Appendix — United States v. Pullman Co.

Supreme Court brief1947

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APPENDIX A.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

PROPOSED POOLING OF RAILROAD EARNINGS IN.

VOLVED IN OPERATION OF THE PULLMAN

COMPANY UNDER RAILROAD OWNERSHIP.

Submitted

Upon application of certain class I railroads for approval

of a proposed pooling of earnings involved in opera-

tion of sleeping car service by The Pullman Company

under railroad ownership, Found: (1) That all appli-

cants have assented to the proposed pooling; (2) That

the proposed pooling will be in the interest of better

service to the public and of economy in operation; (3)

That the proposed pooling will not restrain competi-

tion; and (4) That the consideration for the proposed

pooling wil be just and reasonable. Proposed pooling

authorized and approved.

Jacob Aronson, John Dickinson, Emmett E. McInnis,

Sydney R. Prince, Albert Ward, C. Raymond Hulsart, and

Henry L. Walker for applicants.

George B. Haddock, Samuel Karp, James R. Browning,

Robert J. Bulkley, Frank J. Meistrell, Herbert G. Pillen,

and Arne C. Wiprud, for interveners.

App. 2

REPORT PROPOSED BY HOWARD HOSMER AND

0. G. BARBER, EXAMINERS.

By application, filed July 25, 1946, as amended, 56 class-

I railroads seek approval under section 5(1) of the Inter-

state Commerce Act of a plan for pooling or division of

traffic, or of service, or of gross or net earnings or of any

portion provided for in certain existing and proposed agree

ments relating to railroad sleeping-car service. The appli-

cants are listed in Appendix A, in which appear also the

names of The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, Pere

Marquette Railway Company, and The New York, Chicago

and St. Louis Railroad Company. These three carriers are

opposed to the application, but they wish to become parties

to the plan proposed by the applicants if it is approved.

Petitions of intervention in opposition to the application

were tendered at the hearing by the three opposing rail car-

riers above named, the Department of Justice, and Otis &

Co., a Delaware corporation engaged in investment banking

at Cleveland, Ohio. Otis & Co. says that it ‘‘is not an inter-

vener in this proceeding in the usual sense,’’ and it pre-

sented no testimony.

This application is an outgrowth of a suit brought by the

Department of Justice in the District Court of the United

States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’ against

The Pullman Company, (hereinafter referred to as Pull-

man) the sole sleeping-car company which is subject to the

Interstate Commerce Act, Pullman-Standard Car Manuv-

facturing (hereinafter referred to as Pullman-Standard),

which manufactures sleeping and other railroad cars, and

Pullman Incorporated, a holding company, which owns all

the capital stock of the other two companies, for violation

of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The District Court found

that the defendants had violated that act and ordered them

to separate completely the ownership and operation of

1 This court, which for the case referred to consisted of three cir-

cuit judges, is subsequently referred to as the District Court.

App. 3

sleeping cars from the manufacture of such cars, United

States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123, 53 id. 908. Pullman

Incorporated was given the right to elect which business it

would dispose of. After hearing the District Court on

March 22, 1945, entered an order permitting Pullman In-

corporated to cause Pullman to treat with interested rail-

roads or any other persons for the sale of the sleeping-car

business and the properties connected therewith or for the

sale of the stock of Pullman. (55 F. Supp. 985). About two

months later Pullman Incorporated made an offer to a

buying group of railroads to sell the stock of Pullman to

them. Those railroads accepted that offer November 7,

1945, agreeing to pay for the stock in full in cash. After

a hearing upon application for approval of the sale and the

offers of other prospective purchasers, one of whom was

Otis & Co., the District Court on December 18, 1945, ren-

dered an opinion approving the sale to the railroads (64 F.

Supp. 108) and a few days later entered an order pro-

viding for continued operation of sleeping-car service by

Pulhnan under its present management until March 31,

1946. The court’s order of approval of the sale was subject

to certain conditions set forth in Appendix B. This order

was later continued in effect pending action by the Supreme

Court on an appeal from the decision of December 18, 1945.

Under applicants’ plan they will pay a total of $40,202,482

for the Pullman stock, which will be distributed among

them in the percentage proportions shown in the second

column of Appendix A. Their respective shares of the

purchase price are shown in the third column of that appen-

dix. The details of the proposed transaction are set forth

in a memorandum agreement, as amended, which is in evi-

dence. The general purpose is stated therein as follows:

1. To maintain without interruption orderly sleep-

ing car service requisite in the interest of the public

and for the military establishment in the existing

emergency.

App. 4

2. To afford means whereby every Railroad, subject

to the terms of this Memorandum Agreement, may:

(a) acquire all or any part of the sleeping cars

regularly assigned to its lines;

(b) conduct its own sleeping car operation, in

whole or in part, or arrange, through contract, on

reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, for the

conduct thereof by others;

(c) perform its own service or maintenance, or

service and maintenance, of sleeping cars used in

operations on its lines;

(d) procure such service or maintenance, or

service and maintenance, through contract on rea-

sonable and non-discriminatory terms with The

Pullman Company under railroad ownership or

with a service company constituted as hereinafter

set forth.

It is applicants’ intention to reduce Pullman into, or sell

its properties to, a sleeping-car service corporation within

a period called the interim period which would end not later

than December 31, 1948.

The assent of all applicants to their proposal is evidenced

by certified copies of minutes of meetings of boards of di-

rectors or transcripts of judicial records in cases of rail-

roads undergoing reorganization. For reasons not clearly

disclosed the following railroads which provide sleeping-car

service did not see fit to participate in applicants’ plan:

The Central Railroad Company of New Jersey (trustees) ;

Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company; Chicago,

Indianapolis and Louisville Railway Company; St. Louis

Southwestern Railway Company (trustee) ; Tennessee Cen-

tral Railway Company; and Detroit and Mackinac Railroad

Company. The Canadian railroads and their subsidiaries

in the United States and the National Railways of Mexico

were not invited to join in the plan.

The number of serviceable sleeping cars in the United

App. 5

States as of October 1, 1946, was 6,728,? of which 4,916 were

air-conditioned and 1,812 were not so improved. These

figures do not include troop sleepers built during the war.

Of the air-conditioned cars 618 are lightweight (constructed

of metals such as aluminum or stainless steel), 3,825 are

heavyweight standard sleepers, and 473 are heavyweight

tourist cars. Practically all of the lightweight cars, 3,191

heavyweight standard and 442 heavyweight tourist cars are

regularly assigned to individual railroads. In addition, there

are 672 air-conditioned cars, mostly heavyweight standard

cars, which are unassigned but are available. The service-

able non-air conditioned cars consist of 1,669 heavyweight

tourist cars and 143 heavyweight standard cars. All but a

few of these are unassigned.

The lightweight cars have all been purchased by the rail-

roads to whom they are assigned for a total price of $34,-

697,009, based on the depreciated book values of these cars.

The purchase price of $40,202,482 to be paid by applicants

was arrived at by valuation of other items of property

owned by Pullman, including approximately $20,200,000 for

heavyweight cars, $2,500,000 in working capital to be pro-

vided, $12,500,000 for inventories of materials and supplies,

and about $4,775,000 for miscellaneous property, consisting

principally of repair shops at Atlanta, Ga., Buffalo, N. Y.,

Calumet, Ill., Richmond, Calif., St. Louis, Mo., and Wil-

mington, Del., and laundries at Buffalo, Chicago, Tll., Cin-

cinnati, Ohio, Kansas City, Mo., Miami, Fla., New York, N.

Y., St. Louis, Oakland, Calif., Tampa, Fla., and Washington,

D. C.

In the course of the negotiations between applicants and

Pullman Incorporated a complication arose because of the

reluctance on the part of many railroads to acquire directly

or through stock ownership the considerable number of

heavyweight sleeping cars in the existing Pullman fleet in

view of the likelihood that lightweight equipment will be re-

_* The number includes 27 non-air conditioned cars regularly as-

signed to Mexican and Canadian railroads.

App. 6

quired for the high-speed passenger trains of the future.

To meet this problem a plan was devised under which Pull-

man would issue interest-bearing non-negotiable notes to

Pullman Incorporated due not later than December 31,

1948, in a total amount equal to the present value of the

heavyweight cars. The principal of these notes would be

payable either by surrendering the cars themselves or in

cash. Under applicants’ memorandum agreement any rail-

road, whether an applicant or not, would be permitted to

purchase any heavyweight sleeping car regularly assigned

to it at a stipulated price. It appears that some of them

would avail themselves of this right which has been held in

abeyance pending termination of the antitrust suit. The

agreement further provides that Pullman would offer to

sell unassigned cars to the railroads to the extent that it had

no need for such cars. Another provision requires that any

railroad which purchases either lightweight or heavyweight

cars from Pullman will lease such cars to that company

for operation during the interim period.

As rent for the leased cars Pullman would pay to the

lessor railroad annually an amount equal to the sum of (1)

the depreciation on such cars at rates prescribed by the

Commission taken into the accounts of the lessor plus (2) 3

percent of the depreciated cost of such cars, referred to as

interest rental. So much of this interest rental as is appli-

cable to lightweight cars would be payable in priority and

preference to all other such interest rental and to all inter-

est on the car notes secured by the heavyweight cars before

referred to. (See Appendix C, Section 1 (c).)

Applicants introduced in evidence a proposed uniform

operating contract which would govern the relations be-

tween Pullman and the respective carriers for which it

would perform service during the interim period. Under

this contract Pullman would furnish sleeping cars to the

contracting carriers to the extent that it had available cars

and would service such cars. A contracting railroad would

have the right at any time to furnish and operate its own

App. 7

cars or arrange for a third party to do so, and Pullman

would be obligated to perform the remainder of the total

service insofar as it had available cars.

The contract would provide that Pullman would bz re-

sponsible for damage to cars from causes originating inside

such cars, while the railroad would be responsible for dam-

ages due to accident or casualty originating outside the

cars. Pullman would bear the cost of shop repairs, exterior

yard maintenance, as well as maintenance of the interior

finish, carpets, upholstery, etc., and would clean the inside

of the cars and vestibules. Generally speaking, the rail-

road would haul and switch the cars on passenger runs as

well as to and from repair shops. The railroad would pro-

vide space for airing and storing bedding, linen, and other

supplies but Pullman would pay the railroad for compressed

air, heat, light, and water furnished by the railroad for this

purpose. The railroad would furnish at its own cost lubri-

cating material, ice, and drinking water, heat the cars, and

clean them on the outside. Pullman would furnish and main-

tain the lighting equipment, including electric accessories.

Railroad ticket agents would sell tickets for Pullman ac

commodations but would act as agents of Pullman in so do-

ing. The contract would provide in detail for apportion-

ment of responsibility for injuries to persons or damages

to property. From the standpoint of this proceeding the

most important provisions of the contract are contained in

Article IV, relating to revenue relations between Pullman

and the railroads, which is set forth in Appendix C.

Ditatory ConTENTIONs.

Interveners devote more than half of their briefs to argu-

ments by which they seek to persuade the Commission that

it should dismiss this application without passing upon its

merits. The discussion of this phase of the case centers

on two questions of a legal nature: (1) Under applicants’

proposal would there actually be a pooling or division of

traffic, service, or earnings within the meaning of section 5

App. 8

(1)? (2). Must the applicants’ purchase of the capital

stock of Pullman be approved by the Commission under

section 5(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act which relates

to acquisition of control of one carrier by another or others?

In their briefs the Department of Justice and the inter-

vening railroads argue that there would be no pooling under

applicants’ proposal. In considering this question the na-

ture of the sleeping-car business as applicants propose to

conduct it must be kept in mind. Under the present ar-

rangement the railroads, as it were, have granted a conces-

sion to an independent company to conduct a hotel business

on their lines in order to make available more comfortable

facilities in cars furnished by the independent company for

passengers who are willing to pay for superior accommoda-

tions. The railroads now propose to take over that hotel

business and operate it co-operatively or collectively. The

fact that they will continue to utilize the corporate struc-

ture originally built for the independent company does not

alter the essential fact that for the time being at least this

will be a joint railroad enterprise. To an important and

perhaps an increasing extent the cars will henceforth be

owned by the individual railroads, and the relation of Pull-

man to these will be largely one of service. The revenue re-

ceived from passengers would be collected not by the rail-

road performing the transportation or owning the car but

by the cooperative agency, which under applicants’ plan

will have custody of the pooled revenues of the railroads

derived from sleeping-car service. An important change

from the present arrangement lies in the fact in the future

each contracting railroad will have to participate in an ar-

rangement to guarantee Pullman against operating losses.

In the past some railroads have been required to assume

such guarantees insofar as operations on their individual

lines are concerned but others have not.

The details of the proposed pooling would be controlled

by Article IV of the proposed uniform contract set forth

in Appendix C. From the total gross earnings of all sleep-

App. 9

ing cars operated on the lines of each contracting railroad

for any year Pullman’s operating expenses allocated to

such railroad as hereinafter explained, together with cer-

tain interest charges, are deducted, and the balance, if any,

is divided equally between Pullman and the railroad. On

the other hand, if the gross earnings are less than Pull-

man’s operating expenses allocated to that railroad, the de-

ficiency must be paid by the railroad. The share of net

earnings which the railroad would receive or the amount of

the deficiency which it would have to pay, however, would

not be determined directly by Pullman’s operating costs in-

curred on the individual] railroad, for its operating expenses

would not and probably could not practicably be segregated

to the various lines of railroad on which they acerue. In-

stead each railroad would pay a fraction of the total, ap-

portioned to the principal classes of cars (lightweight,

heavyweight, tourist, ete.), determined by the ratio of cars

in each class operated on each individual railroad to the

total number of such cars. There is thus a special agree-

ment as to sharing the expenses which affects the distribu-

tion of profits earned by the joint enterprise as well as the

guarantee of its operating expenses, and this, we believe,

brings the arrangement within the oft-cited definition of

pooling in the Century Dictionary:

A combination of the interests of several otherwise

competing parties, such as rival transportation lines,

in which all take common ground as regards the public,

and distribute the profits of the business among them-

selves equally, or according to special agreement. In

this sense, pooling is a system of reconciling conflicting

interests, and of obviating ruinous competition, by

which the several competing parties or companies

throw their revenue into one common fund, which is

then divided or distributed among the members of the

pool on a basis of percentages or proportions pre-

viously agreed upon or determined by arbitration.

Where earnings from sleeping-car traffic in the case of an

individual railroad are large enough to afford a surplus for

App. 10

equal division between the railroad and Pullman, they

would seem to constitute pooled net earnings, for the amount

is determined by agreed percentages of Pullman operating

expenses, and Pullman’s half is available for distribution

to all stockholder railroads as dividends, which, if declared,

would be payable without regard to the profitability of the

sleeping-car business on the line of any particular recipient

of the dividends. Where sleeping-car revenue on an individ-

ual line is insufficient to meet its agreed share of Pullman

operating expenses, an element of pooling is present be-

cause of the fact that the payment of its deficiency under its

guaranty would be a deduction from its operating income

derived from all traffic, freight as well as passenger, pre-

sumably to be accounted for as a debit to its income ac-

count, and therefore a portion of its net earnings would be

pooled with contributions from other railroads similarly

situated for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the joint

sleeping-car enterprise.

In a general way the relations between the railroads and

Pullman, at least with respect to net revenue from sleeping-

car traffic, would be similar to those between the railroads

and the Railway Express Agency, Inc., which the Commis-

sion has recognized as a pooling agreement, Railway Exp.

Agency, Inc., Pooling Application, 227 1.C.C. 517. As will

be shown later in this report, there is strong competition

for the transportation of passengers in sleeping cars, and

the situation here is not the same as that presented in Ap-

plication for Approval of Agreement Between Pullman Co.

and the Canadian National Ry. Co., 259 1.C.C. 41, in which

division 3 found that there was no competition between the

parties to that application and that accordingly it was

without jurisdiction under section 5(1). In the past the

Commission has regarded this provision as imposing a

duty on it to pass upon agreements of this kind whenever

a possibility of undue restraint of competition was dis-

closed, and it has therefore interpreted the provision

broadly instead of narrowly, Express Contract, 1920, 59

1.C.C. 518, 522.

App. 11

A pooling of earnings or a portion thereof is sufficient

to raise a question under section 5(1). Applicants make

the further contention that there would also be a pooling

of service similar to that considered in Minnesota-Atlantic

Transit Co. and Nicholson-Universal 8. S. Co. Pooling, 247

LC.C. 319. We do not see the similarity, but the point is of

little importance. When section 5(1) was rewritten by Con-

gress in 1940, it was broadened to embrace **pooling or

division of traffic, or of service, or of gross or net earnings

or of any portion thereof.’’ (Emphasis supplied.) This re-

petition of the word or is significant and serves to negative

the assertion of one of the interveners that ‘‘a pooling or

division of both traffic and revenues is the only kind of ar-

rangement that would fall within the prohibition of the

statute.’’

If the proposal is one for a pooling of earnings, as we

consider it to be, the question then arises whether the Com-

mission would be warranted in declining to pass upon it

under section 5(1), as the interveners contend. The appli-

cation is one for a license as defined in the recently-enacted

Administrative Procedure Act and should be disposed of in

accordance with the requirements of that act.’

The Department of Justice filed a motion to dismiss the

application, concurred in by the other interveners, in which

it stated among other things:

The power of the Commission to approve or author-

ize the acquisition by applicants of the stock of The

Pullman Company is found only in Section 5(2) of the

Interstate Commerce Act, and the Commission is with-

out power to approve said acquisition under Section

5(1), which relates only to pooling and division of traf.

fie or earnings.

*The applicable provision is Section 9(b), ‘““LICENSES.—In

. any case in which application is made for a license required by law

the agency, with due regard to the rights or privileges of all the

interested parties or adversely affected persons and with resse=able

dispatch, shall set and complete any proceedings required to be

conducted pursuant to sections 7 and 8 of this Act or other pro-

ceedings required by law and shall make its decision. * * * ”’

App. 12

The application is made under Section 5(1) of th

Act, and not under Section 5(2). Applicants state the

approval by the Commission of their acquisition of th

stock of The Pullman Company is necessary to the o;

eration of the pooling arrangement, and that unles

the approval of such acquisition is granted, approvs

of the pooling arrangements would be meaningless. Y«

there is no power in the Commission to give such ay

roval under Section 5(1), and no proper notice ha

en given of any application under Section 5(2).

Applicants and the interveners agree that the applicatio

raises no issue under section 5(2). The interveners appea

to be unwilling to commit themselves on the questio

whether action by the Commission under the latter sectio

approving the acquisition of the Pullman stock is necessary

Applicants say that it is not, and there is ample authorit

for that view. Determination of the question involves a

interpretation of section 5(13), which reads as follows:

As used in paragraphs (2) to (12), inclusive, th

term ‘‘carrier’’ means a carrier by railroad and an e:

press company, subject to this part; a motor carrie

— to part Il; and a water carrier subject to pai

This wording is similar to that of section 20a(1), a

follows :

That as used in this section the term ‘‘carrier’’ mear

a common carrier by railroad (except a street, subw

ban, or interurban electric railway which is not ope

ated as a part of a general steam railroad system

transportation) which is subject to this part, or an

corporation organized for the purpose of engagin

in transportation by railroad subject to this part.

A sleeping-car company is not a ‘‘common carrier b

railroad’’ within the meaning of those words in sectio

20a(1), Interlocking Directorate Application of Richard k

Mellon, 199 I.C.C. 521. It could therefore scarcely be co!

sidered a ‘‘carrier by railroad’’ in interpreting sectio

App. 13

5(13). This view is further supported by the legislative his-

tory of the Transportation Act of 1940, which shaped the

present form of this paragraph.‘ |

The interveners express concern over the possibility that

the Commission may make some finding which directly or

indirectly would purport to approve applicants’ acquisition

of the Pullman stock. On this point the Department of

Justice says:

Since such acquisition and control is an essential

and necessary prerequisite to any pooling arrange-

ments, and since the acquisition and control is an inte-

gral and inextricable part of the proposal made by the

applicants, it would be impossible for the Commission,

under the application and upon the basis of the evi.

dence presented in support thereof, to separate or

segregate from the proposal any ling arrangements

falling within the purview of Section 5( 1).

We do not believe that the Commission could properly

circumscribe its duty under section 5(1) by accepting this

view. That duty is to express its opinion after hearing con-

cerning ‘‘ pooling or division of traffic, ete.’’ If it makes the

findings specified in the Statute, the effect is to enable the

applicant carriers lawfully to enter into a contract, agree-

ment, or combination for such pooling or division. At the

hearing the applicants stated that they regarded the pur-

chase of the stock as ‘‘an integral part of the memorandum

man stock, since that is the primary step in the series

of measures whereby the pooling arrangement will be

* See Omnibus Transportation Legislation—Letter from the Chair-

man of the Legislative Committee, Interstate Commerce Commis-

ston, * * © dated January 29, 1940. House Committee Print (76th

Congress 3d Session), pp. 64, 69.

App. 14

sought in the application will necessarily carry with it

approval of all essential parts of the transaction, in-

cluding the stock acquisition.

They cite section 5(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act

in support of this position, which appears to have merit

in view of the fact that the proposed railroad ownership

of the Pullman stock would be the circumstance of out-

standing importance which would make the proposed ar-

rangement a pooling. The question requires no extended

discussion here; if it is material, it is one of law, as to

which the Commission’s opinion would not be final. The

emphasis placed on the stock acquisition by the interveners

and the tenor of their arguments indicates that they per-

haps look forward to further litigation on this point even

though the District Court’s decision approving the sale of

the Pullman stock to the railroads is affirmed.

Such an indication is to be found in the following state.

ment in the brief of Otis & Co. :

Thus the Commission is confronted with the anomaly

of a hearing conducted under section 5(1) on proposed

purchase agreements and a purported pooling opera-

tion, affecting every railroad in the United States, with

the issues wholly undefined, and so without a fair and

reasonable opportunity for interviewers [interveners’?]

to prepare their evidence to meet such issues. This is

one of the basic errors in the proceeding. A clarifica-

tion of the issues at the opening of the hearing would

have laid bare the all-important jurisdictional question

involved and stripped the proceeding of all its obvious

surplusage to the comparatively narrow issues under

section 5(1).

The charge of error here is without justification. All of

the interveners received copies of the application when it

was filed, and there is no reason to believe that any of them

failed to understand that it asked for approval of pooling

under section 5(1). Although this particular intervener

avoided use of the word “‘pooling’’ in its petition for leave

to intervene, this was not true of the other two petitions of

App. 15

intervention. In a letter to Assistant Attorney General

Berge relating to this proceeding a month before the hear-

ing the acting chairman of the Commission after referring

to ‘‘pooling within the meaning of section 5(1) of the Inter-

state Commerce Act”? said:

The application requests that we issue an order ap-

proving and authorizing such pooling.

At the outset of the hearing the presiding officer said:

It is my understanding that this proceeding is solely

under section 5(1) and that no application under sec-

tion 5(2) has been filed * * * as I interpret section 5(2)

itself, that is not necessary,

The charge that interveners did not have a fair oppor-

tunity to prepare their evidence to meet the issue as above

defined is refuted by the fact that more than 60 percent of

the record consisted of their evidence, most of which was

directed to that issue. Some of the discussion of the ques-

tion which appears in the record could be described perhaps

as ‘‘obvious surplusage,’’ but the amount thereof was not

excessive.

The Department of Justice urges that ‘‘even if the juris-

dictional requirements had been met, the Commission should

decline to act on the proposed transactions’ until the ap-

peal from the decision of the District Court is decided by

the Supreme Court. The Department points out that the

proposed sale of the Pullman stock to applicants is con-

tingent on affirmance of the District Court’s decision, and

this applicants concede. The Department, however, fears

that ‘‘Commission approval of applicants’ proposal might

be erroneously construed as permission to evade or vio-

late court order,’’ saying further:

There is danger that any order which might be issued

by the Commission in this matter would be subject to

misconstruction and that corporations and persons in-

volved in the proposed transaction might be misled into

believing that such order would enable them to com-

App. 16

plete the proposed transactions without court approval

or contrary to orders which may be issued by the court

relating to the sale of The Pullman Company or its

future operations.

Although the Supreme Court has referred to che railroads

as being under the ‘‘fostering guardianship’’ of the Com-

mission, (263 U. S. 456, 478) this relation has never been

understood as including any responsibility for protecting

the railroads against unsound advice on the part of their

law departments.

This particular question, however, has already been con-

sidered by the Commission. In the letter from the acting

chairman previously referred to, he said:

In these circumstances, we believe it to be our duty

to proceed with the application in the regular course,

pod not hold it in abeyance until the decision of the

Supreme Court.

There is evidence in the record supporting the wisdom of

so doing. It is desirable that the uncertainty concerning

Pullman’s future be removed as soon as possible. One of

applicants’ witnesses testified on this point as follows:

Questions have arisen as to renegotiation of expir-

ing leases at higher rental rates, questions of making

necessary capital expenditures for which there had

been no provision—and naturally so because the deal

was expected to be consummated quickly—requests of

certain railroads for additional equipment or substi-

tute equipment, or modernization of existing equip-

ment, matters involving the control of expenses, adver-

tising budgets, and sale of pieces of equipment not in-

cluded in the deal, lease of lightweight ears purchased

by the railroads, the matter of operating parlor cars

that had been purehased by certain railroads, and the

interim agreements with railroads to replace con-

tracts that had been canceled as of December 31, 1945.

The longer this state of uncertainty continues the

more involved it will get. There is also the matter of

App. 17

filling positions vacated by resignation, retirement, or

death. Necessarily at this time that is being left en-

tirely to the judgment of the present Pullman manage-

ment.

If the District Court’s order is affirmed, valuable time

will have been saved by the Commission’s action in dispos-

ing of this application without awaiting the Supreme

Court’s decision. We believe that the Commission may

properly complete this proceeding and make its decision at

the earliest practicable time ‘‘with due regard to the rights

or privileges of all the interested parties,’’ as provided by

the Administrative Procedure Act.

The principal questions on which findings must be made

in passing upon this application are (1) whether the appli-

eants’ proposed arrangement will be in the interest of bet-

ter service to the public, or economy in operation, and (2)

whether it will unduly restrain competition. They will be

discussed in that order.

Berrer Service ro THE Pusiic anp

Economy 1n OPERATION.

The word better is a comparative term. The Commission

must therefore determine whether the applicants’ plan of-

fers superior advantages from the standpoint of service to

the public in contrast with other plans for conducting sleep-

ing-ear service. Three alternatives are suggested by the

evidence: (1) Ownership and operation of their own sleep-

ing cars by the individual railroads; (2) operation of a

sleeping-car service business by more than one company as

competitors; and (3) continuation of Pullman’s operations

under the ownership and management of promoters repre-

sented by Otis & Company in its attempt to buy the Pull-

man stock.

The Department of Justice apparently is the only party to

this proceeding which considers either the first or the second

alternative feasible or desirable. It states that one of the

purposes of its antitrust suit was to bring about ‘‘competi-

App. 18

tive conditions . . . under which more than one company

might engage in the operation of a sleeping-car service busi-

ness’’ and criticizes the District Court for approving a plan

‘*which removes incentive for individual participating rail-

roads to acquire and operate their own sleeping cars.’’ The

Department introduced no evidence bearing on these mat-

ters, however.

The chairman of the board of directors of the Chesapeake

& Ohio, testifying on behalf of the railroad interveners,

stated it to be his opinion that individual operation and

ownership of sleeping cars ‘‘would be the worst possible

way ... the most inefficient and most uneconomical.’’ The

possibility that there might be more than one sleeping-car

company, each similar in a general way to Pullman, was

only briefly mentioned in the record. The witness last re-

ferred to testified that within the past 18 months he had

endeavored to organize a company which would compete

with Pullman but met with no encouragement from persons

whom he invited to join in the venture. It may safely be

concluded that the financial hazards involved in such an

undertaking are insuperable at the present time and that

furthermore the participation of more than one company,

which the Department of Justice ostensibly favors, would

not be in the interest of better service to the public or of

economy in operation.

This latter conclusion is based on the evidence of both

the applicants and the intervening railroads. The senior

vice-president of the latter railroads, a man of nearly 50

years’ railroad experience, said he thought ‘‘it would be

more economical, more in the public interest if one agency

operated a unified sleeping-car service, nation-wide,’’ de-

scribing the advantages of unified operation as follows:

An independent agency operating on a nation-wide

basis would have a compelling incentive to standardize

the types and designs of sleeping cars and thereby very

greatly reduce the investment cost of a modern sleep-

ing car fleet with resulting savings in carrying charges

and the annual cost of maintenance. ree factors

—

ee ee

App. 19

would contribute to the reduction in the initial cost of

ae nn om pe = required by a unified service agency as

red with the cost of the equipment that would be

eded by the railroads individually to take care of

their individual needs. These three factors are (1)

reduction in the number of units needed because of

greater utilization of the individual unit, (2) redue-

tion in the number of types of cars resulting from

proper standardization of designs, and (3) reduction

in cost due to arene be in much larger quantities .

Experience of the past few years has conclusively

shown that a nation-wide pool of sleeping cars is a vital

military necessity to safeguard the welfare of the na-

tion.

Another witness for the intervening railroads pointed out

the desirability of uniform equipment ‘‘so that a car orig-

inating in New York, if it broke down in Mexico, could be

repaired with standard parts.’’ Applicants’ evidence fur-

nishes numerous examples of economy due to unified opera-

tion. Maintenance of a readily available equipment pool

facilitates the efficient handling of seasonal travel to sum-

mer or winter resorts and of occasional large passenger

movements such as those to national conventions of out-

standing importance. Operation of through sleeping-car

lines involving two or more railroads is simplified. Inte-

grated handling of rate-making functions, such as the pub-

lication of joint tariffs and ticketing arrangements, is made

possible. There is a labor pool or reserve of trained work-

ers, such as conductors and porters, capable of dealing with

seasonal or abnormal traffic. Unified operation offers wider

opportunity for research and experimentation, resulting in

general improvement of equipment in respect of car design,

riding qualities, bedding, seating, lighting, heating, water

cooling, air conditioning, and other similar matters. The

laundries and car-repair shops previously mentioned and

also warehouses have been located at strategic points in

order to meet the needs of sleeping-car operations on a

number of railroad lines. They are not so located and de-

App. 20

signed as to make them economical for use by individual

lines. Under individual operation of sleeping cars, there-

fore, many new facilities of this kind would have to be built.

Pullman’s executive and operating organization has been

adapted to nation-wide unified functioning. For this pur-

pose the country has been divided into seven zones, each of

which is under its own superintendent. These are subdivided

into 47 districts, for which there are the same number of dis-

trict superintendents, and there is some further subdivision

which need not be described. As an example of this opera-

ting organization, at Atlanta 42 persons handle Pullman

service on eight railroads and in two railroad yards. Appli-

cants, of course, are fully in accord with the railroad inter-

veners as to the indispensability of unified operation of

sleeping-cars during the recent war and the period of de-

mobilization. One of their witnesses stated:

Had it not been for the efficient distribution and utili-

zation by the Pullman Company of all sleeping car

equipment, including troop sleepers and troop kitchen

ears, the railroads could not have moved the tremen-

dous volume of military traffic that they did.

The facts which bear out this statement are a matter of

common knowledge.

The record fully supports a finding that operation of the

sleeping-car business by Pullman under railroad ownership

will be economical and will afford better service to the pub-

lic than either individual operation or division of the busi-

ness among two or more sleeping-car companies. We turn

to the question whether the advantages of unified operation

will be impaired because of applicants’ ownership of the

Pullman stock, as the intervening railroads contend.

These interveners in their petition for leave to intervene

assert that the ownership of Pullman should be ‘‘ completely

independent,’’ but this does not mean complete indepen-

dence of railroad interest. One of their witnesses expressed

his belief ‘‘that some interest in the railroads is desirable

in the Pullman management because they at least are close

App. 21

enough to the railroad situation to get the railroad point of

view.’’ If Pullman were owned by the capitalists identified

with the Otis & Co. offer, it would not be independent of the

railroads, for the same witness testified that the relation-

ship between the intervening railroads and the Otis & Co.

syndicate is very close. These same interests also hold what

are described as sizable blocks of stock in a number of

other railroads.

The interveners’ criticism of lack of independence on the

part of applicants’ proposed management of Pullman ap-

parently refers to the statement by one of their witnesses

that control of Pullman and the railroad since 1890 ‘‘in my

opinion, is by the banking firm of J. P. Morgan & Company

and a small group of affiliated bankers which include Kuhn,

Loeb & Company, and such houses as the Mellon banking

firm, et al.,’’ and that that control would remain under the

applicants’ plan ‘‘because The Pullman Company and the

railroads and the New York Central and the Pennsylvania

all respond to the same voice.’’ The record is otherwise

silent as to Kuhn, Loeb & Co. Evidence concerning J. P.

Morgan & Co. and the Mellon interests is discussed subse-

quently in the report.

The intervening railroads further fear that under the

applicants’ plan ‘‘the smaller railroads would be more or

less at the mercy of the larger railroads.’’ As shown by

Appendix A, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the

New York Central system together would own approxi-

mately 32 percent of the Pullman stock. The next largest

share would be that of the Southern Pacific Company, 8.55

pereent. The remaining 60 percent would be divided into

amounts of 6 percent or less. Pullman with about 50 stock-

holders would be a comparatively small corporation not sim-

ilar to certain other corporations referred to in this record

in which a considerable degree of control can be based on

minority holdings of stock in a strategic position. The in-

terests of the stockholders would not be as investors but

rather as partrers in a joint enterprise closely linked with

App. 22

the business of the individual stockholders. It is difficult

to see any likelihood of mismanagement of the corporation

for the benefit of part of the stockholders to the detriment

of the others. The participating railroads must be pre-

sumed to have carefully considered the probable advantages

as well as any potential disadvantages of the arrangement.

If the smaller roads should have any misgivings as to pos-

sible domination by the larger ones—a hypothesis without

any support in the record—they may take comfort in the

following sentence from the final opinion of the District

Court:

We also know that if any one of the partners in the

cooperative enterprise start to play fast and loose with

one of its associates, this Court is open to a suitor who

claims that our decree is not being complied with.

Under applicants’ plan Pullman would have 15 directors,

Six would be elected at large and nine by regions. Three

would be chosen by the stockholder railroads in each of

three regions, the East, Southeast, and the West. The

stockholders in each of such regions would agree upon three

candidates for three places on the board, and the stock-

holders of the other two regions would be obliged to cast

their votes for the candidates so designated. Thus the

stockholder railroads in the Southeast with a total of 14

percent of the stock, less than the percentage of either the

New York Central or the Pennsylvania, would have the

right to name three directors and the western stockholders,

having 39.5 percent, would be entitled to three. These two

groups, furthermore, would have a combined total of about

53 percent, which by concerted action might have dominant

force in selecting the six directors at large. There is no

evidence, however, pointing to the probability of such geo-

graphical cleavage.

The intervening petition of the Department of Justice

contained an allegation that ‘‘railroads not members of the

Railroad Buying Group would be injured and prejudiced

App. 23

in securing adequate sleeping car service,’’ but counsel for

the Department stated at the hearing that ‘‘the Govern-

ment is not prepared to introduce evidence, and will not

seek to introduce evidence on that particular point.’”

In addition to the Department’s abandonment of this al-

legation it should be remembered that one of the conditions

in the District Court’s approval of the sale of the Pullman

stock to the applicants was ‘‘That the Pullman Company

or any person or corporation to whom the vendee railroads

may hereafter sell Pullman’s stock or assets shall offer to

enter into a contract to supply, as available, excess sleep-

ing ears, not purchased by individual railroads, upon proper

terms, to such railroads as may desire such contract,’’ and

that the court has retained jurisdiction in order to enforce

that condition and others, if necessary. Applicants’ mem-

orandum agreement, as amended, contains the following

provisions which bear on this particular question:

The Pullman Company will service, or to the extent

that it has sleeping cars available it will furnish and

service, for any railroad contracting therefor, sleep-

ing cars owned by or leased to The Pullman Company,

including cars from the pool * * * , and will service

sleeping cars owned by such railroad whether leased to

The Pullman Company or not.

All leases, operating contracts, and other contracts

provided for in thie Article VI shall be on reasonable

non-diseriminatory terms.

There is no evidence which justifies any suspicion of a

lack of good faith in the undertakings above quoted.

The railroad interveners make a specific objection to ap-

plicants’ proposal on the ground that it ‘‘disregards the

fundamental reason for the existence of the Pullman Com-

pany ... the ownership and maintenance of a nation-wide

pool of modern sleeping cars adequate to meet the varying

_ * The petition was sworn to on information and belief, but there

is no suggestion that it should be given evidentiary effect for that

reason.

App. 24

seasonal demands and the needs for through line service.”’

They predict that ‘‘for the next year or two the present

sleeping car equipment, which is largely worn out and ob-

solete, would be operated in much the same way as hereto-

fore, but as new sleeping cars gradually replace the old

ones the railroads individually would own and maintain the

new ears.”’ To this charge applicants reply that under

their agreement the agency which they have in mind for the

period after December 31, 1948, will offer among other

things: ‘‘a contract to supply, as availabie, excess sleeping

cars, not purchased by individual] railroads, upon proper

terms to such railroads as may desire it, and to maintain

such pool of sleeping cars to the extent required, by the

acquisition if necessary of additional cars.’’

The intervening railroads say that the present fleet of

sleeping cars should be replaced by modern equipment as

rapidly as possible and that, if the Otis interests should

come into control of The Pullman Company, the fleet would

he replaced as speedily as the manufacturers could turn out

the ears. There is a strong implication in the testimony of

the Chesapeake & Ohio officials that under applicants’ plan

the replacement of the existing heavyweight cars would

purposely be slow. Other evidence of record detracts from

the force of this implication. The railroads have been in-

terested in obtaining modern lightweight sleeping cars

since 1935, but they encountered difficulties in doing so, due

to their contractual relations with Pullman prior to the de-

cision in the antitrust suit, which was beneficial, directly

and indirectly, in removing those difficulties. From the pres-

ent evidence also it is clear that the railroads fully recog-

nize the desirability of modern lightweight sleeping cars.

This is shown by the promptness with which they exercised

their right to purchase those cars and also by their unwill-

ingness to pay cash for the heavyweight cars which re-

sulted in the ‘‘cash-or-car’’ notes. On the other hand, it

must be recognized that there are important obstacles of a

practical nature to any complete substitution of modern

App. 25

lightweight cars for the present heavyweight cars in the im-

mediate future. Since the cost of a new sleeping car today

is $100,000 or more, and contracts of purchase contain ‘‘es-

calator clauses’’ to allow for increased wage and material

costs, the replacement of 6,000 heavyweight cars would in-

volve an outlay of $600,000,000 at least. There would thus

be a financial problem in addition to the unlikelihood of se-

curing prompt deliveries of such a large amount of new

equipment under the present unsettled conditions which are

retarding the output of railroad cars of all kinds. Further-

more, the heavyweight cars still have a considerable amount

of utility. Although one of the witnesses for the railroad

interveners described the sleeping-car plant as ‘‘in a state

of collapse and practically ready to fall apart,’’ he added:

I am speaking now more of the riding qualities, the

housekeeping features, decorations, and so forth; the

air-conditioning, the springs, the lights, the toilet facili-

ties, and things of that nature, rather than of the physi-

cal safety of the cars. That I have never questioned.

The cars are strong, well built, durable, and probably

will go on running another 100 years, unless something

is done about it.

This statement is corroborated by testimony of one of ap-

plicants’ witnesses who stated :

A passenger car or a steel Pullman sleeping car, it

should be understood, is a steel structure which must

have the strength needed to meet all of the requirements

of the Association of American Railroads and of the

Interstate Commerce Commission safety standards.

During the life of a car that strength must be main-

tained so that at the end of any number of years the

car is sufficiently strong to meet all of the rigid require-

ments of the service in which it is operating. * * *

The structure of a car, namely, the trucks or body por-

tion of the car, does not become obsolete in any such

period as 20 to 25 years. During that period the in-

ternal fittings are renewed several times. The elec-

trical fixtures are changed, the grey is changed,

and the conveniences to the public are modified or

App. 26

changed in accordance with changes in taste and the

traffic requirements.

As before pointed out in this report, a number of rail-

roads, a notable example of which is the Southern Pacific,

have expressed their intention of buying heavyweight cars

assigned to them. The fact that applicants’ plan contem-

plates use of the heavyweight cars, or at least some of them,

until it becomes economical and feasible to replace them

does not make the plan objectionable but on the contrary

is one of its merits.

In our opinion the evidence shows abundantly that ap-

plicants’ plan will result in better service and greater

economy of operation than that which would be attained if

each individual railroad were to operate its own sleeping-

car service or if two or more sleeping-car companies were

engaged in the business.

Restraint or ComPETITION.

The remaining question under section 5(1) is whether

applicants’ pooling plan will unduly restrain competition.

Since this section is part of a comprehensive statute relat-

ing to the regulation of transportation, it seems reasonably

clear that the competition referred to therein is that among

carriers engaged in interstate commerce. This view is sup-

ported by the extensive legislative history of the provision,

as well as decisions of the Commission.

The evidence of record which bears on this question must

be considered in the light of well-known facts of railroad

history. Competition among the railroads for passenger

traffic has always been keen and dramatic. Such part of

this traffic as was formerly non-competitive, the short-haul

local traffic, was largely abandoned without a struggle some

20 years ago to public and private highway vehicles, but

the railroads have not relaxed their competition with each

other and with the air lines for the remaining long-haul

traffic.

bod

App. 27

At the beginning of the depression of the early thirties

the Commission pointed out that one of the causes of the

railroads’ financial ills was excessive competition for pas-

senger traffic.’ Little, if anything, was done to reduce this

competition at that time, and the improvement in economic

conditions a few years later was marked by even sharper

competition evidenced by the establishment of faster light-

weight trains.’ At the present time further development of

this kind are in progress.

A significant circumstance in connection with this aspect

of the case is the promptness with which the lightweight

sleeping cars were bought by the railroads which had the

rigit to purchase them. The New York Central and the

Pennsylvania bought 138 and 142 of those cars, respectively.

A total number of 281 were bought by the following western

railroads: Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe; Chicago, Burling-

ton & Quincy; Chicago & North Western; Chicago, Rock

Island & Pacific; Southern Pacific; and Union Pacific. All

of these carriers are powerful rivals for some of the most

e In Fifteen Per Cent Case, 1931, 178 I. C. C. 539, 584, the Com-

mission said

The carriers in this record pointed out the substantial cur-

tailments of passenger service which have been made in an

endeavor to reduce losses. They have also undertaken experi-

mental service in the hope of recovering profitable patronage.

But much more drastic measures will be necessary if the stag-

gering deficit incurred by that service is to be reduced to

bearable proportions. A little has been done in the pooling

of competitive train service by rival lines, but we believe that

the opportunities in this direction have by no means been

exhausted. Much more can be done under existing law.

‘The Commission deseribed this development at p. 13 of its

Annual Report for 1938, as follows:

Much improvement in railroad passenger service has been

made in the past few years, particularly in the air-condition-

ing of cars, speed, and the development of ‘‘streamlined’’

trains. The improvement has been more notable, however, in

the field of long-haul, and particularly luxury, travel than

elsewhere. The tendency is to abandon branch-line and short-

haul main-line traffie to the bus and the automobile.

App. 28

highly competitive passenger traffic in the country and oper-

ate modern streamlined trains which are extensively ad-

vertised.* Applicants’ witnesses testified that there would

be no restraint of competition for this passenger traffic

among the railroads above-named if the proposed pooling

agreement were approved, and past experience supports

these statements. This competition has not been impaired

by the fact that the sleeping cars used by the competitors

have been manned and serviced by Pullman, and we are

unable to see that the situation would be changed merely

because Pullman would be owned by those competitors and

other railroads. In the future as in the past each indi-

vidual carrier will have a powerful incentive to attract as

many passengers as possible to its trains in order to avoid

deicits from its sleeping-car operations which it would

have to meet under the uniform operating contract.

The Department of Justice, which, as stated in its petition

of intervention ‘‘is concerned with any agreement or ar-

rangement between such owners and operators of a sleeping

car service business which restrains competition and tends

to establish a monopoly,’’ has introduced nw evidence which

even remotely tends to show that transportation competi-

tion among applicants or between any two of them will be

restrained if earnings are pooled in accordance with the

plan here proposed. Nor was any such evidence offered by

the intervening railroads. Asked about the possible effect

of the proposal on competition for passenger traffic between

the Chesapeake & Ohio and certain of the applicants, one of

their witnesses stated that he thought there would be no

restraint immediately in the interim period but that there

might be later ‘‘if the Pullman Company, the agency, was

controlled largely by those competitors,’’ saying further:

* Well-known examples of such competitive trains are the Twen-

tieth Century Limited and the Broadway Limited between New

York and Chicago, the Super Chief, the Chief, and the City of Les

Angeles between Chicago and Los Angeles, the Denver Zephyr, the

SF 2 ee Se ey ee ee ee ee

ver.

App. 29

That would be—I think that would be a natural evo-.

lution. * * * Now, I don’t say that would result in—]

don’t say that it would result in diminution of competi-

tion, but it very well might. Human nature might not

resist the opportunities.

This cautious suggestion of danger, to which the witness

apparently had given little or no previous thought, is not

impressive. The same potential danger would, of course, be

present if Pullman were controlled by persons having a

very close relation to the Chesapeake & Ohio. It should

also be noted that one of the competitors which the witness

obviously had in mind is the Pennsylvania, which for many

years had participated with the Chesapeake & Ohio in a

joint sleeping-car route between New York and Cincinnati,

competitive with the Pennsylvania’s own single-line route

between those cities.

With respect to undue restraint of competition inter.

veners’ contentions are that, there would be such restraint

(1) in the servicing and furnishing of sleeping cars and (2)

in the manufacture of sleeping cars. These contentions

were considered at length by the District Court, and it is

not clear that they are material under section 5(1). How.

ever, they are presented and we shall discuss them.

The intervening railroads argue that ‘‘under applicants’

plan all railroads would be stockholders, creditors and

customers of The Pullman Company, the effect of which

would be to create a monopoly far tighter than the present

monopoly’’ and that ‘‘in these circumstances no new inde-

pendent enterprise could possibly enter the sleeping-car

business.’’ These arguments merely repeat assertions of

their witnesses which constitute most of the evidence bearing

on the question. There are no facts in this record which

would warrant a conclusion different from that of the Dis-

trict Court, expressed in the paragraph quoted in the

footnote.’

see no pny be ' the perpetuation of monopoly in a railroad

Caio eas business. Here we must look rather closely at

App. 30

Reflecting the conditions imposed by the District Court,

epplicants’ proposed uniform contract to be offered the in-

dividual railroads provides as follows:

In case the Railroad shall at any time desire to fur-

nish and operate its own sleeping cars and the usual

and commissary service therein for part of its require-

ments, or shall desire some third party to do so, and

shall request Pullman to furnish sleeping cars and the

usual and commissary service therein for the remain-

der of the requirements of travel over the Railroad’s

lines, Pullman will furnish such partial service to the

extent that it has sleeping cars of the required type

and floor plan available therefor in its fleet of equip-

ment and all of the terms of this contract shall be ap-

plicable to such cars.

Pullman shall lease for the purpose of operation and

servicing on the lines of the Railroad such new-type

light-weight sleeping cars or present-type standard

our concept of what constitutes an unlawful monopoly in this con-

nection. The thing which got the Pullman Company into trouble

was not that it was the only company furnishing sleeping car serv-

ice, but that Pullman made it virtually impossible for anybody else

to get into the business. This applied not only to a competing con-

cessionaire, but even to a railroad which sought to run part of its

own sleeping car service and let Pullman do the rest. We think we

have got rid of all that by the careful limitations imposed upon

Pullman Company by the original judgment in this case, and which

will be imposed upon its successors by the order which we shall

enter. A railroad may join with others and use exclusively the

services of Pullman. It may do part of that service itself, or through

some other concern of its own choosing, and ask Pullman to do the

rest. It may own all of its own sleeping cars, or part of them, or

none of them. All of this is provided for in our judgment. There

is, then, no strangle hold on the sleeping car business by a railroad

owned Pullman Company or anyone else. Therefore, there is no

unlawful monopoly. If there is only one store in a town at whieh

everyone trades, that fact does not itself constitute a monopoly

in the legal sense. It is only when the merchant maintains his posi-

tion by devices which compel everyone to trade with him exclu-

sively that the situation becomes legally objectionable. So here.

If the railroads who are the ones responsible for providing sleeping

ear service can take or leave Pullman assistance to that end, there

is no objection to the fact that most of them may prefer to employ

the Pullman concessionaire. (64 F. Supp. 108, 112)

App. 31

sleeping cars or tourist cars owned (or held under

lease) by the Railroad as the Railroad may el eee

The Department of Justice urges that the reference to an

election on the part of the railroads in the language above

quoted is meaningless because of a sentence in the earlier

memorandum agreement which reads as follows:

Every Railroad party hereto so purchasing euch

(li ate ry cars shall lease the same, and any other

ightweight sleeping cars which it may own or acquire

during the period of the said lease, to the Pullman

Company (but only for assignment for operation as

authorized by such railroad) for a period to expire at

the end of the interim period * * * or earlier, if so

agreed by the parties.

The uniform contract would no doubt supersede the fore-

going provision which seems to have been designed to take

care of needs during the period of demobilization period.

The District Court took note of this situation as follows:

The proposal is that for the present all sleeping

* cars, whether bought by individual roads or not, shall

be in the general pool. This is imperative, since the

armed forces need the service, and the emergency is

not yet passed.

In any event the District Court has undertaken to prevent

any unlawful monopoly by Pullman in the immediate as well

as the more remote future. No legal or factual grounds

would support a finding in this proceeding that competition

in the servicing and furnishing of sleeping cars would be

restrained despite the District Court’s efforts to prevent

such restraint.

This is true also as to the contention that applicants’

plan would result in the continuance of a restraint of trade

in the manufacture of sleeping cars, which the District

Court sought to remove. As shown in Appendix B, to that

end the court ordered that ‘‘no person shall be at the same

time a director of Pullman Inc., and of any vendee rail-

App. 32

road.’’ Shortly after the court’s order Richard K. Mellon,

a director of the Pennsylvania, resigned as a director of

Pullman Incorporated. A few weeks earlier in anticipation

of the District Court’s requirement three other directors

of the latter company had resigned—Harold S. Vanderbilt

and George Whitney, directors of the New York Central,

and Henry S. Sturgis, a director of the Erie Railroad Com-

pany. At about the same time John R. Morron, who had

been a director of both Pullman Incorporated and the

Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, resigned from the

board of the last-named company. Subsequently, Vander-

bilt and Whitney disposed of their holdings of Pullman

Incorporated stock. Sturgis’ investment in that stock is

comparatively small, but Mellon has for some time held a

considerable amount, which together with that owned by

members of his family and other relatives and certain

family trusts, amounts to 96,829 shares.” These constitute

the largest unified holding of Pullman Incorporated stock

and are approximately 3 percent of the total of 3,229,897

shares outstanding March 15, 1946.

J. P. Morgan & Co., Incorporated, is the stock transfer

agent for Pullman Incorporated and has represented it in

certain purchases of its stock for its treasury. Whitney

is a director and the president of Morgan & Company.

Since his resignation from the Pullman Incorporated board

the latter has included no one connected with Morgan &

Company, although D. A. Crawford, president of Pullman

Incorporated, in a letter written February 1946, suggested

that ‘‘a representative of the Morgan & Company group”’

1° The Mellon interest dates from 1930, when Pullman-Standard

absorbed two car-building companies controlled by the Mellons.

At one time it included nearly 432,000 shares of Pullman Incor-

porated stock, but it was sharply reduced in 1941 and 1942. There

is no indication that the Mellon holdings of Pullman Incorporated

stock are likely to be reduced still further, although recently the

chairman of the board of directors of the Chesapeake & Ohio in-

quired of Richard K. Mellon whether a bid for the purchase of those

holdings would be entertained. At present three directors of Pull-

man Incorporated and one member of the board of Pullman-

Standard are identified with the Mellon interest.

App. 33

be elected a director. The record does not show that any-

one who might be included in such a group owns stock in

Pullman Incorporated at this time.

The Department of Justice and the other interveners

take the position that there are interlocking holdings of

stock which connect certain railroad companies with Pull-

man Incorporated and have much the same effect as the

interlocking directorates criticized by the district court.

So far as the record shows, Mellon and Sturgis are the only

railroad directors who themselves own stock in Pullman

Incorporated. In all other instances the connection traced

by the Department of Justice extends through other cor-

porations. For example, next in size to the Mellon interest

in Pullman Incorporated is a block of 45,000 shares owned

or controlled by a Massachusetts investment trust, whose

directors include five railroad directors residing in Boston,

Mass. A number of insurance companies which own stock

in Pullman Incorporated have certain men on their boards

of directors who are also officials or directors of railroads.

Certain other such officials and directors are directors of

banks or trust companies in New York, Chicago, or Phila-

delphia, Pa., which administer trusts or estates whose hold-

ings include Pullman Incorporated stock.

The District Court in its original opinion, speaking of

interlocking directorates, said (50 F'. Supp. 123, 133) :

The significance of such interlocking directorates is

not that their existence, by themselves, constitutes a

violation of the Sherman Act.

This observation would seem applicable a fortiori to the

interlocking holdings of stock stressed by the Department

of Justice in contrast to directorates. There is no evidence

here which supports any suspicion that such attenuated

connections as those above described redound to an unfair

or unlawful advantage of Pullman-Standard in securing

orders for cars. An example which standing by itself might

lend a slight amount of plausibility to such suspicions is to

be found in the Mellon holdings of Pullman Incorporated

App. 34

stock and the Pennsylvania directorate of Richard K. Mel-

lon. The Pennsylvania, however, has never gone out of

its way to buy cars from Pullman-Standard. It now has

on order 256 new passenger coaches, sleeping cars, etc.,

including some which will be owned jointly with other car-

riers. Of these 107 will be supplied by Pullman-Standard

at a total cost of $10,457,140, and 149 are on order from two

other companies at a combined cost of $14,153,106. In

addition, the Pennsylvania is building 100 units of passen-

ger equipment in its own shops. Between 1927 and 1946 the

Pennsylvania acquired 47,497 freight cars, of which Pull-

man-Standard built 1,400 (about 3 percent).

The situation with respect to dealings between the New

York Central and Pullman-Standard is also of interest.

Between 1930 and 1946 this railroad on competitive bids

’ bought 418 passenger cars from Pullman-Standard and its

predecessor and 450 such cars from other companies. It

has never bought any freight cars from Pullman-Standard.

.As of November 1, 1946, the New York Central had on

order 353 passenger cars from Pullman-Standard and 367

from other companies.

Recently the intervening railroads themselves placed an

order for 284 new units of passenger equipment with Pull-

man-Standard. On the theory advanced by the Department

of Justice this order could be explained by the fact that

Harvey D. Gibson, a director of the Chesapeake & Ohio, is

also a director of the Home Insurance Company, which

owns or controls 6,500 shares of Pullman Incorporated

stock. Or it might be suggested that the order reflected a

hope on the part of persons in control of the Chesapeake

& Ohio that they might persuade the Mellons to sell them

some Pullman Incorporated stock. The most reasonable

inference, however, is that the sole determining factor was

one of cost.

The argument that Pullman-Standard would be unlaw-

fully favored if this application were granted is wholly in-

consistent with the legislative policy expressed in the Clay-

ton antitrust act, which by section 10 permits sales trans-

App. 35

actions between corporations, even where there is a sub-

stantial interlocking of management or control, subject to

competitive bidding. The District Court has reinforced

this safeguard by requiring that hereafter all purchases

of new sleeping cars either by Pullman or any of the ap-

plicants shall be made only after competitive bidding, as to

which it said (64 F. Supp. 108, 112):

The requirement for competitive bidding will, we

think, shut off the last possibility of any untoward in-

fluence of Pullman-Standard following sleeping cars

into the hands of the people who now take over.

If it should later develop that the court was mistaken in this

belief, it would no doubt exercise the jurisdiction which it

has retained in the antitrust suit. The evidence here, how.

ever, indicates that any such necessity is extremely un.

likely.

Tue Pusiic Interest.

Although the Department of Justice does not make a

positive contention that section 5(2) of the Interstate Com.

merce Act is applicable to applicant’s proposal, the Depart.

ment urges that there is no evidence in the record bearing

on the elements set forth in section 5(2)(c) to which the

Commission must give weight in passing upon transactions

subject to section 5(2), as follows:

(1) the effect of the proposed transaction upon ade.

uate transportation service to the public; (2) the ef-

fect upon the public interest of the inclusion, or failure

to include, other railroads in the territory involved in

the proposed transaction; (3) the total fixed charges

resulting from the proposed transaction; and (4) the

interest of the carrier employees affected.

Insofar as sleeping-car service involves transportation,

facts are presented which would support a favorable finding

on the first point. Neither upon legal nor upon other

grounds does it seem necessary or appropriate to consider

the other three points. The matter vould require no men-

App. 36

tion in this report were it not for the assertion of the

Department of Justice in its brief that ‘‘insofar as the

employees are concerned, the record shows an utter lack of

plan with respect to, if not a complete disregard of, their

position in the event the proposals are approved.’’ The

intervening railroads make a similar assertion. Such

charges seem to be calculated to incite unrest among the

Pullman employees, for which there is no justification.

In October 1945 the railroad buying group gave the fol.

lowing assurance in writing, which is reiterated in this

record by the applicants:

The Pullman Company under its railroad ownership

will faithfully perform and keep the obligations and

commitments to labor under a —

and practices according to the law of the land...

Since no change in Pullman’s corporate entity or its

present mode of operation is proposed, it is impossible to

see how the employees would be harmed if the proposed

pooling is approved. Nor does it appear that they would be

any better off if Otis & Co., were to come into control of

Pullman. On the other hand, if each individual railroad

were to decide to operate its own service in lieu of Pullman

according to one of the plans which the Department of

Justice avowedly considers desirable it seems certain that

a number of troublesome questions involving labor rela-

tions would arise.

The intervening railroads and Otis & Co., according to

their brief, view the issues of this proceeding as being of

transcendent importance. If this appraisal is correct, by no

means the least important issue is the question whether, as

contended by these interveners, the powers of the Federal

Government shall be used to place control of Pullman in

Otis & Co., rather than in the applicant railroads on the

ground that this action is essential to meet the requirements

of the antitrust statutes and to serve the general public

interest. Otis & Co. states its claim as follows:

App. 37

It should be emphasized that this proposed trans-

action is very different from those cases in which the

lack of a practical alternative puts extreme pressure

on the Commission’s exercise of discretion. Otis & Co.,

was one of several offerors in the District Court at

Philadelphia and is an appellant in the Supreme Court.

Its offer to purchase The Pullman Company is a cash

offer, and its proposals (a) to replace the existing

obsolete pool with a fleet of modern sleeping cars, and

(b) to improve sleeping car service without discrimi-

nation for all the railroads, were spread upon the

record in this proceeding. Otis & Co., and those with

whom it is associated in this offer, are independent of

any relationships, direct or indirect, to the monopoly

interests which control the sleeping car industry and

which the Philadelphia Court condemned in its decision

of May 8, 1944. Farther, Otis & Co.’s ownership and

operation of The Pullman Company would not exclude

any other independent concern from the field. Thus

the Commission is assured that there is no need to

perpetuate a monopoly in the business of furnishing

and servicing sleeping cars; that a completely inde-

pendent group is ready, willing and able to enter the

field to serve all the railroads.

It is assumed, of course, that the intervening railroads con-

cur in the foregoing statement; whether the ultimate object

of the Department of Justice coincides with that of the

other intervenors in this respect is not wholly clear.

It may be that the Commission will not consider it neces-

sary to pass upon the merits of the Otis & Co., offer above

described, but if these are deemed to present a material

issue, our opinion derived from hearing the evidence di-

rectly is that this evidence provides no factual support for

the claimed superiority of that offer from the standpoint

of public interest.

Proposep Finprvas.

The Commission should make the following findings :

1. All of the applicants have assented to the pooling of

railroad earnings involved in the operation of sleeping car

service as proposed in the application.

App. 38

2. The proposed pooling will be in the interest of better

service to the public and of economy in operation.

8. The proposed pooling will not restrain competition.

4. The consideration for the proposed pooling, as set

forth in Appendix C to this report, will be just and reason-

able.

Interveners’ motions to dismiss the application and to

clarify the issues should be denied.

The Commission should enter an order which would ap-

prove and authorize the proposed pooling.

App. 39

APPENDIX A (to Examiners Report).

Carrier

The Pennsylvania Railroad Company

The New York Central Railroad Company )

The Pittsburgh and Lake Erie acumen,

Company

Southern Pacifie Company

Union Pacific Railroad Company

The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Rail-

)

pF yn Great eaibase Railroad )

)

The Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas )

Pacific Railway Company )

New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad )

Company )

Georgia Southern and Florida Railway )

Company )

The New York, New Haven and Hartford

Railroad Company (trustees)

The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company

Chieago and North Western Railway Com- .

pany

Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha

Raiiway Company )

— Burlington & Quincey Railroad

Company

Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company

Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company

The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Rail-

way Company (trustees)

— Pacific Railroad Company (trus-

tees

Illinois Central Railroad Company

Seaboard Air Line Railway Company

to Total Purchase Price

$6,502,872

15.50 6,231,425

3,436,910

2,413,958

2,255,600

Northern Pacific Railway Company

Great Northern Railway Company

Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific

Railroad Company

The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Com-

pany

St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company

(trustees)

Wabash Railroad Company

Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company....

Florida East Coast Railway Company

{ trustees)

The Texas and Pacific Railway Company

The Denver and Rio Grande Western Rail-

road Company (trustees)

Boston and Maine Railroad

Lehigh Valley Railroad Company

Norfolk and Western Railway Company

Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac

Railroad Company

The Alton Railroad Company (trustee)

The Delaware, Lackawanna and Western

Railroad Company

International-Great Northern Railroad Com-

pany (trustees) ’

Central of Georgia Railway Company (trus-

tees)

Erie Railroad Company

Western Pacific Railroad Company

The Delaware and Hudson Railroad Cor-

$39,275,655

App, 41

A te

ercentage Participant’s

of Cars Approximate

Carrier to Total Purchase

SARE SE Re 97.70 $39,275,655

Pere Marquette Railway Company................ 41 163,664

The Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis

SIT sted tiddaclicehiinscnusiceenttnstoniceniesedionstiatasendion 38 154,780

The New York, Chicago and St. Louis Rail-

it ea a I 32 130,417

Chicago Great Western Railway Company... 27 109,672

New Orleans, Texas & Mexico Railway )

Company (trustee) ............ccccccccccceceeeceeees )

The Beaumont, Sour Lake & Western Rail- )

way Company (trustee) 2.00.00... ) 24 96,968

The St. Louis, Brownsville and Mexico )

Railway Company (trustee) .................... )

San Antonio, Uvalde & Gulf Railroad Com- )

i )

Maine Central Railroad Company.................. 23 93,792

The Western Railway of Alabama................ )

Atlanta and West Point Railroad Company ) 16 64,324

i TT RTS 08 33,730

Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railway Company... 06 23,679

Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company...... 06 23,237

The Kansas City Southern Railway Com-

TE dia tieias staraichticicmeitetinhepentnespuinbepuinsitbais 06 22,393

Bangor and Aroostook Railway Company...... 03 10,171

| Ra Na a al ee aE aoe 100.00 $40,202,482

APPENDIX B (to Examiner’s Report).

Final Order of the District Court, entered January 4,

1946, approving the sale of the stock of Pullman Company

to the Applicants (the text of this order is printed in the

Record on these appeals at pp. 1203-1205).

APPENDIX C (to Examiner’s Proposed Report).

Proposed Uniform Operating Contract.

Articie IV.

Section 1 (A). Pullman shall first retain from the £TOss

earnings from the sale of seats, berths and other accommo-

App. 42

dations, and commissary operations (where conducted by

Pullman) in all sleeping cars operated under the terms of

this contract during each contract year an amount, so far

as such gross earnings may be available, equal to the sum

of the following items:

(a) The total of Pullman’s ‘‘ Expenses of Operations’’ of

all cars operated on the lines of the Railroad for such

contract year, with such ‘‘Expenses of Operation’ deter-

mined as provided in Section 3 of this Article and with the

number of cars operated determined as provided in Section

2 of this Article.

(b) An interest return on cars operated on the lines of

the Railroad equivalent to (i) the Railroad’s cars operated

proportion of an amount equal to three (3) percent per

annum on the average depreciated value, as determined and

used in computing price of Pullman stock as of December

31, 1945 (adjusted to reflect subsequent additions and bet-

terments, retirements and depreciation accruals), for all

present-type heavyweight standard sleeping cars, new-type

lightweight sleeping cars, tourist sleeping cars and troop

sleeping cars owned by Pullman, plus (ii) an amount equal

to the Railroad’s cars operated percentage (for the cars

leased to Pullman) of the interest rental paid to the Rail-

road pursuant to Section 2 of Article I of this contract, and

plus (iii) the Railroad’s cars operated percentage of inter-

est rental paid each other railroad for cars of its owner-

ship operated on the lines of the Railroad; computed for

each type of car separately, with the number of cars oper-

ated determined as provided in Section 2 of this Article.

The average depreciated value of Pullman-owned cars shall

be ascertained, for each type of car separately, by averag-

ing the depreciated value at tne beginning of each month

in the year, determined in this paragraph.

(B). If, for any contract year, the total gross earnings

of all sleeping cars operated under the terms of this con-

tract shall exceed the total amount of Pullman’s ‘‘ Expenses

of Operation’’ for all cars operated, plus the interest re-

App. 43

turn to Pullman provided for in paragraph (b) of Sub.

Section (A) of this Section, such excess shall be divided

equally between Pullman and the Railroad.

(C). If, for any contract year, the total gross earnings

of all sleeping cars operated under the terms of this con-

tract shall be less than the total amount of Pullman’s ‘‘ Ex-

penses of Operation’’ of such cars plus the interest rental

applicable to railroad-owned lightweight cars represented

in amounts refered to in clauses (ii) and (iii) ef paragraph

(b) of Sub-Section (A) of this Section, the Railroad shall

pay to Pullman the amount of the deficiency.

Section 2. The number of cars of each type described in

Section 1 of Article I hereof operated during each contract

year shall be determined as follows:

The aggregate number of days of actual service (which

shall include actual time consumed on loaded movements,

regular scheduled layover between trips and empty move-

ments to and from service) of cars of each type and owner-

ship shall be divided by the number of days in the contract

year and the quotient shall be taken to be the average

number of cars of such type continuously in service during

the year.

Section 3. Except as herein otherwise provided, the term

“Expenses of Operation’’ as used in this contract shall

include all of Pullman’s expenses of conducting its sleeping

car business and commissary services, except the cost of

maintaining and operating air conditioning apparatus, but

including all taxes except income taxes, and also including

but not limited to the various items elsewhere herein ex-

pressly provided to be included in ‘‘Expenses of Opera-

tion’’; and that such expenses shall be ascertained sepa-

rately for each of the four types of cars in accordance with

the practice of Pullman in so ascertaining same at the time

this contract is made, subject to such changes as may be

agreed upon or as may be now or hereafter provided for in

the classification of sleeping car accounts prescribed by the

Interstate Commerce Commission; and the total of the ex-

penses so ascertained separately for each type of car shall

App. 44

be divided by the number of all cars of such type operated

by Pullman on all railroads (ascertained as provided in

Section 2 of this Article). The result so obtained, indi-

cating average expense per car of each type shall be multi-

plied by the number of cars of such type (ascertained as

provided in Section 2 of this Article) operated under the

terms of this contract and the product shall be the total

‘*Expenses of Operation’’ of the cars of such type operated

under this contract. ‘‘Expenses of Operation”’’ shall also

include the amount reflecting depreciation included in

rental, and taxes paid in respect to leased cars, but not

interest rental paid in respect thereof, as provided in

Section 2 of Article I of this contract.

For the purpose of the above computation all expenses

of Pullman in connection with the operation of present-

type standard sleeping cars, new-type lightweight sleeping

cars, tourist sleeping cars and troop sleeping cars operated

by Pullman shall be considered common to all four types of

cars except depreciation, shop maintenance, and such other

items of the expense as can be readily apportioned to the

different types of cars (which in the case of depreciation

of new-type lightweight cars leased shall be ascertained and

assigned specifically to the cars of the owner railroad), and

to ascertain average common expenses of operation of each

type of car operated by Pullman, for purposes of contract

settlement with all railroad companies, the above men-

tioned excepted items of expenses shall be eliminated from

the total expenses of Pullman for all of the four types of

cars operated during the contract year, and the total of the

remaining expenses shall be divided by the total number

of present-type standard sleeping cars, new-type light-

weight sleeping cars, tourist sleeping cars and troop sieep-

ing cars operated during such contract year to arrive

at the average of the common expenses of all types of cars

and to such average shall then be added the average of the

above excepted expenses separately for each of the four

types of cars, ascertained as herein provided, and the

total of the average of common expenses and excepted ex-

App. 45

penses for each type of car shall be multiplied by the

number of cars of such type (ascertained as provided in

Section 2 of this Article) to ascertain the ‘‘ Expenses of

Operation’’ for the contract year of all cars of each type

operated on the lines of the Railroad.

Section 4. A statement showing the gross earnings of

ears operated hereunder, and a statement of ‘‘ Expenses of

Operation’’ shall be furnished by Pullman to the Railroad

as soon as practicable after the end of each contract year,

and the Railroad shall have the right to verify such state-

ments by examination of the books and accounts of

Pullman.

All amounts due either party in the annual settlement of

accounts hereunder, shall be paid within 30 days after

statements have been furnished the Rai!road at the close

of each contract year.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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