Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Georgia Power Co. v. Cimarron Coal Corp.
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
No. %H-1272
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY,
etitione i
VS.
CIMARRON COAL CORPORATION,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
ALLEN E. LOCKERMAN
MICHAEL C. MURPHY
1400 Candler Building
Atlanta, Georgia 30305
MARTIN ROACH
2615-16 Citizens Plaza
Louisville, Kentucky
40202
Counsel for Petitione
J. KIRK QUILLIAN
RALPH H. GREIL
Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman
& Ashmore
Of Counsel
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INDEX
Opinions Below
Jurisdiction
Questions Presented
Statutes Involved
Statement of the Case
Reasons for Granting the Writ
Introduction
Discussion of Questions
Conclusion
Appendix A—Opinions and Judgments of the
Courts Below
Appendix B—Coal Supply Agreement with
Amendments
Table of Authorities
CASES
Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A. v. Triangle Aviation
Services, Inc., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975),
aff'g by mem., 389 F. Supp. 1338 (S.D.N-Y.
1974)
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94
S. Ct. 1011, 39 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1974)
American Home Assurance Co. v. American Fi-
delity & Casualty Co., 356 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.
1966)
3, 14
10
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Il INDEX
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v.
Local 7, International Brotherhood of Opera-
tive Potters, 358 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1966) 16
Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238,
82 S. Ct. 1318, 8 L. Ed. 2d 462 (1962) 10
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Ross, 155 F.2d 615 (10th
Cir. 1946) ‘ 7; 43
El Hoss Engineering & Transport Co. v. Ameri-
can Independent Oil Co., 289 F.2d 346 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837
(1961) 7, 10, 19, 20
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S.
543, 84 S. Ct. 909, 11 L. Ed. 2d 898
(1964) 17, 19, 20
Necchi S.p.A. v. Necchi Sewing Machine Sales
Corp., 348 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. de-
nied, 383 U.S. 909 (1966) 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufac-
turing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 87 S. Ct. 1801, 18
L. Ed. 2d 1270 (1967) 6, 7, 8, 11, 22
Strauss v. Silvercup Bakers, Inc., 353 F.2d 595
(2d Cir. 1965) a
Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabric, Inc.,
271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959) 11
’
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S. Ct.
1358, 4 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1960) 10
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80S. Ct.
1347, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1409 (1960) 17,18
’ BLEED THROUGH
INDEX Ill
STATUTES
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. $$1-14
(1970) 2, 6, 15, 19
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Note, The Consequences of a Broad Arbitration
Clause Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 52
Boston U.L. Rev. 571 (1972) 8, 18, 19, 20
Heiner, Pepress Evclusions from Arbitration—
Accommodating the Consensual with the Non-
consensual, 1 GA. L. Rev. 363
(1967) 8, 17, 18, 19, 21
Commercial Arbitration Rules, November 1,1973 19
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1975
NO.
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY,
Petitioner,
Vs.
CIMARRON COAL CORPORATION,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
The petitioner, GEORGIA POWER COMPANY,
respectfully petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to
review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered in this case on
December 9, 1975.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Cireuit (Appendix A, infra, pp. Al-A15)
is reported at 526 F.2d 101 (6th Cir, 1975). The opinion
and judgment of the district court in this case (Appen-
dix A, infra, pp. Ald-A24) are not reported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit was entered on December
9, 1975 and this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
$1254 (1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether a claim avtsing under a contract which
expresses an intent te snsider matters at a future
date is a nonjusticiable issue which cannot be the
subject of judicially imposed arbitration?
II. Whether the parties in this commercial agreement
excluded from arbitration claims arising under
section 26.01, the “gross inequities” provision?
STATUTES INVOLVED
This case involves The Federal Arbitration Act of
1925, 9 U.S.C. $$1-14 (1970), and particularly $2 there-
of, which section is set out below:
A written provision in any maritime transac-
tion or a contract evidencing a transaction involv-
ing commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or trans-
action, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
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part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out
of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about February 6, 1969, Petitioner, Georgia
Power Company (“Georgia Power”) and Cimarron
Coal Corporation (“Cimarron”) entered into a long-
term Coal Supply Agreement, (App. B1-B54). This
agreement, as amended, calls for total shipment of ap-
proximately 26,600,000 tons of coal as specified in the
contract. (App. B46). During the period 1970-1974,
several price increases were granted under the cost
escalation provisions in the contract, based on in-
creased costs in production and delivery, so as to in-
sure profitability of the agreement to Cimarron. The
original contract price of $4.03 per ton (App. B2) more
than doubled to $10.41 per ton by November of 1974.
In 1974, Cimarron unilaterally demanded ai in-
crease in the contract price of approximately $17 per
ton for approximately 20 million tons of coal, pursuant
to $26.01 of the agreement, the “gross inequities” pro-
vision. (App. B19). Cimarron claimed a “gross in-
equity” existed, because other suppliers of coal on the
“spot” or “short-term” market were selling coal for as
much as $29 to $32 per ton during that period of the
energy crisis. Cimarron requested that its price ce-
mands be arbitrated, but Georgia Power responded
that claims made under $26.01 were not arbitrable, be-
cause the clause was permissive and not mandatory.
4
Cimarron never initiated arbitration proceedings or
court action seeking an order for arbitration. Neither
did the parties ever mutually agree that a “gross in-
equity” existed, or agree to a resolution of Cimarro”’s
claimed price increase.
On November 1, 1974, the eve of a national coal
miners strike, Cimarron, a non-union company, issued
an ultimatum that it would cease delivery of coal
under the agreement, unless Georgia Power agreed to
pay a price increase of over $340,000,000 for the total
tonnage to be delivered during the remaining life of
the agreement. Georgia Power refused to pay the de-
manded price increase, and Cimarron ceased delivery
of coal on November 5, 1974.
Georgia Power then initiated a diversity action in
the United States District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky for specific performance of the
contract and for a declaratory judgment on the ar-
bitrability of the demanded price increase under
$26.01. On November 21, 1974, the district court en-
tered a status quo order whereby both parties are
required to continue performance of their respective
obligations under the agreement until the case has
been finally determined on appeal. (App. A23-A24).
After a hearing on the merits, the trial court entered a
judgment which ordered, among other things, the par-
ties to arbitrate Cimarron’s claim under $26.01, and
which maintained in effect the status quo order pre-
viously entered. (App. A21-A22). The Court also en-
tered an Opinion of Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law. (App Al14-A20).
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
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fia et
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's judgment.
(App. Al-A13).
By application for a Writ of Certiorari, Petitioner
seeks review of the Sixth Cireuit Court of Appeals’
decision regarding the arbitrability of Cimarron’s
claim under $26.01 of the agreement.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
INTRODUCTION
This Court should review the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit because
that Court has decided an important question of fed-
eral law which has not, but should be settled by this
Court, and has rendered a decision in conflict with an
earlier decision of the Second Cireuit Court of Ap-
peals. The Sixth Circuit, in affirming the district
court’s decision, held that a contract clause which pro-
vides that gross inequities resulting in unusual con-
ditions not contemplated by the parties “may be cor-
rected by mutual consent,”! was arbitrable under a
broad arbitration clause covering “any unresolved
1. § 26.01. Adjustments for Gross Inequities. Any gross
proven inequity that may result in unusual economic condi-
tions not contemplated by the parties at the time of the
execution of this Agreement may be corrected by mutual con-
sent. Each party shall in the case of a claim of gross inequity
furnish the other with whatever documentary evidence may
be necessary to assist in affecting a settlement.
Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as
relieving either the Purchaser or Seller from any of its
respective obligations hereunder solely because of the exis-
tence of a claim of inequity or the failure of the parties to
reach an agreement with respect thereto.
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controversy .. . arising under this Agreement.” In
so holding the Sixth Circuit extended the types of
matters which are referable to arbitration further
than any other court, including this Court, has ever
done before.
Since the passage of The Federal Arbitration Act,
9 U.S.C. $$1-14 (1970), in 1925, this Court has had
relative few occasions to consider problems arising
under the Act in a commercial context. The last major
statement made by this Court in a commercial arbi-
tration context was the decision in Prima Paint Corp.
». Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Corp., 388 U.S. 395
(1967). There the Court established guidelines for de-
termining the arbitrability of the question of whether
a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. The Court held
that under a broad arbitration clause, a claim of f raud
in the inducement of a contract (to be distinguished
from a claim of fraud in the inducement of the arbi-
tration clause) is an issue to be determined by the
arbitrators and not by the judiciary. The Court was
not faced with the question raised by this case of
how courts should construe commercial agreements
to determine whether a particular dispute is arbitrable
under an admittedly valid arbitration agreement.
More particularly, the Court has never ruled on the
question presented by the instant case of whether in
order to exclude a matter from arbitration, specific,
2. § 20.01, Arbitration. Any unresolved controversy be-
tween the parties, arising under this Agreement shall, at the
request of either party, be submitted to arbitration under the
rules of the American Arbitration Association. The cost and
expense of any arbitration shall be shared equally by the
parties, unless otherwise ordered by the arbitrator.
’ BLEED THROUGH
7
express terms must be used, or whether more general
terms indicating an intention to withhold from arbi-
tration are suitable. See Strauss v. Silvercup Bakers,
Ine., 353 F.2d 555, 557 (2d Cir. 1965); El Hoss En-
gineering & Transport Co. ve American Independent
Oil Co., 289 F.2d 346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
837 (1961).
The Sixth Circuit’s decision erroneously permits
a party to obtain a remedy through arbitration which
could not be obtained through judicial proceedings. A
court will not attempt to fashion an agreement where
the parties have agreed that in the future they would
attempt to mutually agree toa price revision. Beecli
Aireraft Corp, v. Ross, 155 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1946).
Yet, as a result of the Sixth Circuit's decision, a non-
justiciable controversy like that produced by the gross
inequity clause is subject to arbitration.
It has been almost ten years since the Supreme
Court last examined the area of commercial arbitra-
tion. In the Prima Paint case the Court considered the
arbitrability of a dispute as to whether a vali agree-
ment to arbitrate was entered into. This case pre-
sents the next step in judicial analysis with respect to
arbitration — whether the dispute between the parties
is legally arbitrable — and provides the Court with an
excellent opportunity to provide much needed judi-
cial guidance in the area of commercial arbitration.
In this case the parties expressed a definite intent to
correct gross inequities through “mutual consent”
rather than through judicial proceedings or arbitra-
tion. If a more specific provision excluding a dispute
from arbitration was needed, and will be needed in
the future to effectuate the intention of the parties,
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this Court should establish guidelines providing ac-
cordingly.
DISCUSSION OF QUESTIONS
I.
A Claim Arising Under a Contract Provision
Which Expresses an Intent to Consider Commercial
Contingencies at a Future Date is a Nonjusticiable
Issue which Cannot be the Subject of Judicially
Imposed Arbitration.
This case presents a question left unanswered by
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Man ufacturing
Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), that is whether parties can
exclude matters from arbitration by contract language
demonstrating an intent to reserve such issues for
resolution by the parties. See id. at 402-403 n.9; Note,
The Consequences of a Broad Arbitration Clause under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 52 Boston U.L. REV. 571,
595 (1972). The decision by the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals in the instant case illustrates that courts
have become “lost in the shadow of rigid ‘arbitration
worship’ dicta” of cases proselytizing policy favoring
arbitration in collective bargaining agreements, such
that there has been a dramatic and harmful departure
from the neutral principle that courts can order parties
to arbitrate only matters they have agreed to arbi-
trate. See Heiner, Express Exclusions from Arbitra-
tion—Accommodating the Consensual with the Non-
consensual, 1 GA. L. REV. 363, 368 (1967). There is
a need to refocus on the basic premise that:
The duty to arbitrate being contractual in origin,
the Court must make an effort to construe the ex-
’ BLEED THROUGH
9
tent of the contractual duty, rather than enforce
arbitration even of arbitrability upon parties who
do not bind themselves to such a submission.
Strauss v. Silvercup Bakers, Inc., 353 F.2d 555, 558
(2d Cir. 1965).
The gross inequities clause, $26.01, has a special
purpose in this commercial contract between Georgia
Power, a regulated public utility, and Cimarron, a
coal supplier. At the trial of this case, it was shown
that Georgia Power, like other electric public utilities,
has a fuel adjustment clause in its rate structure that
passes added fuel costs on to the consumer. The gross
inequities clause is merely a written declaration that
the parties to the long-term coal supply agreement
recognize that if unanticipated contingencies occur,
one of the parties may find it in its best interest to
grant the other party relief that is not called for
under the contract. Section 26.01 provides a statement
of policy which will allow the public utility the op-
portunity to grant relief to a troubled coal supplier,
hopefully without incurring the wrath of a public
service commission or the public if it surrenders “too
good a deal” in the public interest. Such a clause was
never intended to require the public utility to enter the
free-wheeling environment of an arbitration proceed-
ing, with a supplier who entered the contract with a
net worth of less than one-half million dollars in 1969
and made a profit of over 3 million dollars in 1974,
in order to defend against an open-ended demand for
a price increase of approximately $340 million.
The language of $26.01 expresses the clear intent
that an unforeseable economic condition may be cor-
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rected by mutual consent of the parties, but it does not
mandate any settlement. Neither a court nor an ar-
bitrator can resolve a claim under $26.01, because that
would constitute “making” the agreement for the
parties. An arbitrator is limited to effectuating the
intent of the parties within the contractual language
of the agreement, and may not impose new terms on
the agreement.’ An arbitrator, therefore, cannot make
terms for agreements which the parties never intended
to have made for them by extraneous authority. In
the instant case, the parties clearly and expressly
never intended any change to be made in the contract
pursuant to $26.01, unless made by mutual consent.
See El Hoss Engineering & Transport Co, v. American
Independent Oil Co., 289 F.2d 346 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961).
The courts, and not the arbitrators, must deter-
mine whether or not a party is bound to arbitrate a
particular dispute, based on the contract entered into
by the parties. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370
U.S. 238, 241 (1962). Section 26.01 clearly does not
provide a justiciable issue for an arbitrator or a court
to adjudicate, and therefore is not arbitrable. There
is no basis for a determination of whether the parties
would have considered Cimarron’s claim to be a “gross
inequity”; or whether the parties would have corrected
3. In the context of a labor agreement, this Court re-
cently said: “As the proctor of the bargain, the arbitrator’s
task is to effectuate the intent of the parties.” Alerander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 53 (1974). “The arbitrator
has authority to resolve only questions of contractual rights,”
id., and cannot dispense his own brand of justice. See United
Steelworkers of America vs. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
. BLEED THROUGH
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such claim; much less an indication of how the parties
would have agreed to correct such claim. Since a court
cannot impose terms of a contract which were not
agreed to by the parties, Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Ross,
155 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1946), a court may not order
an arbitrator to impose such unintended terms on the
parties.
Prior to the decision of the Sixth Circuit in the
instant case, the only Circuit which appears to have
addressed the issue presented by this case was the
Second Circuit. In Necchi S.p.A. ve Necchi Sewing
Machine Sales Corp., 348 F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 909 (1966) ,4 the Court held that
a contractual provision which provided that six months
before the expiration of the agreement the parties
“shall examine the possibility of executing a new and,
it is hoped, long term distributorship agreement for
the same territory and at such terms and conditions as
will be then discussed and defined” was not arbitrable.
Speaking through Judge (now Justice) Marshall the
Court said, “Certainly we cannot ask that a renewe]
contract be written for the parties, as it is altogether
too conjectural that the parties would have agreed and
on what terms.” This conclusion was reached even
though the agreement contained an arbitration clause
as broad as the one in this case.
4. The Second Circuit's opinion in Necchi considered
Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabric, inc., 271 F.2d 402,
410 (2d Cir. 1959), which established the liberal federal poli-
cy toward arbitration, and which was relied upon by the
Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufac-
turing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967). The Prima Paint de-
cision did not disturb or contradict the holding in Necehi.
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The Sixth Cireuit’s opinion in this case is in conflict
with the earlier Necchi opinion of the Second Cireuit.
Here the contractual provision in question provides
that “Any gross proven inequity that may result in
unusual economic conditions not contemplated by the
parties at the time of the execution of this Agreement
may be corrected by mutual consent.” Like the situa-
tion the Second Cireuit faced in Necchi, the gross in-
equity clause in this case presents a situation where
“it is altogether too conjectural that the parties would
have agreed and on what terms.”
The Sixth Circuit distinguished Necchi as involv-
ing a dispute over a provision for renewal of a con-
tract as opposed to a dispute over operations under
an ongoing contract. (App. A7). The attempted dis-
tinction is unpersuasive and is more of an example of
ipse divit than a decision based on a previously recog-
nized legal principle. In both Necch? and the instant
ease, the provision in question did no more than require
the parties to examine the possibility of entering into
a new agreement. Similar to the Necchi situation, in
the absence of a new agreement by the parties on the
adjustments necessary for alleged gross inequities,
there is nothing to be enforced either by arbitration or
judicial proceedings. The Court's statement that “the
controversy must be settled somehow in the absence
of mutual consent” (App. A8) flies in the face of the
express words of the contract evidencing the intent
of the parties. Mutual consent is required by the con-
tract and forced submission to arbitration does not
provide such consent.
Simply stated, the current dispute does not involve
any agreement which the parties made in the contract,
? BLEED THROUGH
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15
so the current demand for a price increase does not
arise under the agreement. If an arbitration award in
the instant case granted Cimarron its requested price
increase under $26.01, the contract price would be
raised by as much as $340 million. Such a substantial
rewriting of a material term is tantamount to rewrit-
ing the entire contract as bargained for by the parties.
There is no reasonable distinetion, for the purpose of
requiring arbitration, whether the remainder of the
contract is distorted beyond recognition or whether a
renewal agreement is imposed on the parties. Both re-
sults constitute examples of the arbitrator writing the
contract for the parties.
The Court below relies on two subsequent Second
Circuit decisions as supportive of its interpretation of
Vecchi, See Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A. v. Triangle
Aviation Services, Ine. 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975),
affg. by mem. 389 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
American Home Assurance Co. v. American Fidelity
& Casualty Co, 356 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1966). These
two cases are clearly distinguishable from Neechi and
the instant case and are not inconsistent with Petition-
er’s contention. Both cases involved clauses which man-
dated, rather than permitted, the parties to finally
resolve certain described future events. In American
Home Assurance Co., the parties agreed that, “there
shall be an adequate amendment” to a reinsurance
agreement in the event that the final loss ratio on the
contract during a specified period exceeds 65°. of
gross premium. In Aeronaves, the contract provided
that “an increase in the charges will be negotiated,”
in the event certain described changes in the subject
of the contract occurred during the term of the con-
tract. In both cases the Second Cireuit held such pro-
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visions arbitrable, because they mandated a change in
the contract price if an anticipated described commer=
cial contingency occurred. See Aeronaves, supra, 389
KF. Supp. at 1390. Also, in both of the latter Second
Circuit cases, the subject of controversy concerned a
commercial contingency previously contemplated by
the parties, whereas in both Necchi and the instant
ease, the dispute between the parties concerned con-
tingencies not previously contemplated by the parties.
Section 26.01 could not have been more explicit in
expressing that at the time the contract was executed
the parties did not contemplate what, if any, “gross
proven inequity” would arise during the course of the
agreement. Because such matters were unknown and
not contemplated, the parties reasonably withheld a
commitment to have such matters finally resolved.
Section 26.01 does not provide that any “gross proven
inequity” “shall be” or “will be” corrected. Instead
it provides that such conditions, if any, “may” be cor-
rected and that any such correction must be made “by
the mutual consent” of the parties. The plain and
ordinary meaning of that language is that the parties
didn’t know whether any such gross inequity would
occur, or What would constitute a gross inequity, but
that if such condition did occur, then it would be
resolved by the mutual consent of the parties or not
be resolved at all. Such a clause states an intent of
the parties to consider the consequences of unfore-
seeable changes in the economy, but does not bind the
parties to have a resolution to such changes arbitrated
5. When this agreement was entered into in 1969, Cim-
arron could reasonably have expected escalating costs of op-
erating their mine, and Georgia Power could have anticipated
BLEED THROUGH
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The provision is no more arbitrable than was the pro-
vision in Vecchi requiring the parties to “evamine the
possibility of executing a new ... long term distrib-
utorship agreement... at such terms and conditions as
will be then discussed and defined” (emphasis added).
Despite the clear and unambiguous language of
$26.01, the Sixth Cireuit ruled that Cimarron’s claim
for an adjustment in price Was “a condition which was
recognized by the parties as a possibility when the con-
tract was entered into.” (App. AT). The Court then
concluded that the claim to a price adjustment “ast
be settled somehow in absence of mutual consent.”
(App. AS). Nothing in $26.01 can reasonably be con-
strued to express or imply that Cimarron’s claim was
anticipated or that a resolution of that claim was mau-
dated in the absence of mutual consent. The provision
makes erystal clear that there is no duty on the port
of either party to resolve the dispute or to submit it
to an arbitrator for resolution. The second paragraph
of $26.01 provides that nothing contained in that sec-
tion shall relieve either party of its respective obliga-
tions under the contract, even if a claim of inequit)
exists and if the parties fail to reach an agreement
With respect thereto,
The Federal Arbitration Act and its attendant na-
tional policy favoring arbitration do not, and cannot,
regulatory restraints on its operating: expenses from the
Georgia Public Service Commission, but neither party could
have reasonably contemplated the energy crisis and its effect
on the coal market during the year 1974. Distortions of the
market having unforeseeable consequences on the parties to
the agreement were therefore reserved for consideration by
the parties alone at the time they occurred.
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mandate an arbitrator to make an agreement for the
parties, Necchi, supra, 348 F.2d at 698. As in other
contracts, the express intent of the parties to reserve
certain matters for mutual resolution in the future
must be respected and not caught up in incantations
of policy favoring arbitration. The Sixth Circuit’s
reasoning in the instant case signals the overreaction
to an arbitration policy which must be tempered and
refocused in order to prevent the destruction of the
agreement between the parties in the instant case, and
to prevent the rule of the Sixth Circuit from being
adopted as a matter of law in subsequent cases.
Il.
Section 26.01 of the Agreement Demonstrates an
Intent to Exclude From Arbitration any Claims
for Gross Inequities made Under that Provision.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Cim-
arron’s unilateral claim made pursuant to $26.01 was
arbitrable because of “the absence of language with-
drawing this provision from the arbitration require-
ment.” (App. A10). In support of that conclusion, the
Court relied upon American Radiator & Standard San-
itary Corp. v. Local No. 7, International Brotherhood
of Operative Potters, 358 F.2d 455, 458 (6th Cir.
1966), a collective bargaining agreement case, which
held that “arbitration should not be denied unless it
may be said with positive assurance that the clause
does not cover the dispute” (emphasis added).
Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred
in ruling that $26.01 did not state with “positive as-
surance” that claims made thereunder were excluded
from the arbitration clause of the contract, because
: BLEED THROUGH
17
the provision expressly reserves for the parties alone
the authority to resolve any alleged claim of gross in-
equity by ‘mutual consent,” or not at all. See Part I,
supra. Petitioner further maintains, however, that
the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of
construction in this case, which has the effect of dis-
torting the federal policy toward arbitration in com-
mercial contracts.
The “positive assurance” rule of construction ema-
nates from cases dealing with collective bargaining
agreements, and has been tailored to effectuate the
strong national policy which is peculiar to the labor
relations field. See United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960) ; Heiner, Express Exclusions from Arbitration
—Accommodating the Consensual with the Noncon-
sensual,” 1 GA. L. REV. 363, 364-368, 379-382 (1967).
That rule is wholly inappropriate when applied to a
commercial contract, such as the one in the instant
case.
This Court has forcefully articulated that the ob-
jectives of a national labor policy are to be effectuated
by using arbitration as “the substitute for industrial
strike” and as “part and parcel of the collective bar-
gaining process itself.” United Steelworkers of Ameri-
ca v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960). In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,
376 U.S. 543, 550-551 (1964), the Court characterized
the peculiarities of arbitration clauses in labor agree-
ments:
While the principles of law governing ordinary
contracts would not bind to a contract an uncon-
senting successor to a contracting party, a collec-
—————————————
iS eT EAN
4
LALLA EEE ES ey
18
tive bargaining agreement is not an ordinary
contract. “... [I]t is a generalized code to govern
a myriad of cases which the draftsman cannot
wholly anticipate. .- . The collective agreement
covers the whole employment relationship. It calls
into being a new common law — the common law
of a particular industry or of a particular plant.”
Warrior & Gulf, supra, 363 U.S. at 578-579. Cen-
tral to the peculiar status and f unction of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement is the fact, dictated
both by circumstance, see, id., 365 U.S. at 580, and
by the requirements of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, that it is not in any real sense the simple
product of a consensual relationship.
Consequently, the duty to arbitrate in a labor agree-
ment. while founded on contract, 1s construed “in the
context of a national labor policy” with considerations
favoring arbitration unique to the labor relations
field. Jd.
Contracts in a commercial context, on the other
hand, possess none of the attributes of collective bar-
gaining agreements, especially with regard to the
peculiar role of an arbitration provision, nor are they
governed by express statutory regulation, such as the
National Labor Relations Act. “A commercial arbitra-
tion clause, unlike a labor arbitration provision, serves
predominantly to implement the parties’ intent.” Note,
The Consequences of a Broad Arbitration Clause Under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 52 BosToN U.L. REV.
571, 592 (1972). An arbitration clause contained in a
commercial contract, therefore, should not be con-
strued by the same principles which are tailored for
the peculiarities of collective bargaining agreements.
’ BLEED THROUGH
19
Id. at 592, 594; John Wiley & Sous, supra, 376 U.S. at
550; Heiner, supra.
There is a federal policy favoring arbitration in
lieu of litigation in commercial agreements subject to
the Federal Arbitration Act, and commercial arbitra-
tion clauses should be construed as raising a presump-
tion that disputes arising under the contract are arbi-
trable. Nevertheless, this presumption may be re-
butted by contract language demonstrating an intent
to exclude certain matters from arbitration, even if
such intent is not “positive assurance” that the clause
was to be excluded. Cf., Heiner, supra, 1 GA. L. REV. at
382; Strauss v. Silvercup Bakers, lne., 363 F.2d 555,
998 (2d Cir. 1965); Fl Hoss Engineering & Transport
Co. v. American Independent Oil Co., 289 F.2d 346 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961).
In the instant contract the parties negotiated and
bargained for the sale and purchase of coal, and in-
cluded in that contract a standard arbitration clause,é
intended to avoid litigation regarding general matters
arising under the contract. They also included a pro-
6. Section 20.01 is very similar to the Standard Arbitra-
tion Clause recommended by the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation for general use in commercial contracts:
“Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating
to this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be set-
tled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of
the American Arbitration Association, and judgment
upon the award rendered by the Arbitrator (s) may
be entered in any Court having jurisdiction thereof.”
Commercial Arbitration Rules, Nov. 1, 1973.
Use of such standard clauses has been consistently increas-
ing in commercial contracts. See Note, supra, 52 Boston ULL.
REV. at 571-572.
20
vision, $26.01, which clearly demonstrates the intent
of the parties to reserve the resolution of certain
unforeseeable matters to the mutual agreement
of the parties only. Section 26.01 provides that reso-
lution of a gross inequities claim shall be by mu-
tual consent of the parties or not at all. Therefore, a
judicial determination of nonarbitrability of Cimar-
ron’s claim would not defeat the policy favoring ar-
bitration in lieu of litigation in the commercial context.
Failure of the parties to mutually consent to a correc-
tion of a claim under $26.01 cannot result in a jus-
ticiable issue, and, therefore, cannot be litigated. See
Part I, supra.
This not being a collective bargaining agreement,
there is no expertise in drafting arbitration clauses to
cover all anticipated circumstances. See John Wiley &
Sons, supra, 376 U.S. at 549-551. The question of in-
tention of the parties is “to be ascertained by the same
tests that are applied to contracts generally.” 1 Hoss
Engineering & Transport Co., supra, 289 F.2d at 350.
Even with a policy favoring a presumption of arbitra-
tion, “there is no reason in fact or in law for frustra-
tion of this clearly demonstrated intent” not to ar-
bitrate. /d. at 349. The rigorous standards of construc-
tion applicable to collective bargaining agreements are
not appropriate for commercial agreements. See Note,
supra, 52 BosToN U.L. REY. at 594-596. The Court of
Appeals, therefore, misapplied a “positive assurance”
standard of construction to $26.01, and erroneously
determined Cimarron’s claim to be arbitrable.
The Court of Appeals also erroneously ruled that
“in the absence of language withdrawing the provi-
sion from the arbitration requirement, it is a duty of
’ BLEED THROUGH
21
the court to resolve any doubts in favor of arbitration”
(emphasis added). (App. A10). There was no evidence
before the trial court as to the intent of the parties
with regard to the arbitration clause, the gross in-
equities clause, or the contract in general. If the Sixth
Circuit had a “doubt” as to the parties’ intent, it
should have remanded the case for further finding of
fact on that issue, rather than resolving the “doubts”
on the face of the contract. See Strauss v. Silvercup
Bakers, Inc., supra, 353 F.2d at 558: Heiner, supra,
1 GA. L. REV. at 379-380.
ae am ed
22
CONCLUSION
Petitioner respectfully submits that the decisions
of the courts below in this case are erroneous. By al-
lowing for submission to arbitration of a nonjustici-
able controversy, the Courts below have defeated the
express intention of the parties at the time of contrac-
ting and have extended the types of matters referable
to arbitration further than any court has previously
done. This case thus provides the Court an opportunity
to reexamine the law of commercial arbitration and
provide desperately needed guidance in light of the
increased use of commercial arbitration and changed
economic conditions since the Court decided Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,
388 U.S. 395 (1967).
Respectfully submitted,
ALLEN E. LOCKERMAN
MICHAEL C. MURPHY
1400 Candler Building
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
MARTIN ROACH
2615-16 Citizens Plaza
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Counsel for Petitioner,
Georgia Power Company
J. KIRK QUILLIAN
RALPH H. GREIL
Troutman, Sanders,
Lockerman & Ashmore
Of Counsel
’ BLEED THROUGH
APPENDIX “A”
No. 75-1542
No. 75-1543
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY,
Plaintiff-A ppellant,
APPEAL from the
Cross-A ppellee,
United States Dis-
v. trict Court for the
Western District
CIMARRON COAL CORPORATION, .
of Kentucky.
Defenda TT] t-A ppellee, j
Cross-A ppellant.
Decided and Filed December 9, 1975
Before: PHILLIPS, Chief Judge; MILLER and LIVELY,
Circuit Judges.
LIVELY, Circuit Judge. The issue in this case is
whether a dispute between the parties to a long-term
fuel supply agreement is subject to arbitration. The
coal supply agreement (Agreement) provided that for
a period of ten years beginning January 1, 1970 Cim-
arron would “tender for delivery” and Georgia Power
would purchase quantities of coal set out therein. The
Agreement provided for a base price per ton of coal
of $4.03 as of the date of the Agreement “subject to
adjustment from time to time... .”’ Specific provisions
of the Agreement dealt with the computation of ad-
justments in base price for changes in certain labor
————a eC
———————————————————
A-2
costs, supplies and changes in “governmental imposi-
tions.” Each such adjustment was to be computed ac-
cording to a formula or method set forth in the Agree-
ment. The Agreement also contained the following
provision:
26.01. Adjustments for Gross Inequities. Any
gross proven inequity that may result in unusual
economic conditions not contemplated by the
parties at the time of the execution of this Agree-
ment may be corrected by mutual consent. Each
party shall in the case of a claim of gross in-
equity furnish the other with whatever documen-
tary evidence may be necessary to assist in af-
fecting a settlement.
Nothing contained in this section shall be con-
strued as relieving either the Purchaser or Seller
from any of its respective obligations hereunder
solely because of the existence of a claim of in-
equity or the failure of the parties to reach an
agreement with respect thereto.
As the parties operated under the Agreement several
inereases in base price were made pursuant to the
various provisions for adjustments, including the gross
inequities provision of Section 26.01.
During 1973 and 1974 there was a rapid escalation
in the market price of coal in the United States. Some-
time prior to April 11, 1974 Cimarron requested an
adjustment in the base price under Section 26.01 of
the Agreement, claiming that a gross inequity had
resulted from the disparity between the market price
of coal and the price being paid under the Agreement.
In responding to this request on April 11, Georgia
y BLEED THROUGH
pe
ms
A-3
Power wrote: “As you are aware, We adamantly re-
jected and disagreed with your request for escalation
based upon Section 26.01 of the Coal Supply Agree-
ment. We did acknowledge, however, that a substantial
disagreement existed over the interpretation of this
provision.” (P. Exhibit 38). On August 15, 1974
Cimarron requested an additional price adjustment
under Section 26.01, pointing out that the current
adjusted base price under the Agreement was $10.00
per ton while coal of the same quality was selling for
$29.00 to $32.00 per ton on the open market. Because
of “the very unusual economic conditions existing in
the coal industry at this time . . ..” Cimarron requested
a change in base price to $16.50 per ton. (P. Exhibit
41). Georgia Power rejected the request, but offered
to meet with Cimarron and discuss the matter. (P.
Exhibit 42). During the succeeding months an adjust-
ment in base price was agreed to by the parties pri-
marily on the basis of increased costs of materials
and supplies, bringing the base price when suit was
filed to $10.41 per ton.
On November 1, 1974, Cimarron notified Georgia
Power that it was increasing the base price for coal
to $27.50 per ton effective November 5, 1974 and that
“[w]Je expect to suspend deliveries of coal to you on
November 1, 1974, unless the basic price adjustment
to become effective that day is agreed to or submitted
to arbitration.” (P. Exhibit 48). Georgia Power re-
sponded by telegram November 5, 1974, stating in
part:
In view of the above, if Cimarron ceases ship-
ments on November 5, 1974, as threatened, we
will have to immediately seek judicial enforcement
A-4
of the contract, and you should be governed ac-
cordingly. (P. Exhibit 50).
On November 7, 1974 Georgia Power filed its com-
plaint in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky where Cimarron is lo-
eated. After reciting the material facts and setting
forth its theory Georgia Power sought a temporary
restraining order to prevent Cimarron from (lispos-
ing of coal from the property subject to the Agree-
ment to any purchaser other than Georgia Power until
the commitments of the contract were fulfilled and
from failing to produce and sell to Georgia Power the
amounts of coal agreed to in the contract. In an
amended and substituted complaint filed on November
13, 1974 Georgia Power also sought a declaratory
judgment that Section 26.01 of the Agreement oes
not provide a means for increasing the price of coal
without consent of Georgia Power and that Section
96.01 is not arbitrable, and a further declaration that
Georgia Power had not breached the Agreement by
its refusal to arbitrate the dispute.
The district court declined to enter a temporary re-
straining order, but obtained agreement of the parties
to the entry of a status quo order by which Cimarron
continued to ship to Georgia Power the quantities of
coal provided for in the Agreement at the prices set
therein until a decision on the merits. It further pro-
vided that if it should ultimately be determined that
Cimarron was entitled to a price increase under Sec-
tion 26.01, such increase would apply to coal shipped
under the status quo order. Thereafter Cimarron filed
an answer in which it contended that Georgia Power
had breached the Agreement by refusing to submit an
y BLEED THROUGH
A-5
unresolved controversy to arbitration and that by
suing in the district court Georgia Power had waived
its right to arbitration. Cimarron denied that it had
breached the Agreement in any respect and stated
affirmatively that the provision of the contract for
arbitration contains no limitation on the subject mat-
ter of arbitration. Cimarron also filed a “cross-claim,”
Which appears actually to be a counter-claim, in which
it sought damages from Georgia Power for the coal
shipped under the status quo order measured by the
differenc between the contract price and the pre-
vailing market price for coal of equal quality at the
time of delivery.
Following a hearing on the merits, the district court
entered a judgment holding that the Agreement be-
tween the parties remained in full force and effect
and directing that “the parties shall proceed without
delay to arbitration of the defendant’s claims asserted
under Section 26.01 of said contract.’ The judgment
also provided that the status quo order should remain
in effect. District Judge James F. Gordon filed a
memorandum opinion containing findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Georgia Power appealed from that
portion of the judgment directing arbitration and from
rulings during the trial of the case in which the district
court declined to admit evidence regarding the finan-
cial condition of the parties. Cimarron has cross-
appealed from that portion of the judgment which
denied it damages as claimed in its “eross-complaint”’:
from the holding that Cimarron had no right to rescind
the contract upon Georgia Power’s refusal to arbitrate
and from the court’s ruling that Georgia Power did
not waive its right to seek judicial enforcement of ar-
bitration or a declaratory judgment by reason of its
A-6
refusal to arbitrate. The appeal and cross-appeal were
consolidated for hearing in this court.
Section 20.01 of the Agreement provides :
90.01. Arbitration. Any unresolved controversy
between the parties, arising under this Agree-
ment shall, at the request of either party, be sub-
mitted to arbitration under the rules of the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association. The cost and ex-
pense of any arbitration shall be shared equally
by the parties, unless otherwise ordered by the
arbitrator.
Georgia Power contends that Section 26.01 provides
a purely permissive method of relieving a party from
a gross inequity, but that its language is inconsistent
with a requirement of binding arbitration. This posi-
tion is based on the fact that Section 26.01 provides
relief from gross inequities only “by mutual consent.”
It points to the fact that no criteria for gross inequity
adjustments are contained in the Agreement, contrary
to the provisions for adjustment on account of other
changes in circumstances. Thus Georgia Power basi-
cally argues that a provision of an agreement which
permits modification of any of its terms by mutual
agreement of the parties may only lead to such modi-
fication if the parties do agree. To permit a dispute
under such a provision to be settled by arbitration, it
is argued, would permit the arbitrator to make a new
contract for the parties.
Georgia Power relies principally upon the decision
in Necchi v. Necchi Sewing Machine Sales Corp., 348
F. 2d 693 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 909
, BLEED THROUGH
A-7
(1966). There the court held that a contractual pro-
vision that six months before the expiration of the
agreement the parties “shall examine the possibility
of executing a new and, it is hoped, long term dis-
tributorship agreement for the same territory and at
such terms and conditions as will be then discussed
and defined” was not arbitrable. /d. at 698. The court
found that there was no obligation upon Necchi to
renew the distributorship and no provision for relief
if it failed to examine the possibility of renewal. Speak-
ing through Judge (now Justice) Marshall the court
said, “Certainly, we cannot ask that a renewal con-
tract be written for the parties, as it is altogether too
conjectural that the parties would have agreed and
on what terms.” /d. This conclusion was reached even
though the agreement contained a broad provision for
arbitration of ‘“‘[a]ll matters, disputes or disagree-
ments arising out of or in connection with this Agree-
ment ....” Jd. at 695.
The present case is quite different from Necchi.
There the parties sought to enforce a provision for re-
newal which did no more than require the parties to
examine the possibility of entering into a new agree-
ment. The dispute did not concern operations under
the agreement and the language of the renewal pro-
vision presented nothing for the arbitrator, or a court,
to enforce. On the other hand, in the case now under
review a dispute arose during the life of a subsisting
contract with respect to a present adjustment in prices
on the basis of a condition which was recognized by
the parties as a possibility when the contract was en-
tered into. There is a difference between a provision
which requires parties to attempt to agree on a new
contract and one which requires them to attempt to
Sei ake WP Sg yy pies keh ORR ON RRR HONEA ATR
PE Ny ee oR Pe eee rs
» lb a)
A-8
make an adjustment in price under an ongoing con-
tract by mutual consent. Under the former situation
in the absence of a new agreement there is no contract
to enforce either by arbitration or judicial proceedings.
In the latter case the parties remain bound to con-
tinued operations under their contract and the contro-
versy over a claimed right to price adjustment must
be settled somehow in the absence of mutual consent,
In such a case if the contract provides for arbitration,
the arbitrator is only required to resolve a controversy
arising under the agreement of the parties, not write
a new agreement for them.
The mere fact that it provided for correction of gross
inequities by mutual consent did not remove Section
96.01 from arbitrability. The Necchi court has so held
in cases where the fashioning of a renewal was not
involved. In American Home Assurance Co. V. Ameri-
can Fidelity & Casualty Co., 356 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.
1966), a contractual provision for a reduction of re-
insurance premiums “on a basis to be mutually ar-
ranged” was held to be arbitrable. In Aeronaves de
Mexico S.A. v. Triangle Aviation Services, Inc., 389
F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 504
(2d Cir. 1975), a dispute under a provision that in-
creases in charges for servicing airplanes “will be ne-
gotiated to the satisfaction of both parties” was held
to be arbitrable. Georgia Power's reliance on Beech
Aircraft Corp. v. Ross, 155 F, 2d 615 (10th Cir. 1946),
is misplaced. The contract under consideration in that
case contained no arbitration provision, Under those
circumstances the court held that a provision for price
changes to be effected “by mutual agreement,” in the
absence of a formula for final revision of prices, did
not provide an acceptable standard by which a court
’ BLEED THROUGH
<a
ts)
A-9
could give effect to the intention of the parties. The
reasoning of the court in the Beech Aircraft decision
does not compel the same result in a case where the
parties have agreed in advance to submit unresolved
controversies to arbitration.
In their briefs both parties have recognized that
there is a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration.
This is true in the realm of commercial transactions
as well as labor relations. Nevertheless, as this court
has held, “. . . arbitration is a matter of contract be-
tween the parties, and one cannot be required to sub-
mit to arbitration a dispute which it has not agreed to
submit to arbitration.” United Steelworkers, Local No.
1617 v. General Fireproofing Co., 464 F.2d 726, 729
(6th Cir. 1972). The language of the arbitration clause
in the Agreement before us is as broad and general as
one can conceive. Though Section 26.01 makes no direct
reference to arbitration, whereas several other provi-
sions of the contract do refer to the requirement of ar-
bitration, nevertheless we conclude that if the parties
had not intended for controversies arising under Sec-
tion 26.01 to be submitted to arbitration the Agreement
would have so provided. The intention of the parties
must be determined from the entire agreement. This
court has stated that “. .. arbitration should not be de-
nied unless it may be said with positive assurance that
the clause does not cover the dispute.” American Radi-
ator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Local 7, Internation-
al Brotherhood of Operative Potters, AFL-CIO, 358
F.2d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 1966). While some of the pro-
visions of the contract make reference to the arbitra-
tion requirement, there is no indication or statement
that any provision of the contract is wholly outside of
the arbitration provision. The gross inequities provi-
a Ke
A-10
sion deals with a possible adjustment in price which
might be required because of unforeseeable changes in
the economic climate of the coal industry. This provi-
sion lacks the specific details of the other portions of
the Agreement dealing with price adjustment, but that
arises from the fact that it is something of a ‘“catch-
all” provision designed to take care of the kinds of
changes which cannot be predicted in detail, but which
experience teaches (lo occur. In the absence of language
withdrawing this provision from the arbitration re-
quirement it is the duty of the court to resolve any
doubts in favor of arbitration. American Radiator v.
Local 7, supra at 458.
When the parties to a contract foresee the possibil-
ity of a change in circumstances which might require
modification of the contractual terms and provide for
modification by mutual consent, and thereafter are
unable to agree upon such modification, the resulting
dispute is subject to a broad arbitration provision
such as that contained in the Agreement now before
the court. The fact that contracting parties agree in
general terms to arbitration of disputes indicates a
determination that their interests will be better served
by arbitration than by resort to the courts if problems
arise. The nature of a dispute which thereafter actually
occurs is immaterial. As Judge Learned Hand wrote in
Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv-
ice Corp., 70 F.2d 297, 299 (2d Cir. 1934) ; aff'd., 293
U.S. 449 (1935): “If the clause is general in form, it
makes no difference what may come up under it.”
Georgia power also argues that the Supreme Court
recognized a federal policy in favor of stabilization of
the fuel costs of public utilities in 7ampa Electric Co.
oth ie A MP e fA IM FTIR FY, LGR CTR PN, .
’ BLEED THROUGH
A-11
v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961), and that
policy would be violated by permitting arbitration of
a claim for a price increase based on an asserted gross
inequity. The short answer to this contention is that
the Tampa Electric case was not concerned with arbi-
tration or with the application of the gross inequities
provision in the coal contract between Tampa Electric
and Nashville Coal. Tampa Electric was an antitrust
‘case, and the issues before the Court were entirely
different from those under consideration in the present
case,
The second issue raised by Georgia Power relates to
the refusal of the district court to receive evidence
tendered by Georgia Power relating to the financial
condition of Cimarron. It is the theory of Georgia
Power that it was entitled to show that Cimarron had
not suffered economic hardship by reason of increases
in the market price of coal and that Cimarron had
actually improved its financial condition as a result
of the Georgia Power contract. Georgia Power also
offered evidence designed to show that it was * a
severe financial crisis which would be worsened if
Cimarron should be allowed to raise the price of its
coal above that provided in the contract. Basically,
Georgia Power argues that it was an abuse of equitable
discretion for the district court to refuse to receive this
evidence. The district court properly declined to con-
sider such evidence. The first question before the dis-
trict court on Georgia Power's complaint after de-
nying the request for a temporary restraining order
Was Whether the unresolved controversy between the
parties under Section 26.01 was arbitrable, It was not
the duty of the court to decide whether a gross in-
a
A-12
equity did in fact exist as claimed by Cimarron. The
rejected evidence appears to relate to that issue rather
than the question of arbitrability.
We find no merit to Georgia Power's arguments
based on the provision of the Agreement that it should
be construed according to Georgia law. In the present
case the district court found that the transaction be-
tween Georgia Power and Cimarron is one involving
commerce Within the meaning of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act and this finding is not questioned on appeal.
In West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Multi-Line Industries,
Inc., 201 S.E. 2d 452, 453 (Ga. 1973), it was held that
“the state law and policy with respect thereto [arbi-
tration] must yield to the paramount federal law.”
Cimarron contended in the district court and con-
tinues to argue on appeal that Georgia Power breached
the -Agreement by refusing to arbitrate Cimarron’s
demand for a price increase under Section 26.01 and
as a result Cimarron was entitled to rescind the con-
tract in its entirety. On this theory Cimarron filed
its “cross-claim” asking damages in an amount equal
to the difference between the contract price at which
it has continued to deliver coal under the status quo
order and the market price. The district court held
that Georgia Power did not breach the Agreement by
declining arbitration and filing this action for a ju-
dicial determination of arbitrability of the contro-
versy, and that Cimarron had no right to rescind. The
record discloses that Georgia Power suggested to
Cimarron that it file suit for an order compelling ar-
bitration under Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4. Cimarron did not follow this course
joo 39. ONE Oed ad . ae 2
: > o eye f ARF REAR RE NS OE PHT LOE AMET Ta”
? BLEED THROUGH
A-13
of action, nor did it notify the American Arbitration
Association of the existence of the controversy. After
Cimarron declined to seek judicial enforcement of the
arbitration provision under Section 4 and unilaterally
declared the contract rescinded, Georgia Power filed
this suit seeking, among other things, a declaratory
judgment as to the arbitrability of a controversy under
Section 26.01 of the Agreement. Georgia Power con-
tinued to insist on performance of the contract by
Cimarron and submitted the issue of arbitrability to
the district court. A party does not act at its peril in
seeking an initial judicial determination of whether
an arbitration clause applies to a particular dispute
arising under an agreement. General Guaranty Insur-
ance Co. v. New Orleans General Agency, Inc., 427 F.2d
924 (5th Cir. 1970). To hold that one who seeks such
a judicial determination has breached the entire agree-
ment out of which the controversy arose would tend
to make parties reluctant to agree to arbitration and
would run counter to the policy in favor thereof. In
Galt v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711
(7th Cir. 1967), relied upon by Cimarron, a party was
_ held to have repudiated its agreement to arbitrate, giv-
ing the other party an election to forego arbitration or
insist upon it. Georgia Power did not repudiate the
Agreement by bringing this action, and Cimarron had
no right to rescind.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed on
appeal and cross-appeal. No costs allowed.
A-14
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT OWENSBORO
GEORGIA POWER }
COMPANY,
Plaintiff, Civil Action
Vv.
CIMARRON COAL No. C-74-107-0
CORPORATION,
Defendant,
MEMORANDUM OPINION ....
OF
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW
This matter came on for trial and judgment on
January 9, 1975, upon the whole record herein.
The amount in controversy exceeds $10,000.00,
exclusive of interest and costs, and, further, the
Court has jurisdiction of this action, Title IX, U.S.C.
Section 2, et seq.
The plaintiff is a Georgia corporation engaged in
the business of generating, distributing and selling
electric power, and the defendant is a Tennessee corp-
oration with its principal place of business in Madi-
sonville, Kentucky, and is engaged in the mining of
coal by the strip or open pit method of mining.
On or about February 6, 1969, these parties en-
tered into a long-term coal supply agreement drafted
by the plaintiff. Suffice it to say, said agreement con-
EEL FRA PRATER AE OE ETE SN EO EF eaeess ane Tuatha
’ BLEED THROUGH
A-15
tained various provisions for the allowance of price
adjustments during the life of the contract resulting
from increases to the defendant in its labor, material,
supply and other types of costs. From time to time,
under the provisions pertinent to the above costs the
contract has been adjusted price-wise per ton of coal
and resulting amendments to the base supply agree-
ment to embrace said adjustments have been made.
The basic coal supply agreement contains an
arbitration clause denominated 20.01, reading as fol-
lows:
“Any unresolved controversy between the
parties, arising under this agreement shall, at the
request of either party, be submitted to arbitra-
tion under the rules of the American Arbitration
Association. The cost and expense of any arbitra-
tion shall be shared equally by the parties, un-
less otherwise ordered by the arbitrator.” (Em-
phasis ours.)
The coal supply agreement further contains a
clause denominated as 26.01, reading as follows:
“Any gross proven inequity that may result
in unusual economic conditions not contemplated
by the parties at the time of the execution of this
agreement may be corrected by mutual consent.
Each party shall in the case of a claim of gross
inequity furnish the other with whatever docu-
mentary evidence may be necessary to assist in
affecting a settlement.
“Nothing contained in this section shall be
construed as relieving either the purchaser or the
seller from any of its respective obligations here-
A-16
under solely because of the existence of a claim
of inequity or the failure of the parties to reach an
agreement with respect thereto.”
Beginning in early Spring of 1974, Cimarron made
a request for an adjustment in price under paragraph
26.01. Meetings were held, the request was refused
by Georgia, whereupon Cimarron demanded arbitra-
tion which was refused by Georgia, whereupon Cim-
arron gave notice and ceased delivery under the supply
agreement, whereupon the plaintiff sued.
There is no real dispute about the facts, and the
issue before us is whether or not section 26.01 of the
supply agreement, as amended, is arbitrable under
the contract when the parties are unable to agree upon
relief thereunder.
Air Lines v. Louisville Air Board, 269 F.2d 811
stands for the proposition that state prohibitions
against arbitration have been preempted by federal
legislation and that therefore, absent some state law
deficiency as to the validity of the agreement itself,
such as fraud, et cetera, arbitration provisions will be
held valid. There is no contractual defect here under
Georgia law.
It appears to us from a perusal of the federal cases
appearing in the annotations to Title 9, Section 2, Ar-
bitration — such cases as Butler v. Unistrut, 367 F.2d,
733 (note 5-7), — that federal courts now look with
favor upon arbitration as a means of removing conten-
tions from the area of litigation, relieving congested
dockets and as a means of speedy and inexpensive
relief.
’ BLEED THROUGH
A-17
No one quarrels, least of all we, that for a dispute
to be arbitrable there must have been a contractual
agreement to arbitrate; however, the modern ten-
dency seems to be that on the issue of what was
agreed to be arbitrated, if “fairly debatable” or “rea-
sonably in doubt”, then such should go to arbitration.
Butler, supra. Likewise, no one quarrels with the pro-
position, as expressed in the law of Georgia cited by
the plaintiff, and also in the Necchi v. Necchi Sewing,
348 F.2d 693, a contract to make a contract is not en-
forceable, but such is not the case here.
Further, no one seems to disagree with the gen-
eral proposition of the law that though the Court may
not make a new contract for parties, or rewrite the
agreement under the guise of construction, the Court
must look to the instrument as a whole and, if it is not
ambiguous or uncertain, give it enforcement according
to the terms used by the parties in the language they
saw fit to employ. Evans v. Kelley, 214 F. Supp. 951.
In the instant matter, we are handed a contract.
It contains an arbitration clause expressing in sub-
stance that any unresolved controversy arising under
the agreement is subject to arbitration. It does not
except any provisions of the contract from its opera-
tion. Further, included as a part of that contract is the
clause denominated 26.01.
Along with this document, we are given the fact-
ual background that from time to time during the his-
tory of this agreement price adjustments have been
given to Cimarron, partially at least, under paragraph
26.01, when Georgia Power felt that the adjustment
requested was “cost related”, or otherwise beneficial
to it.
A-138
The plaintiff, it seems, would have us read and
interpret the arbitrability of 26.01 removed the con-
tract or in a legal vacuum, So to speak, arguing that
such a reading shows that 26.01 would stand only for
the proposition that “hope” is the only “mother” of
any thought of relief sought thereunder. We recognize
that read in a vacuum, and not with the contract as
a whole, 26.01 would mean nothing as far as arbitra-
bility is concerned as the avenue for denial of relief
thereunder, but we must decline plaintiff's invitation
to construe it in that narrow light. We see nothing in
the contract that directs us to follow that course of
interpretation.
There is no magic to price adjustments in this
long-term coal contract and certain types of adjust-
ments have been provided under this contract. There
is no claim or argument advanced by plaintiff that the
price adjustments initially provided for, or subse-
quently provided for by amendments under 3.02, 3.03
and 3.04, would not have been subject to arbitration
had the parties been unable to mutually agree there-
on; so it seems to us that the fact of an adjustment
under the gross inequity clause 96.01 not being arbi-
trable, as plaintiff would argue claiming such to be a
rewriting of the agreement, does not hold water —
particularly where this agreement was drafted by the
plaintiff, who, if it was not the intent of the parties
that 26.01 be subject to arbitration, could have simply
provided that 26.01 was not arbitrable. There is no
provision to that effect.
Thus, we hold that 26.01 is arbitrable and with
the Court’s general equitable power a judgment will
be entered without delay directing arbitration of the
BLEED THROUGH
A-19
unresolved dispute under 26.01. We express no
opinion as to the merits of Cimarron’s claim of gross
inequity.
(2) We do not find the plaintiff in breach for fail-
ure to arbitrate, for such would be an abuse of equity
and a negation of its historical justness by a technical
overriding by harsh legal doctrine, particularly in view
of the public interest inherent in this proceeding.
(3) As to Cimarron’s claim of breach by plaintiff
for refusal to arbitrate, we hold against Cimarron un-
der the equitable principles of (2) aforesaid, and the
further recognition of the fact that arbitrability here
as to 26.01 is a matter about which reasonable men, in
good faith, could differ, and I believe the plaintiff
had the right to satisfy itself by a judicial determina-
tion.
(4) As to Cimarron’s claim that arbitration was
a condition precedent to legal remedy and that the
plaintiff by seeking such has elected a remedy and
that the plaintiff by seeking such has elected a remedy
and waived arbitration, we hold against Cimarron
under equity principles and by our direction of arbi-
tration of this matter aforesaid.
(5) Plaintiff’s seeking of the declaratory judg-
ment as to arbitrability does not give Cimarron the
unilateral right to terminate.
(6) As to the affirmative defenses of plaintiff
raised in the answer to the counterclaim, we find that
adequate notice by Cimarron for arbitration was suf-
ficiently given and that Cimarron did not waive its
right to arbitrate by the contractual amendments it
was bound to and did execute after the arising of this
controversy.
A-20
The Court will retain this matter upon its docket
and a judgment will be forthwith entered directing
arbitration, there being no cause for delay, and the
status quo order of this Court heretofore entered by
agreement, without prejudice to the rights of the
parties, remains in full force and effect, pending the
outcome of the arbitration herein ordered, or, if ob-
jection is raised to said status quo order upon appeal,
until it is dissolved by an appellate judge of the Sixth
Circuit.
February 10, 1975
JAMES F’. GORDON
United States District Judge
Copies to:
Counsel of record.
Mu BLEED THROUGH
A-21
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT OWENSBORO
GEORGIA POWER
COMPANY,
Plaintiff, Civil Action
V. >
CIMARRON COAL No. C-74-107-0
CORPORATION,
Defendant, |
JUDGMENT
This matter having come on for trial and upon
the whole case the Court does adjudge as follows:
1. IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the
contract between the parties which is the subject
matter of this litigation is in full force and effect and
binding upon each of the said parties, plaintiff and
defendant.
2. ITIS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDG-
ED that the parties shall proceed without delay to
arbitration of the defendant’s claims asserted under
Section 26.01 of said contract.
3. ITIS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDG-
ED that the status quo order, without prejudice to the
rights of the parties, heretofore entered herein pro-
viding for delivery of coal under the contract shall re-
main in full force and effect.
i. oe
A-22
4. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDG-
ED that each party shall bear its own costs.
January 15, 1975
JAMES F.. GORDON
United States District Judge
Copies to: Counsel of record
PS a a aii Tere
PRL NSN A AEN EMME ERIE LEY BEE TO IOI
’ BLEED THROUGH
A-23
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION
GEORGIA POWER )
COMPANY,
Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION
vs.
CIMARRON COAL NO. 74-107
CORPORATION,
Defendant |
ORDER
This matter came on for hearing on November
21, 1974, and there were present Hon. Martin Roach,
Hon. Michael C. Murphy, Hon. J. Kirk Quillian and
Hon. Allen E. Lockerman on behalf of the plaintiff,
and Hon. W. Stuart McCloy, Sr. on behalf of the
defendant.
The Court ORDERS the defendant Cimarron to
deliver under the contract the contract quantities of
coal at their last agreed contract shipping price per
ton until a decision of this matter on the merits.
Provided: That, if after a hearing on the merits,
this Court finds the dispute under 26.01 to be arbi-
tratable and such determination is supported on
appeal, and
Provided further, that the arbitrator, acting pur-
suant thereto, should subsequently award the defen-
dant Cimarron relief under 26.01 in its per ton price,
then such award, so given, would be instituted
A-24
retroactively by the plaintiff, so as to include all tons
of coal shipped pursuant to this order.
It being understood, of course, that should this
Court after hearing on the merits determine 26.01 not
arbitratable and such position be upheld on appeal;
or having determined the same to be arbitratable
the defendant Cimarron fails to win the arbitration,
then in such event no additional sum would be owed
the defendant Cimarron for the coal shipped pur-
suant to this order.
November 21, 1974
JAMES F. GORDON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Counsel of record
APPENDIX “B”
COAL SUPPLY AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into on
the 6th day of February, 1969, by and between GEOR-
GIA POWER COMPANY, a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the State of Georgia,
and having its principal office in the City of Atlanta,
Georgia (“Purchaser”), and CIMARRON COAL COR-
PORATION, a corporation organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Tennessee, and having its
chief principal office in the City of Madisonville, Ken-
tucky (“Seller’’).
Purchaser represents and warrants that it owns
and operates power generating stations which require
large quantities of coal to operate.
Seller represents and warrants that it controls
through the instruments identified on Exhibit attached
hereto and made a part hereof certain acreages in Hop-
kins County, Kentucky (‘the Cimarron property’’),
outlined in red on a map which is attached hereto as
Exhibit 2 and made a part hereof, which contain more
than 20 million tons of coal that can be commercially
mined or recovered by strip, auger or deep mining
methods. Seller further represents and warrants that
it will build prior to the commencement date of this
Agreement fast loading facilities capable of loading
unit trains at the rate of 3,000 tons per hour.
NOW THEREFORE, Purchaser and Seller agree
as follows:
1.01. Mutual Obligations. Seller agrees to sell
B-2
coal to Purchaser, and Purchaser agrees to buy coal
from Seller on the terms and conditions and in the
quantities set forth below:
9.01. Term of Agreement. The term of this Agree-
ment shall be ten (10) years commencing January 1,
1970. After the expiration of the ten (10) year pri-
mary period of this Agreement, Purchaser shall have
successive options to renew this Agreement for three
periods of five (5) years each. The right to exercise
these options is conditioned upon negotiation of a mutu-
ally agreeable base price and upon Seller having suffi-
cient available coal reserves to dedicate for each option
period. Such options shall be exercised by giving Seller
two years’ written notice prior to termination of the
primary period or of the option period then in effect.
Upon receipt by Seller of such notice, Purchaser and
Seller shall proceed in good faith for sixty (60) days
to attempt to negotiate a mutually agreeable base mine
price for the option period involved. If a mutually
agreeable base mine price is negotiated, then Seller
shall promptly proceed to dedicate sufficient reserves to
fulfill its commitment; otherwise the contract shall
terminate and Purchaser shall not have any further
rights hereunder.
3.01. Base Price Per Ton of Coal. The Base Price
per ton of coal as of the date hereof is $4.03 f.o.b. rail-
road cars at the Cimarron unit train loading facilities.
Base Price is subject to adjustment from time to time,
and hereafter “Base Price” shall mean Base Price as
adjusted. “Ton” shall mean a ton of two thousand
(2,000) pounds avoirdupois weight.
302. Base Price Adjustment. The Base Price per
ENV AANA TARR TREMOR EAS TE? POTENT ARE, VOR
4 BLEED THROUGH
B-3
ton of $4.03 provided for in Section 3.01 is predicted
in part upon the strip mine wage scale rates, fringe
benefits, welfare payment rates, and working condi-
tions for labor employed in producing, washing and
loading coal prevailing on January 1, 1969 in Hopkins
County, Kentucky, and in part, upon the January 1,
1969 rates and amounts of all taxes and other burdens
(including, but not limited to, coal land reclamation
costs, but not including sales and use taxes paid by
Purchaser under Section 16.01 and income taxes or
taxes based upon income) imposed by any federal or
state statute, regulation or local ordinance on the own-
ership, production or sale of coal under this Agreement
(hereinafter collectively referred to as “government
imposition”) in force and effect on January 1, 1969.
The amounts and rates of said labor costs and
said governmental impositions in effect on January 1,
1969 are set forth in Exhibit 3 attached hereto and
made a part hereof.
3.03. Computation of Adjustment for Changes in
Certain Labor Costs.
(a) In the event and whenever after J anuary 1,
1969 the strip mine wage scale rates for producing,
washing or loading coal sold hereunder shall increase
or decrease over or under the arithmetic average wage
scale of $4.247 (14 wage classifications ranging in rate
from $4.765 to $3.865 giving an arithmetic average of
$4.247, hereinafter referred to as “base average wage
scale rate”), as set forth in item 1 of Exhibit 3, pur-
suant to any collective bargaining agreement lawfully
entered into by Seller, or pursuant to changes in strip
mine wage scale rates for producing, washing or load-
B-4
ing coal which are incurred by Seller at its mines on
the Cimarron property as the result of a change in na-
tional or regional bituminous coal union wage agree-
ments, then during the period any such increase or
decrease is in effect, the Base Price shall be increased
or decreased effective immediately as follows:
Effective with the date of any change in strip
mine wage scale rates referred to in this Section 3.03,
a new arithmetic average wage scale rate (hereinafter
referred to as “new average wage scale rate”) shall
be determined by the following formula:
Total of Seller’s Wage Scale
Rates for all Production Em-
New Average Wage _ ployees on the Cimarron Prop-
Scale Rate— erty Number of Seller’s Wage
Classifications of Production
Employees on the Cimarron
Property
The new average wage scale rate will be com-
pared with the base wage scale rate and the percentage
increase or decrease computed. The Base Price shall
then be increased or decreased by an amount deter-
mined by multiplying the percentage increase or de-
crease times $0.75, such $0.75 being the total cost of
labor per ton in effect January 1, 1969 on the Cimar-
ron property.
A detailed example of how the above escalation
plan is intended to operate is shown in Exhibit 5 which
is attached hereto and made a part hereof.
(b) If after execution of this Agreement it should
become necessary for Seller to enter into a collective
’ BLEED THROUGH
B-5
bargaining agreement with any union, Purchaser shall
pay one-third (1/3) of the then existing union welfare
fund payment made by Seller during the term of this
Agreement. Purchaser’s responsibility hereunder shall
noy include the satisfaction of any part of Seller’s lia-
nf y for any previously unfunded welfare fund cre-
aked by virtue of entering into such a collective bar-
gaining agreement.
3.04. Adjustment for Changes in Governmental
Impositions. In the event and whenever after January
1, 1969 any federal or state statute, regulation or
local ordinance or amendment thereto imposes or re-
moves, increases or decreases any governmental im-
positions set forth in items 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Exhibit
3, then during the period when such imposition, re-
moval, increase or decrease is in effect, the Base Price
shall be increased or decreased, as the case may be, by
the amount of such imposition, removal, increase or
decrease applicable to the coal sold to Purchaser here-
under.
Purchaser and Seller shall jointly estimate the
amount of any with the terms of the applicable tariff
as amended, supplemented or replaced. Anything in
this Agreement to the contrary notwithstanding, if
the applicable tariff, or such tariff as amended, sup-
plemented or replaced, imposes more onerous car load-
ing terms, conditions or duties on Seller than those
represented by Seller in this Agreement or than those
existing in the applicable tariff on January 1, 1970,
Purchaser shall pay Seller the cost of performing such
more onerous terms, conditions or duties within thirty
(30) days after receipt from Seller of a written state-
B-6
ment itemizing such charges and showing facts neces-
sary to permit Purchaser to verify such charges.
Purchaser and Seller mutually agree that this
Agreement is based on a coal tariff being published
by, or at the direction of, the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad Company which will provide acceptable unit
train rates, and which will permit the delivered cost
of Seller’s coal to Purchaser to be competitive with
other sources of coal, similarly situated, from which
Purchaser receives coal under long term contract. The
S.F.T.B. Freight Tariff 914-B, I.C.C. S-130 (Jacmac,
Georgia) as amended is not to be construed by Pur-
chaser or Seller as being the tariff referred to by this
paragraph.
5.02. Freight Charge and Risk of Loss. Subject
to reimbursement provided by Sections 5.03 and 5.04,
Purchaser shall pay all freight and other charges im-
posed by the tariff applicable to the destination of the
shipment and shall bear the risk of loss of said ship-
ment after each shipment has been loaded on cars
provided by carrier.
5.03. Excess Loading Costs Chargeable to Seller.
If Seller fails to satisfy the loading requirements of
the applicable tariff, as specified by Purchaser if more
than one origin loading time is available, and such
failure is not due to a Section 14.01 force majeure,
Seller shall pay Purchaser any resulting car detention
penalties or charges for cars not loaded to marked
capacity which Purchaser is required by such tariff
to pay carrier.
5.04. Excess Freight Costs Chargeable to Seller.
? BLEED THROUGH
B-7
If Seller fails to tender sufficient coal to satisfy the
quantity requirements of Section 7.01 and thereby fails
to satisfy the tonnage requirements of the applicable
tariff and such failure is not due to a Section 14.01
force majeure, Seller shall pay Purchaser any resulting
freight charges which Purchaser is required by such
tariff to pay carrier over the amount of such charges
otherwise payable; provided, however, that if under
applicable governmental regulations it is lawful for
Purchaser, in lieu of payment of such excess freight
charges required by the applicable tariff, to pay the
freight charges, at the tariff rate, on the amount of
coal which Seller, under Section 7.01 was obligated to,
but did not, ship for the time period in question, and if
such freight charges on such unshipped coal are less
than the above described excess freight charges, and
if the carrier is willing to accept such freight charges
on such unshipped coal in full settlement of Purch-
aser’s liability under the applicable tariff for the time
period in question, then Seller shall be obligated here-
under only to pay to Purchaser the amount of such
freight charges on such unshipped coal; provided fur-
ther, however, that where the tonnage requirements of
the applicable tariff are to be met in part by Seller and
in part by a supplier or suppliers other than Seller,
Seller shall have no responsibility to Purchaser for any
freight charges where such other supplier or suppliers
and not Seller fail to satisfy the quantity requirements
required of such supplier or suppliers, and Seller’s re-
sponsibility to Purchaser shall be limited to the pay-
ment of such excess freight charges required by such
tariff on the coal shipped by Seller under this Agree-
ment where both Seller and such other supplier or sup-
pliers fail to satisfy the quantity requirements re-
quired of them.
ee,
B-8
5.05. Payment of Excess Costs to Purchaser. Any
payments required by Sections 5.03 and 5.04 above
shall be promptly paid on receipt by Seller of a written
statement from Purchaser itemizing such charges. At
Seller’s election such charges may be credited against
amounts owed by Purchaser to Seller hereunder.
6.01. Shipping Notice. Promptly after loading each
shipment Seller shall mail Purchaser a notice of ship-
ment which shall include pertinent information about
such shipment as mutually agreed to by Purchaser and
Seller from time to time.
7.01. Quantity Requirements. Seller will tender
for delivery, and Purchaser will buy the following
quantities of coal:
(a) 1,400,000 tons during the first twelve (12)
month period of the term hereof;
(b) 1,400,000 tons during the second twelve (12)
month period of the term hereof; and
(c) 2,100,000 tons during each of the remaining
eight (8) twelve (12) month periods of the
term hereof.
8.01. Weighing. The weight of coal sold and de-
livered hereunder shall be determined from Seller’s
scales, which scales shall be acceptable to Purchaser
and the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and which
shall be certified by Southern Weighing and Inspection
Bureau. In the absence of scale weights from Seller,
the Purchaser and Seller will mutually determine by
what means the weight of coal sold, delivered and pur-
chased hereunder shall be determined.
’ BLEED THROUGH
B-9
The aggregate weights determined during any
payment period shall be accepted as the quantity of coal
sold and purchased during such period for which in-
voices are to be rendered and payments to be made.
9.01. Quality Specifications. All coal sold hereunder
shall conform to the following specifications:
(a) Content and Characteristicss
(All percentages shown below are percen-
tages by weight. )
As Received
Ash 9.9%
Fixed Carbon 36.7%
Moisture 8.0%
Volatile Matter 45.4%
100.0%
Sulphur 3.0%
Calorific Value 12,000 Btu/pound
Ash Fusion Temperature— 2175 Degrees
Softening (H—W) Fahrenheit
(ASTM Designation: D 1857-66 T)
Grindability Hardgrove—
(ASTM Designation
D 409-51 (1961) ) 56
(b) Size and Condition. Crushed and washed run
of mine three inch (3”) maximum size lumps;
no intermediate sizes removed; clean and free
of excess impurities.
10.01. Sampling and Analyses. Seller shall collect
samples of each shipment of coal sold hereunder in ac-
cordance with procedures and methods acceptable to
Purchaser and which meet basic American Society of
by ars LO EER SEPP DE et 5
B-10
Testing Materials (A.S.T.M.) standards, and Pur-
chaser shall analyze such samples in accordance with
the procedures outlined in Exhibit 4 which is attached
hereto and made a part hereof except as hereinafter
provided. Purchaser shall have the right at its option,
however, to contract with an independent, qualified,
commercial testing laboratory to perform, using the
procedures outlined in Exhibit 4, the analysis of the
samples referred to above and to perform or supervise
the sample preparation at Seller’s mine. If Purchaser
so elects to employ an independent, qualified, commer-
cial testing laboratory, Seller shall not be liable for any
costs incurred by Purchaser in use of such laboratory
except as hereinafter provided.
Purchaser may observe any samplings performed
by Seller and Seller may observe any analyses per-
formed by Purchaser or its designated commercial
laboratory.
All samples collected by Seller shall be divided
into at least two parts and put in suitable airtight
containers, the first container in each case to be for-
warded to Purchaser, or its designated commercial
laboratory, the second container in each case to be
held available by Seller for a period of thirty (30) days
from actual date of receipt of coal, by Purchaser
properly sealed and labeled, to be analyzed if a dis-
pute arises between Purchaser and Seller.
If a dispute arises between Purchaser and Seller
over the result or method of such analyses, a further
analysis of Seller’s second container shall be made
using the analytical procedures outlined in Exhibit 4
by an independent, qualified, commercial testing facili-
A RRL ALLELE IE SPE ETE E
’ BLEED THROUGH
B-11
ty, and the results of such further analyses shall be
binding upon the parties. The selection of such testing
facility shall be agreed upon by the parties; otherwise,
such selection shall be made by arbitration as provided
in Section 20.01 below. The cost of any independent
analysis shall be borne equally by Seller and Purchaser.
If any dispute arises concerning the method of
sampling used and such dispute is not promptly re-
solved by the parties, such dispute shall be referred
to arbitration as provided in Section 20.01 below.
11.01. Performance Under Contract. If the aver-
ages of the results of the analyses made in accordance
with Section 10.01 during any calendar quarter reveal
that the average percentages of the components of
the coal delivered during that quarter exceed 12% for
ash, 9.5% for moisture, or 3.3% sulphur, or if the
average as received calorific value of such coal for
such period shall be less than 11,500 Btu per pound,
Purchaser may advise Seller of such variations; and,
unless the variations are corrected during the next
calendar quarter, Purchaser may suspend deliveries
until Seller gives reasonable assurances that it will
thereafter eliminate such variations. In the event
deliveries should be so suspended as above provided,
Seller shall pay Purchaser any excess freight charges
under the applicable tariff resulting from a failure to
meet the quantity specifications in Section 7.01 hereof.
12.01. Quarterly Premium or Penalty for Vari-
ance in Average As Received Calorific Content. Pur-
chaser shall pay Seller a premium whenever the aver-
age as received calorific value of coal delivered during
any calendar quarter exceeds twelve thousand (12,000)
B-12
Btu per pound. Seller shall pay Purchaser a penalty
whenever the average as received calorific value of
coal delivered during any calendar quarter is less than
twelve thousand (12,000) Btu per pound.
The amount of such premium or penalty per ton
of coal shipped during any calendar quarter here-
- under shall be computed after the end of each calendar
quarter of the term of this Agreement and shall equal
the difference between the Base Price of coal delivered
during such calendar quarter and the Base Price of
such coal multiplied by a fraction, the denominator of
which shall be twelve thousand (12,000) and the num-
erator of which shall be the average as received calor-
ific value of the coal delivered during such calendar
quarter expressed in Btu. The average as received
calorific value as used in this Section 12.01 shall be
that abstracted from analyses determined as provided
in Section 10.01 above.
Purchaser shall give Seller written notice of the
amount of such premium or penalty as soon as all
analyses of coal shipped during such calendar quarter
have been completed, but no later than ninety (90)
days after the end of such calendar quarter. Unless
Seller protests the premium or penalty within fifteen
(15) days after receipt of such notice, the premium or
penalty shall be deemed accepted.
If the premium or penalty is not so protested,
Purchaser shall pay such premium, or Seller shall pay
such penalty, on or before the next succeeding payment
day provided by Section 4.01.
If the premium or penalty is so protested within
a —_ ,
TS WAAC g ONS IER. IIE PE OROL ESE IIE OI Ly
BLEED THROUGH
oy
B-13
such fifteen (15) day period and the parties are un-
able to resolve their dispute within thirty (30) days
following such protest, the parties shall promptly refer
the controversy to arbitration as provided in Section
20.01 below.
13.01. Additional Coal Production. Seller contem-
plates mining from the Cimarron property and selling
other coal over and beyond the requirements of this
contract. With respect to the sale of coal from this
property by contract providing for performance with-
in 365 days or less (“spot coal’), Seller shall offer in
writing to sell such spot coal to Purchaser before of-
fering to sell such spot coal to anyone other than Pur-
chaser, and Purchaser shall have seventy-two (72)
hours after the receipt of such offer to accept such
offer. If such offer is not accepted, Seller shall be free
to offer such spot coal to anyone. With respect to sale
of other than spot coal (“additional coal”), Seller shall
offer in writing to sell such additional coal to Pur-
chaser before offering to sell such additional coal to
anyone other than Purchaser, and shall promptly there-
after undertake in good faith to negotiate terms and
conditions with Purchaser. If Seller and Purchaser do
not execute a letter of intent to sell and purchase such
additional coal within thirty (30) days after Pur-
chaser receives such notice, Seller shall be free to offer
and to sell such additional coal to anyone. Purchaser
shall have no right to spot coal or additional coal or
to prevent Seller from selling spot coal or additional
coal to anyone other than Purchaser’s right.to notice
and to negotiate provided by this Section 13.01. Seller
shall not, however, during the term of this Agreement
authorize or permit disposition of coal from the Cimar-
B-14
ron property to be made to anyone other than the
Purchaser, execpt to the extent Seller may do so with-
out making the economically and commercially re-
coverable balance of coal in the Cimarron property an
amount less than the maximum tonnage to be there-
after supplied to Purchaser hereunder. Spot coal or
additional coal shall not interfere in any manner with
the movement of the coal contracted hereunder.
14.01. Force Majeure. “Force Majeure” as used
herein shall mean a cause beyond the control of the
Seller (its contractors and subcontractors) or Pur-
chaser, as the case may be, which wholly or partially
prevents the mining, loading or delivery of coal at or
from the Cimarron property, or the receiving, trans-
porting or delivering of coal by the railroads, or the
unloading, storing or burning of coal by Purchaser
at its destination. Examples( without limitations) of
force majeure, but only if beyond the control of Seller
(its contractors and subcontractors) or Purchaser, as
the case may be, are the following: Acts of God, acts of
the public enemy, insurrections, riots, strikes, labor
disputes, labor or material unavailability, fires, ex-
plosions, floods, breakdowns of or damage to plants,
mines equipment or facilities, faults in coal seams, in-
terruptions to or contingencies or facilities, faults in
coal seams, interruptions to or contingenies of trans-
portation, embargoes, orders or acts of civil (includ-
ing, without limitation, a city or county ordinance or
regulation, an act of a state legislature and an act of
the United States Congress) or military authority, and
material reduction in the Purchaser’s customers’ de-
mand for power. If because of force majeure either
Purchaser or Seller is unable to carry out its obligation
under this Agreement, and if such party promptly
SGN LPR GIES OY SARA Dia seine — .
OGRA DEAS ib 8 Vk <5 IRC AIELLO ROE, (LAL GE ALE EE
’ BLEED THROUGH
B-15
gives the other party hereto written notice of such
force majeure, the obligations and liabilities of the
party giving such notices and the corresponding obli-
gations of the other party shall be suspended to the
extent made necessary by and during the continuance
of such force majeure; provided, however, that the
disabling effects of such force majeure shall be elimi-
nated as soon as and to the extent possible.
In the event that during the continuance of this
Agreement, any legal restrictions are imposed which
restrict Purchaser from burning the coal to be supplied
by Seller under this Agreement, any such restriction
shall be deemed to be an event of force majeure under
this Agreement unless its effect can reasonably be
avoided as hereinafter provided. If any such restric-
tion is imposed, Purchaser shall promptly consider
what steps can be taken in the handling and combus-
tion of coal at Purchaser’s plants to avoid such rstric-
tion, and if such steps are reasonable available, which
in Purchaser’s judgment are feasible and will not result
in unreasonable expense to Purchaser, Purchaser shall
promptly take such steps, and such event of force
majeure shall be deemed eliminated. If no such steps
are available or if Purchaser in its judgment deter-
mines such steps are not reasonable or will result in
unreasonable expense to Purchaser, Purchaser shall
so advise Seller. Thereupon Purchaser and Seller shall
promptly consider what steps can be taken in the min-
ing and preparation of coal at Seller’s mine to avoid
such restriction, and if in Purchaser’s judgment such
steps are available at a reasonable expense, such steps
will be taken and the Base Price shall be increased to
compensate Seller for any such additional expense in-
curred by it in taking such steps. No expense contem-
B-16
plated by this paragraph shall be deemed reasonable
if it would result in a delivered price of coal in excess
of the delivered price of competitive fuels or sources
then available to Purchaser.
Any deficiencies in the production or sale of coal
hereunder caused by force majeure shall not be made
up except by mutual consent nor shall the term of this
Agreement be extended by a force majeure. In the
event force majeure reduces Purchaser’s obligation to
purchase coal hereunder, except where Seller does not
offer coal which avoids the restriction referred to in
the preceding paragraph, the minimum quantity of
coal to be sold to Purchaser hereunder shall be that
percentage of Purchaser’s total requirements of rail
delivered coal (as reduced by reason of force ma jeure)
which equals Seller’s percentage hereunder of the total
requirements of rail delivered coal under al! Pur-
chaser’s contracts (having a term of more than three
(3) years) for the purchase of coal in effect immedi-
ately before the taking effects of such force majeure.
Notwithstanding the definition of the term force
majeure above, no cause shall excuse Purchaser or
Seller from full performance insofar as its obligations
under Sections 5.03 and 5.04 unless the cause is one
which is determined by the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad Company to be an event of force majeure
under the provisions of the applicable tariff and ap-
plicable supplements thereto. The construction, inter-
pretation and application of the applicable tariff force
majeure provisions made by the responsible Louisville
and Nashville Railroad Company official shall be bind-
ing upon the parties for this purpose.
7 BLEED THROUGH
B-17
15.01. Assumption of Risks. Any party to this
Agreement, whose agent or property shall go or be
placed on the premises of the other party in order to
implement the terms of this Agreement, assumes the
risk of injury or death to such agent and damages to
such property, and will indemnify and hold the other
party harmless against all loss or liability from what-
ever source, including the sole or joint negligence of
the other party, arising on account of any such injury,
death or damage.
16.01. Sales and Use Taxes. Purchaser shall pay
all sales or use taxes applicable to the sale or use of
coal sold hereunder.
17.01. Construction of Railway Track. Both par-
ties shall use their best efforts to encourage carrier to
complete construction of railway track from its exist-
ing track to the unit train loading facility by October
1, 1969. Such track extension shall be made at no cost
to Purchaser.
18.01. Binding E ffect. This contract shall bind and
inure to the benefits of the parties, their successors and
assigns under Section 19.01.
19.01. Assignments. Neither party may assign
this contract or any rights or obligations hereunder
without the prior written consent of the other party,
but such consent shall not be reasonably withheld.
20.01. Arbitration. Any unresolved controversy
between the parties, arising under this Agreement
shall, at the request of either party, be submitted to
arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitra-
B-18
tion Association. The cost and expense of any arbitra-
tion shall be shared equally by the parties, unless other-
wise ordered by the arbitrator.
21.01. Waiver. The failure of either party to in-
sist on strict performance of any provisions of this
Agreement, or to take advantage of any right here-
under, shall not be construed as a waiver of such pro-
vision or right.
29.01. Remedies Cumulative. Remedies provided
under this Agreement shall be cumulative and in addi-
tion to other remedies provided by law, provided all
such remedies shall be subject to the preceding require-
ment of arbitration.
Seller shall, within 24 hours of the receipt thereof
by Seller, mail Purchaser (at Purchaser’s address as
set forth in Section 23.01) a copy of any notice of de-
fault by Seller in the observance or performance of
Seller’s convenants and obligations (or any of them)
under any of the leases identified on Exhibit 1; upon
receipt of any such copy, Purchaser shall have the
right (but not the obligation) to correct for the ac-
count of Seller any default contained in such notice
and to deduct from amounts due or to become due to
Seller hereunder the cost of correction thereof together
with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent (6% )
per annum.
23.01. Notices. Any notice, request, protest, con-
sent, demand, report or statement given by one party
to the other shall be in writing and deemed duly re-
ceived seventy-two (72) hours after it is deposited
PEF MY OU INS a 0h leh SSeS ENO ELEN
B-19
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, and proper-
ly addressed as follows:
(1) If to Purchaser,
Mr. E. I. Hatch, President
Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 4545
Atlanta, Georgia 30302
(or to such other person or address as Seller shall
have designated by due notice to Purchaser.
(2) If the notice is to Seller,
Mr. Robert Anderson, Jr.
Cimarron Coal Corporation
P. O. Box 89
Madisonville, Kentucky 42431
(or to such other person or address as Seller shall
have designated by due notice to Purchaser).
24.01. Captions. The captions to sections hereof
are for convenience only and shall not be considered
in construing the intent of the parties.
25.01. Applicable Law. This Agreement shall be
construed under the laws of the State of Georgia.
26.01. Adjustments for Gross Inequities. Any
gross proven inequity that may result in unusual eco-
nomic conditions not contemplated by the parties at the
time of the execution of this Agreement may be cor-
rected by mutual consent. Each party shall in the case
of a claim of gross inequity furnish the other with
whatever documentary evidence may be necessary to
assist in affecting a settlement.
Bit ST Sl Sa RRA PKS HEM
Bipiire Nachle eta. pS
B-20
Nothing contained in this section shall be con-
strued as relieving either the Purchaser or Seller from
any of its respective obligations hereunder solely be-
cause of the existence of a claim of inequity or the
failure of the parties to reach an agreement with re-
spect thereto.
27.01. Replacement Coal. In the event Seller fails
to produce and tender for delivery coal from the re-
serves dedicated herein an amount of coal sufficient to
meet the delivery requirements hereunder for the pri-
mary period, or any applicable option period, Seller
will supply coal of equal quality from other sources and
upon the same terms and conditions herein.
Seller agrees to notify Purchaser in writing of its
intention to supply coal from other sources. Purchaser
shall have the right to approve the proposed substitu-
tion, but approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.
Any coals substituted hereunder shall be priced
such that the delivered-to destination-cost per million
Btu to Purchaser shall not exceed the then existent
delivered-to destination-cost per million Btu of the coal
most recently supplied to Purchaser by Seller from the
Cimarron property. “Destination” for the purpose of
this paragraph only shall mean Purchaser’s generat-
ing station now under construction on the Etowah
River near Cartersville, Georgia.
28.01. Entire Agreement. This instrument con-
tains the entire agreement between the parties, and
there are no represetntations, understanding or agree-
ments, oral or written, which are not included herein.
B-21
This Agreement cannot be changed except by duly
authorized representatives of both parties in writing.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have
caused this Agreement to be executed by their duly
authorized officers.
GEORGIA POWER
COMPANY
By: H. L. BOWEN
Vice President
CIMARRON COAL
CORPORATION
By: ROBERT ANDERSON, JR.
President
ATTEST:
C. L. RATTERREE
Asst. Secretary
ATTEST:
WILLIAM E. LEGHON
Asst. Secretary
B-22
EXHIBIT 1
A. POND RIVER - FIES PROPERTIES
1. Lease by Diamond Trust to Cimarron Coal Cor-
poration dated January 27, 1969, covering fol-
lowing properties :
(a) Property acquired by Diamond Trust from
Island Creek Coal Company by Deed dated June
28, 1968, and recorded in Book 319, Page 555,
Hopkins County Clerk’s office.
Tracts identified on Island Creek property map
D-11 as:
Tract 250 — Todd
Tract 251 — Todd
Tract 252 — Todd
Tract 253 — Slayton
Tract 254 — Smith
Tract 255 — Cavanah
Tract 256 — Hanner
Tract 257 — Parker
Tract 266 — Slaton
Tract 267 — Short
Tract 268 — Browder
Tract 269 — Slaton
Tract 270 — Fugate
Tract 271 — Browder
Tract 408 — Slaton
(b) Easements acquired by Diamond Trust from
Island Creek Coal Company by conveyance dated
September 27, 1968, and recorded in Book 321,
Page 109 Hopkins County Court Clerk’s office
applicable to the following tracts identified on
Island Creek property map D-11 as:
’ BLEED THROUGH
Tse
5
B-23
Tract 254-A — Smith
Tract 257 — Parker
Tract 267 —Short
Tract 266 —Slaton
Tract 271 — Browder
(c) Property acquired by Diamond Trust from
L. R. Slayton, et ux., by Deed dated January 3,
1969, and recorded in Book 322, Page 492, Hop-
kins County Court Clerk’s office.
(d) Property leased by Diamond Trust from
Neva Sisk and husband, Ed Sisk, under lease
dated September 10, 1968.
(e) Property acquired by Diamond Trust from
Peabody Coal Company by Deed dated January
22, 1969, and recorded in Book 323, Page 78,
Hopkins County Court Clerk’s office.
. Quitclaim Deed by Badgett Mine Stripping Cor-
poration to Cimarron Coal Corporation dated
January 1, 1969, covering property conveyed by
Sherman Littlepage, et ux., to Badgett Mine
Stripping Corporation by Deed dated June 2,
1965, and recorded in Book ., Page __, Hop-
kins County Court Clerk’s office.
. Quitclaim by Rogers Badgett, et ux., to Cimar-
ron Coal Corporation dated January 1, 1969,
and recorded in Book .., Page __., Hopkins
County Court Clerk’s office covering property
conveyed by Jessie Noble Slaton to Rogers Bad-
gett by Deed dated October 24, 1964, and record-
ed in Book 293, Page 396, Hopkins County Court
Clerk’s office.
B-24
B. CIMARRON (Trust No. 1)
Lease by Russell Badgett, Jr., Trustee to Cimarron
Coal Corporation dated August 28, 1967, and re-
corded in Book , Page .., Hopkins County
Court Clerk’s office covering property conveyed to
Russell Badgett, Jr., Trustee by Island Creek Coal
Company by Deed dated... .... > kee
recorded in Book 289, Page 416, Hopkins County
Court Clerk’s office.
C. WHITE PLAINS (Trust No. 2)
1. Lease by Russell Badgett, Jr., Trustee, to Cimar-
ron Coal Corporation dated January 1, 1969,
and recorded in Book ..., Page _., Hopkins
County Court Clerk’s office covering the follow-
ing property:
(a) Property conveyed to Russell Badgett, Jr.,
Trustee, by Island Creek Coal Company by Deed
dated... -_.,19..., and recorded in Book
317, Page 548, Hopkins County Court Clerk’s
office.
(b) Property leased by Russell Badgett, Jr.,
Trustee from Dow Mercer, et ux., under lease
dated April 24, 1968, recorded in Book 86, Page
155, Hopkins County Court Clerk’s office.
2. Property subleased to Cimarron Coal Corpor-
ation by Rogers Badgett, et ux., by sublease
dated January 1, 1969, recorded in Book _,
Page ._., Hopkins County Court Clerk’s office
covering property leased by Harlan R. Allen, et
ux., et al., by lease dated November 9, 1967, and
recorded in Book 83, Page 561, Hopkins County
Court Clerk’s office.
. RPIicrn THROUGH
B-25
3. Property quitclaimed to Cimarron Coal Corpora-
tion by Badgett Mine Stripping Corporation by
Quitclaim Deed dated January 1, 1969, recorded
covering the property conveyed by Virgil D.
Scott, et ux., et al., by Deed dated August 28,
1964, and recorded in Book 293, Page 16, Hop-
kins County Court Clerk’s office.
EXHIBIT “3”
CIMARRON COAL CORPORATION
ITEM
1. Wage Rates - Production Employees -
January 1, 1969
Wage Classification Straight Time Per Hour
Shovel and Dragline Operator (1) $4.765
4-8Cu Yd.
Shovel and Dragline Oiler (1) $4.215
Over 2 1/2 Cu. Yd.
Bulldozer Operators (1) $4.415
Over D-6 or Equivalent
Grader Operator (1) $4.415
Overburden & Coal Driller (1) $4.065
& Shooters
Pit Mechanic (First Class) (1) $4.415
Pit Mechanic (Second Class) (1) $4.265
Pit Welder (1) $4.265
Tractor - Truck Driver (1) $4.165
7 Tons & Over
Tipple Mechanic (First Class) (1) $4.415
Tipple Mechanic & Welder (1) $4.065
Tipple Operator (1) $4.065
B-26
Tipple Loading Boom Operator (1) $4.065
Car Cleaner, Car Dropper, (1) $3.865
Load Rider Ken
14 $59.460
Arithmetic Average
Wage Scale Rate = $59.460 = $4.247
14
Note: Extra per hour for second shifts eight cents and
for third shift ten cents.
2. Fringe Benefits
Hospitalization Insurance—$32.91 average per em-
ployee. Selective Incentive Bonus based on 10c/ton
mined.
3. Welfare Payment Rates
None
4. Federal Insurance Contributions Act and State and
Federal Unemployment Tax Acts
Federal Insurance Contributions Act—4.8% of each
employee’s gross pay up to $7,800.00 per year.
State Unemployment Tax—2.7% of each employee’s
gross pay up to $3,000.00 per year.
Federal Unemployment Tax—0.40% of each em-
ployee’s gross pay up to $3,000.00 per year.
5. Workmen’s Compensation
Classification Rates Per $100 of Wages
Clerical 0.04
Surface Mining 2.58
6. Working Conditions
None
I” SLIMLINE LLL SARIN
> RILEED THROUGH
B-27
7. Property Taxes
(Based on an assessment equal to 100% for fair
market value)
County Tax Per $100 of Assessment
Hopkins County $1.09
8. Severance County
None
9. Other Taxes or Burdens
Gross Reclamation cost per ton—$0.07
* * . *
The listing of the Classification in item 1 above is
not intended to preclude or limit the addition of em-
ployees in a new job Classification or different Job
Classification not so listed.
If any labor cost or governmental imposition is in
existence as of January 1, 1969 but is not included in
the above schedule, discovery of such cost or imposition
shall not vary the Base Price per ton except to the
extent of any increase or decrease of such cost or im-
position occurring after January 1, 1969.
EXHIBIT “4”
LABORATORY PROCEDURES
(A) Air Drying—Laboratory Sample
The sample (including container with lid and
pan) will be weighed on a balance with a sensitivity of
not less than 0.5 gram. The coal will be spread out in
a non-corroding pan and of sufficient size that the
depth is not more than one inch, the pan with the coal,
container and lid will be placed in an air-drying oven
B-28
with a temperature of 0-15° C above room temperature
and will be air-dried until the loss in weight is not
more than 0.1% in one hour. Before final weight is
taken, air will be circulated through the oven with heat
turned off for at least two hours and the coal then re-
moved to the sample preparation area so that the
temperature and condition of the coal will be in equili-
brium with the air in the room where further sample
preparation is to be done. The weight of the coal plus
pan plus container and lid will be recorded and the air-
drying loss will be calculated as follows:
c, Air Drying Loss — W: — W: x 100
W: — W:
Where W: = Wet weight of coal + pan + con-
tainer -+ lid
w: — Air dry weight of coal + pan +
container + lid
W: — Weight of empty pan + container
+ lid
(B) Residual Moisture
A residual moisture sample of from 50 to 100
grams will be divided out by riffling, using an enclosed
riffle, with 24 three-eights inch divisions, from the air-
dried U.S. No. 8 coal. This will be placed in an air-
tight bottle and mixed on wheel mixer. As an alternate
to riffing, the 50 to 100 gram sample will be secured
by taking small spoonsful from the air-dried coal
spread out over the pan.
The residual moisture in the air-dried coal will be
B-29
determined by weighing on an analytical balance ap-
proximately 10 grams of coal to an accuracy of = 1
Mg. into a tared aluminum box (approximately 75 mm
in diameter and 19mm in height) which has been pre-
viously dried, cooled in dessicator and then tared. This
will be placed in a box type forced air oven, similar to
Theleo Oven Model No. 18, Fisher Isotemp or equiva-
lent, maintained at a temperature of 104-110°C for a
period of one and one-half hours. The lid will be placed
on the box, removed from the oven and placed in a des-
sicator containing indicating grade aluminum oxide
for about thirty minutes or until cool before weighing
on an analytical balance. The percent loss in weight
will be the residual moisture.
(C) Total Moisture Calculation
% Total Moisture =
(100-% Air Drying Loss( x Residual Moisture
100
+ Air Drying Loss
(D) Pulverizing—Laboratory Sample
The entire sample left after the residual moisture
has been removed will be reduced in an enclosed pul-
verizer, (Holmes design or equivalent) to approximate-
ly U.S. No. 60. The sample will be divided to a mini-
mum of 50 grams by riffling using an enclosed riffle
with 24 three-eights inch divisions. The minimum of
50 grams will be screened on a U.S. No. 60 Sieve, any
oversize will be crushed in an agate mortar or equiva-
lent to pass the U.S. No. 60 Sieve and will be put back
with that passing the No. 60 Sieve. The sample will be
placed in an airtight bottle and mixed for a minimum
PRONE ISIT ARERR A ARTI SB ROTTER oA
B-30
of fifteen minutes on a wheel mixer. The sample will
then be ready for the laboratory determinations.
(E) Moisture—U.S. No. 60 Sample
The moisture in the U.S. No. 60 coal will be de-
termined on approximately one gram in a porcelain
capsule 7/8” in depth and 1-3/4” in diameter. A well
fitting aluminum cover will be provided for covering
the capsule during weighing and after drying. Ap-
proximately one gram of coal will be weighed to an
accuracy of + 0.5 Mg. in the capsule which has been
previously dried, cooled in dessicator and then tared.
The capsule (with lid off) containing the coal will be
dried in a box type oven with forced air circulation,
similar to Theleo Oven Model 18, Fisher Isotemp or
equivalent, maintained at a temperature of 104-110°C
for one hour. The lid will be placed on the capsule, the
covered capsule will be removed from oven and placed
in a dessicator containing indicating grade aluminum
oxide for about 30 minutes, or until cool before weigh-
ing. The percent loss in weight will be the percent
moisture in the U.S. No. 60 Coal.
(F) Ash
For the ash determination, the porcelain capsules
containing the dried coal from the 60 mesh moisture
determination will be placed in a cold electric muffle
furnace and the temperature gradually raised to 700-
750°C at a rate to avoid mechanical loss from too rapid
expulsion of volatile matter. The ignition will be
finished to constant weight (+ 0.001 g) at a tempera-
ture of 700-750°C. The capsule containing the ash will
be placed in the dessicator and weighed as soon as cold.
BLEED THROUGH
ORDER ERENT MOE? LTR ORI ape
B-31
(G) Volatile Matter
Volatile matter, when required, will be deter-
mined by the method in ASTM Designation D271-64
paragraphs 16, 17 and 18. The Fieldner electric type
furnace will be used.
(H) Calorific Value
The gross calorific value (gross heat of combus-
tion) in British thermal units (Btu) will be deter-
mined using a calorimeter for which radiation correc-
tions are determined or the Parr Adiabatic Calori-
meter or equivalent as given in ASTM Designation
D271-64 paragraphs 51 to 55 and ASTM Designation
D2015-66.
(1) Sulfur
Sulfur will be determined using the Eschka meth-
od or the bomb washing method as given in ASTM
Designation D271-64 paragraphs 21-26 inclusive.
(J) Ash Softening Temperature
The ash softening temperature, when required,
will be determined by the methods given in ASTM
Designation D1857-66T.
(K) Calculations
Calculations of ash, volatile matter, Btu and sul-
fur will be made as follows:
Dry Basis =
Uncorrected (as weighed U.S. No. 60 Sample) Results «x 100
100—(% Moisture in U.S. No. 60 Cample)
As Received Basis =
(100-% Total Moisture) « (% Dry Basis)
100
B-32
EXHIBIT “5S”
SAMPLE CALCULATIONS
CHANGE IN WAGE SCALE RATES
(All figures shown are hypothetical and have no
particular significance to the parties to this contract. )
Wage Scale Rates (April 1, 1966)
Wage Classifications Per Hour Per Day
1. Shovel Runner $4.10 $29.73
2. Electrician $3.85 $27.90
3. Truck Mechanic $3.85 $27.90
4. Welder $3.85 $27.90
5. Bulldozer Operator $3.75 $27.19
6. Craneman $3.73 $27.07
7. Fireman $3.61 $26.18
8. Washerman $3.57 $25.86
9. Rock Driller $3.56 $25.79
10. Jack Hammer Operator $3.56 $25.79
11. Oiler $3.55 $25.74
12. Tractor Operator $3.51 $25.48
13. Driver—Large Truck $3.51 $25.48
14. Ground Shovel $3.50 $25.39
15. Jigman $3.47 $25.15
16. Tippleman $3.45 $24.98
17. Rock Driller Helper $3.45 $24.98
18. Truck Driver—less than $3.43 $24.85
8-ton capacity
The wage classifications are 18 in number ranging
from $4.10 per hour to $3.43 per hour and average
arithmatically $3.63 per hour—Base Average Wage
Seale Rate. Seller represented $0.75/ton labor com-
ponent in Base Price of coal under contract.
ROE LIE LAOL ND 2 GEE EIU SEE MESES TORE VELL SITIO OO OE
? BLEED THROUGH
B-33
On October 1, 1968 Seller notifies Purchaser of wage
escalation as a result of U.M.W.A. Wage Agreement.
Seller provides Purchaser with the following wage clas-
sifications and new wage scale rates:
Wage Scale Rates (October 1, 1968)
Wage Classification Per Hour Per Day
1. Shovel Runner | $4.56 $33.03
2. Electrician $4.28 $31.04
3. Electrician Helper $4.17 $30.20
4. Truck Mechanic $4.28 $31.04
5. Welder $4.28 $31.04
6. Bulldozer Operator $4.17 $30.24
7. Motor Grader Operator $4.17 $30.24
8. Front End Loader Operator $4.17 $30.24
9. Washerman $4.03 $29.20
10. Driller $4.04 $29.31
11. Jack Hammer Operator $4.04 $29.31
12. Oiler $4.08 $29.61
13. Tractor Operator $3.99 $28.95
14. Driver—Large Truck $4.03 $29.23
15. Groundman—Shovel $4.20 $30.42
16. Groundman—Shovel $3.98 $28.84
17. Jigman $3.95 $28.66
18. Tippleman $3.94 $28.54
19. Barge Loader $3.94 $28.54
20. Driller Helper $3.94 $28.57
21. Truck Driver— $3.91 $28.35
8 ton or less
22. Coal Auger Operator $4.05 $29.33
23. Coal Auger Helper $3.93 $28.51
24. Shooter $4.04 $29.31
25. Cable Puller Operator $4.17 $30.24
The wage classifications effective October 1, 1968 are
25 in number ranging from $4.56 per hour to $3.91
B-34
per hour and average arithmetically $4.09 per hour—
New Average Wage Scale Rate.
New Average Wage Scale Rate $4.09
Base Average Wage Scale Rate $3.63
Difference $0.46 (increase)
$0.46 —- $3.63 = 12.67% increase
0.1267 x $0.75 — $0.09525 or $0.10 per ton increase
Base Price specified in Contract f.o.b. mine $4.03/ton
Increase—effective October 1, 1968 $0.10
New Price f.o.b. Mine $4.13
ETN MOREE EL LR EA eT CR — ———_—
; 5 SCP REDE ATERLEG_LLLEE LLL LLRII EL ILEALGIE LES
» BLEED THROUGH
B-35
AMENDMENT TO COAL SUPPLY AGREEMENT
THIS AMENDMENT is made and entered into
as of the Ist day of January, 1973, by and between
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, a corporation organ-
ized and existing under the laws of the State of Geor-
gia, and having its principal office in the City of
Atlanta, Georgia (“Purchaser”), and CIMARRON
COAL CORPORATION, a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Tennessee, and
having its principal office in the City of Madisonville,
Kentucky (“Seller”).
WITNESSETH:
In consideration of the mutual convenants con-
tained herein, the parties hereby amend the Coal Sup-
ply Agreement entered into by the parties on the 6th
day of February 1969 as follows:
1. Section 2.01 of the Coal Supply Agreement is
amended by deleting the first sentence of said section
and substituting in the place thereof the following:
“Except as the term hereof is extended to
provide for coal shipments in 1980 pursuant
to Section 7.01, as amended, the term of this
Agreement shall be ten (10) years commenc-
in January 1, 1970.”
2. Section 7.01 of the Coal Supply Agreement is
amended by deleting the section in its entirely and
nesercain
i a a aa
B-36
substituting in its place a new Section 7.01 which
shall read as follows:
“Quantity Requirements. Seller will tender
for delivery, and Purchaser will buy the fol-
lowing quantities of coal:
(a) 1,400,000 tons during the calendar year
of 1970;
(b) 1,400,000 tons during the calendar year
of 1971;
(c) 1,400,000 tons during the calendar year
of 1972;
(d) 1,600,000 tons during the calendar year
of 1973, provided that either party, upon
ninety (90) days written notice may require
shipments for the remainder of the calendar
year at an annual rate of 2,100,000 tons;
(e) 2,100,000 tons during each of the calen-
dar years 1974 through 1979,
(f) 700,000 tons during the calendar year
of 1980 plus an additional amount equal to
the difference between 2,100,000 and the num-
ber of tons actually shipped during 1973.”
Except as provided herein, the Coal Supply Agree-
ment executed by the parties on February 6, 1969 is
not otherwise modified or amended.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have
SN SRAELALEN INE AOE ASRS Sha SRE TLE GDA LE LIED IE NEE I ALE IED OE
’ BLEED THROUGH
B-37
caused this Amendment to be executed by their duly
authorized officers, as of the date and year first above
written.
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
By: R. W. SCHERER
Vice President
CIMARRON COAL CORPORATION
By: ROBERT ANDERSON, JR.
President
Attest:
C. L. RATTERREE
Assistant Treasurer
Attest:
EMMITT D. ANDERSON
B-38
AMENDMENT TO COAL SUPPLY AGREEMENT
This Amendment executed this 20th day of No-
vember, 1973, to the Coal Supply Agreement dated
February 6, 1969, as amended January 1, 1973, by and
between Cimarron Coal Corporation (Seller) and
Georgia Power Company (Purchaser)
WITNESSETH:
For and in consideration of the benefits set forth
herein and the mutual promises of the parties hereto,
Seller and Purchaser do hereby agree to further amend
said Coal Supply Agreement as follows:
1. By adding a new section thereto which will pro-
vide as follows:
3.07. Adjustments for Changes in Cost of Sup-
plies. Adjustments for changes in the gross cost of sup-
plies used in the production of coal for delivery under
this Agreement shall be made in the following manner:
Any changes in the base price of supplies shall be
made by determining periodically the percentage
change which shall have occurred since July, 1973, in a
composite of the following price indices published by
the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics in the
following respective relative weights:
BLS Code Relative
Commodity Number Weight
Construction Machinery & Equipment 112 50.0
Petroleum Products—Refined 057 10.0
PERO LL LE ROE NREL I OCI TIO EN LADY OYE, sii SE TROON EY ILO LIES EE PORE ORE *
’ BLEED THROUGH
B-39
Electric Power 054 10.0
Explosives 0679-02 15.0
Tires and Tubes 0712 8.0
Wire and Cable 1026 7.0
100.0
Any changes on or after January 1, 1974, in the
base price of supplies shall be based on changes in a
composite index number for January and July of each
calendar year during the life of this Agreement. The
percentage change in said index from 128.5 (the level
of such index for July, 1973 on the basis that the year
1967 — 100) shall be determined semi-annually to be
effective January 1 and July 1 and shall be applied to
$1.50, such $1.50 being the per ton amount of the
supplies cost component of the Base Price for purposes
of this Section 3.07. The resulting amount, less pre-
vious adjustments made under this section, shall be
added to or substracted from, as the case may be, the
Base Price in effect in the beginning of the month for
which the composite index number is computed, and
shall govern until the beginning of the next succeeding
January or July, as the case may be.
In the event of a published change or revision in
the base for any of the components of said indices or
if a new base is adopted, the revised or new index shall
be adjusted to said base of 1967 equals 100. If such
index is discontinued or otherwise becomes unavailable,
the parties shall utilize a mutually satisfactory sub-
stitute method of price adjustment for materials and
supplies.
An example of how the provisions of this section
are intended to operate is shown in Exhibit 6 attached
hereto and made a part hereof.
B-40
2. By adding a new section thereto, which shall
provide as follows:
3.08. Computation of Adjustment for Changes in
Supervisory Labor Cost. Adjustments for change in the
cost of supervisory labor at the mine shall be made in
the following manner:
If after July 1, 1973, any revision in the base
price as results from any collective bargaining agree-
ment lawfully entered into by Seller or pursuant to
changes in national or regional bituminous coal union
wage agreements is made relative to Section 3.03 here-
under, then beginning with the effective date of such
revision, the base price shall be further increased or
decreased, as the case may be, by an amount deter-
mined by multiplying that percentage change in the
average wage scale rate, when compared to the base
wage scale rate* as calculated for hourly employees
under Section 3.03, times $0.152, such $0.152 being
the total per ton cost of supervisory labor in effect
July 1, 1973. (*Base wage scale rate as used in this
Section 3.08 shall mean the average wage scale rate
for producing, washing or loading coal sold hereunder
on the effective date of the last adjustment. )
Under no circumstances shall Purchaser be re-
quired to compensate Seller for any increase which
exceeds that percentage increase in daily wage rates as
results from the change in national or regional bitumi-
nous coal union wage agreements.
The job classifications used in said supervisory
labor cost in effect on July 1, 1973, are set forth in
Exhibit 7 attached hereto and made a part hereof.
BLEED THROUGH
=
B-41
3. Section 7.01 of the Coal Supply Agreement is
amended by deleting the section in its entirety and sub-
stituting in lieu thereof the following:
7.01. “Quantity Requirements.” Seller will tender
for delivery, and Purchaser will buy the following
quantites of coal:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
1,400,000 tons during the calendar year of
1970;
1,400,000 tons during the calendar year of
1971;
1,400,000 tons during the calendar year of
1972;
1,600,000 tons during the calendar year of
1973;
1,600,000 tons during the calendar year of
1974, provided that either party upon ninety
(90) days written notice may require ship-
ments for the remainder of the calendar year
at an annual rate of 2,100,000 tons;
(f) 2,100,000 tons during each of the calendar
(g)
years 1975 through 1979;
1,200,000 tons during the calendar year of
1980 plus an additional amount equal to the
difference between 2,100,000 and the number
of tons actually shipped during 1974.
4, Except as provided herein and in the Amend-
ment to Coal Supply Agreement executed January 1,
1973, the Coal Supply Agreement dated February 6,
1969, is not otherwise altered or modified as is in all
respects ratified and affirmed.
a
B-42
In Witness Whereof, the parties have caused this
Amendment to their Agreement to be duly executed
and attested in several counterparts, under their re-
spective corporate seals and by their respective cor-
porate officers thereunto duly authorized, all on the
date first mentioned above.
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
By:
Executive Vice President
Date Executed November 20, 1973
CIMARRON COAL CORPORATION
By: ROBERT ANDERSON, JR., President
Chief Executive Officer
Date Executed December 26, 1973
(Seal)
ATTEST
By: EMMITT B. ANDERSON
Assistant Secretary
(Seal)
ATTEST
By: R.W.SHERER
Assistant Secretary
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’ BLEED THROUGH
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BLEED THROUGH
B-45
EXHIBIT “7”
Supervisory Job Classifications
as of July 1, 1973
(1) President
(2) Vice President/Mine Superintendent
(3) Secretary and Treasurer
(4) General Office Secretary
(5) Pit Foreman (3)
(6) Equipment Maintenance Foreman
(7) Preparation Plant Foreman
(8) Supply House Clerk
(9) Mine Office Clerk
COPY BOUND VERTICALLY
—eeeEeeeeeee——————yyEeEE ae
B-46
AMENDMENT TO COAL SUPPLY AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this
19th day of , 1974, by and between
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, a corporation or-
ganized and existing under the laws of the State of
Georgia, and having its principal office in the city of
Atlanta, Georgia (“Purchaser”) and CIMARRON
COAL CORPORATION, a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Tennessee, and
having its chief principal office in the city of Madison-
ville, Kentucky (‘‘Seller’’).
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the Purchaser and Seller have here-
tofore entered into a Coal Supply Agreement dated
February 6, 1969, which was subsequently amended
as of January 1, 1973, and November 20, 1973, (here-
inafter the “Agreement”), whereby Seller dedicated
certain acreages in Hopkins County, Kentucky, con-
taining more than 20,000,000 tons of economically re-
coverable coal to the fulfillment of said Agreement;
WHEREAS, Seller represents and warrants that,
through the instruments identified on Exhibit “1A”
attached hereto and made a part hereof, it has acquired
control of additional acreages in Hopkins County, Ken-
tucky, which contain more than 7,000,000 tons of coal
that can be economically recovered by surface mining
methods; and
WHEREAS, the parties desire to modify and
amend the Agreement hereinafter provided ;
’ BLEED THROUGH
7
B-47
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the
premises and the mutual covenants hereinafter set
forth, it is hereby agreed that the Agreement be modi-
fied and amended in the following respects:
Ae
The Agreement is amended by adding after the
third paragraph on Page 1 a new paragraph which
provides as follows:
“Seller represents and warrants that it con-
trols, through the instruments identified on Ex-
hibit “1A” attached hereto and made a part
hereof, certain additional acreages in Hopkins
County, Kentucky, which contain more than
7,000,000 tons of coal that can be economically re-
covered by surface mining methods and which
Seller dedicates to the fulfillment of this Agree-
ment.”
2.
The Agreement is further amended by attaching
thereto as Exhibit “1A” the exhibit designated “1A”
which is attached to this Amendment and made a part
hereof.
3.
Section 2.01 of the Agreement is amended by de-
leting the section in its entirety and inserting in lieu
thereof the following:
“Term of Agreement. The term of this Agree-
ment shall extend until all mineable and mer-
chantable coal on the property identified on Ex-
hibits “1” and “1A” has been mined, removed and
sold to Purchaser.
ee
PEAR DERS MORIN a a Oe OR A 8 ~~
B-48
4,
Section 7.01 of the Agreement is amended by
deleting the section in its entirety and substituting in
lieu thereof the following:
“Quantity Requirements. Seller will tender
for delivery and Purchaser will buy the following
quantities of coal:
(a) 2,100,000 tons during each of the calendar
years 1974 through December 31, 1980;
(b) 2,100,000 tons during each of the calendar
years during the remainder of the term of
this Agreement; or so much thereof as is
merchantable and economically recoverable
from the reserves dedicated to this Agree-
ment.”
The annual tonnage requirements as provided by
this Section 7.01 hereof, shall be delivered by Seller
and accepted by Purchaser in approximately equal
monthly quantities or as otherwise mutually agreed
to by the parties hereto.
5.
Except as herein provided, the Coal Supply Agree-
ment dated February 6, 1969, as amended as of Janu-
ary 1, 1973, and November 20, 1973, is not otherwise
altered or modified and is in all respects ratified and
affirmed.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have
caused this Amendment to the Coal Supply Agree-
ment to be duly executed and attested in several coun-
terparts, under their respective corporate seals and
’ BLEED THROUGH
B-49
by their respective corporate officers thereunto duly
authorized, all on the date first mentioned above.
(Seal)
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
By: R. W. SCHERER
Executive Vice President
Date Executed 9-19, 1974
CIMARRON COAL CORPORATION
By: ROBERT ANDERSON, JR.
President
Date Executed 9-23, 1974
ATTEST:
By: C. L. RATTERREE
Assistant Secretary
(Seal)
ATTEST:
By: EMMETT D. ANDERSON
Secretary
EXHIBIT “1A”
A. POND RIVER — FIES PROPERTIES
1. Property acquired by Diamond Trust from Pea-
body Coal Company dated September 18, 1972,
covering property conveyed to Peabody from Ter-
teling Brothers by Deed dated May 22, 1953, and
record in Book 220, Page 592, Hopkins County
Court Clerk’s office.
(a) Property leased by Diamond Trust from W.
B-50
B. Dozier and Lulu Hickman under lease dated
July 7, 1971.
(b) Property acquired by Diamond Trust from
Island Creek Coal Company by Deed dated
August 30, 1971, and recorded in Book 340,
Page 184, Hopkins County Court Clerk’s office.
2. Property acquired by Diamond Trust from William
C. Davis dated March 4, 1972, and covering prop-
erty conveyed by Ervin Sheets to William C. Davis
by Deed dated November 17, 1966, and recorded
in Book 308, Page 157, Hopkins County Court
Clerk’s office.
3. Property leased by Diamond Trust from Russell
Badgett, Sr., covering property conveyed to Russell
Badgett, Sr., from Badgett Mine Stripping Corpo-
ration dated June 15, 1970, covering property con-
veyed to Badgett Mine Stripping Corporation from
West Kentucky Coal Company, (Newcoal Farm),
dated July 31, 1963, and recorded in Book 289,
Page 409, Hopkins County Court Clerk’s office.
B. CIMARRON (Trust No. 1)
1. Property acquired by Cimarron Coal Corporation
from Lawrence Springfield by Deed dated July
22, 1969, and recorded in Book 326, Page 57, Hop-
kins County Court Clerk’s office.
2. Property acquired by Cimarron Coal Corporation
from T. Gardiner Slaton by Deed dated July 22,
1969, and recorded in Book 326, Page 59, Hopkins
County Court Clerk’s office.
3. Property acquired by Cimarron Coal Corporation
from E. E. Wilson by Deed dated July 22, 1969,
and recorded in Book 326, Page 61, Hopkins
County Court Clerk’s office.
’ BLEED THROUGH
4
10.
11,
12.
13.
14,
B-51
Property leased by Cimarron Coal Corporation
from L. R. Slaton, et ux., under lease dated June
23, 1969.
. Property leased by Cimarron Coal Corporation
L. R. Slaton et ux., under lease dated June 23,
1969.
Property leased by Cimarron Coal Corporation
from C. W. and W. C. Gatlin under lease dated
January 22, 1972.
Property acquired by Cimarron Coal Corporation
from James E. Slaton by Deed dated July 22,
1969, and recorded in Book 326, Page 63, Hopkins
County Court Clerk’s office.
Property leased by Cimarron Coal Corporation
from Than G. Rice, et ux., under lease dated July
30, 1969.
Property leased by Cimarron Coal Corporation
from Fletcher Slaton under lease dated July 30,
1969.
Property leased by Cimarron Coal Corporation
from W. B. Dozier and Lulu Hickman under lease
dated August 12, 1969.
Coal leased by Cimarron Coal Corporation from
James G. Baker, et ux., under lease dated August
12, 1969.
Property leased by Cimarron Coal Corporation
from E. E. Steff under lease dated August 24,
1969.
Mining lease by Cimarron Coal Corporation from
I. E. and Nora Winstead under lease dated June
19, 1970.
Property acquired by Cimarron Coal Corporation
from Raymond Winstead by Deed dated June 19,
1970, and recorded in Book 331, Page 233, Hop-
kins County Court Clerk’s office.
4
4
:
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3s
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i
Bavseoeiincn, ip WA EPP RLS Se
B-52
P. EXHIBIT 52
AMENDMENT TO COAL SUPPLY AGREEMENT
THIS AMENDMENT executed this first day of
January, 1974, to the COAL SUPPLY AGREEMENT
dated Febraury 6, 1969, as amended January 1, 1973,
November 20, 1973, and January 14, 1974, by and be-
tween Cimarron Coal Corporation (Seller) and Geor-
gia Power Company (Purchaser),
WITNESSETH:
For and in consideration of the benefits set forth
herein and the mutual promises of the parties hereto,
Seller and Purchaser do hereby agree to further amend
said Coal supply Agreement as follows:
1. Modify Section 3.07 to read as follows:
3.07. Adjustments for Changes in Cost of
Supplies. Adjustments for Changes in Cost of sup-
plies used in the production of coal for delivery
under this Agreement shall be made in the follow-
ing manner:
Any changes in the Base Price of supplies
shall be made by determining periodically the per-
centage change which shall have occurred since
July, 1973, in the average monthly price paid by
Seller for Ammonium Nitrate and Diesel Fuel,
and in a composite of the following price indices
published by the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics and having the following respective
weights:
’ BLEED THROUGH
B-53
Commodity Number Weight
Construction Machinery
& Equipment 112 50
Petroleum Products - Refined 057 .03
Electric Power 054 10
Explosives 0679-02 .03
Tires and Tubes 0712 .08
Wire and Cable 1026 .07
Any changes on or after January 1, 1974, in
the Base Price of supplies shall be based on
changes in the average monthly price paid by Sel-
ler for Ammonuim Nitrate and Diesel Fuel, and in
a composite index number for January and July of
each calendar year during the life of this Agree-
ment. The percentage change in Ammonium Ni-
trate from $2.90 per hundred pounds (the average
price paid for Ammonium Nitrate for the month
of July, 1973) shall be determined semi-annually
to be effective January 1 and July 1 and shall be
applied to $.18. The percentage change in Diesel
Fuel from $.170 per gallon (the average price
paid for Diesel Fuel for the month of July, 1973)
shall be determined semi-annually to be effective
January 1 and July 1 and shall be applied to $.105.
The percentage change in the said composite index
from 103.6 (the level of such index for July, 1973,
on the basis that the year 1967 = 100) shall be
determined semi-annually to be effective January
1 and July 1 and shall be applied to $1.215. The
resulting amounts, less previous adjustments made
under this section, shall be added to or substracted
from, as the case may be, the Base Price in effect
at the beginning of the month for which the above
calculations are made, and shall govern until the
2 a apn WARS ETS Sac ee
Bites ow
B-54
beginning of the next succeeding January or July,
as the case may be.
In the event of a published change or revision
in the basis for any of the components of said in-
dices or if a new basis is adopted, the revised or
new index shall be adjusted to said basis of 1967
= 100. If such index is discontinued or otherwise
becomes unavailable, the parties shall utilize a
mutually satisfactory substitute method of price
adjustment for materials and supplies.
An example of how the provisions of this
section are intended to operate is shown in Ex-
hibit 6 attached hereto and made a part hereof.
Z. Except as provided herein and in the Amend-
ments to Coal Supply Agreement dated January 1,
1973, November 20, 1973, and Jenuary 14, 1974, the
Coal Supply Agreement dated Feb. «ry 6, 1969, is not
otherwise altered or modified and is in all respects
ratified and affirmed
In Witness Whereof, the parties have caused this
Amendment to their Agreement to be duly executed
and attested in several counterparts, under their re-
spective corporate seals and by their respective cor-
porate officers thereunto duly authorized, all on the
date first mentioned above.
ATTEST GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
By: By R. W. SCHERER
Secretary Executive Vice President
Date Executed October 31, 1974.
ATTEST CIMARRON COAL
By EMMETT D. CORPORATION
ANDERSON By ROBERT ANDERSON, JR.
Secretary Chief Executive Officer
Date Executed 12-26, 1974
’ BLEED THROUGH
B-55
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pleruer = LET Uee «ELEL Aine = exer Aine = wy staqyy = sequin Aypowwo,
xopuy Joquinn PesysiaMy xopuy apoy
Pary saw xopuy oseg oseg STa
LOG UOlPIgG UI 0} potdtajaoy sev adueyD sd11g Jo UOI}eAYSNII]
9 LIGIHXa
a
eor.|]}]TCUM
COPY BOUND VERTICALLY
Ce
B-56
BPA PST OT EPRI =
uo} sod [T6e'$ asvatoU] [BIOL
uo} 12d PHOT’$ [an [eset 10F osva.aou]
uo} ted 9{1z'$ dVIVIN WNIUOWWY 1Of asvo1ouy]
uo} aad [GL0'$ B[NULIO,, XApUy Jaq esvasouy]
- £167 ST hannune ang aspaiauy Uoy, Aad add 1Y}OL
uo} sad asvasoul POTS = GOT'S < > TH'66
[any [esetq 10F OF, Jog esva1ou]
“1°66 = OLI'$ + 69T'$ — BS¥e10UT JO JUS1Ig
691° $ did Ul ssvaIOUT
Gee UOTJNLAystp gol UO JoJ UOT[eS iad 79° Surpnypout
PLOT ‘Aavnuee Jo YWUOW OY} AOF DI ISVIIAY
OLT $ ELET ‘AINE JO YIWOY OY} AOJ ddJAg WvIOAY
uo][ey) Jag dg
ang jasarg — asnaiauy {0 JWI
uo} tad asvasoul 9T1Z'$ = 8I'$ X 8ELIT
ayBIJIN UNIUOWUY 1OfJ UOT, Jog osvo1oU]
Y,8G° LIT = 06'3$ = IV E$ — eBetoU] JO JUV.L0g
Ir's$ ddIIg Ul ssvaIOUT
129 PLGI ‘Aaenuep Jo YO 24} 10J ddIA1g BSVIOAY
9 RELL LEE V DELEON RO an
BLEED THROUGH
COPY BOUND VERTICALLY
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