difference that such discrimination may not be w-
reasonable or unjust, contrary to the requirements of
sections 15, 16, and 17 of the Act. It points ont that
the language of Section 14(3) of the Act, unlike that of
the other sections referred to, outlaws not only wired:
sonable discrimination but all discrimination. Relying
on dicta of the Supreme Court in Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd.
* Because the Swayne & Hoyt ease involved an administrative
holding that the dual rate system was unreasonably discriminatory
in violation of Section 16 of the Act, this Court could not rest in
that case on a holding that the system was discriminatory but was
compelled to go further and hold it unreasonably so. A lesser
burden is obviously involved here under 14(3) whieh forbids any
discrimination which retaliates against a shipper for patronizing
another carrier,
COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER
47
v. U. S., 800 U.S. 297, complainant concludes that a
prima facie case of discrimination has been made out,
which may not be excused on any showing of reason-
ableness.
This was a correct statement of the contentions of appel-
lee. However, instead of deciding whether the exclusive
patronage contract system was discriminatory, in violation
of Section 14, sub-section 3, as distinguished from Sections
16 and 17, the Board actually decided, in effect, that the
system did not violate Sections 16 and 17. This the Board
accomplished by the simple expedient. of importing the
qualifying adverb ‘‘unduly’’ from Sections 16 and 17 and
insinuating it into Section 14(3)—an unwarranted qualifi-
cation which Congress specifically omitted from Section
14(3) at the time of its enactment.
The fact is that, in this very respect, Congress sienifi-
cantly deviated from the Alexander Report’s recommenda-
tions. The Report (p. 421) recommended that “all car-
riers should be prohibited from retaliatine awainst any
shipper by refusing space accommodations when such are
available, or by resorting to other unfair methods of dis-
“rimination, beeause such shipper has patronized an inde-
pendent line, or has filed a complaint charging unfair treat.
nent, or for any other reason’’, This recommendation was
‘efore the Committees which, in the next session, brought
out the bill which became the 1916 Act. Sut the bill and
the Act importantly departed from the recommendation of
the Alexander Report. Section S14(3) substituted for the
recommended words ‘other unfair methods of diserin:ina-
tion’ the words ‘other discriminating or unfair methods ‘
And confirming the fact that this alteration was not inad-
vertent, this chanee in language was concomitant with
‘nother important deviation from the Alexander Report.
In its fourth recommendation to Congress, the Committee
had advised:
—_.,
* See Sen. Rep. No, 689, 64th Cong., Ist Sess., 10-11,
= ee ee Se ae Ae A Ne LDA AGO GALE A PRIS Ss LE a AAPL D LE LSA i ee
48
In this connection, it is the belief of the Committee
that water carriers should be required to charge equal
rates to all shippers irrespective of the volume of
freight offered for shipment.
In short, the Committee omitted from its fourth recom-
mendation the reasonableness concept imported by the
words ‘undue’? and ‘‘unjust’’, and recommended the pro-
hibition of any inequality of rates. However, the bill which
was introduced and enacted by Congress significantly de-
parted from this advice by incorporating the reasonable-
ness concept into Section 14(4):
Fourth. (No earrier) shall make any unfair or un-
justly discriminatory contract with any shipper based
on the volume of freight offered, or unfairly treat or
5 unjustly diseriminate against any shipper.
In this fashion, Congress made the prohibition against
discrimination in 14(3) peremptory bat required that the
diserimination in 14(4) be unjust, in both cases contrary to
the recommendation of the Alexander Report—thus demon-
stratine that it knowingly and deliberately deleted ‘un-
fair’’ in Section 14(3). In the face of this clear-cut expres-
sion of Congressional intent, the Board’s reinsertion in
a Section 14(3) of the qualification which Congress omitted
represented a usurpation by the Board of legislative au-
thority.
Of course, the distinetion between discrimination and un-
due or unjust discrimination is a familiar one in the field
ef common carrier regulation. Hocking Valley v. United
* States, 210 Fed. 735 (6th Cir., 1914), cert. den. 234 U.S. 757
4 (1919): Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 22 F.
3 Supp. 533, 538 N. D. N. Y. (1937); State of New York v.
United States, 331 U. S. 284 (1947). As Judge Learned
Hand, speaking for a three-judge statutory court, observed
in the Baltimore & Ohio ease, supra, which involved a simi-
lar distinetion under the Interstate Commerce Act:
COPY ROLIND CLOSE IN CENTER
49
Subdivision 1, as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 3(1), gen-
erally forbids a carrier to discriminate unduly or
unreasonably in any way between one person, ‘‘loeal-
ity, port, port district, gateway, transit point’? and
another. It does not, and could not, impose a peremp-
tory prohibition in such cases; the discrimination must
be ‘undue or unreasonable’’; discriminations are not
per se unlawful, their occasion must be examined. That
is not true of discriminations under subdivision three,
which is peremptory, and admits no excuses; carriers
must not discriminate in rates between connecting
lines.
The Board sought to justify this unwarranted tampering
with the statutory language by suggesting that such a
joard amendment of the statute was ‘‘possibly’’ in the
interest of harmonizing 14(3) with the language in other
sections of the statute (R. 60). But the Board achieved
such harmony only at the cost of reading 14(3) completely
out of the Act. If the discrimination is undue under See-
tions 16 or 17, nothing is added by the fact that it is also re-
taliatory under Section 14. The only way Section 14(3) can
he accorded independent vitality in harmony with the other
sections of the Act is to read it as Congress wrote it—to
prohibit any retaliatory discrimination whatsoever against
a shipper for patronizing another carrier or for any other
reason. Thus read, the section engenders no conflict with
Sections 15, 16 or 17 of the Act, each of which were designed
to incorporate the ordinary regulatory provisions against
unjust or undue preference or prejudice between shippers,
ports and localities.
To read the Act as the Board suggested would he to rob
Section 14(3) of all meaning in violation of the familiar
canon of construction that no clause of an Aet ean be pre-
‘med to he without effect. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
87 (1803). To convert the peremptory prohibition in
14(3) into the qualified prohibitions in 15, 16 and 17, is
flatly to ignore the clearly expressed Congressional pro-
hibition axainst retaliatory discrimination of every type
5 DL GEL OR A PAR Ie CA Se RR ETA AOS ONAN AES OMIA S TE GEL A Bs
00
and kind and to attempt to shelter behind administrative
expertise a flatly forbidden discrimination. Jxterstat
Commerce Commission v. Mechling, supra. To read the
Act as Congress wrote it permits the Shipping Act of 1916
to remain as a harmonious whole. More importantly, such
an interpretation of the Act permits the ready effectuation
of the Congressional policy, to protect independent ear-
riage by outlawing all relatiatory discriminations against
shippers seeking to patronize such carriage.
But even if the Board’s reconstruction of Section 14(5)
be aceepted and the Section be interpreted as prohibiting
only retaliation which is unjustly discriminatory, the
Loard’s position is scarcely improved. For then the Board
is faeed with the question that troubled the court below:
how ean a dual rate system constructed by means of an
arbitrary differential be just or reasonable in any cireum-
stances. The only permissible answer is the one supplied
by the Chairman of the very Conferences responsible for
the dual rate system involved here (R. 861):
I do not think the making of rates by differential is a
proper basis, for that is an arbitrary basis.
IV.
Congress Left the Commission No Discretion to Approve a
Dual Rate System Which Works a Retaliatory Dis-
crimination Against a Shipper for Patronizing Another
Carrier.
While the Board sought support for its position in reli-
ance on the decisions of its predecessors, those decisions,
as the Court below noted (R. 130) ‘‘have lacked uniform-
ity and consisteney.’? Of the seven decisions in which the
Board and its predecessors dealt principally with the law-
fulness of the dual rate system,** four have held the system
unlawful.
38 Ay distinguished from several other decisions where the law-
fulness of the system was only ancillary to the right of a com-
plaining carrier to gain admission to the Conference.
COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER
ew
Oe sc oa cae eal
ol
The first case to consider the question was Eden Mining
Co. v. Bluefield’s Fruit, supra, decided in 1922, at a time
when the Board’s predecessors were considerably closer
than the present Board to the Congressional response to
the public indignation which led to the passage of the Ship-
ping Act of 1916. In the Eden case, the Shipping Board
held:
It is evident that the purpose of Congress in enact-
ing these provisions of the statute was to impose upon
common earriers within the purview thereof the duty
of charging uniform rates to all shippers receiving a
similar trans’ ~rtation service. The duty of the re-
spondent uw ¢ these sections was to serve the public
impartially ad we think the language used in W. U.
Tel. Co. vs all Pub. Co., 181 U.S. 92, in dealing with
a similar statute, is entirely applicable to the case in
hand. The court there said: ‘All individuals have
equal rights both in respect to service and charges.
Of course such equality of right does not prevent dif-
ferences in the modes and kinds of service and different
charges based thereon. But that principle of equality
does forbid any difference in charge which is not based
upon difference in service, and even when based upon
differences of service must have some reasonable rela-
tion to the amount of difference and cannot he so great g
as to produce an unjust discrimination.’’ From the .
facts of record in the ease before us it is manifest that B
the transportation service furnished the complainants i
and contract shippers was in all respects identical. ¢
Tt is suggested on behalf of the carrier that as the
complainants were extended full opportunity to avail
themselves of the lower rates by agreeing to the same
condition which contract shippers had aeeepted, they
were accorded the substantial eaualitv of treatment
contemplated by sections 16 and 17 of the Act. This
contention, however, is as uneonvineing here as when
used in support of other kinds of nnjust disertmination
resulting from unfair conditions imposed hv carriers
unon shippers. Under the statute, the complainants,
as memhers of the shipping public, were entitled to
have their shipments earried at the same rates as other
patrons who received identical service. This rieht at-
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tached to each individual transportation transaction as
such, and was not to be predicated upon any condition
imposed by the respondent restricting the complain-
ants’ freedom of choice as to what carrier or earriers
they should elect to patronize in connection with sub-
sequent shipments.
The Shipping Board’s condemnation of the exclusive
patronage contract system in the Eden case was followed
by the Shipping Board Bureau in Intercoastal Investiga-
tion, 1 U.S.S.B.B. 400 (1935), where it was held:
An underlying purpose of the Shipping Act, 1916,
is to prevent every form of favoritism based upon the
relations of the shipper with the carrier as a customer
and to place all shippers, the large and small, the
steady and occasional, upon a plane of equality in the
right to service, For this reason that Act condemns
and makes unlawful every regulation, device, or subter-
fuge which undertakes to give to anyone an advantage
based upon conditions other than those inhering in the
transportation itself and alone. Contracts of the char-
acter in question do not constitute a transportation
condition as to warrant a difference in transportation
rates,
The prohibition of discrimination means, among
other things, that no difference or distinetion shall be
made in rates that coerce the public to employ one com-
petitor to the exclusion of another, or deprive one com-
petitor of business which under freedom of selection
by the publie would be given to it, and thus create a
monopoly in favor of another competitor.
To the same effect as the holding in the Intercoastal In-
vestigation was the decision of the same Bureau in Gulf
3 Intercoastal Contract Rates, 1 U.S.S.B.B. 524, which was
3 affirmed by this Court sub nom Swayne & Hoyt, supra.
: Relying on the decisions of its predecessors set forth
5 ahove, the Commission in Contract Routing Restrictions.
& 2 U.S.M.C. 220 (1939), again held that the contract rate
oI
at
system in foreign commerce was unlawful:
Pe. ee ee ee 2 ee Se ee ee a ea ke et ek
ro
vo
o
Since they carry more than 80 percent of the traffic
from the Great Lakes area, it is obvious that respond-
ents, for all practical purposes, have a monopoly. A
difference in rates for identical services based solely
upon whether or not the carrier secures the shipper’s
entire patronage is prima facie discriminatory. (Em-
phasis supplied.)
As the Contract Routing case demonstrated, the criterion
employed by the Board’s predecessors in outlawing the
exclusive patronage contract system has been, not the na-
ture of the commerce, whether foreign or intercoastal. but
the monopolistic nature of the system. If, as the Commis-
sion held in the Contract Routing Restrictions case, ‘a
difference in rates for identical services based solely upon
whether or not the carrier secures the shipper’s entire pa-
tronage is prima facie discriminatory,’’ then the exclusive
patronage contract system is necessraily discriminatory,
and in violation of Section 14 of the Act.
With scarcely more than a passing nod at the four clear-
eut holdings by its predeeessors against the exclusive pa-
tronage contract system (R. 59), the Board singled out for
emphasis two other decisions, Rawleigh v. Stoomvaart, et
al. 1 U.S.S.B.B. 285 (1933) and Pacific Coast European
Conference, 3 U.S.M.C. 11 (1948), which held the dual rate
system lawful. In fact, the Board substantially adopted
the rationalization of the Pacific Coast ease as a basis for
its decision here (R. 57, 58).
Whatever the respective merits of these contradictory
holdings by the Board’s predecessors may be, they at least
establish such an inconsistent course of administrative ac-
tion as to render the administrative interpretations of little
weight here. American Surety v. Bethlehem Bank. 314
U.S. 314, 319 (1941); United States v. Missouri Pacific R.
Co., 278 U.S. 269, 280 (1929).
However, even if the course of administrative interpre-
tation had been completely unambiguous, uniform, and con-
sistent in its support of the dual rate svstem, the decision
of the Board here could not stand in the teeth of the clear
pea aaitna, ike Ie 3
statutory proscription of retaliation through the use of dis-
criminatory methods against a shipper for patronizing an-
other carrier. United States v. Missourt Pacific R. Co.,
supra; Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 88, 89 (1940);
Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 97 (1941). As this
Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, ob-
served in the Mitchell case, supra:
On the facts here presented, there is no room, as the
Government properly says, for administrative or ex-
pert judgment with respect to practieal difficulties. It
is enough that the discrimination shown was palpably
unjust and forbidden by the Act.
As noted above, the determinative facts are largely ad-
mitted on the record, and accordingly there is no factual
issue here on which this Court might feel bound by the
administrative judgment as was the ease in United States
v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 310 U. S. 344 (1940).
In this case, we have a dual rate system which can
have no conceivable function except to force shippers
to use conference lines instead of independent earriers.
There may be reasonable differences of opinion as to the
wisdom of such a policy, but not as to the certainty of its
result; and Congress, as noted above, has 1aade the policy
judgment and has flatly forbidden the Board to do what it
has done. Here the situation is analogous to Mitchell v.
United States, supra, where another administrative body
sought to shelter a flatly forbidden discrimination behind
the cloak of expertise. There, as here, the Court was re-
ferred to United States v. Chicago Heights, supra, and a
host of other decisions upholding the right of administra-
tive agencies to make factual judgments. But, as noted
above, this Court answered that no administrative or ex-
pert judgment could serve to justify a discrimination for-
bidden by the Act. And such, it is submitted, must be the
answer of the Court here.
a3)
CONCLUSION.
Since 1931, Isbrandtsen has been engaged in plying the
North Atlantic trade routes as an independent common
carrier. During the entire period, Isbrandtsen has been
engaged in fair and open competition with the Conference
lines, and the shipping publie has been well served by the
presence in the trade of this independent check on confer-
ence rates and services. In the light of this history, it
would seem rather late in the day for the Conferences to
come forward with the suggestion that it is in the in-
terest of an independent American Merchant Marine for
a foreign-flag dominated conference to be endowed with
power to deny an American flag carrier equal access to
American shippers—and this in the teeth of the Shipping
Act of 1916, in which Congress embodied a policy designed
to preserve independent non-Conference carriage. To ef-
fectuate this policy, as well as to preserve the benefits of
independent competition for the shipping public, this Court
should affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Respectfully submitted,
Joun J. O’Connor
Washington Building
Washington 5, D. C.
Witiuiam L. McGovern
1200 Eighteenth Street, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.
Counsel for Appellee
Arxoutp, Forras & Porter
1200 Eighteenth Street, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.
Of Counsel
January 21, 1952.
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APPENDIX A.
North Atlantic Baltic Freight Conference
North Atlantie Continental Freight Conference
North Atlantic French Atlantic Freight Conference
North Atlantie U. K. Freight Conference
SO Broad Street
New York 4, N. Y.
Telephone Whitehall 4-0990 Cable Tranconfer
October 1, 1948
To Merchant Shippers:
(ientlemen:
Enclosed please find, for your prompt acceptance, offer
of contracts for the period November 1, 1948 to December
1, 1949.
It is important that advice of acceptance of these con-
tracts is in the hands of the Carriers promptly. This will
avoid application of the higher non-contract rates of the
Carriers tariff and to accomplish this we therefore urge that
you sign and return the enclosed forms to us by return mail.
Please sign and return all copies and do not remove anu
classifications that may be attached. We will promptly
execute and return one complete copy of each contract for
your files.
If you have ceased exporting to the ports covered by these
contracts or do not desire to sign them kindly return the
forms to us with vour advices so as to clear our records.
Tf the name of firm or address appearing in the contract
ix not correct, please correct same defore returning the
forms.
Very truly yours, (S.) C. R. Andrews, Chairman.
(fol. 51] North Atlantie Continental Freight Conference
80 Broad Street, New York 4, N.Y.
The Canadian Continental Eastbound Freigcht Conference
315 St. Sacrement Street, Montreal 1, Canada
Memorandum of Agreement, made this — d: iv of —, 19--
hetween — hereinafter called the Merchant (66) Mer-
chant’? ine aaa. subsidiaries, affiliates and agents of any of
them), and the several Steamship Lines named below
ele AOU AAAS BIE LE EOL AAA, WI DOES FB EP AIRTER INS IT 8 SEA
57
members of the North Atlantic Continental Freight Confer-
ence and The Canadian Continental Eastbound Freight
Conference, hereinafter called the Carriers. It is under-
stood and agreed that if any additional Line or Lines be-
come members of the North Atlantic Continental Freight
Conference or the The Canadian Continental Kastbound
Freight Conference, respectively, such Line or Lines shall
thereby and thereupon become parties to this agreement as
Carriers, and the Merchant shall have the right to ship on
such Line or Lines to the same extent as on the other Car-
riers and should any Line or Lines cease to be Members of
said Conferences, they shall simultaneously cease to be Car-
riers hereunder and this agreement shall thereupon termi-
nate and expire as between the Merchant and sueh Line or
Lines, but shall continue in full foree and effect according to
its terms as between the Merchant and the Lines still re-
maining Members of said Conferences.
1. In consideration of the rates and other conditions
stated herein, the Merchant agrees to offer or cause to he
offered to the Carriers for transportation by them to Bel-
gium, Germany and Holland and discharge at such ports of
said countries served by the Carriers as may be designated
hy the Merchant, all shipments of the commodities men-
tioned (or provided) below.
2. This contract covers all export shipments of the Mer-
chant of the herein named (or provided for) commodities
moving out of United States North Atlantie and Canadian
ports to or through ports of the aforesaid countries, and
all said shipments shall be tendered to the Carriers for their
Vessels which may load at the ports of Norfolk, Newport
News, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York. Boston, Portland
aud Canadian ports Montreal and East thereof and sched-
nled to sail to the port of destination designated by the
Merchant, and failure so to tender any such shipments to
the Carriers or shipment of them by vessels other than
those of the Carriers shall be a violation of this contract.
The Carriers agree, subject to provisions hereof, to trans-
hort said shipments on their vessels sailing to the aforesaid
countries,
a) *. . :
’. The Merchant has the option of selecting any of the
vessels operated by the respective Carriers to the countries
herein mentioned subject to agreement with the particular
r on
Carrier as to the quantity, but it is the spirit of this agree-
# ment that the Merchant, so far as convenient to him, will
distribute shipments equitably between the several Carriers.
The Merchant agrees to make application for space as early
as practicable before the vessel’s advertised sailing date.
If the Carriers fail to name space within three business
days after the Merchant duly applies therefor, on a vessel
<cheduled to sail from the port of shipment selected within
fifteen days after the seaboard clearance date desired, the
Merchant shall be free with respect to such shipment to
secure space elsewhere without prejudice to his right to
future shipment under this agreement but before making
such arrangement the Merchant shall first give the office of
the Conference an opportunity to arrange space.
4. The Carriers severally agree to furnish the Merchant
at the rate or rates named or provided for herein space in
such vessels as they may respectively load at said loading
ports for transportation and discharge at the ports desired,
provided that suitable unbooked space is available therein
when the Merchant makes application. If the Merchant
shall make shipment hereunder for the benefit of some party
not holding or conforming to a similar agreement, or shall
make shipment in violation hereof, then the Carriers shall
have the option at any time to declare this agreement termi-
nated, and the Merchant shall be liable to the Carriers for
liquidated damages equal to twice the amount of freight
that would have been payable under this contract in respect
of the shipment constituting the violation. The Merchant
[ fol. 32] agrees to furnish to the Carriers, through the office
of the Conference, full information concerning propriety
of any shipment made or not made by the Merchant under
the agreement and failure to furnish such information
promptly after request shall entitle the Carriers to cancel
this agreement on ten days’ written notice.
5. The commodities and the rates thereon to which this
agreement applies are:
As per Reverse Side or Attached
Other commodities as may be shipped by the Merchant
from time to time, which shall be deemed covered by this
agreement, at the lowest rates then in effect for the par-
ticular commodity.
59
The minimum charge on any one bill of lading or per
package shall conform to the Carriers’ charges in connec-
tion with the particular commodity in effect at time of
~hipment.
Unless otherwise specifically stated herein packages or
pieces exceeding 4480 pounds or 30 feet in length will take
the additional Heavy Lift Charges and Extra Length
Charges in effect at time shipments are made,
Rates quoted herein are in United States currency on
shipments originating in United States moving either
through United States Ports or through Canadian Ports,
and are in Canadian currency on shipments originating in
Canada, moving either through Canadian Ports or through
United States Ports.
The rates herein specified are subject to be increased
reasonably from time to time. Any notice of increase shall
te deemed accepted by the Merchant unless within 20 days
after his receipt of the notice of increase he gives the Car-
riers written notice of non-aceeptance. In event of such
non-aecceptance the Carriers shall have the option at any
time within 20 days after receipt of the Merchant’s notice
to cancel this agreement on giving the Merchant at least 60
days written notice, but if such notice is not given this
agreement shall remain in effect.
The Carriers have the option to reduce their rates, and
should they during the term of this agreement reduce their
rates on the commodities herein named (or provided for)
helow the rates herein agreed, the Merchant, under like
conditions, shall be given the full benefit of suck reduced
rates during the period same remain in effect.
f. Shipments are subject to all the provisions of the per-
mit dock receipt, and bill of lading in use by the Carrier
when shipment is tendered. If valuation higher than that
provided by the regular form of bill of lading is desired hy
the Merchant it must be declared before shipment and, in
accordance with tariff provisions, a higher rate paid than
stated in this agreement.
7. In ease of dispute under this agreement the Merchant
and Carrier(s) each agree to submit the matter to arbitra-
tion at New York, or Montreal if the Merchant is domiciled
in Canada, each appointing an arbitrator and the two so
chosen shall select an umpire to which arbitration committee
. _ ‘ dn RO NE : PRaaEd SENNA TE ns Ls wna S N eaten’
ar Se ERRAND LILLE EOE pn Re! Oe
ia alii -
60
all data requested in connection with the matter in dispute
shall be made available. Decision of two or more members
of said Committee shall be binding on the parties.
. This agreement shall cover shipments as above speci-
fied on vessels scheduled to sail from port at which shipment
is loaded during the period from November 1, 1948, to De-
cember 31, 1949, both dates inclusive and shall continue in
effect on the same terms and conditions throughout consecu-
tive subsequent years, subject to the right of either the
lerchant or the Carriers to terminate the same as of De-
cember 31 in any year by giving the other party ninety days
33 written notice of termination.
: ‘fol. 38] 9. In the event of the imminence or existence of |
var, hostilities or warlike operations between any Nations,
4 blockades, embargoes, regulations of any government av-
‘ thority, or any official interference with commercial inter-
: course, affecting the operations of the Carriers, or any of
them in the trade covered by this agreement, the Carriers
¢ or any one or more of them shall at their option have the
9
right to cancel this agreement.
Members of:
North Atlantic Continental Freight Conference operating
e services from United States North Atlantie Ports:
4 A/S J. Ludwig \Mowinekels Rederi (Cosmopolitan Line):
% Black Diamond Steamship Corp. (Black Diamond Lines):
s Compagnie renerale Transatlantique (French Line)
A Compagnie Maritime Belge (Lloyd Royal) S. A.;
F Cunard White Star Limited;
@ Dampskibsselskabet af 1912 A/S, A/S Dampskibsselska-
3 het Sv endborg, A. P. Moller, Maersk Line;
3 Ellerman’s Wilson Line, Limited (Wilson Line) :
N. V. Nederlandseh-Amerikaansche Stoomvanrt-Maat-
schappij (Holland America Line) ;
Sonth Atlantie Steamship Line, Ine. ;
United States Lines Company (U nited States Lines):
Waterman Steamship Corporation,
The Canadian Continental Eastbound Freieht Conference
operating services from Canadian Ports Montreal and east
Ty
nee
PEERED Sire Ae eS
thereof:
4 Canadian Shipowners Ltd., Montship Lines Ltd., (Canada
a Continental Line) ;
Canadian Pacific Steamships Limited ;
hehe BAPE LSI ERD ARN DAE Voateatrnal tr i de
PBs gd 20) PR a SION FP med + aa BaD
i 7
61
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (French Line) ;
County Line Ltd. (County Line) ;
Cunard White Star Limited (Cunard White Star Line) ;
N. V. Nederlandsch-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maat-
sthappij ‘*Holland-Amerika Lijn’’ (Holland America
Line
Swedish American Line Continental Service (Swedish
American Line) ;
Watts & Co, Ltd. (Watts Watts Line).
SUL ECO0 OSES OE COS O'S OH OE HE &9 4S bk @ OE cele e 8 4b es
(Signature for and on behalf of the
above mentioned Steamship Lines)
Please return to North Atlantie Continental Freight
Conference, 80 Broad Street, New York 4, N.Y.
Preheat” se
aren:
pews Sok
eS Sen Geer S A Pak ek tae he eS
A tia OR Ne Site ee
62
APPENDIX B.
Specimen Contracts Introduced as Exhibits During
Hearings of Alexander Committee.
Exhibit 26, Vol. I, p. 97.
Memorandum of freight contract made this 1st day of
May, 1912, between the R. P. Houston & Co., party of the
first part, and Messrs. Arkell & Douglas (Inc.), party of
the second part, for their entire shipments from New York
to Montevideo, La Plata, Buenos Aires, Rosario, and Bahia
Blanea from date to April 30, 1913, included.
Party of the tirst part agrees to provide tonnage for all
shipments which party of the second part has for shipment,
provided reasonable notice of intention to ship (I say 20
days) is given, at the following rates of freight:
Cents
1. Harvesters, headers, binders, header binders,
reapers, mowers, hay rakes, drills, stackers, seed
sowers, corn pickers, hand grain shellers and
parts thereof, carts, harrows, plows (except trac-
tion engine gang plows) ...............-e.e000:: 16
2. Cleaners, hay presses, grain mills, grain planters,
DMM POMMOTS, FOIVOTIMOTS.. . 2 2 occ cece sc ceeeees 18
3. Wheelbarrows, shovels, spades, hay forks ...... 20
Chairs, desks, and common furniture .......... 1714
ie Is aa doh a's padekcevbiceknes avi 19
5. Agricultural engines and thrashers, including gas
engines, traction and gang plows:
I ii ald Salada a swaps eda vac Ads 8's 20
a a daa weds :k tw leh oaby ks 22
ee CU I ON cs iene ke cect reuse succes 28
ee eens 20)
8. Lubricating oil (till Dee. 31) .................. 15
9% Automobiles:
Not exceeding 2 tons (till Dee. 31) 2... ...0..... 15
OO Sr Oe RPE OU SED onc noc ccc ccw ce cecuss 18
10. Sewing machines (till Dee. 31) ..........0..... 14
11. General cargo not otherwise enumerated, current
rates at time of shipment.
All the above rates are to Montevideo and Buenos Aires
and are per cubic foot or 56 pounds at steamer’s option un-
COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER
5
ape eae:
page
less otherwise specified and on pieces not over 2 tons weight
unless otherwise specified, but it is understood and agreed
that it is not permissible to separate parts of one machine
or more of the same class—in other words, if part of a
machine is taken at the measurement rate, the machine en-
tire must be carried on this basis, the same with weight
freight.
It is agreed that the rates of freight to Rosario and Bahia
Blanea for all shipments irrespective of quantity by any
steamer shall be + cents per cubie foot, or 56 pounds over
the Buenos Aires rates, whether sailing direct or to Buenos
Aires first. The rates to La Plata shall be 3 cents per
cubic foot, or 56 pounds over the Buenos Aires rates,
The rate on binder twine to Rosario, Bahia Blanea, and
La Plata shall be 6 cents per bale ove: the Buenos Aires
rate.
Rates on goods not covered by above agreement weighing:
over 4,400 pounds are to be mutually agreed to between the
parties hereto.
Parts of any of the above-mentioned articles to take the
rate of the complete machine.
All freights to be prepaid.
All shipments are subject to the terms and conditions of
the Houston Line’s River Plate bills of lading,
Kerosene, naphtha, lumber, rosin, and other rough or
dangerous cargo to be subject to special arrangement,
It is mutually agreed and understood that this contract
covers the entire shipments of Messrs, Arkel] & Donelass
(Ine.), estimated to amount to about — tons from New
York to the River Plate ports, and shipments shall only he
made by steamers designated by R. P. Houston & Co.
It is further agreed that in ease R. P. Houston & Co, re-
duce the rates of freight to any other shipper or shippers
on any of the articles above mentioned durine the period
covered by this contract, then Messrs. Arkell & Donelas
(Ine.) to he accorded the benefit of all such rednetions dyy-
ing the period that said rates are reduced.
Exhibit 34, p. 247
New York, November 12, 1910
The Barber Asphalt Paving Co.
Land Title Building, Philadelphia, Pa,
' .
Gentlemen: We beg to confirm contract made with you to-
day for all shipments of asphalt and residuum (in custody
QE ———IEE
er a ey
;
zg
‘.
%
ee ee SL ae SELLER meee
barrels) under your control from New York to Rio de
Janeiro during the next three months, and contract to con-
tinue thereafter, subject to 30 days’ notice by either party,
on the following terms:
By steamers of the Prince Line and Hamburg South
American Line and Hamburg American Line, $5.50 net.
By steamers of the Lamport & Holt Line, $5.50 net and
10 per cent primage.
All per ton of 2,240 pounds, gross weight; all prepaid on
signing of bills of lading and free from alongside.
Please note that the following clause will be inserted in
all bills of lading, to be signed by you, viz:
To be taken from alongside the steamer by consienees of
goods at their own risk and expense immediately the
steamer is ready to deliver. Consignees to send a competent
representative, who will sign receipts for each lighter load
before it leaves the steamer’s side, otherwise the steamer
will not be responsible for any claims on the cargo. In
default the goods to be landed by the agents of the steamer
at expense (including dock dues) and risk of the consignees.
In the event of the consignees failing to carry out this
clause, the shipper shall be held, and hereby holds, himself
responsible for all expenses incurred thereby.
We have written this letter in duplicate; kindly keep one
and return the other approved by you.
Yours faithfully,
Pavuu F. Gernarp & Co.
General Agents
Accepted by cable authority dated October 28, from Carlos
A. de Miranda Jordao,
Tue Barser AspHact Pavine Co.
By F. J. Buxron, Agents
Exhibit 34, p. 248
New York, January 21, 1910
Messrs. Guinle & Co.
New York City
Dear Sirs: We hereby beg to confirm freight agreement
made with you by us, acting for the Prinee Line, Lamport
Pee Ore et ee So ee Oe Te St ed ma kes I
PRAIA ih in wi Ne hc TRI LCi FARR Ye LY pc SN Ahab Hons, 6 oP ALE EAE” HD
65
& Holt Line, and Hamburg-South American Steamship Co.,
and Hamburg-American Line (joint service). This agree-
ment to cover the transportation of your entire shipments
of lawful merchandise from New York to ports in Brazil
named below, on the following terms:
For Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, and Santos: Electrical
and other machinery (electrical fittings), $7 per ton, weight
or measurement, ship’s option; transmission towers (struc-
tural material), $6 per ton, weight or measurement, ship’s
option; curved plates $6 per ton, weight or measurement,
ship’s option; car material, $6 per ton, weight or measure-
ment, ship’s option; paint and varnish, $7.50 per ton, weight
or measurement, ship’s option; copper wire, $7.50 per ton,
weight or measurement, ship’s option; lubricating oil, 15
cents per cubic foot—landed.
Above rates apply to pieces not exceeding 2 tons.
Pieces in excess of 2 tons to pay tariff rates for heavy
lifts, less 10 per cent.
Locomotives up to 10 tons, 18 cents per cubic foot, F. F. A.
Bahia to pay above rates F. F. A. or $1.80 per ton addi-
tional if landed.
No F. F. A. bill of lading to be signed for less than 40
tons.
Coods not provided for in this agreement to pay tariff
rates of steamer carrying the goods.
Rio Grande do Sul: To pay 25 per cent over the con-
tract Rio de Janeiro landed rates, F. F. A.
Porto Alegre: To pay $4 per ton weight or measurement,
ship's option, over Rio Grande do Sul rates: all landed.
Freight to be prepaid against delivery of hills of ladine
and not subject to any return whatsoever.
K.P. A. eargo to bear the usual signed clause in bills of
lading,
Shipments by Prince Line and Hambure Lines to he with-
ont primage.
Lamport & Holt Line to have option of chargine 10 per
cent primage in addition to the above rates.
The steamship lines agree to provide space on receipt of
ample notice of your requirements by steamers of. the
Prince Line, Lamport & Holt Line and Hambure-Sonth
\merican Steamship Co., and Hambure-Ameriean Line
(jomt service).
Pieces too large to go below deck to go on deck at ship-
per’s risk.
Ee”
66
It is further agreed that no single piece shall be tendered
under this contract exceeding steamers’ or ports’ handling
facilities.
Shipments subject to all conditions of companies’ regular
bills of lading.
This contract to run during the current month and the
three following months and to run thereafter subject to 30
days’ notice of withdrawal on the part of either party, but
such notice not to be given before April 1, 1910.
Yours faithfully,
Pau F. Geruarp & Co.
General Agents
Accepted:
Guinle & Co.
This contract was canceled December 6, 1910.
Exhibit 35, p. 249
New York, October 2, 1912
Messrs. Enoch Morgan Sons & Co.
439 West Street, New York City
Dear Sirs: We beg to confirm contract made with you
today covering all your shipments of Sapolio, whieh yon
control (approximately 250 tons), hence to Montevideo and
Buenos Aires, from date to January 31, 1913, inclusive, at
the following rates of freight, viz: Montevideo, $10 net per
ton; Buenos Aires, $11 net per ton.
All per ton of 40 cubic feet, or 2,240 pounds, steamer’s op-
tion.
Freight is to be prepaid, and all shipments are subject
to the terms and conditions of the regular carrying line's
River Plata bills of lading.
We agree that in case the rate of freight on Sapolio is re-
duced you are to receive the benefit of such reduced rates
during the period of such reduction.
Yours faithfully,
Paci F. Gernarp & Co.
Per F. Scuarpine
General Agents
COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER
67
Exhibit 34, p. 251
New York, May 31, 1912
The Ansonio Clock Co.
99 John Street, New York City
Gentlemen: We beg to confirm contract made with you
today covering all your shipments of clocks (approximately
10,000-15,000 cubic fi=t) hence to Montevideo, Buenos
Aires, and Rosario froin date to April 30, 1913, inclusive, at
the following rates of freight, viz: Montevideo, 25 cents per
cubic foot ; Buenos Aires, 271% cents per cubic foot; Rosario,
3115 cents per cubic foot.
All freight is to be prepaid and all shipments subject to
terms and conditions of the regular carrying line’s River
Plata bill of lading.
We agree that in case the Prince Line reduce the rates
of freight to any other shipper or shippers on clocks you
are to receive the benefit of such reduced rates during the
period of such reduction.
Yours faithfully,
Paut F. Geruarn & Co.
Per H. Connor
General Agents
Accepted:
Tue Ansonia Crock Co.
Raymonp J. Scuweizer
Exhibit 34, p. 251
Memorandum of freight contract made this 28th day of
May, 1912, between Paul F. Gerhard & Co., agents of Prince
Line, party of the first part, and Messrs. Heywood Bros.
& Wakefield Co., party of the second part, for their entire
shipments of lawful merchandise, which they control, from
New York to Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Rosario from
date to April 30, 1913, inclusive, for which the party of the
first part agrees to provide tonnage, provided reasonable
hotice is given.
Rates of freight as follows:
Cane and wood seat and folding chairs, children’s ve-
hicles, hentwood chairs, rattan mats, chair cane, car seats,
woven cane web seating, reed and rattan specialties, Mon-
tevideo, 171% cents; Buenos Aires, 171% cents; Rosario,
21% cents.
Booogie?
A te Ay pxioe Corse
Rei WO ee Et
se
se a A
erm
.
“ith
Epi ueT A
¢
2
ys
vr.
%
7 cotta naaateceicas seta . ‘ ARIE LALLA CAEN ce oh 280 BLN
Wits Ceres : é me Oaks
68
All per cubic foot; all freight prepaid; all shipments sub-
ject to the carrying line’s regular bill of lading.
Other articles to be charged at current tariff rates.
It is further agreed that in case the Prince Line reduces
the rates of freight to any other shipper or shippers on any
articles named in this contract the party of the second part
shall have the benefit of such reduced rates during the
period of such reduction.
Paux F. Geruarp & Co.
Agents of Prince Line
Hrywoop Brotuers & WAKEFIELD (‘o.
Henry H. Morreii
Exhibit 34, p. 258
Memorandum of freight contract, made this 20th day of
September, 1911, between Paul F. Gerhard & Co., agents
for the Prince Line, party of the first part, and Brown
Portable Elevator Co., party of the second part, for their
entire shipments of portable elevators from New York to
Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Rosario from date to May
1, 1912, inclusive, at the following rates of freight, viz:
To Montevideo and Buenos Aires, $8 per ton; to Rosario,
£9.60 per ton.
All the above per ton of 40 eubie feet, or 2,240 pounds,
steamer’s option, prepaid as customary, and no package to
exceed 2 tons in weight.
The Prince Line agree to furnish not less than one
steamer per month; all shipments subject to terms and con-
ditions of the regular Prinee Line bill of lading.
Pau F. Gernarp & Co.
Per H. Connor
yeneral Agents Prince Line
Accepted.
Tur Brown Portasite Evevator (Co.
COPY BOUND CLOSE IN CENTER
BSE hae Ribena 8s:
69
APPENDIX C.
Sections 14 and 15, Shipping Act, 1916.
Sec. 14 (46 U.S. C. 812). That no common earrier by
water shall, directly or indirectly, in respect to the trans-
portation by water of passengers or property between a
port of a State, Territory, District, or possession of the
United States and any other such port or a port of a for-
eign country—
First. Pay, or allow, or enter into any combination,
agreement, or understanding, express or implied, to pay
or allow, a deferred rebate to any shipper. The term ‘de-
ferred rebate’? in this Act means a return of any portion
of the freight money by a carrier to any shipper as a con-
sideration for the giving of all or any portion of his ship-
ments to the same or any other carrier, or for any other
purpose, the payment of which is deferred beyond the ecom-
pletion of the service for which it is paid, and is made only
if, during both the period for which computed and the
period of deferment, the shipper has complied with the
terms of the rebate agreement or arrangement.
Second. Use a fighting ship either separately or in eon-
junction with any other carrier, through agreement or
otherwise. The term ‘fighting ship’’ in this Act means
a vessel used in a particular trade by a earrier or group
of carriers for the purpose of excluding, preventing, or re-’
ducing competition by driving another carrier out of said
trade.
Third. Retaliate against any shipper by refusing, or
threatening to refuse, space accommodations when such
are available, or resort to other discriminating or unfair
methods, because such shipper has patronized anv other
‘arrier or has filed a complaint charging unfair treatment,
or for any other reason.
Fourth. Make any unfair or unjustly discriminatory con-
tract with any shipper based on the volume of freight of-
fered, or unfairly treat or unjustly discriminate against
any shipper in the matter of (a) eargo space acecommoda-
tions or other facilities, due regard being had for the proper
loading of the vessel and the available tonnage; (b) the
loading and landing of freight in proper condition; or
(c) the adjustment and settlement of claims.
Pei < sat a Me
70
Any carrier who violates any provision of this section
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of
not more than $25,000 for each offense.
Sec. 15 (46 UL S.C. 814). That every common carrier
by water, or other person subject to this Act, shall! file im-
mediately with the board a true copy, or, if oral, a true and
complete memorandum, of every agreement with another
such carrier or other person subject to this Act, or tmodi-
fication or cancellation thereof, to which it may be a party
or conform in whole or in part, fixing or regulating trans-
portation rates or fares; giving or receiving special rates,
accommodations, or other special privileges or advantages;
controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroying competi-
tion; pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, or traffic;
allotting ports or restricting or otherwise regulating the
number and charaeter of sailings between ports; limiting
or regulating in any way the volume or character of freight
or passenger traffie to be earried; or in) any manner
providing for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative
working arrangement. The term ‘tagreement’’ in this
section includes understandings, conferences, and other
arrangements.
The board may by order disapprove, eancel, or modify
any agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof,
whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to
be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers,
shippers, exporters, importers, or ports, or between ex-
porters from the United States and their foreign competi-
tors, or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the
United States, or to be in violation of this Aet, and shall
approve all other agreements, modifications, or can-
cellations.
Agreements existing at the time of the organization of
the board shall be lawful until disapproved by the board.
It shall be unlawful to carry out any agreement or any por-
tion thereof disapproved by the board.
All agreements, modifications, or cancellations made
after the organization of the board shall be lawful only
when and as long as approved by the board, and before
approval or after disapproval it shall be unlawful to carry
out in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, any such
agreement, modification, or cancellation.
Every agreement, modification, or cancellation lawful un-
der this section shall be excepted from the provision [sic]
i, ti mee na inn ahi nobtina te ehee eee «<n |} eee eee
_—_
of the Act approved July second, eighteer, hundred and
ninety, entitled, “*An Aet to protect trade and commerce
against unlawful restraints and monopolies,’? and amend-
ents and acts supplementary thereto, and the provisions
of sections seventy-three to seventy-seven, both inclusive,
of the Act approved August twenty-seventh, eighteen hun-
dred and ninety-four, entitled “An Act to reduce taxation,
to provide revenue for the Government, and for other pur-
poses,’ and amendments and acts supplementary thereto.
Whoever violates any provision of this section shall be
liable toa penalty of $1,000 for each day such violation eon-
tinues, to be recovered by the United States in a civil action,
71
.
mY
r} 42
; APPENDIX D.
ee Excerpt from “Summary of Conferences and Agreements”,
Alexander Committee Report, Vol. IV, pp. 287-292.
; Il. Meeting the competition of lines outside of the cop.
ference.—While the conference lines regulate competition
‘ between themselves through one or more of the above-
" mentioned methods, and agree not to aid or encourage a
Fi nonconferenee line, nearly all the agreements which do not
: contain a deferred rebate system make no direct reference §
i to the methods which should be adopted for meeting the
a competition of outside lines, this matter apparently be-
f ing reserved entirely for conference action. In this re-
% speet the agreements frequently provide that the signa-
¥ tories must take joint action to defend their mutual inter.
ests in the event of competition from other lines. Three
am
methods seem to have been adopted to accomplis!) this
£ purpose, viz:
2 1. Deferred rebate systems, whereby shippers, who agree
; to employ exclusively the steamers of the conference lines
in a given trade, are allowed a rebate of a certain per-
centage of their freight payments (usually 5 or 10 per
* cent), which rebate is computed for a designated period
(usually every three, six, or twelve months), but v hich is
not paid until after a certain number of months (usually
a six months) following the period for which it is computed,
; and only on the condition that during the entire time, in-
; cluding both the period for which the rebate was computed
C as well as the time of deferment, the shipper has given his
crclusive support to the conference lines. Since the time
of payment of the rebate follows the period for which it's
computed, the shipper, if he desires to obtain the rebate.
* is under constant obligations to the conference lines. and
ix prevented from patronizing any other service since that
act would mean the forfeiture of all aceumulated rebates.
{ JIndging from the faets produced in the foregoing pages.
4 this method has proved by far the most effective device for
; the control of a trade, and is being used principally in the
5 long-distance trades (such as, for example, the westhound
trade from the Orient' and most South American port~)
‘1 Chapter V, p. 118.
2Chapter VI, pp. 153-188.
73
where the regular lines feel that they can assure to ship-
pers a regular and efficient service only on condition of
exclusive support. The system has proved especially effec
tive where American importers are also importers in
Europe and the same conference lines serve both the
American and European trade, and where (as in the cotfee
trade from Brazil to Europe and the United States’) the
deferred rebate agreement stipulates that the payment of
the rebates is dependent upon the shippers’ exclusive use
of the conference lines for all shipments destined to either
the United States or Europe, thus making it impossible for
an independent line to seeure freight unless it stands in a
position to protect the shipper in both his American and
European shipments. Moreover, as has been repeatedly
pointed out in this volume, shippers require, above all else,
a regular service, and in this connection the testimony
shows that by patronizing an outside line the shipper would
not only forfeit his rebates but could be penalized by being
denied accommodations for future shipments even at the
full rates of freight. Such retaliation would leave the ship-
per unprotected since an independent line is not large
enough to supply him with tonnage at all times. In other
words, the conference lines, by rotating the sailings of
their steamers, can give a regular and frequent service,
whereas the independent line with its fewer steamers can
only offer sailing at less frequent intervals.
With the exeeption of the rebates to Bermuda. Mar-
tingne and Guadeloupe? (where, however, the rebates aro
not deferred, but depend upon t! size of the shipper’s total
shipments), the deferred rebate systems now in use are
equally open to all shippers who agree to give exclusive pa-
tronage, and are granted without discrimination as regards
the size of individual or total shipments. Moreover, near-
ly all the rebate systems apply only to the American im-
port trade, only four instances having been found where
such rebates are granted in the export traffic from Amer.
iean ports, viz, in the New York-Bermuda. Martingue and
(inadelouve trade (which, as noted, are not strictly de-
erred)? in the New York-Colombian trade. in the New
‘Chapter VT, pp. 157, 158.
*Ch. VITT. p. 219-221.
*Ch. VI, p. 178.
ieee —— . eee Deer AOS E TOD OE! rn at pbs Nigel ees
nr nd laps si
74
York-Kingston (Jamaica) trade,t and in the trade from
the United Kingdom to certain American-Pacifie coast
ports.” With reference to the Ameriean export trade jt
seems that the lines are laborine under the assumption
that deferred rebates are illegal; and in some eases where
such rebates formerly existed they have been abandoned,
and where their adoption has been taken wider considera-
tion, a decision was reached not to establish the same. Ty
the import trade, on the contrary, the lines appear to eo oy
the theory that this country has no jurisdiction ever the
matter, and that such rebates may be freely granted if
the arrangement is made abroad and if. the rebates are
paid at a foreign port. But in this conneetion it should be
noted that the deferred rebate system, although applied
only to the import traffic, is, nevertheless, a very effective
device for the control of the trade, since to make the trade
profitable an independent line must have cargo in both di-
rections.
2. The use of fighting ships, or collective competition
aaaimst a single competing line.—To what extent this prac.
tice prevails at present is difficult to ascertain, practically
all of the steamship line representatives who testified he-
fore the Committee having denied the existence of the prae-
tice. But the facts obtained by the Committee show clearly
that this method has been used in recent vears. Thus, in
the North Atlantic passenger traffic, the evidence pre-
sented in the suit against the Hambure-Ameriean Line
et al. shows that in about the year 1908 the conference
lines authorized the appointment of a committee for the
purpose of seleeting fighting steamers to destroy the com. |
petition of nonconference lines. This committee, secord-
ing to the evidence, would select suitable steamers from
“uv of the conference lines to sail on the same days and
hetween the same ports, the regular rates heine redueed to
® point sufficiently low to secure the traffic, As already
stated in this volume (p. 46) ‘‘the evidence in the Govern-
ment’s suit shows that such opposition sailines were re-
neatedly instituted against certain independent lines. * * *
Any surplus of passengers which were hooked for the fight-
ine steamer, but which could not be carried by the same,
*Ch. VIIT, p. 215.
* (Ch. II, p. 89.
a ee ee ed
4 Ret,
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aS hid nana AO
75
would be transferred to other conference line steamers at
the reduced rates. The expenses and loss from the lower
rates, resulting to any line whose vessels had been selected,
yore distributed over the members of the conference. It
was thus a ease of all the lines, united in conference, op-
posing every sailing of a single opposition line. By dis-
‘ributing the loss over the several members of the confer-
enee, each constituent line would sutfer proportionately
much less than the one line which was fighting the entire
vroup, and which would inevitably soon exhaust its re-
sources in the conflict with the combined power of the large
lines with their superior speed and better third-class ac-
commodations.’? Again, in the freight traffic, It appears
that six leading German lines established a ‘*fiolting cor-
poration,’’ called the Syndikats-Rhederei, the shares of
which were opportioned among the rarious lines with ref-
erence to the tonnage of the companies. This fighting cor-
poration was organized toward the close of 1905, and ae-
cording to the report of Mr. Robert P. Skinner, Ameri-
can Consul General at Hamburg, ‘‘four comparatively small
and inexpensive steamers were purchased, and these, with
such others as may be chartered frem time to time, are
hired out to the six owners of the company to meet dan-
verous competition and to drive it away. The fighting ships
handle chiefly bulk goods, leaving merehandise which re-
quires prompt transportation to the care of the parent com-
pany, Which maintains its nominal rates as far as possible,
the stress of competition being borne by the fighting ships
principally. In times of peace the fighting ships engage
in regular trade on time charters. As this corporation is
vot one for profit primarily, the investment in reality. is a
new sort of insurance.’’ (Vol. 3, pp. 53-54.) Mr. W. G.
Sickel, Viee-Director in charge of the Hamburg-Ameriecan
Line. testified before the Committee that ‘it is a well-
known fact that the Syndikats-Rhederi does exist,”” and
that he believed that its purpose is as stated above, (Vol. 2,
»). 826.)
3. Contracts with shippers which may be classified as:
(a) Joint contracts made by the conference as a whole.—
Such contracts are made for the account of all the lines in
the agreement, each carrying its proportion of the contract
freight as tendered from time to time. The contracting lines
agree to furnish steamers at regular intervals and the
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