Amicus Curiae Brief — Big Rivers Electric Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency (Nos. 75-7787, 75-7744)
Supreme Court brief1975
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Supreme Court of the United States :
Ocroben Trea, 1974
Big Riveus Eneerige Cornvorarion J
KENTUCKY Powrhk COMPANY and
Kenreoky Uris CoMPpany,
Petitions rs, i
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ISNVIRONMENTAL PRrorreerTion AGENCY, :
Riessens. Kb. Train, ANdiminietrator, fi
Te sponds yl,
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE FOR THE BAY AREA
LEAGUE OF INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATIONS, INC. /
Joun TT. Ronan, TE
Tuxedo, New York VOUS7T
HW. Kowsarp DUN Ke LBeROorR Bi
Threoporre -. Gane
Covington & BURLING
SBS Sictoonth Street. N.W,
Woashineton. Db ¢ MMM,
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
mntoront OF Amees OMRINO. 66 kc cacascccvrsvescceens 1
Reasons For Granting The Writ ...........eeeeeee0e 2
I. The Issues Raised By The Decision Below
Are Of Continuing And Overriding Impor-
tance Concerning The Implementation Of
Se CON BOE eh ceceererseebaeneess 2
II. The Decision Of The Court Of Appeals
Below Restricts The Rights Of The States,
Recognized By This Court In Train v.
NRDC, To Adopt A Wide Range Of Emis-
sion Controls Provided That Such Controls
Are Effective To Meet National Standards 5
III. The Court of Appeals Below Has Misread
The Decision Of This Court In Train v.
NRDC And Has Misconstrued The Defini-
tion Of ‘Emission Limitation’? Under See-
tion 110(a)(2)(B) Of The Clean Air Act .. 7
ee PE Re ee PORTS Bene hI Mie Ne a hd Oe 10
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Big Rivers Electrie Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 16 (6th
tS Re Pe neee Fe Seman AINA ey 3, 8
NRDC vy. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (Sth Cir. 1974), rev’d sub.
nom, Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975) ........ 5-9
STaTuTORY PRovIsIONs:
Clean Air Act, As Amended
42 U.S.C. § 1857¢-5(a)(2)(B) (1970) ........3,5,8,9
Be UW OAn Cee FINO ivkceccsccreccsdvecss s
OP We. BROT TAO ok pecans cicracexdceos .
REGULATIONS:
40 Fed. Reg. 4445 (1975) ........cccccscsccccccdy hy ty?
Be Sra FOUND CEOTOD iis dav adewsns codesweecenns s
40 C.F.R. § 52.238 (1975)
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBER TERM, 1975
No. 75-774
Bia Rivers Evecrric CorroratTion
KENTUCKY PowER CoMPANY and
Kentucky UTinities Company,
Petitioners,
Us
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Russet. E. Tram, Administrator,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE FOR THE BAY AREA
LEAGUE OF INDUSTRIAL ASSOCIATIONS, INC.
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The Bay Area League of Industrial Associations,
Ine. submits this brief in support of petitioners Big
Rivers et al. Both petitioners and respondent Envir-
onmental Protection Agency have consented to the
filing of this brief amicus by letters which have been
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presented to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to Rule
42(2).
The Bay Area League of Industrial Associations,
Ine. (** BALTA”’’) is an incorporated league of indus-
trial corporations with manufacturing facilities located
in the San Francisco Bay area. BALIA is a party to
rulemaking in which the EPA has proposed formally
to disapprove certain provisions in the Bay Area im-
plementation plan solely on the grounds that it per-
mitted ground level monitoring controls, based upon
the same rationale as the agency’s disapproval of the
Kentucky regulation involved in this ease. It is re-
spectfully submitted that the decision below raises im-
portant questions concerning the implementation of the
Clean Air Act which will have far reaching impact upon
amicus curiae, its members, and other industries simi-
larly situated.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The granting of the petition for a writ of certiorari
in this case is supported by several grounds that are
traditionally deemed by this Court to warrant plenary
review.
I. The Issues Raised by the Decision Below Are of Continuing
and Overriding Importance Concerning the Implementation
of the Clean Air Act
The petitioners have pointed to the significant econo-
mic impact which would be borne by consumers of
electric power if the states were required in all cases
to enforce Guly certain types of emission control re-
gulations—‘constant emission controls’’—and were
not permitted to adopted the combination of air pollu-
tion regulations best suited to their particular situa-
3
tion which would meet the national air quality stand-
ards. The impact of the decision below, however,
would be felt beyond the electric power industry to the
extent that it stands as precedent for the disapproval
of all ground level monitoring emission controls as
per se invalid under Section 110(a)(2)(B) of the
Clean Air Act, even where such controls are demonstr-
ably effective to reduce or limit air pollution emissions
to attain and maintain national air quality standards.
Illustrative of the kind of effective ground level
monitoring control which might be held invalid if the
decision below were permitted to stand is San Fran-
cisco Bay Area BAAPCD Regulation 2, which the
EPA has proposed retroactively to disapprove. 40
Fed. Reg. 4445 (January 30, 1975). This regulation
permits industrial sources to employ certain types of
ground leye] monitoring controls which limit emissions
at all times to meet a 24-hour ground level standard
which is more than three times more stringent than the
EPA national air quality standard. Where this
ground level standard is exceeded by an industrial
source, emission control devices are required to limit
emissions to meet the standard. In contrast with the
intermittent control systems permitted under the Ken-
tucky regulation disapproved in the decision below,
emission rates under BAAPCD Regulation 2 are not
adjusted upward or downward to meet changes in
meteorological conditions. Rather, emissions are
limited at all times to a level sufficient to meet the
stringent BAAPCD standard under the worst predict-
able meteorological conditions .
The EPA national air quality standards for sulfur
dioxide were attained in the San Francisco Bay Area
as of May 31, 1972, the date that EPA approved the
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California State implementation plan. 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.238. Computer modeling simulations and actual
monitoring data submitted to EPA by amicus curiae
demonstrate that the national standards have been
maintained since that date and will continue to be main-
tained in the future by a substantial margin . These
data further demonstrate that since May 31, 1972, en-
forcement of BAAPCD Regulation 2 has effected a
substantial reduction in the sulfur dioxide emissions
in the San Francisco Bay Area, and has improved air
quality beyond that required under the EPA national
standards. Further, very substantial additional re-
ductions of emissions are scheduled in 1976. Millions
of dollars have been spent since May 31, 1972, by San
Francisco Bay Area industry to meet the requirements
of BAAPCD Regulation 2.
The proposed retroactive disapproval by EPA of
BAAPCD Regulation 2 is based solely on the fact that
it provides ground level monitoring controls as an op-
tion. As stated by the Administrator in his notice of
proposed rulemaking:
‘Regulations which contain an emission limita-
tion but which permit compliance with ambient
air limitations as an option to compliance with the
emission limitation are not approvable.’’ 40 Fed.
Reg. at 4446.
If the BAAPCD Regulation 2 ground level monitor-
ing control option is disapproved, the various industry
members of BALIA will be required to spend addi-
tional millions of dollars for the further abatement of
sulfur dioxide emissions although such additional ex-
penditure would not be necessary to maintain the na-
tional air quality standards.
5)
This case has an importance beyond that of amicus
curiae and its members, significant as that is. In its
January 30, 1975, announcement proposing disap-
| proval of BAAPCD Regulation 2, EPA made it clear
that the agency would be taking further action to dis-
approve all state plans which contain optional control
features. 40 Fed. Reg. at 4446. The decision below
thus involves a question of continuing importance
under the Clean Air Act which should be reviewed by
this Court.
II. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Below Restricts the
Rights of the States, Recognized by This Court in Train
v. NRDC, To Adopt a Wide Range of Emission Controls
Provided that Such Controls Are Effective To Meet Na-
tional Standards
The decision below is inconsistent with Congressional
policy and misreads this Court’s decision in Train v.
NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975), in that it sustains the
Iv PA’s disapproval of the Kentucky air pollution regu-
lation without regard to the effectiveness of the control
systems permitted under the Kentucky regulation to
reduce or limit air contaminant emissions to attain and
maintain national air quality standards.’
Section 110(a)(2)(B) of the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1857¢-5(a)(2)(B), provides that the EPA
“The portion [of the Kentucky regulations] which was disap-
| proved provided as follows:
‘**Where is it demonstrated . .. that an air contaminant
source can apply an alternative control strategy which will
provide for achicvement and maintenance of applicable air
quality standards, the Commission may . . . authorize such
control strategy ....’’’ 523 F.2d at 18 (emphasis added).
The Kentucky regulation thus required that an applicable al-
ternative contral strategy must be effective to attain and maintain
national standards.
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Administrator must determine whether a state imple-
mentation plan ‘‘includes emission limitations ... and
such other measures as may be necessary to insure
attainment and maintenance of such primary or sec-
ondary standard.”” In Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60
(1975), this Court affirmed the right of a state to adopt
‘‘whatever mix of emission limitations’’ it deems best
suited to its particular situation ‘*so long as the ulti-
mate effect of a State’s choice of emission limitations
is compliance with the national standards for ambient
air....’’ 421 U.S. at 79. This Court’s decision in
Train, therefore, mandates EPA approval of state regu-
lations where they are demonstrably effective for the
timely attainment and subsequent maintenance of am-
bient air standards.
The Train decision not only permits maximum flexi-
bility in the kind and mix of control regulations a
state may adopt, but, as well, makes it clear that an
approvable control strategy may provide that an indivi-
dual source or group of sources may be completely ex-
cepted from the plan. 421 U.S. at 93-94, n. 28. It is
within the states’s discretion to determine which
sources will be restricted as a part of its mix of emission
limitations, provided that this mix is sufficient to attain
and maintain national standards. <As indicated in the
Train decision, whether or not a specific source or group
of sources is controlled by the state’s emission limita-
tion mix is not a basis for EPA disapproval of the
implementation plan provision.
Further, EPA’s emphasis on ‘‘constant emission
controls”’ is also directly contrary to this Court’s ad-
monition in Train against ‘‘forcing”’ the use of techno-
logy. The agency’s position, as set forth in its proposed
disapproval of the Bay Area regulations, is that ‘‘con-
7
stant emission controls’’ must be applied ‘‘wherever
technology is available.’”? 40 Reg. 4446. This aspect
of EPA’s legal position was totally rejected by this
Court in Train:
‘* [S]o long as the national standards are being
attained and maintained, there is no basis in the
present Clean Air Act for forcing further techno-
logical developments.’’ 421 U.S. at 91.
The Clean Air Act as interpreted by this Court in the
Train decision permits the states to adopt and enforce
a wide spectrum of types of emission controls provided
that they are demonstrably effective to reduce or limit
emissions to maintain and attain national air quality
standards.
III. The Court of Appeals Below Has Misread the Decision of
This Court in Train v. NRDC and Has Misconstrued the
Definition of “Emission Limitation” Under Section 110(a)
(2)(B) of the Clean Air Act
The Court of Appeals below misconstrued the opinon
of this Court in the Train decision to justify the per se
disapproval of certain classes of emission controls with-
out inquiry into their effectiveness to meet national
standards. In Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 78 (1975),
this Court referred to the term ‘‘emission limitations”’
broadly as:
** [Regulations of the composition of substances
emitted into ambient air from [pollution] sources
They are the specific rules to which operators
of pollution sources are subject, and which if en-
forced should result in ambient air which meets
the national standards.”’
Although this Court did not elaborate further on this
point, since it was not an issue in that case, the court
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below seized upon the single term ‘‘composition’’ in the
foregoing quote, and redefined an ‘‘emission limita-
tion’’ under Section 110(a)(2)(B) of the Act as
‘“*TA] rule or regulation pertaining to sulfur
dioxide or any other contaminant would quality
as an emission limitation only if it regulates the
amount of that kind of material which may be
included in the emission from a given source.”’
523 F. 2d at 21-22.
The court then leaped to the conclusion that only a
constant emission control device on all sources would
satisfy this definition.
The decision below is not supported by this Court’s
opinion in Train, and is contrary to the mandate of
Congress. Section 110(a)(2)(B) of the Act refers to
‘‘emission limitations and such other measures’’ and is
not confined to constant emission controls. EPA’s state
plan regulations by their own terms permit great flexi-
bility to the states in the kind and mix of pollution
control regulations which they may adopt, collectively
termed a ‘‘control strategy’’:
‘* *Control strategy’ means a combination of meas-
ures designed to achieve the aggregate reduction
of emissions necessary for attainment and main-
tenance of a national standard....’’ 40 C.F.R.
§51(n).
Further, EPA’s interpretation of ‘‘emission limita- -
tions’’ is inconsistent with Congress’ careful use of
the term ‘‘emission standard”’ in other provisions of
the Act—such as Sections 111 and 112—to refer to
constant emission controls. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-6,
1857¢-7.
9
Finally, it is noteworthy that the decision of the
Court of Appeals in NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th
Cir. 1974), reversed on other grounds sub nom Train v.
NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975), upon which the decision
below relies, does not go so far as to require ‘‘constant
emission controls.’’ The distinction between ‘‘constant
emission controls,” 7.e., ‘‘emission standards,’’ and the
broader elass of permissible ‘‘emission limitations’’
which may serve to indirectly limit the amount of emis-
sions was clarified by the Fifth Circuit as follows:
“‘TT]t is necessary to... define different categories
of the kinds of ‘enforceable controls’ which may
be employed to affect attainment of ambient air
standards. The first, ‘emission standards’ refers
to standards setting specific quantitative limits on
the amounts given individual sources may emit into
the air. The second, ‘emission limitations’ [as
defined in Section 110(a)(2)(B) of the Clean Air
Act], is an inclusive term referring to any type
of control to reduce the amount of emissions into
the air. This includes, of course, ‘emission stand-
ards’, but also ineludes a number of regulatory
devices. These range from regulations directing
sources of emissions to cease or curtail operations
to regulations specifving the sulfur content of fuel
that fuel-burning emission sourees may burn;
‘transportation controls’ designed to reduce the
use of motor vehicles . . . and the imposition of
emission charges or other economie incentives
aimed at inducing parties to reduce their emissions
voluntarily.”’ 489 F.2d at 394, n.2 (emphasis
added).
In short, the decision below which mandates constant
emission controls is based upon a reading of the Act
which is without basis in the statutory language, EPA’s
own regulations, or judicial decisions.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the decision below
was erroneous on questions of great importance to
amicus curiae and to other industries affected by state
implementation plans. Review by this Court is es-
sential.
Respectfully submitted,
Joun T. Ronan, III
Tuxedo, New York 10987
H. Epwarp DUNKELBERGER, JR.
THEODORE L. GARRETT
CovINGTon & BURLING
888 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
January 1976
ENT Se Ne TIRES Re id iG ie bgt Oeakdhy eatin RU SRS DROS ee at
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