Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma
Supreme Court brief1976
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Prratuma Partners, a California limited part-
nership, and Wuaiam Lawrence,
Petitioners,
V8.
Tae Crry or Peracvma, a California Charter City, Hen
Potnam, Roszat A. Brunnes, Joun W. Cavanacn,
Roserr E. Day, James L. Hanserson, Feep
MaLooLo A, SAR
James L, BrYERs,
900 College Avenue,
Santa Rose, California 95404,
Counsel for Petitioners,
PAWEL AE? ‘ PURE ARIE + ee
Page
CE as vecvxcd cag keRh ha hhes RAG bh enaedneenaane 2
RN en eee TTT ee ye ee Peet ee re 2
OU cs cna cencncrctvicdecvassndeveus sacne 3
Constitutional provisions involved ..............0.00e ee eee 3
Ee Ne ae cccas ups chen Sehheeubiegakaan 4
Reasons for gramting the WHEE 2.0... cesses csceccenccccs 10
1. The decision of the court of appeals denying peti-
tioners standing to assert the interests of prospective
residents of Petaluma creates a confusing and unnec-
essary test for derivative standing and conflicts with
decisions of this court and other courts of appeals ... 10
2. The decision of the court of appeals to review an
admittedly exclusionary land-use ordinance only for
a “rational basis,” and not on some higher and stricter
standard, conflicts with decisions of this court and
courts of last resort in the several states ........... 15
3. In a metropolitan housing market, exclusionary meas-
ures taken by one city increase burdens on other
cities, frustrate efforts to find housing, and cause a
decline in the quality of the region’s housing. No met-
ropolitan city may legislate for “the general welfare”
without considering the impact of its land-use laws
a Bi OI 5s i Es Sn Ree ha SiR ee a Ss 21
Ci ao card CREE N UE Oe Pi OV ERA Ran Wa ER ea cha peeks 28
id
RETR ee
Table of Authorities Cited
Cases Pages
Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) ...17, 18, 23
Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765
EE Sane eUEVECING Gs dat REEOO GCA CHEKM ek us cand ancee 18, 23
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 .......... cece ween 12, 16
Berenson v. Town of New Castle, ........ <a (No. 430,
ee te ei Wa cus ssbb Ka sAAREOED ATS 22, 23
Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper,
200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959) ........ ce eee eee 25
CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc, 513 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
SE Res, SVR ee re we is baevan + Vannes bedessadbenacces 13
Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116
eo Nr Pee er See ee ean 24
City of Newport v. Horton, 22 R.I. 196, 47 A. 312 (1900) 25
Construction Industry Ass’n of Sonoma County v. City of
Petaluma, 375 F.Supp. 574 (N.D.Calif. 1974), rev’d, 522
F.2d 897 (9th Cir.) rehearing and hearing en bane
den., ......... jt” eee (9th Cir. October 2, 1975) ......... 2
ee I SE OE oan ean e vs ha kbodce des deeees 13
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 .............. 13, 16-17, 25
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 .............. 21
Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Board of
Health, 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974) ............... 13, 14
Gajon Bar and Grill, Ine. v. Kelley, 508 F.2d 1317 (2d
CL AGT Mik Ssihs dan chi wees et ees 13
Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d
359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1970), appeal dismissed, 409
asa cui wal gk a deten ies «cece a eh< ecu 11, 18, 19
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 ........... ce eee 13
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 ..13,17, 19
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755 [Stewart, J., con-
eae eile band Gh eseenedisAsaw eg cvega diane’ 15, 27
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d
og EE er reer ere ee rere ee 18, 23
Be ae i a
RRR RMN AIR INTE oe Te eI NSN NNN RONEN PENRO RI NIN THES TL ANN GTN
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CrrED iii
Pages
Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Blackjack, 467 F.2d
Se CU OIE apc ce cag da MAb ARAN aSS Cha cK ka ews 11,13
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 ............... 12
Seott v. Indian Wells, 6 Cal.3d 541, 99 Cal.Rptr. 745
ADEPT IR se NP AES Sey pC si RR 24
Simon vy. Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942) 25
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt.
Laurel, 67 NJ. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dis-
I, Se CE Oe CORI se uN acccbadeedscaccacsnce 19, 22
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 ........... 12
Warth vy. Seldin, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (June 25, 1975) ....11,15, 27
Constitutional Provisions
Constitution of the United States:
Ds Oe I UE hs BAN Ch ce sAa inde cabacexccaces 3
Be ee, OO 0 Bn as ca wah kecccicrsrcacc 3
Amendments 9, 10, and 14, Section 1 ............... 3
Statutes
Be Tae ORE ck wa Sadak as On Kacecdéekackeance 2
Texts
S Cumber-Sam. L.Rev. 543 (1975) 2... ccc ccc cece ccccccs 2
Equal Opportunity in Suburbia (U.S. Civil Rights Comm.,
RRR SS a SR irl Re Nga svi, SA aS Nee ar nS 27
Note, 3 Fordham Urban L.J. 187 (1974) ..............8. 2
F. Turner, The Frontier in American History (1920) .... 25
Note, 9 Georgia L.Rev. 260 (1974) .......... ccc eee eens 2
Comment, 12 Harv. J. Legis. 244 (1955) ................ 2
Comment, 26 Hast. Ld. 849 (1975) .....cccccccccccecns 2
J. Ukeles, The Consequences of Municipal Zoning (1964) .. 27
Sa Pe WEY ORD ate
e = |
a em ed
iv TaBLE oF AUTHORITIES CITED
Note, 50 L.A. Bar Bull. 252 (1975) .............eeeeees
26 Land Use Law & Zoning Digest No. 7 at 611 (1974) ..
Note, 35 Louisiana L.Rev. 676 (1975) ............. cee eee
Note, 51 N.D. L.Rev. 509 (1974) .... cc cwcceccecccccesss
N. Williams & T. Norman, Exclusionary Land-Use Con-
trols: The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 Syra-
Note, 23 Kansas L.Rev. 324 (1975) .......... cee cence 0
2
2
2
2
gs eB eres th See error. 27
Note, 2 Ohio North. L.Rev. 318 (1974) ................. 2
Note, 36 Ohio St. L.J. 128 (1975) ............ccceeeeees 2
Comment, 5 Pacifie L.J. 570 (1974) .............. 0c eee 2
R. A. Sedler, Standing to Assert Jus Tertii in the Su-
preme Court, 71 Yale L.J. 599 (1962) ................ 13
R. Freilich & G. Bass, Exclusionary Zoning: Suggested
Litigation Approaches, 3 The Urban Lawyer 344 (1971) 20
Note, 6 Seton Hall L.Rev. 207 (1974) .................. 2
R. L. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice (4th
i en hnes ws On hak an hoe eek Bl kaen de aekekaac 16
Comment, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the
Constitution, 44 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 989 (1969) ............ 3
The Use of Land: A Citizen’s Guide to Urban Growth
(Rockefeller Bros. Trust Fund, 1973) ................. 26, 27
Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Doubleday-Anchor ed.
ROGER. <a 5 AbRaEe MaEN ONS Sa We UeEN News h sabi ke os kveen lees 25
Note, 28 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 430 (1975) .................. 2
Note, 19 Villanova L.Rev. 739 (1974) ...............005- 2
Note, 31 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 575 (1974) ................ 2
Comment, 84 Yale L.J. 1564 (1975) .......... cc cee eee 2
oo
FE RAT ety SERN YS TIE
— _—
—
Iu the Supreme Court
OF THE
United States
OctToBER TERM, 1975
No.
Construction InpustRy AssociaTION OF Sonoma County,
a California non-profit corporation, THE SAN FRANCISCO,
PENINSULA AND REpDwoop Empire BuILpING INDUSTRY
AssociaTIon, a California non-profit corporation,
PETALUMA PaRTNERS, a California limited part-
nership, and WILLIAM LAWRENCE,
Petitioners,
vs.
Tue Crry or Peratuma, a California Charter City, HELEN
PutnaM, Ropert A. BRUNNER, JOHN W. CavVANAGH,
Ropert E. Daty, James L. HARBERSON, FRED
V. Matrer, and WituiaM A. Prrry,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
The petitioners Construction Industry Association of
Sonoma County, a California non-profit corporation,
The San Francisco, Peninsula and Redwood Empire
Building Industry Association, a California non-profit
corporation, Petaluma Partners, a California limited
LAR LER AAI LOIRE ALOT ME ILM AY IOS RE ten
MR YM Tey
partnership, and William Lawrence, respectfully
pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit entered in this action on August 13,
1975.
OPINION BELOW
Construction Industry Assn. of Sonoma County v.
City of Petaluma, 375 F.Supp. 574 (N.D.Calif. 1974),
rev'd,, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.) rehearing and hearing
en bane dena, ......... re (9th Cir. October 2, 1975)'
JURISDICTION
The opinion of the court of appeal was rendered
and judgment entered on August 13, 1975. A timely
petition “-» rehearing en bane was denied on October
2, 1975 and judgment filed in the court of appeals on
October 14, 1975, This petition for certiorari is filed
within ninety days of October 2, 1975. This court’s
jurisdictiion is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).
1The district court opinion has been noted in a number of legal,
—— and urban affairs journals. See, Note, 2 Ohio North. L.
ev. 318 (1974) ; Note, 31 Wash. & Lee L.Rev, 575 (1974); Note,
3 Fordham Urban L.J. 187 (1974); Note, 51 N.D. L.Rey. 509
(1974); Note, 6 Seton Hall L.Rey. 207 (1974) ; Note, 19 Villanova
L. Rey. 739 (1974); Note, 5 Cumber-Sam. L.Rev. 543 (1975); Note,
9 Georgia L.Rev. 260 (1974); Note, 23 Kansas L.Rev. 324 (1975);
Note, 35 Louisiana L.Rev. 676 (1975) ; Note, 50 L.A. Bar Bull. 252
(1975); Note, 36 Ohio St. L.J. 128 (1975); Note, 28 Vanderbilt
L.Rey. 430 (1975). See, also 26 Land Use Law & Zoning Digest No.
7 at 611 (1974); Comment, 84 Yale L.J. 1564 (1975); Comment,
12 Harv. J. Legis. 244 (1955); Comment, 5 Pacifie LJ. 570
(1974); Comment, 26 Hast. L.J. 849 (1975),
SY DONT IR Le etme ATI ABA Den VEN LY
cai | = aS ‘ wae
3
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ;
1. Whether plaintiffs who have demonstrated their .
own standing must show the existence of a “special, '
on-going relationship”, outside the context of the leg- F
islation being challenged, with third persons whose :
rights they seek standing to assert with their own. E
2. Whether a municipal ordinance with the express
purpose and effect of excluding substantial numbers
of new residents from the city shall be judged on a
rational basis standard or by some higher and stricter
test.
3. Whether a city legislating for “the general wel-
fare” by intentionally excluding new residents must
measure and consider the impact of its law on pro-
spective residents, on other cities forced by the exclu-
sionary law to absorb disproportionately large shares
of regional housing demand, and on the quality of
the region’s housing stock.
esi: AE
oo eRe?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The following provisions of the Constitution of the
United States:
1. Article I, Section 8;
2. Article III, Sections 1 and 2; and
3. Amendments 9, 10, and 14, Section 1.?
“This litigation involves in part the right to travel, whose source
in the Constitution of the United States is not settled. See,
e.g., Comment, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the Con-
stitution, 44 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 989 (1969),
é
Risen nell Berean ee |
~ scteneney —
PEGE NAER IRE POG LIPS ALE. Fe ne ea
4
All of these provisions are printed in Appendix F
to this petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petaluma began the 1960s as a relatively self-suffi-
cient town of 21,400 people, grown i:om about 10,000
in 1950, and lying mainly outside the urbanizing influ-
ences of the San Francisco metropolitan region [C.T.
366; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-3 at 2]*. Petaluma
adopted a general plan in 1962, which predicted sub-
stantial growth for the city. By 1985 the city forecast
that its population would reach 67,400 persons, and
that the city would provide services to an additional
9,600 persons outside the city limits, for a total of
77,000. [Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 13 at 251.
During the 1960s, Petaluma developed in some ways
as its 1962 general plan had predicted, increasing its
housing stock by 60.8 percent. [Pretrial order, C.T.
366; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-8 at 5]. But the city
did not develop the industrial and commercial tax
base its 1962 general plan had forecast, and by the
end of the 1960s, Petaluma’s newer residents were
in large part daily commuters to San Francisco and
San Rafael. [ Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-5 at 11; Plain-
tiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-8 at 10].
8Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 1-5 and 7-10 to plaintiffs’ complaint in this
litigation were first marked at trial as Plaintiffs’ Exhibits Nos. 1-5
and 7-10 [C.T. 82]. They were later marked as a single exhibit,
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1 [C.T. 158]. In this petition, Plaintiffs’
Exhibit No. 1 and the separate exhibits within it are referred to
jointly as, for example, “Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-3,” which means
exhibit no. 3 in trial exhibit no. 1,
Family incomes rose quickly in Petaluma in the
1960s as the result of an influx of new residents who
commuted to the industrialized center of the region
and enjoyed the benefit of urban wages. Real dispos-
able income per household rose in Petaluma almost
twenty percent from 1960 through 1970. [Plaintiffs’
Exhibit No. 1-8 at 9-10].
Housing costs in Petaluma during the 1960s re-
mained reasonable, below prevailing costs in Santa
Rosa and Novato, two nearby cities. [Jd. at 7]. When
Petaluma set out in 1970 and 1971 to limit the number
of new residents, the city acknowledged the attractive-
ness of Petaluma to households of modest incomes
and set about to frustrate “the large demand for rela-
tively low-cost homes in the City.” [Jd. at 7-8]. Be-
fore Petaluma implemented its constraints against
new residents, access to housing in many parts of the
San Francisco region had already been virtually
closed to families earning less than $12,000 a year,
but “the Petaluma area still manages to offer this
opportunity.” [Id. at 8].
In 1970, Petaluma’s rate of housing production
substantially increased, reflecting the city’s new role
as an important suburb and housing supplier for the
region. Yet, even this new rate of growth remained in
phase with the 1962 projections for Petaluma’s popu-
lation in 1985. [R.T. 83, 100, 103-107, 111-114; C.T.
366; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No, 1-8 at 5].
In 1971 and 1972, the city enacted a plan that im-
posed a quota of 500 new dwelling units each year
on housing construction in the city, which reduced by
PERRIN L OAR RES Cte am ae a ab Re Ce tee meee |
:
eas, URS ee elation ear Ter
6
one-half to two-thirds the amount of housing being
produced to meet market demand.* [Appendix A at
4, 7.]
The Petaluma housing plan was ostensibly limited
to five years, but no sooner was it passed than the
city began to extend the plan by implication through
at least 1990. The city attempted to disable itself from
returning in five years to market-rate housing pro-
duction by limiting its contractual draw of domestic
water from the Sonoma County Water Agency, a
major supplier of water to the city, and by purposely
under-sizing its sewer treatment facilities. [District
court findings nos. 10 and 13, Appendix A at 6-10].
No one has ever argued that all the values Petaluma
has tried to protect or all the means turned to that
end are unconstitutional or even unwise. Much of
what Petaluma has attempted will, if administered
fairly, inerease the burdens on land owners and
builders, but improve the process of urban develop-
ment in the city. Petaluma’s reliance on the planned
unit development to gain greater control over the
process of development from beginning to end, its in-
‘The court of appeals questioned whether the 500-unit quota
was ‘‘misleading,’’ because it applied to housing projects involv-
ing five units or more, exempting projects of lesser number. [| Ap-
pendix B at 39]. However, Petaluma has always conceded that the
500-unit quota would, despite the exemption of four-or-fewer-unit
projects, ‘limit growth during this |five-vear] period to 2,500 new
dwelling units or an average of 500 units annually.”’ [ Plaintiffs’
Exhibit No. 1-5 at 1-2]. The court of appeals acknowledged that
the four-or-fewer exception was not an issue in the ease by assum-
ing that the effeet of the Petaluma plan was as the district court
had found, to reduce housing production to less than ‘‘ reasonably
anticipated market demand.’’ | Appendix B at 42}
RE NOME RTA cE EY NE Oo PET RAO RR Set menyas ce
sistence on a greater mix of single-family and multi-
family development, and its attempt to use bonus
points for low- and moderate-income housing®, go un-
challenged here,
The petitioners have argued from the beginnings of
this litigation that the collision in this case is between
important values, each deserving high regard and at-
tention, and have urged that the vice of Petaluma’s
attempts to cure its problems is overbreadth and a
failure to consider reasonable, less drastic, and valid
alternatives to exclusion. Even the court of appeal ac-
cepted the district court’s finding that the express
purpose and effect of the Petaluma plan, as an end
in itself, was to prevent new residents from settling
in Petaluma.
Petaluma has not been consistent in its attempt to
maintain its “small town character.” It does not limit
industrial or commercial development. Thus, the basis
for the Petaluma plan appears not so much a refusal
to grow, even at the loss of “smallness,” but a refusal
to grow in ways that do not maximize the city’s tax
5 The court of appeal suggested that the city’s provision for
bonus points to developers who submitted low-income housing
projects was another “inclusionary” aspect of the city’s plan. Of
course, the plan did not mandate inclusion of low-income housing
among the 500 units produced each year and placed the full bur-
den for low-income housing production on each individual devel-
opment. This simply imposed a public obligation on the developer
and his limited number of consumers. The effects of the annual
500-unit limitation in driving up housing costs made this token
provision for low-income housing a shadow against the glaring
effects of constraining the supply of housing in the face of intense
demand. | Appendix A at 7, 16-17.]
FTG veamemos grill
DLR A NOLO, 2
8
base and minimize its taxes, at the expense of out-
siders, other cities in the region, and the quality of
existing regional housing stock. [Appendix A at 16-17,
32-33. ]
The district court found that Petaluma is part of an
interactive regional housing market. People displaced
from Petaluma do not disappear from the region, but
present themselves in search of housing in other cities
of the regional market. Communities faced with their
own housing demand and the excluded demand of
Petaluma retaliate with exclusionary laws of their
own. The aggregate effect of proliferating housing-
exclusion laws deprives the region of a substantial per-
centage of housing starts necessary to accommodate
regional demographic changes and to maintain the
quality of the region’s current housing stock. [District
court findings 14a and 14h, Appendix A at 10-11].
The district court found that one of the effects of
the Petaluma plan would be a serious interference
with interstate, intrastate, and foreign travel, as
people trying to move into or within the San Francisco
region found housing either financially unavailable or
simply non-existent in reasonable supply or quality.
[District court finding 14; Appendix A at 16], As a
consequence, the district court held that:
the “Petaluma Plan” is an effort to avoid the
problems that accompany contemporary trends in
population growth. Through the plan, the defend-
ants propose to address themselves to such prob-
lems by limiting the number of people who will
henceforth be permitted to move into the city.
The express purpose and the intended and actual
effects of the “Petaluma Plan” have been to ex-
Rg
9
clude substantial numbers of people who would
otherwise have elected to immigrate into the city.*
The plaintiffs do not challenge the legitimacy
of the defendants’ desire to deal with the prob-
lems of population growth but contend that the
means which they have employed to accomplish
their ends fall far short of constitutional validity.
. .. [I]t is contended that the city has violated
the people’s right to travel. Considering the facts
of the case, we agree.
[District court conclusion of law no. 2, Appendix A
at 17-18].
The district court limited its holding to “the only
issue presented here, for the first time, [that is]...
whether or not a municipality may claim the specific
right to keep others away.” [Conclusion of law no.
10, Appendix A at 31]. The district court reassured
the city that it did not intend to limit “traditional
efforts” at zoning and other forms of land-use con-
trols. However, the district court noted that the city
showed signs of evading the spirit of the court’s deci-
sion and provided for the appointment of a federal
master to observe the extent of the city’s efforts at
compliance with the court’s judgment. [Appendix A
at 31-35]
®The court of appeals concluded that Petaluma’s encouragement
of multi-family and low-income housing made the city’s plan
unique despite its limitation on the number of housing units pro-
duced. [ Appendix B at 50 n. 10]. The court even characterized the
plan at one point as ‘‘inelusionary,’’ rather than exclusionary, de-
spite the court’s acknowledgement of the substantial and regressive
loeal and regional impact of the city’s artificial constraints on
housing supply. [ Appendix B at 55 n. 16, 56]. The court coneluded
that even though the plan ‘‘may frustrate some legitimate regional
housing needs, the Plan is not arbitrary or unreasonable.’’ [Ap-
pendix B at 56].
I OLR Ra OF TIO IL ETRE RIR SE
10
While an appeal to the ninth circuit was” pending,
former Justice Douglas granted a stay of the district
court’s order and injunction. [Order of September 18,
1974, No. A.-1298]
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. The decision of the court of appeals denying petitioners
standing to assert the interests of prospective residents of
Petaluma creates a confusing and unnecessary test for deriva-
tive standing and conflicts with decisions of this court and
other courts of appeals.
The court of appeals has seriously misunderstood
the showing necessary for petitioners to invoke the
interests of housing consumers, prospective residents
of Petaluma. The court of appeals requires that some
out-of-court “special, on-going relationship” between
the petitioners and prospective residents of Petaluma
be demonstrated before petitioners may assert con-
sumer interests with their own.
Having made an extra-judicial relationship essen-
tial to derivative standing, the court of appeals takes
a mechanistic and unnecessarily narrow view of that
relationship. The court states that housing suppliers
and consumers are joined in this case only by “the
possibility that but for the [Petaluma] Plan they
would be parties to a purchase-sale agreement.” [Ap-
pendix B at 47].’
7The court of appeals suggested the petitioners had “attempted
to align their business interests in attacking the Plan with legiti-
mate housing needs of the urban poor and racial minorities,” but
found that the plan did not have the effect of excluding “poor
persons and racial minorities.” [Appendix B at 55 n. 16] The
court failed to take account of the obvious community of interest
PALI SDL SRE NE EE LIEN Lh, I NIRS RB ER CA EM a LE ARES
RRS RIE MRR DS LASERS AEE BENE
il
In a single sale by one builder to one purchaser,
only a contractual community of interest may join
them. But in the larger sense of two classes of poten-
tial litigants vitally interested in an open housing ;
market, builder and buyer have an intense and con-
tinuing mutual objective, which led the Court of
Appeals for the Eigth Circuit to characterize their
relationship as “not only sufficiently close . . . but inti- b
mately close.” Park View Heights Corp. v. City of ;
Blackjack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1213-1214 (8th Cir. 1972). ;
See, also, Golden v. Planning Board of Town of :
Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1970),
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 [due process and
mobility issues inseparable }.
The court of appeals attempted further to diminish
the link between builder and buyer by commenting that ‘
there was no present contractual agreement between :
the petitioners and any prospective purchasers of ;
Petaluma housing. The court did not explain how
builders or landowners could have as yet made con-
tracts to sell or rent housing, when the very legisla-
tion at issue prevents that housing from _ being
constructed.®
LEE CDN EID OES ILE
against exclusionary laws between builders and people in search
of housing. The district court made elaborate findings on the very
serious impact the Petaluma plan has on persons of low income,
not only in drying up supplies of new housing, but in depriving ;
the poor of a traditionally important source of shelter, which is :
used but decent housing vacated by persons of rising incomes
and upward mobility. [Appendix A at 11, 14-17] The court of
appeals ignored those findings, apparently because petitioners in
the court’s view lacked standing to raise the rights of consumers.
8Warth v. Seldin, 45 L.Ed.2d 343, 360 n. 18 (June 25, 1975) 5
held that consumers excluded from a community need not show for :
federal standing that they have a present contractual interest in a
particular project.
aaa
SEY RS ATMO ny PN
&
ET SET rE ee IS eR Nal eRe .
12
When the issue is whether one may assert the
rights of another against a specific law, and only for
that purpose, the relevant inquiry is to discern how
wisely and well the named plaintiff will advance the
cause of the absent third person, how unlikely it is
that the absent party will be able to assert his own
rights in another forum, how seriously diluted the
absent party’s rights might be if the challenged law
is enforced against him, and whether the named plain-
tiff may himself be seriously affected if he cannot
assert third-party rights, e.g., when the named plain-
tiff has no defense to enforcement of the law except
the rights of others. It is this relationship vis-a-vis
the challenged !aw between named plaintiffs and third
persons, and not the presence or absence of other
factors outside litigation, that has gradually formed
the key to derivative standing in this court and other
courts of appeals, and thus put the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit athwart the path of the law.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, a pri-
vate school whose existence was threatened by man-
datory public education laws was permitted to assert
its own economic interests and the associational
rights and educational preferences of its students
and their parents. The court’s focus was on the
mutual threat to private education the school and stu-
dents faced from the laws, not upon the nature or
permanence of the school’s contract to teach indi-
vidual students. In Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,
and Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229,
parties with only a fleeting contractual relationship
were joined in antipathy to a racial barrier, one as
on
. Cemaeaesen mab
- — Dae UR DR OE SSS ETE Po wk ot ord
— SAB IIE EN AED CELIO IRIE I EN
SRS SO
j
J
a
13
the minority person directly offended by racial bias,
the other as the party against whom civil remedies
were asserted for violating a racial covenant. In Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, and Doe v. Bolton,
MENTOR
410 U.S. 179, doctors were permitted to assert rights t
of their patients against anti-contraception and anti- F
abortion statutes, not out of an analysis of the pro- :
fessional relationship of patient and physician, but ;
from proof of the regressive impact of the laws on f
both parties. In both cases, the doctors’ only defense E
was derived from the rights of their patients, since §
the doctors were otherwise in violation of the statutes. :
See, also, Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160; Memo- 7
rial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250; R. A.
Sedler, Standing to Assert Jus Tertit in the Supreme
Court, 71 Yale L.J. 599, 626-628 (1962).
Other courts of appeal have been satisfied for de-
rivative standing with the relationship of supplier and
consumer in a number of contexts, if sufficient identity
of interests in the litigation was shown. In Park View
Heights Corp. v. City of Blackjack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th
Cir. 1972), the court permitted housing producers to
raise the interests of minority and low-income housing
consumers against discrimination. The second circuit
permitted travel agents to assert the interests of trav-
elers against CAB affinity group regulations and bar
owners to raise the claims of their patrons against
anti-topless dancing ordinances. CAB v. Carefree
Travel, Inc., 513 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1975): Gajon Bar
and Grill, Inc. v. Kelley, 508 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1974).
The seventh circuit permitted hospitals to assert pa-
tients’ rights to abortions, Friendship Medical Center,
x
} F
a RORNT ARIES IEEE SARE NTS ETE NT LE ETT TE
14
Ltd. v. Chicago Board of Health, 505 F.2d 1141 (7th
Cir. 1974).
In all of these decisions, an out-of-court relation-
ship is either absent, of little consequence, or never
considered by the court, yet standing is permitted to
assert third-party rights.
The court of appeals holds out the possibility that
housing consumers might file their own actions against
the Petaluma plan. But no prospective purchaser of
housing in Petaluma can prove that he has been ex-
cluded from the city. The city permits 500 units to
be built each year, and theoretically any single pur-
chaser would be a candidate for one of the permitted
units. In this way, each named consumer plaintiff
could be said to lack the requisite “direct injury” for
standing. Even a formal organization of such plaintiffs
would fail to show direct injury unless it reached
a membership of more than 500 households; and then
it could be argued that those members who do not
buy housing this year may be able to buy it next year.
Yet, throughout so strained an inquiry, it would be
clear that as a “lass all prospective residents of Peta-
luma have suffered serious, substantial, and regres-
sive effects from Petaluma’s constraints against
housing, because each member has been put at hazard
by the Petaluma quota.
The court of appeals states that the “complex eco-
nomic, political and social factors involved in this case
are compelling evidence that resolution of the impor-
tant housing and environmental issues raised here is
exclusively the domain of the legislature.” [Appendix
eee
15
B at 57 n. 17]. It is as much the court of appeals’
apparent belief that complex urban law cases are non-
justiciable, as the court’s draconian law of standing,
that bodes ill for any challenge to housing exclusion
laws in the ninth circuit. This court has said in Warth
v. Seldin that judicial review of zoning laws will be
available “in a proper case.” 45 L.Ed.2d at 360, n. 18;
see also, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755
(Stewart, J., concurring). The court of appeals has
translated Warth into a closed-door policy, which will
never admit of judicial review.
2. The decision of the court of appeals to review an admittedly
exclusionary land-use ordinance only for a “rational basis,”
and not on some higher and stricter standard, conflicts with
decisions of this court and courts of last resort in the several
states.
The district court carefully limited itself to “the
only issue presented here, for the first time, .. .
whether or not a municipality may claim the sp. fic
right to keep others away.” The court held that . \e
Petaluma plan violated the right of migration and set-
tlement of prospective residents of Petaluma and held
the city to the burden of demonstrating a compelling
state interest to justify interference with that right. ;
[Appendix A at 31-32]. The district court assured the
city that the court did not intend to interfere with :
the panoply of zoning powers that when not abused
and distorted to prohibited purposes are the means
traditionally reserved to local government to solve
the pervasive problems of urban development,
4%
———
16
The court of appeals has broken away from a
fundamental policy of our people, that “the Constitu-
tion was framed under the dominion of a political
philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed
upon the theory that the people of the several states
must sink or swim together, and that in the long run
prosperity and salvation are in union and not divi-
sion.” Hdwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174, The
power to exclude citizens from free movement and
settlement, absent compelling considerations and less
offensive alternatives, has never before been so out-
spokenly claimed by any court of which petitioners
are aware.
The court of appeals held that “practically all zon-
ing restrictions have as a purpose and effect the
exclusion of some activity or type of structure or a
certain density of inhabitants.” [Appendix B at 51].
Since a zoning restriction may have some ascertain-
able effect of impeding unrestricted mobility, the
court of appeals reasoned that a zoning regulation
that had no other purpose than to exclude new resi-
dents was not per se invalid or subject to more than
minimum judicial scrutiny.
The decision of the court of appeals is in conflict
with prior decisions of this court and several state
courts of last resort.°
In Edwards v. California, this court overturned a
state law that attempted to isolate the state from
Conflict between federal courts of appeals and state courts of
last resort on federal law is an important basis for review in this
court. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S, 249, 252; R. L. Stern &
E, Gressman, Supreme Court Practice § 4.9 (4th ed, 1969),
PLEMENT AND ONE CAEN TREE ATU NN HN! Ome MPM MUTED Re MAK MY Rar MMT NEY FIM
17
interstate migration of indigents. While reaffirming
a spirit of deference to state legislation to solve
difficult issues, this court emphasized that its defer-
ence “does not mean that there are no boundaries to
the permissible area of State legislative activity.
There are, And none is more certain than the prohibi-
tion against attempts on the part of a single State
to isolate itself from the difficulties common to all of
them by restraining the transportation of persons and
property across its borders.” 314 U.S. at 173,
This court has yet specifically to apply the right of
migration and settlement to solely intrastate move-
ment. The court has carefully refrained from holding
that intrastate movement is not protected and has
struck down laws that deterrred or penalized mixed
interstate and intrastate movement, such as the dis-
trict court found was affected in this case. Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250.
This court has often been required to draw lines and
distinctions between traditional legislative efforts en-
titled to substantial deference and legislation offen-
sive to fundamental values. Several state courts of
last resort have established similar limits in judging
the efforts of communities to isolate themselves from
urban growth and expansion.
In Appeal of Girsh, 487 Pa, 237, 263 A.2d 395
(1970), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that ‘‘a
zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent
the entrance of neweomers in order to avoid future
burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the administra-
tion of public services and facilities cannot be held
SNC PEN I, PSR ALL IO LEN ER NP EOD
18
valid.” 263 A.2d at 397. See, also, Appeal of Kit-Mar
Builders, 439 Pa, 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970), and
National Land & Inv. Co, v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215
A.2d 597 (1965).
In Golden v, the Planning Board of Town of
Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 3384 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1970),
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S, 1003, the New York Court
of Appeals, in dealing with the Ramapo phased
growth plan, stated that “though the issues are
framed in terms of the developer’s due process
rights, those rights cannot, realistically speaking,
be viewed separately and apart from the rights of
others ‘in search of a [more] comfortable place to
live.’ ” 30 N.Y.2d 359, 375, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 149. Hav-
ing suggested that its analysis was based on the right
of personal mobility and settlement, the court of ap-
peals subjected the Ramapo plan to intense scrutiny,
brushing past recitals of legislative intent “regardless
of their professedly beneficent purposes.”
There is, then, something inherently suspect in a
scheme which, apart from its professed purposes,
effects a restriction upon the free mobility of
a people until some time in the future when pro-
jected facilities are available to meet increased
demands. Although zoning must include schemes
designed to allow municipalities to more effec-
tively contend with the increased demands of
evolving and growing communities, under its
guise, townships have wont to try their hands at
an array of exclusionary devices in the hope of
avoiding the very burden which growth must in-
evitably bring. [Citations omitted. ]
ial
Ww
Rie eae ae ae ae eae a ad
bag
19
We will not countenance, then, under any guise,
community efforts at immunization or exclusion.
But, far from being exclusionary, the present
amendments merely seek, by the implementation
of sequential development and timed growth, to
provide a balanced cohesive community dedicated
to efficient use of land... and a bona fide effort
to maximize population density consistent with
orderly growth, ...
30 N.Y.2d 359, 375, 378, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 149-150,
152.
In Southern Burlington County NAACP v, Town-
ship of Mt. Laurel, 67 NJ. 151, 336 A2d 713 (1975),
appeal dismissed, 46 L.Ed.2d 28 (1975), the Supreme
Court of New Jersey imposed on all growing
cities—those with an obvious and major part to
play in providing housing in a regional setting—
an absolute obligation to absorb fair shares of hous-
ing, notwithstanding arguments by the township that
would have easily passed muster under a traditional
“rational basis” test. For example, the court refused
to accept arguments that the added fiscal burdens on
the city that new housing and a demand for services
produce are sufficient to permit the city to turn aside
a fair share of housing demand. See, also, Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 [political
difficulty of financing indigent medical care is not a
compelling state interest for infringing right of
migration ].
The gradual development of our law, to impose
more intense review on cities involved in the use of
land-use controls to disturb demographic patterns,
20
seems to have evolved to meet the pervasive tendency
of cities in every metropolitan region to attempt to
shift the burden of providing housing to some other
city in the region. There seems little choice but to
impose a high degree of scrutiny on land-use plans
that deter migration and settlement for their own
sake. As Robert Freilich, the author of the Ramapo
plan, has said:
Despite its recent notoriety, the exclusionary
use of zoning was first noted in the lower court’s
opinion in Ambler Realty, discussed by Norman
Williams during the fifties, and brought to na-
tional attention in 1968 by the Douglas Commis-
sion Report, Building the American City. This
report showed that zoning has regrettably become
more a regulation for ulterior economic and social
motives than a device of planning for the sound
and orderly development of communities. While
this is in part due to the parochial views of many
communities adopting zoning, to a large extent
it is also due to judicial decision making. ...The
result has been an inward set of restrictions
adopted to abet a municipality’s fiscal and social
views without regard to the effect of the policies
on the urban society.
R. Freilich & G. Bass, Eaclusionary Zoning: Sug-
gested Litigation Approaches, 3 The Urban Lawyer
344, 346-347 (1971).
i
21
3. In a metropolitan housing market, exclusionary measures
taken by one city increase burdens on other cities, frustrate
efforts to find housing, and cause a decline in the quality of
the region’s housing. No metropolitan city may legislate for
“the general welfare” without considering the impact of
its land-use laws outside its borders.
The court of appeals agreed that ‘unlike the situa-
tion in the past most municipalities today are neither
isolated nor wholly independent from neighboring
municipalities and that, consequently, unilateral land
use decisions by one local entity affect the needs and
resources of the entire region. ... It does not neces-
sarily follow, however, that the due process rights of
builders and landowners are violated because a local
entity exercises in its own self-interest the police
power lawfully delegated to it by the state.” [Appen-
dix B at 56-57] The district court had carefully ana-
lyzed the complex and substantial effects of the Peta-
luma plan on the San Francisco region, and the court
of appeal conceded that the plan “may frustrate some
legitimate regional housing needs.” Yet the court of
appeals virtually invited the city to extend indefinitely
its exclusionary plan beyond the original five-year
term. [Appendix B at 56, 57 n. 17]
The court of appeals’ refusal to consider the re-
gional impacts of the Petaluma plan, as affecting Peta-
luma’s duty to consider the regional general welfare,
is in conflict with decisions by several state courts of
highest resort. It also offends this court’s decision of
fifty years ago in Euclid v, Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 387, which held open the possibility that
greater public rights than those of one town might
ee Oey as Pe MOLY as
eGR BBE ZEEE SAI IOPO SOO LGT OL LERS, AY
e LOO TEPPER PLETE EGIL LE TN LOE SL IIe BS EF FETS EM
5
22
require a court to set aside the deference ordinarily
given to local land-use legislation,
In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Town-
ship of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975),
appeal dismissed, 46 L.Ed.2d 28 (1975), the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that ‘‘the general welfare
which developing municipalities like Mt. Laurel must
consider extends beyond their boundaries and can-
not parochially be confined to the claimed good of
the particular municipality.” 336 A.2d at 727, 728.
The court held that it is the obligation of each grow-
ing city in a metropolitan region, much like the
“growth centers” identified by the district court opin-
ion in Petaluma, ‘‘to meet the needs, desires, and re-
sources of all categories of people who may desire to
live within its boundaries. . . . [I]t may not adopt
regulations or policies which thwart or preclude that
opportunity.” 336 A.2d at 728.
In Berenson v. Town of New Castle, ......... N.Y.2d .....
(No. 430, December 2, 1975), the Court of Appeals
for New York held that
in enacting a zoning ordinance, consideration
must be given to regional needs and requirements.
It may be true, for example, that New Castle
already has a sufficient number of multiple-dwel-
ling units to satisfy both its present and future
populations. However, residents of Westchester
County, as well as the larger New York City
metropolitan region, may be searching for multi-
ple-family housing in the area to be near their
employment or for a variety of other social and
and economic reasons. There must be a balancing
RE DE EES IB IT SIE OE ES RTE OPE
Seiten “ea LEAN AR FOOL EAE STN REM ab AE EAD AM
23
of the local desire to maintain the status quo
within the community and the greater public
interest that regional needs be met. Although
we are aware of the traditional view that zoning
acts only upon the property lying within the
zoning board’s territorial limits, it must be rec-
ognized that zoning has a substantial impact
beyond the boundaries of the municipality ...
[and] the court . . . should take into considera-
tion not only the general welfare of the resi-
dents of the zoning township, but should also
consider the effect of the ordinance on the neigh-
boring communities.
[Slip opinion at 8.]
The New York Court of Appeals in Berenson spe-
cifically considered whether it was exclusively a leg-
islative task to require that local communities observe
a larger sense of general welfare and, rejecting that
notion, said that “until the day comes when regional,
rather than local, governmental units can make [land-
use] determinations, the courts must assess the rea-
sonableness of what the locality has done.” [Slip
opinion at 9.]
In Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A2d 395
(1970), Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268
A.2d 765 (1970), and National Land & Inv. Co. v.
Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965), the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that no community in a
larger regional housing market could attempt to iso-
late itself from inevitable demographie demands sim-
ply by observing the wishes of its current residents.
The court required communities in a metropolitan
— NS SF ERAN APSE PRIEST TTI PERLITE A PTT NL AML ELM EN NE
COLIN POLO ONE SANE
RAHN eA TAAL RD Tn
24
setting to take a regional view of their land-use laws.
The court described the very substantial damage that
could be done if parochial local land-use decisions
proliferated throughout the region.
In Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich.
508, 116 N.W.2d 816 (1962), a minimum lot size re-
striction was challenged as unrelated to the general
welfare. The city defended the restriction on the
grounds that it had adopted a sewer plan for the gen-
eral area to serve a fixed population of 21,300 people
in the year 2000 and then zoned its land to limit pop-
ulation to that figure. The Michigan Supreme Court
overturned the ordinance, holding that a city might
ignore the needs of a regional population seeking
entry to the city if there were a present danger affect-
ing public welfare, but not otherwise, The City of
Troy’s efforts to disable itself from serving the needs
of an expanding population were very much like
Petaluma’s limiting its water and sewer facilities to
prevent indefinitely any attempt to resume former
rates of housing production.
California has recognized that local zoning decisions
may have an impact outside the zoning municipality
and requires that nearby landowners be given notice
and the opportunity to be heard in zoning decisions
that affect their interests. Scott v. Indian Wells, 6
Cal.3d_ 541, 99 Cal.Rptr. 745 (1972). The due process
rights of non-resident landowners, which the court of
appeals refused to consider, seem indistinguishable
from the interests of prospective residents of a city
substantially affected by its exclusionary zoning laws.
CD aE ed ena Se 2 a a RR el
ash we tt BY ORR SE INA Ag ni WO ANE RIES NI EH 1 ES 1 Pet ARR IE SA AIRS 6 Ol “ts
4 As NS BNE ENP fae ee meters . want : :
25
Other states have required that consideration be ,
given to the interests of outsiders in legislating within
municipal boundaries. Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass. :
560, 42 N.1.2d 516 (1942); Board of County Super- £
visors of Fairfax County v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 i
S.E.2d 390 (1959); City of Newport v. Horton, 22 '
R.I, 196, 47 A. 312 (1900).
The duty to consider the views of outsiders arises
from a number of compelling considerations. We have :
always been a restless and mobile people, to whom the
freedom to resettle in other parts of the land is fun-
damental and necessary. Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160; Tocqueville, Democracy tn America 284-285
(Doubleday-Anchor ed, 1969); F. Turner, The Fron-
tier in American History, 2, 37 (1920).
There is... an ideal involved, that of respecting
the free choice of Americans to move in search
of a better job or a better life. Mobility has been
a traditional road to opportunity in America.
Wholesale growth restrictions imposed by many
communities could block that road for the many
who still want to travel it... . Now, however,
growth restrictions are being considered in many
areas—and implemented in a few. ... Some seem
but the latest trick to keep the “good life” to ;
oneself, Some are transparent efforts to exclude t
specific groups of “immigrants.” .. .
Communities must be aware of prohibiting too
much, though, for the right of mobility is clear
not only in tradition but in law... . Clearly, the
courts are going to be asked to draw, with some
precision, the line between legitimate protective
regulations and improper restrictions on growth
ms & ae . . 7 — scpanc meet a SRP RRL SS ORRENT EAP R IES NS
m — 2 VEAL RET HY OE NRTA IY LUE Yas APONTE TT SOP EFAS RR NOR ST HG TI RELI SEES PEE Bee: a
26
and mobility. The line they draw—and the re-
sponsive measures adopted by governments as
that line becomes clearer—will have a major in-
fluence on how and where we grow.
The issue is not whether there will be urban re-
gions but what form they will take, for we are
convinced that the urban region is a fact of life.
The Use of Land: A Citizen’s Guide to Urban Growth,
18, 88, 98, 100 (Rockefeller Bros. Trust Fund, 1973).
There is, furthermore, the sad but now recognized
tendency of many suburbs to discourage residential
migration, because they see in industrial and com-
mercial growth, but not in new housing, a means of
relief from heavy locai tax burdens.
In the midst of a mobile and expanding popula-
tion, local governments represent the people al-
ready there. Prospective residents, who may be
destined to double or treble the population of the
community, do not live within local boundaries
and therefore do not vote. The local government
thus speaks for the people who got there first.
Many of these first arrivals have recognized
for years that additional development has little
to offer them. Some suburbs have engaged in a
curious inter-municipal competition in which de-
velopment (particularly low- or moderate-income
housing) has been perceived as the common en-
emy, threatening to overrun the weak or inatten-
tive locality. Municipal efforts to combat the
threat have resembled nothing so much as com-
petitive dike-building by neighboring landowners,
each hoping that his higher dikes will keep the
OLE ESI ROE ILE IE PIRATE RT DRE EON OTN gh IE TEN
27
floodwaters off his own land and drive them onto
his neighbors’ instead. Even ten or fifteen years
ago, local officials would privately explain that
a new zoning amendment increasing minimum
lot sizes was at least partly intended to keep up
with the requirements in a neighboring town.
Id. at 225-226.
This court has recently indicated its willingness to
review zoning laws in a proper ease. Warth v. Seldin,
45 L.Ed.2d 343, 360 n. 18 (1975). The court has es-
tablished a policy that before it will cross political
boundaries to impose metropolitan solutions, some
proof must be made out that those who are brought
unwillingly into the solution contributed to the prob-
lem. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755 [Stewart,
J., concurring }.
The court may in this case take a modest step, not
only to settle the conflict among the court of appeals
and the several states over the appropriate definition
of the general welfare in a metropolitan setting, but
in preventing confrontations between suburbs, build-
ers, non-residents, and other communities. The court
may by adopting a regional definition of the general
welfare require that cities take into account the extra-
territorial impact of their land-use laws before those
laws are enacted.
The court of appeals has left Petaluma and other
suburbs free to withdraw indefinitely from the task
See, also, J. Ukeles, The Consequences of Municipal Zoning,
(1964): N. Williams & T. Norman, Exrclusionary Land-Use Con-
trols: The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 Syracuse L. Rev.
475 (1971); Equal Opportunity in Suburbia 42 (U.S. Civil
Rights Comm., 1974).
28
of insuring adequate housing in a society in which
private industry, not the state, is the major source of
shelter. By demeaning the part that the private build-
ing industry plays in housing—in its limitations on
standing and in denigrating the duty of a city to con-
sider “land owners’ or builders’ ” rights—the court of
appeals has sadly misunderstood that for better or
worse housing in America is privately produced. Yet,
in this case, it is the interests of consumers and of
a mobile population that the district court considered
and the court of appeals ignored, and this court
should say emphatically that the district court’s em-
phasis was not misplaced.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue
to review the judgment and opinion of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Respectfully submitted,
Macotm A. Misuraca,
JAMES L, BEYERS,
Counsel for Petitioners.
December 21, 1975.
(Appendices Follow)
OGRE BOAR DIEM
Appendix A
[875 F.Supp. 571]
United States District Court
Northern District of California
Lloyd H. Burke, District Judge
No. 0-73-663
Date April 26, 1974
Construction Industry Association of i
Sonoma County ete., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
The City of Petaluma, a California
charter city,
Defendants. .
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW
This action was heard without a jury from January
14 through January 18, 1974. Arata, Misuraca & Cle-
ment, Malcolm A. Misuraca, James L. Beyers, Craig M.
Thomas and Joseph Joiner, of counsel, appeared for
the plaintiffs. Sturgis, Den-Dulk, Douglass & Ander-
son, Robert Anderson and Edouard E. Robert, of
counsel, appeared for the defendants. The action was
tried, submitted without argument; and the court
Ee SORIA NREL RONLENE MN RRR LREREEENE EES ET IS RID?
eT |
2
made its oral decision (in favor of plaintiffs) at the
conclusion of trial. The court finds from the evidence
that:
Findings of Fact
1. The city of Petaluma, California, is within
modern-day commuting distance of San Francisco and
is a part of the San Francisco Bay Area metropolitan
region. Until recently, Petaluma was known primarily
for its dairy and poultry resources.
2. The defendants, Helen Putnam, Robert A. Brun-
ner, John W. Cavanaugh, Robert A. Daly, James L.
Harberson, Fred V. Mattei, and William A. Perry,
are the members of the Petaluma City Council. All
elements and employees of the defendant city are
under their control.
3. Through the early 1960’s Petaluma’s govern-
ment operated under the prevailing assumption that
“growth is good.” Its planning provided generously
for housing “developments” and eventually permitted
the eastern portion of the city to become densely popu-
lated by a sea of tract homes. Growth was uncon-
trolled.
4. In 1962, the city officials of Petaluma studied
its growth patterns and concluded that, if current
trends continued, by 1985 the city would have a popu-
lation of 77,000; it would cease to be a “rural” com-
munity. Subsequent growth rates confirmed the
predictions; and Petaluma’s population increased
dramatically until the early 1970’s. From 1964 through
1971, the following numbers of housing units were
completed in Petaluma:
a caeeeieieieaiemeaael et ve eee 2 van aaah Panne
3
1964 ‘ 270 SO cdi 379
PE icebepdiss 440 eee se 358
SOP \ndehiieetiorcbis 321 PE cticherishinsdes 591
TU nctiimkick 234 I: Sunsninicenen 891
5. In 1970 and 1971, the city approved approxi-
mately 2,000 units for future construction. This num-
ber of units represents the fair measure of the market
and demographic demands for housing in Petaluma.
Since the 1970-1971 period, market demand has been
and continues to be substantially in excess of five
hundred units per year.
6. With the accelerated growth figures of 1970 and
1971, the citizens of Petaluma began to question
earlier judgments ahout the desirability of growth for
its own sake; and they set about quite openly to curb
the population growth in their city. In early 1971, a
“citizen’s committee”, aided by a firm of professional
planners, drafted a suggested “policy on growth” for
Petaluma. One tool used in arriving at their statement
of policy included the sending of questionnaires to
approximately 10,000 residents of the city. The great
majority of the returned questionnaires indicated that
the citizens of Petaluma wanted to limit the increase
of future residents.
7. In accordance with growing community senti-
ment, the city council adopted an official development
policy in June, 1971, the policy statement itself having
been the one drawn up by the citizens’ committee and
the city planning staff. The statement, entitled “Offi-
cial Statement of Development Polieyv for the City of
Petaluma”, reflected the local sentiment expressed
above. As a preamble the statement asserted that
mF ees
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4
“In order to protect its small town character and
surrounding open spaces, it shall be the policy of
the City to control its future rate and distribution
of growth...”
8. The city council implemented the official growth
policy of June, 1971, and adopted the “Petaluma
Plan,” which includes, among other items, the follow-
ing ordinances:
(a) Environmental Design Plans and Maps, Peta-
luma Resolution No. 6008 N.C.S.
(b) A Residential Development System, Petaluma
Resolution No. 6113 N.C.S.
(c) The Petaluma Housing Element, Petaluma
Resolution No. 6126 N.C.S.
(d) <A proposed breakdown of approximately 2,500
units to be allocated by the plan for the years 1973
through 1977.
(e) Rules and Regulations for business of the
Residential Development Board (the “RDEB”).
9. The city council intended in enacting the “Peta-
luma Plan” to limit Petaluma’s demographic and mar-
ket growth rate in housing and in the immigration of
new residents. The plan did have the intended effect
in a number of respects, of which the following are
the most significant :
(a) The city limited new housing units to approxi-
mately one-third to one-half of the demographic and
market demand of the 1970-1971 period.
(b) The city created an ‘‘urban extension line,”
i.e., an ultimate boundary intended to mark the outer
Toa ashi Me i ite Bn SIRs as i a a Seited Wa AY EA CCL Aa os ae aie oo haath a
5
limits of the city’s expansion for twenty or more
years. Within this perimeter, the city used density
limitation and other techniques to set a maximum
population of the city at approximately 55,000 as
against the 1962 projection of 77,000 by 1985. Such a
limitation is a substantial interference with demo-
graphic and market demand for housing and the im-
migration of new residents. The 1962 general plan
estimate of 77,000 residents in 1985 was a reasonable
estimate of those demands on the housing market, and
it continued to be reasonable in 1970 and 1971.
(c) The area within the “urban extension line”
was sufficient at the city’s chosen densities for growth
for the twenty year planning period only at the 500
unit annual limitation, not at natural demographic
and market demand rates. The effect of the “urban
extension line” is to limit “excessive” population
growth, which limitation was the defendants’ purpose.
Tf the 500 unit rate limit were removed, the limit on
population set up by the “urban extension line” would
still act as a substantial deterrent to travel and com-
merce.
(d) The city refused, for fifteen or more years, to
annex or to extend city facilities to land outside the
‘urban extension line.” The city solicited the assist-
anee of the county and the Loeal Ageney Forma-
tion Commission (“LAFCO”) to prohibit residential
growth outside of the “urban extension line.” Thus,
the extension line inhibited immigration not only into
Petaluma, but also into its surrounding areas.
(e) Permits for the building of the limited num-
ber of units are granted and/or evaluated by the resi-
AI LENS 8 TAI ODE AMIRI LOLI AT AARPEUT AGG A ALORA ERT tt DERM LBLE RARELY hb IGE LORIN A PBA BERS
6
dential development evaluation board (the “RDEB”).
The rating system employed is an intricate one, which
establishes a competitive situation between the pro-
posed applications. Although we do not understand
plaintiffs to attack the rating concept itself, they do
contend that the application of this particular sys-
tem’s terms resembles a “Catch-22” type of operation ;
apparently nobody really knows what regulations will
be applied, or how, or by whom. Plaintiffs argue that
the merit rating system, as employed by these defend-
ants, is actually a hazing system intended to discour-
age unwanted builders from acquiring permission to
build.
10. Although the defendants contend that the
“Petaluma Plan” is intended to last only through
1977, official attempts have been made to perpetuate
the plan through 1990 at least. Such attempts include
the annual 500 unit building limitation, the urban ex-
tension line, and the limitation of available facilities.
For example, the city has purposefully limited its
eontract with the Sonoma County Water Agency, a
major supplier of water to the city, to 9.8 million
gallons of water per day through the year 1990. This
flow is sufficient for a population of 55,000. By limit-
ing its public facilities, the city intended to serve a
population lower than the market and demographic
growth rates would produce, to restrict the travel of
new residents into Petaluma, and consequently to limit
the number of housing units that might be constructed.
11. Housing in Petaluma and elsewhere in the San
Francisco metropolitan region is produced substan-
tially through goods, services and communication de-
vices in interstate commerce.
12. The “Petaluma Plan” prevented the construc-
tion of approximately one-half to two-thirds of hous-
ing units that market and demographic growth forces
would have demanded for Petaluma during the 1973-
1977 period and the subsequent extension of the plan
into 1990. The people in need and desirous of housing
were and will be forced to turn to other areas within
the region for accommodation. Such persons consist
of Californians as well as out-of-state immigrants.
13. Although defendants contended that, as a mat-
ter of law, this court may not inquire into the motives
for the implementation of the growth limitation policy,
they have introduced evidence which is designed to
prove that the growth curbs were imposed because of
the inadequacy of the city’s water and sewage treat-
ment facilities and not to keep others from moving
into Petaluma. Without intending to resolve the ini-
tial legal position taken on the point, we find that the
assertions made are not true.
When the “Petaluma Plan” was conceived in 1971,
the city faced no immediate, serious or unusual diffi-
culty in using or expanding the capacity of its public
facilities to serve existing demographie and market
growth rates in housing. The city could have con-
tinued to meet the demands on such facilities made
by the growth rate trends of 1970 and 1971 without
unusual strain upon such facilities. The city’s refer-
ence to such alleged inadequacies is no more than an
excuse intended to justify the “Petaluma Plan” after
bi aS i ad al ia
its adoption. Specific findings on sewer and water fa-
cilities follow:
(a) The city determined in 1965 to add to the
capacity of its existing sewage treatment plan, which
was first constructed in 1938, then expanded and re-
constructed from time to time. In 1965 it had a ea-
pacity of 1 million gallons per day for secondary
sewage treatment. Between 1965 and 1968, new con-
struction increased the capacity of the facilities to
2.6 million gallons of sewage per day. In wet months
the facilities could handle up to 14 million gallons per
day, a combined demand of sewage and storm water.
(b) In planning the 1968 addition to the treatment
facilities, the city used inaccurate growth projections;
and although the ultimate treatment capacity of the
1968 plant could be expanded to 14 million gallons
per day, it was limited to 2 million gallons per day.
The city later found that the additional facilities ac-
tually increased capacity to 2.6 million gallons per
day. The combined capacity of the 1938 and 1968 fa-
cilities would not indefinitely keep pace with the
growth trends reflected in the 1962 projections, but
they were fully capable of being augmented to handle
up to 14 million gallons of sewage treatment per day
in the 1968 plant.
(ec) In 1973, the city began to increase its ¢a-
pacity to treat sewage to 7 million gallons per day.
The expansion is to be available in July, 1975.
(d) Based upon city sewage treatment reports
which indicate that the per person per day burden on
the treatment facilities amounts to between 50 and
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9
100 gallons, the city currently has the capacity to serve
approximately 6,000 to 12,000 more persons.
(e) The city is able, at the present time, to return
to absorbtion of existing market and demographic
growth rates without exceeding the capacity of city
facilities. Such facilities are either now in place,
under construction, or capable of being augmented
by new capacity and at all times will be adequate for
anticipated real demographic and market demands.
(f) Nor can the city accurately claim that it cur-
rently exceeds regional water quality control stand-
ards. Although the water quality control board for the
San Francisco Bay Region has required the city ulti-
mately to cease the discharge of treated sewage into
the Petaluma River, a schedule has been adopted for
the shifting of the point of discharge. Petaluma may
easily meet the new discharge standards without dis-
turbing demographic and market residential growth
rates. Moreover, the State of California and the fed-
eral government have stipulated that the city is in
conformance with all applicable water quality stand-
ards in its waste water treatment facilities.
(g) The city’s water supply is substantially drawn
from the Russian River through the Sonoma County
Water Agency. The city’s demands upon agency
sources range between 4.7 million gallons per day in
peak summer months, to about one-half that amount
in the winter months.
(h) The city controls its water service and has a
surplus in excess of $3,000,000 in water funds. The
city is currently negotiating the placement of wells in
IF 8 METER PMR ERORS AE esvoremeneoneneady
10
nearby communities for interim use, until the Russian
River-Cotati intertie is completed in 1976. The inter-
tie will furnish a substantial amount of additional
water to Petaluma.
(i) Petaluma has requested a 9.8 million gallon
per day supply of water from the Russian River-Co-
tati intertie, which, as mentioned above, is to be com-
pleted in 1976. Such a request, though not limited by
the supplying agency, represents the amount of water
which would be necessary through the year 1990, if
Petaluma’s population limitation plan were to remain
in effect. The city may expand its contract by request,
and a surplus in the intertie exists for expansion of
water supplies into Petaluma.
(j) Since, as well as the intertie, other additional
supplies of water will be available in the future, the
city is well able to expand at market and demographic
rates without a crisis in its water supply.
(k) The city has not established that any of its
other facilities is in any way threatened by residential
growth at market or demographic rates.
14. Although the parties disagree as to the rele-
vance of the matter, the following findings relate to
the probable effects of the growth limitation poliey in
dispute and the probable effects if such a policy were
to spread to the remaining municipalities of the San
Francisco metropolitan region.
(a) The San Francisco metropolitan region is gen-
erally self-contained and has a unitary housing mar-
ket. Persons excluded from one suburb do not leave
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11
the region but seek housing elsewhere in the area.
Where suburbs not practicing exclusionary growth lim-
itation are forced to absorb not only their own “share”
of the population growth, but also the excluding sub-
urb’s as well, they tend to retaliate by adopting ex-
clusionary measures of their own. It is appropriate
to measure the potential effects that the exclusion
practiced by Petaluma would have if it proliferated
throughout the region itself.
(b) Limits on the supply of housing in one part
of a regional market create increased demand for
housing elsewhere in the area. Other areas then have
incentives to limit housing.
(ec) Limiting housing in the face of static or rising
demand increases the cost of private housing and the
rent structure of tenant housing. This increase is
equally applicable in both the area practicing the ex-
clusion and elsewhere in the region where the rejected
demand is felt.
(d) Limits on housing supply in the suburbs tend
to keep people who would otherwise move to those
suburbs in the center cities.
(e) In any given period, a certain percentage of
existing housing is in need of replacement, either be-
cause it is obsolete or substandard or because it is
destroyed or damaged beyond repair.
(f) If the total housing demand in such a region
be frustrated by a policy that limits the supply of
housing to less than demand, certain results will inevi-
tably follow. Substandard and obsolete housing which
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12
should be replaced will remain in the market to deal
with the high demand and will partially fill it with
low quality structures. The overall nature of the re-
gion’s housing stock will decline. Tenant housing is
as subject to this phenomenon as privately owned and
occupied housing. Landlords will discover that they
may leave substandard housing in the rental market
and may ignore its need for maintenance and rehabili-
tation without suffering high vacancy rates, demand
for such housing being unnaturally high.
(g) Growth throughout a metropolitan region
takes place unevenly in certain “growth centers,”
areas having unused capacity which can be tapped or
the ability to augment capacity to serve new residents.
(1) Petaluma is such a growth center for the San
Francisco metropolitan region.
(2) Such centers serve, among other things, as
residential centers for people who work elsewhere in
the center cities complex, in other suburbs or in other
job centers.
(3) Residential growth in such centers, though
targer than in some other cities in the region, is not
disproportionately larger in the sense that market,
economic, demographic and other forces within the
region dictate that growth shall oceur in substantial
part in growth centers.
(h) If such growth centers curtail residential
growth to less than demographic and market rates, as
has been attempted in the present case, serious and
damaging dislocation will occur in the housing mar-
LE III US DEI SSE EP ELE LINTON EIT,
13
ket, the commerce it represents, and in the travel and
settlement of people in need and in search of housing.
Even in cities in the region that do not qualify as
“srowth centers,” the same exclusion of residential
growth would lead to substantially the same adverse
consequences, if the exclusion were region-wide.
(i) The publie facilities, land, existing social ad-
vantages and access to the center cities and to other
job centers that growth centers offer to a metropoli-
tan region in need of housing cannot be adequately
placed elsewhere to support local and regional housing
needs. Although “new towns” could be constructed
where none already exists, the initial cost would be
prohibitive to build infrastructure, i.e., the basic pub-
lic facilities necessary to serve the town. Experience
in “new town” development has proved that the
“front-end facilities cost” in new towns makes them
impractical, at least as a source of housing for low
and moderate income groups.
(j) Itis impossible to force housing out of growth
centers and into rural areas, without providing for
public facilities. Some public facilities, i. e., fire pro-
tection, streets and schools, must be provided by the
responsible government. Others, such as septic sys-
tems, water wells, and private roads, tend to occupy
large amounts of open space to provide for single-
family homes. In later years, when septic tanks,
water wells and substandard streets decline, the cities
are usually forced to add the old rural develop-
ments to city services, i. e., sewers, water supplies, and
streets, at substantially increased cost over the amount
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14
that would have been incurred, if the developments
had been originally incorporated into city services.
(k) Moreover, it is not feasible to force housing
out of growth centers and into the center cities. The
destruction and reconstruction of center city housing
raise many problems that have not been solved, except
in massive government-sponsored, urban renewal proj-
ects—sometimes these have not been successful. As-
sembly of land ownership for efficient large-scale de-
velopment is difficult. It is difficult to acquire financing
for center-city housing. Construction costs are high,
relative to construction costs in growth centers.
(1) From 1960 to 1970, the number of occupied resi-
dential units in the San Francisco region increased
by 379,000. This increase was in turn made up of
234,000 small households (one and two persons) and
145,000 larger households (three persons and more).
The greater rate of increase in smaller than larger
households indicates increased demand for housing,
with each house, on the average, housing fewer people.
(m) As real income rises, income earners tend to
move into better housing. The housing they leave be-
hind “filters down” to persons of lower income.
(n) People in the San Francisco region and else-
where show a high rate of residential mobility. As of
1970, more than half of the people in the region had
lived in their current residence for less than five
years. This mobility is a reflection of foreign, inter-
state and intrastate travel and reflects a demand for
housing.
TILER NSLS RITE LEE EA UBT PRLS LLL IIE SIS ILE IS ED OS TER IRRE ESE AEPEIILEN
wan ————E Ree
i
15
(0) From 1960 to 1970, of a total of 490,782 new
housing units constructed, approximately 112,729 units
replaced substandard and obsolete housing. This fig-
ure represents a replacement of existing housing stock
at a rate of approximately one percent per year.
(p) A reasonable forecast of the total increase in
the number of households in the San Francisco re-
gion for the decade 1970 to 1980 is 274,500. Of these,
approximately fifty-four percent will be small and
forty-six percent larger households.
(q) A reasonable forecast of the increase in house-
hold real income for the period between 1969 and 1979
for San Francisco region families is from a median
income of $11,745 in 1969 to a median income of $15,270
in 1979. This shift will result in housing mobility and
a “filtration” of vacated housing into the hands of
those of lower income, as described in finding no. 14.
(r) A reasonable forecast of the number of hous-
ing units needed for replacement of substandard or
obsolete housing in the decade 1970 to 1980, at a one
percent replacement rate, is 155,280 units.
(s) Ifthe “Petaluma Plan” limiting housing start-
ing at approximately six percent of existing housing
stock each year—were to proliferate throughout the
San Francisco region, the results would be as ex-
plained in the following findings:
(1) For the decade of 1970 to 1980, the “shortfall”
in needed housing would be approximately 105,000
units. (For the decade of the 1960’s, the shortfall
would have been 110,291; and for the decade of the
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16
1950’s, 89,376 units.) This shortfall would occur pri-
marily in “growth centers.”
(2) Interstate, intrastate and foreign travel would
be seriously inhibited, as people trying to move into
the region found housing either economically unavail-
able or simply nonexistent in reasonable quality.
(3) The cost of regional housing would increase.
The specific housing most affected would be “threshold
housing,” that is, the least expensive housing avail-
able without government subsidy, but through insti-
tutional financing. Loss of “threshold housing”, means
in turn, that persons of incomes of $8,000 to $14,000
per year would be deprived of housing to meet their
needs.
(4) To service demand in the face of restricted
supply old, substandard, or obsolete housing would re-
main in the regional housing market without decrease
in price or rent. The aggregate housing stock for the
region would decline in quality at a serious rate.
(5) Persons of incomes lower than $8,000 per year
who would have been the beneficiaries of “filtration” of
housing left by higher-income earners moving into
“threshold housing” would find themselves unable to
move into better housing.
(6) With fewer available places, the mobility of
residents of the region would be inhibited. People
tend not to put their own houses on the market until
they have located other housing.
(7) The aggregate effect of a proliferation of the
“Petaluma Plan” throughout the San Francisco re-
17
gion would be a decline in regional housing stock
quality, a loss of the mobility of current and prospec-
tive residents and a deterioration in the quality and
choice of housing available to income earners with real
incomes of $14,000 per year or less.
15. To the extent that any of the foregoing findings
constitutes conclusions of law or mixed findings of law
and fact, they are incorporated in the conclusions of
law that follow.
Conclusions of Law
1. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the
freedom to travel, which includes the right to enter
and live in any State or municipality in the Union,
has long been recognized as a basic right under the
Constitution, or a “fundamental right.” Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct.
1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974); Dunn v. Blumenstein,
405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 594 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22
L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) ; Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 S.Ct. 164, 86 L.Ed. 119
(1941); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 S.Ct. 1113,
2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 91 S.Ct. 260, 27 L.Ed.2d 272 (1969).
2. The “Petaluma Plan” is an effort to avoid the
problems that accompany contemporary trends in pop-
ulation growth. Through the plan, the defendants
propose to address themselves to such problems by
limiting the number of people who will henceforth be
permitted to move into the city. The express purpose
18
and the intended and actual effects of the “Petaluma
Plan” have been to exclude substantial numbers of
people who would otherwise have elected to immigrate
into the city.
The plaintiffs do not challenge the legitimacy of the
defendants’ desire to deal with the problems of popu-
lation growth but contend that the means which they
have employed to accomplish their ends fall far short
of constitutional validity. In essence, the plaintiffs
contend that the question of where a person should
live is one within the exclusive realm of that individ-
ual’s prerogative, not within the decision-making
power of any governmental unit. Since Petaluma has
assumed the power to make such decisions on the
individual’s behalf, it is contended that the city has
violated the people’s right to travel. Considering the
facts of the case, we agree.
3. It is not necessary for “standing” purposes that
the plaintiffs introduce any evidence relating to any
individual who was actually excluded by the plan.
As stated in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250, at p. 257, 94 S.Ct. 1076, at p. 1082, 39
L.Ed.2d 306 (1974) :
“Tt is true, as appellees argue, that there is no
evidence in the record before us that anvone was
actually deterred from traveling by the challenged
restriction. But neither did the majority in Sha-
piro find any reason ‘to dispute the “evidence that
few welfare recipients have in fact, been deterred
[from moving] by residence requirements.” . . .
Indeed, none of the litigants had themselves been
deterred.’ Dunn, supra, 405 U.S., at 340, 92 S.Ct.
19
at 1002 (citations omitted). An attempt to dis-
tinguish Shapiro by urging that a durational resi-
dency requirement for voter registration did not
deter travel, was found to be a ‘fundamental mis-
understanding of the law’ in Dunn, supra, at 339-
340, 92 S.Ct. at 1001.
“*Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that de-
nial of welfare actually deterred travel. Nor
have other “right to travel” cases in this Court
always relied on the presence of actual deter-
rence. In Shapiro we explicitly stated that the
compelling-state-interest test would be triggered
by “any classification which serves to penal-
ize the right to [travel] ....’” (Emphasis orig-
inal, footnote omitted.)
“Thus, Shapiro and Dunn stand for the proposi-
tion that a classification which ‘operates to Penal-
ize those persons . . . who have exercised their
constitutional right of interstate migration’, must
be justified by a compelling state interest.”
See also, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct.
1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1971) and Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510
(1965).
4. Inasmuch as there is no meaningful distinction
between a law which “penalizes” the exercise of a
right and one which denies it altogether, it is clear
that the growth limitation under attack may be de-
fended only insofar as it furthers a compelling state
interest. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, su-
pra. Moreover, as noted in Dunn v. Blumstein, supra,
405 U.S. at 348, 92 S.Ct. at 1003:
7 ee |
20
“It is not sufficient for the State to show that
[the rules implemented] further a very substan-
tial state interest. In pursuing that important
interest the State cannot choose means that un-
necessarily burden or restrict constitutionally pro-
tected activity. Statutes affecting constitutional
rights must be drawn with ‘precision’. NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 340, 9
L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258, 265, 88 S.Ct. 419, 424, 19 L.Ed.2d 508
(1967), and must be ‘tailored’ to serve their legit-
imate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra,
394 U.S. at 631, 89 S.Ct. 1322, at 1329. And if
there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those
goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally pro-
tected activity, a State may not choose the way of
greater interference. If it acts at all, it must
choose ‘less drastic means’. Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231
(1960).” (Emphasis supplied)
We therefore make the following inquiries into the
defendants’ asserted “compelling state interests” and
the alternatives which are available to them which
would accomplish the same goals. (See also, Palo Alto
Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F.Supp. 908, 911 [N.D.
Cal. 1970])
5. Essentially, the defendants claim that there are
three such compelling interests which support those
exclusionary measures adopted. The first of these re-
lates to the obvious necessity for a municipality to
provide for adequate sewage treatment facilities and
the related contention that the present capacity of
—y
21
Petaluma’s facilities is inadequate to serve an uncon-
trolled population. As found above, however, the
present facilities of the defendant city are fully capa-
ble of meeting the increased demands of a growing
population, and therefore, the purported justification
is invalid.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the defendants’ view
of the situation is correct, the question still unan-
swered is whether there be any reasonable alternative
available to meet the problem, the implementation of
which alternative would not unduly burden the right
to travel. Dunn v. Blumstein, supra. One such alterna-
tive which suggests itself is the potential for increasing
the capacity of the existing sewage treatment plants,
a solution both real and practical.
Resting their argument upon the following syl-
logism, the defendants contend that the new construc-
tion is not a “reasonable” alternative. First, they point
out that the erection of additional facilities is an ex-
pensive proposition. Second, under state law, the nec-
essary funding would have to be approved by the
electorate before it could be secured. The ultimate
conclusion is that this court must stand ready to order
the citizens of Petaluma to vote in a particular man-
ner before those funds could be assured. The assertion
that courts do not order the results of elections is so
obvious that comment is not required.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not people
currently excluded from Petaluma have the right to
immigrate into the area. If so relief will be granted
and their rights will be enforced; after which the
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matter of dealing with the natural burdens that the
exercise of those rights places upon the municipality
falls entirely within the discretion of city officials, or
the city electorate. Neither Petaluma city officials, nor
the local electorate may use their power to disapprove
bonds at the polls as a weapon to define or destroy
fundamental constitutional rights.
6. The second matter which allegedly “compelled”
the defendants to limit population growth relates to
the adequacy of the city’s water supply. Again, an
inquiry into the facts reveals that there is no connec-
tion between the availability of water and the exclu-
slonary zoning measures taken. Defendants have pur-
posefully calculated future water needs based upon
their own projections which implemented the disputed
five hundred unit per year limitation. The city then
requested an amount of water which would satisfy
the demand of such an artificially limited population.
Where a municipality purposefully limits the quan-
tity of any particular commodity available, then seeks
to justify a population limitation based upon an al-
leged inadequacy of that commodity, it has not stated
a compelling interest which supports the limitation.
Petaluma has so proceeded in the present case, and
accordingly, it has failed to offer a compelling state
interest in this regard.
Additionally, “alternative means”, ineluding the eur-
rent ability to request more water supplies from its
source, are available to the defendants. For both rea-
sons, therefore, the purported justification set out
above must fail.
EIEIO SLL SRI ES LELGOP ILL LEE LIAS
a yyaccoeeoa nt PARROT SRE ERE ANE LES
23
7. Defendants point out that virtually all zoning
schemes limit the manner in which people move about
in one way or another. In doing so, they contend, fi-
nally and most frankly, that, by virtue of its zoning
power, the city has an inherent right to “control its
own rate of growth” and that its citizens’ desires to
protect its “small town character” are sufficiently com-
pelling reasons to justify the exclusionary ordinances.
This last defense assertion states the essence of the
matter and aptly defines the issue: may a municipality
capable of supporting a natural population expansion
limit growth simply because it does not prefer to grow
at the rate which would be dictated by prevailing mar-
ket demand. It is our opinion that it may not.
Zoning ordinances have traditionally been entitled
to substantial judicial deference, City of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71
L.Ed. 303 (1922); ef. Nectow v. City of Cambridge,
277 U.S. 183, 18 S.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed. 842 (1928), but
they are not totally beyond review. Palo Alto Ten-
ants Union v. Morgan, supra; Boraas v. Village of
Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2nd Cir. 1973), reversed,
fae U.S.\ ........, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed. 797 (1974)?
1Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre has been reversed by the Su-
preme Court on grounds not relevant to the present case. It was
found there that the right to travel was not involved in a zoning
regulation which prohibited groups of unmarried persons from
living together in the village. In the present case, however, the
very reason for being of the “Petaluma Plan” is to keep people
out, a patent attempt to affect such excluded persons’ right to
travel. Accordingly, unlike the Boraas decision, the compelling
governmental interest standard of review must still be employed
in the case at bar, since “fundamental” rights are affected.
Se EE GAIT EL REE A Se LEG RL TOT OE PSIG LP EEE SE IE LOS OLE LEER BEE MELE ILE VE LI ELE IG LOE
FEL SEFTON YOY
Lee
a eR
SCOOT IM tS DA On
24
The present case is somewhat unique among the fed-
eral cases in that it is the only one within our purview
which deals with an outright numerical limitation on
population. In discussing governmental attempts to
control population in another context, the Supreme
Court has remarked, in Edwards v. California, supra,
314 U.S. at 173-174, 62 S.Ct. at 167:
“We have repeatedly and recently affirmed and
we now reaffirm, that we do not conceive it our
function to pass upon the ‘wisdom, need, or ap-
priateness’ of the legislative efforts of the States
to solve such difficulties ...
“But this does not mean that there are no bound-
aries to the permissible area of State legislative
activity. There are. And none is more certain than
the prohibition against attempts on the part of a
single State to isolate itself from the difficulties
common to all of them by restraining the trans-
portation of persons and property across its bor-
ders. It. is frequently the case that a State might
gain a momentary respite from the pressure of
events to the outside world. But in the words of
Mr. Justice Cardozo: ‘The Constitution was
framed under the dominion of a political philoso-
phy less parochial in range. It was framed upon
the theory that the people of the several states
must sink or swim together, and that in the long
run prosperity and salvation are in union and
not division.’ ”
Notwithstanding the scarcity of case law on the
topic, and in consideration of the general concepts
expressed in Edwards v. California, we believe that
the reasoning employed in a recent series of cases from
Fs a ea Re ty le eal
SR IEA EE PO BEF IE EE ETS EOE IE
a 7
25
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania best expresses the
underlying rationale of those cases which do recog-
nize the right to travel as fundamental. Accordingly,
we concur with those decisions and adopt their rea-
soning as our own view of the law under the Federal
Constitution also.
The first of the series was Bilbar Construction v.
Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958),
in which the Supreme Court stressed its continued
agreement with the Euclid’ standard of constitu-
tionality. The Court upheld a minimum lot size
requirement of one acre (plus a 150 foot front-
age), noting that the provision could be rationally
related to the “general welfare,” since even aesthetic
considerations come within that realm. Several years
later, however, the same Court faced a zoning scheme
which, when measured against its own “Euclid” stand-
ards, left no doubt in the minds of the court that the
zoning scheme violated “the fundamental law” plainly,
palpably, ete. In National Land and Investment Co. v.
Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1966), the Court
was presented with another acre plot.
The municipality asserted many compelling state
interests which resemble those discussed earlier, such
as its desire to deal with sewage problems and to avoid
heavy traffic loads on its road system. The Supreme
2The Court’s language differed slightly from the United States
Supreme Court’s in Euclid, the Pennsylvania Court electing to
provide that the “legislative enactment can be declared void only
when it violates the fundamental law clearly, palpably, plainly,
and in such a manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in the
minds of the court.” 393 Pa. at 70, 141 A.2d at 855.
mie ee aS |
a ON sD
anne
26
Court pointed out that under Pennsylvania law mu-
nicipalities have the right to deal with sewage prob-
lems and they should deal with them rather than ac-
cept them as they are. With respect to highway traffic
the Court made a comment which we consider partic-
ularly apropos of the case at bar.
“Tt can be seen that the restriction to four acre
lots, so far as traffic is concerned, is based upon
possible future conditions. Zoning is a tool in the
hands of governmental bodies which enables them
to more effectively meet the demands of evolving
and growing communities. It must not and can
not be used by those officials as an instrument by
which they may shirk their responsibilities. Zon-
ing is a means by which a governmental body can
plan for the future—it may not be used as a
means to deny the future. The evidence on the
record indicates that for the present and the im-
mediate future the road system of Easttown
Township is adequate to handle the traffic load. It
is also quite convincing that the roads will become
increasingly inadequate as time goes by and that
improvements will eventually have to be made.
Zoning provisions may not be used, however, to
avoid the increased responsibilities and economic
burdens which time and natural growth invari-
ably bring.” 419 Pa. at 527, 215 A.2d at 609-610.
In addition to the discussion relating to its high-
ways and sewers, the defendant in National Land also
asserted that its efforts to preserve the “character” of
the community were permissible zoning objectives.
The character could be preserved, it argued, by the
creation of a greenbelt and the aesthetics that large-lot
sae POETS SOLE LE OLD LL CELE EISELE ERE
27
zoning offers. Implying that simply “zoning” green-
belts into existence raises due process problems, the
Court said,
“Ti]f the preservation of open spaces is the town-
ship objective, there are means by which this can
be accomplished which include authorization for
‘cluster zoning’ or condemnation of development
rights with compensation paid for that which is
taken.” 419 Pa. at 529, 215 A.2d at 611.
All that remained was the defendant’s contention
that it was exercising its right to protect the “setting”
or the character of the municipality, and that the exer-
cise of that power was valid although it may have the
ultimate effect of limiting population growth. As the
Court noted, at 419 Pa. 530, 215 A.2d 611
“Appellants denominate this goal as falling within
the ambit of promoting the ‘general welfare’. Un-
fortunately, the concept of the general welfare
defies meaningful capsule definition and consti-
tutes an exceedingly difficult standard against
which to test the validity of legislation. However,
it must always be ascertained at the outset
whether, in fact, it is the public welfare which is
being benefited or whether, disguised as legislation
for the public welfare, a zoning ordinance actually
serves purely private interests.
“There is no doubt that many of the residents of
this area are highly desirous of keeping it the
way it is, preferring, quite naturally, to look out
upon the land in its natural state rather than on
other homes. These desires, however, do not rise
to the level of public welfare. This is purely a
matter of private desire which zoning regulations
may not be employed to effectuate.”
NLM ONE SD MRL EN TEN oe |
woe we yarn
At 419 Pa. 532, 215 A.2d 612, the Court summarized
the actual rationale which supported the zoning regu-
lation as representing the township’s
“position that it does not desire to accommodate
those who are pressing for admittance to the
township unless such admittance will not create
any additional burdens upon governmental fune-
tions and services. The question posed is whether
the township can stand in the way of the natural
forces which send out growing population into
hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a com-
fortable place to live. We have concluded not. A
zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to
prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to
avoid future burdens, economic or otherwise, upon
the administration of public services and facilities
cannot be held valid. ...
* * * * * *
“It is clear . .. that the general welfare is not
fostered or promoted by a zoning ordinance de-
signed to be exclusive or exclusionary... .”
Another minimum lot size requirement® was pre-
sented in Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466,
268 A.2d 765 (1970), along with justifications much
like the ones raised in National Land, supra. The pur-
pose of the regulation, the Court concluded, was the
desire to exclude in order to maintain the community
at or near its present size. The Court then stated, at
439 Pa. 474, 268 A.2d 768-769, as follows
“The implication of our decision in National Land
is that communities must deal with the problems
8In the municipality involved the minimum lot size ranged
from two to three acres.
PLE LOLE LLLIT OOLON EN PEIN RENE EO IO
SP RPE REINS ore ; .
WEP TS REAR ARE ENE LUNE LA ENO G MT IES
29
of population growth. They may not refuse to
confront the future by adopting zoning regula-
tions that effectively restrict population to near
present levels. It is not for any given township
to say who may or may not live within its confines,
while disregarding the interests of the entire area.
If Concord Township is successful in unnaturally
limiting its population growth through the use of
exclusive zoning regulations, the people who would
normally live there will inevitably have to live in
another community, and the requirement that they
do so is not a decision that Concord Township
should alone be able to make.”
Kit-Mar followed an earlier case in which a zoning
regulation was held unconstitutional because it “zoned-
out” apartment buildings because of their propensity
to create traffic problems and other strains on public
facilities. In Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 244, 245,
263 A.2d 398, 399, the Court commented as follows
“Appellee here has simply made a decision that
it is content with things as they are, and that the
expense or change in character that would result
from people moving in to find ‘a comfortable place
to live’ are for someone else to worry about.
* cal * * * *
“This case deals with the right of people to live
on land, a very different problem than whether
appellee must allow certain industrial uses within
its borders.”
As stated above, we find the reasoning of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court persuasive and sound; and
accordingly, we take a similar view. A zoning regula-
tion which has as its purpose the exclusion of addi-
— CRT RMR te PITS FEE EIEN LEIS LIGA N LOO SE S LIE
YORE AT RE TNO) ee |
YUN PROSTAR,
30
tional residents in any degree is not a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, nor is it one within the public
welfare.
8. Since the population limitation policies com-
plained of are not supported by any compelling gov-
ernmental interest the exclusionary aspects of the
“Petaluma Plan” must be, and are hereby declared in
violation of the right to travel and, hence, are uncon-
stitutional. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,
supra. Such holding is intended to encompass, not only
the outright numerical limitations upon the issuance
of building permits, but also any and all features of
the plan which, directly or indirectly, seek to control
population growth by any means other than market
demands.
Since we have reached this conclusion, the plaintiffs’
contentions regarding the plan’s invalidity under the
Commerce Clause and remaining Equal Protection
arguments need not be considered.
9. The circumstances of the case suggest that in
order to assure complete relief to the plaintiffs, the
court will retain jurisdiction over the matter until
zoning and land use policies of the defendant city are
more settled than at the present time.’ If there be a
substantial possibility that the wrong complained of
4Affidavits submitted to the court indicate that since the date
of the court’s oral order directing the defendants to evaluate
future building permits without regard to their numerical limi-
tation policies, the defendants have ceased to issue building per-
mits altogether. While the court hesitates to embark upon
contempt proceedings on the basis of oral orders, the refusal to
act by the defendants leads us to the conclusion expressed above.
RELISTS NMG OL IS oe LEI LET OL BD
31
may be repeated in a form other than the one declared
to be illegal, such continuing jurisdiction is appropri-
ate. See Field Enterprises v. Cove Industries, 297 F.
Supp. 989 (E.D. N.Y. 1969). Although plaintiffs con-
tend that the defendants are at this moment embark-
ing upon a “zoning” program which would circumvent
the spirit of the present holding, we hestitate to enjoin
future activities which may or may not materialize.
Cf., Field Enterprises, supra; United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 71 S.Ct. 160, 95 L.Ed.
89 (1950); International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12, 92 L.Ed. 20 (1947); United
States v. Jefferson County School Board, 372 F.2d
836 (5th Cir. 1966), corrected 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.
1967). In the event that the defendants should respond
in such a manner, however, the retention of jurisdic-
tion will offer the aggrieved persons immediate access
to the court for such action and remedies as may be
proper.
10. We believe that it is appropriate against the
background of the present case, for the court to com-
ment upon not only what has been held but also what
has not been held. The issue here has not been whether
or not local government may engage in any number
of traditional zoning efforts which have been common
throughout our history, such as providing for a cer-
tain density of population in a given neighborhood,
or standards for the type and quality of construction,
ete. The only issue presented here, for the first time,
is whether or not a municipality may claim the spe-
cific right to keep others away. Therefore, the defend-
32
ants’ assertion that the result of this case will destroy
or harmfully restrict the zoning and land-use plan-
ning power of municipalities is neither pertinent nor
correct. No “traditional” powers to zone are affected
by the holding in the case.
As contended by plaintiffs on pages 7 and 8 of their
Trial Brief,
“This case is a study in anti-planning, the refusal
of a city to come to grips with the fact that it has
joined a metropolitan complex and is no longer
the sleepy small town that it once was. In a world
in which nothing is as unchanging as change,
Petaluma wants to stay the same. The means to
that end is to draw up the bridge over the moat
and turn people away. This is not the use of police
power, but the abdication of that power....
“Tn a large sense this case sets up the consti-
tutional protections against a single small city’s
passing laws to keep people away, to maintain
‘small town character’ at the expense of depriving
people of mobility, their right to travel, and of
decent housing or perhaps any housing at all....
“Tn a narrower sense, this case [holds] .. . that
local police power may [not] be used to shift the
burden of providing housing to other cities in a
metropolitan region which have their own police
power and their own problems. This issue...
[questions] the jurisdiction of one town to visit
its problems on another.
“The prospective resident turned away at Peta-
luma does not disappear into the hinterland, but
presents himself in some other suburb of the same
metroplex, perhaps in some town with as many
problems or more than Petaluma... . By this
33
means, Petaluma legislates its problems into prob-
lems for Napa, Vallejo or Walnut Creek. May
Petaluma pass a law to bind the whole world?
See, Bosselman, ‘Can the Town of Ramapo Pass
a Law to Bind the Rights of the Whole World?’
1 Fla.State L.Rev. 234 (1973)... .”
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND
PERMANENT INJUNCTION
The court has made its findings of fact and con-
clusions of law in this action. On those findings and
conclusions the court grants its declaratory judgment
and permanent injunction as follows:
1. The court decrees that the following resolu-
tions and ordinances of the City of Petaluma, inso- —
far as they purport to limit the natural population
growth of the area, violate the United States Con-
stitution for the reasons, and limited to those rea-
sons, set forth in the conclusions of law made by the
court in this action:
(a) The Petaluma Official Development Policy,
June 7, 1971, Resolution No. 5760 N.C.S.;
(b) The Petaluma Environmental Design Plans
and Maps, March 27, 1962, Resolution No. 6008
N.CS. ;
(c) The Resolution of Policy Respecting Resi-
dential Policv and Population Growth, April 17,
1972, Resolution No. 6028 N.C.S.
(d) The Petaluma Residential Development
System, August 21, 1972, Resolution No. 6113
N.CS.
(e) The Petaluma Housing Element, Septem-
ber 5, 1972, Resolution No. 6126 N.C.S.
oF PEE LIELS DIDOT PR AE eae aim)
34
(f) All elements of the City of Petaluma gen-
eral plan, the Petaluma zoning law, the Petalu-
ma subdivision law, or other land use ordinances
of the city, that implement the unconstitutional
elements contained in a (a) through
(e) above.
2. The City of Petaluma, Helen Putnam, Robert
A. Brunner, John W. Cavanagh, Robert E. Daly,
James L. Harberson, Fred V. Mattei, and William
A. Perry, and their municipal agents, servants, em-
ployees, contractors, attorneys, and each of the suc-
cessors in interest to all such persons, and all of
them, are hereby permanently enjoined from enforc-
ing in any manner the resolutions and ordinances
described in paragraph 1(a) through 1(f) above, and
the other policies and actions of the city which may
have the effect, the intent, directly or indirectly, of
placing any numerical limitation, whether definite or
approximate, upon the number of persons permitted
to enter the City of Petaluma in order to establish
residence. Such persons are prohibited from taking
any action of any nature, formal or informal, that
preserves, duplicates, replaces, reinstates in another
form, or otherwise furthers any of the ordinances
resolutions, municipal actions, planning, administra-
tion of specific land use proposals, or other actions
or omissions held bv this court to violate the United
States Constitution in paragraph one of this declara-
tory indgment and injunction.
3. The court retains jurisdiction over the subject
matter of this action and over all of the narties, in-
35
cluding those for whom plaintiffs have standing to
sue, and their agents, servants, employees, contrac-
tors, members of the Petaluma City Council, attor-
neys, clerks and others serving municipal functions
for the City of Petaluma and subject to its orders
and control, and all of their successors in interest, to
determine on motion on appropriate notice and sub-
ject to the court’s discretion any further controversies
within the subject matter of this litigation, the find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law, this declaratory judg-
ment or the foregoing injunction in this action.
4. In the event that such further controversies
shall arise between the parties, it is the intention of
the court to appoint a special master whose function
it shall be to hear evidence and to make proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law which may
thus arise. Such findings and conclusions shall be sub-
ject to immediate review by this court.
(a) The parties may, if they so desire, within a
period of thirty davs from the date of this order,
submit to the court a list of no more than three per-
sons whom they believe to be especially qualified to
fulfill the position of special master which is de-
seribed above.
(hb) Such special master shall he compensated at
a rate set hy the court. The sums due for such serv-
ices, alone with other appropriate legal sums. shal]
he naid by the narty who fails to prevail in such
actions.
5 The pleintiffe shall have their casts of suit,
ee eae Cee OT a oe
36
Appendix B
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Construction Industry Association of
Sonoma County, a California non-
profit corporation, et al.,
Plaintiffs-A ppellees. | wo, 74-2100
vs.
The City of Petaluma, a California
charter city,
Defendants-A ppellants. ;
OPINION
[August 13, 1975]
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Before: BARNES and CHOY, Circuit Judges,
and EAST,* District Judge.
CHOY, Circuit Judge:
The City of Petaluma (the City) appeals from a
district court decision voiding as unconstitutional cer-
tain aspects of its five-year housing and zoning plan.
We reverse.
Statement of Facts
The City is located in southern Sonoma County,
about 40 miles north of San Francisco. In the 1950’s
and 1960’s Petaluma was a relatively self-sufficient
*Honorable William G. East, Senior United States District Judge,
District of Oregon, sitting by designation.
x ae SEER ER IE LEAL LEADON PAM DALI ir 8 St DE ALES EPO ATG ome —
te eae AE Mine PF
‘ 1g WEDD ie7 say a
—— ER Dag OL GEL AES EE SERA
town. It experienced a steady population growth
from 10,315 in 1950 to 24,870 in 1970. Eventually, the
City was drawn into the Bay Area metropolitan
housing market as people working in San Francisco
and San Rafael became willing to commute longer
distances to secure relatively inexpensive housing
available there. By November 1972, according to un-
official figures, Petaluma’s population was at 30,500,
a dramatic increase of almost 25 per cent in little
over two years.
The increase in the City’s population, not surpris-
ingly, is reflected in the increase in the number of its
housing units. From 1964 to 1971, the following num-
ber of residential housing units were completed:
UE cicspesecineens 270 ft 379
BNE wpetincecnn 440 IT Victkecsiascsnes 398
Be enkicsansnlnns 321 BE aedteeecnsin 591
EEE siciniactermnans 234 SIE 891
In 1970 and 1971, the years of the most rapid growth,
demand for housing in the City was even greater
than above indicated. Taking 1970 and 1971 together,
builders won approval of a total of 2000 permits al-
though only 1482 were actually completed at the end
of 1971.
Alarmed by the accelerated rate of growth in 1970
and 1971, the demand for even more housing, and the
sprawl of the City eastward, the City adopted a tem-
porary freeze on development in early 1971. The con-
struction and zoning change moratorium was _ in-
tended to give the City Council] and the Citv plan-
ners an opportunity to studv the housing and zoning
situation and to develop short and long range plans.
> OMe & iti
rs ZBL AL LA NM WHS een,
38
The Council made specific findings with respect to
housing patterns and availability in Petaluma, in-
cluding the following: That from 1960-1970 hous-
ing had been in almost unvarying 6000 square-foot
lots laid out in regular grid patterns; that there was
a density of approximately 4.5 housing units per acre
in the sing'> femily home areas; that during 1960-
1970, 88 per cent of housing permits issued were for
single-family detached homes; that in 1970, 83 per
cent of Petaluma’s housing was single family dwell-
ings; that the bulk of recent development (largely
single family homes) occurred on the eastern portion
of the City, causing a large deficiency in moderately
priced multi-family and apartment units on the east
side.
To correct the imbalance between single-family and
multi-family dwellings, curb the sprawl of the City
on the east, and retard the accelerating growth of the
City, the Council in 1972 adopted several resolutions,
which collectively are called the “Petaluma Plan”
(the Plan).
The Plan, on its face limited to a five-year period
(1972-1977).' fixes a housing development growth rate
*
1The district court found that although the Plan is ostensibly
limited to a five-year period, official attempts have been made to
perpetuate the Plan beyond 1977. Such attempts include the urban
extension line (see text infra) and the agreement to purchase from
the Sonoma County Water Agency only 9.8 million gallons of water
per day through the year 1990. This flow is sufficient to support
a population of 55,000. If the City were to grow at a rate of about
500 housing units per year (approximately three persons per unit),
the City would reach a population of 55,000 about the year 1990.
The 55,000 figure was mentioned by City officials as the projected
optimal (and maximum) size of Petaluma. See, e.g., R.T. at 135-43,
145-46. -
PRAT PT DEERE ISPS on ART * i8 2 te. LER STR PRLS Sek F s C8
39
not to exceed 500 dwelling units per year.? Each
dwelling unit represents approximately three people.
The 500 unit figure is somewhat misleading, however,
because it applies only to housing units (hereinafter
referred to as “development-units”) that are part of
projects involving five units or more. Thus, the 500
unit figure does not reflect any housing and popula-
tion growth due to construction of single family
homes or even four-unit apartment buildings not part
of any larger project.
The Plan also positions a 200 foot wide “green-
belt” around the City,’ to serve as a boundary for
urban expansion for at least five years, and with
respect to the east and north sides of the City, for
perhaps ten to fifteen years. One of the most innova-
tive features of the Plan is the Residential Devel-
opment Control System which provides procedures
and criteria for the award of the annual 500 devel-
opment-unit permits. At the heart of the allocation
procedure is an intricate point system, whereby a
builder accumulates points for conformity by his
projects with the City’s general plan and environ-
mental design plans, for good architectural design,
and for providing low and moderate income dwelling
units and various recreational facilities. The Plan
further directs that allocations of building permits
2The allotment for each year is not an inflexible limitation. The
Plan does provide for a 10 percent variance (50 units) below or
above the 500 unit annual figure, but the expectation of the Council
is that not more than 2500 units will be constructed during the
five-year period.
8At some points this urban extension line is about .25 mile
beyond the present City limits.
REAR Rete YN Ce at AE,
EE POOL, AOL TELL GPRD PS LORE OE OE EESTI NEO IO EE te ee eR ene
are to be divided as evenly as feasible between the
west and east sections of the City and between single-
family dwellings and multiple residential units (in-
cluding rental units),* that the sections of the City
closest to the center are to be developed first in order
to cause ‘‘infilling” of vacant area, and that 8 to 12
per cent of the housing units approved be for low and
moderate income persons.
In a provision of the Plan, intended to maintain
the close-in rural space outside and surrounding
Petaluma, the City solicited Sonoma County to estab-
lish stringent subdivision and appropriate acreage
parcel controls for the areas outside the urban exten-
sion line of the City and to limit severly further resi-
dential infiling.
Purpose of the Plan
The purpose of the Plan is much disputed in this
case. According to general statements in the Plan
itself, the Plan was devised to ensure that ‘‘develop-
ment in the next five years, will take place in a rea-
sonable, orderly, attractive manner, rather than in a
completely haphazard and unattractive manner.” The
controversial 500 unit limitation on residential devel-
opment-units was adopted by the City “[i]n order
to protect its small town character and surrounding
4By providing for the increase of multi-family dwellings (in-
eluding townhouses as well as rental apartments), the Plan allows
increased density. Whereas, during the years just preceding the
Plan, housing density was about 4.5 units per acre, under the
Plan single-family housing will consist of not only low (4.5 units
per acre) but also medium density (4.5 to 10 units per acre).
And multi-family housing, to comprise about half of the housing
under the Plan, will be built at a density of 10 or more units
per acre.
nT EOP LEIS DOB. SI CME AED EAE INA BELIEVE BESE, C ACLAOLLE
a # GRRE AMATO A ODBC DS CT er vemnepmeseue -
se tene
41
open space.” The other features of the Plan were
designed to encourage an east-west balance in devel-
opment, to provide for variety in densities and build-
ing types and wide ranges in prices and rents, to
ensure infilling of close-in vacant areas, and to pre-
vent the sprawl of the City to the east and north.
The Builders Association of Sonoma County (the
Association) argues and the district court found,
however, that the Plan was primarily enacted “to
limit Petaluma’s demographic and market growth in
housing and in the immigration of new residents.”
375 F.Supp. 574, 576.
Market Demand and Effect of the Plan
In 1970 and 1971, housing permits were allotted at
the rate of 1000 annually, and there was no indica-
tion that without some governmental control on
growth consumer demand would subside or even re-
main at the 1000 unit per year level. Thus, if Peta-
luma had imposed a flat 500-unit limitation on all
residential housing the effect of the Plan would
clearly be to retard to a substantial degree the nat-
ural growth rate of the City. Petaluma, however, did
not apply the 500-unit limitation across the board.
but instead exempted all projects of four units or
less. Because appellees failed to introduce any evi-
dence whatsoever as to the number of exemnt units
5After the appellees initiated this suit, the City attempted to
show that the Plan was implemented to prevent the over-taxing of
available water and sewage facilities. We find it unnecessary, how-
ever, to consider the claim that sewage and water problems justified
implementation of the Plan.
cic LIE ELLIO COLDER PE OO = BO lg PE A, OVE
expected to be built during the five-year period, the
effect of the 500 development-unit limitation on the
natural growth in housing is uncertain. For purposes
of this decision, however, we will assume that the 500
development-unit growth rate is in fact below the
reasonably anticipated market demand for such units
and that absent the Petaluma Plan, the City would
grow at a faster rate.
According to undisputed expert testimony at trial,
if the Plan (limiting housing starts to approximately
6 per cent of existing housing stock each year) were
to be adopted by municipalities throughout the
region, the impact on the housing market would be
substantial. For the decade 1970 to 1980, the short-
fall in needed housing in the region would be about
105,000 units (or 25 per cent of the units needed).
Further, the aggregate effect of a proliferation of the
Plan throughout the San Francisco region would be
a decline in regional housing stock quality, a loss of
the mobility of current and prospective residents and
a deterioration in the quality and choice of housing
available to income earners with real incomes of
$14,000 per vear or less. If, however, the Plan were
considered by itself and with respect to Petaluma
only, there is no evidence to suggest that there would
he a deterioration in the quality and choice of hous-
ing available there to persons in the lower and mid-
dle income brackets. Actually, the Plan inereases the
availability of multi-family units (owner-ocenpied °
and rental units) and low-income units which were
rarely constructed in the pre-Plan days.
Ah BERTI Lp INE A SOD Ma NE
: se-0t * A eas Yate RE LE Or
Rete reer rae SIA eh ORIEN PD DY BA LI RTD I od ue
43
Court Proceedings
‘wo landowners (the Landowners) and the Associ-
ation instituted this suit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and its
officers and council members, claiming that the Peta-
luma Plan was unconstitutional. The district court
ruled that certain aspects of the Plan unconstitution-
ally denied the right to travel in so far as they tended
‘“‘to limit the natural population of the area.” 375
F.Supp. 574, 588, The court enjoined the City and its
agents from implementing the unconstitutional ele-
ments of the Plan, but the order was stayed by Jus-
tice Douglas pending this appeal.
Jurisdiction
The City, on two wholly separate grounds, chal-
lenges the power of the district court to hear the suit
below. The City contends that a court has no jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
entertain a suit against members of a city council.
Relying on City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507
(1973), which held that a city is not a “person” under
§ 1983, the City argues that its councilmen, similarly,
are not “persons.” This court, however, has recently
faced the very issue raised by the City and has held
that a city official is a “person” within the meaning
of §1983 and that a district court has jurisdiction
under 28 1.8.C. § 1343 over an action to enjoin him
from enforcing an unconstitutional statute. Ybarra v.
City of the Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250,
953 (9th Cir. 1974).
DALAT FE LS EE Ta IP RY —_
ee eT ne
TP Ae SET, OS
44
The district court had jurisdiction not only under
§ 1343 but also under the general federal question
statute, 28 U.S.C. 1331. It does not appear to a legal
certainty that the amount in controversy is less than
$10,000. See St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red
Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938).
Standing
The City also challenges the standing of the Associ-
ation and the Landowners to maintain the suit. The
standing requirement raises the threshhold question in
every federal case whether plaintiff has made out a
“case or controversy” between himself and the defend-
ant within the meaning of Article III of the Constitu-
tion. In order to satisfy the constitutional require-
ment that courts decide only cases or controversies
and to ensure the requisite concreteness of facts and
adverseness of parties, plaintiff must show that he has
a “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,”
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), or that he
has suffered “some threatened or actual injury result-
ing from the putatively illegal action.” Linda R.S.
v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973). Further, the
plaintiff must satisfy the additional court-imposed
standing requirement that the “interest sought to be
protected by the complainant is arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” As-
sociation of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Ine. v. Camp, 297 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). A corollary
to the “zone of interest” requirement. is the well-
recognized general rule that ‘‘even when the plaintiff
45
has alleged injury sufficient to meet the ‘case or con-
troversy’ requirement, . . . the plaintiff must assert
his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his
claim to relief on the Jegal rights or interests of third
parties.” Warth v. Seldin, ........... EI AOb dasionn UE abas , slip
op. at 8 (1975); accord, United States v. Raines, 362
U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249, 256 (1953).
Appellees casily satisfy the “injury in fact” stand-
ing requirement. The Association alleges it has suf-
fered in its own right monetary damages due to lost
revenues, Sonoma County builders contribute dues
to the Association in a sum proportionate to the
amount of business the builders do in the area. Thus,
in a very real sense a restriction on building in Pet-
aluma causes economic injury to the Association.®
The two Landowners also have already suffered or
are threatened with a direct injury. It is their posi-
tion that the Petaluma Plan operated, of itself, to
adversely affect the value and marketabilty of their
land for residential uses, and such an allegation is
sufficient to show that they have a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy. See Golden v.
Planning Board of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y. 2d
359, 365-66, 285 N.F. 2d 291, 294, 334 N.Y.S. 2d 138,
142, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
*Even assuming arquendo that the Association i’self has not
suffered a direct injury, it nonetheless has standing to represent
the interests of its own members, most if not all of whom have
suffered or are threatened with a direet injury. See Warth v.
Seldin, U.S. at , slip op. at 20; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 734-41 (1972).
46
Although appellees have suffered or are threatened
with direct personal injury, the “zone of interest” re-
quirement poses a huge stumbling block to their at-
tempt to show standing. The primary federal claim
upon which this suit is based—the right to travel or
migrate—is a claim asserted not on the appellees’
own behalf, but on behalf of a group of unknown
third parties allegedly excluded from living in Petal-
uma. Although individual builders, the Association,
and the Landowners are admittedly adversely affected
by the Petaluma Plan, their economic interests are
undisputedly outside the zone of interest to be pro-
tected by any purported constitutional right to travel.
Accordingly, appellees’ right to travel claim “falls
squarely within the prudential standing rule that nor-
mally bars litigants from asserting the rights or legal
interests of others in order to obtain relief from in-
jury to themselves.” Warth v. Seldin, U.S. at. ........ .
slip op. at 18. ;
There are several exceptions to this general rule,
but plaintiffs do not fall within any of them. Con-
gress may grant standing by statute to persons who
might otherwise lack standing, td., but here no stat-
ute expressly or by clear implication grants to per-
sons in appellees’ position a right of action based on
third parties’ right to travel. On several occasions,
the Sunreme Court has granted standing to persons
whom a criminal statute directly affected to challenge
the statute on the ground that if enforced it would
infringe the rights of third parties. F’.q., Doe ». Bol-
ton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973): Griswold v. Con-
nectient, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). No comparison,
47
however, may be iairly drawn between appellees and
the doctors facing criminal sanctions in Bolton and
Griswold. Nor do appellees allege that the Petaluma
Plan precludes or otherwise adversely affects a rela-
tionship existing between them and the persons whose
rights allegedly have been violated. Cf. NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958). The only con-
nection between any of the appellees and any of the
persons who purportedly are excluded from Petal-
uma is the possibility that but for the Plan they
would be parties to a purchase-sale agreement.’ There
exists no special, on-going relationship between appel-
lees and those whose rights allegedly are violated
which militates in favor of granting standing. Cf.
NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 458-60; Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925) ;
Washington Utilities &} Transportation Commission
y. FCC, —. Pe Gn ees (9th Cir. 1975); Akron
Board of Education v. State Board of Education of
Ohio, 490 F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 932 (1974). Nor have the Association and the
Landowners shown that their prosecution of the suit
is necessary to ensure protection of the rights asserted.
Cf. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 237
(1969) ; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 459; Barrows
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. at 257. Assuming arguendo that
the constitutional right to travel applies to this case,
7The Association does not allege that a contractual or other
relationship proteeted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1982 actually
exists between its members and any particular person excluded
from residence in the town, or that any such relationship was either
punished or disrupted by the City. Compare Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969) with Warth v. Seldin, .....
Ue. % ...... n.22, slip op. at 23 n.22.
— |
those individuals whose mobility is impaired may
bring suit on their own behalf and on behalf of those
similarly situated. Although Warth v. Seldin denied
standing to a group of low-income and minority-
group plaintiffs challenging exclusionary zoning prac-
tices, the case is no bar to a suit against the City
brought by a proper group of plaintiffs. The Court
in Warth v. Seldin left open the federal court doors
for plaintiffs who have some interest in a particular
housing project and who, but for the restrictive zon-
ing ordinances, would be able to reside in the com-
munity.
Although we conclude that appellees lack standing
to assert the rights of third parties, they nonetheless
have standing to maintain claims based on violations
of rights personal to them. Accordingly, appellees
have standing to challenge the Petaluma Plan on the
grounds asserted in their complaint that the Plan is
arbitrary and thus violative of their due process
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. and
that the Plan poses an unreasonable burden on inter-
state commerce. See Steel Hill Development, Inc. v.
Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir.
1972): Sisters of Providence of St. Maru of the
Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396, 400
(N.D. Til. 1971). The fact that one of the Landown-
er’s property lies wholly outside the present City
houndaries and that the other’s pronerty lies mostly
outside the houndaries is no har to their challenging
the Citv’s Plan which has a direct, intended and im-
mediate effect on the property. See Scott vr. City of
[Resa SE ET RISES SOS LLP BERS OIE SELES PALE LG LI EIEN REED RELL IE AE
» — , Las ene -
ADAPT
49
Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 548-49, 492 P.2d 1137,
1141-42, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749-50 (1972).
Other Challenges to the Plan
Although the district court rested its decision
solely on the right to travel claim,* all the facts and
legal conclusions necessary to resolve appellees’ other
claims are part of the record. ‘Thus, in order to pro-
mote judicial economy, we now dispose of the other
challenges to the Plan.* See Blaney v. Florida Na-
tional Bank at Orlando, 357 B.2d 27, 28 (5th Cir.
1966) ; Necchi v. Neccht Sewing Machine Sales Corp.,
348 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir. 19165), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 909 (1966).
Substantive Due .Process
Appellees claim that the Plam is arbitrary and un-
reasonable and, thus, violative: of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amemdment. According to
8Since the court struck down the Pan on the right to travel
ground, the court believed it unnecessary to consider plaintiffs’
contentions that the Plan was invalid wnder the commerce clause
and under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 375 F. Supp. at 586.
°In discussing whether the Plan, althtonugh a burden on the right
to travel, was justified by a compellimg state interest, the court
serutinized the Plan’s purpose. According to the court, the preserva-
tion of the City’s small town characterr and the slowing down of
the rate of growth by limiting the ntaumber of new homeowners
were not within the public welfare. 3755 F. Supp. at 586. Thus, in
light of this finding, it would be a wasttefy] exercise to remand the
ease for consideration of the substantijye due process issue. The
court has already made clear its conclusion that the avowed pur-
poses of the plan do not amount to leegitimate governmental in-
terests.
ay
PARTIE YO” F
30
appellees, the Plan is nothing more than an exclu-
slonary zoning device,’ designed solely to insulate
Petaluma from the urban complex in which it finds
itself. The Association and the Landowners reject,
as falling outside the scope of any legtimate govern-
mental interest, the City’s avowed purposes in imple-
menting the Plan—the preservation of Petaluma’s
small town character and the avoidance of the social
and evironmental problems caused by an uncontrolled
growth rate.
In attacking the validity of the Plan, appellees
rely heavily on the district court’s finding that the
express purpose and the actual effect of the Plan is
to exclude substantial numbers of people who would
otherwise elect to move to the City. 375 F. Supp. at
581. The existence of an exclusionary purpose and
effect reflects, however, only one side of the zoning
10Exelusionary zoning” is a phrase popularly used to describe
suburban zoning regulations which have the effect, if not also the
purpose, of preventing the migration of low and middle-income
persons. Since a large percentage of racial minorities fall within
the low and middle income brackets, exclusionary zoning regula-
tions may also effectively wall out racial minorities. See generally
Aloi, Goldberg & White, Racial and Economic Segregation by Zon-
ing: Death Knell for Home Rule? 1969 U. Tol. L. Rev. 65 (1969) ;
Bigham & Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning Practices: An Examination
of the Current Controversy, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 1111 (1972); David-
off & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land
Use Controls, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 509 (1971) ; Note, Exclusionary
Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 Harv. Li. Rev. 1645 (1971).
Most court challenges to and comment upon so-called exclusionary
zoning focus on such traditional zoning devices as height limita-
tions, minimum square footage and minimum lot size requirements,
and the prohibition of multi-family dwellings or mobile homes. The
Petaluma Plan is unique in that although it assertedly slows the
growth rate it replaces the past pattern of single-family detached
homes with an assortment of housing units, varying in price and
design.
POOR COP"
;OPY
51
regulation. Practically all zoning restrictions have
as a purpose and effect the exclusion of some activ-
ity or type of structure or a certain density of inhab-
itants. And in reviewing the reasonableness of a zon-
ing ordinance, our inquiry does not terminate with
a finding that it is for an exclusionary purpose.'! We
must determine further whether the exclusion hears
any rational relationship to a legitimate state inter-
est. If it does not, then the zoning regulation is in-
valid. If, on the other hand, a legitimate state inter-
est is furthered by the zoning regulation, we must
defer to the legislative act. Being neither a super
legislature nor a zoning board of appeal, a federal
court is without authority to weigh and reappraise the
factors considered or ignored by the legislative body
in passing the challenged zoning regulation.’? The
reasonableness, not the wisdom, of the Petaluma Plan
is at issue in this suit.
It is well settled that zoning regulations “must find
their justification in some aspect of the police power,
asserted for the public welfare.” Village of Euclid v.
11Our inquiry here is not unlike that involved in a case alleging
denial of equal protection of the laws. The mere showing of some
discrimination by the state is not sufficient to prove an invasion of
one’s constitutional rights. Most legislation to some extent dis-
criminates between various classes of persons, business enterprises,
or other entities. However, absent a suspect classification or invasion
of fundamental rights, equal protection rights are violated only
where the classification does not bear a rational relationship to a
legitimate state interest. See Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos
Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974).
12 Appellees’ brief is unnecessarily oversize (125 pages) mainly
beeause it is rife with quotations from writers on regional planning,
economie regulation and sociological policies and themes. These
types of considerations are more appropriate for legislative bodies
than for courts.
TT Pe Te
rei ati tals calc
PDE LADO the AR IE | 8 ta
52
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). The
concept of the public welfare, however, is not limited
to the regulation of noxious activities or dangerous
structures. As the Court stated in Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954):
The concept of the public welfare is brioad and
inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual
as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.
It is within the power of the legislature tto deter-
mine that the community should be beauitiful as
well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-
balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
(citations omitted). Accord, Village of Belle ‘Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 6, 9 (1974).
In determining whether the City’s interest in pre-
serving its small town character and in avoiding
uncontrolled and rapid growth falls within the broad
concept of “public welfare”, we are considerably as-
sisted by two recent cases. Belle Terre, supra, and
Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d
250 (9th Cir. 1974), each of which upheld as not
unreasonable a zoning regulation much more restric-
tive than the Petaluma Plan, are dispositive of the
due process issue in this case.
In Belle Terre the Supreme Court rejected numer-
ous challenges’* to a village’s restricting land! use to
13The plaintiffs in Belle Terre claimed inter alia that the
ordinance interferred with a person’s right to travel and right to
migrate to and settle within a state.
The Supreme Court held that since the ordinance was mot aimed
at transients, there was no infringement of anyone’s right’ to travel.
416 U.S. at 7. Although due to appellees’ lack of standing -we do not
reach today the right to travel issue, we note that the Petaluma
Plan is not aimed at transients, nor does it penalize those who have
OR OG FEE ILI LO OBOE AE
53
one-family’* dwellings excluding lodging houses,
boarding houses, fraternity houses or multiple-dwell-
ing houses. By absolutely prohibiting the construc-
tion of or conversion of a building to other than
single-family dwelling, the village ensured that it
would never grow, if at all, much larger than its
population of 700 living in 220 residences. Nonethe-
less, the Court found that the prohibition of board-
ing houses and other multi-family dwellings was rea-
sonable and within the public welfare because such
dwellings present urban problems, such as the occu-
pation of a given space by more people, the increase
in traffic and parked cars and the noise that comes
with increased crowds. According to the Court,
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few,
and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate
guidelines in a land-use project addressed to
family needs. This goal is a permissible one
within Berman v. Parker, supra. The police
power is not confined to elimination of filth,
stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay
out zones where family values, youth values, and
the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people.
416 U.S. at 9. While dissenting from the majority
opinion in Belle Terre on the ground that the regula-
recently exercised their right to travel. See CEEED v. California
Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 332-34 (1974); cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
342 (1972).
14The word “family” as used in the ordinance meant one or more
persons related by blood, adoption or marriage, living together as
a single housekeeping unit. Two or fewer persons living together,
though not related by blood, adoption or marriage were considered
a “family”. 416 U.S. at 2.
SPREE DIS ER IN ee |
54
tion unreasonably burdened the exercise of First
Amendment associational rights, Mr. Justice Mar-
shall concurred in the Court’s express holding that a
local entity’s zoning power is extremely broad:
[LJocal zoning authorities may properly act in
furtherance of the objectives asserted to be
served by the ordinance at issue here: restricting
uncontrolled growth, solving traffic problems,
keeping rental costs at a reasonable level, and
making the community attractive to families.
The police power which provides the justifica-
tion for zoning is not narrowly confined. And, it
is appropriate that we afford zoning authorities
considerable latitude in choosing the means by
which to implement such purposes.
416 U.S. at 13-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis added) (citations omitted).
Following the Belle Terre decision, this court in
Los Altos Hills had an opportunity to review a zon-
ing ordinance providing that a housing lot shall con-
tain not less than one acre and that no lot shall be
occupied by more than one primary dwelling unit.
The ordinance as a practical matter prevented poor
people from living in Los Altos Hills and restricted
the density, and thus the population, of the town. This
court, nonetheless, found that the ordinance was ra-
tionally related to a legitimate governmental interest
—the preservation of the town’s rural environment—
and, thus, did not violate the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 503 F.2d at 254.
Both the Belle Terre ordinance and the Los Altos
Hills regulation had the purpose and effect of per-
55
manently restricting growth; nonetheless, the court
in each case upheld the particular law before it on
the ground that the regulation served a legitimate
governmental interest falling within the concept of the
public welfare: the preservation of quiet family
neighborhoods (Belle Terre) and the preservation of
a rural environment (Los Altos Hills). Even less
restrictive or exclusionary than the above zoning
ordinances is the Petaluma Plan which, unlike those
ordinances, does not freeze the population at present
or near-present levels.’* Further, unlike the Los Altos
Hills ordinance and the various zoning regulations
struck down by state courts in recent years, the
Petaluma Plan does not have the undesirable effect
of walling out any particular income class nor any
racial minority group.’®
15[nder the Petaluma Plan, the population is expected to increase
at the rate of about 1500 persons annually. This rate approxi-
mates the rate of growth in the 1960’s and represents about a 6
percent inerease per year over the present population.
16Although appellees have attempted to align their business in-
terests in attacking the Plan with legitimate housing needs of the
urban poor and racial minorities, the Association has not alleged
nor ean it allege, based on the record in this case, that the Plan
has the purpose and effect of excluding poor persons and racial
minorities. Cf. Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v.
Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E. 2d 390 (1959). Contrary to the
picture painted by appellees, the Petaluma Plan is “inclusionary”
to the extent that it offers new opportunities, previously unavail-
able, to minorities and low and moderate-income persons. Under the
pre-Plan system single family, middle-income housing dominated
the Petaluma market, and as a result low and moderate income
persons were unable to secure housing in the area. The Plan
radically changes the previous building pattern and requires that
housing permits be evenly divided between single family and multi-
family units and that approximately eight to twelve per cent of
the units be constructed specifically for low and moderate income
persons.
In stark contrast, each of the exclusionary zoning regulations
invalidated by state courts in recent years impeded the ability of
cece |
we rey Te - ¥ nie LD Ae TNO. deta Mel HBT oes 8 sth LSS I ae tte 2 fw Be Ra SPR rel Stara de
Although we assume that some persons desirous of
living in Petaluma will be excluded under the hous-
ing permit limitation and that, thus, the Plan may
frustrate some legitimate regional housing needs, the
Plan is not arbitrary or unreasonable. We agree with
appellees that unlike the situation in the past most
municipalities today are neither isolated nor wholly
independent from neighboring municipalities and
that, consequently, unilateral land use decisions by
one local entity affect the needs and resources of an
entire region. See, c.g., Golden v. Planning Board of
Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) ;
National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa.
504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Note, Phased Zoning: Reg-
ulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land Develop-
ment, 26 Stan. L. Rey. 585, 605 (1974). It does not
necessarily follow, however, that the due process
rights of builders and landowners are violated merely
heeause a loeal entity exercises in its own self-inter-
est the nolice power lawfully delegated to it hy the
(4 aere minimum lot); Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax
County v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959) (rezoning
to minimum two acre lots with the effect of keeping poor in another
section of municipality).
’ ae beets Cates Ba RNC
OLN OE ILL DIOL IES ON LR Oe
57
state. See Belle Terre, supra; Los Altos Hills, supra.
If the present system of delegated zoning power does
not effectively serve the state interest in furthering
the general welfare of the region or entire state, it
is the state legislature’s and not the federal courts’
role to intervene and adjust the system. As stated
supra, the federal court is not a super zoning board
and should not be called on to mark the point at
which legitimate local interests in promoting the wel-
fare of the community are outweighed by legitimate
regional interests. See Note, supra, at 608-11.
We conclude therefore that under Belle Terre and
Los Altos Hills the concept of the public welfare is
sufficiently broad to uphold Petaluma’s desire to pre-
serve its small town character, its open spaces and
low density of population, and to grow at an orderly
and deliberate pace.’
170ur decision upholding the Plan as not in violation of the
appellees’ due process rights should not be read as a permanent
endorsement of the Plan. In a few years the City itseif for good
reason may abandon the Plan or the state may decide to alter its
laws delegating its zoning power to the local authorities; or to meet
legitimate regional needs, regional zoning authorities may be es-
tablished. See, e.g., Cal. Gov. Code §§ 66600 et seg. (San Francisco
Bay Conservation and Development Commission) ; Cal Gov. Code
§§ 66801, 67000 et seq. (Tahoe Regional Planning Agency) ; Public
Resources Code §§ 27000 et seq. (California Coastal Zone Conser-
vation Commission). To be sure, housing needs in metropolitan
areas like the San Francisco Bay Area are pressing and the needs
are not being met by present methods of supplying housing. How-
ever, the federal court is not the proper forum for resolving these
problems. The controversy stirred up by the present litigation, as
indicated by the number and variety of amici on each side, and
the complex economic, political and social factors involved in this
case are compelling evidence that resolution of the important
housing and environmental issues raised here is exclusively the
domain of the legislature.
Sa en at
PvEiE SARL 6.8 AL ALLELES POR BEE Ee EN AI OTD TM
58
Commerce Clause
The district court found that housing in Petaluma
and the surrounding areas is produced substantially
through goods and services in interstate commerce
and that curtailment of residential growth in Peta-
luma will cause serious dislocation to commerce. 375
F. Supp. at 577, 579. Our ruling today, however, that
the Petaluma Plan represents a reasonable and
legitimate exercise of the police power obviates the
necessity of remanding the case for consideration of
appellees’ claim that the Plan nanan d burdens
interstate commerce.
It is well settled that a state regulation validly
based on the police power does not impermissibly
burden interstate commerce where the regulation nei-
ther discriminates against interstate commerce nor
operates to disrupt its required tniformity. Huron
Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 441, 448 (1960). As
stated by the Supreme Court almost 25 years ago:
When there is a reasonable basis for legislation
to protect the social, as distinguished from the
economic, welfare of a community, it is not for
this Court because of the Commerce Clause to
deny the exercise locally of the sovereign power
of the [state].
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641 (1951). It is
wholly beyond a court’s limited authority under the
Commerce Clause to review state legislation by bal-
ancing reasonable social welfare legislation against
its incidental burden on commerce. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock
59
Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 393 U.S. 129, 136
(1968).
Consequently, since the local regulation here is
rationally related to the social and environmental
welfare of the community and does not discriminate
against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its
required uniformity, appellees’ claim that the Plan
unreasonably burdens commerce must fail.*
Reversed.
18Qur decision today conforms with others which have upheld
reasonable state environmental legislation despite some burden
incidentally placed on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Huron Cement
Co. v. Detroit, supra (air pollution statute) ; Procter & Gamble
Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ........
U.S. .... (1975) (ban on phosphate detergents); American Can
Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 15 Or. App. 618, 517
P.2d 691 (1973) (ban on non-returnable beverage containers).
pyre & moangrrdy
ee ee ery
a ae ons . ; <> sc anne ieee
60
Appendix C
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
No. 74-2100
Construction Industry Association of |
Sonoma County, a nonprofit corpora-
tion, et al.,
Plaintiffs-A ppellees,
Vs.
The City of Petaluma, a California
charter city,
Defendants-A ppellants.
:
[Filed Oct. 2, 1975]
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
ORDER
Before: Barnes and Cuow, Circuit Judges, and East,*
District Judge,
The panel as constituted in the above case has voted
to deny the petition for rehearing and to reject the
suggestion for rehearing en banc.
The full court has been advised of the suggestion
for rehearing en bane and no judge of the court has
voted to grant rehearing en banc. F.R.App.P. 35(b).
The petition for rehearing is denied and the sugges-
tion for rehearing en bane is rejected.
*Hon. William G. East, Senior United States District Judge,
District of Oregon, sitting by designation,
61
Appendix D
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
Case No. C-73-663-LHB
Construction Industry Association of ’
Sonoma County, a nonprofit corpora-
tion, et al.,
Plaintiff,
Vs.
The City of Petaluma, a California
charter city,
Defendant. |
NOTICE OF SPREADING OF MANDATE
To:
Arata, Misuraca, Clement & Haley
717 College Avenue
Santa Rosa, CA 95402
Joseph H. Henderson
1200 College Avenue
Santa Rosa, CA 95402
Edouard E. Robert
133% Kentucky Street
Petaluma, CA 94952
Sturgis, Deu-Dulk Douglas & Anderson
1322 Webster Street
Oakland, CA 94612
ie eR a ee hk eee |
62
Notice is hereby given that the Mandate of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to this Court
was spread on the minutes of this Court on October
14, 1975.
( ) Affirming
(X) Reversing
( ) Reversing and Remanding (with instructions)
Dated: October 15, 1975.
Clerk of Court
/s/ Theodore H. Kast
by: Theodore H. Kast
Deputy Clerk.
RAE ELI EEO LON EEN OP SN III NE
63
Appendix E
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
No. 74-2100 DC# C 73-663-LHB
Construction Industry Association of )
Sonoma County, a nonprofit corpora-
tion, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Vs.
The City of Petaluma, a California
charter city,
Defendants. |
[Filed Oct. 14, 1975]
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
JUDGMENT
This Cause came on to be heard on the Transcript
of the Record from tlie United States District Court
for the Northern District of Californ.. and was duly
submitted.
On Consideration Whereof, It is now here ordered
and adjudged by this Court, that the judgment of the
said District Court in this Cause be, and hereby is
REVERSED.
SPR AEN OE OO TA SEN SC AINE ONL AS CD ot Ltn ORE
64
With costs in this Court in favor of the Appellant
and against Appellee in the amount of $1,325.44.
Printing Appellant’s briefs $1,260.44
Docket fee 50.00
Clerk’s fee 1500
$1,325.44
Filed and entered August 13, 1975.
A True Copy
Attest Oct. 9, 1975
Emil E. Melfi, Jr.,
Clerk
J. N. Iway,
Deputy.
Pa ARNE Seg OIE Re QL IPR tes TN eee
65
Appendix F
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE I
Section 8. The Congress shall have Power... To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. ...
ARTICLE IIT
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Consti-
tution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ;
—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls ;—to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction ;—to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party ;—to Controversies be-
tween two or more States ;—between a State and Citi-
zens of another State;—bhetween Citizens of different
states,—between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between
» State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects. ...
Pee eS SE
22 OG SE POI SALIENCE LEV OI GL BOSD GOODS IT! ELIS GES
PILE LER ELOY OGY IL BM IER A IEP
——e——— SST on he
PEAR WAA CR Ae
66
AMENDMENT IX
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.
AMENDMENT X
The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.
AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction there-
of, are citizens of the United States and the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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