Appendix — United States v. Pullman Co.
Supreme Court brief1947
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APPENDIX A.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
PROPOSED POOLING OF RAILROAD EARNINGS IN.
VOLVED IN OPERATION OF THE PULLMAN
COMPANY UNDER RAILROAD OWNERSHIP.
Submitted
Upon application of certain class I railroads for approval
of a proposed pooling of earnings involved in opera-
tion of sleeping car service by The Pullman Company
under railroad ownership, Found: (1) That all appli-
cants have assented to the proposed pooling; (2) That
the proposed pooling will be in the interest of better
service to the public and of economy in operation; (3)
That the proposed pooling will not restrain competi-
tion; and (4) That the consideration for the proposed
pooling wil be just and reasonable. Proposed pooling
authorized and approved.
Jacob Aronson, John Dickinson, Emmett E. McInnis,
Sydney R. Prince, Albert Ward, C. Raymond Hulsart, and
Henry L. Walker for applicants.
George B. Haddock, Samuel Karp, James R. Browning,
Robert J. Bulkley, Frank J. Meistrell, Herbert G. Pillen,
and Arne C. Wiprud, for interveners.
App. 2
REPORT PROPOSED BY HOWARD HOSMER AND
0. G. BARBER, EXAMINERS.
By application, filed July 25, 1946, as amended, 56 class-
I railroads seek approval under section 5(1) of the Inter-
state Commerce Act of a plan for pooling or division of
traffic, or of service, or of gross or net earnings or of any
portion provided for in certain existing and proposed agree
ments relating to railroad sleeping-car service. The appli-
cants are listed in Appendix A, in which appear also the
names of The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, Pere
Marquette Railway Company, and The New York, Chicago
and St. Louis Railroad Company. These three carriers are
opposed to the application, but they wish to become parties
to the plan proposed by the applicants if it is approved.
Petitions of intervention in opposition to the application
were tendered at the hearing by the three opposing rail car-
riers above named, the Department of Justice, and Otis &
Co., a Delaware corporation engaged in investment banking
at Cleveland, Ohio. Otis & Co. says that it ‘‘is not an inter-
vener in this proceeding in the usual sense,’’ and it pre-
sented no testimony.
This application is an outgrowth of a suit brought by the
Department of Justice in the District Court of the United
States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’ against
The Pullman Company, (hereinafter referred to as Pull-
man) the sole sleeping-car company which is subject to the
Interstate Commerce Act, Pullman-Standard Car Manuv-
facturing (hereinafter referred to as Pullman-Standard),
which manufactures sleeping and other railroad cars, and
Pullman Incorporated, a holding company, which owns all
the capital stock of the other two companies, for violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The District Court found
that the defendants had violated that act and ordered them
to separate completely the ownership and operation of
1 This court, which for the case referred to consisted of three cir-
cuit judges, is subsequently referred to as the District Court.
App. 3
sleeping cars from the manufacture of such cars, United
States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123, 53 id. 908. Pullman
Incorporated was given the right to elect which business it
would dispose of. After hearing the District Court on
March 22, 1945, entered an order permitting Pullman In-
corporated to cause Pullman to treat with interested rail-
roads or any other persons for the sale of the sleeping-car
business and the properties connected therewith or for the
sale of the stock of Pullman. (55 F. Supp. 985). About two
months later Pullman Incorporated made an offer to a
buying group of railroads to sell the stock of Pullman to
them. Those railroads accepted that offer November 7,
1945, agreeing to pay for the stock in full in cash. After
a hearing upon application for approval of the sale and the
offers of other prospective purchasers, one of whom was
Otis & Co., the District Court on December 18, 1945, ren-
dered an opinion approving the sale to the railroads (64 F.
Supp. 108) and a few days later entered an order pro-
viding for continued operation of sleeping-car service by
Pulhnan under its present management until March 31,
1946. The court’s order of approval of the sale was subject
to certain conditions set forth in Appendix B. This order
was later continued in effect pending action by the Supreme
Court on an appeal from the decision of December 18, 1945.
Under applicants’ plan they will pay a total of $40,202,482
for the Pullman stock, which will be distributed among
them in the percentage proportions shown in the second
column of Appendix A. Their respective shares of the
purchase price are shown in the third column of that appen-
dix. The details of the proposed transaction are set forth
in a memorandum agreement, as amended, which is in evi-
dence. The general purpose is stated therein as follows:
1. To maintain without interruption orderly sleep-
ing car service requisite in the interest of the public
and for the military establishment in the existing
emergency.
App. 4
2. To afford means whereby every Railroad, subject
to the terms of this Memorandum Agreement, may:
(a) acquire all or any part of the sleeping cars
regularly assigned to its lines;
(b) conduct its own sleeping car operation, in
whole or in part, or arrange, through contract, on
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, for the
conduct thereof by others;
(c) perform its own service or maintenance, or
service and maintenance, of sleeping cars used in
operations on its lines;
(d) procure such service or maintenance, or
service and maintenance, through contract on rea-
sonable and non-discriminatory terms with The
Pullman Company under railroad ownership or
with a service company constituted as hereinafter
set forth.
It is applicants’ intention to reduce Pullman into, or sell
its properties to, a sleeping-car service corporation within
a period called the interim period which would end not later
than December 31, 1948.
The assent of all applicants to their proposal is evidenced
by certified copies of minutes of meetings of boards of di-
rectors or transcripts of judicial records in cases of rail-
roads undergoing reorganization. For reasons not clearly
disclosed the following railroads which provide sleeping-car
service did not see fit to participate in applicants’ plan:
The Central Railroad Company of New Jersey (trustees) ;
Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company; Chicago,
Indianapolis and Louisville Railway Company; St. Louis
Southwestern Railway Company (trustee) ; Tennessee Cen-
tral Railway Company; and Detroit and Mackinac Railroad
Company. The Canadian railroads and their subsidiaries
in the United States and the National Railways of Mexico
were not invited to join in the plan.
The number of serviceable sleeping cars in the United
App. 5
States as of October 1, 1946, was 6,728,? of which 4,916 were
air-conditioned and 1,812 were not so improved. These
figures do not include troop sleepers built during the war.
Of the air-conditioned cars 618 are lightweight (constructed
of metals such as aluminum or stainless steel), 3,825 are
heavyweight standard sleepers, and 473 are heavyweight
tourist cars. Practically all of the lightweight cars, 3,191
heavyweight standard and 442 heavyweight tourist cars are
regularly assigned to individual railroads. In addition, there
are 672 air-conditioned cars, mostly heavyweight standard
cars, which are unassigned but are available. The service-
able non-air conditioned cars consist of 1,669 heavyweight
tourist cars and 143 heavyweight standard cars. All but a
few of these are unassigned.
The lightweight cars have all been purchased by the rail-
roads to whom they are assigned for a total price of $34,-
697,009, based on the depreciated book values of these cars.
The purchase price of $40,202,482 to be paid by applicants
was arrived at by valuation of other items of property
owned by Pullman, including approximately $20,200,000 for
heavyweight cars, $2,500,000 in working capital to be pro-
vided, $12,500,000 for inventories of materials and supplies,
and about $4,775,000 for miscellaneous property, consisting
principally of repair shops at Atlanta, Ga., Buffalo, N. Y.,
Calumet, Ill., Richmond, Calif., St. Louis, Mo., and Wil-
mington, Del., and laundries at Buffalo, Chicago, Tll., Cin-
cinnati, Ohio, Kansas City, Mo., Miami, Fla., New York, N.
Y., St. Louis, Oakland, Calif., Tampa, Fla., and Washington,
D. C.
In the course of the negotiations between applicants and
Pullman Incorporated a complication arose because of the
reluctance on the part of many railroads to acquire directly
or through stock ownership the considerable number of
heavyweight sleeping cars in the existing Pullman fleet in
view of the likelihood that lightweight equipment will be re-
_* The number includes 27 non-air conditioned cars regularly as-
signed to Mexican and Canadian railroads.
App. 6
quired for the high-speed passenger trains of the future.
To meet this problem a plan was devised under which Pull-
man would issue interest-bearing non-negotiable notes to
Pullman Incorporated due not later than December 31,
1948, in a total amount equal to the present value of the
heavyweight cars. The principal of these notes would be
payable either by surrendering the cars themselves or in
cash. Under applicants’ memorandum agreement any rail-
road, whether an applicant or not, would be permitted to
purchase any heavyweight sleeping car regularly assigned
to it at a stipulated price. It appears that some of them
would avail themselves of this right which has been held in
abeyance pending termination of the antitrust suit. The
agreement further provides that Pullman would offer to
sell unassigned cars to the railroads to the extent that it had
no need for such cars. Another provision requires that any
railroad which purchases either lightweight or heavyweight
cars from Pullman will lease such cars to that company
for operation during the interim period.
As rent for the leased cars Pullman would pay to the
lessor railroad annually an amount equal to the sum of (1)
the depreciation on such cars at rates prescribed by the
Commission taken into the accounts of the lessor plus (2) 3
percent of the depreciated cost of such cars, referred to as
interest rental. So much of this interest rental as is appli-
cable to lightweight cars would be payable in priority and
preference to all other such interest rental and to all inter-
est on the car notes secured by the heavyweight cars before
referred to. (See Appendix C, Section 1 (c).)
Applicants introduced in evidence a proposed uniform
operating contract which would govern the relations be-
tween Pullman and the respective carriers for which it
would perform service during the interim period. Under
this contract Pullman would furnish sleeping cars to the
contracting carriers to the extent that it had available cars
and would service such cars. A contracting railroad would
have the right at any time to furnish and operate its own
App. 7
cars or arrange for a third party to do so, and Pullman
would be obligated to perform the remainder of the total
service insofar as it had available cars.
The contract would provide that Pullman would bz re-
sponsible for damage to cars from causes originating inside
such cars, while the railroad would be responsible for dam-
ages due to accident or casualty originating outside the
cars. Pullman would bear the cost of shop repairs, exterior
yard maintenance, as well as maintenance of the interior
finish, carpets, upholstery, etc., and would clean the inside
of the cars and vestibules. Generally speaking, the rail-
road would haul and switch the cars on passenger runs as
well as to and from repair shops. The railroad would pro-
vide space for airing and storing bedding, linen, and other
supplies but Pullman would pay the railroad for compressed
air, heat, light, and water furnished by the railroad for this
purpose. The railroad would furnish at its own cost lubri-
cating material, ice, and drinking water, heat the cars, and
clean them on the outside. Pullman would furnish and main-
tain the lighting equipment, including electric accessories.
Railroad ticket agents would sell tickets for Pullman ac
commodations but would act as agents of Pullman in so do-
ing. The contract would provide in detail for apportion-
ment of responsibility for injuries to persons or damages
to property. From the standpoint of this proceeding the
most important provisions of the contract are contained in
Article IV, relating to revenue relations between Pullman
and the railroads, which is set forth in Appendix C.
Ditatory ConTENTIONs.
Interveners devote more than half of their briefs to argu-
ments by which they seek to persuade the Commission that
it should dismiss this application without passing upon its
merits. The discussion of this phase of the case centers
on two questions of a legal nature: (1) Under applicants’
proposal would there actually be a pooling or division of
traffic, service, or earnings within the meaning of section 5
App. 8
(1)? (2). Must the applicants’ purchase of the capital
stock of Pullman be approved by the Commission under
section 5(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act which relates
to acquisition of control of one carrier by another or others?
In their briefs the Department of Justice and the inter-
vening railroads argue that there would be no pooling under
applicants’ proposal. In considering this question the na-
ture of the sleeping-car business as applicants propose to
conduct it must be kept in mind. Under the present ar-
rangement the railroads, as it were, have granted a conces-
sion to an independent company to conduct a hotel business
on their lines in order to make available more comfortable
facilities in cars furnished by the independent company for
passengers who are willing to pay for superior accommoda-
tions. The railroads now propose to take over that hotel
business and operate it co-operatively or collectively. The
fact that they will continue to utilize the corporate struc-
ture originally built for the independent company does not
alter the essential fact that for the time being at least this
will be a joint railroad enterprise. To an important and
perhaps an increasing extent the cars will henceforth be
owned by the individual railroads, and the relation of Pull-
man to these will be largely one of service. The revenue re-
ceived from passengers would be collected not by the rail-
road performing the transportation or owning the car but
by the cooperative agency, which under applicants’ plan
will have custody of the pooled revenues of the railroads
derived from sleeping-car service. An important change
from the present arrangement lies in the fact in the future
each contracting railroad will have to participate in an ar-
rangement to guarantee Pullman against operating losses.
In the past some railroads have been required to assume
such guarantees insofar as operations on their individual
lines are concerned but others have not.
The details of the proposed pooling would be controlled
by Article IV of the proposed uniform contract set forth
in Appendix C. From the total gross earnings of all sleep-
App. 9
ing cars operated on the lines of each contracting railroad
for any year Pullman’s operating expenses allocated to
such railroad as hereinafter explained, together with cer-
tain interest charges, are deducted, and the balance, if any,
is divided equally between Pullman and the railroad. On
the other hand, if the gross earnings are less than Pull-
man’s operating expenses allocated to that railroad, the de-
ficiency must be paid by the railroad. The share of net
earnings which the railroad would receive or the amount of
the deficiency which it would have to pay, however, would
not be determined directly by Pullman’s operating costs in-
curred on the individual] railroad, for its operating expenses
would not and probably could not practicably be segregated
to the various lines of railroad on which they acerue. In-
stead each railroad would pay a fraction of the total, ap-
portioned to the principal classes of cars (lightweight,
heavyweight, tourist, ete.), determined by the ratio of cars
in each class operated on each individual railroad to the
total number of such cars. There is thus a special agree-
ment as to sharing the expenses which affects the distribu-
tion of profits earned by the joint enterprise as well as the
guarantee of its operating expenses, and this, we believe,
brings the arrangement within the oft-cited definition of
pooling in the Century Dictionary:
A combination of the interests of several otherwise
competing parties, such as rival transportation lines,
in which all take common ground as regards the public,
and distribute the profits of the business among them-
selves equally, or according to special agreement. In
this sense, pooling is a system of reconciling conflicting
interests, and of obviating ruinous competition, by
which the several competing parties or companies
throw their revenue into one common fund, which is
then divided or distributed among the members of the
pool on a basis of percentages or proportions pre-
viously agreed upon or determined by arbitration.
Where earnings from sleeping-car traffic in the case of an
individual railroad are large enough to afford a surplus for
App. 10
equal division between the railroad and Pullman, they
would seem to constitute pooled net earnings, for the amount
is determined by agreed percentages of Pullman operating
expenses, and Pullman’s half is available for distribution
to all stockholder railroads as dividends, which, if declared,
would be payable without regard to the profitability of the
sleeping-car business on the line of any particular recipient
of the dividends. Where sleeping-car revenue on an individ-
ual line is insufficient to meet its agreed share of Pullman
operating expenses, an element of pooling is present be-
cause of the fact that the payment of its deficiency under its
guaranty would be a deduction from its operating income
derived from all traffic, freight as well as passenger, pre-
sumably to be accounted for as a debit to its income ac-
count, and therefore a portion of its net earnings would be
pooled with contributions from other railroads similarly
situated for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the joint
sleeping-car enterprise.
In a general way the relations between the railroads and
Pullman, at least with respect to net revenue from sleeping-
car traffic, would be similar to those between the railroads
and the Railway Express Agency, Inc., which the Commis-
sion has recognized as a pooling agreement, Railway Exp.
Agency, Inc., Pooling Application, 227 1.C.C. 517. As will
be shown later in this report, there is strong competition
for the transportation of passengers in sleeping cars, and
the situation here is not the same as that presented in Ap-
plication for Approval of Agreement Between Pullman Co.
and the Canadian National Ry. Co., 259 1.C.C. 41, in which
division 3 found that there was no competition between the
parties to that application and that accordingly it was
without jurisdiction under section 5(1). In the past the
Commission has regarded this provision as imposing a
duty on it to pass upon agreements of this kind whenever
a possibility of undue restraint of competition was dis-
closed, and it has therefore interpreted the provision
broadly instead of narrowly, Express Contract, 1920, 59
1.C.C. 518, 522.
App. 11
A pooling of earnings or a portion thereof is sufficient
to raise a question under section 5(1). Applicants make
the further contention that there would also be a pooling
of service similar to that considered in Minnesota-Atlantic
Transit Co. and Nicholson-Universal 8. S. Co. Pooling, 247
LC.C. 319. We do not see the similarity, but the point is of
little importance. When section 5(1) was rewritten by Con-
gress in 1940, it was broadened to embrace **pooling or
division of traffic, or of service, or of gross or net earnings
or of any portion thereof.’’ (Emphasis supplied.) This re-
petition of the word or is significant and serves to negative
the assertion of one of the interveners that ‘‘a pooling or
division of both traffic and revenues is the only kind of ar-
rangement that would fall within the prohibition of the
statute.’’
If the proposal is one for a pooling of earnings, as we
consider it to be, the question then arises whether the Com-
mission would be warranted in declining to pass upon it
under section 5(1), as the interveners contend. The appli-
cation is one for a license as defined in the recently-enacted
Administrative Procedure Act and should be disposed of in
accordance with the requirements of that act.’
The Department of Justice filed a motion to dismiss the
application, concurred in by the other interveners, in which
it stated among other things:
The power of the Commission to approve or author-
ize the acquisition by applicants of the stock of The
Pullman Company is found only in Section 5(2) of the
Interstate Commerce Act, and the Commission is with-
out power to approve said acquisition under Section
5(1), which relates only to pooling and division of traf.
fie or earnings.
*The applicable provision is Section 9(b), ‘““LICENSES.—In
. any case in which application is made for a license required by law
the agency, with due regard to the rights or privileges of all the
interested parties or adversely affected persons and with resse=able
dispatch, shall set and complete any proceedings required to be
conducted pursuant to sections 7 and 8 of this Act or other pro-
ceedings required by law and shall make its decision. * * * ”’
App. 12
The application is made under Section 5(1) of th
Act, and not under Section 5(2). Applicants state the
approval by the Commission of their acquisition of th
stock of The Pullman Company is necessary to the o;
eration of the pooling arrangement, and that unles
the approval of such acquisition is granted, approvs
of the pooling arrangements would be meaningless. Y«
there is no power in the Commission to give such ay
roval under Section 5(1), and no proper notice ha
en given of any application under Section 5(2).
Applicants and the interveners agree that the applicatio
raises no issue under section 5(2). The interveners appea
to be unwilling to commit themselves on the questio
whether action by the Commission under the latter sectio
approving the acquisition of the Pullman stock is necessary
Applicants say that it is not, and there is ample authorit
for that view. Determination of the question involves a
interpretation of section 5(13), which reads as follows:
As used in paragraphs (2) to (12), inclusive, th
term ‘‘carrier’’ means a carrier by railroad and an e:
press company, subject to this part; a motor carrie
— to part Il; and a water carrier subject to pai
This wording is similar to that of section 20a(1), a
follows :
That as used in this section the term ‘‘carrier’’ mear
a common carrier by railroad (except a street, subw
ban, or interurban electric railway which is not ope
ated as a part of a general steam railroad system
transportation) which is subject to this part, or an
corporation organized for the purpose of engagin
in transportation by railroad subject to this part.
A sleeping-car company is not a ‘‘common carrier b
railroad’’ within the meaning of those words in sectio
20a(1), Interlocking Directorate Application of Richard k
Mellon, 199 I.C.C. 521. It could therefore scarcely be co!
sidered a ‘‘carrier by railroad’’ in interpreting sectio
App. 13
5(13). This view is further supported by the legislative his-
tory of the Transportation Act of 1940, which shaped the
present form of this paragraph.‘ |
The interveners express concern over the possibility that
the Commission may make some finding which directly or
indirectly would purport to approve applicants’ acquisition
of the Pullman stock. On this point the Department of
Justice says:
Since such acquisition and control is an essential
and necessary prerequisite to any pooling arrange-
ments, and since the acquisition and control is an inte-
gral and inextricable part of the proposal made by the
applicants, it would be impossible for the Commission,
under the application and upon the basis of the evi.
dence presented in support thereof, to separate or
segregate from the proposal any ling arrangements
falling within the purview of Section 5( 1).
We do not believe that the Commission could properly
circumscribe its duty under section 5(1) by accepting this
view. That duty is to express its opinion after hearing con-
cerning ‘‘ pooling or division of traffic, ete.’’ If it makes the
findings specified in the Statute, the effect is to enable the
applicant carriers lawfully to enter into a contract, agree-
ment, or combination for such pooling or division. At the
hearing the applicants stated that they regarded the pur-
chase of the stock as ‘‘an integral part of the memorandum
man stock, since that is the primary step in the series
of measures whereby the pooling arrangement will be
* See Omnibus Transportation Legislation—Letter from the Chair-
man of the Legislative Committee, Interstate Commerce Commis-
ston, * * © dated January 29, 1940. House Committee Print (76th
Congress 3d Session), pp. 64, 69.
App. 14
sought in the application will necessarily carry with it
approval of all essential parts of the transaction, in-
cluding the stock acquisition.
They cite section 5(11) of the Interstate Commerce Act
in support of this position, which appears to have merit
in view of the fact that the proposed railroad ownership
of the Pullman stock would be the circumstance of out-
standing importance which would make the proposed ar-
rangement a pooling. The question requires no extended
discussion here; if it is material, it is one of law, as to
which the Commission’s opinion would not be final. The
emphasis placed on the stock acquisition by the interveners
and the tenor of their arguments indicates that they per-
haps look forward to further litigation on this point even
though the District Court’s decision approving the sale of
the Pullman stock to the railroads is affirmed.
Such an indication is to be found in the following state.
ment in the brief of Otis & Co. :
Thus the Commission is confronted with the anomaly
of a hearing conducted under section 5(1) on proposed
purchase agreements and a purported pooling opera-
tion, affecting every railroad in the United States, with
the issues wholly undefined, and so without a fair and
reasonable opportunity for interviewers [interveners’?]
to prepare their evidence to meet such issues. This is
one of the basic errors in the proceeding. A clarifica-
tion of the issues at the opening of the hearing would
have laid bare the all-important jurisdictional question
involved and stripped the proceeding of all its obvious
surplusage to the comparatively narrow issues under
section 5(1).
The charge of error here is without justification. All of
the interveners received copies of the application when it
was filed, and there is no reason to believe that any of them
failed to understand that it asked for approval of pooling
under section 5(1). Although this particular intervener
avoided use of the word “‘pooling’’ in its petition for leave
to intervene, this was not true of the other two petitions of
App. 15
intervention. In a letter to Assistant Attorney General
Berge relating to this proceeding a month before the hear-
ing the acting chairman of the Commission after referring
to ‘‘pooling within the meaning of section 5(1) of the Inter-
state Commerce Act”? said:
The application requests that we issue an order ap-
proving and authorizing such pooling.
At the outset of the hearing the presiding officer said:
It is my understanding that this proceeding is solely
under section 5(1) and that no application under sec-
tion 5(2) has been filed * * * as I interpret section 5(2)
itself, that is not necessary,
The charge that interveners did not have a fair oppor-
tunity to prepare their evidence to meet the issue as above
defined is refuted by the fact that more than 60 percent of
the record consisted of their evidence, most of which was
directed to that issue. Some of the discussion of the ques-
tion which appears in the record could be described perhaps
as ‘‘obvious surplusage,’’ but the amount thereof was not
excessive.
The Department of Justice urges that ‘‘even if the juris-
dictional requirements had been met, the Commission should
decline to act on the proposed transactions’ until the ap-
peal from the decision of the District Court is decided by
the Supreme Court. The Department points out that the
proposed sale of the Pullman stock to applicants is con-
tingent on affirmance of the District Court’s decision, and
this applicants concede. The Department, however, fears
that ‘‘Commission approval of applicants’ proposal might
be erroneously construed as permission to evade or vio-
late court order,’’ saying further:
There is danger that any order which might be issued
by the Commission in this matter would be subject to
misconstruction and that corporations and persons in-
volved in the proposed transaction might be misled into
believing that such order would enable them to com-
App. 16
plete the proposed transactions without court approval
or contrary to orders which may be issued by the court
relating to the sale of The Pullman Company or its
future operations.
Although the Supreme Court has referred to che railroads
as being under the ‘‘fostering guardianship’’ of the Com-
mission, (263 U. S. 456, 478) this relation has never been
understood as including any responsibility for protecting
the railroads against unsound advice on the part of their
law departments.
This particular question, however, has already been con-
sidered by the Commission. In the letter from the acting
chairman previously referred to, he said:
In these circumstances, we believe it to be our duty
to proceed with the application in the regular course,
pod not hold it in abeyance until the decision of the
Supreme Court.
There is evidence in the record supporting the wisdom of
so doing. It is desirable that the uncertainty concerning
Pullman’s future be removed as soon as possible. One of
applicants’ witnesses testified on this point as follows:
Questions have arisen as to renegotiation of expir-
ing leases at higher rental rates, questions of making
necessary capital expenditures for which there had
been no provision—and naturally so because the deal
was expected to be consummated quickly—requests of
certain railroads for additional equipment or substi-
tute equipment, or modernization of existing equip-
ment, matters involving the control of expenses, adver-
tising budgets, and sale of pieces of equipment not in-
cluded in the deal, lease of lightweight ears purchased
by the railroads, the matter of operating parlor cars
that had been purehased by certain railroads, and the
interim agreements with railroads to replace con-
tracts that had been canceled as of December 31, 1945.
The longer this state of uncertainty continues the
more involved it will get. There is also the matter of
App. 17
filling positions vacated by resignation, retirement, or
death. Necessarily at this time that is being left en-
tirely to the judgment of the present Pullman manage-
ment.
If the District Court’s order is affirmed, valuable time
will have been saved by the Commission’s action in dispos-
ing of this application without awaiting the Supreme
Court’s decision. We believe that the Commission may
properly complete this proceeding and make its decision at
the earliest practicable time ‘‘with due regard to the rights
or privileges of all the interested parties,’’ as provided by
the Administrative Procedure Act.
The principal questions on which findings must be made
in passing upon this application are (1) whether the appli-
eants’ proposed arrangement will be in the interest of bet-
ter service to the public, or economy in operation, and (2)
whether it will unduly restrain competition. They will be
discussed in that order.
Berrer Service ro THE Pusiic anp
Economy 1n OPERATION.
The word better is a comparative term. The Commission
must therefore determine whether the applicants’ plan of-
fers superior advantages from the standpoint of service to
the public in contrast with other plans for conducting sleep-
ing-ear service. Three alternatives are suggested by the
evidence: (1) Ownership and operation of their own sleep-
ing cars by the individual railroads; (2) operation of a
sleeping-car service business by more than one company as
competitors; and (3) continuation of Pullman’s operations
under the ownership and management of promoters repre-
sented by Otis & Company in its attempt to buy the Pull-
man stock.
The Department of Justice apparently is the only party to
this proceeding which considers either the first or the second
alternative feasible or desirable. It states that one of the
purposes of its antitrust suit was to bring about ‘‘competi-
App. 18
tive conditions . . . under which more than one company
might engage in the operation of a sleeping-car service busi-
ness’’ and criticizes the District Court for approving a plan
‘*which removes incentive for individual participating rail-
roads to acquire and operate their own sleeping cars.’’ The
Department introduced no evidence bearing on these mat-
ters, however.
The chairman of the board of directors of the Chesapeake
& Ohio, testifying on behalf of the railroad interveners,
stated it to be his opinion that individual operation and
ownership of sleeping cars ‘‘would be the worst possible
way ... the most inefficient and most uneconomical.’’ The
possibility that there might be more than one sleeping-car
company, each similar in a general way to Pullman, was
only briefly mentioned in the record. The witness last re-
ferred to testified that within the past 18 months he had
endeavored to organize a company which would compete
with Pullman but met with no encouragement from persons
whom he invited to join in the venture. It may safely be
concluded that the financial hazards involved in such an
undertaking are insuperable at the present time and that
furthermore the participation of more than one company,
which the Department of Justice ostensibly favors, would
not be in the interest of better service to the public or of
economy in operation.
This latter conclusion is based on the evidence of both
the applicants and the intervening railroads. The senior
vice-president of the latter railroads, a man of nearly 50
years’ railroad experience, said he thought ‘‘it would be
more economical, more in the public interest if one agency
operated a unified sleeping-car service, nation-wide,’’ de-
scribing the advantages of unified operation as follows:
An independent agency operating on a nation-wide
basis would have a compelling incentive to standardize
the types and designs of sleeping cars and thereby very
greatly reduce the investment cost of a modern sleep-
ing car fleet with resulting savings in carrying charges
and the annual cost of maintenance. ree factors
—
ee ee
App. 19
would contribute to the reduction in the initial cost of
ae nn om pe = required by a unified service agency as
red with the cost of the equipment that would be
eded by the railroads individually to take care of
their individual needs. These three factors are (1)
reduction in the number of units needed because of
greater utilization of the individual unit, (2) redue-
tion in the number of types of cars resulting from
proper standardization of designs, and (3) reduction
in cost due to arene be in much larger quantities .
Experience of the past few years has conclusively
shown that a nation-wide pool of sleeping cars is a vital
military necessity to safeguard the welfare of the na-
tion.
Another witness for the intervening railroads pointed out
the desirability of uniform equipment ‘‘so that a car orig-
inating in New York, if it broke down in Mexico, could be
repaired with standard parts.’’ Applicants’ evidence fur-
nishes numerous examples of economy due to unified opera-
tion. Maintenance of a readily available equipment pool
facilitates the efficient handling of seasonal travel to sum-
mer or winter resorts and of occasional large passenger
movements such as those to national conventions of out-
standing importance. Operation of through sleeping-car
lines involving two or more railroads is simplified. Inte-
grated handling of rate-making functions, such as the pub-
lication of joint tariffs and ticketing arrangements, is made
possible. There is a labor pool or reserve of trained work-
ers, such as conductors and porters, capable of dealing with
seasonal or abnormal traffic. Unified operation offers wider
opportunity for research and experimentation, resulting in
general improvement of equipment in respect of car design,
riding qualities, bedding, seating, lighting, heating, water
cooling, air conditioning, and other similar matters. The
laundries and car-repair shops previously mentioned and
also warehouses have been located at strategic points in
order to meet the needs of sleeping-car operations on a
number of railroad lines. They are not so located and de-
App. 20
signed as to make them economical for use by individual
lines. Under individual operation of sleeping cars, there-
fore, many new facilities of this kind would have to be built.
Pullman’s executive and operating organization has been
adapted to nation-wide unified functioning. For this pur-
pose the country has been divided into seven zones, each of
which is under its own superintendent. These are subdivided
into 47 districts, for which there are the same number of dis-
trict superintendents, and there is some further subdivision
which need not be described. As an example of this opera-
ting organization, at Atlanta 42 persons handle Pullman
service on eight railroads and in two railroad yards. Appli-
cants, of course, are fully in accord with the railroad inter-
veners as to the indispensability of unified operation of
sleeping-cars during the recent war and the period of de-
mobilization. One of their witnesses stated:
Had it not been for the efficient distribution and utili-
zation by the Pullman Company of all sleeping car
equipment, including troop sleepers and troop kitchen
ears, the railroads could not have moved the tremen-
dous volume of military traffic that they did.
The facts which bear out this statement are a matter of
common knowledge.
The record fully supports a finding that operation of the
sleeping-car business by Pullman under railroad ownership
will be economical and will afford better service to the pub-
lic than either individual operation or division of the busi-
ness among two or more sleeping-car companies. We turn
to the question whether the advantages of unified operation
will be impaired because of applicants’ ownership of the
Pullman stock, as the intervening railroads contend.
These interveners in their petition for leave to intervene
assert that the ownership of Pullman should be ‘‘ completely
independent,’’ but this does not mean complete indepen-
dence of railroad interest. One of their witnesses expressed
his belief ‘‘that some interest in the railroads is desirable
in the Pullman management because they at least are close
App. 21
enough to the railroad situation to get the railroad point of
view.’’ If Pullman were owned by the capitalists identified
with the Otis & Co. offer, it would not be independent of the
railroads, for the same witness testified that the relation-
ship between the intervening railroads and the Otis & Co.
syndicate is very close. These same interests also hold what
are described as sizable blocks of stock in a number of
other railroads.
The interveners’ criticism of lack of independence on the
part of applicants’ proposed management of Pullman ap-
parently refers to the statement by one of their witnesses
that control of Pullman and the railroad since 1890 ‘‘in my
opinion, is by the banking firm of J. P. Morgan & Company
and a small group of affiliated bankers which include Kuhn,
Loeb & Company, and such houses as the Mellon banking
firm, et al.,’’ and that that control would remain under the
applicants’ plan ‘‘because The Pullman Company and the
railroads and the New York Central and the Pennsylvania
all respond to the same voice.’’ The record is otherwise
silent as to Kuhn, Loeb & Co. Evidence concerning J. P.
Morgan & Co. and the Mellon interests is discussed subse-
quently in the report.
The intervening railroads further fear that under the
applicants’ plan ‘‘the smaller railroads would be more or
less at the mercy of the larger railroads.’’ As shown by
Appendix A, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the
New York Central system together would own approxi-
mately 32 percent of the Pullman stock. The next largest
share would be that of the Southern Pacific Company, 8.55
pereent. The remaining 60 percent would be divided into
amounts of 6 percent or less. Pullman with about 50 stock-
holders would be a comparatively small corporation not sim-
ilar to certain other corporations referred to in this record
in which a considerable degree of control can be based on
minority holdings of stock in a strategic position. The in-
terests of the stockholders would not be as investors but
rather as partrers in a joint enterprise closely linked with
App. 22
the business of the individual stockholders. It is difficult
to see any likelihood of mismanagement of the corporation
for the benefit of part of the stockholders to the detriment
of the others. The participating railroads must be pre-
sumed to have carefully considered the probable advantages
as well as any potential disadvantages of the arrangement.
If the smaller roads should have any misgivings as to pos-
sible domination by the larger ones—a hypothesis without
any support in the record—they may take comfort in the
following sentence from the final opinion of the District
Court:
We also know that if any one of the partners in the
cooperative enterprise start to play fast and loose with
one of its associates, this Court is open to a suitor who
claims that our decree is not being complied with.
Under applicants’ plan Pullman would have 15 directors,
Six would be elected at large and nine by regions. Three
would be chosen by the stockholder railroads in each of
three regions, the East, Southeast, and the West. The
stockholders in each of such regions would agree upon three
candidates for three places on the board, and the stock-
holders of the other two regions would be obliged to cast
their votes for the candidates so designated. Thus the
stockholder railroads in the Southeast with a total of 14
percent of the stock, less than the percentage of either the
New York Central or the Pennsylvania, would have the
right to name three directors and the western stockholders,
having 39.5 percent, would be entitled to three. These two
groups, furthermore, would have a combined total of about
53 percent, which by concerted action might have dominant
force in selecting the six directors at large. There is no
evidence, however, pointing to the probability of such geo-
graphical cleavage.
The intervening petition of the Department of Justice
contained an allegation that ‘‘railroads not members of the
Railroad Buying Group would be injured and prejudiced
App. 23
in securing adequate sleeping car service,’’ but counsel for
the Department stated at the hearing that ‘‘the Govern-
ment is not prepared to introduce evidence, and will not
seek to introduce evidence on that particular point.’”
In addition to the Department’s abandonment of this al-
legation it should be remembered that one of the conditions
in the District Court’s approval of the sale of the Pullman
stock to the applicants was ‘‘That the Pullman Company
or any person or corporation to whom the vendee railroads
may hereafter sell Pullman’s stock or assets shall offer to
enter into a contract to supply, as available, excess sleep-
ing ears, not purchased by individual railroads, upon proper
terms, to such railroads as may desire such contract,’’ and
that the court has retained jurisdiction in order to enforce
that condition and others, if necessary. Applicants’ mem-
orandum agreement, as amended, contains the following
provisions which bear on this particular question:
The Pullman Company will service, or to the extent
that it has sleeping cars available it will furnish and
service, for any railroad contracting therefor, sleep-
ing cars owned by or leased to The Pullman Company,
including cars from the pool * * * , and will service
sleeping cars owned by such railroad whether leased to
The Pullman Company or not.
All leases, operating contracts, and other contracts
provided for in thie Article VI shall be on reasonable
non-diseriminatory terms.
There is no evidence which justifies any suspicion of a
lack of good faith in the undertakings above quoted.
The railroad interveners make a specific objection to ap-
plicants’ proposal on the ground that it ‘‘disregards the
fundamental reason for the existence of the Pullman Com-
pany ... the ownership and maintenance of a nation-wide
pool of modern sleeping cars adequate to meet the varying
_ * The petition was sworn to on information and belief, but there
is no suggestion that it should be given evidentiary effect for that
reason.
App. 24
seasonal demands and the needs for through line service.”’
They predict that ‘‘for the next year or two the present
sleeping car equipment, which is largely worn out and ob-
solete, would be operated in much the same way as hereto-
fore, but as new sleeping cars gradually replace the old
ones the railroads individually would own and maintain the
new ears.”’ To this charge applicants reply that under
their agreement the agency which they have in mind for the
period after December 31, 1948, will offer among other
things: ‘‘a contract to supply, as availabie, excess sleeping
cars, not purchased by individual] railroads, upon proper
terms to such railroads as may desire it, and to maintain
such pool of sleeping cars to the extent required, by the
acquisition if necessary of additional cars.’’
The intervening railroads say that the present fleet of
sleeping cars should be replaced by modern equipment as
rapidly as possible and that, if the Otis interests should
come into control of The Pullman Company, the fleet would
he replaced as speedily as the manufacturers could turn out
the ears. There is a strong implication in the testimony of
the Chesapeake & Ohio officials that under applicants’ plan
the replacement of the existing heavyweight cars would
purposely be slow. Other evidence of record detracts from
the force of this implication. The railroads have been in-
terested in obtaining modern lightweight sleeping cars
since 1935, but they encountered difficulties in doing so, due
to their contractual relations with Pullman prior to the de-
cision in the antitrust suit, which was beneficial, directly
and indirectly, in removing those difficulties. From the pres-
ent evidence also it is clear that the railroads fully recog-
nize the desirability of modern lightweight sleeping cars.
This is shown by the promptness with which they exercised
their right to purchase those cars and also by their unwill-
ingness to pay cash for the heavyweight cars which re-
sulted in the ‘‘cash-or-car’’ notes. On the other hand, it
must be recognized that there are important obstacles of a
practical nature to any complete substitution of modern
App. 25
lightweight cars for the present heavyweight cars in the im-
mediate future. Since the cost of a new sleeping car today
is $100,000 or more, and contracts of purchase contain ‘‘es-
calator clauses’’ to allow for increased wage and material
costs, the replacement of 6,000 heavyweight cars would in-
volve an outlay of $600,000,000 at least. There would thus
be a financial problem in addition to the unlikelihood of se-
curing prompt deliveries of such a large amount of new
equipment under the present unsettled conditions which are
retarding the output of railroad cars of all kinds. Further-
more, the heavyweight cars still have a considerable amount
of utility. Although one of the witnesses for the railroad
interveners described the sleeping-car plant as ‘‘in a state
of collapse and practically ready to fall apart,’’ he added:
I am speaking now more of the riding qualities, the
housekeeping features, decorations, and so forth; the
air-conditioning, the springs, the lights, the toilet facili-
ties, and things of that nature, rather than of the physi-
cal safety of the cars. That I have never questioned.
The cars are strong, well built, durable, and probably
will go on running another 100 years, unless something
is done about it.
This statement is corroborated by testimony of one of ap-
plicants’ witnesses who stated :
A passenger car or a steel Pullman sleeping car, it
should be understood, is a steel structure which must
have the strength needed to meet all of the requirements
of the Association of American Railroads and of the
Interstate Commerce Commission safety standards.
During the life of a car that strength must be main-
tained so that at the end of any number of years the
car is sufficiently strong to meet all of the rigid require-
ments of the service in which it is operating. * * *
The structure of a car, namely, the trucks or body por-
tion of the car, does not become obsolete in any such
period as 20 to 25 years. During that period the in-
ternal fittings are renewed several times. The elec-
trical fixtures are changed, the grey is changed,
and the conveniences to the public are modified or
App. 26
changed in accordance with changes in taste and the
traffic requirements.
As before pointed out in this report, a number of rail-
roads, a notable example of which is the Southern Pacific,
have expressed their intention of buying heavyweight cars
assigned to them. The fact that applicants’ plan contem-
plates use of the heavyweight cars, or at least some of them,
until it becomes economical and feasible to replace them
does not make the plan objectionable but on the contrary
is one of its merits.
In our opinion the evidence shows abundantly that ap-
plicants’ plan will result in better service and greater
economy of operation than that which would be attained if
each individual railroad were to operate its own sleeping-
car service or if two or more sleeping-car companies were
engaged in the business.
Restraint or ComPETITION.
The remaining question under section 5(1) is whether
applicants’ pooling plan will unduly restrain competition.
Since this section is part of a comprehensive statute relat-
ing to the regulation of transportation, it seems reasonably
clear that the competition referred to therein is that among
carriers engaged in interstate commerce. This view is sup-
ported by the extensive legislative history of the provision,
as well as decisions of the Commission.
The evidence of record which bears on this question must
be considered in the light of well-known facts of railroad
history. Competition among the railroads for passenger
traffic has always been keen and dramatic. Such part of
this traffic as was formerly non-competitive, the short-haul
local traffic, was largely abandoned without a struggle some
20 years ago to public and private highway vehicles, but
the railroads have not relaxed their competition with each
other and with the air lines for the remaining long-haul
traffic.
bod
App. 27
At the beginning of the depression of the early thirties
the Commission pointed out that one of the causes of the
railroads’ financial ills was excessive competition for pas-
senger traffic.’ Little, if anything, was done to reduce this
competition at that time, and the improvement in economic
conditions a few years later was marked by even sharper
competition evidenced by the establishment of faster light-
weight trains.’ At the present time further development of
this kind are in progress.
A significant circumstance in connection with this aspect
of the case is the promptness with which the lightweight
sleeping cars were bought by the railroads which had the
rigit to purchase them. The New York Central and the
Pennsylvania bought 138 and 142 of those cars, respectively.
A total number of 281 were bought by the following western
railroads: Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe; Chicago, Burling-
ton & Quincy; Chicago & North Western; Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific; Southern Pacific; and Union Pacific. All
of these carriers are powerful rivals for some of the most
e In Fifteen Per Cent Case, 1931, 178 I. C. C. 539, 584, the Com-
mission said
The carriers in this record pointed out the substantial cur-
tailments of passenger service which have been made in an
endeavor to reduce losses. They have also undertaken experi-
mental service in the hope of recovering profitable patronage.
But much more drastic measures will be necessary if the stag-
gering deficit incurred by that service is to be reduced to
bearable proportions. A little has been done in the pooling
of competitive train service by rival lines, but we believe that
the opportunities in this direction have by no means been
exhausted. Much more can be done under existing law.
‘The Commission deseribed this development at p. 13 of its
Annual Report for 1938, as follows:
Much improvement in railroad passenger service has been
made in the past few years, particularly in the air-condition-
ing of cars, speed, and the development of ‘‘streamlined’’
trains. The improvement has been more notable, however, in
the field of long-haul, and particularly luxury, travel than
elsewhere. The tendency is to abandon branch-line and short-
haul main-line traffie to the bus and the automobile.
App. 28
highly competitive passenger traffic in the country and oper-
ate modern streamlined trains which are extensively ad-
vertised.* Applicants’ witnesses testified that there would
be no restraint of competition for this passenger traffic
among the railroads above-named if the proposed pooling
agreement were approved, and past experience supports
these statements. This competition has not been impaired
by the fact that the sleeping cars used by the competitors
have been manned and serviced by Pullman, and we are
unable to see that the situation would be changed merely
because Pullman would be owned by those competitors and
other railroads. In the future as in the past each indi-
vidual carrier will have a powerful incentive to attract as
many passengers as possible to its trains in order to avoid
deicits from its sleeping-car operations which it would
have to meet under the uniform operating contract.
The Department of Justice, which, as stated in its petition
of intervention ‘‘is concerned with any agreement or ar-
rangement between such owners and operators of a sleeping
car service business which restrains competition and tends
to establish a monopoly,’’ has introduced nw evidence which
even remotely tends to show that transportation competi-
tion among applicants or between any two of them will be
restrained if earnings are pooled in accordance with the
plan here proposed. Nor was any such evidence offered by
the intervening railroads. Asked about the possible effect
of the proposal on competition for passenger traffic between
the Chesapeake & Ohio and certain of the applicants, one of
their witnesses stated that he thought there would be no
restraint immediately in the interim period but that there
might be later ‘‘if the Pullman Company, the agency, was
controlled largely by those competitors,’’ saying further:
* Well-known examples of such competitive trains are the Twen-
tieth Century Limited and the Broadway Limited between New
York and Chicago, the Super Chief, the Chief, and the City of Les
Angeles between Chicago and Los Angeles, the Denver Zephyr, the
SF 2 ee Se ey ee ee ee ee
ver.
App. 29
That would be—I think that would be a natural evo-.
lution. * * * Now, I don’t say that would result in—]
don’t say that it would result in diminution of competi-
tion, but it very well might. Human nature might not
resist the opportunities.
This cautious suggestion of danger, to which the witness
apparently had given little or no previous thought, is not
impressive. The same potential danger would, of course, be
present if Pullman were controlled by persons having a
very close relation to the Chesapeake & Ohio. It should
also be noted that one of the competitors which the witness
obviously had in mind is the Pennsylvania, which for many
years had participated with the Chesapeake & Ohio in a
joint sleeping-car route between New York and Cincinnati,
competitive with the Pennsylvania’s own single-line route
between those cities.
With respect to undue restraint of competition inter.
veners’ contentions are that, there would be such restraint
(1) in the servicing and furnishing of sleeping cars and (2)
in the manufacture of sleeping cars. These contentions
were considered at length by the District Court, and it is
not clear that they are material under section 5(1). How.
ever, they are presented and we shall discuss them.
The intervening railroads argue that ‘‘under applicants’
plan all railroads would be stockholders, creditors and
customers of The Pullman Company, the effect of which
would be to create a monopoly far tighter than the present
monopoly’’ and that ‘‘in these circumstances no new inde-
pendent enterprise could possibly enter the sleeping-car
business.’’ These arguments merely repeat assertions of
their witnesses which constitute most of the evidence bearing
on the question. There are no facts in this record which
would warrant a conclusion different from that of the Dis-
trict Court, expressed in the paragraph quoted in the
footnote.’
see no pny be ' the perpetuation of monopoly in a railroad
Caio eas business. Here we must look rather closely at
App. 30
Reflecting the conditions imposed by the District Court,
epplicants’ proposed uniform contract to be offered the in-
dividual railroads provides as follows:
In case the Railroad shall at any time desire to fur-
nish and operate its own sleeping cars and the usual
and commissary service therein for part of its require-
ments, or shall desire some third party to do so, and
shall request Pullman to furnish sleeping cars and the
usual and commissary service therein for the remain-
der of the requirements of travel over the Railroad’s
lines, Pullman will furnish such partial service to the
extent that it has sleeping cars of the required type
and floor plan available therefor in its fleet of equip-
ment and all of the terms of this contract shall be ap-
plicable to such cars.
Pullman shall lease for the purpose of operation and
servicing on the lines of the Railroad such new-type
light-weight sleeping cars or present-type standard
our concept of what constitutes an unlawful monopoly in this con-
nection. The thing which got the Pullman Company into trouble
was not that it was the only company furnishing sleeping car serv-
ice, but that Pullman made it virtually impossible for anybody else
to get into the business. This applied not only to a competing con-
cessionaire, but even to a railroad which sought to run part of its
own sleeping car service and let Pullman do the rest. We think we
have got rid of all that by the careful limitations imposed upon
Pullman Company by the original judgment in this case, and which
will be imposed upon its successors by the order which we shall
enter. A railroad may join with others and use exclusively the
services of Pullman. It may do part of that service itself, or through
some other concern of its own choosing, and ask Pullman to do the
rest. It may own all of its own sleeping cars, or part of them, or
none of them. All of this is provided for in our judgment. There
is, then, no strangle hold on the sleeping car business by a railroad
owned Pullman Company or anyone else. Therefore, there is no
unlawful monopoly. If there is only one store in a town at whieh
everyone trades, that fact does not itself constitute a monopoly
in the legal sense. It is only when the merchant maintains his posi-
tion by devices which compel everyone to trade with him exclu-
sively that the situation becomes legally objectionable. So here.
If the railroads who are the ones responsible for providing sleeping
ear service can take or leave Pullman assistance to that end, there
is no objection to the fact that most of them may prefer to employ
the Pullman concessionaire. (64 F. Supp. 108, 112)
App. 31
sleeping cars or tourist cars owned (or held under
lease) by the Railroad as the Railroad may el eee
The Department of Justice urges that the reference to an
election on the part of the railroads in the language above
quoted is meaningless because of a sentence in the earlier
memorandum agreement which reads as follows:
Every Railroad party hereto so purchasing euch
(li ate ry cars shall lease the same, and any other
ightweight sleeping cars which it may own or acquire
during the period of the said lease, to the Pullman
Company (but only for assignment for operation as
authorized by such railroad) for a period to expire at
the end of the interim period * * * or earlier, if so
agreed by the parties.
The uniform contract would no doubt supersede the fore-
going provision which seems to have been designed to take
care of needs during the period of demobilization period.
The District Court took note of this situation as follows:
The proposal is that for the present all sleeping
* cars, whether bought by individual roads or not, shall
be in the general pool. This is imperative, since the
armed forces need the service, and the emergency is
not yet passed.
In any event the District Court has undertaken to prevent
any unlawful monopoly by Pullman in the immediate as well
as the more remote future. No legal or factual grounds
would support a finding in this proceeding that competition
in the servicing and furnishing of sleeping cars would be
restrained despite the District Court’s efforts to prevent
such restraint.
This is true also as to the contention that applicants’
plan would result in the continuance of a restraint of trade
in the manufacture of sleeping cars, which the District
Court sought to remove. As shown in Appendix B, to that
end the court ordered that ‘‘no person shall be at the same
time a director of Pullman Inc., and of any vendee rail-
App. 32
road.’’ Shortly after the court’s order Richard K. Mellon,
a director of the Pennsylvania, resigned as a director of
Pullman Incorporated. A few weeks earlier in anticipation
of the District Court’s requirement three other directors
of the latter company had resigned—Harold S. Vanderbilt
and George Whitney, directors of the New York Central,
and Henry S. Sturgis, a director of the Erie Railroad Com-
pany. At about the same time John R. Morron, who had
been a director of both Pullman Incorporated and the
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, resigned from the
board of the last-named company. Subsequently, Vander-
bilt and Whitney disposed of their holdings of Pullman
Incorporated stock. Sturgis’ investment in that stock is
comparatively small, but Mellon has for some time held a
considerable amount, which together with that owned by
members of his family and other relatives and certain
family trusts, amounts to 96,829 shares.” These constitute
the largest unified holding of Pullman Incorporated stock
and are approximately 3 percent of the total of 3,229,897
shares outstanding March 15, 1946.
J. P. Morgan & Co., Incorporated, is the stock transfer
agent for Pullman Incorporated and has represented it in
certain purchases of its stock for its treasury. Whitney
is a director and the president of Morgan & Company.
Since his resignation from the Pullman Incorporated board
the latter has included no one connected with Morgan &
Company, although D. A. Crawford, president of Pullman
Incorporated, in a letter written February 1946, suggested
that ‘‘a representative of the Morgan & Company group”’
1° The Mellon interest dates from 1930, when Pullman-Standard
absorbed two car-building companies controlled by the Mellons.
At one time it included nearly 432,000 shares of Pullman Incor-
porated stock, but it was sharply reduced in 1941 and 1942. There
is no indication that the Mellon holdings of Pullman Incorporated
stock are likely to be reduced still further, although recently the
chairman of the board of directors of the Chesapeake & Ohio in-
quired of Richard K. Mellon whether a bid for the purchase of those
holdings would be entertained. At present three directors of Pull-
man Incorporated and one member of the board of Pullman-
Standard are identified with the Mellon interest.
App. 33
be elected a director. The record does not show that any-
one who might be included in such a group owns stock in
Pullman Incorporated at this time.
The Department of Justice and the other interveners
take the position that there are interlocking holdings of
stock which connect certain railroad companies with Pull-
man Incorporated and have much the same effect as the
interlocking directorates criticized by the district court.
So far as the record shows, Mellon and Sturgis are the only
railroad directors who themselves own stock in Pullman
Incorporated. In all other instances the connection traced
by the Department of Justice extends through other cor-
porations. For example, next in size to the Mellon interest
in Pullman Incorporated is a block of 45,000 shares owned
or controlled by a Massachusetts investment trust, whose
directors include five railroad directors residing in Boston,
Mass. A number of insurance companies which own stock
in Pullman Incorporated have certain men on their boards
of directors who are also officials or directors of railroads.
Certain other such officials and directors are directors of
banks or trust companies in New York, Chicago, or Phila-
delphia, Pa., which administer trusts or estates whose hold-
ings include Pullman Incorporated stock.
The District Court in its original opinion, speaking of
interlocking directorates, said (50 F'. Supp. 123, 133) :
The significance of such interlocking directorates is
not that their existence, by themselves, constitutes a
violation of the Sherman Act.
This observation would seem applicable a fortiori to the
interlocking holdings of stock stressed by the Department
of Justice in contrast to directorates. There is no evidence
here which supports any suspicion that such attenuated
connections as those above described redound to an unfair
or unlawful advantage of Pullman-Standard in securing
orders for cars. An example which standing by itself might
lend a slight amount of plausibility to such suspicions is to
be found in the Mellon holdings of Pullman Incorporated
App. 34
stock and the Pennsylvania directorate of Richard K. Mel-
lon. The Pennsylvania, however, has never gone out of
its way to buy cars from Pullman-Standard. It now has
on order 256 new passenger coaches, sleeping cars, etc.,
including some which will be owned jointly with other car-
riers. Of these 107 will be supplied by Pullman-Standard
at a total cost of $10,457,140, and 149 are on order from two
other companies at a combined cost of $14,153,106. In
addition, the Pennsylvania is building 100 units of passen-
ger equipment in its own shops. Between 1927 and 1946 the
Pennsylvania acquired 47,497 freight cars, of which Pull-
man-Standard built 1,400 (about 3 percent).
The situation with respect to dealings between the New
York Central and Pullman-Standard is also of interest.
Between 1930 and 1946 this railroad on competitive bids
’ bought 418 passenger cars from Pullman-Standard and its
predecessor and 450 such cars from other companies. It
has never bought any freight cars from Pullman-Standard.
.As of November 1, 1946, the New York Central had on
order 353 passenger cars from Pullman-Standard and 367
from other companies.
Recently the intervening railroads themselves placed an
order for 284 new units of passenger equipment with Pull-
man-Standard. On the theory advanced by the Department
of Justice this order could be explained by the fact that
Harvey D. Gibson, a director of the Chesapeake & Ohio, is
also a director of the Home Insurance Company, which
owns or controls 6,500 shares of Pullman Incorporated
stock. Or it might be suggested that the order reflected a
hope on the part of persons in control of the Chesapeake
& Ohio that they might persuade the Mellons to sell them
some Pullman Incorporated stock. The most reasonable
inference, however, is that the sole determining factor was
one of cost.
The argument that Pullman-Standard would be unlaw-
fully favored if this application were granted is wholly in-
consistent with the legislative policy expressed in the Clay-
ton antitrust act, which by section 10 permits sales trans-
App. 35
actions between corporations, even where there is a sub-
stantial interlocking of management or control, subject to
competitive bidding. The District Court has reinforced
this safeguard by requiring that hereafter all purchases
of new sleeping cars either by Pullman or any of the ap-
plicants shall be made only after competitive bidding, as to
which it said (64 F. Supp. 108, 112):
The requirement for competitive bidding will, we
think, shut off the last possibility of any untoward in-
fluence of Pullman-Standard following sleeping cars
into the hands of the people who now take over.
If it should later develop that the court was mistaken in this
belief, it would no doubt exercise the jurisdiction which it
has retained in the antitrust suit. The evidence here, how.
ever, indicates that any such necessity is extremely un.
likely.
Tue Pusiic Interest.
Although the Department of Justice does not make a
positive contention that section 5(2) of the Interstate Com.
merce Act is applicable to applicant’s proposal, the Depart.
ment urges that there is no evidence in the record bearing
on the elements set forth in section 5(2)(c) to which the
Commission must give weight in passing upon transactions
subject to section 5(2), as follows:
(1) the effect of the proposed transaction upon ade.
uate transportation service to the public; (2) the ef-
fect upon the public interest of the inclusion, or failure
to include, other railroads in the territory involved in
the proposed transaction; (3) the total fixed charges
resulting from the proposed transaction; and (4) the
interest of the carrier employees affected.
Insofar as sleeping-car service involves transportation,
facts are presented which would support a favorable finding
on the first point. Neither upon legal nor upon other
grounds does it seem necessary or appropriate to consider
the other three points. The matter vould require no men-
App. 36
tion in this report were it not for the assertion of the
Department of Justice in its brief that ‘‘insofar as the
employees are concerned, the record shows an utter lack of
plan with respect to, if not a complete disregard of, their
position in the event the proposals are approved.’’ The
intervening railroads make a similar assertion. Such
charges seem to be calculated to incite unrest among the
Pullman employees, for which there is no justification.
In October 1945 the railroad buying group gave the fol.
lowing assurance in writing, which is reiterated in this
record by the applicants:
The Pullman Company under its railroad ownership
will faithfully perform and keep the obligations and
commitments to labor under a —
and practices according to the law of the land...
Since no change in Pullman’s corporate entity or its
present mode of operation is proposed, it is impossible to
see how the employees would be harmed if the proposed
pooling is approved. Nor does it appear that they would be
any better off if Otis & Co., were to come into control of
Pullman. On the other hand, if each individual railroad
were to decide to operate its own service in lieu of Pullman
according to one of the plans which the Department of
Justice avowedly considers desirable it seems certain that
a number of troublesome questions involving labor rela-
tions would arise.
The intervening railroads and Otis & Co., according to
their brief, view the issues of this proceeding as being of
transcendent importance. If this appraisal is correct, by no
means the least important issue is the question whether, as
contended by these interveners, the powers of the Federal
Government shall be used to place control of Pullman in
Otis & Co., rather than in the applicant railroads on the
ground that this action is essential to meet the requirements
of the antitrust statutes and to serve the general public
interest. Otis & Co. states its claim as follows:
App. 37
It should be emphasized that this proposed trans-
action is very different from those cases in which the
lack of a practical alternative puts extreme pressure
on the Commission’s exercise of discretion. Otis & Co.,
was one of several offerors in the District Court at
Philadelphia and is an appellant in the Supreme Court.
Its offer to purchase The Pullman Company is a cash
offer, and its proposals (a) to replace the existing
obsolete pool with a fleet of modern sleeping cars, and
(b) to improve sleeping car service without discrimi-
nation for all the railroads, were spread upon the
record in this proceeding. Otis & Co., and those with
whom it is associated in this offer, are independent of
any relationships, direct or indirect, to the monopoly
interests which control the sleeping car industry and
which the Philadelphia Court condemned in its decision
of May 8, 1944. Farther, Otis & Co.’s ownership and
operation of The Pullman Company would not exclude
any other independent concern from the field. Thus
the Commission is assured that there is no need to
perpetuate a monopoly in the business of furnishing
and servicing sleeping cars; that a completely inde-
pendent group is ready, willing and able to enter the
field to serve all the railroads.
It is assumed, of course, that the intervening railroads con-
cur in the foregoing statement; whether the ultimate object
of the Department of Justice coincides with that of the
other intervenors in this respect is not wholly clear.
It may be that the Commission will not consider it neces-
sary to pass upon the merits of the Otis & Co., offer above
described, but if these are deemed to present a material
issue, our opinion derived from hearing the evidence di-
rectly is that this evidence provides no factual support for
the claimed superiority of that offer from the standpoint
of public interest.
Proposep Finprvas.
The Commission should make the following findings :
1. All of the applicants have assented to the pooling of
railroad earnings involved in the operation of sleeping car
service as proposed in the application.
App. 38
2. The proposed pooling will be in the interest of better
service to the public and of economy in operation.
8. The proposed pooling will not restrain competition.
4. The consideration for the proposed pooling, as set
forth in Appendix C to this report, will be just and reason-
able.
Interveners’ motions to dismiss the application and to
clarify the issues should be denied.
The Commission should enter an order which would ap-
prove and authorize the proposed pooling.
App. 39
APPENDIX A (to Examiners Report).
Carrier
The Pennsylvania Railroad Company
The New York Central Railroad Company )
The Pittsburgh and Lake Erie acumen,
Company
Southern Pacifie Company
Union Pacific Railroad Company
The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Rail-
)
pF yn Great eaibase Railroad )
)
The Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas )
Pacific Railway Company )
New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad )
Company )
Georgia Southern and Florida Railway )
Company )
The New York, New Haven and Hartford
Railroad Company (trustees)
The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company
Chieago and North Western Railway Com- .
pany
Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha
Raiiway Company )
— Burlington & Quincey Railroad
Company
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company
The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Rail-
way Company (trustees)
— Pacific Railroad Company (trus-
tees
Illinois Central Railroad Company
Seaboard Air Line Railway Company
to Total Purchase Price
$6,502,872
15.50 6,231,425
3,436,910
2,413,958
2,255,600
Northern Pacific Railway Company
Great Northern Railway Company
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific
Railroad Company
The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Com-
pany
St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company
(trustees)
Wabash Railroad Company
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company....
Florida East Coast Railway Company
{ trustees)
The Texas and Pacific Railway Company
The Denver and Rio Grande Western Rail-
road Company (trustees)
Boston and Maine Railroad
Lehigh Valley Railroad Company
Norfolk and Western Railway Company
Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac
Railroad Company
The Alton Railroad Company (trustee)
The Delaware, Lackawanna and Western
Railroad Company
International-Great Northern Railroad Com-
pany (trustees) ’
Central of Georgia Railway Company (trus-
tees)
Erie Railroad Company
Western Pacific Railroad Company
The Delaware and Hudson Railroad Cor-
$39,275,655
App, 41
A te
ercentage Participant’s
of Cars Approximate
Carrier to Total Purchase
SARE SE Re 97.70 $39,275,655
Pere Marquette Railway Company................ 41 163,664
The Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis
SIT sted tiddaclicehiinscnusiceenttnstoniceniesedionstiatasendion 38 154,780
The New York, Chicago and St. Louis Rail-
it ea a I 32 130,417
Chicago Great Western Railway Company... 27 109,672
New Orleans, Texas & Mexico Railway )
Company (trustee) ............ccccccccccceceeeceeees )
The Beaumont, Sour Lake & Western Rail- )
way Company (trustee) 2.00.00... ) 24 96,968
The St. Louis, Brownsville and Mexico )
Railway Company (trustee) .................... )
San Antonio, Uvalde & Gulf Railroad Com- )
i )
Maine Central Railroad Company.................. 23 93,792
The Western Railway of Alabama................ )
Atlanta and West Point Railroad Company ) 16 64,324
i TT RTS 08 33,730
Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railway Company... 06 23,679
Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company...... 06 23,237
The Kansas City Southern Railway Com-
TE dia tieias staraichticicmeitetinhepentnespuinbepuinsitbais 06 22,393
Bangor and Aroostook Railway Company...... 03 10,171
| Ra Na a al ee aE aoe 100.00 $40,202,482
APPENDIX B (to Examiner’s Report).
Final Order of the District Court, entered January 4,
1946, approving the sale of the stock of Pullman Company
to the Applicants (the text of this order is printed in the
Record on these appeals at pp. 1203-1205).
APPENDIX C (to Examiner’s Proposed Report).
Proposed Uniform Operating Contract.
Articie IV.
Section 1 (A). Pullman shall first retain from the £TOss
earnings from the sale of seats, berths and other accommo-
App. 42
dations, and commissary operations (where conducted by
Pullman) in all sleeping cars operated under the terms of
this contract during each contract year an amount, so far
as such gross earnings may be available, equal to the sum
of the following items:
(a) The total of Pullman’s ‘‘ Expenses of Operations’’ of
all cars operated on the lines of the Railroad for such
contract year, with such ‘‘Expenses of Operation’ deter-
mined as provided in Section 3 of this Article and with the
number of cars operated determined as provided in Section
2 of this Article.
(b) An interest return on cars operated on the lines of
the Railroad equivalent to (i) the Railroad’s cars operated
proportion of an amount equal to three (3) percent per
annum on the average depreciated value, as determined and
used in computing price of Pullman stock as of December
31, 1945 (adjusted to reflect subsequent additions and bet-
terments, retirements and depreciation accruals), for all
present-type heavyweight standard sleeping cars, new-type
lightweight sleeping cars, tourist sleeping cars and troop
sleeping cars owned by Pullman, plus (ii) an amount equal
to the Railroad’s cars operated percentage (for the cars
leased to Pullman) of the interest rental paid to the Rail-
road pursuant to Section 2 of Article I of this contract, and
plus (iii) the Railroad’s cars operated percentage of inter-
est rental paid each other railroad for cars of its owner-
ship operated on the lines of the Railroad; computed for
each type of car separately, with the number of cars oper-
ated determined as provided in Section 2 of this Article.
The average depreciated value of Pullman-owned cars shall
be ascertained, for each type of car separately, by averag-
ing the depreciated value at tne beginning of each month
in the year, determined in this paragraph.
(B). If, for any contract year, the total gross earnings
of all sleeping cars operated under the terms of this con-
tract shall exceed the total amount of Pullman’s ‘‘ Expenses
of Operation’’ for all cars operated, plus the interest re-
App. 43
turn to Pullman provided for in paragraph (b) of Sub.
Section (A) of this Section, such excess shall be divided
equally between Pullman and the Railroad.
(C). If, for any contract year, the total gross earnings
of all sleeping cars operated under the terms of this con-
tract shall be less than the total amount of Pullman’s ‘‘ Ex-
penses of Operation’’ of such cars plus the interest rental
applicable to railroad-owned lightweight cars represented
in amounts refered to in clauses (ii) and (iii) ef paragraph
(b) of Sub-Section (A) of this Section, the Railroad shall
pay to Pullman the amount of the deficiency.
Section 2. The number of cars of each type described in
Section 1 of Article I hereof operated during each contract
year shall be determined as follows:
The aggregate number of days of actual service (which
shall include actual time consumed on loaded movements,
regular scheduled layover between trips and empty move-
ments to and from service) of cars of each type and owner-
ship shall be divided by the number of days in the contract
year and the quotient shall be taken to be the average
number of cars of such type continuously in service during
the year.
Section 3. Except as herein otherwise provided, the term
“Expenses of Operation’’ as used in this contract shall
include all of Pullman’s expenses of conducting its sleeping
car business and commissary services, except the cost of
maintaining and operating air conditioning apparatus, but
including all taxes except income taxes, and also including
but not limited to the various items elsewhere herein ex-
pressly provided to be included in ‘‘Expenses of Opera-
tion’’; and that such expenses shall be ascertained sepa-
rately for each of the four types of cars in accordance with
the practice of Pullman in so ascertaining same at the time
this contract is made, subject to such changes as may be
agreed upon or as may be now or hereafter provided for in
the classification of sleeping car accounts prescribed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission; and the total of the ex-
penses so ascertained separately for each type of car shall
App. 44
be divided by the number of all cars of such type operated
by Pullman on all railroads (ascertained as provided in
Section 2 of this Article). The result so obtained, indi-
cating average expense per car of each type shall be multi-
plied by the number of cars of such type (ascertained as
provided in Section 2 of this Article) operated under the
terms of this contract and the product shall be the total
‘*Expenses of Operation’’ of the cars of such type operated
under this contract. ‘‘Expenses of Operation”’’ shall also
include the amount reflecting depreciation included in
rental, and taxes paid in respect to leased cars, but not
interest rental paid in respect thereof, as provided in
Section 2 of Article I of this contract.
For the purpose of the above computation all expenses
of Pullman in connection with the operation of present-
type standard sleeping cars, new-type lightweight sleeping
cars, tourist sleeping cars and troop sleeping cars operated
by Pullman shall be considered common to all four types of
cars except depreciation, shop maintenance, and such other
items of the expense as can be readily apportioned to the
different types of cars (which in the case of depreciation
of new-type lightweight cars leased shall be ascertained and
assigned specifically to the cars of the owner railroad), and
to ascertain average common expenses of operation of each
type of car operated by Pullman, for purposes of contract
settlement with all railroad companies, the above men-
tioned excepted items of expenses shall be eliminated from
the total expenses of Pullman for all of the four types of
cars operated during the contract year, and the total of the
remaining expenses shall be divided by the total number
of present-type standard sleeping cars, new-type light-
weight sleeping cars, tourist sleeping cars and troop sieep-
ing cars operated during such contract year to arrive
at the average of the common expenses of all types of cars
and to such average shall then be added the average of the
above excepted expenses separately for each of the four
types of cars, ascertained as herein provided, and the
total of the average of common expenses and excepted ex-
App. 45
penses for each type of car shall be multiplied by the
number of cars of such type (ascertained as provided in
Section 2 of this Article) to ascertain the ‘‘ Expenses of
Operation’’ for the contract year of all cars of each type
operated on the lines of the Railroad.
Section 4. A statement showing the gross earnings of
ears operated hereunder, and a statement of ‘‘ Expenses of
Operation’’ shall be furnished by Pullman to the Railroad
as soon as practicable after the end of each contract year,
and the Railroad shall have the right to verify such state-
ments by examination of the books and accounts of
Pullman.
All amounts due either party in the annual settlement of
accounts hereunder, shall be paid within 30 days after
statements have been furnished the Rai!road at the close
of each contract year.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.