Appellants Brief — Dyer v. City Council of Beloit

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Ocroszer Team, 1947.

No. 275

Appellant’s Brief

\ CLAUDE D. STOUT,

Milton, Wisconsin,

GEORGE 8. GEFFS,

JACOB GEFFS,

ELI BLOCK,

Janesville, Wisconsin,

Counsel for Appellant.

Midwest Law Printing Co., 340 W. Huron 8t., Chicago

SUBJECT INDEX.

Opinion of the Courts below

Statement of Jurisdiction

Statement of the case

Specification of errors

Summary of Argument

Argument

1. The requirement of the Beloit Ordinance that

the pasteurization plant must be located within six

miles of State Street and East Grand Avenue in said

city prohibits interstate commerce of pure, whole-

some and sanitary milk and is therefore unconstitu-

tional

The milk which appellant proposed to sell is pure

and sanitary and meets the requirement of the Beloit

Ordinance as to sanitation

A State cannot prohibit interstate commerce on the

ground that it is inconvenient or impractical to in-

spect the original source of the product being offered

Including a small part of Illinois within the six

mile zone does not meet the requirements of the

Interstate Commerce clause as to appellant who ob-

tains his milk beyond the six mile zone

Beloit is not free to prohibit interstate commerce

in the absence of congressional action

ii

Appellant is not responsible for Beloit’s inability

to inspect the milk being offered for sale....................

The milk that appellant offered for sale is being

adequately inspected according to current standard

and approved methods..............................

2. The provision of the Beloit Ordinance which

prohibits the sale of milk not pasteurized within the

six mile zone is arbitrary, discriminatory and in

violation of the 14th Amendment of the United

States Constitution

A city may not draw a line around itself and pro-

hibit the sale of milk originating beyond the line,

although it deems that it has included enough terri-

tory to supply its local needs

The six mile zone was drawn without reasonable

relation to the supposed object to he obtained by the

city ;

Courts of last resort in other states have held

such ordinances to be in violation of due process........

Conclusion _......

Appendix:

Model Milk Ordinance

Opinion of Attorney General of Michigan.................

Cases Crrep.

Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. 8. 78, 34 L. Ed. 862........

Carter v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 321 U. 8, 131,

64 S. Ct. 464

Freeman v. Hewit, .. U. S. ~.., 67 8. Ct. 274.0000.

Grant v. Leavell, 259 Ky. 263, 82 8S. W. (2d) 283...

19

19

17

16

iii

John P. King Mfg. Co. v. City of Augusta et al.,

277 U. S. 100, 48 S. Ct. 489, 72 L. Ed. 801

La Franchi v. City of Santa Rosa, 8 Cal. (2d) 331,

65 P. (2d) 1301

McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327, 64 S. Ct.

1023

Miller v. Williams, 12 Federal Supp. 236

Prescott v. City of Borger, (Tex. App.) 158 S. W.

(2d) 578

Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 18 S. Ct.

757, 43 L. Ed. 49

Sheffield Farms Co., Inc. v. Seaman 114 N. J. L. 455,

177 A. 372

Southern Pac. Co. v. State of Arizona, 325 U. S. 761,

65 S. Ct. 1515

State ex rel. Larson v. City of Minneapolis, 190

Minn. 138, 251 N. W. 121

State of Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S., 313, 34 L. Ed.

36 Stat. 1156, 43 Stat. 937, 45 Stat. 54, 28 U. S. C. A.

344 (a) a

Texts.

22 Am. Jur. Food Sec. 16 page 817

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Ocroser Term, 1947.

No. 275

LAWRENCE DYER,

Appellant’s Brief

TT

OPINION OF THE COURTS BELOW.

The opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of

Wisconsin (R. 26-30) is reported in 250 Wis. 613, 27

N. W. (2d) 733; the opinion of the Cireuit Court for

Rock County is not officially reported, but is found in

the record at pages 4-6.

2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.

(a) The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

Section 237 (a) of the Judicial Code, as amended (36

Stat. 1156, 43 Stat. 937, 45 Stat. 54, 28 U. S. C. A. 344

(a) ), from a final judgment of the Supreme Court of

Wisconsin entered the 10th day of June, 1947. Section

237 of the Judicial Code provides that a final judgment

or decree in a suit in the highest court of a state

‘*Where is drawn in question the validity of a

statute of any state on the ground of its being re-

pugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the

United States, and the decision is in favor of its

validity, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court

upon appeal.’’

There was drawn in question in this case the validity,

under Section 8 of Article 1 and the 14th Amendment

of the Constitution of the United States, of Section 8.09

(x) (2) of the Beloit City Ordinances,

A city ordinance is a statute within the meaning of

Section 237 (a) of the Judicial Code, for purpose of

appeal to this court. John P. King Mfg. Co. v. City

Council of Augusta, et al. 277 U. 8. 100, 48 8. Ct. 489,

72 L. Ed. 801,

(b) Judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of

Wisconsin was entered on June 10, 1947, (R. 26-30) and

an appeal was allowed by that court to this Court on

July 30, 1947,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The case involves the constitutionality of Section 8.09

(x) (2) of the Beloit City Ordinances, which reads:

‘*No pasteurized milk shall be sold in the City of

Beloit which shall not have been pasteurized in ap-

as lr eS eh hUue EP es aes reese! es ae eT. Fo

proved plants within six miles from the intersection

of State Street and E. Grand Ave. in the City of

Beloit.””

The parties at the beginning of the trial made the fol-

lowing stipulation of facts:

‘It Is Hereby Stipulated, in open coart, by Law-

rence Dyer, Petitioner, by McGowan, and Geffs, his

attorneys, and the defendants by C. L. Haugan,

City Attorney for the City of Beloit and Eari J.

Caskey, their attorneys; that on the 29th day of

August, 1946, the petitioner, Lawrence Dyer, made

written application to the City of Beloit for a li-

cense to distribute the milk of the Dean Milk Com-

pany in the City of Beloit, and that in so doing he

has complied with all of the terms of the City Ordi-

nance in Beloit, except in the one respect, that the

pasteurization plant of the Dean Milk Compnay is

located at Chemung, Illinois, a distance of more than

six miles from the corner of Kast Grand Avenue and

State Street in the City of Beloit; that the pasteuri-

zation plant of the Dean Milk Company, from which

the Petitioner will receive his milk for distribution

in Beloit is hetween twenty-five and thirty miles

from the point indicated by the ordinance in the City

of Beloit.

‘*It Is Also Stipulated, that in accordance with the

terms of the City Ordinance, the petitioner has filed

with the City Clerk a list of the farmers who bring

their milk to the Chemung dairy of the Dean Milk

Company and that the number of farms so named

amounts to one hundred ninety-seven; that such

farms are located in the Counties of McHenry, Boone

and Winnebago in the State of Illinois, and Wal-

worth County in the State of Wisconsin.

‘‘It Is Further Stipulated, that on the 3th day

of August, 1946, the City Council of Beloit rejected

the application of the petitioner for such milk license

upon the ground that the pasteurization plant of the

Dean Milk Company was located more than six miles

4

“It Is Further Stipulated, that it is the intention

petitioner, in the event a license is granted

to obtain milk pasteurized at the factory of

the Dean Milk Company at Chemung, Illinois, and

oe eee ee for sale in

City Beloit at retail stores,

a this 26th day of September, 1946’’ (R.

Appellant Dyer testified that the milk he proposed to

sell to retail stores in Beloit was Grade A. milk and its

composition qualifies as to the sanitary conditions and

quality required by the Beloit City Ordinance (R. 9);

that the milk is cooled to 34 degrees when it comes from

the pasteurizer and placed in paper cartons; that his

truck was insulated and in warm weather he used ice;

that when the milk arrived at Beloit, its temperature

would not be more than 42 degrees Fahrenheit; that he

had occasion to check the bacteria count on this milk

with the bacteria count of milk sold in Beloit, and in

every instance it was lower than other milk pasteurized

and sold in Beloit (R. 9-10); that this milk was sold in

the City of Chicago and suburbs; that each farm which

supplies milk to the Dean plant is inspected every week

and sometimes twice a week by the Chicago Board of

Health; that the Dean Milk Company also has its own

inspectors who inspect the source of the milk at the

farms; that the City of Chicago and its suburbs operate

under what is known as the Model Milk Ordinance for-

mulated by the Public Health Service of the United

States; (The Model Milk Ordinance is set out in the

Appendix of this brief); that the City of Chicago op-

erates under what is known as the Mayor Kelly Milk

Ordinance, which is as stringent as the Medel Milk Ordi-

nance formulated by the Public Health Service of the

United States (R. 10); that this milk is delivered to the

Dean Plant the same day it is produced and would be

delivered normally within two hours after being pas-

teurized (R. 9).

Stanley J. Goldschmidt, the City Sanitarian of Beloit,

testified that he and one assistant had charge of inspect-

ing all farms from which Grade A Milk was sold in Be-

loit; also the inspection of restaurants, clubs, taverns,

garbage collection, 1500 people engaged in handling food,

quarantine, contagious diseases, and the complaints com-

ing into the department (R. 10-11); that with his present

staff that he could not inspect the Dean Plant and 150

additional sources of milk even though the plant and

farms were located within six miles of Beloit (R. 12);

that there is more milk coming into Beloit every day

than what local people use (P, 11); that there is no ob-

jection to the quality or sanitary condition of the milk

that Mr. Dyer intends to deliver to the City of Beloit

that he knew of and that he had or one or two occasions

delivered it to the State Laboratory of Hygiene; that he

would say it was about the average of the milk sold in

Beloit, not any worse or any better (R. 12),

That his opposition to granting a license to Mr. Dyer

was based upon the proposition that the pasteurization

plant where he received his milk was located more than

six miles from State and Grand Avenue, City of Beloit

(R. 12).

That his department did not inspect dairy farms which

furnished Grade B milk to Beloit (R. 11) and that farms

furnishing Grade A milk were inspected twice a vear (TM.

12); that if this license was granted the city would have to

hire another inspector (R. 12) which would cost the city

$200.00 a month and traveling expenses (R. 13), but that

it would be hard to say whether the additional inspector

would devote his time to inspecting additional farms with-

out first lave out a program (R. 13).

The Milk Ordinance of the City of Beloit is set forth

in the Record pages 13-23. The Ordinance makes no re-

quirement in regard to the proximity of the sources of

the milk, or dairy farms, to the City of Beloit. As to

the inspection of the original sources and milk plants,

the Ordinance provides:

**(X) (6) The Health Officer or any officially ap-

pointed representative he may so designate shall in-

spect periodically or at such time as convenient or

which expediency may require, every dairy farm

producing milk and cream for consumption within

the City of Beloit and all milk plants whose milk

and cream are intended for consumption within the

City of Beloit’’ (R. 22).

**(X) (7) Samples of milk and cream from dair-

ies, milk depots, stores, cafes, soda-fountains, res-

taurants and other places where milk products are

sold shall be tested as often as the Health Officer

may require. Bacteria counts and other tests shall

be made in conformity with the standard methods

recommended by the American Public Health Asso-

ciation and the Association of Official Agricultural

Chemists. Tests may include such other chemical and

physical determinations as the Health Officer may

deem necessary for making hacterial counts and the

detection of adulteration. Notices of bacterial counts

shall be given to the producer or distributor con-

cerned as soon as made. Samples may be taken hy

the Health Officer at any time prior to the final de-

livery to consumer of any milk or milk products.

All dairies, milk plants, milk depots, stores, cafes,

restaurants, soda-fountains and other places which

shall sell or offer for sale milk or milk products in

the city of Beloit shall furnish the Health Officer,

- ,

upon his request, the names and addresses of source

from which their milk supply is obtained’’ (R. 22-

23).

The Ordinance makes the following requirement in re-

gard to the location of the pasteurization plant:

**(X) (2) No pasteurized milk shall be sold in

the City of Beloit which shall not have been pasteur-

ized in approved plants within six miles from the

intersection of State Street and E. Grand Ave., in

the City of Beloit’? (R. 22).

The trial court in its opinion stated:

‘*No objection is raised by the City as to the

Grade or quality of the milk sought to he sold, and

it is conceded that the petitioner has complied with

all of the terms of the Beloit Ordinance, except in

the one respect, that the pasteurization plant of the

Dean Milk Company is located at Chemung, Illinois, a

distance of more than six miles from the City of

Beloit, i. ¢., a distance of hetween twenty-five and

thirty-five miles from the point indicated by the Be-

loit City Ordinance”? (R. 5).

The trial Court ruled that the six mile requirement of

the Ordinance did not deprive the appellant of his prop-

erty rights and constitutional rights without due process

of law, and was not an illegal interference with Inter-

state Commerce (R. 6).

The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the Su-

preme Court of the State of Wisconsin (R. 25).

SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS.

1. The Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin

erred in holding and deciding that Sec. 8.09 (X) (2) of

the Beloit City Ordinance which reads:

‘*No pasteurized milk shall be sold in the City of

Beloit which shall not have been pasteurized in ap-

8

proved plants within six miles from the intersection

of State Street and East Grand Avenue in the City

of Beloit.’’,

did not deprive appellant of his property rights without

due process of law, did not deprive appellant of his right

of contract, and did not deny to appellant the equal pro-

tection of the laws within the meaning of section 1 of

article XIV of the Amendments to the Constitution of the

United States.

2. The Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin erred

in holding and deciding that said city ordinance as ap-

plied to appellant did not violate section 8, article I of

the Constitution of the United States, being what is com-

monly called the Interstate Commerce clause of the

United States Constitution.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

1. The requirement of the Beloit Ordinance that the

pasteurization plant must be located within six miles of

State Street and East Grand Avenue in said city prohibits

interstate commerce of pure, wholesome and sanitary

milk and is therefore unconstitutional.

It is conceded that appellant’s milk meets all the re-

quirements of the Beloit Milk Ordinance except it was

pasteurized in a plant 25 to 35 miles from Beloit. A city

or state may enact reasonable inspection laws to insure

the purity of food being offered for sale within its bound-

aries, but a city or state may not prohibit interstate com-

merce in such commodities altogether even though the

inspection is burdensome, and inspection at the origina!

Lee ee ee ee

——

9

source impossible from a practical standpoint. The con-

tention that inspection of appellant’s milk would cause

undue hardship upon the city of Beloit because the pas-

teurization plant is located 25 to 35 miles from Beloit is

without merit because the city’s chief health officer tes-

tified that his department would be unable to inspect the

additional farms and plant even if they were located

within the six mile zone, and it would be a minor matter

for the chief health officer to satisfy himself whether or

not the inspection now being made is adequate. Inspection

of appellant’s sources of milk, the milk plant and trans-

portation facilities would not be burdensome as a matter

of fact.

The fact that the six mile zone covers a small portion

of the State of Illinois does not make the Beloit Ordinance

less objectionable as to commerce originating in Illinois

more than six miles from the City of Beloit.

The City of Beloit is not at liberty to prohibit inter-

state commerce in the absence of congressional action.

The interstate commerce clause is a grant of power to

Congress to control commerce, and is a diminution pro

tanto of absolute state sovereignty over the same sub-

ject. The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to

create an area of free trade among the several states.

2. The provision of the Beloit Ordinance which pro-

hibits the sale of milk not pasteurized within the six mile

zone is arbitrary, discriminatory, and in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

A city ordinance which arbitrarily draws a line around

the city and prohibits the sale of milk pasteurized beyond

the line under any and all circumstances and conditions

—

10

is arbitrary and discriminatory. Erection of a prohib-

itive trade barrier by a city deprives those who are pre-

vented from competing in the city markets of their prop-

erty and right of contract without due process of law and

denies to them the equal protection of the law.

All courts of last resort in this country except the case

at bar has held similar ordinances in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment. In some of the cases the burden

of inspection was much more onerous than in the case at

bar.

Appellant should not be denied relief because he did

not offer to bear the expenses of inspection, because (1)

he was denied a license on the sole ground that the pas-

teurization plant from which he proposed to obtain milk

was located more than six miles from the City of Beloit,

(2) Appellant tendered all the license fees provided for

in the Ordinance and (3) Appellant has no control over

staffing and regulating the Health Department of the

City of Beloit.

The requirement of the Beloit Ordinance that the pas-

teurizatien plant must be located within six miles of State

Street and East Grand Avenue in said city prohibits in-

terstate commerce of pure, wholesome and sanitary milk

and is therefore unconstitutional.

The trial Court stated in its opinion:

**No objection is raised by the City as to the Grade

or quality of the milk sought to be sold, and it is

conceded that the petitioner has complied with all of

the terms of the Beloit Ordinance, except in the one

respect, that the pasteurization plant of the Dean

Milk Company is located at Chemung, Illinois, a

distance of more than six miles from the City of

Beloit; i. e., a distance of between twenty-five and

thirty-five miles from the point indicated by the

Beloit City Ordinance.’’ (R. 5).

This statement in the trial Court’s opinion under the

Wisconsin law is equivalent to the formal Finding of

Fact, Wolfrom v. Anderson, 249 Wis. 433, 25 N. W. 2d

880.

The parties stipulated in open court that the appellant

had

**Complied with all of the terms of the Citv Or-

dinance in Beloit, except in the one respect, that the

pasteurization plant of the Dean Milk Company is

located at Chemung, Illinois, a distance of more than

six miles from the corner of East Grand Avenue and

State Street in the City of Beloit’’ (R. 8).

The Beloit Ordinance makes no requirement as to the

location of the farms where the milk is produced.

12

It is true that Beloit is located on the state line be-

tween Wisconsin and Illinois and that the circle with the

six mile radius from East Grand Avenue and State Street

includes a small portion of the State of Illinois. The six

mile zone prescribed by the Beloit Ordinance prohibits

the Appellant from selling pasteurized milk within the

city for the sole reason that the milk was pasteurized

at a plant twenty-five to thirty-five miles away from

Beloit.

Both the trial court and the Supreme Court of the State

of Wisconsin held that the provision for the six mile zone

was a valid provision notwithstanding the Interstate

Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States. It stands as a verity

in this case that the milk which the appellant proposed

to sell is pure, wholesome, sanitary and meets all the re-

quirements prescribed by the Beloit Milk Ordinance ex-

cept that it was not pasteurized within the six mile zone.

This position when applied to the appellant is a clear

violation of the Interstate Commerce Clause of the United

States Constitution.

In Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. 8. 1 18 S.

Ct. 757 43 L. Ed. 49 this court held a Pennsylvania Stat-

ute was in violation of the Interstate Commerce Clause

of the Constitution which prohibited the introduction and

sale within its borders of oleomargarine. At page 12 Mr.

Justice Peckham, speaking for the majority of the Court,

stated: Ps)

‘“‘The general rule to be deduced from the deci-

sions of this court is that a lawful article of com-

merce cannot be wholly excluded from importation

into a state from another state where it was manu-

factured or grown. A state has power to regulate

13

the introduction of any article, including a food prod-

uct, so as to insure purity of the article imported,

but such police power does not include the total ex-

clusion even of an article of food.

In Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. 8S. 313, it was held

that an inspection law relating to an article of food

was not a rightful exercise of the police power of

the state if the inspection prescribed were of such a

character or if tt were burdened with such conditions

as would wholly prevent the imtroduction of the sound

article from other states. This was held in relation

to the slaughter of animals whose meat was to .be

sold as food in the state passing the so-called in-

spection law. The principle was affirmed in Brim-

mer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, and im Scott v. Donald,

165 U. S. 58, 97.

Is the rule altered in a case where the inspection

or analysis of the article to be imported is some-

what difficult and burdensome? Can the pure and

healthy food product be totally excluded on that ac-

count? No case has gone to that extent in this court.

The nearest approach to it was the case of Peirce v.

New Hampshire, 46 U. S. 5 How. 504, involving the

importation of intoxicating liquors. But in Leisy v.

Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, the New Hampshire case was

overruled, and it was stated by the present Chief

Justice, in speaking for the court, that ‘whatever our

individual views may be as to the deleterious or dan-

gerous qualities of particular articles, we cannot hold

that any articles which Congress recognizes as sub-

jects of interstate commc¢rce are not such, or that

whatever are thus recognized can be controlled by

state laws amounting to regulations, while they re-

tain that character; although, at the same time, if

directly dangerous in themselves, the state may take

appropriate measures to guard against injury before

it obtains complete jurisdiction over them. To con-

cede to a state the power to exclude, directly or in-

directly, articles so situated, without congressional

permission, is to concede to a majority of the people

of a state, represented in the state legislature, the

14

power to regulate commercial intercourse between

the states, by determining what shall be its subjects,

when that power was distinctly granted to be ex-

ercised by the people of the United States, repre-

sented in Congress, and its possession by the latter

was considered essential to that more perfect union

which the Constitution was adopted to create.’

To the same effect, we think, is the case of Han-

mibal & St. J. Railroad Company v. Husen, 95 VW. S.

465, in which it was said that ‘whatever may be the

power of a state over commerce that is completely

internal, it can no more prohibit or regulate that

which is interstate than it can that which is with

foreign nations.’ The court, therefore, while conced-

ing the right of the state to enact reasonable inspec-

tion laws to prevent the importation of diseased cat-

tle, held the law of Missouri there under considera-

tion to be invalid, because it prohibited absolutely

the introduction of Texas cattle during the time

named in the act, even though they were perfectly

healthy and sound.

The court said that a state could not, under the

cover of exerting its police powers, substantially

prohibit or burden either foreign or interstate com-

merce. Reasonable and appropriate laws for the in-

spection of articles, including food products, were ad-

mitted to be valid, but absolute prohibition of an un-

adulterated, healthy, and pure article has never been

permitted as a remedy against the importation of

that which was adulterated and therefore unhealthy

or impure.

We do not think the fact that the article is subject

to be adulterated by dishonest persons in the course

of its manufacture, with other substances, which it

is claimed may in some instances become deleterious

to health, creates the right in any state through its

legislature to forbid the introduction of the unadul-

terated article into the state. The fact that the arti-

cle is liable to adulteration in the course of manu-

facture, and that the articles with which it may be

15

mixed may possibly and under some circumstances

be deleterious to the health of those who consume it,

is known to us by means of various references to the

subject in books and encyclopaedias, but there was

no affirmative evidence offered on the trial to prove

the fact. From these sources of information it may

be admitted that oleomargerine in the course of its

manufacture may sometimes be adulterated by dis-

honest manufacturers with articles that possibly may

become injurious to health. Conceding the fact, we

yet deny the right of a state to absolutely prohibit

the introduction within its borders of an article of

commerce which is not adulterated and which in its

pure state is healthful, simply because such an arti-

cle in the course of its manufacture may be aculter-

ated by dishonest manufacturers for purposes of

fraud or illegal gains. The bad article may be pro-

hibited, but not the pure and healthy one.

In the execution of its police powers we admit the

right of the state to enact such legislation as it may

deem proper, even in regard to articles of interstate

commerce, for the purpose of preventing fraud or

deception in the sale of any commodity and to the

extent that it may be fairly necessary to prevent

the introduction or sale of an adulterated article

within the limits of the state. But in carrying out

its purposes the state cannot absolutely prohibit the

introduction within the state of an article of com-

merce like pure oleomargarine.’’

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated in its opinion:

‘‘This ordinance does not violate the interstate

commerce clause of the United States constitution.

Milk may be furnished from farms and pasteuriza-

tion plants in the state of Illinois as well as in the

state of Wisconsin, and in fact milk is so furnished.

The production and delivery of milk are essentially

local problems with which congress has not sought

to deal, leaving the city of Beloit free to act in the

exercise of its police powers. State v. Chicago, Mil-

16

waukee d St. Paul R. Co. (1908), 136 Wis. 407, 117

N. W. 686, 19 L. R. A. (N. 8S.) 326; Wadhams Oil

Co. v. Tracy (1909), 141 Wis. 150, 123 N. W. 785.”’

(R. 29-30)

The above pronouncement is in conflict with the deci-

sions of this court upon the meaning and purpose of

the Interstate Commerce Clause of the Constitution of

the United States. The fact that the arbitrary circle

drawn by the city of Beloit around itself includes ap-

proximately one hundred fifteen square miles of terri-

tory of the State of Illinois does not meet the constitu-

tional requirements of Commerce originating beyond the

rim of the circle. If the proposition stated by the Wis-

consin Court is allowed to stand then all interstate com-

merce in this country will soon come to an end. Any

state could effectively prohibit interstate commerce by

allowing importation within its borders of goods pro-

duced within a limited zone beyond its boundaries.

The second proposition of the Wisconsin Court that the

city of Beloit is free to act in the absence of action by

Congress is also in conflict with the decisions of this

Court. This court stated in Freeman v. Hewit, ..U, 8...

67 S. Ct. 274, 276:

*‘Our starting point is clear. In two recent cases

we applied the principle that the Commerce Clause

was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact

laws for the protection and encouragement of com-

merce among the States, but by its own force created

an area of trade free from interference by the States.

In short, the Commerce Clause even without imple-

menting legislation by Congress is a limitation upon

the power of the States. Southern Pacific Co, v. Ari-

zona, 325 U. S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515 89 L. Ed. 1915;

Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. .., 66 S. Ct. 1050,

In so deciding we reaffirmed, upon fullest consider-

ation, the course of adjudication unbroken through

the Nation’s history. This limitation on State power,

ELEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

17

as the Morgan case so well illustrates, does not

merely forbid a State to single out interstate corm-

merce for hostile action. A State is also precluded

from taking any action which may fairly be deemed

to have the effect of impeding the free flow of trade

between States. It is immaterial that local commerce

is subjected to a similar encumbrance. It may com-

mend itself to a State to encourage a pastoral in-

stead of an industrial society. That is its concern

and its privilege. But to compare a State’s treat-

ment of its local trade with the exertion of its au-

thority against commerce in the national domain

is to compare incomparables.

These principles of limitation on State power ap-

ply to all State policy no matter what State interest

gives rise to its legislation. A burden on interstate

commerce is none the lighter and no less objectionable

because it is imposed hy a State under the taxing

power rather than under manifestations of police

power in the conventional sense.’ (Ttalies ours.)

In Carter v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 321 U. 8. 131,

64 S. Ct. 464 at page 137 of U. S. Rep. and 468 of S. Ct.

Rep. :

“That clause remains in the Constitution as a

grant of power to Congress to control commerce and

as a diminution pro tanto of absolute state sover-

eignty over the same subject.”’

In Southern Pac. Co. v. State of Arizona, 325 U. 8.

761, 769, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 1520, this Court stated:

‘*For a hundred years it has been accepted con-

stitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, with-

out the aid of congressional legislation, thus affords

some protection from state legislation inimical to

the national commerce, and that in such cases, where

Congress has not acted, this Court and not the state

legislature, is under the commerce clause the final

arbiter of the competing demands of state and na-

tional interests.”’

18

In McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U. 8. 327, 330,

64 5S. Ct. 1023, 1026 this Court stated:

‘The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was

to create an area of free trade among the several

States.”’

The case of Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. 8. 78, 34 L. Fd.

852 held unconstitutional the statute of the State of Vir-

ginia which provided for inspection of meat that was

transported more than one hundred miles after slaughter

and for an inspection fee of one cent a pound. Rebman

was convicted for the sale of meat from animals slaughi-

tered in [linois. The United States Supreme Court held

the Virginia statute unconstitutional. The Court stated:

**Is the Statute now before us liable to the objec-

tion that, by its necessary operation, it interferes

with the enjoyment of rights granted or secured by

the Constitution? This question admits of but one an-

swer. The Statute is, in effect, a prohibition upon

the sale in Virginia, of beef, veal or mutton, although

entirely wholesome, if from animals slaughtered one

hundred miles or over from the place of sale. We

say prohibition, because the owner of such meats can-

not sell them in Virginia until they are inspected

there; and being required to pay the heavy charge of

one cent per pound to the inspector, as his compensa-

tion, he cannot compete, upon equal terms, in the

markets of that Commonwealth, with those in the

same business, whose meats, of like kind, from ani-

mals slaughtered within less than one hundred miles

from the place of sale, are not subjected to inspec-

tion at all. Whether there shall be inspection or not,

and whether the seller shall compensate the inspec-

tor or not, is thus made to depend entirely upon the

place where the animals, from which the heef, veal

or mutton is taken, were slaughtered. Undoubtedly,

a State may establish regulations for the protection

of its people against the sale of unwholesome meats,

provided such regulations do not conflict with the

ELFEN THO MICHWM —. PHOODES CoOPry

19

powers conferred by the Constitution upon Congress,

or infringe rights granted or secured by that instru-

ment. But it may not, under the guise of exerting

its police powers, or of enacting Inspection Laws,

make discriminations against the products and in-

dustries of some of the States in favor of the prod-

ucts and industries of its own or of other States. The

owner of the meats here in question, although they

were from animals slaughtered in Illinois, had the

right, under the Constitution, to compete in the mar-

kets of Virginia upon terms of equality with the

owners of like meats, from animals slaughtered in

Virginia or elsewhere within one hundred miles from

the place of sale. Any local regulation which, in

terms or by its necessary operation, denies this

equality in the markets of a State, is, when applied

to the people and products or industries of other

States, a direct burden upon commerce among the

States, and therefore void.’’

The right of the City of Beloit to inspect appellant’s

milk before sale is not involved in this case. The provision

of the Ordinance in question simply prohibits the sale of

the milk altogether.

Beloit may regulate the introduction of a food product

in such way as to insure its purity, but such power does

not include the total exclusion of an article of food. 22

Am. Jur. Food Sec. 16 page 817.

The defense in this action consisted chiefly of the prop-

osition that it was too expensive and inconvenient for the

City of Beloit to inspect the additional sources of milk

and the pasteurization plant from which the appellant

would obtain the milk he proposed to sell. There is no

objection to the purity, wholesomeness or sanitation of

the milk which the appellant proposed to sell in Beloit.

The objection is that the City of Beloit does not want to

ineur the inconvenience and expense necessary to satisfy

itself that this milk does comply with the requirements

of its Ordinance.

20

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated in its opinion:

‘‘The city of Beloit has two employees in this de-

partment, the city sanitarian and an assistant, and

proof was offered that to assume the inspection of

the additional plant and farms it would require the

employment of another employee at a cost of $2,400

per year, and if other likewise distant plants were

included it would cost much more. Convenience and

efficiency are self-evident.’’ (R. 28-29)

The record, however, shows that the city sanitarian and

one assistant inspect the Grade A farms furnishing milk

to Beloit about twice a year; that they inspect also 38

restaurants, 16 soda fountains, 18 light lunch establ'sh-

ments, 20 confectionery stores, 81 grocery and meat mar-

kets, 8 bakeries 53 taverns and clubs, 8 dairies and also

supervise the collection of garbage from about 8,500

households, inspect 1,500 people engaged in handling food

and also handle the daily complaints and the quarrantine

of contagious diseases. In their spare time they look

after the correspondence that comes into the office.

The city sanitarian also testified that if additional

farms and pasteurization plants from which the appellant

proposed to obtain his milk were all located within the

six mile zone that he and his assistant would not have

time to inspect them; an additional inspector would cost

the City of Beloit about $200.00 per month plus travelling

expenses and that, ‘‘it would be hard to say whether his

work would be devoted to inspecting additional farms

without first laying out a program.’’ (R. 12-13)

The record shows that the farms and plant from which

the appellant would obtain his milk were inspected by

cities in Illinois obtaining milk from the Dean Milk Com-

pany and by the inspectors of the Dean Milk Company it-

self twice a week. The farms within the six mile zone

furnishing Grade A milk are inspected only twice a year

BLEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

21

by th City of Beloit and those furnishing Grade B milk

are not inspected at all.

Section 11 of the Model Milk Ordinance and Code, re-

commended by the United States Public Health Service

and prepared by direction of the Surgeon General of the

United States provides:

**Sec. 11. Milk and milk products from points

beyond the limits of routine inspection—Milk and

milk products from points beyond the limits of rou-

tine inspection of the city of may not be sold

in the city of , or its police jurisdiction, unless

produced and/or pasteurized under provisions equi-

valent to the requirements of this ordinance: Pro-

vided, That the health officer shall satisfy himself

that the health officer having jurisdiction over the

production and processing is properly enforcing such

provisions.’

The provision of the Model Milk Code is perfectly rea-

sonable and is an adequate safeguard to insure the purity

and sanitation of the milk—in fact, the Beloit Milk

Ordinance, Sec. (X) (6) authorizes a similar procedure.

This section provides:

**(6) The Health Officer or any officially appointed

representative he may so designate shall inspect

periodically or at such time as convenient or which

expediency may require, every dairy farm producing

milk and cream for consumption within the city of

Beloit and all milk plants whose milk and cream are

intended for consumption within the city of Beloit.’’

Section (X) (7) of the Beloit Milk Ordinance author-

izes the health officer to examine samples of the milk and

to make all of the tests recommended by the American

Public Health Association and Association of Official

Agricultural Chemists to determine the purity and sani-

tation of the milk.

22

The milk which the appellant proposed to furnish is

regularly inspected twice a week both as to the sources of

the milk and pasteurization plant and the means of trans-

portation by cities with ordinances just as exacting and

stringent as the Beloit City Ordinance. The city sani-

tarian of Beloit, with little expense and inconvenience,

could easily determine whether or not this inspection was

being made in the proper manner and whether or not the

requirements of the Ordinances of the Illinois cities were

being met.

The location of the pasteurization plant 25 or 35 miles

from the City of Beloit in this day of modern roads and

automobiles presents no great inconvenience. As to the

inspection of the additional farms the Beloit City Or-

dinance prescribes no limitation as to the location of the

farms; the six mile limit applies only to the pasteuriza-

tion plant.

In view of the frank admission of the city sanitarian

that he would be unable to inspect the additional farms

and the pasteurization plant even if they were located

within the six mile limit destroys the excuse that the

appellant should be barred from engaging in Interstate

Commerce because of the inconvenience and expense in

determining whether or not his product is pure, whole-

some and sanitary.

The same excuse that the city of Beloit makes was

made by the State of Minnesota and denied by this Court

in the case of State of Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S.

313, 34 L. Ed. 455. That case involved the sale of fresh

meat. It is common knowledge that fresh meat is subject

to contamination to an equal extent as milk. The Minne-

sota statute prohibited the sale of fresh meat in Minne-

sota unless the animal had been inspected in Minnesota

before slaughter. Barber was convicted of selling meat

ELEED THROUGH ~— POOR COPY

23

in Minnesota which had been slaughtered in Illinois. The

State of Minnesota argued that it could not determine

whether or not the animal was healthy by merely inspect-

ing the meat when it was offered for sale. The State of

Minnesota contended that it could only be determined

whether or not the anima] was healthy by inspecting the

animal before slaughter. It also contended that it had a

right to have this fact determined by its own inspectors

and that it was too inconvenient and expensive ior its

inspectors to go to [llinois and other states and inspect

the animal before slaughter. This contention was rejected

by the United States Supreme Court and this Court

stated at page 458:

‘*On the contrary, the enactment of a similar

statute by each one of the States composing the

Union would result in the destruction of commerce

among the several States, so far as such commerce

is involved in the transportation from one part of

the country to another of animal meats designed

for human food, and entirely free from disease.

* * * When to this is added the fact that the Statute,

by its necessary operation, prohibits the sale, in

the State, of fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or pork,

from animals that may have been inspected carefully

and thoroughly in the State where they were slaugh-

tered, and before they were slaughtered, no doubt

can remain as to its effect upon commerce among

the several States. Jt will not do to say—certainly

no judicial tribunal can, with propriety, assume—that

the people of Minnesota may not, with due regard

to their health, rely wpon inspections in other States

of animals there slaughtered for purposes of human

food. Tf the object of the Statute had been to deny

altogether to the citizens of other States the privi-

lege of selling, within the limits of Minnesota, for

human food, any fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or

pork, from animals slaughtered outside of that State,

and to compel the people of Minnesota, wishing to

buy such meats, either to purchase those taken from

24

animals inspected and slaughtered in the State, or

to incur the cost of purchasing them, when desired

for their own domestic use, at points beyond the

State, that object is attained by the Act in question.

Our duty to maintain the Constitution will not permit

us to shut our eyes to these obvious and necessary

results of the Minnesota Statute. If this legislation

does not make such discrimination against the prod-

ucts and business of other States in favor of the

products and business of Minnesota, as interferes

with and burdens commerce among the several States,

it would be difficult to enact legislation that would

have that result.’’

In the lower courts, the case of Muller v. Williams, 12

Federal Supp. 236 held unconstitutional a regulation of

the Health Commissioner of Baltimore City which pro-

hibited the use or sale of cream for the manufacture of

ice cream produced by dairies situated more than fifty

miles from the City limits. The plaintiff, a citizen of

Pennsylvania, with principal place of business at Phila-

dephia, sought an injunction against the regulation. The

City defended upon the ground that ‘‘there are more

than 4,000 dairy farms within the 50 mile limit from

Baltimore and the number of available inspectors is, as

a matter of reasonable expense, necessarily limited. With

regard to distantly located dairy plants, for instance

those in Wisconsin, it is said to be impossible to make

such frequent inspections and to carry on such educa-

tional work as is possible within a limited distance from

Baltimore City.’’ Judge Chestnut held the regulation to

be in conflict with both the Due Process and Interstate

Commerce Clauses of the Constitution. In his opinion,

he stated:

‘‘In my opinion the regulation is invalid, when

attacked as unreasonable. by a directly interested

party producing milk within the State of Maryland

(in the absence of a state statute) outside the zone

BLEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

25

or from the point of view of being a direct burden

upon interstate commerce. From the latter aspect,

the applicable principles of constitutional law are

now well settled. Freedom of commerce between

the states is the rule and not the exception. Under

the Constitution it may be regulated by Congress but

unless otherwise specifically so regulated, the states

may exercise their police power by statute and may

authorize their municipal corporations to do so by

ordinances, provided the latter are reasonably

adapted to the legitimate end of protecting the

health, morals and welfare of the community. But

when local regulations under the guise of police

power are not reasonably adapted to accomplish

these legitimate ends and constitute a direct burden

upon interstate commerce, they must fall, 12 C. J.

52, 60, 81. The principle here involved has been

very recently applied by the Supreme Court of the

United States to interstate shipments of milk in the

ease of Baldwin, Commissioner v. Seelig, 294 U. S.

511, 55 S. Ct. 497, 79 L. Ed. 1032. There a statute

of New York which required a minimum price to

be paid producers of milk within the State and

further provided that no milk from other states

should be sold in New York unless the same minimum

prices were paid to producers in foreign states, was

held unconstitutional as applied to interstate ship-

ments of milk from Vermont, when sold in the

original package, whether in the cans in which

transported or as milk bottled therefrom. Said Mr.

Justice Cardozo (294 U. S. 511, pages 521, 522, 55

S. Ct. 497, 499, 79 L. Ed. 1032):

‘New York is equally without power to prohibit

the introduction within her territory of milk of whole-

some quality acquired in Vermont, whether at high

prices or at low ones. * * * Such a power, if ex-

erted, will set a barrier to traffic hetween one state

and another as effective as if customs duties, equal

to the price differential, iad been laid upon the thing

transported. Imposts or duties upon commerce with

other countries are placed, by an express prohibi-

26

tion of the Constitution, beyond the power of a state,

‘*except what may be absolutely necessary for exe-

euting its inspection Laws.’’ Constitution, art 1,

$10, cl. 2; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 19

L. Ed. 382. Imposts and duties upon interstate com-

merce are placed beyond the power of a state, with-

out the mention of an exception, by the provision

committing commerce of that order to the power of

the Congress. Constitution, Art. 1 48, cl. 3. ‘‘It is

the established doctrine of this court that a state

may not, in any form or under any guise, directly

burden the prosecution of interstate business.’’* * *

Nice distinctions have been made at times between

direct and indirect burdens. They are irrelevant

when the avowed purpose of the obstruction, as well

as its necessary tendency, is to suppress or mitigate

the consequences of competition between the states.

Such an obstruction is direct by the very terms of

the hypothesis. We are reminded in the opinion

below that a chief occasion of the commerce clauses

was ‘‘the mutual jealousies and aggressions of the

States, taking form in customs barriers and other

economic retaliation.’’ ’

“Tf the principle of this regulation is once es-

tablished as to milk it could seemingly be extended

to other food products such as vegetables, fruits and

meats, which are likewise subject, although perhaps

in less stringent degree, to food inspection and ex-

clusion laws, but only when reasonable. * * * The

result might well be that Baltimore would be made

an isolated sanitary area for much of its food sup-

ply, although it is certainly not intended to suggest

that such an unreasonable extension of the prin-

ciple is at all likely to be proposed by our very

efficient Health Commissioner. The principle, how-

ever, is one that runs directly counter to the consti-

tutional freedom of the interstate commerce.’’

* * -_ * .

‘*The real objection of the Health Department to

the foreign cream is based on the alleged impractica-

BLEED THROUGH ~ POOR COPY

27

bility of adequate and effective supervision by its

own representatives of the dairy farms which pro-

duce the milk supply from remotely situated foreign

dairy plants. This of itself is not a sufficient basis

for excluding the cream although very probably it

would support regulations of a somewhat different

nature than those applicable to the local supply

which would afford every reasonable assurance to

the Health Commissioner for the protection of the

health of the community.’’

It is submitted that the provision of the Beloit Ordi-

nance which requires milk to be pasteurized within the

six mile zone is in violation of the Interstate Commerce

Clause of the Constitution of the United States.

II.

The provision of the Beloit Ordinance which prohibits

the sale of milk not pasteurized within the six mile zone

is arbitrary, discriminatory and in violation of the 14th

Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The philosophy of the opinion of both the trial and

Supreme Court of Wisconsin was that the City of Beloit

could make arrangements to inspect enough of the sur-

rounding territory to supply it with milk and prohibit

entry of milk originating beyond the artificial line pre-

scribed by the Ordinance. This philosophy is set forth

in the following quotation from the opinion of the Snu-

preme Court of the State of Wisconsin:

**It cannot be said that the city, in adopting the

section in dispute, arbitrarily acted on the question

of convenience, efficiency, and cost of inspection,

unless we adopt the rule in the case of Meridian v.

Sippy, 54 Cal. App. (2d) 214, 128 Pac. (2d) 884,

where the court said that milk production is a legiti-

mate business and so long as persons engaged in the

28

business put out a clean, pure and wholesome product

it should be permitted to flow freely on the markets,

unburdened by duplication of imspection and pro-

hibitive trade barriers, which rule we do not adopt.

(Italies ours).

**Counsel for appellant relies on State ex rel. Lar-

son v. City of Minneapolis, supra, and La Francei v.

City of Santa Rosa, 8 Cal. (2d) 331, 65 Pace. (2d)

1301. In each instance the city passed an ordinance

restricting the sale of milk in their respective cities

to that pasteurized in plants located within the city

limits of the particular city. No consideration was

given to the area necessary to furnish the milk, and

the plants near the cities in question were arbi-

trarily prohibited from selling milk in the city. No

inspection of the farms producing the milk was pro-

vided for in the ordinances, making the facts entirely

different from those under consideration. Every

ordinance must stand or fall upon its own merits.

It is either reasonable or arbitrary in accordance

with the facts and purposes it is intended to serve,

if within the police powers of the municipality adopt-

ing it. The area necessary to be included in the ordi-

nance could well depend upon the population to be

served, the amount of milk produced, and the loca-

tion of the pasteurization plants with reference to

the population to be served. A reasonable exercise

of police power is not a trade barrier, and contract

rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment

of the federal constitution do not have a superior

right to the right of a municipality to reasonably

protect the health of its citizens.’’ (Italics ours)

(R. 29).

The six mile zone was drawn without reasonable rela-

tion to the supposed object to be obtained by the city.

The chief health officer of the city testified that with his

present staff they would be unable to inspect the milk

plant and the additional farms from which the appellant

proposed to obtain his milk even though the plant and

farms were located within the six mile zone.

BLEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

29

This means that the city arbitrarily limited the busi-

ness to those who were already engaged in the business

and prohibited newcomers from competing for the busi-

ness.

Under the doctrine above announced by the Supreme

Court of the State of Wisconsin every city and village

could build a trade barrier around itself and include so

much of the surrounding territory as the city deemed

necessary to serve the population and to suit its own

convenience as to inspection. This doctrine is not con-

fined merely to milk, other articles of food such as meat,

bakery goods, fruits and vegetables are subject to being

inspected. Any article of food which the city has a right

to inspect to determine its fitness for human consump-

tion could be excluded from Interstate Commerce if it

originated or was produced beyond the artificial line

which the city saw fit to draw around itself.

Every decision of the Courts of last resort in this

country has held such requirements to be in violation

of due process of law-excepting the decision here under

review.

State ex rel. Larson v. City of Minneapolis 190 Minn.

138, 251 N. W. 121 was a mandamus to compel the re-

spondents to issue to relator a license to sell pasteurized

milk and its products within the City of Minneapolis.

The question presented involved the constitutionality

of a city ordinance which made it unlawful to sell pas-

teurized milk in Minneapolis unless it was pasteurized

in plants located within the city limits.

Petitioner’s plant was located 30 miles beyond the city —

limits.

The trial court found that the inspection necessary to

safeguard the public health:

30

‘*is attended with substantial public expense, which

is greater or less according to the distance to be

traveled by the inspectors for the purpose of mak-

ing such inspection”’

and that this ordinance was reasonable in that respect.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the trial court

and stated in the opinion:

“‘The issue, then, is limited to the question of

whether or not provision by the city for adequate

inspection of relator’s pasteurization plant, trans-

portation facilities, etc., is so expensive and incon-

venient to the city as to justify prohibition by it of

relator’s established business unless he moves his

pasteurization plant into the city.’’

‘“‘If the inspection fee is deemed insufficient, there

appears to be no good reason why such insufficiency

can not be remedied in a manner that would impose

no unjust hardship on any one concerned. There is

nothing in the record to show what, if any, incon-

venience the city may be put to that would justify

such a harsh requirement as provided by the ordi-

nance. We are obliged to hold that the ordinance,

in so far as it prohibits the sale of pasteurized

milk or its products in the city of Minneapolis, unless

the same shall have been pasteurized in a pasteuriza-

tion plant located within the city limits, violated

relator’s constitutional rights of property and con-

tract. The restriction contained therein goes ‘beyond

the reasonable demands of the occasion,’ and is not

adaptable to the end sought.’’

In the Larson case Ninety-seven per cent (97%) of

the milk and Ninety-nine and one-tenth per cent (99.1%)

of the cream consumed in the city were pasteurized in

plants located within the city limits; the city ‘had three

milk inspectors, one inspected raw milk and two pas-

teurized milk. One of the latter spent one-half of his

time on plants located outside of the city. Notwithstand-

ing these facts the Minnesota court stated:

ELEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

31

‘“‘The restriction contained therein goes ‘beyond

the reasonable demands of the occasion,’ and is not

adaptable to the end sought.’’

The trial court in the case at bar stated in its opinion:

‘“‘The petitioner herein has made no offer to as-

sume or repay the additional expense necessary to

have such additional inspections made.’’ (R. 6).

The answer to that proposition is that the Beloit City

Ordinance makes no provision for payment of any of the

expenses of inspection, and the appellant has no control

over the staffing and regulating of the Health Depart-

ment of the City of Beloit.

The same argument was made in the Larson case and

that was answered by the Supreme Court of Minnesota:

“If the inspection fee is deemed insufficient, there

appears to be no good reason why such insufficiency

ean not be remedied in a manner that would impose

no unjust hardship on any one concerned.’’

Furthermore, the objection made by the trial court

is not apropos to the case at bar because the license was

refused to the appellant on the sole ground that the

pasteurization: plant from which he proposed to obtain

his milk was not located within the six mile zone.

Sheffield Farms Co., Inc. v. Seaman, 114 N. J. L. 455,

177 A. 372 was a proceeding in certiorari to review the

action of the Health Department of the City of Perth

Amboy, N. J. in refusing to grant petitioner a permit to

sell and distribute its milk in Perth Amboy.

The Health Department refused the permit because it

did not have sufficient personnel or funds to inspect peti-

tioner’s milk. The Department was already inspecting

21 duly licensed distributors, 350 licensed retailers and

2,000 separate sources of milk.

32

The city had an adequate supply of milk and the price

was fixed by the State Milk Control Board.

The Supreme Court set the refusal aside, stating:

‘It is next urged that the refusal was based on

a sound discretion lodged in those possessing the

power to grant the permit. This is not so. There is

no such discretion in the granting power in the

premises. Moreover, even if such an unreasonable,

arbitrary, and capricious discretion were delegated

or vested in the granting power it would be illegal.

‘*It is further contended for the respondents that

the permit was refused in order to conserve public

health and safety, and that the city is without funds

to inspect and supervise the sources of prosecutor’s

supply of milk.

‘*Here, again, the argument finds no support in

the record of the stipulated facts. Respondents con-

cede that they have no knowledge respecting the

quality of prosecutor’s milk and milk products, or

the sanitary condition under which its milk is pro-

duced, handled, or marketed. It clearly could not,

therefore, form a judgment of refusal to grant the

permit on unknown or undetermined facts. Nor does

the mere lack of funds to investigate the facts justify

the refusal. The Legislature has provided for such

a contingency. See section 10, chapter 131, P. L.

1932, p. 222, at p. 235 N. J. St. Annual 1932, p. 81-

162A (10).

**Tt will serve no useful purpose to answer or

further discuss the purported reason argued upon

which the refusal is sought to be justified. Suffice

it to say that the meager facts, relevant as to the

occasion and history of the refusal, lead us to the

conclusion that they are without substance. They are

excuses rather than legal reasons. The city just

took the position that it had enough milk dealers

and that it had the situation ‘well in hand.’ Such

a position is unreasonable; it is arbitrary, capricious,

and discriminatory. It unlawfully curtails prose-

ELEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

33

cutor’s common-law right to engage in a lawful busi-

ness, notwithstanding that it has fully complied with

the requirements of the state and city. This the city

cannot lawfully do.

‘‘The refusal is set aside, with costs.’’

LaFranchi v. City of Santa Rosa, 8 Cal. (2d) 331,

6& P. (2d) 1301, was an action for declaratory relief.

The ordinance prohibited sale of milk within Santa Rosa

that was pasteurized outside of the city limits. The Su-

preme Court of California reversed the lower court and

held the ordinance unconstitutional. After reviewing the

eases from other jurisdictions the Supreme Court stated

(page 1304):

‘** * * In other words, it has been held quite

generally that the city limits as the boundary line

outside of which plants may not be located if the

milk is to be sold within the city do not aave a rea-

sonable relationship to a proper legislative object

and gnm ordinances fixing such a boundary are

invalid.

**In line with the authorities from other jurisdic-

tions from which we have quoted are those from our

own courts declaring that ordinances designed for

the purpose of erecting tariff barriers are void.

* @ @))

Meridian v. Sippy, 54 Cal. App. (2d) 214, 128 P. (2d)

884, held invalid an ordinance of the City of Stockton.

The effect of the ordinance was to prevent milk from

being brought beyond the boundaries of San Joaquin

County and sold in Stockton. The upper court held that

the ordine:. > violated both the California Statute and

Constitutic.., at page 886, the court stated:

**If the position of respondent is sound, it may

lead to dire results. It would be possible for every

city in the State of California to erect prohibitive

trade barriers around the boundary of the county

34

of its locale; not only milk, but many other food

products designed for human consumption could be

barred in this same manner. The free flow of goods

from one community to another is conducive to the

general prosperity and economic welfare of the state

and nation. Furthermore, milk production is a legi-

timate business; millions of dollars in this state are

invested in this industry, and so long as the per-

sons engaged in this business put out a clean, pure

and wholesome product, a way should be found to

allow their products to flow freely in the market,

unburdened by duplication of inspection and pro-

hibitive trade barriers, and if the present law on our

statute books can be given a reasonable construction

which will bring about this result, it should be given

such construction.’’

At page 888:

‘*Any ordinance or statute which prevents any

person from engaging in a lawful business cannot

be upheld unless protection of life, health or prop-

erty makes it reasonably necessary. Such is not the

case The contention of respondent if approved

might ult in the erection of trade barriers that

would affect the economic prosperity of the whole

state.’’

Grant v. Leavell, 259 Ky. 267, 82 S. W. (2d) 283,

held invalid an ordinance of Louisville which prohibited

the sale of milk from plants located outside of Louis-

ville and not engaged in business when the ordinance

was enacted. Plaintiff built his plant after the ordinance

was enacted and outside of Louisville. Plaintiff sought

to sell Grade A raw milk in Louisville. The court held

the ordinance unreasonable and unconstitutional. At page

285 the court stated:

‘“‘The general. rule as to the regulations in the

sale of ordinary articles of commerce, such as milk,

is only that they must be reasonable to be valid.’’

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35

‘‘Loaf Baking Co. v. Pace (Tex. Civ. App.), 19 S.

W. (2d) 459; City of Des Moines v. Fowler (lowa),

255 N. W. 880; Whitney v. Watson, et al., 85 N. H.

238, 157 A. 78, 86. In the last mentioned case, the

principles applicable to regulation of the sale of

milk were thus stated: ‘Dairy products are normally

legitimate subjects of commerce, interference with

which is justifiable only so far as the protection

of the public health requires. To that extent the

Legislature may regulate and limit their sales. Be-

yond this, the marketing of such products is a mat-

ter of right. It is in the interest of the purchasing

public as well as of the producer that a license be

granted the latter when he has fulfilled the legisla-

tive requirements.’’

Prescott v. City of Borger (Tex. App.) 158 8S. W.

(2d) 578, involved an ordinance of the City of Borger.

The ordinance prohibited sale of milk not pasteurized

within the county. Plaintiff’s plant was 60 miles away

and in another county. The Court held the ordinance

was in conflict with both the Texas Statute and Consti-

tution.

The attorney-General of Michigan on November 6,

1946, ruled that a milk ordinance prescribing a 30 mile

limit for the City of Midland, Michigan, was invalid

and in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. We have

set this opinion out in full in the appendix of this brief.

We submit that the provision of the Beloit Milk Ordi-

nance prohibiting the sale of the milk within the city

which is pasteurized in plants located outside the six

mile zone is in violation of the Interstate Commerce

Clause of the United States and that it deprives the ap-

pellant of his property rights and the right to contract

in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-

stitution of the United States; that the said provision is

arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory and that the

36

judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Wis-

consin should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Ciaupe D. Srovrt,

Milton, Wisconsin,

Attorney for Appellant.

Grorce S. Gerrs,

Jacos Gerrs,

Eu Brock,

of McGowan, Geffs, Geffs & Block,

Janesville, Wisconsin,

Of Counsel.

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PUBLIC HEALTH BULLETIN.

No. 220

(1939 Edition)

UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE MILK

ORDINANCE

(This unabridged form of the ordinance should be

adopted only where the short enabling form in part I

is not considered legal.)

An ordinance defining ‘‘milk’’ and certain ‘‘milk prod-

ucts,’’ ‘‘milk producer,’’ ‘‘pastewrization,’’ etc., prohibit-

ing the sale of adulterated and misbranded milk and milk

products, requiring permits for the sale of milk and milk

products, regulating the inspection of dairy farms and

milk plants, the examination, grading, labeling, placard-

ing, pasteurization, regrading, distribution, and sale of

milk and milk products, providing for the publishing of

milk grades, the construction of future dairies and milk

plants, the enforcement of this ordinance, and the fixing

of penalties.

Be it ordained by the of the city

of as follows:

Secrion 1. Definitions —The following definitions shall

apply in the interpretation and the enforcement of this

ordinance :

A. Milk.—Milk is hereby defined to be the lacteal secre-

tion obtained by the complete milking of one or more

38

healthy cows, excluding that obtained within 15 days

before and 5 days after calving, or such longer period

as may be necessary to render the milk practically colo-

strum free; which contains not less than 8 percent of

milk solids not fat, and not less than 3% percent of milk

fat.

B. Milk fat or butter fat—Milk fat or butter fat is the

fat of milk.

C. Cream and sour cream.—Cream is a portion of

milk which contains less than 18 percent milk fat. Sour

cream is cream the acidity of which is more than 0.20

pereent, expressed as lactie acid.

D. Skimmed milk.—Skimmed milk is milk from which

a sufficient portion of milk fat has been removed to re-

duce its milk-fat percentage to less than 3% percent.

E. Milk or skimmed-milk beverage—A milk beverage

or a skimmed-milk beverage is a food compound or con-

fection consisting of milk or skimmed milk, as the case

may be, to which has been added a sirup or flavor con-

sisting of wholesome ingredients.

F. Buttermilk.—Buttermilk is a product resulting from

the churning of milk or cream, or from the souring or

treatment by a lactic acid or other culture of milk,

skimmed milk, reconstituted skimmed milk, evaporated

or condensed milk or skimmed milk, or milk or skimmed-

milk powder. It contains not less than 8 percent of milk

solids not fat.

G. Vitamin D milk.—Vitamin D milk is milk the vita-

min D content of which has been increased by a method

and in an amount approved by the health officer.

H. Reconstituted or recombined milk and cream.—Re-

constituted or recombined milk is a product resulting

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39

from the recombining of milk constituents with water,

and which complies with the standards for milk fat and

solids not fat of milk as defined herein. Reconstituted

or recombined cream is a product resulting from the

combination of dried cream, butter, or butter fat with

cream, milk, skimmed milk, or water.

I. Goat milk.—Goat milk is the lacteal secretion, free

from colostrum, obtained by the complete milking of

healthy goats, and shall comply with all the requirements

of this ordinance. The word ‘‘cows’’ shall be interpreted

to include goats.

J. Homogenized milk—Homogenized milk is milk

which has been treated in such manner as to insure

break-up of the fat globules to such an extent that after

48 hours storage no visible cream separation occurs on

the milk and the fat percentage of the top 100 ec.

of milk in a quart bottle, or of proportionate volumes

in containers of other sizes, does not differ by more than

5 percent of itself from the fat percentage of the re-

maining milk as determined after thorough mixing.

K. Milk products.—Milk products shall be taken to

mean and include cream, sour cream, homogenized milk,

goat milk, vitamin D milk, buttermilk, skimmed milk,

reconstituted or recombined milk and cream, milk bev-

erages, skimmed-milk beverages, and any other product

made by the addition of any substance to milk or any

of these products and used for similar purposes and

designated as a milk product by the health officer.

L. Pasteurization.—The terms ‘‘pasteurization,’’ ‘‘pas-

teurized,’’ and similar terms shall be taken to refer to

the process of heating every particle of milk or milk

products to at least 143° F., and holding at such tem-

40

perature for at least 30 minutes, or to at least 160° F.,

and holding at such temperature for at least 15 seconds,

in approved and properly operated equipment: Provided,

That nothing contained in this definition shall be con-

strued as disbarring any other process which has been

demonstrated to be equally efficient and is approved by

the State health authority.

M. Adulterated milk and milk products —Any milk

or milk product which contains any unwholesome sub-

stance, or which if defined in this ordinance does not

conform with its definition, or which carries a grade

label unless such grade label has been awarded by the

health officer and not revoked, shall be deemed adul-

terated and misbranded.

N. Milk producer.—A milk producer is any person who

owns or controls one or more cows a part or all of the

milk or milk products from which is sold or offered for

sale.

O. Milk distributor —A milk distributor is any person

who offers for sale or sells to another any milk or milk

products for human consumption as such.

P. Dairy or dairy farm.—A dairy or dairy farm is

any place or premises where one or more cows are kept,

a part or all of the milk or milk products from which

is sold or offered for sale.

Q. Milk plant.—A milk plant is any place or premises

or establishment where milk or milk products are col-

lected, handled, processed, stored, bottled, pasteurized,

or prepared for distribution.

R. Health officer—The term ‘‘health officer’’ shall

mean the health authority of the city of......... pecctiliened , or his

authorized representative.

ELEED THROUGH ~— POOR COPY

41

S. Average bacterial plate count, direct microscopic

count, reduction time, and cooling temperature.—Average

bacterial plate count and average direct microscopic

count shall be taken to mean the logarithmic average,

and average reduction time and average cooling tem-

perature shal] be taken to mean the arithmetic average,

of the respective results of the last four consecutive

samples, taken upon separate days, irrespective of the

date of grading or regrading.

T. Grading period——The grading period shall be such

period of time as the health officer may designate within

which grades shall be determined for all milk and milk

products, provided that the grading period shall in no

case exceed 6 months.

U. Person.—The word ‘‘person’’ as used in this ordi-

nance shall mean ‘‘person, firm, corporation, or associa-

tion.”’

_ V. And/or.—Where the term ‘‘and/or’’ is used ‘‘and’’

shall apply where possible, otherwise ‘‘or’’ shall apply.

Seo. 2. The sale of adulterated milk, or ungraded milk

or milk products prohibited—No person shall within the

I i ccageleates , or its police jurisdiction, produce,

sell, offer, or expose for sale, or have in possession

with intent to sell, any milk or milk product which is

adulterated, misbranded, or ungraded. It shall be un-

lawful for any person, elsewhere than in a private home,

to have in possession any adulterated; misbranded, or

ungraded milk or milk product.

Sec. 3. Permits—It shall be unlawful for any person

to bring into or receive into the city of —........... + or its

police jurisdiction, for sale, or to sell, or offer for sale

therein, or to have in storage where milk or milk prod-

ucts are sold or served, any milk or milk product defined

42

in this ordinance, who does not possess a permit from

the health officer of the city of ................. =

Only a person who complies with the requirements of

this ordinance shall be entitled to receive and retain

such a permit.

Such a permit may be suspended by the health officer,

or revoked after an opportunity for a hearing by the

health officer, upon the violation by the holder of any

of the terms of this ordinance.

Sec. 4. Labeling and placarding.—All bottles, cans,

packages, and other containers enclosing milk or any

milk product defined in this ordinance shall be plainly

labeled or marked with (1) the name of the contents as

given in the definitions in this ordinance; (2) the grade

of the contents; (3) the word ‘‘pasteurized’’ only if the

contents have been pasteurized; (4) the word ‘‘raw”’

only if the contents are raw; (5) the phrase ‘‘for pas-

teurization’’ if the contents are to be pasteurized; (6)

the name of the producer if the contents are raw, and

the name of the plant at which the contents were pas-

teurized, if the contents are pasteurized; and (7) in the

case of Vitamin D milk, the designation ‘‘Vitamin D

Milk’’ and the source of the vitamin D. The label or

mark shall be in letters of a size, kind, and color ap-

proved by the health officer and shall contain no marks

or words which are misleading.

Every restaurant, cafe, soda fountain, or other estab-

lishment serving milk or milk products shall display at

all times, in a place designated by the health officer, a

notice approved by the health officer, stating the lowest

grade of milk and/or milk products served.‘

in which only grade A milk or only certified

grade A pasteurized are permitted to be sold may

ry and

delete this paragraph and nevertheless be recognized as having adopted

ordinance.

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43

Sec. 5. Inspection of dairy farms and milk plants for

the purpose of grading or regrading.—At least once dur-

ing each grading period the health officer shall inspect

all dairy farms and al] milk plants whose milk or milk

products are intended for consumption within the city of

SS , or its police jurisdiction. In case the health

officer discovers the violation of any item of sanitation,

he shall make a second inspection after a lapse of such

time as he deems necessary for the defect to be reme-

died, but not before the lapse of 3 days; and the second

inspection shall be used in determining the grade of milk

and/or milk products. Any violation of the same item of

this ordinance on two consecutive inspections shall call

for immediate degrading.

One copy of the inspection report shall be posted by

the health officer in a conspicuous place upon an inside

wall of one of the dairy farm or milk plant buildings, and

said inspection report shall not be defaced or removed by

any person except the health officer. Another copy of

the inspection report shall be filed with the records of

the health department.

Sec. 6. The examination of milk and milk products.—

During each grading period at least four samples of milk

and cream from each dairy farm and each milk plant

shal] be taken on separate days and examined by the

health officer. Samples of other milk products may be

taken and examined by the health officer as often as he

deems necessary. Samples of milk and milk products

from stores, cafes, soda fountains, restaurants, and

other places where milk or milk products are sold shall

be examined as often as the health officer may require.

Bacterial plate counts and direct microscopic counts shall

be made in conformity with the latest standard methods

recommended by the American Public Health Associ-

44

ation.” Examinations may include such other chemical

and physical determinations as the health officer may

deem necessary for the detection of adulteration, these

examinations to be made in accordance with the latest

standard methods of the American Public Health Associ-

ation and the Association of Official Agricultural Chem-

ists." Samples may be taken by the health officer at

any time prior to the final delivery of the milk or milk

products. All proprietors of stores, cafes, restaurants,

soda fountains, and other similar places shall furnish

the health officer, upon his request, with the names of all

distributors from whom their milk and milk products

are obtained. Bio-assays of the vitamin D content of

vitamin D milk shall be made when required by the

health officer in a laboratory approved by him for such

examinations.

Whenever the average bacterial count, the average

reduction time, or the average cooling temperature falls

beyond the limit for the grade then held, the health of-

ficer shall send written notice thereof to the person con-

cerned, and shall take an additional sample, but not

before the lapse of 3 days, for determining a new average

in accordance with section 1 (S). Violation of the grade

requirement by the new average or by any subsequent

average during the remainder of the current grading

period shall call for immediate degrading or suspension

S Municipalities in which the adoption of legislation by reference

is not considered legal may substitute the following wording: “* * *

in conformity with the regulations of the health officer (or board of

speci may be treated in the same manner, such as

the requirements the Association of Medical Milk Com-

missions under the definition of certified milk-raw, uirements

modified accredited areas in item ir, and the U. S. Public Health

Service milk code in section 154.

BLEED THROUGH ~ POOR COPY

45

of the permit, unless the last individual result is within

the grade limit.

Seo. 7. The grading of milk and milk products.—At

least once every 6 months the health officer shall an-

nounce the grades of all milk and milk products deliv-

ered by all producers or distributors and ultimately

consumed within the city of ~................ , or its police

jurisdiction. Said grades shall be based upon the follow-

ing standards, the grading of milk products being iden-

tical with the grading of milk except that the bacterial

standards shall be doubled in the case of cream, and

omitted in the case of sour cream and buttermilk. Vita-

man D milk shall be only of grade A or grade B pas-

teurized, certified, or grade A raw quality.

Certified milk-raw.—Certified milk-raw is raw milk

which conforms with the requirements of the American

Association of Medical Milk Commissions‘ in force at

the time of production and is produced under the super-

vision of a medical milk commission and of the State

board of health or of the city or county health officer

Grade A raw milk.—Grade A raw milk is raw milk the

average bacterial plate count of which as determined

under sections 1 (S) and 6 of this ordinance does not

exceed 50,000 per cubic centimeter, or the average direct

microscopic count of which does not exceed 50,000 per

cubic centimeter if clumps are counted or 200,000 per

cubic centimeter if individual organisms are counted, or

the average reduction time of which is not less than 8

hours: Provided, That if it is to be pasteurized the

corresponding limits shall be 200,000 per cubie centi-

meter, 200,000 per cubic centimeter, 800,000 per cubic

* See footnote 5, p. 7.

46

centimeter, and 6 hours, respectively; and which is pro-

duced upon dairy farms conforming with all of the fol-

lowing items of sanitation.

Irem lr. Cows, tuberculosis and other diseases.—Ex.-

cept as provided hereinafter, a taberculin test of all

herds and additions thereto shall be made before any

milk therefrom is sold, and at least once every 12 months

tnereafter, by a licensed veterinarian approved by the

State livestock sanitary authority. Said tests shall be

made and reactors disposed of in accordance with the

requirements approved by the United States Department

of Agriculture, Bureau of Animal Industry,* for accred-

ited herds. A certificate signed by the veterinarian or

attested to by the health officer and filed with the health

officer shall be evidence of the above test: Provided, That

in modified accredited counties in which the modified

accredited area plan is applied to the dairy herds the

modified accredited area system approved by the United

States Bureau of Animal Industry‘ shall be accepted

in lieu of annual testing.

Within ........... " years after the adoption of this ordi-

nance all milk and milk products consumed raw shall

be from herds or additions thereto which have been

found free from Bang’s disease, as shown by blood serum

tests for agglutinins against Brucella abortus made in a

laboratory approved by the health officer. All such herds

shall be retested at least every 12 months and all reac-

tors removed from the herd. A certificate identifying

each animal by number, and signed by the laboratory

making the test, shall be evidence of the above test.

Cows which show an extensive or entire induration of

one or more quarters of the udder upon physical exami-

* See footnote 5, p. 7.

* The number should be inserted when the ordinance is adopted. It

should not exceed 6 if the community wishes to be recognized

Se having odopted thie ordinance.

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47

nation, whether secreting abnormal milk or not, shall

be permanently excluded from the milking herd. Cows

giving bloody, stringy, or otherwise abnormal milk, but

with only slight induration of the udder, shall be ex-

duded from the herd until re-examination shows that

the milk has become normal.

For other diseases such tests and examinations as the

health officer may require shall be made at intervals

and by methods prescribed by him, and any diseased

animals or reactors shall be disposed of as he may

require.

Irem 2r. Dairy barn, lighting—A dairy or milking

barn shall be required and in such sections thereof

where cows are milked windows shall be provided and

kept clean and so arranged as to insure adequate light

properly distributed, and when necessary shall be pro-

vided with adequate supplementary artificial light.

Irem 3r. Dairy barn, air space and ventilation—Such

sections of all dairy barns where cows are kept or milked

shall be well ventilated and shall be so arranged as to

avoid overcrowding.

Irem 4r. Dairy barn, floors—-The floors and gutters

of such parts of all dairy barns in which cows are milked

shall be constructed of concrete or other approved im-

pervious and easily cleaned material, provided that if

the milk is to be pasteurized tight wood may be used,

shall be graded to drain properly, and shall be kept

clean and in good repair. No horses, pigs, fowl, calves,

ete., shall be permitted in parts of the barn used for

milking.

Trem 5r. Dairy barn, walls and ceilings.—The walls

and ceilings of all dairy barns shall be whitewashed once

48 .

each year or painted once every 2 years, or oftener, if

necessary, or finished in an approved manner, and shall

be kept clean and in good repair. In case there is a

second story above that part of the barn in which

cows are milked the ceiling shall be tight. If the feed

room adjoins the milking space, it shall be separated

therefrom by a dust-tight partition and door. No feed

shall be stored in the milking portion of the barn.

Irem 6r. Dairy barn, cowyard.—All cowyards shall be

graded and drained as well as practicable and kept clean.

Irem 7r. Manure disposal.—All manure shall be re-

moved and stored or disposed of in such manner as best

to prevent the breeding of flies therein or the access

of cows to piles thereof.

Irem 8r. Milk house or room, construction—There

shall be provided a milk house or milk room in which

the cooling, handling, and storing of milk and milk prod-

ucts and the washing, bactericidal treatment, and storing

of milk containers and utensils shall be done. (a) The

milk house or room shall be provided with a tight floor

constructed of concrete or other impervious material,

in good repair, and graded to provide proper drainage.

(b) It shall have walls and ceilings of such construction

as to permit easy cleaning, and shall be well painted or

finished in an approved manner. (c) It shall be well

lighted and ventilated. (d) It shall have all openings

effectively screened including outward-opening, self-clos-

ing doors, unless other effective means are provided to

prevent the entrance of flies. (e) It shall be used for

no other purposes than those specified above except as

may be approved by the health officer; shall not open

dizectly into a stable or into any room used for domestic

_——

1476740—40—-_2

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49

purposes; shall, unless the milk is to be pasteurized,

have water piped into it; shall be provided with ade-

quate facilities for the heating of water for the cleaning

of utensils; shall be equipped with two-compartment sta-

tionary wash and rinse vats, except that in the case of

retail raw milk, if chlorine is employed as the principal

bactericidal treatment, the three-compartment type must

be used; and shall, unless the milk is to be pasteurized,

be partitioned to separate the handling of milk and the

storage of cleansed utensils from the cleaning and other

operations, which shall be so located and conducted as

to prevent any contamination of the milk or of cleaned

equipment.

Irem 9r. Milk house or room, cleanliness and flies.—

The floors, walls, ceilings, and equipment of the milk

house or room shall be kept clean at all times. All means

necessary for the elimination of flies shall be used.

Item 10r. Toilet—Every dairy farm shall be provided

with one or more sanitary toilets conveniently located

and properly constrneted, operated, and maintained, so

that the waste is inaccessible to flies and does not pollute

the surface soil or contaminate any water supply.

Irem llr. Water supply.—The water supply for the

milk room and dairy barn shall be properly located,

constructed, and operated, and shall be easily accessible,

adequate, and of a safe sanitary quality.

Irem 12r. Utensils, construction—All multi-use con-

tainers or other utensils used in the handling, storage,

or transportation of milk or milk products must be

made of smooth nonabsorbent material and of such con-

struction as to be easily cleaned, and must be in good

repair. Joints and seams shall be soldered flush. Woven

wire cloth shall not be used for straining milk. All milk

50

pails shall be of a small-mouth design approved by the

health officer. The manufacture, packing, transportation,

and handling of single-device containers and container

eaps and covers shall be conducted in a sanitary manner.

Irem 13r. Utensils, cleaning.—All multi-use containers,

equipment, and other utensils used in the handling, stor-

age, or transportation of milk and milk products must

be thoroughly cleaned after each usage.

Irem 14r. Utensils, bactericidal treatment.—All multi-

use containers, equipment, and other utensils used in

the handling, storage, or transportation of milk or milk

products shall between each usage be subjected to an

approved bactericidal process with steam, hot water,

chlorine, or hot air.

Irem 15r. Utensils, storage——All containers and other

utensils used in the handling, storage, or transportation

of milk or milk products shall be stored so as not to

become contaminated before being used.

Irem 16r. Utensils, handling.—After bactericidal treat-

ment no container or other milk or milk product utensil

shall be handled in such manner as to permit any part

of any person or his clothing to come in contact with

any surface with which milk or milk products ome in

contact.

Irem 17r. Milking, udders and teats, abnormal milk.—

The udders and teats of all milking cows shall be clean

and rinsed with a bactericidal solution at the time of

milking. Abnormal milk shall be kept out of the milk

supply and shall be so handled and disposed of as to

preclude the infection of the cows and the contamination

of milk utensils.

————— a ee ee ee ee ee ee te

51

Irem 18r. Milking, flanks.—The flanks, bellies, and tails

of all milking cows shall be free from visible dirt at

the time of milking.

Irem 19r. Milkers’ hands.—Milkers’ hands shall be

clean, rinsed with a bactericidal solution, and dried with

a clean towel immediately before milking and follow-

ing any interruption in the milking operation. Wet-

hand milking is prohibited. Convenient facilities shall

be provided for the washing of milkers’ hands.

Irem 20r. Clean clothing—Milkers and milk handlers

shall wear clean outer garments while milking or handl-

ing milk, milk products, containers, utensils, or equip-

ment.

Irem 2ir. Milk stools——Milk stools shall be kept clean.

Irem 22r. Removal of milk.—Each pail of milk shall

be removed immediately to the milk house or straining

room. No milk shall be strained or poured in the dairy

barn.

Irem 23r. Cooling —Milk must be cooled immediately

after completion of milking to 50° F. or less, and main-

tained at that average temperature, as defined in section

1 (S), until delivery. If milk is delivered to a milk plant

or receiving station for pasteurization or separation, it

must be delivered within 2 hours after completion of

milking or cooled to 70° F. or less and maintained at

that average temperature until delivered.

Irem 24r. Bottling and capping.—Milk and milk prod-

ucts shall be bottled from a container with a readily

cleanable valve, or by means of an approved bottling

machine. Bottles shall be capped by machine. Caps or

cap stock shall be purchased in sanitary containers and

kept therein in a clean dry place until used.

52

Irem 25r. Personnel, health—The health officer or a

physician authorized by him shall examine and take a

careful morbidity history of every person connected with

a retail raw dairy, or about to be employed, whose work

brings him in contact with the production, handling,

storage, or transportation of milk, milk products, con-

tainers, or equipment. If such examination or history

suggests that such person may be a carrier of or in-

fected with the organisms of typhoid or paratyphoid

fever or any other communicable diseases likely to be

transmitted through milk, he shall secure appropriate

specimens of body discharges and cause them to be exam-

ined in a laboratory approved by him or by the State

health authorities for such examinations, and if the re-

sults justify such person shall be barred from such

employment.

Such persons shall furnish such information, submit to

such physical examinations, and submit such laboratory

specimens as the health officer may require for the pur-

pose of determining freedom from infection.

Irem 26r. Miscellaneous.—All vehicles used for the

transportation of milk or milk products shall be so con-

structed and operated as to protect their contents from

the sun and from contamination. All vehicles used for the

transportation of milk or milk products in their final deliv-

ery containers shall be constructed with permanent tops

and with permanent or roll-down sides and back, provided

that openings of the size necessary to pass the delivery

man may be permitted in the sides or back for loading

and unloading purposes. Al] vehicles shall be kept clean,

and no substance capable of contaminating milk or milk

products shall be transported with milk or milk prod-

ucts in such manner as to permit contamination. All

vehicles used for the distribution of milk or milk prod-

ELEED THROUGH — POOR COPY

53

ucts shall have the name of the distributor prominently

displayed.

The immediate surroundings of the dairy shall be kept

in a neat, clean condition.

Grade B raw milk—Grade B raw milk is raw milk

which violates the bacterial standard and/or the abortion

testing requirement for grade A raw milk, but which con-

forms with all other requirements for grade A raw milk,

and has an average bacterial plate count not exceeding

1,000,000 per cubic centimeter, or an average direct

microscopic count not exceeding 1,000,000 per cubic centi-

meter if clumps are counted or 4,000,000 per cubic centi-

meter if individual organisms are counted, or an average

reduction time of not less than 31% hours, as determined

under sections 1 (S) and 6.

Grade C raw milk.—Grade C raw milk is raw milk

which violates any of the requirements for grade B raw

milk.

Certified milk-pasteurized.—Certified milk-pasteurized

is certified milk-raw which has been pasteurized, cooled,

and bottled in a milk plant conforming with the require-

ments for grade A pasteurized milk.

Grade A pasteurized milk.—Grade A pasteurized milk

is grade A raw milk, with such exceptions as are indi-

eated if the milk is to be pasteurized, which has been pas-

teurized, cooled, and bottled in a milk plant conforming

with all of the following items of sanitation and the

average bacterial plate count of which at no time after

pasteurization and until delivery exceeds 30,000 per

cubic centimeter, as determined under sections 1 (S)

and 6.

The grading of a pasteurized milk supply shall include

the inspection of receiving and collecting stations with

54

respect to items 1p to 15p, inclusive, and 17p, 19p, 22p,

and 23p, except that the partitioning requirement of item

5p shall not apply.

Irsm 1p. Floors.—The floors of all rooms in which

milk or milk products are handled or stored or in which

milk utensils are washed shall be constructed of concrete

or other equally impervious and easily cleaned material

and shall be smooth, properly drained, provided with

trapped drains, and kept clean.

Irem 2p. Walls and ceilings.—Walls and ceilings of

rooms in which milk or milk products are handled or

stored or in which milk utensils are washed shall have

a smooth, washable, light-colored surface and shall be

kept clean.

Irem 3p. Doors and windows.—Unless other effective

means are provided to prevent the access of flies, all

openings into the outer air shall be effectively screened

and doors shal] be self-closing.

Irem 4p. Lighting and ventilation—All rooms shall

be well lighted and ventilated.

Item 5p. Miscellaneous protection from contamination.

—The various milk-plant operations shall be so located

and conducted as to prevent any contamination of the milk

or of the cleaned equipment. Al] means necessary fer the

elimination of flies shal] be used. There shall be separate

rooms for (a) the pasteurizing, processing, cooling, and

bottling operations, and (b) the washing and bacteri-

cida] treatment of containers. Cans of raw milk shall

not be unloaded directly into the pasteurizing room. Pas-

teurized milk or milk products shall not be permitted to

come in contact with equipment with which unpasteurized

milk or milk products have been in contact, unless such

55

equipment has first been thoroughly cleaned and sub-

jected to bactericidal] treatment. Rooms in which milk,

milk products, cleaned utensils, or containers are handled

or stored shall not open directly into any stable or living

quarters. The pasteurization plant shall be used for no

other purposes than the processing of milk and milk

products and the operations incident thereto, except as

may be approved by the health officer.

Irem 6p. Toilet facilities—Every milk plant shall be |

provided with toilet facilities conforming with the ordi-

nances of the city of -.................. . Toilet rooms shall not

open directly into any room in which milk, milk products,

equipment, or containers are handled or stored. The

doors of all toilet rooms shall be self-closing. Toilet

rooms shall be kept in a clean condition, in good repair,

and well ventilated. In case privies or earth closets are

permitted and used, they shall be separate from the build-

ing, and shall be of a sanitary type constructed and

operated in conformity with the requirements of item

10r, grade A raw milk.

Irem 7p. Water supply—The water supply shall be

easily accessible, adequate, and of a safe, sanitary quality.

Irem 8p. Hand-washing facilities—Convenient hand-

washing facilities shall be provided, including warm run-

ning water, soap, and approved sanitary towels. The use

of a common towel is prohibited.

Irem 9p. Sanitary piping.—All piping used to conduct

milk or milk products shall be ‘‘sanitary milk piping’’

of a type which can be easily cleaned with a brush.

Pasteurized milk and milk products shall be conducted

from one piece of equipment to another only through san-

itary milk piping.

56

Irem 10p. Construction and repair of containers and

equipment.—All multi-use containers and equipment with

which milk or milk products come in contact shall be

constructed in such manner as to be easily cleaned and

shall be kept in good repair. The manufacture, packing,

transportation, and handling of single-service containers

and container caps and covers shall be conducted in a

sanitary manner.

Item 1lp. Disposal of wastes.—All wastes shall be

properly disposed of.

Irem 12p. Cleaning and bactericidal treatment of con-

tainers and equipment.—All milk and milk products con-

tainers and equipment, except single-service containers,

shall be thoroughly cleaned after each usage. All con-

tainers shall be subjected to an approved bactericidal

process after each cleaning and all equipment immedi-

ately before each usage. When empty and before being

returned to a producer by a milk plant each container

shall be effectively cleaned and subjected to bactericidal

treatment.

Irem 13p. Storage of containers and equipment.—After

bactericidal treatment all bottles, cans, and other multi-

use milk or milk-products containers and equipment shall

be stored in such manner as to be protected from con-

tamination.

Irem 14p. Handling of containers and equipment.—

Between bactericidal treatment and usage, and during

usage, containers and equipment shal] not be handled or

operated in such manner as to permit contamination of

the milk.

Irem 15p. Storage of caps, parchment paper, and sin-

gle-service containers.—Milk-bottle caps or cap stock,

parchment paper for milk cans, and single-service con-

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57

tainers shall be purchased and stored only in sanitary

tubes and cartons, respectively, and shall be kept therein

in a clean dry place.

Irem 16p. Pasteurization.—Pasteurization shall be per-

formed as described in section 1 (L) of this ordinance.

Irem 17p. Cooling.—All milk and milk products re-

ceived for pasteurization shall immediately be cooled in

approved equipment to 50° F. or less and maintained at

that temperature until pasteurized, unless they are to

be pasteurized within 2 hours after receipt; and all

pasteurized milk and milk products shal] be immediately

cooled in approved equipment to an average tempera-

ture of 50° F. or less, as defined in section 1 (8S), and

maintained thereat until delivery.

Irem 18p. Bottling.—Bottling of milk and milk prod-

ucts shall be done at the place of pasteurization in ap-

proved mechanical equipment.

Irem 19p. Overflow milk.—Overflow milk or milk

products shall not be sold for human consumption.

Item 20p. Capping.—Capping of milk and milk prod-

ucts shall be done by approved mechanical equipment.

Hand capping is prohibited. The cap or cover shall cover

the pouring lip to at least its largest diameter.

Irem 2ip. Personnel, health—The health officer or a

physician authorized by him shall examine and take a

eareful morbidity history of every person connected with

a pasteurization plant, or about to be employed, whose

work brings him in contact with the production, handling,

storage, or transportation of milk, milk products, con-

tainers, or equipment. It such examination or history

suggests that such person may be a carrier of or infected

with the organisms of typhoid or paratyphoid fever or

58

any other communicable diseases likely to be transmitted

through milk, he shall secure appropriate specimens of

body discharges and cause them to be examined in a

laboratory approved by him or by the State health an-

thorities for such examinations, and if the results justify

such person shall be barred from such employment.

Such persons shall furnish such information, submit to

such physical examinations, and submit such laboratory

specimens as the health officer may require for the pur-

pose of determining freedom from infection.

Irem 22p. Personnel, cleanliness.—All persons coming

in contact with milk, milk products, containers, or equip-

ment shall wear clean outer garments and shall keep

their hands clean at all times while thus engaged.

Irem 23p. Miscellaneous.—All vehicles used for the

transportation of milk or milk products shall be so con-

structed and operated as to protect their contents from

the sun and from contamination. All vehicles used for

the transportation of milk or milk products in their final

delivery containers shall be constructed with permanent

tops and with permanent or roll-down sides and back,

provided that openings of the size necessary to pass the

delivery man may be permitted in the sides or back for

loading and unloading purposes. All vehicles shall be

kept clean, and no substance capable of contaminating

milk or milk products shall be transported with milk or

milk products in such manner as to permit contamination.

All vehicles used for the distribution of milk or milk

products shall have the name of the distributor promi-

nently displayed.

The immediate surroundings of the milk plant shall be

kept in a neat, clean condition.

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59

Grade B pasteurized milk.—Grade B pasteurized milk

is pasteurized milk which violates the bacterial standard

for Grade A pasteurized milk and/or the provision of

lip-cover caps of item 20p and/or the requirement that

grade A raw milk be used, but which conforms with all

other requirements for grade A pasteurized milk, has

been made from raw milk of not less than grade B qual-

ity, and has an average bacterial plate count after pas-

teurization and before delivery not exceeding 50,000 per

eubie centimeter, as determined under sections 1 (8S)

and 6.

Grade C pasteurized milk—Grade C pasteurized milk

is pasteurized milk which violates any of the requirements

for grade B pasteurized milk.

Seo. 8. Grades of milk and milk products which may

be sold.—From and after 2 months from the date on

which this ordinance takes eifect no milk or milk products

shall be sold to the final wonsumer or to restaurants,

soda fountains, grocery stores, or similar estabiishments

0 .: Previaed, That when any milk

distributor fails to qualify for one of the above grades

the health officer is authorized to revoke his permit,’ or

in lieu thereof to degrade his product and permit its sale

during a temporary period not exceeding 30 days or in

emergencies such longer period as he may deem neces-

sary.

Src. 9. Supplementary grading prescribed and regrad-

ing authorized.—If, at any time between the regular an-

nouncernents of the grades of milk or milk products, a

lower grade shal] become justified, in accordance with

sections 5, 6, and 7 of this ordinance, the health officer

shall immediately lower the grade of such milk or milk

* See footnote 2, p. 2.

*See footnote 2, p. 2.

60

products, and shall enforce proper labeling and placard-

ing thereof.

Any producer or distributor of milk or milk products

the grade of which has been lowered by the health officer,

and who is properly labeling his milk and milk products,

may at any time make application for the regrading of

his product.

Upon receipt of a satisfactory application, in case the

lowered grade is the result of an excessive average bac-

terial plate count, direct microscopic count, reduction

time, or cooling temperature, the health officer shall take

further samples of the applicant’s output, at a rate of

not more than two samples per week. The health officer

shall regrade the milk or milk products upward whenever

the average of the last four sample results indicates the

necessary quality, but not before the lapse of 2 weeks

from the date of degrading.

In case the lowered grade of the applicant’s product

is due to a violation of an item of the specifications pre-

scribed in section 7, other than average bacterial plate

count, direct microscopic count, reduction time, or cooling

temperature, the said application must be accompanied

by a statement signed by the applicant to the effect that

the violated item of the specifications has been conformed

with. Within 1 week of the receipt of such an application

and statement the health officer shall make a reinspection

of the applicant’s establishment, and thereafter as many

additional reinspections as he may deem necessary to

assure himself that the applicant is again complying with

the higher grade requirements, and, in case the findings

justify, shall regrade the milk or milk products upward,

but not before the lapse of 2 weeks from the date of

degrading.

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61

Sec. 10. Transferring or dipping milk; delivery contain-

ers; handling of more than one grade; delivery of milk

at quarantined residences.—Except as permitted in this

section, no milk producer or distributor shell transfer

milk or milk products from one container to another on

the street, or in any vehicle or store, or in any place

except a bottling or milk room specially used for that

purpose. The sale of dip milk is hereby prohibited.

All pasteurized milk and milk products shall be placed

in their final delivery contain’ rs in the plant in which

they are pasteurized, and all raw milk and milk products

sold for consumption in the raw state shall be placed in

their final delivery containers at the farm at which they

are produced. Milk and imilk products sold in the dis-

tributor’s containers in quantities less than 1 gallon shall

be delivered in standard milk bottles or in single-service

containers. It shall be unlawful for hotels, soda foun-

tains, restaurants, groceries, and similar establishments

to sell or serve any milk or milk product except in the

original container in which it was received from the dis-

tributor or from a bulk contsiner equipped with an ap-

proved dispensing device: /’r. vided, That this require-

ment shall not apply to cream ecunsumed on the prem-

ises, which may he served from the original bottle or

from a dispenser approved for euch service.

It shal] be unlawful for any hotel, soda fountain, res-

taurant, grocery, or similar establishment to sell or serve

any milk or milk products whic) have not been main-

tained, while in its possession, at a temperature of 50°

F. or less.

No milk or milk products shall be permitted to come

in contact with equipment with which a lower grade of

milk or milk products has bees in contact unless such

equipment has first been thoroughly cleaned and sub-

jected to bactericidal treatment.

62

Bottled milk or milk products, if stored in water, shall

be so stored that the tops of the bottles will not be

submerged.

It shall be the duty of all persons to whom milk or

milk products are delivered to clean thoroughly the con-

tainers in which such milk or milk products are delivered

before retarning such containers. Apparatus, containers,

equipment, and utensils used in the handling, storage,

processing, or transporting of milk or milk products shall

not be used for any other purpose without the permission

of the health officer.

The delivery of milk or milk products to and the col-

lection of milk or milk products containers from residences

in which cases of communicable disease transmissible

through milk supplies exist shall be subject to the special

requirements of the health officer.

Seo. 11. Milk and milk products from points beyond

the limits of routine inspection.—Milk and milk products

from points beyond the limits of routine inspection of

the city of may not be sold in

the city of , or its police jurisdic-

tion, unless produced and/or pasteurized under provi-

sions equivalent to the requirements of this ordinance:

Provided, That the health officer shall satisfy himself

that the health officer having jurisdiction over the pro-

duction and processing is properly enforcing such pro-

visions.

Sec. 12. Future dairies and milk plants.—All dairies

and milk plants from which milk or milk products are

supplied to the city of ...Whieh are here-

after constructed, reconstructed, or extensively altered

shall conform in their construction to the requirements

of this ordinance for grade A dairy farms producing

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63

milk for consumption in the raw state, or for grade A

pasteurization plants, respectively: Provided, That the

requirement of a two-room milk house shall be waived

in the case of dairies the milk from which is to be pas-

teurized. Properly prepared plans for all dairies and

‘milk plants which are hereafter constructed, recon-

structed, or extensively altered shall be submitted to the

health officer for approval before work is begun. In the

ease of milk plants signed approval shall he obtained

from the health officer and/or the State health depart-

ment.

Src. 13. Notification of disease.—Notice shall be sent

to the health officer immediately by any producer or dis-

tributor of milk or milk products upon whose dairy farm

or in whose milk plant any infectious, contagious, or com-

municable disease occurs.

Sec. 14. Procedure when infection suspected—When

suspicion arises as to the possibility of transmission of

infection from any person concerned with the handling

of milk or milk products, the health officer is authorized

to require any or all of the following measures: (1) The

immediate exclusion of that person from milk handling,

(2) the immediate exclusion of the milk supply concerned

from distribution and use, (3) adequate medical and bac-

teriological examination of the person, of his associates,

and of his and their body discharges.

Sec. 15. Enforcement interpretation—This ordinance

shall be enforced by the health officer in accordance with

the interpretations thereof contained in the 1939 edition

of the United States Public Health Service Milk Code,

a certified copy of which shall be on file in the city

elerk’s office.””

%” See footnote 6, p. 7.

64

Sec. 16. Penalty—Any person who shall violate any

provision of this ordinance shall be fined not more than

at the discretion of the court. Each

and every violation of the provisions of this ordinance

shall constitute a separate offense.

Seo. 17. Repeal and date of effect—All ordinances and

parts of ordinances in conflict with this ordinance are

hereby repealed; and this ordinance shall be in full force

and effect immediately upon its adoption and its publi-

cation, as provided by law.

Seo. 18. Unconstitutionality clause-—Should any sec-

tion, paragraph, sentence, clause, or phrase of this or-

dinance be declared unconstitutional or invalid for any

reason, the remainder of said ordinance shall not be af-

fected thereby.

Opinion of Attorney General of Michigan.

ORDINANCES.

(Milk)

A city ordinance providing that no license shall be

granted to a milk producer whose dairy farm is more

than thirty miles from the city and whose plant is located

outside of the city, is violative of the constitutional rights

of property and contract of a dealer whose plant is

located outside the city. It is further discriminatory, and

therefore invalid.

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65

0-5105 November 6, 1946

William DeKleine, M. D., Commissioner

Michigan Department of Health

Dewitt Road

Lansing 4, Michigan

Dear Dr. DeKleine:

We understand from your inquiry relative to the Michi-

gan Model Milk Ordinance that the city of Midland

adopted such ordinance and is now considering amending

the ordinance by inserting a section to read as follows:

**No license required by this section shall be granted

except upon certification by the Health Officer, and

no license shall be granted to a producer whose

dairy farm is more than thirty miles from the city

unless, in the opinion of the Health Officer, an emer-

gency exists which necessitates a greater milk-shed

area, or to a processer, bottler or distributor, not

now engaged in said business, whose plant is located

outside of the city.’’

You state that the city attorney of Midland does not

feel inclined to approve this proposed section and that

he will not do so without the recommendation of your

department. You therefore question as to the advisability

of making such a recommendation.

It is my opinion that such a provision in the ordinance,

as is presented, would be discriminatory, violative of the

constitutional rights of property and contract, and un-

enforceable.

While our Michigan Supreme Court has not passed

precisely on this particular question, in the case of Cook

Coffee Co. v. Flushing, 267 Mich. 131, it was said by the

court:

‘It has been

prohibition and invalid.’’ (Citing Brooks v. Mangan,

86 Mich. 576; City of Saginaw v. Saginaw Circuit

Judge, 106 Mich. 32; and Goldstein v. City of Ham-

tramck, 227 Mich. 263.)

Tt has likewise been held in many jurisdictions that

a classification in an ordinance based on location of its

place of business is void. In the case of Miller v. Wil-

liams, 12 Fed. Supp. 236, a regulation of a city health

commissioner similar to the ordinance under considera-

tion was before the court. This regulation had been made

under a city ordinance which ordinance had been upheld

by the courts, and provided, among other things, that

persons dealing in milk and cream in Baltimore City

must obtain permits from the health commissioner. In

this case, it was held that a regulation of a city health

commission, prohibiting the sale of cream in the city for

use in the manufacture of ice cream unless produced

within a fifty mile radius of the city, was invalid as to

shipper from another state as a direct burden on inter-

state commerce. The court further said in connection

with this regulation:

‘‘In my opinion the regulation is invalid, when

attacked as unreasonable by a directly interested

party producing milk within the state of Maryland

(in the absence of a state statute) outside the zone

or from fhe point of view of being a direct burden

upon interstate commerce.”’

Your further #t -ntion is called to the case of Grant

v. Leavell, 259 Ky. 267, where the court held that the

refusal to grant a permit for the sale of milk within

the city, solely upon the ground that the applicant had

constructed his miik plant since the ordinance had been

rrrcrren '’worvinwu. DomAampD “nov

67

passed and had not located it within the city where it

would be more accessible for easy and frequent inspec-

tion, was held to be discriminatory, and therefore invalid.

In the case of Ex. Rel. Larsen v. Minneapolis, 190 Minn.

138, it was held that a provision in the city ordinance

which prohibits the sale of pasteurized milk or its prod-

ucts within the city, unless the milk has been pasteurized

in a plant located within the city limits, violates the con-

stitutional rights of property and contract of a dealer

whose plant is located outside the city.

Very truly yours,

Foss O. Exprep,

Attorney General.

By John A. Bradshaw,

Deputy Attorney General.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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