Petition for Writ of Certiorari — E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency
Supreme Court brief1976
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the Cited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1975.
- 75-1613
NALCO CHEMICAL COMPANY,
Petitioner,
VS.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.
Victor P. KAYSER,
JOHN C. BERGHOFF, Jr.,
135 South LaSalle Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60603,
DaviD MACHANIC,
WILLIAM H. FITZ,
1200 18th Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C. 20036,
Attorneys for Petitioner.
Of Counsel:
CHADWELL, KAYSER, RUGGLES,
McGEE & HASTINGs,
135 South LaSalle Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60603,
(312) 726-2545,
PIERSON, BALL & Down,
1200 18th Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C. 20036,
(202) 331-8566.
Gunthorp-Warren Printing Company, Chicago e Financial 6-6565
Sietat eta ol
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
PAGE
I Cc Vicna lee tai Coe ete eS 1
MI ies x Vids FL ewes Cae Oa ee hc eae oe 2
SINE oy yao doen eduh cs ewdcyiee nus 2
Statutes and Regulations Involved .................. 3
UN GE TE. iwi Dh ehh aay cdacesaadeuks 3
Chronology of the Regulations ................. 3
I Se ce iN wads dene Owe ews 5
Reasons for Granting the Writ ....... 2... ...002000. 7
I. The Lower Court Unjustifiably Attributed Inherent
Discretion in the EPA to Regulate, Despite a
Limited Congressional Grant of Authority ......
A. Threshold Determination ................
B. Lepeistive Mistery .........0.sencseca 10
C. Comparison with Other Sections .......... 11
D. Generalized Attribution of Discretion ...... 12
Il. The Lower Court Unjustifiably Limited the Scope
of Its Review Because This Case Involved Environ-
IT SE ee a at cance eas 15
A. The Conflict Within the Lower Court as to
PU Se NE 5. vce bonne euaicies 15
B. The Record Does Not Support the Regulation
and Its Promulgation Constitutes a Clear Error
AP I hf ses be ee fase oes ee 19
If]. The Regulation Should Be Set Aside or Remanded
to the EPA Because of Failure to Provide Mean-
ingful Opportunity for Comment .............. 22
AE oo 6 ha. k be wee ee wea cee a Ae ee ee 30
Ce ee eee eer ee err ee eek nt Al
ND koh veka oo ccs eRe eae ee ewer Bl
DHAMnRD COHOPRPY
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.
Cases.
Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F. 2d 722 (D. C. Cir. 1974)
SE NaIE Sadi tactnas excita Sacer lice Seas aati GAG as enn sala: 4,9, 10
Austin v. Jackson, 353 F. 2d 910 (Sth Cir. 1965) ...... 23
Bowman Transportation v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,
We 20
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S.
ih eee eae ti ep oa 6 iad ode 17
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973) ............00-. 28
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S.
} I eee ceieg reer a ln Gay os vce dees 17,19
: Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 465 F. 2d
i ee exo ce a adc mews pnuw es 13, 19, 23
/ Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F. 2d 1292
a I ea are seer kh noms two wes eww 8 13
3 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439
: F. 2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ............005. 16, 17, 20
Great Lakes Screw Corp. v. NLRB, 409 F. 2d 375 (7th
: ee ee ack i ww kleié nadine 23
: Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F. 2d 841
(D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U. S. 923 (1971) ....17, 20
Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205 (1910) ............ 19
Hess & Clark Div. of Rhodia, Inc. v. FDA, 495 F. 2d 975
ae i sb dias ee wplvie k we 6 ab a 23
Homan v. United States, 279 F. 2d 767 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U. S. 866 (1960) ................... 18
Hotch v. United States, 212 F. 2d 280 (9th Cir. 1954) .. 26
BLEED THROUGH
Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 449 F. 2d
ee NN abies hoa cao oceans 13
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F. 2d 615
Oe eS NN nd ccc awake 8 dee ecdan 16, 17, 23
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F. 2d 846 (D. C.
I ne er ON ee Ue 20, 23
Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F. 2d 375
(D. C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U. S. 921 (1974)
ee ee ar 17, 20, 23
Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F. 2d 492 (8th Cir.
ay ed OS ON OCR SET ON are er ae 13,14
Rodway v. U. S. Dept of Agriculture, 514 F. 2d 809 (D.C.
I ahs Pei a careers suk we oe oe La bs 20, 22
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194 (1947) ........ 20
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727 (1972) ........ 16
Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F. 2d
1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 992 (1975) ... 13
South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F. 2d 646 (1st Cir.
cn ARES OR Re Om rr eet ra ne 23
United States v. American-Foreign SS. Corp., 363 U. S.
I aa es alle pi cued ee ho: 18
United States ex rel. Robinson v. Johnston, 316 U. S.
oR RS I i yee a ie 18
Universal Cameia Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474 (1951) 17
Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F. 2d 1013 (3d Cir.
ile APRA GE Sah ERCSEY Sevier in ge orien Get Rene SO ee 26
Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F. 2d 1009 (D. C.
I eu alee whee ee as ew ie a et 23, 26
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attic LA PLT Ree gia PSS Hae Ye apie ae ene
a eS
EBON ry 0g EM TEE Be Ms Se non
iv
Statutes.
Administrative Procedure Act:
Be as <A 6s 4p Sw oe @ weak 10, 20, 29
ee Ne Soe ehh Re ook 8 A iw ee ORK Ce 17
eS Oe a Sage ak ood eas ghd glaly’ a pee ant 15, 20
Clean Air Amendments of 1970:
ae ae eS oe ey 11
mee, fue, S22 UU... 0. § 90S red oo kc ca laies 11,12
Sec. 211 (c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c) ....
Pilg hala ur tare ane ect Lane ees 3, 8,9, 11, 12, 15, 16
See. Sar, 42 UE C. SUBST vn ve cikve dace. 5
, oe Some: | 5} ee emradr ay arc la 2
Miscellaneous.
116 Cong. Rec. Part 14, 19229-31, 32921 (June, 1970) 11, 17
Handler, A Rebuttal: The Need for a Sufficient Scientific
Base for Government Regulation, 43 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
Ee og koe ev eek oes pea ree Ree 15
The Random House Dictionary, The English Language
SEE, ax codices <5 oO EG a ERE ee eee eee i2
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the En-
SR Be ot re ee re re errs 12
BLEED THROUG
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1975.
NALCO CHEMICAL COMPANY,
Petitioner,
vs.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.
Petitioner, Nalco Chemical Company, prays that a Writ of
Certiorari issue to review the opinions and judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
entered in this case, en banc, on March 19, 1976.
OPINIONS BELOW.
The opinions and judgment of the Court of Appeals are re-
ported at 8 ERC 1785. Because of their extraordinary length,
they are filed in a separate, bound Appendix with this Court.*
and supplemented by respondent on March 28, 1974 and April 19,
1974,
Emphasis is supplied herein unless otherwise noted.
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JURISDICTION.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on March
19, 1976. Issuance of the mandate has been stayed, pending
the filing of a petition for a Writ of Certiorari, by order of
the Court of Appeals.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1254(1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED.
1. Whether the Administrator of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency has inherent discretion to limit the use of lead
additives in gasoline on the basis of fear of an uncertain or
unknown harm, notwithstanding that the Clean Air Act author-
ized the Administrator to regulate only if the emission products
of such fuel additive “will endanger the public health or welfare”.
2. Whether judicial review of environmental regulations,
which involve highly technical areas, should be limited, and if
so, what is the correct standard of procedural and substantive
review of such regulations.
3. Whether the adoption of the final lead additive phase-
down regulations by the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency was in violation of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act and a clear error of judgment.
4. Whether the Environmental Protection Agency met the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act when it did
not provide adequate notice and opportunity to comment to the
public and interested persons on new medical and scientific
evidence which was substituted for prior evidence and became
the basis for its final regulations.
s — ee ee ee en
sfeswetee: me Otel t eed
Pere
ees
et
5. Whether the reviewing court may properly go outside
the administrative record and initiate after oral argument, an ex
parte investigation for the purpose of supplementing that record
to determine when the public and interested persons received
notice of material upon which the regulations were based.
DPS ARES See SD wierd ere asec gattand lwo ates
SO. OF SA
BLEED THROU:
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED.
The pertinent provisions of the Clean Air Act (42 U. S. C.
§§ 1857c-3, 1857f-1 and 1857f-6c), the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (5 U.S. C. §§ 553 and 706) and the regulations in-
volved (40 CFR § 80.1, 80.2(c), 80.20, 80.25 and 80.26)
are set forth in Appendix A, hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Chronology of the Regulations.
On January 30, 1971, within one month after the enactment
of the Clean Air Act Amendments, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued an advance
notice of proposed rulemaking to reduce the permissible lead
content of gasoline under Section 211(c)(1)(A) of the Act
(36 Fed. Reg. 1486). More than one year later, on February
23, 1972, the EPA published its first set of proposed regulations
(App. 23). This first set of regulations proposed a reduction in
the use of lead additives in gasoline over a four-year period
beginning January 1, 1974, based on EPA’s conclusion that:
“Airborne lead levels exceeding 2 ng per cubic meter... .
are associated with a sufficient risk of adverse physiological
effects to constitute endangerment of the public health.”
(App. 23.)
This proposed rulemaking was accompanied by the EPA’s
first health justification document, “Health Hazards of Lead”
(App. 292) and a subsequent position paper, “Atmospheric
Lead and Public Health”, to bolster its conclusion as to the
alleged need for a 60-65% reduction in airborne lead (App.
276). Comments were invited for a 90-day period (37 Fed.
Reg. 11786-87). Within two months, EPA made corrections
and additions to the “Health Hazards of Lead” paper because of
“miscalculations” (App. 272).
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— |
ae Oe Ligaen < om
4
Hearings were held on these regulations and numerous com-
ments and statements were submitted from the industrial,
medical, scientific and governmental communities which severely
criticized EPA’s medical and scientific justification for these
regulations (See, e.g., App. 2118, 2413, 2431, 2438, and
2481).
EPA then reevaluated its health justification, “changed it
substantially” (App. 2), and reproposed regulations on January
10, 1973 (App. 14).* The reproposed health regulations were
accompanied by another EPA health justification paper, en-
titled “EPA’s Position on the Health Effects of Airborne Lead”
(App. 158). As the majority opinion notes, EPA had com-
pletely “abandoned” its earlier “discredited” approach for esti-
mating the reduction in airborne lead necessary to protect
public health, by the time that the Second Health Document
was issued (Maj. Op. A-3).
The comment period for this second set of proposed regula-
tions closed on March 11, 1973. Despite the substantial changes
in EPA's position, criticism from the scientific and medical com-
munities as well as other governmental agencies continued un-
abated (See, e.g., App. 2477, 2479 and 2494).
On October 28, 1973, while EPA was considering the com-
ments on the second proposed regulations, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit issued a single-page order
directing the EPA Administrator to reach a final decision on the
matter within 30 days.**
On November 28, 1973, the final regulations were announced
and were promulgated on December 6, 1973 (App. 1). The final
* At the same time, the EPA issued final regulations requiring the
marketing of lead-free gasoline. These regulations (“the marketing
regulations”) were approved in Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F. 2d
722 (D. C. Cir. 1974).
** National Resources Defense Council v. EPA, No. 72-2233
(D. C. Cir., Oct. 28, 1973). Petitioner herein was not a party to this
case. The order was entered on the motion of the plaintiff and was
unreported.
BLEED THROU
5
regulations were accompanied by still another health justification
document, this time entitled “Health Implications of Airborne
Lead” (App. 27). The regulations, as promulgated in the
Federal Register, are accompanied by a lengthy Preamble which
summarizes EPA support for its health position (App. 1-5).
No comment period was allowed on the final regulations.
Petitioner filed its petition to review these regulations on De-
cember 27, 1973, pursuant to Section 307 of the Clean Air
Act (42 U. S. C. § 1857h-5). On December 20, 1974, the
panel of the Court of Appeals which heard the petition, ordered
the regulations set aside in an 87-page opinion (with a 96-page
dissent) published on January 28, 1975 (7 ERC 1353).
“Because of the importance of the issues presented,” the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia granted EPA’s petition for
rehearing, set the case for argument en banc on May 30, 1975
and reversed the panel opinion in a 5 to 4 decision published on
March 19, 1976, with two ccncurring and two dissenting
opinions.
Background Facts
At the outset, it is impertant to recognize that lead occurs
naturally in the earth’s crust and atmosphere (App. 319) and is
a part of every living thing (App. 54). Lead is not harmful
per se (App. 2611) and in fact, it is now thought that lead
may be a necessary element for growth (Doc. 459).
Mere exposure to lead is not indicative of harm to health.
The absorption of lead without retention is not indicative of
harm, since it is undisputed that lead is continuously excreted by
the body, by means of known biological mechanisms and is
stored in bone, teeth and hair where it is biologically inert and
thus without harmful health effects (App. 324-25). In normal
circumstances, human beings achieve a steady state of lead
body levels and maintain this steady state with the rate of
output approximately equal to the rate of input (App. 326).
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5 Ate DE SIE ANA lr Si
6
Dr. Paul B. Hammond, Chairman of the Pancl on Lead of the
National Academy of Sciences summarized this background:
“It is not a question of whether or not people have lead.
They all do. It is rather a question of how much lead they
have and how much is harmful. So far as adults are con-
cerned, the general population is exposed to far less lead
than are workers in battery factories and lead smelters who
remain in good health in spite of their high exposure as
compared to the general public.” (App. 2611.)
The principal source of lead to human beings, by far, is the
food and fluids of the normal diet—not the respiration of air-
borne lead (App. 1970, 1996-97). Even though there has been a
rise in the use of leaded gasoline—a 70% increase from
1959-1969 (App. 2427)—there has not been a corresponding
rise in the average concentrations of airborne lead in major
urban areas, as shown by the conclusion of the National
Academy of Science that with:
“
. the high degree of dispersion associated with the
venting of burned lead alkyls into the air . . . the average
lead content of the air over most major cities apparently
has not changed greatly over the last 15 years. The net
result is that correspondingly little change in the character
and magnitude of the effects of atmospheric lead on bio-
logic systems will likely occur for some years to come.
We are, in short, not dealing with a rapidly shifting scene
in this respect.” (App. 356-57.)
Lead compounds have been used as additives in gasoline for
over 50 years, for the purpose of increasing the octane or “anti-
knock” quality required by high compression engines. Increas-
ing the compression ratio in automobile engines adds to efficiency
and economy of operation, but the gasoline octane must be
increased accordingly. If lead cannot be used, then additional
“aromatics”, derived from crude oil itself, must be substituted.
The production of additional aromatics requires more severe
refining conditions and the use of substantial additional quanti-
ties of crude oil (App. 1414-15). Thus, these regulations will
BLEED THROUGH
7
inevitably result in the consumption of large quantities of ad-
ditional barrels of crude oil each year as well as imposing sub-
stantial financial requirements on refiners for construction of
new facilities and modifications of those now in existence.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.
I. The Lower Court Unjustifiably Attributed Inherent Dis-
cretion in the EPA to Regulate, Despite a Limited Con-
gressional Grant of Authority.
The majority opinion below concludes that in the area of the
environment and public health, EPA has inherent discretion
to regulate, with standards of agency rationality similar to the
standards used to review Congressional legislation. This inherent
discretion, according to the majority opinion, comes necessarily
into play because the regulation deals with the environment,
despite the specific language of the Congressional grant of
authority and despite the absence of a scientific or medical “data
base” for regulation. The opinion of the lower court will be
undoubtedly quoted for this proposition as long as it stands
unreviewed. However, if this is to be the law of environmental
regulation, it should be decided by this Court and not by the
lower court in a 5 to 4 decision.
The opening paragraph of the majority opinion presages its
holding that even in the absence of medical or scientific evi-
dence, the EPA may regulate:
“It is only recently that we have begun to appreciate the
danger posed by unregulated modification of the world
around us, and have created watchdog agencies whose task
it is to warn us, and protect us, when technological ‘ad-
vances’ present dangers unappreciated—or unrevealed—
by their supporters. . . . Necessarily, they must deal with
predictions and uncertainty, with developing evidence, with
conflicting evidence, and, sometimes, with little or no
evidence at all.” (Maj. Op. 6.)
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8
é The majority opinion after extensive discussion, repeats the
theme—EPA has inherent discretion to regulate:
| “Questions involving the environment are particularly
: prone to uncertainty. . . . How else can they act, given a
mandate to protect the pubiic health but only a slight or
non-existent data base upon which to draw?” (Maj. Op.
46-47.)
To be sure, the majority opinion argued that they were not
allowing the EPA Administrator “to set policy on his own terms”
and that Congress did set policy euidelines (Maj. Op. 55). But
those guidelines are so broad that it matters very little whether
Congress attempted to specifically limit or condition the EPA’s
| power. Once the majority assumed that the issue of the health
effects of lead was “on the frontiers of scientific knowledge”.
the EPA could act based on no more than a “fear of an un-
j known harm” (Maj. Op. 56).
; The dissent was well aware that the majority was enunciating
a different and lower standard for environmental regulation:
Mog Se La naa
“From the pages of the court's opinion there seeps the
theme that this is an environmental case: hence, the court
i like the agency need not labor by the usual rules. We
: recognize no such exemption for this or any other type
case .. .” (Dis. Op. 50.)*
A. Threshold Determination.
In Section 211(c)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act, Congress
authorized EPA to regulate gasoline additives only “if any
emission products of such fuel or fuel additive will endanger
the public health.” But the majority argues that instead of call-
ing for “the Administrator to make a threshold factual deter-
mination of endangerment”:
“[A] determination of endangerment to public health is
necessarily a question of policy that is to be based on an
assessment of risks and that should not be bound by cither
the procedural or the substantive rigor proper for questions
of fact.” (Maj. Op. 46.)
*SeealsoDis.Op.35.5 $ |}
. Fin wets eat
BEE et
BLEED THROUGH
y
However, as the dissent points out, the “question” of whether
the EPA may “assess risks” in regulating fuel additives is a
strawman (Dis. Op. 52). The issue is whether Congress required
the EPA to decide, based upon its expertise, that there is
a causal connection between lead additive emissions and an
endangerment to public health. As even the majority admits,
Congress set up “a legal mechanism by which the [medical]
evidence could be weighed in a more objective tribunal”
(Maj. Op. 12).*
The only prior decision dealing with this section of the Clean
Air Act (Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F. 2d 722 (D. C. Cir.
1974)) dealt with Section 211(c)(1)(B) giving the EPA Ad-
ministrator authority to regulate fuel additives on other than a
health endangerment basis, “if emission products of such fuel
or fuel additive will impair to a significant degree” the perform-
ance of emissions control devices. The court held there that this
section requires a:
“. . . threshold determination whether or not to regulate a
particular fuel or additive. In effect. the provision estab-
lishes a rebuttable presumption that the Agency should
maintain a laissez faire posture with regard to fuel regula-
tion. . . . The findings are to show why regulation, as op-
posed to no regulation, is necessary or otherwise advisable.
These findings constitute a condition precedent to em-
barking upon the exercise of regulatory power.” (501 F.
2d at 736.)
The court went on to find that EPA had quasi-legislative powers
in deciding how to regulate.
However, in dealing with the companion provision giving the
Administrator power to regulate fuel additives “if any emissions
products or such fuel or fuel additive will endanger the public
health or welfare,” the majority argues that this section is “in-
herently” different. Unlike subsection (B), which is “highly
* In fact, Congress clearly believed that EPA should embark upon
a course of regulation “only with trepidation”, as the majority notes,
because such regulation would be “telling manufacturers how to make
their fuels.” (Maj. Op. 16, n. 14.)
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10
suitable to factual proof.” the “Section 211(c)(1)(A) threshold
determination . . . is inherently unlike that of its sister section”
and the question of endangerment “is a risk, and so must
be decided by assessment of risks as well as by proof of facts.”
(Maj. Op. 45.) Thus, the majority opinion, in attempting to
: distinguish its interpretation in Amoco, falls back on unjustified
assumptions of “inherent” differences. *
: The majority also concedes that Amoco held that Section 4
: of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U. S. C. § 553) neces-
sarily calls for a “factual threshold determination” in connection
with subsection (B) (“if .. . will impair”) (Maj. Op. 45-46).
Why does not the parallel subsection (A) (“if . . . will
endanger”) call for such a threshold determination?
ae
B. Legislative History.
The majority attempted to find support in the legislative his-
tory, but all that exists points to the opposite conclusion. The
majority argues that an early House bill called for a “specific
findings” under the ‘will endanger’ standard (Maj. Op. 38).
and that the deletion of that findings requirement was:
“a recognition by Congress that a determination of en-
dangerment to public health is necessarily a question of
policy that is to be based on an assessment of risks and
that should not be bound by either the procedural or the
substantive rigor proper for questions of fact.” (Maj. Op.
46.)
This assertion is unsound. If the statute as first written called
for “specific findings,” the “will endanger” standard could not
“necessarily” be a question of policy. How could it inherently
become so, if the “specific findings” requirement were removed?
The fact is that the House bill never did call for * ‘specific find-
Ee gs ARE a aa oar ote koo
Se
Aes ey
Sy RAC ai aces
"* The only apparent ground for such an argument, is that a deter-
mination of * ‘impairment” is. less complex scientifically than a deter-
mination of “endangerment”. The absence of legislative history to
; support such 2 reading of parallel sections, makes it merely an opinion
based on the clarity of hindsight.
i
LAN DEERE NARS ARNE RM EGE D G0 AD
BLEED THROUGH
ings” in connection with endangerment.* The legislative history
shows that both the House and Senate intended that if fuel
additives were to be regulated either because of impairment to
an emission control device or endangerment of the public health,
a factually based determination must be the basis.**
C. Comparison with Other Sections.
The majority opinion engages in a lengthy comparison of
Section 211(c)(1)(A) with Sections 108 and 202 of the Clean
Air Act, in order to bolster its construction of Section 211
(Maj. Op. 22-28). This comparison results in interpretations
of these sections which makes determination of EPA’s powers
under the Clean Air Act ambiguous at best.
The majority opinion argues that Section 108 of the Act,
relating to the EPA Administrator's power to set air quality
criteria for pollutants which “in his judgment” have an ad-
verse effect on public health, “requires proof of demonstrable
harm” (Maj. Op. 23-24). This, of course, ignores the fact that
Congress expressly left this decision in Section 108 to the “judg-
ment” of the EPA Administrator.
Section 202 grants the Administrator authority to prescribe:
“
** Representative Staggers of the Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce Committee: “. . . if he has the facts, and he has proven thus by
facts, that they are a danger”. Representative Rogers (House Manager
of the Bill): “whenever the facts show that . . . and additive .
adversely affects the health or prevents the emission standards from
being met”. Senator Baker (ranking minority member of the Confer-
ence Committee): “when he finds that . . . emissions . . . endanger
the public health”. (116 Cong. Rec. 19229-30, 19231, 32921)
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12
which in his judgment causes or contributes to, or is likely
to cause or contribute to, air pollution which endangers the
public health or welfare”.
As to the portion of Section 202 dealing with automobile emis-
sions which “in his judgment” cause or contribute or are “likely”
to cause air pollution, the majority states that the standard is
“more lenient than Section 211” (Maj. Op. 26-27). However,
as to the phrase “air pollution which endangers the public health
or welfare”, the majority argues that “regulation may not be
premised on a threshold determination of likely danger; rather
regulation must be premised on a determination of danger.”
Thus, the majority concludes that: “This is essentially the same
finding of endangerment as under Section 211”; and that “in
making the threshold determination of danger both sections
(202 and 211] are the same” (Maj. Op. 26-27).
Thus, the majority agrees that under 211 a “threshold de-
termination” of danger must be made, which cannot be satisfied
by a finding of “likely danger.”* This contradicts its conclusion
that the “will endanger” requirement is met by something less
than “likely danger” and that even “fear of uncertain or un-
known harm” is enough (Maj. Op. 56).
S202 Carnal
NAO REY Ora LU SLED Mabe raiel Wa MU ens:
D. Generalized Attribution of Discretion.
The majority seeks to encompass Section 211 in its broad
category of questions involving the environment, to justify its
claim of wide grant of discretion to EPA:
“Never before have massive quantities of asbestiform tail-
ings been spewed into the water we drink. Never before
have our industrial workers been occupationally exposed
to vinyl chloride or to asbestos dust. Never before has
the food we eat been permeated with DDT or the pesticides
aldrin and dieldrin. And never before have hundreds of
* The dictionary synonyms for “likely” include “in all probability,
probably” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language 1971); “reasonably to be believed or expected”
(The Random House Dictionary, The English Language, 1966).
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wee paneer? * iP ia PESTLE re OS BRE TE SEES Sia
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thousands of tons of lead emissions been disgorged annually
into the air we breathe”. (Maj. Op. 47.)
In support of this hortatory attempt to measure all environmental
matters by a single standard, despite the varied approaches
authorized by Congress, the majority cites several other lower
court decisions.* The majority suggests that the same standard
should be applied in all such cases to “avoid environmental
catastrophe” (Maj. Op. 48).
This attempt to blur the specific questions involved in con-
nection with the lead regulation is unjustified. First, all of the
Cases cited by the majority deal with carcinogens as to which the
lower court itself has said that “the concept of a threshold
exposure level has no practical significance where carcinogens
are concerned.”** (Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (Shell),
510 F. 2d 1292, 1298). The Society of Plastics Industry and
Hodgson decisions did not question whether the carcinogen
should be regulated, but only the manner of regulation. In both
cases, the Secretary of Labor was required by the law to establish
safe levels as a maximum for exposure. In Environmental
Defense Fund v. EPA, supra, dealing with the pesticides
aldrin/dieldrin, the court noted that not only was broad discre-
tion granted on the Administrator. but the statute on its terms
“places the burden of establishing the safety of a product on...
the applicant” (510 F. 2d at 1297).
The Reserve Mining decision does not stand for the proposi-
tion that regulation in the environmental field can be based on a
“non-existent data base.” Instead, the Eighth Circuit Court of
* Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F. 2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975);
The Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F. 2d 1301
(2d Cir.) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Industrial Union Dept.,
AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 449 F. 2d 467 (D. C. Cir. 1974); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. EPA (Coahoma), 465 F. 2d 528 (D. C.
Cir. 1972); and Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (Shell), 510
F. 2d 1292 (D. C. Cir. 1975).
** In Reserve Mining, the National Academy of Sciences had em-
phasized that there was no known safe level of the carcinogenic
asbestos fibers (514 F. 2d at 508).
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Appeals weighed the existing health evidence as to the car-
cinogenicity of the asbestos tailings in the context of a court
of equity determining the need for abatement because:
“As will be evident from the discussion that follows, we
adhere to our preliminary assessment that the evidence is
insufficient to support the kind of demonstrable danger to
the public health that would justify the immediate closing
of Reserve’s operations. We now address the basic question
of whether the discharges pose any risk to public health
and, if so, whether the risk is one which is legally cogni-
zable.” (514 F. 2d at 507.)
Throughout the majority opinion there runs the strain that
the question of the health effects of environmental lead is on
“the frontiers of scientific knowledge” and therefore EPA may
rely on “guesstimates” and “theoretical extrapolations” and
“speculation” (Maj. Op. 46-47). However, lead has been used
as an additive in gasoline for over 50 years and its health effects
have been studied for as long. The subject of the health effects
of lead has received massive attention and has been a continu-
ing source of study for decades. *
The nature of scientific inquiry in the field of environmental
health is identical to that in other scientific fields, irrespective
of “the problems faced by EPA in deciding whether lead auto-
motive emissions pose a threat . . .” (Maj. Op. 48). As the
President of the National Academy of Sciences recently stated
in an article referred to by the majority:
“Government regulation of technical products and proces-
ses must rest on a rational and sufficient scientific base.
. . . Government regulations or programs intended to com-
bat those hazards must, as a minimum, rest on detailed
appraisal of the nature and magnitude of those risks, of
the monetary and other costs of measures intended to
reduce the severity of each risk, and of the nature and mag-
* In fact, the number of studies involved in this area is so great
that EPA recently published an annotated bibliography on the “Bio-
logical Aspects of Lead” which iists over 4,100 studies during the
decade prior to 1964. (See Addendum I to Nalco Supp. Br.).
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15
nitude of the benefits involved in the process or product
under consideration.” Handler, A Rebuttal: The Need for
a Sufficient Scientific Base for Government Regulation, 43
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 808, 812 (1975).
Characterizing this matter as “environmental”, as justi-
fication for unbridled agency discretion is simply a subtle form
of prejudgment of the issues, as reflected in the majority remark
that: “For years the lead anti-knock industry has refused to
accept the developing evidence that lead emissions contribute
significantly to the total human lead body burden” (Maj. Op.
12). But Congress did not intend regulation on the basis of a
“non-existent data base”. If that were the intent there would
have been no need to qualify the EPA Administrator’s authority
by the “will endanger” language of Section 211(c)(1)(A).
Il. The Lower Court Unjustifiably Limited the Scope of Its
Review Because This Case Involved Environmental
Regulations.
A. The Conflict Within the Lower Court as to Scope of Review.
The five divergent opinions in the lower court raise a substan-
tial issue under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U. S. C.
$706) as to the thoroughness of the court’s review of highly
technical environmental regulations.
The majority essentially argues that EPA “should not be bound
by either the procedural or the substantive rigor proper for ques-
tions of fact” (Maj. Op. 46).
The opinion of Judge Bazelon (joined in by Judge Mc-
Gowan) while concurring in the construction of Section 211,
asserts that “I cannot agree that this automatically relieves the
Administrator’s decision from the ‘procedural . . . rigor proper for
questions of fact’.” (Bazelon Op. 1). On the other hand, Judge
Bazelon argues that a lower standard of substantive review must
apply “. . . in cases of great technological complexity,” and the
court should not “scrutinize the technical merits of each deci-
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16
sion” but rather “establish a decision-making process that assures
a reasoned decision that can be held up to the scrutiny of the
scientific community and the public” (/d.).
Judge Leventhal reads the other concurring judges as advo-
cating “engaging in no substantive review at all, whenever the
substantive issues at stake involve technical matters that the
judges involved consider beyond their individual technical com-
petence,” and that this is in effect “a signal to judges to abstain
from any substantive review’ (Leventhal Op. 1).
The dissent asserts that: “From the pages of the Court's
opinion there seeps the theme that this is an environmental case;
hence the Court like the agency need not labor by the usual
rules. We recognize no such exemption for this or any other type
case; certainly Congress did not give it to us” (Dis. Op. 50).
The concurring dissent, although agreeing with the majority
that Section 211(c)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act embodies
“strong precautionary powers,” does not agree with its opinion
that these powers can be exercised on a “nonexistent data base”
(MacKinnon Op. 2-3).
The concept that environmental cases represent a “new era”
is not unique. (See International Harvester Co. Vv. Ruckelshaus,
478 F. 2d at 615, 650-51 (D. C. Cir. 1973) concurring opinion,
C. J. Bazelon.)* However, it has been suggested that the im-
portance and impact of environmental legislation on public
health and the economy, calls for more supervision by the Court,
not less. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.
2d 584, 597-98 (D. C. Cir. 1971), pointed out that the super-
visory power of the court “has come into more frequent use”
and that “courts are increasingly asked to review administrative
action that touches on fundamental personal interests in life,
health and liberty . . . To protect these interests from adminis-
trative siirenns, it is necessary, but not sufficient, to insist
° See also Environmental Defense Fund \ Vv. -Ruckelshaus, 439 F. 2d
584, 597 (D. C. Cir. 1971); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727,
755 (1972) (Dissent).
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17
on strict judicial scrutiny of administrative action . . .” (Chief
Judge Bazelon). See also, Portland Cement Association v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F. 2d 375, 393 (D. C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U. S. 921 (1974).
Indeed, the increasing impact of environmental regulations
would appear to dictate a continued scrutiny by reviewing
courts, to prevent administrative action from becoming, as this
Court said in Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371
U. S. 156, 167 (1962) “a monster which rules with no prac-
tical limits on its discretion.”* The need for review, though
approached “with utmost diffidence” because of “technical
complexities”, is apparent (/nternational Harvester v. Ruckel-
shaus, 478 F. 2d at 641).**
The need for a resolution of the issue of the scope of review
is illustrated by the variety of views expressed by Chief Judge
Bazelon who, in Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus,
439 F. 2d at 597-98, called for an increase in the rigor of review
of environmental regulations, and in /nternational Harvester v.
Ruckelshaus, 487 F. 2d at 651 suggested that this did not mean
the courts would “dig deeper”, but now suggests a restriction on
substantive review akin to the exclusion of 5 U. S. C. § 701(a)
(2) for “agency action . . . committed to agency discretion by
law”, which as this Court said in Citizens to Preserve Overton
* There is no reason to assume that because the subject matter is
the environment, that agency personnel will somehow be free of all
possibility of “impermissible whim, improper influence, misplaced
zeal .. . the clutch of unconscious preference and irrelevant prejudice”
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC (D. C. Cir. 1971), 444
F. 2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U. S. 923 (1971).
** Congress expected that interested parties taking issue with the
actions of the Administrator would have the benefit “of an appeal
to the court from [under] the Administrative Procedure Act” and if
it was felt “that there were not the facts and that the ruling was
wrong, the court would have the final decision” (116 Cong. Rec.
(Part 14) at 19230-31 House) (10 June 1970). See Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474 (1951), holding that in
determining scope of review the court must consider both the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and Congressional intent in adopting the
regulatory legislation.
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18
Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 410 (1971), “is a very narrow
exception”.
The conflict within the circuit cannot be decided here by a
rehearing en banc (U. S. ex rel. Robinson vy. Johnston, 316
U. S. 649 (1942)), for a rehearing has already been held.
Thus, the purpose of en banc hearings, to avoid “conflicts
within” and promote “finality of decision” in a court of appeals
and to “determine the major doctrinal trends of the future’ for
4 the circuit cannot be achieved. United States v. American-For-
: eign SS. Corp., 363 U. S. 685, 689-90 (1960). Unless this
| Court reviews, there will inevitably be conflicting decisions
within the circuit depending upon the composition of the par-
ticular panels.* This is particularly important because the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia is the sole venue for
review under several key sections of the Clean Air Act whereby
Congress intended to avoid the very problem of conflicting de-
cisions which arises here. Also, because of this circuit’s leader-
ship in this area, conflicts within the circuit will no doubt
engender conflicts among other circuits, depending upon which
of the several views of the lower court are followed.**
rai Lac’
a Further, review of this issue is necessary because the law of
d the case may not have been decided below. Assuming that
Judges Bazelon and McGowan did not engage in any substan-
tive review, consistent with their opinion—and if their opinion
as to the proper scope of review is wrong—then in fact there
was no majority and only three of the nine active judges have
* Thus 3 judges assert a reduced rigor of both procedural and
substantive review in environmental cases; 2 judges oppose any
reduction in procedural rigor but would substantially abdicate all
substantive review; and the 4 dissenting judges assert that the same
procedural and substantive rigor applies as in other cases.
** While decisions as to the law rendered in one circuit are not
binding in other circuits, in the interest of uniformity such decisions
j should be followed unless the other circuit is convinced that the
: decision is clearly wrong. E.g., Homan v. United States, 279 F. 2d
$ 767, 773 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U. S. 866 (1960). In this
instance, other circuits would have a variety of choices.
ni oi Be yt) lal tdi BS ds ia ites St
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“affirmed” the regulation.* The impact of the lead phasedown
regulation on the nation’s future and economy is too important,
and the controversy over its validity too substantial, to let this
regulation stand on such a hybrid vote.
B. The Record Does Not Support the Regulation and Its
Promulgation Constitutes a Clear Error of Judgment.
One of the most difficult issues, as reflected in more than
a hundred pages of opinion in the court below, is whether
EPA here committed a “clear error of judgment” when it
determined to regulate lead additives.** In order to justify the
regulation, EPA must provide a record for the reviewing court
which is of sufficient completeness as to the factors considered
and reasons for regulation that the Court can, through a “search-
ing and substantial inquiry”, satisfy itself that the decision was
“based on a consideration of the relevant factors.” Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, supra, 401 U. S. at 415. As
the court below stated in Environmental Defense Fund v. En-
vironmental Protection Agency, 465 F. 2d 528, 540-41 (D. C.
Cir. 1972):
“We cannot discharge our role adequately unless we
hold EPA to a high standard of articulation . . . The im-
portance and difficulty of subject matter entail special
responsibilities when the EPA undertakes to explain and
defend its actions in court.”
** The majority opinion contains an extensive footnote [Maj. Op.
pp. 69-71 fn. 74] which indicates uncertainty as to the meaning of
“clear error of judgment” as enunciated by this Court in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 (1971). The variety
of views below as to the scope of review and circumstances which
would require the setting aside or remand of the regulation here, is
evidence of that uncertainty.
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Also in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F. 2d
841, 852 (D. C. Cir. 1970), the same court held:
“The function of the court is to assure that the agency
has given reasoned consideration to all of the material facts
and issues. This calls for insistence that the agency articu-
late with a reasonable clarity its reasons for decision, and
identify the significance of the crucial facts. . . .”*
If an administrative agency has not complied with the notice
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U. S. C.
§ 553) so that the reviewing court has the benefit of comments
by interested parties, and the agency’s response, the reviewing
court does not have the “whole record” which it is required to
review under § 706. See Rodway v. U. S. Dept. of Agriculture,
514 F. 2d 809, 817 (D. C. Cir. 1975); Portland Cement As-
sociation Vv. Ruckelshaus, 486 F. 2d 375, 400 (D. C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U. S. 921 (1974); and Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, supra, 444 F. 2d at 850 (D. C.
Cir. 1970).
This Court has held: “We may not supply a reasoned basis
for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.”
Bowman Transportation v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,
419 U. S. 281, 286 (1974). The court “must judge the
propriety of such [administrative] action solely by the grounds
invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or
improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative
action by what it considers to be a more adequate or proper
basis.” Securities Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196
(1947).
The following are illustrations of the lack of EPA reasoned
decision-making here that require the regulation be set aside
as a clear error of judgment or, at the least, that it be remanded
to the EPA.
* See also EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F. 2d 584, 597 (D. C. Cir.
1971), and Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F. 2d 846 (D. C.
Cir. 1972).
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21
1. As the dissent points out, to permit its conclusion that
there is an over-exposure to lead in the general adult population,
EPA rejected several major studies dealing with blood lead
levels in adults (some partially sponsored by EPA itself) show-
ing the absence of excessive blood lead in urban adults, on the
ground that the studies contained the methodological flaws of no
measurement of lead intake from sources other than airborne
lead (Dis. Op. 68-74). Yet EPA relied on two older epidemio-
logical studies, which show a small percentage of slightly “ex-
cessive” blood lead levels, despite the fact that those studies are
subject to the same alleged imperfect methodology. There is no
articulation of the reasons for this picking and choosing.
The majority sought to supply an explanation for the EPA
by asserting that the amount of intake of lead from dietary
sources might well be assumed to be constant within particular
metropolitan areas but assumed to vary between different
areas (Maj. Op. 85-86).* As the concurring opinion pointed
out, this may only be a “homespun scientific aphorism” well
beyond the competency of the majority to judge (Bazelon
Op. 3).
2. The other basis for the EPA’s claim of “significant risk
of harm” is the alleged contribution of automobile lead emis-
sions to blood lead levels in urban children through childhood
ingestion of lead-laden dirt. The EPA however, admitted that
lead in paint is “the primary cause of clinical lead poisoning in
children” (38 Fed. Reg. 33736), and its conclusion as to the
significance of the contribution of automobile lead emissions is
put forward solely as an unproven “hypothesis” (Dis. Op.
79-80). The majority asserts that in any event EPA made this
hypothesis only “a secondary basis for the regulations” and
therefore placed “only limited reliance on it” (Maj. Op. 90, 95).
* As the dissent argued, not only is this explanation a post-hoc
rationalization by the court, but it is illogical on its face, since there
is no reason to believe that dietary sources of lead would be any
more uniform as “between Scarsdale and Harlem”, than as between
“greater Philadelphia” and “greater New York” (Dis. Op. 77).
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22
In fact, EPA’s own scientists, in commenting upon the Third
Health Document stated that: “we should like to emphasize that
none of the studies cited directly implicated lead from automo-
tive exhausts as being responsible for the harming of any human
being” (App. 1057; Dis. Op. 82).
3. Another clear error of judgment by the EPA is the sub-
stantial reliance on the new studies as the basis for the final
regulation without adequate notice and opportunity for comment
(See infra pp. 22-25). This, in and of itself makes the adoption
of the regulation “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of dis-
cretion”. Rodway v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, supra,
$14 F. 2d at 817.
Ill. The Regulation Should Be Set Aside or Remanded to the
EPA Because of Failure to Provide Meaningful Oppor-
tunity for Comment.
From the outset, one of the principal issues before the lower
court involved the lack of meaningful opportunity afforded to in-
terested parties to comment on the scientific studies and “private
communications” which formed, in substantial part, the basis
for the final regulations (See, Nalco Main Br. 5, 17-18, 22-24
and 3!; and Nalco Supp. Br. 44). Now the en banc opinions of
the lower court have created a related question: whether the
reviewing court could properly go outside the administrative
record, on an ex parte basis after oral argument, and attempt to
“reconstruct” the chronology of public notice.
Both issues may have resulted from the rush to regulate
which occurred here in part because of the one-page order of
the Court of Appeals on October 28, 1973.* But this order could
* As Judge MacKinnon noted in his concurring dissent:
“This complex and lengthy lawsuit was foreordained when, on
October 29, 1973, a panel of this court directed the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency to reach a final
decision within 30 days . . . Although the proposed rulemaking
had then been in progress for nearly three years, it was patently
(Continued on next page)
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23
not alter the need for scrupulous attention to fundamentally
fair procedures. The order did not mandate that the EPA
jettison its prior medical and scientific bases and rely materially
on medical evidence which was never brought to the attention of
the public for meaningful comment.
As the Court of Appeals has held on numerous occasions, in
complex administrative decision-making, EPA must be held
to a high standard of articulation and fairness of procedure in
order for the reviewing court to properly function. In Portland
Cement Association Vv. Ruckelshaus, supra, 468 F. 2d at 393
the court held that:
“It is not consonant with the purpose of a rulemaking
proceeding to promulgate rules on the basis of inadequate
data, or on data that [to a] critical degree is known o. ly to
the agency.”
“What counts is the reality of an opportunity to submit an
effective presentation. . . .” Walter Holm Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.
2d 1009, 1016 (D. C. Cir. 1971).* The majority did not require
the agency to adhere to these principles in this case.
The Third Health Document which was issued by the EPA
simultaneous with the final regulations, was described by the
EPA as “a presentation of the pertinent evidence upon which
a decision could be made as to whether or not there is a
health justification to regulate lead in gasoline” (App. 30).
unrealistic to believe that the agency could sift through its ac-
cumulated data, afford the public and other agencies an op-
portunity to review any evidence contributed since the end of
the last comment period on March 11, 1973, reach a proper
decision based on all the evidence and draft the complicated
regulations within the required 30 days.” (MacKinnon Op. 1.)
* See also Chief Judge Bazelon concurring in Jnternational Har-
vester Co. Vv EPA, 478 F. 2d 615, 651 (D. C. Cir. 1973); Hess &
Clark v. FDA, 495 F. 2d 975, 990 n. 45 (D. C. Cir. 1974); En-
vironmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 465 F. 2d 528, .... (D.C. Cir.
1972), and Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F. 2d 846, 850
(D. C. Cir. 1972). Other circuit courts of appeals agree: South
Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F. 2d 646, 665 (1st Cir. 1974);
Great Lakes Screw Corp. v. NLRB, 409 F. 2d 375, 379 (7th Cir.
1969); and Austin v. Jackson, 353 F. 2d 910. 911 (4th Cir. 1965).
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The “evidence” on which the EPA Administrator actually re-
lied in support of the final decision to regulate, was discussed
in the extensive Preamble to the regulations (App. 5; Dis. Op.
A-1 to A-14). The Preamble made no attempt to defend the
earlier studies relied on in prior Health Documents, but instead
“weighed against these criticisms, [new] studies which have
shown that airborne lead does contribute significantly to lead
exposure in the general population” (App. 3).
As the basis for the final regulations, the EPA Administra-
tor discusses six studies relating to airborne lead as an endanger-
ment to health of adults* and in the Preamble the EvA dis-
cusses these six studies—and only these six studies (App. 3-4).
Thus, these studies form the principal, if not complete, EPA
basis for the regulations.
For the second aspect of its health justification (lead in dirt
contributing to childhood lead poisoning), EPA again relies
almost entirely on new studies and “private communications”:
two Newark studies; and studies from Chicago, Philadelphia
and Rochester.** As the dissent points out, these studies were
not only referred to in the “New Information” section of the
Preamble, but were also fully discussed in the EPA Adminis-
trator’s summary of information upon which he relied (Dis. Op.
30). The majority opinion’s argument that these studies “play
no role in the Administrator’s decision to regulate” (Maj. Op.
107) is incredible: The majority opinion itself, which dis-
cusses the “evidence tying children to leaded dust”, discusses
only five studies, three of which are the new studies referred to
above (Maj. Op. B-1 et seq.).***
* Two pilot lead isotope studies (App. 678 and 704) “an un-
published study in Japan” (App. 1092); Chamber studies (App.
596 and 391); the Seven Cities Study re-analysis (Doc. 228); and
the Daines Study (App. 466).
** See, App. 5, 138, 140, 662, 718, 738 and 967.
*** That these studies are crucial to the EPA’s dustfall
“hypothesis” is further evidence by EPA’s statement in the Third
Health Document that:
“Studies from Philadelphia, Chicago and Newark discussed
above provide persuasive evidence to strongly suggest that
(Continued on next page)
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25
Thus, these studies are not simply makeweight for the EPA but
serve as a fundamental basis for the second part of the EPA’s
health justification basis for the regulations.
EPA admitted that the reproposal of the regulations on
January 10, 1973 occurred not only because the EPA’s basis for
the reduction was “substantially revised,” but because its
basis “had not been available for review by the scientific com-
munity” (App. 29). Yet, in November, 1973, the EPA was
willing to propose final regulations when the new basis for those
regulations had not been available for scientific scrutiny. The
opinions discuss, in detail, when these new studies may have
become available for comment (Maj. Op. pp. 101 to 106;
Dis. Op. pp. 27 to 29). Several of these studies may have
become “available” for the first time at the Conference on Low
Lead Toxicity on October 1-2, 1973 in the month prior to the
promulgation of the final regulations (Maj. Op. 101; Dis.
Op. 25). However, even in November, 1973 when the EPA’s
Third Health Document was completed, EPA admitted that:
“A detailed evaluation of all presentations at the conference is
beyond the scope of the [Third Health] document” (App. 31).
Other new material relied on had not even been published at the
time the regulations were promulgated and were either in draft
form, “in press” or simply unavailable “private communica-
tions”.*
sources of lead other than paint, including that resulting from
the presence of lead in gasoline, play an important role in
childhood lead exposure.” (App. 130.)
*The “unpublished Japanese study”, second Newark study,
the so-called “Chicago Study” which was a “personal communication
from Coordinator of the Chicago Lead Poisoning Program to Dr.
J. S. Lin-Fu” (App. 140) and “personal communication from Phila-
delphia Dept. of Public Health” (App. 138).
The majority opinion argued that petitioner Nalco was able to
comment upon some of the newly disclosed bases for the regulations
as evidenced by petitioner’s “cxteasive comments” on these new
studies (Maj. Op. 102, n. 106). These “extensive” comments on an
EPA tentative draft consisted of all of three pages in a 54 page
document (Doc. 821, pp. 7-9). Further, these comments could not
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26
To discern the dates on which some of these drafts and new
studies became “available” the lower court relied upon a series
of unsupported and unsworn assertions made by EPA counsel
in letters sent to the Court of Appeals after the en banc argu-
ment. The majority mistakenly assumed that counsel for peti-
tioner was kept informed of these ex parte communications,
and that the “facts” asserted in these letters were not dis-
puted and therefore usable by the court.* That assumption is
incorrect:
(a) Counsel for petitioner did not receive the letter of
September 26, 1975 (see Appendix B., B2-4, hereto), until the
next week, when it was sent to counsel because counsel for
3 petitioner had learned that such a letter had been sent and
specifically requested a copy.
(b) Counsel for petitioner learned of the October 2, 1975
j letter for the first time upon reading the en banc opinions of the
. court below. This letter was never sent to petitioner’s counsel
as shown by the face of the letter which does not bear any certif-
icate of service or carbon copies to petitioners counsel (see
Appendix B., B8, hereto).
(c) It has also now been learned that a third letter was sent
to the Court of Appeals dated September 22, 1975. This letter
was also not sent to counsel for petitioner (Appendix B., B1,
hereto).
Sait oe ah hain
have been received, if mailed to the EPA, more than one weck prior
to final announcement of the regulations and EPA’s 117 page sup-
porting document. The fact that one interested party may have ap-
preciated that the EPA planned to rely substantially on new, un-
commented upon material, is not relevant to the issue of the lack
: of opportunity for meaningful public comment to governmental
; agencies concerned, with the protection of the public health. See:
Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F. 2d 1009, 1016 (D. C. Cir.
; 1971); Wagner Electric Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F. 2d 1013, 1019 (3d
Cir. 1972); Hotch v. United States, 212 F. 2d 280, 282 (9th Cir.
1954).
*“Copies of these letters were sent by EPA to counsel for all
parties to this litigation. No party commented on either letter.” (Maj.
Op. 101, n. 104.)
ESS SOT IS IRE EI et ERY EEL EGE LILES I TIPLE NL IEE IE IE EI
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27
(d) When counsel for petitioner requested information as to
documents which had been sent to the lower court, counsel for
EPA sent a letter dated October 15, 1975 (Appendix B., B9-11,
hereto) which did not disclose the existence of the October y §
1975 letter but merely enclosed a copy of a partial list of docu-
ments sent to the lower court.
Thus, the fact that a complaint was not made by “able and
experienced counsel for petitioners” (Maj. Op. 101), is hardly
relevant, since it was impossible for counsel to complain about
a situation about which it was uninformed.
Even this attempt to supplement the record failed to “disclose
when each piece of new information is received and when and
how it was made available for comment” (Bazelon Op. 5).
For example, the September 26, 1975 letter from EPA
counsel to the lower court said as to the first isotope study
(Doc. 113) that “the files of the Office of General Counsel . . .
indicate that the abstracts were sent . . . to the public file on
October 4, 1973” (Appendix B., B3, hereto). EPA counsel
apparently did not know when they were actually placed in the
files to be theoretically “available” to whomever might be can-
vassing through the “public file”. This letter also states that the
second isotope study was “sent to the Office of the General
Counsel on August 6, 1973 for transmittal to . . . the public
file.” The letter further asserts, without record support, that the
Japanese study “was sent to the Office of General Counsel on
July 22. 1973 for transmittal . . . to the public file’. As to each
assertion there is no indication when the documents were
actually transmitted to and placed in the “public file”.
The letter of EPA counsel to the clerk of the lower court
dated September 22, 1973 refers to a court inquiry as to
“docket records”, possibly questioning whether there are any
records of the actual date of deposit of materials in the public
information file (Appendix B., B1, hereto). Counsel for peti-
tioner is still not privy to these communications.
SNR ERENT ae TS ag LET eS TY
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28
Finally, the October 2, 1975 letter, enclosing a report on
“preliminary results of the first isotope study” says, “The letter
was filed and indexed with the public comments under ‘Califor-
nia University’ and I overlooked it before” (Appendix B., B8,
hereto). With such a filing system, confusing to EPA’s own
counsel, how can it appropriately be suggested that petitioner
was “on notice” of everything which might be deposited, at
some time or other, in the EPA public information files?*
Two of the concurring judges (Judges Bazelon and
McGowan) noted, “the failure of the record to clearly disclose
the procedural steps followed by EPA,” stating that the Court
was forced to “reconstruct these steps by inferences and sur-
mise.” Thus the concurring judges concluded that: “Ordinarily,
. . . I think a record which so burdens judicial review would
require remand for clarification”, but in this case the court chose
not to do so (Bazelon Op. 4-5).
The action of the reviewing court here goes well beyond the
power of an appellate court and is in direct conflict with deci-
sions of this Court. If the record is insufficient or even unclear
on such a crucial issue as the opportunity to comment, the
action must be remanded to provide such an opportunity. In
Camp V. Pitts, 411 U. S. 138 (1973) (per curiam), this Court
dealt with a similar question where the case presented a “nar-
row, but substantial, question with respect to the proper proce-
dure to be followed when a reviewing court determines that an
administrative agency’s stated justification for informal action
does not provide an adequate basis for judicial review.” (411
U. S. at 138.) The Court held that in applying the “arbitrary
and capricious” test:
* In the EPA counsel’s letter of October 15, 1975, responding to
petitioner’s counsel’s telephone inquiry, EPA counsel did not “make
note of all the documents requested shortly after oral argument”,
but attached a list showing “The type of document is indicated and
the list is otherwise complete”, and that “several letters from in-
dustry” were requested, presumably by the Court, but “specific
document numbers were not noted” (Appendix B., B9-11, hereto).
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29
“. . . the focal point for judicial review should be the
administrative record already in existence, not some new
record made initially in the reviewing court.” (411 U. S.
at 142.)
Here, the lower court did make a new record as to when docu-
ments were perhaps made available for public comment and
petitioner was severely prejudiced by this ex parte action.
In summary, consideration of procedural issues under 5
U. S. C. § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act raises the
following issues:
(a) Does the melange of alleged notices through presenta-
tion of material during “by invitation only” seminars, transmis-
sion to one interested party, or deposit in “public files” at
some undetermined dates at intermittent times during the months
immediately preceding issuance of the regulations, comply with
the statute’s requirement for notice and opportunity to comment?
(b) Is it a reasonable construction of Section 553 to hold
that interested members of the public must make in effect a
daily check of the deposit of materials in inadequately indexed
“public files” of the agency, guess as to which materials the
agency will seek to rely on, and file their comments sufficiently
in advance of rule-making to assure that the agency has had
an opportunity to consider them, all at the peril of being held to
have waived right of comment on new materials substantially
relied on by the agency if they do not do so?
(c) Does the fact that the EPA previously published notices
of proposed regulations and material on which it proposed to
rely and provided a period for comment thereon, excuse the
failure to follow such procedure when the final regulation is
based substantially on new scientific and medical materials as
to which there has been no notice and opportunity to comment?
(d) Can the reviewing court properly rely upon ex parte
unsworn and unsupported assertions of agency counsel to add
to the administrative record on review on an important issue
such as notice and the opportunity to comment?
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JRE I Rs na uae Sra
A MORAN eat. pw
30
CONCLUSION.
The questions presented raise issues of national importance,
which have generated widely divergent opinions in the lower
court. The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Victor P. KAYSER,
JoHN C. BERGHOFF, JR.,
135 South LaSalle Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60603,
Davip MACHANIC,
WILLIAM H. FITZ,
1200 18th Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C. 20036,
Attorneys for Petitioner.
Of Counsel:
CHADWELL, KAYSER, RUGGLES,
McGEE & HASTINGS,
135 South LaSalle Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60603,
(312) 726-2545,
PIERSON, BALL & DowD,
1200 18th Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C. 20036,
(202) 331-8566.
mene a
MELE IMAL PPLE A ERENT VRSCA ROD AT Cys TEIN
lal
RIL EEN THRO
GH
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Appendix
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Al
APPENDIX A.
1. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, Dec. 31,
1970, 84 Stat. 1698-1700.
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3(a)(1).
Sec. 108.(a)(1) For the purpose of establishing national
primary and secondary ambient air quality standards, the Ad-
ministrator shall within 30 days after the date of enactment
of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 publish, and shall from
time to time thereafter revise, a list which includes each air
pollutant—
(A) which in his judgment has an adverse effect on public
health or welfare;
(B) the presence of which in the ambient air results from
numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources, and
(C) for which air quality criteria had not been issued before
the date of enactment of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970,
but for which he plans to issue air quality criteria under this
section.
42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1(a)(1).
Sec. 202. (a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(d)—
(1) The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and
from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of
this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pol-
lutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new
motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment causes or con-
tributes to, or is likely to cause or to contribute to, air pollution
which endangers the public health or welfare. Such standards
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A2
shall be applicable to such vehicles and engines for their useful
life (as determined under subsection (d)), whether such vehicles
and engines are designed as complete systems or incorporate
devices to prevent or control such pollution.
42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c{c).
Sec. 211. (c)(1) The Administrator may, from time to
time on the basis of information obtained under subsection (b)
of this section or other information available to him, by regula-
tion, control or prohibit the manufacture, introduction into com-
merce, offering for sale, or sale of any fuel additive for use in
a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine (A) if any emission
products or such fuel or fuel additive will endanger the public
health or welfare, or (B) if emission products of such fuel or
fuel additive will impair to a significant degree the performance
of any emission control device or system which is in general use,
or which the Administrator finds has been developed to a point
where in a reasonable time it would be in general use were such
regulation to be promulgated.
(2)(A) No fuel, class of fuels, or fuel additive may be
controlled or prohibited by the Administrator pursuant to clause
(A) of paragraph (1) except after consideration of all relevant
medical and scientific evidence available to him, including con-
sideration of other technologically or economically feasible
means of achieving emission standards under section 202.
(B) No fuel or fuel additive may be controlled or prohibited
by the Administrator pursuant to clause (B) of paragraph (1)
except after consideration of available scientific and economic
data, including a cost benefit analysis comparing emission con-
trol devices or systems which are or will be in general use and
require the proposed control or prohibition with emission con-
trol devices or systems which are or will be in general use and
do not require the proposed control or prohibition. On request
of a manufacturer of motor vehicles, motor vehicle engines, fuels,
EIT ORE are e ~s te eee Oe ae we
A3
or fuel additives submitted within 10 days of notice of proposed
rulemaking, the Administrator shall hold a public hearing and
publish his findings with respect to any matter he is required
to consider under this subparagraph. Such findings shall be pub-
lished at the time of promulgation of final regulations.
(C) No fuel or fuel additive may be prohibited by the Ad-
ministrator under paragraph (1) unless he finds, and publishes
such finding, that in his judgment such prohibition will not
cause the use of any other fuel or fuel additive which will
produce emissions which will endanger the public health or
welfare to the same or greater degree than the use of the fuel
or fuel additive proposed to be prohibited.
42 U.S.C. § 1857h-S.
Sec. 307. (b)(1) A petition for review of action of the
Administrator in promulgating any national primary or sec-
ondary ambient air quality standard, any emission standard un-
der section 112, any standard of performance under section 111,
any standard under section 202 (other than a standard required
to be prescribed under section 202(b)(1)), any determination
under section 202(b)(5), any control or prohibition under sec-
tion 211, or any standard under section 231 may be filed only
in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.
2. Administrative Procedure Act
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)
General notice of proposed rule making shall be published
in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are
named and either personally served or otherwise have actual
notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall in-
clude—
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public
rule making proceedings;
a — - << -_— -
A4
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the
rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule
or a description of the subjects and issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this sub-
section does not apply—
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy,
or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorpo-
rates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor
in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure there-
on are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall
give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments
with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After con-
sideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall
incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of
their basis and purpose. When rules are required by statute to
be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,
sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection.
5 U.S.C. § 706(1) & (2)
Scope of review
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, inter-
pret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The
reviewing court shall—
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or un-
reasonably delayed; and
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AS
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, find-
ings, and conclusions found to be—
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, priv-
ilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority,
or limitations, or short of statutory right; :
(D) without observance of procedure required by f
law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case
subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or
otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hear-
ing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that
the facts are subject to trial de novo by the review-
ing court.
EAI wmataee
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
3. The Fuel Additive Regulation
Fep. REG. Vor. 38, No. 234, Dec. 6, 1973
Part 80 of Chapter I, Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regu-
lations is amended as follows:
1. In § 80.1, the second sentence is revised to read as
follows:
§ 80.1 Scope.
* * * These regulations are based upon a determination by
the Administrator that the emission product of a fuel or additive
will endanger the public health, or will impair to a significant
degree the performance of a motor vehicle emission control ‘
device in general use or which the Administrator finds has been i
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&
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A6
developed to a point where in a reasonable time it would be in
general use were such regulations promulgated; and certain
other findings specified by the Act.
2. In § 80.2, a new paragraph (m) is added as follows:
§ 80.2 Definitions.
(m) “Lead additive manufacturer” means any person who
produces a lead additive or sells a lead additive under his own
name.
3. A new § 80.20 is added as follows:
§ 80.20 Controls applicable to gasoline refiners.
(a)(1) in the manufacture of gasoline at any refinery, no
gasoline refiner shall exceed the average lead content per gallon
specified below for each 3-month period (January through
March, April through June, July through September, October
through December) :
(i) 1.7 grams of lead per gallon, after January 1, 1975;
(ii) 1.4 grams of lead per gallon, after January 1, 1976;
(iii) 1.0 grams of lead per gallon, after January 1, 1977;
(iv) 0.8 grams of lead per gallon, after January 1, 1978:
(v) 0.5 grams of lead per gallon, after January 1, 1979.
(2) For each 3-month period (January through March,
April through June, July through September, October through
December) the average lead content per gallon shall be com-
puted by dividing total grams of lead used at a refinery in the
manufacture of gasoline by total gallons of gasoline manufac-
tured at such refinery.
(3) For each 3-month period (January through March,
April through June, July through September, October through
December) commencing with the period January 1, 1975
through March 31, 1975, each refiner shall submit to the Ad-
ministrator a report showing for each refinery (i) the total
grams of lead in lead additive inventory on the first day of the
4 *
in .
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AP Dresses ey:
A7
period, (ii) the total grams of lead received during the period,
(iii) the total grams of lead in lead additive inventory on the
last day of the period, (iv) the total gallons of gasoline produced
by such refinery during the period, and (v) the average lead
content in each gallon of gasoline produced during the period.
Reports shall be submitted within 15 days after the close of the
reporting period, on forms supplied by the Administrator upon
request.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) (1)(i) and (ii) of this
section shall not be applicable to any refiner which does not have
more than 30,000 barrels per day crude oil or bona fide feed
stock capacity from owned or leased facilities or from facilities
made available to such refiner under an arrangement such as,
but not limited to, an exchange agreement (except one on a
refined product for refined product basis), or throughput or
other form of processing agreement, with the same effects as
though such facilities had been leased.
4. A new § 80.25 is added as follows:
§ 80.25 Controls applicable to lead additive manufac-
turers.
For each 3-month period (January through March, April
through June. July through September, October through
December) commencing with the period January 1, 1975 through
March 31, 1975, each lead additive manufacturer shall submit
to the Administrator a report showing the total grams of lead
shipped to each refinery by such lead additive manufacturer
during the period. Reports shall be submitted within 15 days
after the close of the reporting period, on forms supplied by the
Administrator upon request.
5. A new § 80.26 is added as follows:
§ 80.26 Confidentiality of information.
Information obtained by the Administrator or his repre-
sentative pursuant to this part shall be treated, in so far as
its confidentiality is concerned, in accordance with the pro-
visions of 40 CFR Part 2.
DREW LOR ROE SSE EEN CBRL OY
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- flD.~ 2 eS ite Vie Tah ONO? ee
hae Restetses
Bl
APPENDIX B.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.
September 22, 1975
Ms. Terry Jalbert
Office of the Clerk
U. S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
U. S. Courthouse
Third Street and Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C.
Dear Ms. Jalbert:
Enclosed in two folders are the documents from the record
in Ethyl Corporation v. EPA requested by the Court this
morning.
Will you ask Mr. Cathay to call me at his convenience tomor-
row? I do not think EPA maintained in the past the type of
docket records mentioned in his request to Mr. Clark of the
Justice Department, but I would like to clarify the request.
My telephone number is 755-0766.
Also, Mr. Shawaker, the Justice Department attorney assigned
to this matter will be out of the country for the next three weeks.
If additional documents are needed, I suggest that your office
contact me directly during this period. The record is stored in
my office, and we will be able to respond promptly.
Sincerely yours,
Leslie Carothers,
Attorney
Air Quality Noise and
Radiation Division (A-133)
——— -. .- ——_ -_— <<. =)
B2
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Washington, D. C. 20460
September 26, 1975
Mr. Dan Cathey
Office of the Clerk
U. S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
U. S. Courthouse
Third Street and Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C.
Co ae a
Re: Ethyl Corporation v. EPA (73-2205)
Dear Mr. Cathey:
This is in reply to your request for information on the dates
when EPA received Documents 113 and 468 in the record of the
rulemaking regarding lead additives in gasoline. The informa-
: tion you requested is as follows:
’ A. Document No. 113
This document in the record consists of two separate studies
by Rabinowitz, Wetherill, and Kopple using lead isotope tracers
to investigate human lead metabolism.
1. The first study listed in the Certified Index to the Record
and entitled “Studies of human lead metabolism using stable
isotope tracers” was presented at a joint EPA-HEW Symposium
on lead on October 1-2, 1973. There is no evidence in the
4 record or elsewhere that EPA received an advance copy of the
: full text of this paper.
F EPA did receive advance abstracts of most of the papers pre-
sented shortly before the Symposium. These abstracts, includ-
ing an abstract of the Rabinowitz paper, appear in the record
SSR RNAS TT I EMILE LIT LEH OLE IETS ELLIE EILEEN LEELA POE OER BOT
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B3
as Document No. 1092. The files of the Office of General
Counsel, which reviewed many documents before transmittal to
Ethyl Corporation under a Freedom of Information Act Agree-
ment, indicate that the abstracts were sent to Ethyl Corporation
and to the public file on October 4, 1973.
2. The second study by the same authors indexed as Docu-
ment 113 is “Lead Metabolism in the Normal Human: Stable
Isotope Studies.” The copy of the study appearing in Document
113 is the study as published in the November, 1973 issue of
Science Magazine.
The isotope study reported in Science was conducted before
the similar study reported at the EPA/HEW symposium. An
early draft of the study ultimately published in November,
1973, was sent to EPA by one of the authors on May 5, 1973.
The covering letter and the attached draft appear in the record
as Document No. 470. A copy of that document is enclosed.
In addition, a revised and final draft of the same study was
subsequently received by EPA and sent to the Office of General
Counsel on August 6, 1973 for transmittal to Ethyl Corpora-
tion and the public file. This typed draft does not appear in the
Certified Index to the Record, because I directed the librarian
who assisted me in preparing the index to remove drafts of
scientific articles that were also available in published form by
the time the regulations were promulgated, provided that the
typed draft was identical to the published version. I retained
in my files of duplicates the copy of the typewritten draft with
the notation that it was withdrawn from the public file on Janu-
ary 22, 1974, during the period when we prepared the index.
I will be glad to forward this draft and the notation if the Court
desires it.
B. Document No. 468
The study by Tsuchiya, et el. entitled “Study of Lead Con-
centrations in Atmosphere and Population in Japan” was sent
to the Office of General Counsel on July 22, 1973, for trans-
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B4
mittal to Ethyl Corporation and to the public file. The docu-
ment was therefore received by EPA before that date.
If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ LESLIE CAROTHERS
Leslie Carothers
Attorney
Air Quality Noise and
4 Radiation Division (A-133)
; Enclosure.
i
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Saison Nee, ee
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ee ee eee re ey
PLEA OIE RP EL EIDE MEL IONS IOI LALIT CLE EO RIM GES SEE SRLS RN UEP ERTIES:
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BS
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Washington, D. C. 20460.
’
September 29, 1975
David Mechanic, Esq.
Pierson, Bell & Dowd
1000 Ring Building
Washington, D. C. 20036
Dear Mr. Mechanic:
Re: Ethyl Corporation v. EPA (73-2205) and
related cases
Last week, the Clerk of the Court requested information on
the dates when EPA received Documents No. 113 and 468 in
the Certified Index to the Record. Our letter in response to this
request is enclosed for your information.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ LESLIE CAROTHERS
Leslie Carothers
Attorney
Air Quality Noise and
Radiation Division (A-133)
-— —_ -~ — - «~
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Nike Sil B02 nw viel ZS
SSR Re a ONE oe cs ds Se acca
B6
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Washington, D. C. 20460.
October 1, 1974
Mr. Robert Bonner
Chief Deputy Clerk
U. S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
U. S. Courthouse
Washington, D. C.
Re: Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 73-2205; Nalco Chemical
Co. v. EPA, 73-2270; NPRA v. EPA, 74-1021;
PPG Industries v. EPA, 73-2268; E. I. DuPont
De Nemours v. EPA, 73-2269.
Dear Mr. Bonner:
Per your request, I am enclosing eight (8) copies of the
article entitled “Atmospheric Lead: Its Relationship to Traffic
Volume and Proximity to Highways” by Robert H. Daines,
Harry Motto, and Daniel M. Chilko. The article was published
in the April, 1970 issue of Environmental Science and Tech-
nology. This study is cited in other articles reproduced in the
Joint Appendix (see, ¢€.g., p. 269 n. 17 and 467 n. 1), buta
copy of this reference was not included in the Certified Index to
the Record.
I am also enclosing copies of a second article with a similar
title by the same authors in case there was any confusion about
the reference desired. That article is entitled “Lead in Soils and
Plants: Its Relationship to Traffic Volume and Proximity to
Highways” by Harry L. Motto, Daniel H. Daines, Daniel M.
Chilko, and Carlotta K. Motto. This reference is Document
No. 102 in the Certified Index to the Record, but it is not
included in the Joint Appendix.
cc:
B7
A complete copy of Airborne Lead in Perspective, the Report
of the National Academy of Sciences is also included as you
requested. It is Document No.
14 in the Certified Index.
Excerpts from the report are reproduced in the Joint Appendix
at pp. 309-363.
Copies of this letter and the two enclosed articles are being
sent to counsel of record. If I can be of further assistance,
please let me know.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ LESLIE CAROTHERS
Leslie Carothers
EG-333
Edward J. Shawaker, Esq.
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Joseph C. Carter, Esq.
Hunton, Williams, Gay & Gibson
700 East Main Street
Richmond, Virginia 23212
John J. Adams, Esq.
Hunton, Williams, Gay & Gibson
Suite 1060
1730 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
John C. Berghoff, Jr., Esq.
Chadwell, Kayser, Ruggles,
McGee & Hastings
135 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
Attorney
Air Quality Noise and
Radiation Divison (EG-333)
David Machanic, Esq.
Pierson, Ball & Dowd
1000 Ring Building
Washington, D. C. 20036
Daniel Gribbon, Esq.
Allan Topol, Esq.
Covington & Burling
888 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
H. Edward Dunkelberger, Esq
Theodore L. Garrett, Esq.
Covington & Burling
888 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
B8
October 2, 1975
Mr. Dan Cathey
Office of the Clerk
U. S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
U. S. Courthouse
Third Street and Constitution Avenue
Washington, D.C.
Re: Ethyl Corporation v. EPA (73-2205) and
related cases
Dear Mr. Cathey:
Enclosed is a copy of Document No. 875, a letter to EPA
dated August 28, 1972, reporting preliminary results of the
first isotope study in Document No. 113. The letter was filed
and indexed with the public comments, under “California
University” and I overlooked it before.
I am also enclosing a copy of the letter sent to opposing
counsel with the copy of my letter to you of September 26,
1975. Identical letters were sent to each counsel.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ LESLIE CAROTHERS
Leslie Carothers
Attorney
Air Quality Noise and
Radiation Division (A-133)
BLEED THROUGH
B9
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ;
Washington, D. C. 20460. '
October 15, 1975
Victor P. Kayser, Esq.
Chadwell, Kayser, Ruggles,
McGee & Hastings
135 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
Re: Nalco Chemical Company v. EPA (73-2270)
Dear Mr. Kayser:
Mr. Fitz told me that you were interested in knowing what
documents the Court had requested from the record of the lead
litigation. I am enclosing a copy of our list of the documents
requested to date. As the enclosure indicates, I did not make
note of all the documents requested shortly after the oral argu-
ment; but the type of document is indicated, and the list is
otherwise complete.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ LESLIE CAROTHERS
Leslie Carothers
Attorney
Air Quality Noise and
Radiation Division (A-133)
ce: Mr. William Fitz
DR aie Rr kN ARR IIE IRENE ET EL me
POOR COPY
_r
~ FO ee RAE ieee M7
oO a
i oe ak Pe me
BLO
DOCUMENTS FROM THE ETHYL RECORD
REQUESTED BY THE COURT.
9/22/75
160
170
180
345
835
836
Summary of Comments Relative to EPA Position on Lead
in Gasoline. Undated.
Summary Relative to EPA Position on Lead. Undated.
EPA Reopens Record on Proposed Lead Regulations.
Undated.
Summary of EPA’s Position for Controlling Lead in
Leaded Gasoline. Undated.
International Lead Zinc Research Organization, Inc.
Letter from J. F. Cole, July 30, 1973.
Letter from J. F. Cole, March 9, 1973.
9/3/75
84
85
11]
141
142
143
433
486
Knelson, Role of Clinical Research, etc. (also in
Appendix ).
Knelson, Kinetics of Respiratory Lead Intake in Humans,
May 1973. (Also in Appendix).
Proceedings of Luxemburg Conference.
EPA’s Position on the Health Effects of Lead. (Draft
of Health Paper), October 19, 1973.
EPA's Position on the Health Effects of Lead. (Draft of
Health Paper), July 25, 1973.
EPA’s Position on the Health Effects of Lead. (Draft of
Health Paper), June 22, 197..
Ethyl Transcript of EPA/HEW Symposium, Oct. 1-3,
1973.
Briefing memo for Train, October 1973.
1109 Unsigned, untitled draft of Briefing paper, July 12, 1973.
BLEED THROUGH
Bil
6/9/75
807 DuPont Submission, 3/9/73.
821 Nalco (Calandra) critique of EPA Health Position
Paper, November 19, 1973.
Several letters from industry received just before the Court-
ordered decision date were requested. Specific document num-
bers were not noted.
POOR COPY
See REN ee |
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AOPREME GOMIRT! UL fi
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75-16 '2, 1613, 16/9,
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Ocroper Term, 1975
Eruyn Corpvoration, Petitioner
v.
I.NVIRON MENTAL Prorection AGency, Respondent
PPG Ixpvusrrirs, Ixc., Petitioner
e.
NVIRONMENTAL Prorection Acency, Respondent
K. 1. DePoxr pe Nemours axnp Company, Petitioner
v.
IINVIRON MENTAL Protection AGency, Respondent
Natco Cvemican Company, Petitioner
e.
NVIRONMENTAL Prorection AGENcy, Respondent
NationaL Perrotecm Rerimers Association, Petitioner
v.
NVIRONMENTAL Prorection AGENcy, Respondent
JOINT APPENDIX TO
PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Press oF Byron S. ApamMs Printinc, INc., WASHINGTON, D. C.
~~
BLEED ‘
bes: z
1ROUGH
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication
in the Federal Reporter or U.S. App. D.C. Reports. Users are requested
to notify the Clerk of any formal errors in orde
r that corrections may be
made before the bound volumes go to press.
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 73-2205
ETHYL CORPORATION, PETITIONER
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT
No. 73-2268
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., PETITIONER
Vv.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT
No. 73-2269
E. I. DUPONT DE NEMouRs & COMPANY, PETITIONER
Vv.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT
POOR COPY
od
2
No. 73-2270
NALCO CHEMICAL COMPANY, PETITIONER
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT
No. 74-1021
NATIONAL PETROLEUM REFINERS ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER
V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT
Petitions for Review of an Order of the
Environmental Protection Agency
On Rehearing En Bane
Argued En Banc May 30, 1975
Decided March 19, 1976
SYLLABUS
Section 211(c)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act authorizes
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
to regulate gasoline additives whose emission products
“will endanger the public health or welfare * * *.”
42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6e(c) (1)(A) (1970). Acting pur-
as eo ts eae
am
3
suant to that power in rule-making proceedings, the Ad-
ministrator determined that leaded gasoline automotive
emissions present “a significant risk of harm” to the
public health, thereby endangering it within the con-
templation of the statute. Based on this finding, the
Administrator issued regulations requiring annual re-
ductions in the lead content of leaded gasoline. Held:
1. The Administrator’s interpretation of the statutory
“will endanger” standard is entitled to great deference.
Train Vv. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421
U.S. 60, 75 (1975). We find no basis in the language
of the statute or in its legislative history to fault his
interpretation. In applying the “will endanger” stand-
ard, the Administrator is authorized to assess risks of
harm and, where the risk is found to be significant, to
act to prevent the harm from happening. Thus the regu-
latory action under this precautionary statute should pre-
cede, and hopefully prevent, the perceived harm. Pp. 17-
66.
a. Some of the questions involved in promulga-
tion of environmental regulations “are on the fron-
tiers of scientific knowledge, and consequently as to
them insufficient data is presently available to make
a fully informed factual determination. Decision
making must in that circumstance depend to a
greater extent upon policy judgments and less upon
purely factual analyses.” Industrial Union Depart-
ment, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 331,
338, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (1974). Pp. 45-56.
b. In making his policy judgment by assessing
risks the Administrator is not required to limit his
consideration to the danger presented by lead ad-
ditives “in and of themselves.” He may consider
the cumulative impact of lead additives with other
sources of human exposure to lead. Pp. 56-61.
4
2. The Administrator’s determination that lead emis-
sions “present a significant risk of harm to the health
of urban populations, particularly to the health of city
children,” is not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law * * *.”
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). His determination has
a rational basis in the evidence. Pp. 66-97.
a. We must look at the Administrator’s decision
not as the chemist, biologist, or statistician that we
are qualified neither by training nor experience to
be, but as a reviewing court exercising our narrowly
defined duty of holding agency action to certain
minimal standards of rationality. Pp. 66-74.
b. We need not seek a single dispositive scientific
study that fully supports the Administrator’s de-
termination. Science does not work that way; nor
does agency fact-finding. Rather, the Administrator’s
decision may be fully supportable if it is based, as
it is here, on the inconclusive but suggestive results
of numerous studies. By its nature, scientific evi-
dence is often cumulative; the more supporting,
albeit inconclusive, evidence available, the more
likely the accuracy of the conclusion. Pp. 75-76.
ce. The vast bulk of the evidence before the Ad-
ministrator provides inferences, no one of which
is dispositive, which support the Administrator’s
findings. Particularly in light of the precautionary
nature of the “will endanger” standard, we can-
not find the Administrator’s conclusion that lead
automotive emissions present a significant risk of
harm to the public health arbitrary or capricious.
Pp. 77-97.
The order of the Environmental Protection Agency
is
Affirmed.
RYT APEL AONE TS ETI APRONS OR
5
Joseph C. Carter, Jr., with whom John J. Adams and
David F. Peters were on the brief, for petitioner in
No. 73-2205. Arnold H. Quint also entered an appear-
ance for petitioner in No. 73-2205.
Daniel M. Gribbon, with whom Allan J. Topol and
Charles Lister were on the brief, for petitioners in Nos.
73-2268 and 73-2269.
Victor P. Kayser, with whom John C. Berghoff, Jr.,
Robert E. Nord, David Machanic, and William H. Fitz
were on the brief, for petitioner in No. 73-2270.
H. Edward Dunkelberger, Jr.. with whom Theodore
L. Garrett was on the brief, for petitioner in No. 74-
1021.
Robert V. Zener, General Counsel, Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, and Leslie A. Carothers, Attorney, En-
vironmental Protection Agency, with whom Wallace H.
Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, and Edmund B.
Clark, Martin Green, and Edward J. Shawaker, Attor-
neys, Department of Justice, were on the brief, for re-
spondent. Raymond N. Zagone, Attorney, Department
of Justice, also entered an appearance for respondent in
No. 73-2268.
David Schoenbrod filed a brief on behalf of Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. et al. as amici curiae
urging affirmance.
Befcre BAZELON, Chief Judge, and WRIGHT, McGowan,
TAMM, LEVENTHAL, ROBINSON, MACKINNON, Ross, and
WILKEY, Circuit Judges, sitting en bance.
Opinion for the court, in which Chief Judge BAZELON
and Circuit Judges McGowan, LEVENTHAL, and RoBIN-
SON concur, filed by Circuit Judge WRIGHT.
Concurring opinion, in which Circuit Judge MCGOWAN
joins, filed by Chief Judge BAZELON.
Concurring statement filed by Circuit Judge LEVEN-
THAL.
6
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge MACKINNON.
Dissenting opinion, in which Circuit Judges TAMM
and Ross join, filed by Circuit Judge WILKEY.
WRIGHT, Circuit Judge: Man’s ability to alter his
environment has developed far more rapidly than his
ability to foresee with certainty the effects of his altera-
tions. It is only recently that we have begun to ap-
preciate the danger posed by unregulated modification
of the world around us, and have created watchdog
agencies whose task it is to warn us, and protect us,
when technological “advances” present dangers unap-
preciated—or unrevealed—by their supporters. Such
agencies, unequipped with crystal balls and unable to
read the future, are nonetheless charged with evaluat-
ing the effects of unprecedented environmental modifica-
tions, often made on a massive scale. Necessarily, they
must deal with predictions and uncertainty, with de-
veloping evidence, with conflicting evidence, and, some-
times, with little or no evidence at all. Today we ad-
dress the scope of the power delegated one such watch-
dog, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). We
must determine the certainty required by the Clean Air
Act before EPA may act to protect the health of our
populace from the lead particulate emissions of auto-
mobiles.
Section 211(c)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act autho-
rizes the Administrator of EPA to regulate gasoline ad-
ditives whose emission products “will endanger the pub-
lic health or welfare * * *.” 42 U.S.C. $ 1857f-6e(c) (1)
(A). Acting pursuant to that power, the Administrator,
after notice and comment, determined that the automo-
tive emissions caused by leaded gasoline present “a signi-
‘ All sections of the Act pertinent to this case were added
by the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, Dee.
31, 1970, 84 Stat. 1698-1700.
PO Heo ee eS PL ek »
7
ficant risk of harm” to the public health. Accordingly,
he promulgated regulations that reduce, in step-wise
fashion, the lead content of leaded gasoline. We must
decide whether the Administrator properly interpreted
the meaning of Section 211(c) (1) (A) and the scope of
his power thereunder, and, if so, whether the evidence
adduced at the rule-making proceeding supports his final
determination. Finding in favor of the Administrator
on both grounds, and on all other grounds raised by
petitioners, we affirm his determination.
* The new regulations, together with regulations requiring
all gasoline refiners to market at least one line of lead-
free gasoline, are set out in 40 C.F.R. § 80 (1975). The lead-
free regulations serve a different purpose than the low-lead
regulations now before us. Leaded gasoline fouls the cata-
lytic converter emission control system developed by the major
automobile companies to meet the air pollutant emission
standards set by Congress in § 202 of the Clean Air
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1. So as to allow implementation of
the catalytic converter, the Administrator ordered the market-
ing of lead-free gasoline pursuant to his authority under
§ 211(c) (1) (B), the sister section to § 211(c) (1) (A) at
issue here. Section 211(c) (1) (B) gives EPA authority to
regulate gasoline additives whose emission products “will
impair to a significant degree the performance of any emis-
sion control device or system which is in general use * * *.”
42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c) (1) (B). The lead-free regulations
were approved by this court in Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 163
U.S.App.D.C. 162, 501 F.2d 722 (1974).
On March 5, 1975, the Administrator suspended the 1977
statutory standards for automobile emissions of hydrocarbons
and carbon monoxide, establishing interim standards for that
model year equal to those now in effect. 40 Fep. REG. 11900.
This action was taken to slow the emission reduction sched-
ule and thereby minimize a potential health hazard posed by
the gradual increase in sulfuric acid emissions produced by the
catalytic converter. So far as this decision is relevant to
this case, it bears noting that the lead-free gasoline regu-
lations will continue in effect and automobiles will continue
to be equipped with catalytic converters for the foreseeable
future. See note 68 infra.
teh fen td
© eRe ate aN et del
oe
I. THE FACTS, THE STATUTE, THE PROCEEDINGS
AND THE REGULATIONS
Hard on the introduction of the first gasoline-powered
automobiles came the discovery that lead “antiknock”
compounds, when added to gasoline, dramatically increase
the fuel’s octane rating. Increased octane allows for
higher compression engines, which operate with greater
efficiency. Since 1923 antiknocks have been regularly
added to gasoline, and a large industry has developed to
supply those compounds. Today, approximately 90 percent
of motor gasoline manufactured in the United States cor
tains lead additives, even though most 1975 and 1976
model automobiles are equipped with catalytic conver-
ters, which require lead-free gasoline. From the be-
ginning, however, scientists have questioned whether the
addition of lead to gasoline, and its consequent diffusion
into the atmosphere from the automobile emission, poses
a danger to the public health. As use of automobiles,
* The principal studies and symposia over the years on the
subject have included Sayers et al., “Experimental Studies
on the Effect of Ethyl Gasoline and Its Combustion Prod-
ucts,” Bureau of Mines, 1927; HEW, “Public Health Aspects
of Increasing Tetraethy! Lead Content in Motor Fuel,” Pub-
lic Health Service Pub. No. 712, 1959; Kehoe, “The Metabo-
lism of Lead in Man in Health and Disease,” The Harben
Lectures, 1960, JA 500-579; HEW, “Survey of Lead in the
Atmosphere of Three Urban Communities,” JA 789-839;
HEW, “Symposium on Environmental Lead Contamination,”
Public Health Service Pub. No. 1440, 1966, JA 975-984;
Tepper & Levin, “A Survey of Air and Population Lead
Levels in Selected American Communities,” 1972, JA 840-
916; National Academy of Sciences, “Airborne Lead in Per-
spective,” 1972, JA 309-362; EPA and Commission of
European Communities, Proceedings of International Sym-
posium, “Environmental Health Aspects of Lead,” Luxem-
bourg, 1973, JA 676-677; EPA and National Institute of
Environmental Health Services, Conference on “Low-Level
Lead Toxicity,” Raleigh, N.C., 1973.
BLEED THRO
7
a
9
and emission of lead particulates, has accelerated in the
last quarter century, this concern has mounted. The rea-
sons for concern are obvious (and essentially undisputed
by petitioners): (1) lead in high concentrations in the
body is toxic; (2) lead can be absorbed into the body
from the ambient air; and (3) lead particulate emis-
sions from gasoline engines account for approximately
90 percent of the lead in our air. Despite these apparent
reasons for concern, hard proof of any danger caused
by lead automotive emissions has been hard to come by.
Part of the reason for this lies in the multiple sources
of human exposure to lead.
Lead is an ubiquitous element. It is found in the land,
in the sea, in plants, in animals, and, ultimately, in
humans. Traces of lead ranging from 10 to 40 micro-
grams per 100 grams of blood (10-40 ug/100g)* are
found in everyone, including those living in environments
with almost no atmospheric lead. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES COMMITTEE ON BIOLOGIC EFFECTS OF ATMOS-
PHERIC POLLUTANTS, AIRBORNE LEAD IN PERSPECTIVE 118
(1972) (hereinafter NAS Report). Despite its uni-
versal presence, however, lead serves no known purpose
in the human body, and at higher concentrations is
toxic, causing anemia, severe intestinal cramps, paral-
ysis of nerves, fatigue, and even death. Clinical symp-
toms of lead poisoning appear at blood lead levels of
80-100 ug or higher, and symptomatic lead poisoning
may appear at levels of 50-60 ug, particularly in the
* Some of the data discussed herein speak of micrograms of
lead per 100 grams of blood, while other data report micro-
grams per 100 milliliters of blood. Since the density of blood
is close to 1.0, these figures are directly comparable. There-
fore, lead concentrations, unless otherwise indicated, will
hereafter simply be given in micrograms. See NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES COMMITTEE ON BIOLOGIC EFFECTS OF
ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTANTS, AIRBORNE LEAD IN PERSPECTIVE
61 n. * (1972) (hereinafter NAS Report).
POOR COPY
a
i Rel) le lee eed
OOOO EOE EO Eel
10
presence of anemia. EPA’s PosITION ON THE HEALTH
IMPLICATIONS OF AIRBORNE LEAD (hereinafter Third
Health Document) at III-1, Joint Appendix (hereinafter
JA) 54-55.
Human body lead comes from three major sources. In
most people, the largest source is the diet. EPA esti-
mates daily dietary lead intake for adults to average
200-300 ug per day, with a range of 100-500 ug a day.
Third Health Document at V-2, JA 82. Absorption of
dietary lead into the bloodstream is estimated at about
10 percent, although in children absorption may be as
high as 50 percent. Thus the average adult adds 20-30
ug of lead to his bloodstream daily from his diet alone.
This daily intake, which may be highly variable depend-
ing on individual diets, NAS Report at 50, is generally
regarded as, for all practical purposes, uncontrollable.’
A second major source of the body’s lead burden, at
least among urban children, is regarded as controllable,
although effective control may be both difficult and ex-
pensive to achieve. Ingestion of lead paint by children
with pica (the abnormal ingestion of non-food substances,
a relatively common trait in pre-school children, particu-
larly ages 1-3) is generally regarded as “the principal
environmental source in cases of severe acute lead poi-
soning in young children.” NAS Report at 140. Lead-
based paint was widely used in pre-1940 housing, for
both interiors and exteriors, so children living in older
housing, particularly in urban ghettos where such paint
is both present and peeling, are most susceptible to this
form of lead poisoning. Limited control has been
achieved in that lead paints are now rarely used, and
* Lead in food and water ultimately can be traced to lead in
soil and this, of course, is uncontrollable. The NAS Report
concluded that “[t]here is no evidence that the amount of
lead in the diets of people has changed substantially since
: 1940.” NAS Report at 206.
SOT eg ET ee SER TEs |
BLEED THRO!
11
are frequently banned by statute, for interior surfaces.
But while some local laws require removal of existing
peeling lead paints, and there is federal legislation to
aid states and municipalities in such efforts, Lead-Based
Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4801 et
seq., (1970), there is no concentrated national effort at
removal, and the danger to children living in dilapidated
housing will remain for some time.‘
The last remaining major source of lead exposure for
humans is the ambient air. This source is easily the most
controllable, since approximately 90 percent of lead in
the air comes from automobile emissions,’ and can be
simply eliminated by removing lead from gasoline.* While
the extent to which such lead actually enters the body
is vigorously contested by petitioners and lies at the heart
of this appeal. all parties agree that, to some extent at
least, airborne lead can be absorbed through the lungs
as a person breathes lead-contaminated air and that it
can be eaten by children with pica after larger lead
particles fall to the ground and mix with dust. Once
the lead is in the body, however. its source becomes irre-
levant; all lead in the bloodstream, from whatever source,
is essentially fungible. Thus so long as there are multi-
* A list of local laws regarding control and/or removal of
lead-based paints can be found in NAS Report at 77.
* This is EPA’s figure, Third Health Document at II-4, JA
37, and Ethyl Corporation (hereinafter Ethyl), alone among
the petitioners, contests it. Supplemental brief of petitioner
Ethyl Corporation (hereinafter Ethyl Supp. Br.) at 40. We
cannot say that EPA’s estimate is unreasonable. It was de-
termined by discounting the NAS Panel’s conclusion that
“about 98° of the airborne lead that can be traced to its
source comes from combustion of gasoline.” NAS Report at
31. See also id. at 12-13.
* An alternative approach, considered and rejected by EPA,
is to trap and remove lead emissions from the exhausts of
automobiles using leaded gasoline. See note 66 infra.
eNO aE TE PE
ade Os
12
ple sources of lead exposure it is virtually impossible to
isolate one source and determine its particular effect on
the body. The effect of any one source is meaningful
only in cumulative terms.
The multiple sources of human exposure to lead explain
in part why it has been difficult to pinpoint automobile
lead emissions as a danger to public health. Obviously,
any danger is caused only by the additive effect of lead
emissions on the other, largely uncontrollable, sources
of lead. For years the lead antiknock industry has re-
fused to accept the developing evidence that lead emis-
sions contribute significantly to the total human lead
body burden. In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,
Pub. L. 91-604, December 31, 1970, 84 Stat. 1698-1700,
however, Congress finally set up a legal mechanism by
which that evidence could be weighed in a more objective
tribunal. It gave the newly-created EPA authority to
control or prohibit the sale or manufacture of any fuel
additive whose emission products “will endanger the pub-
lic health or welfare * * *.” 42 U.S.C. $ 1857f-6e(c) (1)
(A) (1970). It is beyond question that the fuel additive
Congress had in mind was lead.”
Given this mandate, EPA published on January 31,
1971 advance notice of proposed rule-making. The Ad-
ministrator announced he was considering possible con-
trols on lead additives in gasolines, both because of their
possible danger to health and because of their incom-
patibility with the newly-developed catalytic converter
emission contro] system.” 36 FED. REG. 1486 (1971).
* See, e.g., 116 CoNG. Rec. 19207 (1970) (remarks of Rep.
Skubitz) (“the Government can require that the oil com-
panies get the lead out”); id. at 19228-19230 (colloquy be-
tween Reps. Waggoner & Staggers): id. at 19234 (remarks
of Rep. Williams); id. at 19239 (remarks of Rep. Sebelius).
*° Regulations promulgated for the latter reason were ap-
proved in Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, supra note 2. See note 2
supra.
ee race ng EES ALO aa 4
PAGED LE NE LET IO LOOM EL DLE EE A NIE
BLEED THRO!
13
Proposed regulations were issued a year later, Febru-
ary 23, 1972, supported by a document Health Hazards
of Lead" ‘hereinafter First Health Document), pre-
pared by the EPA scientific staff. Comments were in-
vited for a 90-day period, later reopened for an additional
30 days. 37 Fep. Rec. 11786-11787 (1972). At the
same time public hearings were held in Washington,
D. C., Dallas, and Los Angeles.
On January 10, 1973 the Administrator, while issuing
final regulations requiring availability of some lead-free
gasoline to allow implementation of the catalytic con-
verter system, 38 FED. REG. 1254; approved in Amoco
Oil Co. v. EPA, 163 U.S.App.D.C. 162, 501 F.2d 722
(1974), reproposed the health-based regulations now at
issue. 38 FED. REG. 1258. The reproposal was supported
by a second health document, EPA’s Position on the
Health Effects of Airborne Lead (hereinafter Second
Health Document), JA 158, and was necessitated by a
modification of EPA’s analysis of the health effects of
lead emissions. The Agency concluded, after considering
the comments received, that it was virtually impossible
to identify the precise amount of airborne lead that will
endanger public health. Instead, the control strategy
would concentrate on evaluating the cumulative effect of
airborne lead on total human lead exposure and the sig-
nificance of that contribution. 38 FED. REG. 1258. The
reproposed regulations themselves were similar to the
original proposal, requiring a phased cutback to 1.25
grams of lead per gallon of leaded gasoline, but, in
recognition of the industry’s lead-time problems, pushing
the timetable for reduction back one year. The Agency
again invited public comment, this time for a 60-day
period.
"JA 292. This document was subsequently revised by
HEALTH HAZARDS OF LEAD (rev. April 11, 1972), JA 254;
ATMOSPHERIC LEAD AND PUBLIC HEALTH, (April 11, 1972),
JA 276; and CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS TO HEALTH HAZARDS
or LEAD (April 27, 1972), JA 272.
POOR COPY
14
On October 28, 1973, as a result of a motion filed in
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, D.C.
Cir. No. 72-2233, this court ordered EPA to reach within
30 days a final decision on whether lead additives should
be regulated for health reasons. EPA published its final
health document, entitled EPA’s Position on the Health
Implications of Airborne Lead, on November 28, 1973.
JA 27. This document, the Third Health Document, ex-
tensively details and reviews the state of knowledge of
the health effects of airborne lead. It candidly discusses
the various scientific studies, both pro and con, underly-
ing this information, and ultimately concludes that lead
from automobile emissions will endanger the public health.
The same day, based largely on the conclusions of the
Third Health Document, EPA promulgated its final
regulations, accompanied by a thorough discussion of its
health conclusions, the impact of the regulations, and
the alternative courses of action considered and re-
jected. 38 Fep. REG. 33734. The final regulations re-
; quire the same step-wise reduction of lead additives but,
in response to the comments of a majority of refiners,
calculate the reduction in a slightly different manner.
Whereas the original and reproposed regulations set
standards for permissible lead use by each refiner on
the basis of grams of lead per gallon of leaded gasoline
produced (leaded pool averaging), the final regulations
base the standards on grams of lead per gallon of all
gasoline produced (total pool averaging). The quantity of
lead emitted into the atmosphere is the same under both
systems; EPA simply converted its leaded pool figures
into total pool figures. Under the final regulations, lead
in all gasoline would be reduced over a five-year period
to an average of 0.5 grams per gallon.”
—
wiht hatte ae
** The reduction would proceed in the following steps:
1.7 g/gal. after Jan. 1, 1975
1.4 g/gal. after Jan. 1, 1976
; [continued]
Po LOLOL OLLI AA OI
RBRLEED THR
LIGH
15
Petitioners, various manufacturers of lead additives
and refiners of gasoline, appealed the promulgation of
low-lead regulations to this court under Section 307 of
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5. The appeal was
heard by a division of the court on September 9, 1974.
On December 20, 1974, the division, one judge dissent-
ing, ordered the regulations set aside. The majority and
dissenting opinions were published on January 28, 1975.’*
Because of the importance of the issues presented, we
granted EPA’s petition for rehearing en banc on March
17, 1975, vacating the judgment and opinions of the
division and setting the case for reargument on May 30,
1975. All parties were invited to submit supplementary
briefs addressing the issues raised by the division
opinions.
The regulations are challenged by petitioners on a vari-
ety of grounds, all of which will be addressed below.
Their primary claims, and the ones on which the division
1.0 g/gal. after Jan. 1, 1977
0.8 g/gal. after Jan. 1, 1978
0.5 g/gal. after Jan. 1, 1979
40 C.F.R. § 80.20 (1975). According to EPA calculations,
when the overall lead content of both leaded and unleaded
gasoline averages 0.5 grams per gallon, leaded gasoline would
contain an average of 1.25 grams of lead per gallon, the same
as under the original regulations. See 38 FED. REG. at 33739
(1973).
3 Commentators have been uniformly critical of the ma-
jority opinion. See Gardner, Federal Courts and Agencies:
An Audit of the Partnership Books, 75 CoLuM. L. REv. 800,
801 & n.77 (1975); Note, Judicial Review of the Facts in In-
formal Rulemaking: A Proposed Standard, 84 YALE L.J. 1750,
1767-68 & nn. 81-82 (1975); Note, Reserve Mining—The
Standard of Proof Required to Enjoin an Environmental
Hazard to the Public Health, 58 MINN. L. REv. 893, 918-19
n.116 (1975). See also Reserve Mining Co. Vv. EPA, 514 F.2d
492, 519-520 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
POOR COPY
16
majority based its reversal, are that the Administrator
misinterpreted the statutory standard of “will endanger”
and that his application of that standard is without
Support in the evidence and arbitrary and capricious.
@
II. THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Under Section 211(c) (1) (A) the Administrator may,
on the basis of all the information available to him,
promulgate regulations that
control or prohibit the manufacture, introduction
into commerce, offering for sale, or sale of any fuel
or fuel additive for use in a motor vehicle or motor
vehicle engine (A) if any emission products of such
fuel or fuel additive will endanger the public health
or welfare * * *.
42 U.S.C. § 1857-6e(a) (1) (A). The Administrator can-
not act under Section 211(c)(1)(A), however, until
after “consideration of all relevant medical and scientific
evidence available to him, including consideration of
other technologically or economically feasible means of
achieving emission standards under [Section 202].” Sec-
tion 211(c) (2) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6e(c) (2) (A). See-
tion 202 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1, allows the Ad-
ministrator to set standards for emission of pollutants
from automobiles (as opposed to standards for the com-
position of the gasoline that produces the emissions), and
is thus the preferred—although not the mandatory—
alternative under the statutory scheme, presumably be-
cause it minimizes Agency interference with manufac-
turer prerogatives."
1% When EPA acts under § 211(c) (1) (A) it is essentially
telling manufacturers how to make their fuels, a task Con-
gress felt the Agency should enter upon only with trepidation.
See, e.g., 116 Conc. REc. 32920 (1970) (remarks of Sen.
Baker) ; id. at 19229 (remarks of Reps. Rogers & Waggoner).
[continued]
5h OE LIEBE GENEL NED LEE IES AISLE EPAS SEE LN ELSIE CGS INE
ENE
BLEED TI
? OUGH
Ee RTE VRE Sa REET tL SS NT my SE RT SRT EAA ES EET DA OE TOP AE
17
The Administrator is also required, before prohibiting
a fuel or fuel additive under Section 211(c) (1) (A), to
find, and publish the finding, that in his judgment any
fuel or fuel additive likely to replace the prohibited one
will not “endanger the public health or welfare to the
same or greater degree * * *.” Section 211(c) (2) (C), 42
U.S.C. § 1857f-6e(c) (2) (C). It is significant that this
is the only conclusion the Administrator is expressly re-
quired to “find” before regulating a fuel or fuel additive
for health reasons.
A. The Threshold Determination
In making his threshold determination that lead par-
ticulate emissions from motor vehicles “will endanger the
public health or welfare,” the Administrator provided
his interpretation of the statutory language by couch-
ing his conclusion in these words: such emissions “pre-
sent a significant risk of harm to the health of urban
populations, particularly to the health of city children.”
38 Fep. REG. 33734. By way of further interpretation,
he added that it was his view
On the other hand, when the Agency acts under § 202, it is
only mandating an end product—regulated emissions. The
method for achieving the required result is entirely in the
hands of the manufacturers.
Nonetheless, deference to regulation under § 202 is not
mandatory. The Administrator is only required to “consider”
the possibility of regulating under that section instead of un-
der § 211. This language is in sharp contrast to the version
of § 211 that was passed by the House. The House version
would have allowed regulation under § 211 only after the Ad-
ministrator made a specific finding “that it is not otherwise
technologically or economically feasible to achieve the emission
standards established pursuant to section 202 of this Act.”
H.R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 210(g) (1) (1970). This
mandatory deference to § 202 regulation was removed in con-
ference and the present more flexible language was substi-
tuted. See pages 40-43 infra.
POOR COPY
18
that the statutory language * * * does not require
a determination that automobile emissions alone cre-
ate the endangerment on which controls may be
based. Rather, the Administrator believes that in
providing this authority, the Congress was aware
that the public’s exposure to harmful substances re-
sults from a number of sources which may have
varying degrees of susceptibility to control.
Id. It is petitioners’ first claim of error that the Admin-
istrator has erroneously interpreted Section 211(c) (1)
(A) by not sufficiently appreciating the rigor demanded
by Congress in establishing the “will endanger” stand-
ard. Therefore, petitioners argue, the Administrator’s
action is “short of statutory right,” in violation of Sec-
tion 10(e)(2)(C) of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1970).
Petitioners argue that the “will endanger” standard
requires a high quantum of factual proof, proof of ac-
tual harm rather than of a “significant risk of harm.”
See Supplemental brief of petitioner Ethyl Corporation
(hereinafter Ethyl Supp. Br.) at 20. Since, according to
petitioners, regulation under Section 211(¢) (1) (A) must
be premised upon factual proof of actual harm, the Ad-
ministrator has, in their view, no power to assess risks
or make policy judgments in deciding to regulate lead
additives. Moreover, petitioners argue, regulation must
be based on the danger presented by lead additives “in
and of themselves,” so it is improper to consider, as the
Administrator did, the cumulative impact of lead addi-
tives on all other sources of human exposure to lead.
We have considered these arguments with care and find
them to be without merit.’ It is our view that the
t
** At oral argument, petitioners claimed the regulations
were void because the Administrator had failed to couch his
ultimate finding in the language of the statute itself. See also
Supplemental brief of petitioner National Petroleum Refiners
RI EFEnD '
YR OLICH
19
Administrator’s interpretation of the standard is the cor-
rect one.”
1. The Precautionary Nature of “Will Endanger.”
Simply as a matter of plain meaning, we have difficulty
crediting petitioners’ reading of the “will endanger”
Association (hereinafter NPRA Supp. Br.) at 5. The short
answer to the argument is that petitioners’ view of the facts
is erroneous. While interpreting the “will endanger” standard
to mean “presents a significant risk of harm,” 33 FED. REG.
33734, the Administrator ultimately did make his finding in
the language of the statute:
These regulations are based upon a determination by the
Administrator that the emission product of a fuel or
additive will endanger the public health * * *,
Id. at 33741. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.1 (1974).
In any case, however, the issue is spurious. It is well estab-
lished that ultimate findings do not have to be expressed at
all, let alone be expressed in the language of the statute.
Rather, absent compelling countervailing considerations, an
ultimate finding will be implied from the action taken. Pa-
cific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186
(1935) ; Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 32-33 (1827)
(Story, J.). Cf. Joseph v. FCC, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 207, 211-
212, 404 F.2d 207, 211-212 (1968). The law is fully developed
in 2 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.07 at 455-
59 (1958).
** We note that even if we did not agree fully with the
Administrator’s interpretation of the Act, we would be obliged
to accord it considerable deference. As the Supreme Court
recently held in approving, despite the contrary views of
several circuits, the Administrator’s reading of another sec-
tion of the Clean Air Act:
Without going so far as to hold that the Agency’s con-
struction of the Act was the only one it permissibly
could have adopted, we conclude that it was at the very
least sufficiently reasonable that it should have been
accepted by the reviewing courts.
Train V. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S.
60, 75 (1975). See also id. at 87.
DOHHOR COHORDY
Soy
"RESO oN
~ ons
20
standard. The meaning of “endanger” is not disputed.
Case law and dictionary definition agree that endanger
means something less than actual harm.'’ When one is
endangered, harm is threatened; no actual injury need
ever occur. Thus, for example, a town may be “endan-
gered” by a threatening plague or hurricane and yet
emerge from the danger completely unscathed.'* A stat-
It is linguistically clear, of course, that one can be “en-
dangered” without actually being harmed. Nonetheless, some
risk of harm is necessary. State v. Fine, 324 Mo. 194, 23
S.W.2d 7, 9 (1929). Webster defines “endanger” as “to bring
into danger or peril of probable harm or loss.’”’ WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 748 (1961) (empha-
sis added).
Not all courts have agreed that “probability” of harm is the
proper determinant of danger. Where grounds for divorce
are few, for instance, courts have interpreted laws allowing
divorce because of inhuman treatment that “endangers the
life” to require only the slightest possibility of actual loss of
life. Thus action that endangers health has been held to
endanger life on the theory that the former cannot be en-
dangered without threatening the latter. See Cole v. Cole, 23
Iowa 433, 488 (1867); Beebe v. Beebe, 10 Iowa 133, 139
(1859). In one of the latest of these cases, mistreatment
that deprived a spouse of needed rest and peace of mind was
held to “endanger” life. Smith v. Smith, 258 Iowa 557, ,
138 N.W.2d 453, 456 (1966). We need not decide here how
remote the possibility of actual harm could be under the
“will endanger” standard since we accept the Administrator’s
determination in this case that a “significant” risk to health
falls within the statutory language. See pages 31-36 infra.
8 Petitioner Ethyl suggests that while these may indeed be
examples of endangerment they differ from the threat from
automotive lead emissions in that
plagues do cause death and illness; violent storms do
cause damage—known facts that may be experienced by
the threatened community.
Ethyl Supp. Br. at 11 (footnote omitted). We may prelimi-
narily observe that the absorption of lead does cause lead
poisoning, a known fact that may be evaluated by the public
21
ute allowing for regulation in the face of danger is, nec-
essarily, a precautionary statute. Regulatory action may
be taken before the threatened harm occurs; indeed, the
very existence of such precautionary legislation would
seem to demand that regulatory action precede, and,
optimally, prevent, the perceived threat. As should be
apparent, the “will endanger” language of Section 211
(c) (1) (A) makes it such a precautionary statute.
The Administrator read it as such, interpreting “will
endanger” to mean “presents a significant risk of harm.”
38 FED. REG. 33734. We agree with the Administrator’s
interpretation. This conclusion is reached not only by
reference to the plain meaning of the statute, but by
juxtaposition of Section 211(¢c)(1)(A) with other sec-
tions of the Clean Air Act and by analysis of pertinent
precedent.”
and the EPA. However, in so far as Ethyl is complaining
that the mechanism by which plagues and storms cause
damage is well known while the question of the relation be-
tween lead automobile emissions and the absorption of lead
is less certain, Ethyl’s observation only supports the reading
of § 211(c) (1) (A) as a precautionary statute. The massive
diffusion of airborne lead is a gross environmental modi-
fication never before experienced. Of course, there are no
past disasters of the kind anticipated by the Administrator
on which the community’s experience may be based. This,
however, is inherent in such a threat and does not imply that
no danger is posed by it. We believe the precautionary lan-
guage of the Act indicates quite plainly Congress’ intent that
regulation should precede any threatened, albeit unprecedent-
ed, disaster. Ethyl is correct that we have not had the oppor-
tunity to learn from the consequences of an environmental
overdose of lead emissions; Congress, however, sought to
spare us that communal experience by enacting § 211(c)
(1) (A).
1° Since Congress seemed to assume that the meaning of
the threshold determination required by § 211(c) (1) (A)
would be self-evident, there is a complete absence of
22
Petitioners support their view of the rigorous nature
of the “will endanger” standard by relying on two other
sections of the Clean Air Act that also allow for regula-
tion of air pollutants for health reasons. Ethyl Supp.
Br. at 18-23; supplemental brief of petitioner Nalco
Chemical Company (hereinafter Nalco Supp. Br.) at
20-25; NPRA Supp. Br. at 31-46. However, we find in the
same sections relied upon by petitioners firm support for
our view of the precautionary nature of Section 211 (c)
(1) (A). The provisions identified by petitioners are Sec-
é tions 108 and 202 of the Act. Section 108 directs the Ad-
; ministrator to list, for the purpose of establishing national
primary and secondary ambient air quality standards
pursuant to Section 109, each air pollutant “which in
his judgment has an adverse effect on public health or
welfare * * *.” Section 108(c) (1) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 1857
ce-3(a) (1) (A). Section 202 authorizes the Administrator
to set standards for each automobile emission “which
in his judgment causes or contributes to, or is likely to
cause or contribute to, air pollution which endangers
i the public health or welfare.” Section 202(a) (1), 42
; U.S.C. § 1857f-1(a) (1).
Petitioners suggest that the threshold decision to reg-
ulate under both Section 108 and Section 202 can be
based on less evidence than required under Section 211
and that, therefore, the proof necessary for action under
Section 211 must be particularly firm. Petitioners mis-
read both sections. Section 108 requires an actual “ad-
verse effect” on health before an air pollutant may be
listed for regulation; actual harm must result. This
er ee ee ee
helpful legislative history. What little there is of relevance
is discussed at pages 38-43 infra. See also note 89 infra.
*° Should there be any doubt about this conclusion, it is
quickly resolved by reference to § 109. There Congress
AOL REI ALIN SG ie EL EF IEICE A TOE MIG IES INET ED A
BLEED THROL
23
firm threshold finding is reasonable in light of the con-
siderable disruption caused by action under Sections 108-
110. After a pollutant is listed under Section 108, the
Administrator must issue national ambient air quality
standards under Section 109 within a year. Promulga-
tion of standards begins the implementation plan process
of Section 110 under which the states must control, on
a mandatory timetable, the listed pollutants to the ex-
tent necessary to achieve the federal standards. Sec-
tion 110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5. Sections 108-110 are
“technology forcing” provisions; the attainment of the
primary, health-based standards takes precedence over
the cost and present technological feasibility of achieving
the requisite control. Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 515
F.2d 206, 215-16 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, —— USS.
——, 44 U.S. L. WEEK 3200 (Oct. 6, 1975). Cf. Train
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 90-
91 (1975). See also S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-3 (1970).
Thus, before ordering this extensive chain of action
to begin, Congress demanded a threshold determination
that the pollutant causes actual harm.*' In:this sense
made it quite clear how it would refer to anything other than
actual harm. Section 109(b) (2) provides that national second-
ary ambient air quality standards for pollutants listed under
§ 108 be prescribed with a margin of safety; they should
be sufficient to protect against “any known or anticipated
adverse effects associated with the presence of such air
pollutant in the ambient air.” 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b) (2)
(emphasis added). When Congress uses the phrase in § 108
without the modifier “known or anticipated” it plainly
embraces only the usual meaning of adverse effects, i.e., known
adverse effects or actual harm.
** The Administrator appears to have a measure of discre-
tion in determining whether to list a pollutant under § 108,
which, by its terms, speaks of the exercise of his “judg-
ment.” See 38 FED. REG. 33740 (1973). Amicus Natural Re-
sources Defense Council (NRDC) has argued that listing of
24
Section 108 is not a precautionary statute at all, and so
differs sharply from Section 211. However, the effects
of such after-the-fact regulation are somewhat amelio-
rated by the Act; Congress did provide a precautionary
element in standard-setting under Sections 108-110. Sec-
tion 109 expressly requires that the ambient air stand-
ards ultimately issued provide for “an adequate margin
of safety.” 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b) (1). Thus, while the
threshold decision to regulate under Sections 108-110
is not precautionary but rather requires proof of demon-
strable harm caused by the suspect pollutant, once the
decision is made the standards promulgated must be
: preventive in nature. Congress’ choice of this scheme
is in direct contrast to the procedures it established
under Section 211. Under that section the decision to
regulate is based on perceived danger. Unless we are
to assume Congress chose its language carelessly, regula-
tion in the face of “danger” rather than in the face of
“adverse effects” must mean that the threshold decision
to regulate under Section 211 is precautionary.** The
contrast between the standards of Sections 108-110 and
of Section 211 supports our view of the precautionary
nature of the “will endanger” standard.”
Soe tall
j air pollutants under § 108 is mandatory. Its petition for
4 review of these regulations raising that issue was dis-
7 missed by the division for want of jurisdiction, Natural Re-
: sources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, No. 74-1023 (D.C. Cir.
September 11, 1974), and NRDC has since brought a success-
ful citizen’s suit under § 304 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2, to
compel issuance of national ambient air standards for lead.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Vv. Train, No. 74-
Civ-4617 (S.D.N.Y. decided March 1, 1976).
22 Thus we must reject amicus NRDC’s suggestion that the
standards for action under §§ 108 and 211 are the same.
*8 Petitioners’ arguments that the threshold determination
under the “adverse effect” standard is less rigorous than un-
der the “will endanger” standard are either spurious or mis-
SEES T LOT EELS OIE ETE
BLEED THRO
GH
25
Petitioners also rely on Section 202 to support their
strict reading of Section 211. Ethyl suggests that Section
202 is more lenient than Section 211 in that it allows
regulation of “likely” dangers. Ethyl Supp. Br. at 18-19.
See also Naleo Supp. Br. at 20-21; NPRA Supp. Br.
directed. Naleo Chemical Company (Nalco) and Ethyl] argue
that the presence of the phrase “in his judgment” in § 108,
and its absence in § 211, means the Administrator has greater
discretionary power under the former section. Ethyl Supp. Br.
at 21; Naleo Supp. Br. at 22. As we shall explain below, see
note 37 infra, the Administrator retains the same (if not
greater, see note 21 supra) discretionary power under § 211.
Nalco points to the “margin of safety” language of § 109
as proof of a “lower standard” under § 108, Nalco Supp. Br.
at 22, without recognizing that the margin of safety refers
only to the implementing requirement of formulating stand-
ards and not to the threshold decision to regulate. NPRA
likewise confuses this point by suggesting that the listing re-
quirement of §108 is like the reporting requirements of
§ 211(a), so that the “margin of safety” language is com-
parable to § 211(c) (1) (A), only more generous. NPRA Supp.
Br. at 42-43. This ignores the fact that once a pollutant is
listed under § 108 the decision to regulate is made; standards
under § 109 must follow. On the other hand, additives re-
ported under § 211(a) are not necessarily regulated; regula-
tions are premised only on a § 211(c) (1) (A) finding of en-
dangerment. Thus, as suggested in the text, the threshold
determination under § 108 is properly compared to the
threshold determination under § 211(c) (1) (A).
Ethyl argues that an “adverse effect’? does not have as
severe a connotation as “endangerment.” Ethyl] Supp. Br. at
19 n.27. Even if true, however, this argument has nothing
to do with whether the threshold determination to regulate
is, or is not, precautionary. Even if § 108 allowed regu-
lation of less severe effects than does § 211, regulations
could still be premised only on a finding of an actual effect,
while § 211 regulations could still be premised on a pre-
cautionary finding of threatened, albeit more severe, harm.
POOR COPY
26
; at 31-36. Section 202 provides that the Administrator
may regulate
the emission of any air pollutant [from any new
motor vehicle] which in his judgment causes or con-
tributes to, or is likely to cause or contribute to,
: air pollution which endangers the public health or
F welfare.
42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1(a)(1) (emphasis added). While
this language may be unnecessarily opaque, we think a
fair reading disproves petitioners’ suggestion. The itali-
cized language upon which petitioners rely refers not
to the causal relationship between air pollution and
health, but to the relationship between automobile emis-
sions and air pollution. Thus regulation may not be
premised on a threshold determination of likely danger;
rather regulation must be premised on a determination
of danger, a finding that “air pollution which endangers
the public health” is the end product of the emission to
. be regulated. This is essentially the same finding of
; endangerment as under Section 211. “Likely” enters
: the equation only in determining whether the emitted
air pollutant, which would be regulated, contributes to
y the air pollution which is found dangerous. Here the
j statute allows for a somewhat attenuated chain of causa-
tion. Regulation may be premised on a determination
that an air pollutant emitted from a new automobile is
likely to contribute to air pollution which endangers the
public health. In establishing this chain of causation
Bre othe bi atti ¢
ON NOR EE 66 ee
kh ae rca the BIA ES
*In essence, petitioners are suggesting § 202 is more
properly read to provide for regulation of any automotive
emission
which in his judgment causes or contributes to, or is
7 likely to cause or contribute to, air pollution which causes
3 or contributes to, or is likely to cause or contribute to,
the endangerment of the public health or welfare.
Quite obviously, this is not what Congress said.
Pentrenicns.. r
3
3
3
s
BLEED THR
UGH
27
Section 202 is more lenient than Section 211,”° but in
making the threshold determination of danger both sec-
tions are the same:* air pollution must endanger the
public health before regulation is justified.”
** Section 211 simply skips this chain of causation and re-
quires instead that the emission products of the fuel additive
to be regulated endanger the public health. This omission of
a step does not support petitioners’ “in and of itself” theory,
see pages 56-61 infra, but rather is responsive to the different
intendments of §§ 101 and 211. See note 27 infra. In any
case, it is plain that for regulation under § 211 the emission
products must directly (although not necessarily by them-
selves) endanger the public health; whether they contribute
to air pollution that in turn endangers the public health, as
required by § 202, is irrelevant. Since the Administrator
found that lead emissions directly endanger the public health,
whatever leniency § 202 provides is irrelevant to this case.
Nalco takes issue with the dismissal of this question and
asks sarcastically, “If causation is irrelevant to the regula-
tion of fuel additives, why is EPA concerned about meeting
any standard at all in these regulations.” Nalco Supp. Br.
at 20-21. Nalco is confusing two separate causation issues.
There is undoubtedly a causation issue about whether lead
emissions cause a danger to public health. On the other hand,
however, there is no causation issue about whether lead
emissions contribute to lead air pollution. There is no such
issue, first, because § 211, unlike § 202, does not demand such
a finding and, second, because in any case petitioners could
not, and do not, contest the validity of that assertion. It is
only this issue of causation, to which the “likely” language
of § 202 relates, that EPA argues, and we agree, is irrelevant
to this case. See EPA Supp. Br. at 17-18.
*°Thus while Congress preferred emission regulation un-
der § 202 to fuel content regulation under § 211, see note 14
supra, there is no reason to assume, as NPRA argues, NPRA
Supp. Br. at 31-35, that in situations where § 211 regulation
is proper, the Administrator must find greater potential harm
before acting. Cf. note 23 supra.
**NPRA recognizes that a literal reading of § 202 pro-
duces the result suggested above. Thus it argues that this
POOR COPY
28
Thus the two sections of the Clean Air Act presented
by petitioners in support of their stringent reading of
the threshold requirement for action under Section 211
turn out, upon analysis, to be of no support at all. Sec-
tion 108 only bolsters our reading of Section 211 as a
precautionary statute while Section 202 includes the
same standard as Section 211 and thus is of no guidance
one way or the other. While petitioners have little more
to offer to prove that the “will endanger” standard
demands proof of actual harm and is not precautionary
in nature, we may turn, in support of our interpretation,
to the relevant case law. While cases interpreting the
4 At a RCNA lc
ae RNB iL wry 4
result is “meaningless, or at best tautological,” NPRA Supp.
Br. at 32, so that its “likely” danger theory emerges as an
acceptable, although linguistically incorrect, alternative. Id.
at 33. NPRA argues that the above reading would require
the Administrator to determine whether “the emission
of any air pollutant .. . is likely to cause or to contribute
to, air pollution ....”
Id. at 32 (emphasis in original). Since under this reading,
NPRA argues, the Administrator would always reach a posi-
tive conclusion, this reading must be incorrect. We agree that
this reading is of little value, but we do not think it is the
proper result of our analysis above. Rather, we think that
to regulate under § 202 the Administrator must find that
emission of the air pollutant is likely to cause or contribute
to dangerous air pollution. This addition is important,
for not all air pollutants contribute to dangerous air pollution
: and, more importantly, not all dangerous air pollution is
; oat caused by air pollutants that are, themselves, dangerous. Thus
. hydrocarbons, whose emission is regulated by § 202, are not
3 themselves always dangerous, but are properly regulated
j because they react in sunlight to form smog, which is danger-
4 ous. See S. Rep. 89-192, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 5-6 (1965);
i EPA Supp. Br. at 18 n.15. Thus, far from stating a tautology,
~§ 202 allows for the regulation of such apparently innocent
pollutants, which indirectly cause dangerous pollution.
Soll Oh Aina lo gk
anal o 2H abel val
2m AE Ma 8
AMAR ncn: ES UY Nad.
BLEED TH
}OUGH
29
meaning of “endanger” are few in number,” at least one
recent case is directly on point and fully in accord
with our view.
In Reserve Mininy Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th
Cir. 1975) (en banc), the Eighth Circuit addressed,
among other issues, the meaning of the phrase “endanger-
ing the health or welfare of persons” under Section 1160
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1970
(FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. $1160. FWPCA and the Clean
Air Act together constitute the bulk of this nation’s
substantive environmental protection legislation.” As
28 See note 17 supra. See also Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 348, 465 F.2d 528
(1972), where in interpreting the more rigorous statutory
language “imminent hazard” which must be found before the
registration for a pesticide may be suspended pending the
conclusion of cancellation proceedings, 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)
(Supp. II 1972), we concluded, per Judge Leventhal:
It is enough if there is substantial likelihood that seri-
ous harm will be experienced during the year or two
required in any realistic projection of the administrative
process.
Id. at 360, 465 F.2d at 540 (emphasis added).
In another case interpreting the standards for cancellation
of a pesticide under the same statute, we held, per Judge
Wilkey, that a showing of “potentially great dangers from
DDT” sufficed as a basis for cancellation. Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. EPA (Coahoma), 160 U.S.App.D.C. 123,
128, 489 F.2d 1247, 1252 (1973).
2° Cf. Environmental Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1531 et
seq.; Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 42
U.S.C. § 4371 et seq.; National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. While initially the
procedural requirements of NEPA consumed judicial en-
ergies most conspiciously, see, e.g., Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827 (1972) ;
Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 146
U.S.App.D.C. 33, 449 F.2d 1109 (1971), courts are increas-
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30
such, and because of their contemporaneous enactment,
interpretations of provisions of one Act have frequently
been applied to comparable provisions of the other. See,
e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train,
166 U.S.App.D.C. 812, 321-322, 510 F.2d 692, 701-702
(1975). Thus Reserve Mining’s interpretation of “en-
dangering” is relevant to the meaning of the term “en-
danger” in the Clean Air Act. Indeed, it is particularly
relevant because in construing the language before it the
Eighth Circuit borrowed extensively from the interpre-
tation ,of the “will endanger” language of Section 211
expressed in the dissent from the division opinion in this
case, the same interpretation we adopt here. See Re-
serve Mining Co. v. EPA, supra, 514 F.2d at 528-529.
After analysis of the plain meaning of the FWPCA
provision, comparison with other sections of that Act,
and reference to our division’s dissent, the Eighth
Circuit’s unanimous conclusion fully supports our view
of the “will endanger” standard:
In the context of this environmental legislation, we
believe that Congress used the term “endangering”
in a precautionary or preventive sense, and, there-
fore, evidence of potential harm as well as actual
harm comes within the purview of that term.
Id. at 528.
In sum, based on the plain meaning of the statute, the
juxtaposition of Section 211 with Sections 108 and 202,
and the Reserve Mining precedent, we conclude that the
“will endanger” standard is precautionary in nature and
ingly according substantive weight to the NEPA language.
See Sierra Club vy. Morton, U.S.App.D.C., _—-
& n.25, 514 F.2d 856, 873-875 & n.25 ( 1975), and cases
cited therein, cert. granted, sub nom. Kleppe v. Sierra Club,
— USS. , 44 U.S. L. WEEK 3397 (Jan. 12, 1976).
31
does not require proof of actual harm before regulation
is appropriate.*
Perhaps because it realized that the above interpreta-
tion was the only possible reading of the statutory
language, petitioner Ethyl] addresses this interpretation
and argues that even if actual harm is not required for
action under Section 211(c)(1)(A), the occurrence of
the threatened harm must be “probable” before regula-
tion is justified. Ethyl Supp. Br. 12. While the diction-
ary admittedly settles on “probable” as its measure of
danger,*’ we believe a more sophisticated case-by-case
analysis is appropriate. See note 17 supra. Danger, the
Administrator recognized, is set not by a fixed probability
of harm, but rather is composed of reciprocal elements
of risk and harm, or probability and severity. Cf.
Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States,
166 U.S.App.D.C. 416, 419, 510 F.2d 796, 799 (1975);
Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, supra, 514 F.2d at 519-520.
That is to say, the public health may properly be found
endangered both by a lesser risk of a greater harm and
by a greater risk of a lesser harm.**? Danger depends
* See Green, The Risk-Benefit Calculus in Safety Deter-
minations, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 791 (1975); Handler, A
Rebuttal: The Need for a Sufficient Scientific Base for Gov-
ernment Regulation, id. at 808. Both authors agree that
government safety determinations should be preventive and
‘ based on assessment of risks. Dr. Handler differs from Pro-
fessor Green in arguing that risks should be quantified be-
fore regulatory decistons are made. Professor Green believes
that quantification is not always necessary or possible, and
that the public health is better served by the making of value
judgments, however inexact.
"1 See note 17 supra.
** This proposition must be confined to reasonable limits,
however. In Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United
States, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 416, 510 F.2d 796 (1975), a division
of this court found the possibility of a Class 9 nuclear reactor
27 ee Oe eT ee ee nts
32
upon the relation between the risk and harm presented
by each case, and cannot legitimately be pegged to “prob-
able” harm, regardless of whether that harm be great
or small. As the Eighth Circuit found in Reserve Min-
ing, these concepts “necessarily must apply in a de-
termination of whether any relief should be given in
eases of this kind in which proof with certainty is im-
possible.” ** 514 F.2d at 520.
disaster, a disaster of ultimate severity and horrible conse-
quences, to be so low that the Atomic Energy Commission’s
minimal consideration of the effects of such a disaster in an
environmental impact statement prepared for a new reactor
was sufficient. Likewise, even the absolute certainty of de
minimis harm might not justify government action. Under
§ 211 the threatened harm must be sufficiently significant
to justify health-based regulation of national impact. Ulti-
mately, of course, whether a particular combination of slight
risk and great harm, or great risk and slight harm, consti-
tutes a danger must depend on the facts of each case.
** Nalco devotes several pages of its brief to arguing that
there is a distinction between “risk” and “danger” that EPA
fails to recognize. Nalco Supp. Br. at 9-11, citing Reserve
Mining Co. Vv. EPA, supra note 13, and Power Reactor Devel-
opment Co. Vv. International Union of Electricians, 367 U.S.
396 (1961). To the extent Nalco argues that risk and danger
are not synonymous, Nalco battles with a straw man. EPA
recognizes that a risk to public health is not necessarily a
danger to public health; it only argues that a significant risk
of widespread lead poisoning constitutes such a danger. To
the extent Nalco argues there is no element of risk in danger,
it is plainly wrong, as the cases it cites demonstrate. In sup-
port of its position, Nalco quotes the following language from
Reserve Mining, in which the en bane court compares its
present opinion with the “stay” opinion of a division of the
court, Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073
(8th Cir. 1974), in which the division stayed the District
Court’s injunction ordering the immediate closing of the Re-
serve Mining plant:
As will be evident from the discussion that follows, we
adhere to our preliminary assessment that the evidence
PARI ELENA IIIT PINES PEM
33
In Reserve Mining the issue was whether asbestiform
wastes flushed into Lake Superior by the Reserve Min-
ing Company endangered health.** The polluted lake
is insufficient to support the kind of demonstrable dan-
ger to the public health that would justify the immediate
closing of Reserve’s operations. We now address the
basic question of whether the discharges pose any risk
to the public health, and, if so, whether the risk is one
that is legally cognizable.
514 F.2d at 507. The Eighth Circuit is not drawing a sharp
line between “danger” and “risk,” but is only contrasting
degrees of danger. Nalco fails to note that the “legally cog-
nizable” risk ultimately found was that Reserve’s discharges
were “endangering” the public health within the meaning of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. See page 34
infra. Necessarily, “risk” is an element of “danger,” and the
Reserve Mining court explicitly recognized that fact. 514
F.2d at 520.
The Power Reactor case is likewise of no support to Nalco.
There the Supreme Court simply recognized that when regu-
lations juxtaposed, and ordered, findings of “undue risk” and
“endanger,” an “undue risk” was not intended to mean “en-
danger.” The Court did not say that risk was not an element
of danger, only that in the regulations before it an “undue”
risk was not necessarily a sufficient risk to constitute a “dan-
ger.”
** Reserve Mining involved issues not only under FWPCA,
but under § 407 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33
U.S.C. § 401 et seq., the federal common law of public nui-
sance, and various Minnesota air and water pollution laws,
Minn, Stat. Ann. § 116.081(1); id. § 115.07(1) ; id. § 105.41.
Finding the evidence of danger posed by Reserve Mining’s
waste emissions into the air more compelling than that of
the danger posed by the water emissions (since a correlation
between inhalation, but not ingestion, of asbestos fibers and
cancer could be found), the Eighth Circuit found the con-
tinued air emissions to be in violation of various Minnesota
regulations and ordered Reserve to “promptly take al) steps
necessary to comply” with the law. Reserve Mining Co. v.
EPA, supra note 13, 514 F.2d at 588. With respect to the
34
waters formed the drinking supply of several surround-
ing communities, while a medical theory, bolstered only
by inconclusive evidence, suggested that ingestion of the
3 wastes caused cancer. See pages 93-94 infra. Applying
the “endangering the health or welfare of persons” stand-
ard of the FWPCA, the court found the wastes to be a
danger cognizable under the Act. The court did not
find that the danger was probable; rather it found the
wastes to be “potentially harmful,” 514 F.2d at 528, and
potential harm to be embraced by the “endangering”
standard, id. See page 30 supra. The court concluded:
as
The record shows that Reserve is discharging a
substance into Lake Superior waters which under
an acceptable but unproved medical theory may be
considered as carcinogenic. As previously discussed,
this discharge gives rise to a reasonable medical
concern over the public health. We sustain the dis-
trict court’s determination that Reserve’s discharge
into Lake Superior constitutes pollution of waters
“endangering the health or welfare of persons”
within the terms of §§ 1160(c) (5) and (g) (1) of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and is
subject to abatement.
514 F.2d at 529 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
The court thus allowed regulation of the effluent on only
a “reasonable” or “potential” showing of danger, hardly
the “probable” finding urged by Ethyl as the proper
reading of the “endanger” language in Section 211.
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water pollution, as described in the text, the court found the
probabilities of danger to be
low for they do not rest on a history of past health
harm attributable to ingestion but on a medical theory
implicating the ingestion of asbestos fibers as a causa-
tive factor in increasing the rates of gastrointestinal
cancer among asbestos workers.
Id. at 5386 (emphasis added). Thus the court only ordered
cessation of dumping within a “reasonable time.” Jd. at 538.
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35
The reason this relatively slight showing of probability
of risk justified regulation is clear: the harm to be
avoided, cancer, was particularly great. However, be-
cause the risk was somewhat remote, the court did not
order the immediate cessation of asbestiform dumping,
but rather ordered such cessation within “a reasonable
time.” Jd. at 538.
Reserve Mining convincingly demonstrates that the
magnitude of risk sufficient to justify regulation is in-
versely proportional to the harm to be avoided. Cf.
Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States,
supra. It would be a bizarre exercise in balancing
horrors to determine whether cancer or lead poisoning
is a greater harm to be avoided,** but
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