Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma

Supreme Court brief1976

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Text

Prratuma Partners, a California limited part-

nership, and Wuaiam Lawrence,

Petitioners,

V8.

Tae Crry or Peracvma, a California Charter City, Hen

Potnam, Roszat A. Brunnes, Joun W. Cavanacn,

Roserr E. Day, James L. Hanserson, Feep

MaLooLo A, SAR

James L, BrYERs,

900 College Avenue,

Santa Rose, California 95404,

Counsel for Petitioners,

PAWEL AE? ‘ PURE ARIE + ee

Page

CE as vecvxcd cag keRh ha hhes RAG bh enaedneenaane 2

RN en eee TTT ee ye ee Peet ee re 2

OU cs cna cencncrctvicdecvassndeveus sacne 3

Constitutional provisions involved ..............0.00e ee eee 3

Ee Ne ae cccas ups chen Sehheeubiegakaan 4

Reasons for gramting the WHEE 2.0... cesses csceccenccccs 10

1. The decision of the court of appeals denying peti-

tioners standing to assert the interests of prospective

residents of Petaluma creates a confusing and unnec-

essary test for derivative standing and conflicts with

decisions of this court and other courts of appeals ... 10

2. The decision of the court of appeals to review an

admittedly exclusionary land-use ordinance only for

a “rational basis,” and not on some higher and stricter

standard, conflicts with decisions of this court and

courts of last resort in the several states ........... 15

3. In a metropolitan housing market, exclusionary meas-

ures taken by one city increase burdens on other

cities, frustrate efforts to find housing, and cause a

decline in the quality of the region’s housing. No met-

ropolitan city may legislate for “the general welfare”

without considering the impact of its land-use laws

a Bi OI 5s i Es Sn Ree ha SiR ee a Ss 21

Ci ao card CREE N UE Oe Pi OV ERA Ran Wa ER ea cha peeks 28

id

RETR ee

Table of Authorities Cited

Cases Pages

Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) ...17, 18, 23

Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765

EE Sane eUEVECING Gs dat REEOO GCA CHEKM ek us cand ancee 18, 23

Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 .......... cece ween 12, 16

Berenson v. Town of New Castle, ........ <a (No. 430,

ee te ei Wa cus ssbb Ka sAAREOED ATS 22, 23

Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper,

200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959) ........ ce eee eee 25

CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc, 513 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.

SE Res, SVR ee re we is baevan + Vannes bedessadbenacces 13

Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116

eo Nr Pee er See ee ean 24

City of Newport v. Horton, 22 R.I. 196, 47 A. 312 (1900) 25

Construction Industry Ass’n of Sonoma County v. City of

Petaluma, 375 F.Supp. 574 (N.D.Calif. 1974), rev’d, 522

F.2d 897 (9th Cir.) rehearing and hearing en bane

den., ......... jt” eee (9th Cir. October 2, 1975) ......... 2

ee I SE OE oan ean e vs ha kbodce des deeees 13

Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 .............. 13, 16-17, 25

Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 .............. 21

Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Board of

Health, 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974) ............... 13, 14

Gajon Bar and Grill, Ine. v. Kelley, 508 F.2d 1317 (2d

CL AGT Mik Ssihs dan chi wees et ees 13

Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d

359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1970), appeal dismissed, 409

asa cui wal gk a deten ies «cece a eh< ecu 11, 18, 19

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 ........... ce eee 13

Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 ..13,17, 19

Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755 [Stewart, J., con-

eae eile band Gh eseenedisAsaw eg cvega diane’ 15, 27

National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d

og EE er reer ere ee rere ee 18, 23

Be ae i a

RRR RMN AIR INTE oe Te eI NSN NNN RONEN PENRO RI NIN THES TL ANN GTN

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CrrED iii

Pages

Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Blackjack, 467 F.2d

Se CU OIE apc ce cag da MAb ARAN aSS Cha cK ka ews 11,13

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 ............... 12

Seott v. Indian Wells, 6 Cal.3d 541, 99 Cal.Rptr. 745

ADEPT IR se NP AES Sey pC si RR 24

Simon vy. Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942) 25

Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt.

Laurel, 67 NJ. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dis-

I, Se CE Oe CORI se uN acccbadeedscaccacsnce 19, 22

Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 ........... 12

Warth vy. Seldin, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (June 25, 1975) ....11,15, 27

Constitutional Provisions

Constitution of the United States:

Ds Oe I UE hs BAN Ch ce sAa inde cabacexccaces 3

Be ee, OO 0 Bn as ca wah kecccicrsrcacc 3

Amendments 9, 10, and 14, Section 1 ............... 3

Statutes

Be Tae ORE ck wa Sadak as On Kacecdéekackeance 2

Texts

S Cumber-Sam. L.Rev. 543 (1975) 2... ccc ccc cece ccccccs 2

Equal Opportunity in Suburbia (U.S. Civil Rights Comm.,

RRR SS a SR irl Re Nga svi, SA aS Nee ar nS 27

Note, 3 Fordham Urban L.J. 187 (1974) ..............8. 2

F. Turner, The Frontier in American History (1920) .... 25

Note, 9 Georgia L.Rev. 260 (1974) .......... ccc eee eens 2

Comment, 12 Harv. J. Legis. 244 (1955) ................ 2

Comment, 26 Hast. Ld. 849 (1975) .....cccccccccccecns 2

J. Ukeles, The Consequences of Municipal Zoning (1964) .. 27

Sa Pe WEY ORD ate

e = |

a em ed

iv TaBLE oF AUTHORITIES CITED

Note, 50 L.A. Bar Bull. 252 (1975) .............eeeeees

26 Land Use Law & Zoning Digest No. 7 at 611 (1974) ..

Note, 35 Louisiana L.Rev. 676 (1975) ............. cee eee

Note, 51 N.D. L.Rev. 509 (1974) .... cc cwcceccecccccesss

N. Williams & T. Norman, Exclusionary Land-Use Con-

trols: The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 Syra-

Note, 23 Kansas L.Rev. 324 (1975) .......... cee cence 0

2

2

2

2

gs eB eres th See error. 27

Note, 2 Ohio North. L.Rev. 318 (1974) ................. 2

Note, 36 Ohio St. L.J. 128 (1975) ............ccceeeeees 2

Comment, 5 Pacifie L.J. 570 (1974) .............. 0c eee 2

R. A. Sedler, Standing to Assert Jus Tertii in the Su-

preme Court, 71 Yale L.J. 599 (1962) ................ 13

R. Freilich & G. Bass, Exclusionary Zoning: Suggested

Litigation Approaches, 3 The Urban Lawyer 344 (1971) 20

Note, 6 Seton Hall L.Rev. 207 (1974) .................. 2

R. L. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice (4th

i en hnes ws On hak an hoe eek Bl kaen de aekekaac 16

Comment, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the

Constitution, 44 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 989 (1969) ............ 3

The Use of Land: A Citizen’s Guide to Urban Growth

(Rockefeller Bros. Trust Fund, 1973) ................. 26, 27

Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Doubleday-Anchor ed.

ROGER. <a 5 AbRaEe MaEN ONS Sa We UeEN News h sabi ke os kveen lees 25

Note, 28 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 430 (1975) .................. 2

Note, 19 Villanova L.Rev. 739 (1974) ...............005- 2

Note, 31 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 575 (1974) ................ 2

Comment, 84 Yale L.J. 1564 (1975) .......... cc cee eee 2

oo

FE RAT ety SERN YS TIE

— _—

—

Iu the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OctToBER TERM, 1975

No.

Construction InpustRy AssociaTION OF Sonoma County,

a California non-profit corporation, THE SAN FRANCISCO,

PENINSULA AND REpDwoop Empire BuILpING INDUSTRY

AssociaTIon, a California non-profit corporation,

PETALUMA PaRTNERS, a California limited part-

nership, and WILLIAM LAWRENCE,

Petitioners,

vs.

Tue Crry or Peratuma, a California Charter City, HELEN

PutnaM, Ropert A. BRUNNER, JOHN W. CavVANAGH,

Ropert E. Daty, James L. HARBERSON, FRED

V. Matrer, and WituiaM A. Prrry,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

The petitioners Construction Industry Association of

Sonoma County, a California non-profit corporation,

The San Francisco, Peninsula and Redwood Empire

Building Industry Association, a California non-profit

corporation, Petaluma Partners, a California limited

LAR LER AAI LOIRE ALOT ME ILM AY IOS RE ten

MR YM Tey

partnership, and William Lawrence, respectfully

pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judg-

ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit entered in this action on August 13,

1975.

OPINION BELOW

Construction Industry Assn. of Sonoma County v.

City of Petaluma, 375 F.Supp. 574 (N.D.Calif. 1974),

rev'd,, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.) rehearing and hearing

en bane dena, ......... re (9th Cir. October 2, 1975)'

JURISDICTION

The opinion of the court of appeal was rendered

and judgment entered on August 13, 1975. A timely

petition “-» rehearing en bane was denied on October

2, 1975 and judgment filed in the court of appeals on

October 14, 1975, This petition for certiorari is filed

within ninety days of October 2, 1975. This court’s

jurisdictiion is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

1The district court opinion has been noted in a number of legal,

—— and urban affairs journals. See, Note, 2 Ohio North. L.

ev. 318 (1974) ; Note, 31 Wash. & Lee L.Rev, 575 (1974); Note,

3 Fordham Urban L.J. 187 (1974); Note, 51 N.D. L.Rey. 509

(1974); Note, 6 Seton Hall L.Rey. 207 (1974) ; Note, 19 Villanova

L. Rey. 739 (1974); Note, 5 Cumber-Sam. L.Rev. 543 (1975); Note,

9 Georgia L.Rev. 260 (1974); Note, 23 Kansas L.Rev. 324 (1975);

Note, 35 Louisiana L.Rev. 676 (1975) ; Note, 50 L.A. Bar Bull. 252

(1975); Note, 36 Ohio St. L.J. 128 (1975); Note, 28 Vanderbilt

L.Rey. 430 (1975). See, also 26 Land Use Law & Zoning Digest No.

7 at 611 (1974); Comment, 84 Yale L.J. 1564 (1975); Comment,

12 Harv. J. Legis. 244 (1955); Comment, 5 Pacifie LJ. 570

(1974); Comment, 26 Hast. L.J. 849 (1975),

SY DONT IR Le etme ATI ABA Den VEN LY

cai | = aS ‘ wae

3

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ;

1. Whether plaintiffs who have demonstrated their .

own standing must show the existence of a “special, '

on-going relationship”, outside the context of the leg- F

islation being challenged, with third persons whose :

rights they seek standing to assert with their own. E

2. Whether a municipal ordinance with the express

purpose and effect of excluding substantial numbers

of new residents from the city shall be judged on a

rational basis standard or by some higher and stricter

test.

3. Whether a city legislating for “the general wel-

fare” by intentionally excluding new residents must

measure and consider the impact of its law on pro-

spective residents, on other cities forced by the exclu-

sionary law to absorb disproportionately large shares

of regional housing demand, and on the quality of

the region’s housing stock.

esi: AE

oo eRe?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The following provisions of the Constitution of the

United States:

1. Article I, Section 8;

2. Article III, Sections 1 and 2; and

3. Amendments 9, 10, and 14, Section 1.?

“This litigation involves in part the right to travel, whose source

in the Constitution of the United States is not settled. See,

e.g., Comment, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the Con-

stitution, 44 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 989 (1969),

é

Risen nell Berean ee |

~ scteneney —

PEGE NAER IRE POG LIPS ALE. Fe ne ea

4

All of these provisions are printed in Appendix F

to this petition.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petaluma began the 1960s as a relatively self-suffi-

cient town of 21,400 people, grown i:om about 10,000

in 1950, and lying mainly outside the urbanizing influ-

ences of the San Francisco metropolitan region [C.T.

366; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-3 at 2]*. Petaluma

adopted a general plan in 1962, which predicted sub-

stantial growth for the city. By 1985 the city forecast

that its population would reach 67,400 persons, and

that the city would provide services to an additional

9,600 persons outside the city limits, for a total of

77,000. [Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 13 at 251.

During the 1960s, Petaluma developed in some ways

as its 1962 general plan had predicted, increasing its

housing stock by 60.8 percent. [Pretrial order, C.T.

366; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-8 at 5]. But the city

did not develop the industrial and commercial tax

base its 1962 general plan had forecast, and by the

end of the 1960s, Petaluma’s newer residents were

in large part daily commuters to San Francisco and

San Rafael. [ Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-5 at 11; Plain-

tiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-8 at 10].

8Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 1-5 and 7-10 to plaintiffs’ complaint in this

litigation were first marked at trial as Plaintiffs’ Exhibits Nos. 1-5

and 7-10 [C.T. 82]. They were later marked as a single exhibit,

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1 [C.T. 158]. In this petition, Plaintiffs’

Exhibit No. 1 and the separate exhibits within it are referred to

jointly as, for example, “Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 1-3,” which means

exhibit no. 3 in trial exhibit no. 1,

Family incomes rose quickly in Petaluma in the

1960s as the result of an influx of new residents who

commuted to the industrialized center of the region

and enjoyed the benefit of urban wages. Real dispos-

able income per household rose in Petaluma almost

twenty percent from 1960 through 1970. [Plaintiffs’

Exhibit No. 1-8 at 9-10].

Housing costs in Petaluma during the 1960s re-

mained reasonable, below prevailing costs in Santa

Rosa and Novato, two nearby cities. [Jd. at 7]. When

Petaluma set out in 1970 and 1971 to limit the number

of new residents, the city acknowledged the attractive-

ness of Petaluma to households of modest incomes

and set about to frustrate “the large demand for rela-

tively low-cost homes in the City.” [Jd. at 7-8]. Be-

fore Petaluma implemented its constraints against

new residents, access to housing in many parts of the

San Francisco region had already been virtually

closed to families earning less than $12,000 a year,

but “the Petaluma area still manages to offer this

opportunity.” [Id. at 8].

In 1970, Petaluma’s rate of housing production

substantially increased, reflecting the city’s new role

as an important suburb and housing supplier for the

region. Yet, even this new rate of growth remained in

phase with the 1962 projections for Petaluma’s popu-

lation in 1985. [R.T. 83, 100, 103-107, 111-114; C.T.

366; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No, 1-8 at 5].

In 1971 and 1972, the city enacted a plan that im-

posed a quota of 500 new dwelling units each year

on housing construction in the city, which reduced by

PERRIN L OAR RES Cte am ae a ab Re Ce tee meee |

:

eas, URS ee elation ear Ter

6

one-half to two-thirds the amount of housing being

produced to meet market demand.* [Appendix A at

4, 7.]

The Petaluma housing plan was ostensibly limited

to five years, but no sooner was it passed than the

city began to extend the plan by implication through

at least 1990. The city attempted to disable itself from

returning in five years to market-rate housing pro-

duction by limiting its contractual draw of domestic

water from the Sonoma County Water Agency, a

major supplier of water to the city, and by purposely

under-sizing its sewer treatment facilities. [District

court findings nos. 10 and 13, Appendix A at 6-10].

No one has ever argued that all the values Petaluma

has tried to protect or all the means turned to that

end are unconstitutional or even unwise. Much of

what Petaluma has attempted will, if administered

fairly, inerease the burdens on land owners and

builders, but improve the process of urban develop-

ment in the city. Petaluma’s reliance on the planned

unit development to gain greater control over the

process of development from beginning to end, its in-

‘The court of appeals questioned whether the 500-unit quota

was ‘‘misleading,’’ because it applied to housing projects involv-

ing five units or more, exempting projects of lesser number. [| Ap-

pendix B at 39]. However, Petaluma has always conceded that the

500-unit quota would, despite the exemption of four-or-fewer-unit

projects, ‘limit growth during this |five-vear] period to 2,500 new

dwelling units or an average of 500 units annually.”’ [ Plaintiffs’

Exhibit No. 1-5 at 1-2]. The court of appeals acknowledged that

the four-or-fewer exception was not an issue in the ease by assum-

ing that the effeet of the Petaluma plan was as the district court

had found, to reduce housing production to less than ‘‘ reasonably

anticipated market demand.’’ | Appendix B at 42}

RE NOME RTA cE EY NE Oo PET RAO RR Set menyas ce

sistence on a greater mix of single-family and multi-

family development, and its attempt to use bonus

points for low- and moderate-income housing®, go un-

challenged here,

The petitioners have argued from the beginnings of

this litigation that the collision in this case is between

important values, each deserving high regard and at-

tention, and have urged that the vice of Petaluma’s

attempts to cure its problems is overbreadth and a

failure to consider reasonable, less drastic, and valid

alternatives to exclusion. Even the court of appeal ac-

cepted the district court’s finding that the express

purpose and effect of the Petaluma plan, as an end

in itself, was to prevent new residents from settling

in Petaluma.

Petaluma has not been consistent in its attempt to

maintain its “small town character.” It does not limit

industrial or commercial development. Thus, the basis

for the Petaluma plan appears not so much a refusal

to grow, even at the loss of “smallness,” but a refusal

to grow in ways that do not maximize the city’s tax

5 The court of appeal suggested that the city’s provision for

bonus points to developers who submitted low-income housing

projects was another “inclusionary” aspect of the city’s plan. Of

course, the plan did not mandate inclusion of low-income housing

among the 500 units produced each year and placed the full bur-

den for low-income housing production on each individual devel-

opment. This simply imposed a public obligation on the developer

and his limited number of consumers. The effects of the annual

500-unit limitation in driving up housing costs made this token

provision for low-income housing a shadow against the glaring

effects of constraining the supply of housing in the face of intense

demand. | Appendix A at 7, 16-17.]

FTG veamemos grill

DLR A NOLO, 2

8

base and minimize its taxes, at the expense of out-

siders, other cities in the region, and the quality of

existing regional housing stock. [Appendix A at 16-17,

32-33. ]

The district court found that Petaluma is part of an

interactive regional housing market. People displaced

from Petaluma do not disappear from the region, but

present themselves in search of housing in other cities

of the regional market. Communities faced with their

own housing demand and the excluded demand of

Petaluma retaliate with exclusionary laws of their

own. The aggregate effect of proliferating housing-

exclusion laws deprives the region of a substantial per-

centage of housing starts necessary to accommodate

regional demographic changes and to maintain the

quality of the region’s current housing stock. [District

court findings 14a and 14h, Appendix A at 10-11].

The district court found that one of the effects of

the Petaluma plan would be a serious interference

with interstate, intrastate, and foreign travel, as

people trying to move into or within the San Francisco

region found housing either financially unavailable or

simply non-existent in reasonable supply or quality.

[District court finding 14; Appendix A at 16], As a

consequence, the district court held that:

the “Petaluma Plan” is an effort to avoid the

problems that accompany contemporary trends in

population growth. Through the plan, the defend-

ants propose to address themselves to such prob-

lems by limiting the number of people who will

henceforth be permitted to move into the city.

The express purpose and the intended and actual

effects of the “Petaluma Plan” have been to ex-

Rg

9

clude substantial numbers of people who would

otherwise have elected to immigrate into the city.*

The plaintiffs do not challenge the legitimacy

of the defendants’ desire to deal with the prob-

lems of population growth but contend that the

means which they have employed to accomplish

their ends fall far short of constitutional validity.

. .. [I]t is contended that the city has violated

the people’s right to travel. Considering the facts

of the case, we agree.

[District court conclusion of law no. 2, Appendix A

at 17-18].

The district court limited its holding to “the only

issue presented here, for the first time, [that is]...

whether or not a municipality may claim the specific

right to keep others away.” [Conclusion of law no.

10, Appendix A at 31]. The district court reassured

the city that it did not intend to limit “traditional

efforts” at zoning and other forms of land-use con-

trols. However, the district court noted that the city

showed signs of evading the spirit of the court’s deci-

sion and provided for the appointment of a federal

master to observe the extent of the city’s efforts at

compliance with the court’s judgment. [Appendix A

at 31-35]

®The court of appeals concluded that Petaluma’s encouragement

of multi-family and low-income housing made the city’s plan

unique despite its limitation on the number of housing units pro-

duced. [ Appendix B at 50 n. 10]. The court even characterized the

plan at one point as ‘‘inelusionary,’’ rather than exclusionary, de-

spite the court’s acknowledgement of the substantial and regressive

loeal and regional impact of the city’s artificial constraints on

housing supply. [ Appendix B at 55 n. 16, 56]. The court coneluded

that even though the plan ‘‘may frustrate some legitimate regional

housing needs, the Plan is not arbitrary or unreasonable.’’ [Ap-

pendix B at 56].

I OLR Ra OF TIO IL ETRE RIR SE

10

While an appeal to the ninth circuit was” pending,

former Justice Douglas granted a stay of the district

court’s order and injunction. [Order of September 18,

1974, No. A.-1298]

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The decision of the court of appeals denying petitioners

standing to assert the interests of prospective residents of

Petaluma creates a confusing and unnecessary test for deriva-

tive standing and conflicts with decisions of this court and

other courts of appeals.

The court of appeals has seriously misunderstood

the showing necessary for petitioners to invoke the

interests of housing consumers, prospective residents

of Petaluma. The court of appeals requires that some

out-of-court “special, on-going relationship” between

the petitioners and prospective residents of Petaluma

be demonstrated before petitioners may assert con-

sumer interests with their own.

Having made an extra-judicial relationship essen-

tial to derivative standing, the court of appeals takes

a mechanistic and unnecessarily narrow view of that

relationship. The court states that housing suppliers

and consumers are joined in this case only by “the

possibility that but for the [Petaluma] Plan they

would be parties to a purchase-sale agreement.” [Ap-

pendix B at 47].’

7The court of appeals suggested the petitioners had “attempted

to align their business interests in attacking the Plan with legiti-

mate housing needs of the urban poor and racial minorities,” but

found that the plan did not have the effect of excluding “poor

persons and racial minorities.” [Appendix B at 55 n. 16] The

court failed to take account of the obvious community of interest

PALI SDL SRE NE EE LIEN Lh, I NIRS RB ER CA EM a LE ARES

RRS RIE MRR DS LASERS AEE BENE

il

In a single sale by one builder to one purchaser,

only a contractual community of interest may join

them. But in the larger sense of two classes of poten-

tial litigants vitally interested in an open housing ;

market, builder and buyer have an intense and con-

tinuing mutual objective, which led the Court of

Appeals for the Eigth Circuit to characterize their

relationship as “not only sufficiently close . . . but inti- b

mately close.” Park View Heights Corp. v. City of ;

Blackjack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1213-1214 (8th Cir. 1972). ;

See, also, Golden v. Planning Board of Town of :

Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1970),

appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 [due process and

mobility issues inseparable }.

The court of appeals attempted further to diminish

the link between builder and buyer by commenting that ‘

there was no present contractual agreement between :

the petitioners and any prospective purchasers of ;

Petaluma housing. The court did not explain how

builders or landowners could have as yet made con-

tracts to sell or rent housing, when the very legisla-

tion at issue prevents that housing from _ being

constructed.®

LEE CDN EID OES ILE

against exclusionary laws between builders and people in search

of housing. The district court made elaborate findings on the very

serious impact the Petaluma plan has on persons of low income,

not only in drying up supplies of new housing, but in depriving ;

the poor of a traditionally important source of shelter, which is :

used but decent housing vacated by persons of rising incomes

and upward mobility. [Appendix A at 11, 14-17] The court of

appeals ignored those findings, apparently because petitioners in

the court’s view lacked standing to raise the rights of consumers.

8Warth v. Seldin, 45 L.Ed.2d 343, 360 n. 18 (June 25, 1975) 5

held that consumers excluded from a community need not show for :

federal standing that they have a present contractual interest in a

particular project.

aaa

SEY RS ATMO ny PN

&

ET SET rE ee IS eR Nal eRe .

12

When the issue is whether one may assert the

rights of another against a specific law, and only for

that purpose, the relevant inquiry is to discern how

wisely and well the named plaintiff will advance the

cause of the absent third person, how unlikely it is

that the absent party will be able to assert his own

rights in another forum, how seriously diluted the

absent party’s rights might be if the challenged law

is enforced against him, and whether the named plain-

tiff may himself be seriously affected if he cannot

assert third-party rights, e.g., when the named plain-

tiff has no defense to enforcement of the law except

the rights of others. It is this relationship vis-a-vis

the challenged !aw between named plaintiffs and third

persons, and not the presence or absence of other

factors outside litigation, that has gradually formed

the key to derivative standing in this court and other

courts of appeals, and thus put the Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit athwart the path of the law.

In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, a pri-

vate school whose existence was threatened by man-

datory public education laws was permitted to assert

its own economic interests and the associational

rights and educational preferences of its students

and their parents. The court’s focus was on the

mutual threat to private education the school and stu-

dents faced from the laws, not upon the nature or

permanence of the school’s contract to teach indi-

vidual students. In Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,

and Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229,

parties with only a fleeting contractual relationship

were joined in antipathy to a racial barrier, one as

on

. Cemaeaesen mab

- — Dae UR DR OE SSS ETE Po wk ot ord

— SAB IIE EN AED CELIO IRIE I EN

SRS SO

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a

13

the minority person directly offended by racial bias,

the other as the party against whom civil remedies

were asserted for violating a racial covenant. In Gris-

wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, and Doe v. Bolton,

MENTOR

410 U.S. 179, doctors were permitted to assert rights t

of their patients against anti-contraception and anti- F

abortion statutes, not out of an analysis of the pro- :

fessional relationship of patient and physician, but ;

from proof of the regressive impact of the laws on f

both parties. In both cases, the doctors’ only defense E

was derived from the rights of their patients, since §

the doctors were otherwise in violation of the statutes. :

See, also, Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160; Memo- 7

rial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250; R. A.

Sedler, Standing to Assert Jus Tertit in the Supreme

Court, 71 Yale L.J. 599, 626-628 (1962).

Other courts of appeal have been satisfied for de-

rivative standing with the relationship of supplier and

consumer in a number of contexts, if sufficient identity

of interests in the litigation was shown. In Park View

Heights Corp. v. City of Blackjack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th

Cir. 1972), the court permitted housing producers to

raise the interests of minority and low-income housing

consumers against discrimination. The second circuit

permitted travel agents to assert the interests of trav-

elers against CAB affinity group regulations and bar

owners to raise the claims of their patrons against

anti-topless dancing ordinances. CAB v. Carefree

Travel, Inc., 513 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1975): Gajon Bar

and Grill, Inc. v. Kelley, 508 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1974).

The seventh circuit permitted hospitals to assert pa-

tients’ rights to abortions, Friendship Medical Center,

x

} F

a RORNT ARIES IEEE SARE NTS ETE NT LE ETT TE

14

Ltd. v. Chicago Board of Health, 505 F.2d 1141 (7th

Cir. 1974).

In all of these decisions, an out-of-court relation-

ship is either absent, of little consequence, or never

considered by the court, yet standing is permitted to

assert third-party rights.

The court of appeals holds out the possibility that

housing consumers might file their own actions against

the Petaluma plan. But no prospective purchaser of

housing in Petaluma can prove that he has been ex-

cluded from the city. The city permits 500 units to

be built each year, and theoretically any single pur-

chaser would be a candidate for one of the permitted

units. In this way, each named consumer plaintiff

could be said to lack the requisite “direct injury” for

standing. Even a formal organization of such plaintiffs

would fail to show direct injury unless it reached

a membership of more than 500 households; and then

it could be argued that those members who do not

buy housing this year may be able to buy it next year.

Yet, throughout so strained an inquiry, it would be

clear that as a “lass all prospective residents of Peta-

luma have suffered serious, substantial, and regres-

sive effects from Petaluma’s constraints against

housing, because each member has been put at hazard

by the Petaluma quota.

The court of appeals states that the “complex eco-

nomic, political and social factors involved in this case

are compelling evidence that resolution of the impor-

tant housing and environmental issues raised here is

exclusively the domain of the legislature.” [Appendix

eee

15

B at 57 n. 17]. It is as much the court of appeals’

apparent belief that complex urban law cases are non-

justiciable, as the court’s draconian law of standing,

that bodes ill for any challenge to housing exclusion

laws in the ninth circuit. This court has said in Warth

v. Seldin that judicial review of zoning laws will be

available “in a proper case.” 45 L.Ed.2d at 360, n. 18;

see also, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755

(Stewart, J., concurring). The court of appeals has

translated Warth into a closed-door policy, which will

never admit of judicial review.

2. The decision of the court of appeals to review an admittedly

exclusionary land-use ordinance only for a “rational basis,”

and not on some higher and stricter standard, conflicts with

decisions of this court and courts of last resort in the several

states.

The district court carefully limited itself to “the

only issue presented here, for the first time, .. .

whether or not a municipality may claim the sp. fic

right to keep others away.” The court held that . \e

Petaluma plan violated the right of migration and set-

tlement of prospective residents of Petaluma and held

the city to the burden of demonstrating a compelling

state interest to justify interference with that right. ;

[Appendix A at 31-32]. The district court assured the

city that the court did not intend to interfere with :

the panoply of zoning powers that when not abused

and distorted to prohibited purposes are the means

traditionally reserved to local government to solve

the pervasive problems of urban development,

4%

———

16

The court of appeals has broken away from a

fundamental policy of our people, that “the Constitu-

tion was framed under the dominion of a political

philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed

upon the theory that the people of the several states

must sink or swim together, and that in the long run

prosperity and salvation are in union and not divi-

sion.” Hdwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174, The

power to exclude citizens from free movement and

settlement, absent compelling considerations and less

offensive alternatives, has never before been so out-

spokenly claimed by any court of which petitioners

are aware.

The court of appeals held that “practically all zon-

ing restrictions have as a purpose and effect the

exclusion of some activity or type of structure or a

certain density of inhabitants.” [Appendix B at 51].

Since a zoning restriction may have some ascertain-

able effect of impeding unrestricted mobility, the

court of appeals reasoned that a zoning regulation

that had no other purpose than to exclude new resi-

dents was not per se invalid or subject to more than

minimum judicial scrutiny.

The decision of the court of appeals is in conflict

with prior decisions of this court and several state

courts of last resort.°

In Edwards v. California, this court overturned a

state law that attempted to isolate the state from

Conflict between federal courts of appeals and state courts of

last resort on federal law is an important basis for review in this

court. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S, 249, 252; R. L. Stern &

E, Gressman, Supreme Court Practice § 4.9 (4th ed, 1969),

PLEMENT AND ONE CAEN TREE ATU NN HN! Ome MPM MUTED Re MAK MY Rar MMT NEY FIM

17

interstate migration of indigents. While reaffirming

a spirit of deference to state legislation to solve

difficult issues, this court emphasized that its defer-

ence “does not mean that there are no boundaries to

the permissible area of State legislative activity.

There are, And none is more certain than the prohibi-

tion against attempts on the part of a single State

to isolate itself from the difficulties common to all of

them by restraining the transportation of persons and

property across its borders.” 314 U.S. at 173,

This court has yet specifically to apply the right of

migration and settlement to solely intrastate move-

ment. The court has carefully refrained from holding

that intrastate movement is not protected and has

struck down laws that deterrred or penalized mixed

interstate and intrastate movement, such as the dis-

trict court found was affected in this case. Memorial

Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250.

This court has often been required to draw lines and

distinctions between traditional legislative efforts en-

titled to substantial deference and legislation offen-

sive to fundamental values. Several state courts of

last resort have established similar limits in judging

the efforts of communities to isolate themselves from

urban growth and expansion.

In Appeal of Girsh, 487 Pa, 237, 263 A.2d 395

(1970), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that ‘‘a

zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent

the entrance of neweomers in order to avoid future

burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the administra-

tion of public services and facilities cannot be held

SNC PEN I, PSR ALL IO LEN ER NP EOD

18

valid.” 263 A.2d at 397. See, also, Appeal of Kit-Mar

Builders, 439 Pa, 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970), and

National Land & Inv. Co, v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215

A.2d 597 (1965).

In Golden v, the Planning Board of Town of

Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 3384 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1970),

appeal dismissed, 409 U.S, 1003, the New York Court

of Appeals, in dealing with the Ramapo phased

growth plan, stated that “though the issues are

framed in terms of the developer’s due process

rights, those rights cannot, realistically speaking,

be viewed separately and apart from the rights of

others ‘in search of a [more] comfortable place to

live.’ ” 30 N.Y.2d 359, 375, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 149. Hav-

ing suggested that its analysis was based on the right

of personal mobility and settlement, the court of ap-

peals subjected the Ramapo plan to intense scrutiny,

brushing past recitals of legislative intent “regardless

of their professedly beneficent purposes.”

There is, then, something inherently suspect in a

scheme which, apart from its professed purposes,

effects a restriction upon the free mobility of

a people until some time in the future when pro-

jected facilities are available to meet increased

demands. Although zoning must include schemes

designed to allow municipalities to more effec-

tively contend with the increased demands of

evolving and growing communities, under its

guise, townships have wont to try their hands at

an array of exclusionary devices in the hope of

avoiding the very burden which growth must in-

evitably bring. [Citations omitted. ]

ial

Ww

Rie eae ae ae ae eae a ad

bag

19

We will not countenance, then, under any guise,

community efforts at immunization or exclusion.

But, far from being exclusionary, the present

amendments merely seek, by the implementation

of sequential development and timed growth, to

provide a balanced cohesive community dedicated

to efficient use of land... and a bona fide effort

to maximize population density consistent with

orderly growth, ...

30 N.Y.2d 359, 375, 378, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 149-150,

152.

In Southern Burlington County NAACP v, Town-

ship of Mt. Laurel, 67 NJ. 151, 336 A2d 713 (1975),

appeal dismissed, 46 L.Ed.2d 28 (1975), the Supreme

Court of New Jersey imposed on all growing

cities—those with an obvious and major part to

play in providing housing in a regional setting—

an absolute obligation to absorb fair shares of hous-

ing, notwithstanding arguments by the township that

would have easily passed muster under a traditional

“rational basis” test. For example, the court refused

to accept arguments that the added fiscal burdens on

the city that new housing and a demand for services

produce are sufficient to permit the city to turn aside

a fair share of housing demand. See, also, Memorial

Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 [political

difficulty of financing indigent medical care is not a

compelling state interest for infringing right of

migration ].

The gradual development of our law, to impose

more intense review on cities involved in the use of

land-use controls to disturb demographic patterns,

20

seems to have evolved to meet the pervasive tendency

of cities in every metropolitan region to attempt to

shift the burden of providing housing to some other

city in the region. There seems little choice but to

impose a high degree of scrutiny on land-use plans

that deter migration and settlement for their own

sake. As Robert Freilich, the author of the Ramapo

plan, has said:

Despite its recent notoriety, the exclusionary

use of zoning was first noted in the lower court’s

opinion in Ambler Realty, discussed by Norman

Williams during the fifties, and brought to na-

tional attention in 1968 by the Douglas Commis-

sion Report, Building the American City. This

report showed that zoning has regrettably become

more a regulation for ulterior economic and social

motives than a device of planning for the sound

and orderly development of communities. While

this is in part due to the parochial views of many

communities adopting zoning, to a large extent

it is also due to judicial decision making. ...The

result has been an inward set of restrictions

adopted to abet a municipality’s fiscal and social

views without regard to the effect of the policies

on the urban society.

R. Freilich & G. Bass, Eaclusionary Zoning: Sug-

gested Litigation Approaches, 3 The Urban Lawyer

344, 346-347 (1971).

i

21

3. In a metropolitan housing market, exclusionary measures

taken by one city increase burdens on other cities, frustrate

efforts to find housing, and cause a decline in the quality of

the region’s housing. No metropolitan city may legislate for

“the general welfare” without considering the impact of

its land-use laws outside its borders.

The court of appeals agreed that ‘unlike the situa-

tion in the past most municipalities today are neither

isolated nor wholly independent from neighboring

municipalities and that, consequently, unilateral land

use decisions by one local entity affect the needs and

resources of the entire region. ... It does not neces-

sarily follow, however, that the due process rights of

builders and landowners are violated because a local

entity exercises in its own self-interest the police

power lawfully delegated to it by the state.” [Appen-

dix B at 56-57] The district court had carefully ana-

lyzed the complex and substantial effects of the Peta-

luma plan on the San Francisco region, and the court

of appeal conceded that the plan “may frustrate some

legitimate regional housing needs.” Yet the court of

appeals virtually invited the city to extend indefinitely

its exclusionary plan beyond the original five-year

term. [Appendix B at 56, 57 n. 17]

The court of appeals’ refusal to consider the re-

gional impacts of the Petaluma plan, as affecting Peta-

luma’s duty to consider the regional general welfare,

is in conflict with decisions by several state courts of

highest resort. It also offends this court’s decision of

fifty years ago in Euclid v, Ambler Realty Co., 272

U.S. 365, 387, which held open the possibility that

greater public rights than those of one town might

ee Oey as Pe MOLY as

eGR BBE ZEEE SAI IOPO SOO LGT OL LERS, AY

e LOO TEPPER PLETE EGIL LE TN LOE SL IIe BS EF FETS EM

5

22

require a court to set aside the deference ordinarily

given to local land-use legislation,

In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Town-

ship of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975),

appeal dismissed, 46 L.Ed.2d 28 (1975), the New

Jersey Supreme Court held that ‘‘the general welfare

which developing municipalities like Mt. Laurel must

consider extends beyond their boundaries and can-

not parochially be confined to the claimed good of

the particular municipality.” 336 A.2d at 727, 728.

The court held that it is the obligation of each grow-

ing city in a metropolitan region, much like the

“growth centers” identified by the district court opin-

ion in Petaluma, ‘‘to meet the needs, desires, and re-

sources of all categories of people who may desire to

live within its boundaries. . . . [I]t may not adopt

regulations or policies which thwart or preclude that

opportunity.” 336 A.2d at 728.

In Berenson v. Town of New Castle, ......... N.Y.2d .....

(No. 430, December 2, 1975), the Court of Appeals

for New York held that

in enacting a zoning ordinance, consideration

must be given to regional needs and requirements.

It may be true, for example, that New Castle

already has a sufficient number of multiple-dwel-

ling units to satisfy both its present and future

populations. However, residents of Westchester

County, as well as the larger New York City

metropolitan region, may be searching for multi-

ple-family housing in the area to be near their

employment or for a variety of other social and

and economic reasons. There must be a balancing

RE DE EES IB IT SIE OE ES RTE OPE

Seiten “ea LEAN AR FOOL EAE STN REM ab AE EAD AM

23

of the local desire to maintain the status quo

within the community and the greater public

interest that regional needs be met. Although

we are aware of the traditional view that zoning

acts only upon the property lying within the

zoning board’s territorial limits, it must be rec-

ognized that zoning has a substantial impact

beyond the boundaries of the municipality ...

[and] the court . . . should take into considera-

tion not only the general welfare of the resi-

dents of the zoning township, but should also

consider the effect of the ordinance on the neigh-

boring communities.

[Slip opinion at 8.]

The New York Court of Appeals in Berenson spe-

cifically considered whether it was exclusively a leg-

islative task to require that local communities observe

a larger sense of general welfare and, rejecting that

notion, said that “until the day comes when regional,

rather than local, governmental units can make [land-

use] determinations, the courts must assess the rea-

sonableness of what the locality has done.” [Slip

opinion at 9.]

In Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A2d 395

(1970), Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268

A.2d 765 (1970), and National Land & Inv. Co. v.

Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965), the Pennsyl-

vania Supreme Court held that no community in a

larger regional housing market could attempt to iso-

late itself from inevitable demographie demands sim-

ply by observing the wishes of its current residents.

The court required communities in a metropolitan

— NS SF ERAN APSE PRIEST TTI PERLITE A PTT NL AML ELM EN NE

COLIN POLO ONE SANE

RAHN eA TAAL RD Tn

24

setting to take a regional view of their land-use laws.

The court described the very substantial damage that

could be done if parochial local land-use decisions

proliferated throughout the region.

In Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich.

508, 116 N.W.2d 816 (1962), a minimum lot size re-

striction was challenged as unrelated to the general

welfare. The city defended the restriction on the

grounds that it had adopted a sewer plan for the gen-

eral area to serve a fixed population of 21,300 people

in the year 2000 and then zoned its land to limit pop-

ulation to that figure. The Michigan Supreme Court

overturned the ordinance, holding that a city might

ignore the needs of a regional population seeking

entry to the city if there were a present danger affect-

ing public welfare, but not otherwise, The City of

Troy’s efforts to disable itself from serving the needs

of an expanding population were very much like

Petaluma’s limiting its water and sewer facilities to

prevent indefinitely any attempt to resume former

rates of housing production.

California has recognized that local zoning decisions

may have an impact outside the zoning municipality

and requires that nearby landowners be given notice

and the opportunity to be heard in zoning decisions

that affect their interests. Scott v. Indian Wells, 6

Cal.3d_ 541, 99 Cal.Rptr. 745 (1972). The due process

rights of non-resident landowners, which the court of

appeals refused to consider, seem indistinguishable

from the interests of prospective residents of a city

substantially affected by its exclusionary zoning laws.

CD aE ed ena Se 2 a a RR el

ash we tt BY ORR SE INA Ag ni WO ANE RIES NI EH 1 ES 1 Pet ARR IE SA AIRS 6 Ol “ts

4 As NS BNE ENP fae ee meters . want : :

25

Other states have required that consideration be ,

given to the interests of outsiders in legislating within

municipal boundaries. Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass. :

560, 42 N.1.2d 516 (1942); Board of County Super- £

visors of Fairfax County v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 i

S.E.2d 390 (1959); City of Newport v. Horton, 22 '

R.I, 196, 47 A. 312 (1900).

The duty to consider the views of outsiders arises

from a number of compelling considerations. We have :

always been a restless and mobile people, to whom the

freedom to resettle in other parts of the land is fun-

damental and necessary. Edwards v. California, 314

U.S. 160; Tocqueville, Democracy tn America 284-285

(Doubleday-Anchor ed, 1969); F. Turner, The Fron-

tier in American History, 2, 37 (1920).

There is... an ideal involved, that of respecting

the free choice of Americans to move in search

of a better job or a better life. Mobility has been

a traditional road to opportunity in America.

Wholesale growth restrictions imposed by many

communities could block that road for the many

who still want to travel it... . Now, however,

growth restrictions are being considered in many

areas—and implemented in a few. ... Some seem

but the latest trick to keep the “good life” to ;

oneself, Some are transparent efforts to exclude t

specific groups of “immigrants.” .. .

Communities must be aware of prohibiting too

much, though, for the right of mobility is clear

not only in tradition but in law... . Clearly, the

courts are going to be asked to draw, with some

precision, the line between legitimate protective

regulations and improper restrictions on growth

ms & ae . . 7 — scpanc meet a SRP RRL SS ORRENT EAP R IES NS

m — 2 VEAL RET HY OE NRTA IY LUE Yas APONTE TT SOP EFAS RR NOR ST HG TI RELI SEES PEE Bee: a

26

and mobility. The line they draw—and the re-

sponsive measures adopted by governments as

that line becomes clearer—will have a major in-

fluence on how and where we grow.

The issue is not whether there will be urban re-

gions but what form they will take, for we are

convinced that the urban region is a fact of life.

The Use of Land: A Citizen’s Guide to Urban Growth,

18, 88, 98, 100 (Rockefeller Bros. Trust Fund, 1973).

There is, furthermore, the sad but now recognized

tendency of many suburbs to discourage residential

migration, because they see in industrial and com-

mercial growth, but not in new housing, a means of

relief from heavy locai tax burdens.

In the midst of a mobile and expanding popula-

tion, local governments represent the people al-

ready there. Prospective residents, who may be

destined to double or treble the population of the

community, do not live within local boundaries

and therefore do not vote. The local government

thus speaks for the people who got there first.

Many of these first arrivals have recognized

for years that additional development has little

to offer them. Some suburbs have engaged in a

curious inter-municipal competition in which de-

velopment (particularly low- or moderate-income

housing) has been perceived as the common en-

emy, threatening to overrun the weak or inatten-

tive locality. Municipal efforts to combat the

threat have resembled nothing so much as com-

petitive dike-building by neighboring landowners,

each hoping that his higher dikes will keep the

OLE ESI ROE ILE IE PIRATE RT DRE EON OTN gh IE TEN

27

floodwaters off his own land and drive them onto

his neighbors’ instead. Even ten or fifteen years

ago, local officials would privately explain that

a new zoning amendment increasing minimum

lot sizes was at least partly intended to keep up

with the requirements in a neighboring town.

Id. at 225-226.

This court has recently indicated its willingness to

review zoning laws in a proper ease. Warth v. Seldin,

45 L.Ed.2d 343, 360 n. 18 (1975). The court has es-

tablished a policy that before it will cross political

boundaries to impose metropolitan solutions, some

proof must be made out that those who are brought

unwillingly into the solution contributed to the prob-

lem. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755 [Stewart,

J., concurring }.

The court may in this case take a modest step, not

only to settle the conflict among the court of appeals

and the several states over the appropriate definition

of the general welfare in a metropolitan setting, but

in preventing confrontations between suburbs, build-

ers, non-residents, and other communities. The court

may by adopting a regional definition of the general

welfare require that cities take into account the extra-

territorial impact of their land-use laws before those

laws are enacted.

The court of appeals has left Petaluma and other

suburbs free to withdraw indefinitely from the task

See, also, J. Ukeles, The Consequences of Municipal Zoning,

(1964): N. Williams & T. Norman, Exrclusionary Land-Use Con-

trols: The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 Syracuse L. Rev.

475 (1971); Equal Opportunity in Suburbia 42 (U.S. Civil

Rights Comm., 1974).

28

of insuring adequate housing in a society in which

private industry, not the state, is the major source of

shelter. By demeaning the part that the private build-

ing industry plays in housing—in its limitations on

standing and in denigrating the duty of a city to con-

sider “land owners’ or builders’ ” rights—the court of

appeals has sadly misunderstood that for better or

worse housing in America is privately produced. Yet,

in this case, it is the interests of consumers and of

a mobile population that the district court considered

and the court of appeals ignored, and this court

should say emphatically that the district court’s em-

phasis was not misplaced.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue

to review the judgment and opinion of the Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

Macotm A. Misuraca,

JAMES L, BEYERS,

Counsel for Petitioners.

December 21, 1975.

(Appendices Follow)

OGRE BOAR DIEM

Appendix A

[875 F.Supp. 571]

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Lloyd H. Burke, District Judge

No. 0-73-663

Date April 26, 1974

Construction Industry Association of i

Sonoma County ete., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

The City of Petaluma, a California

charter city,

Defendants. .

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS

OF LAW

This action was heard without a jury from January

14 through January 18, 1974. Arata, Misuraca & Cle-

ment, Malcolm A. Misuraca, James L. Beyers, Craig M.

Thomas and Joseph Joiner, of counsel, appeared for

the plaintiffs. Sturgis, Den-Dulk, Douglass & Ander-

son, Robert Anderson and Edouard E. Robert, of

counsel, appeared for the defendants. The action was

tried, submitted without argument; and the court

Ee SORIA NREL RONLENE MN RRR LREREEENE EES ET IS RID?

eT |

2

made its oral decision (in favor of plaintiffs) at the

conclusion of trial. The court finds from the evidence

that:

Findings of Fact

1. The city of Petaluma, California, is within

modern-day commuting distance of San Francisco and

is a part of the San Francisco Bay Area metropolitan

region. Until recently, Petaluma was known primarily

for its dairy and poultry resources.

2. The defendants, Helen Putnam, Robert A. Brun-

ner, John W. Cavanaugh, Robert A. Daly, James L.

Harberson, Fred V. Mattei, and William A. Perry,

are the members of the Petaluma City Council. All

elements and employees of the defendant city are

under their control.

3. Through the early 1960’s Petaluma’s govern-

ment operated under the prevailing assumption that

“growth is good.” Its planning provided generously

for housing “developments” and eventually permitted

the eastern portion of the city to become densely popu-

lated by a sea of tract homes. Growth was uncon-

trolled.

4. In 1962, the city officials of Petaluma studied

its growth patterns and concluded that, if current

trends continued, by 1985 the city would have a popu-

lation of 77,000; it would cease to be a “rural” com-

munity. Subsequent growth rates confirmed the

predictions; and Petaluma’s population increased

dramatically until the early 1970’s. From 1964 through

1971, the following numbers of housing units were

completed in Petaluma:

a caeeeieieieaiemeaael et ve eee 2 van aaah Panne

3

1964 ‘ 270 SO cdi 379

PE icebepdiss 440 eee se 358

SOP \ndehiieetiorcbis 321 PE cticherishinsdes 591

TU nctiimkick 234 I: Sunsninicenen 891

5. In 1970 and 1971, the city approved approxi-

mately 2,000 units for future construction. This num-

ber of units represents the fair measure of the market

and demographic demands for housing in Petaluma.

Since the 1970-1971 period, market demand has been

and continues to be substantially in excess of five

hundred units per year.

6. With the accelerated growth figures of 1970 and

1971, the citizens of Petaluma began to question

earlier judgments ahout the desirability of growth for

its own sake; and they set about quite openly to curb

the population growth in their city. In early 1971, a

“citizen’s committee”, aided by a firm of professional

planners, drafted a suggested “policy on growth” for

Petaluma. One tool used in arriving at their statement

of policy included the sending of questionnaires to

approximately 10,000 residents of the city. The great

majority of the returned questionnaires indicated that

the citizens of Petaluma wanted to limit the increase

of future residents.

7. In accordance with growing community senti-

ment, the city council adopted an official development

policy in June, 1971, the policy statement itself having

been the one drawn up by the citizens’ committee and

the city planning staff. The statement, entitled “Offi-

cial Statement of Development Polieyv for the City of

Petaluma”, reflected the local sentiment expressed

above. As a preamble the statement asserted that

mF ees

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4

“In order to protect its small town character and

surrounding open spaces, it shall be the policy of

the City to control its future rate and distribution

of growth...”

8. The city council implemented the official growth

policy of June, 1971, and adopted the “Petaluma

Plan,” which includes, among other items, the follow-

ing ordinances:

(a) Environmental Design Plans and Maps, Peta-

luma Resolution No. 6008 N.C.S.

(b) A Residential Development System, Petaluma

Resolution No. 6113 N.C.S.

(c) The Petaluma Housing Element, Petaluma

Resolution No. 6126 N.C.S.

(d) <A proposed breakdown of approximately 2,500

units to be allocated by the plan for the years 1973

through 1977.

(e) Rules and Regulations for business of the

Residential Development Board (the “RDEB”).

9. The city council intended in enacting the “Peta-

luma Plan” to limit Petaluma’s demographic and mar-

ket growth rate in housing and in the immigration of

new residents. The plan did have the intended effect

in a number of respects, of which the following are

the most significant :

(a) The city limited new housing units to approxi-

mately one-third to one-half of the demographic and

market demand of the 1970-1971 period.

(b) The city created an ‘‘urban extension line,”

i.e., an ultimate boundary intended to mark the outer

Toa ashi Me i ite Bn SIRs as i a a Seited Wa AY EA CCL Aa os ae aie oo haath a

5

limits of the city’s expansion for twenty or more

years. Within this perimeter, the city used density

limitation and other techniques to set a maximum

population of the city at approximately 55,000 as

against the 1962 projection of 77,000 by 1985. Such a

limitation is a substantial interference with demo-

graphic and market demand for housing and the im-

migration of new residents. The 1962 general plan

estimate of 77,000 residents in 1985 was a reasonable

estimate of those demands on the housing market, and

it continued to be reasonable in 1970 and 1971.

(c) The area within the “urban extension line”

was sufficient at the city’s chosen densities for growth

for the twenty year planning period only at the 500

unit annual limitation, not at natural demographic

and market demand rates. The effect of the “urban

extension line” is to limit “excessive” population

growth, which limitation was the defendants’ purpose.

Tf the 500 unit rate limit were removed, the limit on

population set up by the “urban extension line” would

still act as a substantial deterrent to travel and com-

merce.

(d) The city refused, for fifteen or more years, to

annex or to extend city facilities to land outside the

‘urban extension line.” The city solicited the assist-

anee of the county and the Loeal Ageney Forma-

tion Commission (“LAFCO”) to prohibit residential

growth outside of the “urban extension line.” Thus,

the extension line inhibited immigration not only into

Petaluma, but also into its surrounding areas.

(e) Permits for the building of the limited num-

ber of units are granted and/or evaluated by the resi-

AI LENS 8 TAI ODE AMIRI LOLI AT AARPEUT AGG A ALORA ERT tt DERM LBLE RARELY hb IGE LORIN A PBA BERS

6

dential development evaluation board (the “RDEB”).

The rating system employed is an intricate one, which

establishes a competitive situation between the pro-

posed applications. Although we do not understand

plaintiffs to attack the rating concept itself, they do

contend that the application of this particular sys-

tem’s terms resembles a “Catch-22” type of operation ;

apparently nobody really knows what regulations will

be applied, or how, or by whom. Plaintiffs argue that

the merit rating system, as employed by these defend-

ants, is actually a hazing system intended to discour-

age unwanted builders from acquiring permission to

build.

10. Although the defendants contend that the

“Petaluma Plan” is intended to last only through

1977, official attempts have been made to perpetuate

the plan through 1990 at least. Such attempts include

the annual 500 unit building limitation, the urban ex-

tension line, and the limitation of available facilities.

For example, the city has purposefully limited its

eontract with the Sonoma County Water Agency, a

major supplier of water to the city, to 9.8 million

gallons of water per day through the year 1990. This

flow is sufficient for a population of 55,000. By limit-

ing its public facilities, the city intended to serve a

population lower than the market and demographic

growth rates would produce, to restrict the travel of

new residents into Petaluma, and consequently to limit

the number of housing units that might be constructed.

11. Housing in Petaluma and elsewhere in the San

Francisco metropolitan region is produced substan-

tially through goods, services and communication de-

vices in interstate commerce.

12. The “Petaluma Plan” prevented the construc-

tion of approximately one-half to two-thirds of hous-

ing units that market and demographic growth forces

would have demanded for Petaluma during the 1973-

1977 period and the subsequent extension of the plan

into 1990. The people in need and desirous of housing

were and will be forced to turn to other areas within

the region for accommodation. Such persons consist

of Californians as well as out-of-state immigrants.

13. Although defendants contended that, as a mat-

ter of law, this court may not inquire into the motives

for the implementation of the growth limitation policy,

they have introduced evidence which is designed to

prove that the growth curbs were imposed because of

the inadequacy of the city’s water and sewage treat-

ment facilities and not to keep others from moving

into Petaluma. Without intending to resolve the ini-

tial legal position taken on the point, we find that the

assertions made are not true.

When the “Petaluma Plan” was conceived in 1971,

the city faced no immediate, serious or unusual diffi-

culty in using or expanding the capacity of its public

facilities to serve existing demographie and market

growth rates in housing. The city could have con-

tinued to meet the demands on such facilities made

by the growth rate trends of 1970 and 1971 without

unusual strain upon such facilities. The city’s refer-

ence to such alleged inadequacies is no more than an

excuse intended to justify the “Petaluma Plan” after

bi aS i ad al ia

its adoption. Specific findings on sewer and water fa-

cilities follow:

(a) The city determined in 1965 to add to the

capacity of its existing sewage treatment plan, which

was first constructed in 1938, then expanded and re-

constructed from time to time. In 1965 it had a ea-

pacity of 1 million gallons per day for secondary

sewage treatment. Between 1965 and 1968, new con-

struction increased the capacity of the facilities to

2.6 million gallons of sewage per day. In wet months

the facilities could handle up to 14 million gallons per

day, a combined demand of sewage and storm water.

(b) In planning the 1968 addition to the treatment

facilities, the city used inaccurate growth projections;

and although the ultimate treatment capacity of the

1968 plant could be expanded to 14 million gallons

per day, it was limited to 2 million gallons per day.

The city later found that the additional facilities ac-

tually increased capacity to 2.6 million gallons per

day. The combined capacity of the 1938 and 1968 fa-

cilities would not indefinitely keep pace with the

growth trends reflected in the 1962 projections, but

they were fully capable of being augmented to handle

up to 14 million gallons of sewage treatment per day

in the 1968 plant.

(ec) In 1973, the city began to increase its ¢a-

pacity to treat sewage to 7 million gallons per day.

The expansion is to be available in July, 1975.

(d) Based upon city sewage treatment reports

which indicate that the per person per day burden on

the treatment facilities amounts to between 50 and

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100 gallons, the city currently has the capacity to serve

approximately 6,000 to 12,000 more persons.

(e) The city is able, at the present time, to return

to absorbtion of existing market and demographic

growth rates without exceeding the capacity of city

facilities. Such facilities are either now in place,

under construction, or capable of being augmented

by new capacity and at all times will be adequate for

anticipated real demographic and market demands.

(f) Nor can the city accurately claim that it cur-

rently exceeds regional water quality control stand-

ards. Although the water quality control board for the

San Francisco Bay Region has required the city ulti-

mately to cease the discharge of treated sewage into

the Petaluma River, a schedule has been adopted for

the shifting of the point of discharge. Petaluma may

easily meet the new discharge standards without dis-

turbing demographic and market residential growth

rates. Moreover, the State of California and the fed-

eral government have stipulated that the city is in

conformance with all applicable water quality stand-

ards in its waste water treatment facilities.

(g) The city’s water supply is substantially drawn

from the Russian River through the Sonoma County

Water Agency. The city’s demands upon agency

sources range between 4.7 million gallons per day in

peak summer months, to about one-half that amount

in the winter months.

(h) The city controls its water service and has a

surplus in excess of $3,000,000 in water funds. The

city is currently negotiating the placement of wells in

IF 8 METER PMR ERORS AE esvoremeneoneneady

10

nearby communities for interim use, until the Russian

River-Cotati intertie is completed in 1976. The inter-

tie will furnish a substantial amount of additional

water to Petaluma.

(i) Petaluma has requested a 9.8 million gallon

per day supply of water from the Russian River-Co-

tati intertie, which, as mentioned above, is to be com-

pleted in 1976. Such a request, though not limited by

the supplying agency, represents the amount of water

which would be necessary through the year 1990, if

Petaluma’s population limitation plan were to remain

in effect. The city may expand its contract by request,

and a surplus in the intertie exists for expansion of

water supplies into Petaluma.

(j) Since, as well as the intertie, other additional

supplies of water will be available in the future, the

city is well able to expand at market and demographic

rates without a crisis in its water supply.

(k) The city has not established that any of its

other facilities is in any way threatened by residential

growth at market or demographic rates.

14. Although the parties disagree as to the rele-

vance of the matter, the following findings relate to

the probable effects of the growth limitation poliey in

dispute and the probable effects if such a policy were

to spread to the remaining municipalities of the San

Francisco metropolitan region.

(a) The San Francisco metropolitan region is gen-

erally self-contained and has a unitary housing mar-

ket. Persons excluded from one suburb do not leave

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11

the region but seek housing elsewhere in the area.

Where suburbs not practicing exclusionary growth lim-

itation are forced to absorb not only their own “share”

of the population growth, but also the excluding sub-

urb’s as well, they tend to retaliate by adopting ex-

clusionary measures of their own. It is appropriate

to measure the potential effects that the exclusion

practiced by Petaluma would have if it proliferated

throughout the region itself.

(b) Limits on the supply of housing in one part

of a regional market create increased demand for

housing elsewhere in the area. Other areas then have

incentives to limit housing.

(ec) Limiting housing in the face of static or rising

demand increases the cost of private housing and the

rent structure of tenant housing. This increase is

equally applicable in both the area practicing the ex-

clusion and elsewhere in the region where the rejected

demand is felt.

(d) Limits on housing supply in the suburbs tend

to keep people who would otherwise move to those

suburbs in the center cities.

(e) In any given period, a certain percentage of

existing housing is in need of replacement, either be-

cause it is obsolete or substandard or because it is

destroyed or damaged beyond repair.

(f) If the total housing demand in such a region

be frustrated by a policy that limits the supply of

housing to less than demand, certain results will inevi-

tably follow. Substandard and obsolete housing which

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12

should be replaced will remain in the market to deal

with the high demand and will partially fill it with

low quality structures. The overall nature of the re-

gion’s housing stock will decline. Tenant housing is

as subject to this phenomenon as privately owned and

occupied housing. Landlords will discover that they

may leave substandard housing in the rental market

and may ignore its need for maintenance and rehabili-

tation without suffering high vacancy rates, demand

for such housing being unnaturally high.

(g) Growth throughout a metropolitan region

takes place unevenly in certain “growth centers,”

areas having unused capacity which can be tapped or

the ability to augment capacity to serve new residents.

(1) Petaluma is such a growth center for the San

Francisco metropolitan region.

(2) Such centers serve, among other things, as

residential centers for people who work elsewhere in

the center cities complex, in other suburbs or in other

job centers.

(3) Residential growth in such centers, though

targer than in some other cities in the region, is not

disproportionately larger in the sense that market,

economic, demographic and other forces within the

region dictate that growth shall oceur in substantial

part in growth centers.

(h) If such growth centers curtail residential

growth to less than demographic and market rates, as

has been attempted in the present case, serious and

damaging dislocation will occur in the housing mar-

LE III US DEI SSE EP ELE LINTON EIT,

13

ket, the commerce it represents, and in the travel and

settlement of people in need and in search of housing.

Even in cities in the region that do not qualify as

“srowth centers,” the same exclusion of residential

growth would lead to substantially the same adverse

consequences, if the exclusion were region-wide.

(i) The publie facilities, land, existing social ad-

vantages and access to the center cities and to other

job centers that growth centers offer to a metropoli-

tan region in need of housing cannot be adequately

placed elsewhere to support local and regional housing

needs. Although “new towns” could be constructed

where none already exists, the initial cost would be

prohibitive to build infrastructure, i.e., the basic pub-

lic facilities necessary to serve the town. Experience

in “new town” development has proved that the

“front-end facilities cost” in new towns makes them

impractical, at least as a source of housing for low

and moderate income groups.

(j) Itis impossible to force housing out of growth

centers and into rural areas, without providing for

public facilities. Some public facilities, i. e., fire pro-

tection, streets and schools, must be provided by the

responsible government. Others, such as septic sys-

tems, water wells, and private roads, tend to occupy

large amounts of open space to provide for single-

family homes. In later years, when septic tanks,

water wells and substandard streets decline, the cities

are usually forced to add the old rural develop-

ments to city services, i. e., sewers, water supplies, and

streets, at substantially increased cost over the amount

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14

that would have been incurred, if the developments

had been originally incorporated into city services.

(k) Moreover, it is not feasible to force housing

out of growth centers and into the center cities. The

destruction and reconstruction of center city housing

raise many problems that have not been solved, except

in massive government-sponsored, urban renewal proj-

ects—sometimes these have not been successful. As-

sembly of land ownership for efficient large-scale de-

velopment is difficult. It is difficult to acquire financing

for center-city housing. Construction costs are high,

relative to construction costs in growth centers.

(1) From 1960 to 1970, the number of occupied resi-

dential units in the San Francisco region increased

by 379,000. This increase was in turn made up of

234,000 small households (one and two persons) and

145,000 larger households (three persons and more).

The greater rate of increase in smaller than larger

households indicates increased demand for housing,

with each house, on the average, housing fewer people.

(m) As real income rises, income earners tend to

move into better housing. The housing they leave be-

hind “filters down” to persons of lower income.

(n) People in the San Francisco region and else-

where show a high rate of residential mobility. As of

1970, more than half of the people in the region had

lived in their current residence for less than five

years. This mobility is a reflection of foreign, inter-

state and intrastate travel and reflects a demand for

housing.

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15

(0) From 1960 to 1970, of a total of 490,782 new

housing units constructed, approximately 112,729 units

replaced substandard and obsolete housing. This fig-

ure represents a replacement of existing housing stock

at a rate of approximately one percent per year.

(p) A reasonable forecast of the total increase in

the number of households in the San Francisco re-

gion for the decade 1970 to 1980 is 274,500. Of these,

approximately fifty-four percent will be small and

forty-six percent larger households.

(q) A reasonable forecast of the increase in house-

hold real income for the period between 1969 and 1979

for San Francisco region families is from a median

income of $11,745 in 1969 to a median income of $15,270

in 1979. This shift will result in housing mobility and

a “filtration” of vacated housing into the hands of

those of lower income, as described in finding no. 14.

(r) A reasonable forecast of the number of hous-

ing units needed for replacement of substandard or

obsolete housing in the decade 1970 to 1980, at a one

percent replacement rate, is 155,280 units.

(s) Ifthe “Petaluma Plan” limiting housing start-

ing at approximately six percent of existing housing

stock each year—were to proliferate throughout the

San Francisco region, the results would be as ex-

plained in the following findings:

(1) For the decade of 1970 to 1980, the “shortfall”

in needed housing would be approximately 105,000

units. (For the decade of the 1960’s, the shortfall

would have been 110,291; and for the decade of the

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1950’s, 89,376 units.) This shortfall would occur pri-

marily in “growth centers.”

(2) Interstate, intrastate and foreign travel would

be seriously inhibited, as people trying to move into

the region found housing either economically unavail-

able or simply nonexistent in reasonable quality.

(3) The cost of regional housing would increase.

The specific housing most affected would be “threshold

housing,” that is, the least expensive housing avail-

able without government subsidy, but through insti-

tutional financing. Loss of “threshold housing”, means

in turn, that persons of incomes of $8,000 to $14,000

per year would be deprived of housing to meet their

needs.

(4) To service demand in the face of restricted

supply old, substandard, or obsolete housing would re-

main in the regional housing market without decrease

in price or rent. The aggregate housing stock for the

region would decline in quality at a serious rate.

(5) Persons of incomes lower than $8,000 per year

who would have been the beneficiaries of “filtration” of

housing left by higher-income earners moving into

“threshold housing” would find themselves unable to

move into better housing.

(6) With fewer available places, the mobility of

residents of the region would be inhibited. People

tend not to put their own houses on the market until

they have located other housing.

(7) The aggregate effect of a proliferation of the

“Petaluma Plan” throughout the San Francisco re-

17

gion would be a decline in regional housing stock

quality, a loss of the mobility of current and prospec-

tive residents and a deterioration in the quality and

choice of housing available to income earners with real

incomes of $14,000 per year or less.

15. To the extent that any of the foregoing findings

constitutes conclusions of law or mixed findings of law

and fact, they are incorporated in the conclusions of

law that follow.

Conclusions of Law

1. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the

freedom to travel, which includes the right to enter

and live in any State or municipality in the Union,

has long been recognized as a basic right under the

Constitution, or a “fundamental right.” Memorial

Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct.

1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974); Dunn v. Blumenstein,

405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972);

Shapiro v. Thompson, 594 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22

L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.

745, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) ; Edwards v.

California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 S.Ct. 164, 86 L.Ed. 119

(1941); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 S.Ct. 1113,

2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.

112, 91 S.Ct. 260, 27 L.Ed.2d 272 (1969).

2. The “Petaluma Plan” is an effort to avoid the

problems that accompany contemporary trends in pop-

ulation growth. Through the plan, the defendants

propose to address themselves to such problems by

limiting the number of people who will henceforth be

permitted to move into the city. The express purpose

18

and the intended and actual effects of the “Petaluma

Plan” have been to exclude substantial numbers of

people who would otherwise have elected to immigrate

into the city.

The plaintiffs do not challenge the legitimacy of the

defendants’ desire to deal with the problems of popu-

lation growth but contend that the means which they

have employed to accomplish their ends fall far short

of constitutional validity. In essence, the plaintiffs

contend that the question of where a person should

live is one within the exclusive realm of that individ-

ual’s prerogative, not within the decision-making

power of any governmental unit. Since Petaluma has

assumed the power to make such decisions on the

individual’s behalf, it is contended that the city has

violated the people’s right to travel. Considering the

facts of the case, we agree.

3. It is not necessary for “standing” purposes that

the plaintiffs introduce any evidence relating to any

individual who was actually excluded by the plan.

As stated in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,

415 U.S. 250, at p. 257, 94 S.Ct. 1076, at p. 1082, 39

L.Ed.2d 306 (1974) :

“Tt is true, as appellees argue, that there is no

evidence in the record before us that anvone was

actually deterred from traveling by the challenged

restriction. But neither did the majority in Sha-

piro find any reason ‘to dispute the “evidence that

few welfare recipients have in fact, been deterred

[from moving] by residence requirements.” . . .

Indeed, none of the litigants had themselves been

deterred.’ Dunn, supra, 405 U.S., at 340, 92 S.Ct.

19

at 1002 (citations omitted). An attempt to dis-

tinguish Shapiro by urging that a durational resi-

dency requirement for voter registration did not

deter travel, was found to be a ‘fundamental mis-

understanding of the law’ in Dunn, supra, at 339-

340, 92 S.Ct. at 1001.

“*Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that de-

nial of welfare actually deterred travel. Nor

have other “right to travel” cases in this Court

always relied on the presence of actual deter-

rence. In Shapiro we explicitly stated that the

compelling-state-interest test would be triggered

by “any classification which serves to penal-

ize the right to [travel] ....’” (Emphasis orig-

inal, footnote omitted.)

“Thus, Shapiro and Dunn stand for the proposi-

tion that a classification which ‘operates to Penal-

ize those persons . . . who have exercised their

constitutional right of interstate migration’, must

be justified by a compelling state interest.”

See also, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct.

1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1971) and Griswold v. Con-

necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510

(1965).

4. Inasmuch as there is no meaningful distinction

between a law which “penalizes” the exercise of a

right and one which denies it altogether, it is clear

that the growth limitation under attack may be de-

fended only insofar as it furthers a compelling state

interest. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, su-

pra. Moreover, as noted in Dunn v. Blumstein, supra,

405 U.S. at 348, 92 S.Ct. at 1003:

7 ee |

20

“It is not sufficient for the State to show that

[the rules implemented] further a very substan-

tial state interest. In pursuing that important

interest the State cannot choose means that un-

necessarily burden or restrict constitutionally pro-

tected activity. Statutes affecting constitutional

rights must be drawn with ‘precision’. NAACP v.

Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 340, 9

L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); United States v. Robel, 389

U.S. 258, 265, 88 S.Ct. 419, 424, 19 L.Ed.2d 508

(1967), and must be ‘tailored’ to serve their legit-

imate objectives. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra,

394 U.S. at 631, 89 S.Ct. 1322, at 1329. And if

there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those

goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally pro-

tected activity, a State may not choose the way of

greater interference. If it acts at all, it must

choose ‘less drastic means’. Shelton v. Tucker, 364

U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231

(1960).” (Emphasis supplied)

We therefore make the following inquiries into the

defendants’ asserted “compelling state interests” and

the alternatives which are available to them which

would accomplish the same goals. (See also, Palo Alto

Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F.Supp. 908, 911 [N.D.

Cal. 1970])

5. Essentially, the defendants claim that there are

three such compelling interests which support those

exclusionary measures adopted. The first of these re-

lates to the obvious necessity for a municipality to

provide for adequate sewage treatment facilities and

the related contention that the present capacity of

—y

21

Petaluma’s facilities is inadequate to serve an uncon-

trolled population. As found above, however, the

present facilities of the defendant city are fully capa-

ble of meeting the increased demands of a growing

population, and therefore, the purported justification

is invalid.

Even assuming, arguendo, that the defendants’ view

of the situation is correct, the question still unan-

swered is whether there be any reasonable alternative

available to meet the problem, the implementation of

which alternative would not unduly burden the right

to travel. Dunn v. Blumstein, supra. One such alterna-

tive which suggests itself is the potential for increasing

the capacity of the existing sewage treatment plants,

a solution both real and practical.

Resting their argument upon the following syl-

logism, the defendants contend that the new construc-

tion is not a “reasonable” alternative. First, they point

out that the erection of additional facilities is an ex-

pensive proposition. Second, under state law, the nec-

essary funding would have to be approved by the

electorate before it could be secured. The ultimate

conclusion is that this court must stand ready to order

the citizens of Petaluma to vote in a particular man-

ner before those funds could be assured. The assertion

that courts do not order the results of elections is so

obvious that comment is not required.

The sole issue in this case is whether or not people

currently excluded from Petaluma have the right to

immigrate into the area. If so relief will be granted

and their rights will be enforced; after which the

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matter of dealing with the natural burdens that the

exercise of those rights places upon the municipality

falls entirely within the discretion of city officials, or

the city electorate. Neither Petaluma city officials, nor

the local electorate may use their power to disapprove

bonds at the polls as a weapon to define or destroy

fundamental constitutional rights.

6. The second matter which allegedly “compelled”

the defendants to limit population growth relates to

the adequacy of the city’s water supply. Again, an

inquiry into the facts reveals that there is no connec-

tion between the availability of water and the exclu-

slonary zoning measures taken. Defendants have pur-

posefully calculated future water needs based upon

their own projections which implemented the disputed

five hundred unit per year limitation. The city then

requested an amount of water which would satisfy

the demand of such an artificially limited population.

Where a municipality purposefully limits the quan-

tity of any particular commodity available, then seeks

to justify a population limitation based upon an al-

leged inadequacy of that commodity, it has not stated

a compelling interest which supports the limitation.

Petaluma has so proceeded in the present case, and

accordingly, it has failed to offer a compelling state

interest in this regard.

Additionally, “alternative means”, ineluding the eur-

rent ability to request more water supplies from its

source, are available to the defendants. For both rea-

sons, therefore, the purported justification set out

above must fail.

EIEIO SLL SRI ES LELGOP ILL LEE LIAS

a yyaccoeeoa nt PARROT SRE ERE ANE LES

23

7. Defendants point out that virtually all zoning

schemes limit the manner in which people move about

in one way or another. In doing so, they contend, fi-

nally and most frankly, that, by virtue of its zoning

power, the city has an inherent right to “control its

own rate of growth” and that its citizens’ desires to

protect its “small town character” are sufficiently com-

pelling reasons to justify the exclusionary ordinances.

This last defense assertion states the essence of the

matter and aptly defines the issue: may a municipality

capable of supporting a natural population expansion

limit growth simply because it does not prefer to grow

at the rate which would be dictated by prevailing mar-

ket demand. It is our opinion that it may not.

Zoning ordinances have traditionally been entitled

to substantial judicial deference, City of Euclid v.

Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71

L.Ed. 303 (1922); ef. Nectow v. City of Cambridge,

277 U.S. 183, 18 S.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed. 842 (1928), but

they are not totally beyond review. Palo Alto Ten-

ants Union v. Morgan, supra; Boraas v. Village of

Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2nd Cir. 1973), reversed,

fae U.S.\ ........, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed. 797 (1974)?

1Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre has been reversed by the Su-

preme Court on grounds not relevant to the present case. It was

found there that the right to travel was not involved in a zoning

regulation which prohibited groups of unmarried persons from

living together in the village. In the present case, however, the

very reason for being of the “Petaluma Plan” is to keep people

out, a patent attempt to affect such excluded persons’ right to

travel. Accordingly, unlike the Boraas decision, the compelling

governmental interest standard of review must still be employed

in the case at bar, since “fundamental” rights are affected.

Se EE GAIT EL REE A Se LEG RL TOT OE PSIG LP EEE SE IE LOS OLE LEER BEE MELE ILE VE LI ELE IG LOE

FEL SEFTON YOY

Lee

a eR

SCOOT IM tS DA On

24

The present case is somewhat unique among the fed-

eral cases in that it is the only one within our purview

which deals with an outright numerical limitation on

population. In discussing governmental attempts to

control population in another context, the Supreme

Court has remarked, in Edwards v. California, supra,

314 U.S. at 173-174, 62 S.Ct. at 167:

“We have repeatedly and recently affirmed and

we now reaffirm, that we do not conceive it our

function to pass upon the ‘wisdom, need, or ap-

priateness’ of the legislative efforts of the States

to solve such difficulties ...

“But this does not mean that there are no bound-

aries to the permissible area of State legislative

activity. There are. And none is more certain than

the prohibition against attempts on the part of a

single State to isolate itself from the difficulties

common to all of them by restraining the trans-

portation of persons and property across its bor-

ders. It. is frequently the case that a State might

gain a momentary respite from the pressure of

events to the outside world. But in the words of

Mr. Justice Cardozo: ‘The Constitution was

framed under the dominion of a political philoso-

phy less parochial in range. It was framed upon

the theory that the people of the several states

must sink or swim together, and that in the long

run prosperity and salvation are in union and

not division.’ ”

Notwithstanding the scarcity of case law on the

topic, and in consideration of the general concepts

expressed in Edwards v. California, we believe that

the reasoning employed in a recent series of cases from

Fs a ea Re ty le eal

SR IEA EE PO BEF IE EE ETS EOE IE

a 7

25

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania best expresses the

underlying rationale of those cases which do recog-

nize the right to travel as fundamental. Accordingly,

we concur with those decisions and adopt their rea-

soning as our own view of the law under the Federal

Constitution also.

The first of the series was Bilbar Construction v.

Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958),

in which the Supreme Court stressed its continued

agreement with the Euclid’ standard of constitu-

tionality. The Court upheld a minimum lot size

requirement of one acre (plus a 150 foot front-

age), noting that the provision could be rationally

related to the “general welfare,” since even aesthetic

considerations come within that realm. Several years

later, however, the same Court faced a zoning scheme

which, when measured against its own “Euclid” stand-

ards, left no doubt in the minds of the court that the

zoning scheme violated “the fundamental law” plainly,

palpably, ete. In National Land and Investment Co. v.

Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1966), the Court

was presented with another acre plot.

The municipality asserted many compelling state

interests which resemble those discussed earlier, such

as its desire to deal with sewage problems and to avoid

heavy traffic loads on its road system. The Supreme

2The Court’s language differed slightly from the United States

Supreme Court’s in Euclid, the Pennsylvania Court electing to

provide that the “legislative enactment can be declared void only

when it violates the fundamental law clearly, palpably, plainly,

and in such a manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in the

minds of the court.” 393 Pa. at 70, 141 A.2d at 855.

mie ee aS |

a ON sD

anne

26

Court pointed out that under Pennsylvania law mu-

nicipalities have the right to deal with sewage prob-

lems and they should deal with them rather than ac-

cept them as they are. With respect to highway traffic

the Court made a comment which we consider partic-

ularly apropos of the case at bar.

“Tt can be seen that the restriction to four acre

lots, so far as traffic is concerned, is based upon

possible future conditions. Zoning is a tool in the

hands of governmental bodies which enables them

to more effectively meet the demands of evolving

and growing communities. It must not and can

not be used by those officials as an instrument by

which they may shirk their responsibilities. Zon-

ing is a means by which a governmental body can

plan for the future—it may not be used as a

means to deny the future. The evidence on the

record indicates that for the present and the im-

mediate future the road system of Easttown

Township is adequate to handle the traffic load. It

is also quite convincing that the roads will become

increasingly inadequate as time goes by and that

improvements will eventually have to be made.

Zoning provisions may not be used, however, to

avoid the increased responsibilities and economic

burdens which time and natural growth invari-

ably bring.” 419 Pa. at 527, 215 A.2d at 609-610.

In addition to the discussion relating to its high-

ways and sewers, the defendant in National Land also

asserted that its efforts to preserve the “character” of

the community were permissible zoning objectives.

The character could be preserved, it argued, by the

creation of a greenbelt and the aesthetics that large-lot

sae POETS SOLE LE OLD LL CELE EISELE ERE

27

zoning offers. Implying that simply “zoning” green-

belts into existence raises due process problems, the

Court said,

“Ti]f the preservation of open spaces is the town-

ship objective, there are means by which this can

be accomplished which include authorization for

‘cluster zoning’ or condemnation of development

rights with compensation paid for that which is

taken.” 419 Pa. at 529, 215 A.2d at 611.

All that remained was the defendant’s contention

that it was exercising its right to protect the “setting”

or the character of the municipality, and that the exer-

cise of that power was valid although it may have the

ultimate effect of limiting population growth. As the

Court noted, at 419 Pa. 530, 215 A.2d 611

“Appellants denominate this goal as falling within

the ambit of promoting the ‘general welfare’. Un-

fortunately, the concept of the general welfare

defies meaningful capsule definition and consti-

tutes an exceedingly difficult standard against

which to test the validity of legislation. However,

it must always be ascertained at the outset

whether, in fact, it is the public welfare which is

being benefited or whether, disguised as legislation

for the public welfare, a zoning ordinance actually

serves purely private interests.

“There is no doubt that many of the residents of

this area are highly desirous of keeping it the

way it is, preferring, quite naturally, to look out

upon the land in its natural state rather than on

other homes. These desires, however, do not rise

to the level of public welfare. This is purely a

matter of private desire which zoning regulations

may not be employed to effectuate.”

NLM ONE SD MRL EN TEN oe |

woe we yarn

At 419 Pa. 532, 215 A.2d 612, the Court summarized

the actual rationale which supported the zoning regu-

lation as representing the township’s

“position that it does not desire to accommodate

those who are pressing for admittance to the

township unless such admittance will not create

any additional burdens upon governmental fune-

tions and services. The question posed is whether

the township can stand in the way of the natural

forces which send out growing population into

hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a com-

fortable place to live. We have concluded not. A

zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to

prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to

avoid future burdens, economic or otherwise, upon

the administration of public services and facilities

cannot be held valid. ...

* * * * * *

“It is clear . .. that the general welfare is not

fostered or promoted by a zoning ordinance de-

signed to be exclusive or exclusionary... .”

Another minimum lot size requirement® was pre-

sented in Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466,

268 A.2d 765 (1970), along with justifications much

like the ones raised in National Land, supra. The pur-

pose of the regulation, the Court concluded, was the

desire to exclude in order to maintain the community

at or near its present size. The Court then stated, at

439 Pa. 474, 268 A.2d 768-769, as follows

“The implication of our decision in National Land

is that communities must deal with the problems

8In the municipality involved the minimum lot size ranged

from two to three acres.

PLE LOLE LLLIT OOLON EN PEIN RENE EO IO

SP RPE REINS ore ; .

WEP TS REAR ARE ENE LUNE LA ENO G MT IES

29

of population growth. They may not refuse to

confront the future by adopting zoning regula-

tions that effectively restrict population to near

present levels. It is not for any given township

to say who may or may not live within its confines,

while disregarding the interests of the entire area.

If Concord Township is successful in unnaturally

limiting its population growth through the use of

exclusive zoning regulations, the people who would

normally live there will inevitably have to live in

another community, and the requirement that they

do so is not a decision that Concord Township

should alone be able to make.”

Kit-Mar followed an earlier case in which a zoning

regulation was held unconstitutional because it “zoned-

out” apartment buildings because of their propensity

to create traffic problems and other strains on public

facilities. In Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 244, 245,

263 A.2d 398, 399, the Court commented as follows

“Appellee here has simply made a decision that

it is content with things as they are, and that the

expense or change in character that would result

from people moving in to find ‘a comfortable place

to live’ are for someone else to worry about.

* cal * * * *

“This case deals with the right of people to live

on land, a very different problem than whether

appellee must allow certain industrial uses within

its borders.”

As stated above, we find the reasoning of the Penn-

sylvania Supreme Court persuasive and sound; and

accordingly, we take a similar view. A zoning regula-

tion which has as its purpose the exclusion of addi-

— CRT RMR te PITS FEE EIEN LEIS LIGA N LOO SE S LIE

YORE AT RE TNO) ee |

YUN PROSTAR,

30

tional residents in any degree is not a compelling gov-

ernmental interest, nor is it one within the public

welfare.

8. Since the population limitation policies com-

plained of are not supported by any compelling gov-

ernmental interest the exclusionary aspects of the

“Petaluma Plan” must be, and are hereby declared in

violation of the right to travel and, hence, are uncon-

stitutional. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,

supra. Such holding is intended to encompass, not only

the outright numerical limitations upon the issuance

of building permits, but also any and all features of

the plan which, directly or indirectly, seek to control

population growth by any means other than market

demands.

Since we have reached this conclusion, the plaintiffs’

contentions regarding the plan’s invalidity under the

Commerce Clause and remaining Equal Protection

arguments need not be considered.

9. The circumstances of the case suggest that in

order to assure complete relief to the plaintiffs, the

court will retain jurisdiction over the matter until

zoning and land use policies of the defendant city are

more settled than at the present time.’ If there be a

substantial possibility that the wrong complained of

4Affidavits submitted to the court indicate that since the date

of the court’s oral order directing the defendants to evaluate

future building permits without regard to their numerical limi-

tation policies, the defendants have ceased to issue building per-

mits altogether. While the court hesitates to embark upon

contempt proceedings on the basis of oral orders, the refusal to

act by the defendants leads us to the conclusion expressed above.

RELISTS NMG OL IS oe LEI LET OL BD

31

may be repeated in a form other than the one declared

to be illegal, such continuing jurisdiction is appropri-

ate. See Field Enterprises v. Cove Industries, 297 F.

Supp. 989 (E.D. N.Y. 1969). Although plaintiffs con-

tend that the defendants are at this moment embark-

ing upon a “zoning” program which would circumvent

the spirit of the present holding, we hestitate to enjoin

future activities which may or may not materialize.

Cf., Field Enterprises, supra; United States v. United

States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 71 S.Ct. 160, 95 L.Ed.

89 (1950); International Salt Co. v. United States,

332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12, 92 L.Ed. 20 (1947); United

States v. Jefferson County School Board, 372 F.2d

836 (5th Cir. 1966), corrected 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.

1967). In the event that the defendants should respond

in such a manner, however, the retention of jurisdic-

tion will offer the aggrieved persons immediate access

to the court for such action and remedies as may be

proper.

10. We believe that it is appropriate against the

background of the present case, for the court to com-

ment upon not only what has been held but also what

has not been held. The issue here has not been whether

or not local government may engage in any number

of traditional zoning efforts which have been common

throughout our history, such as providing for a cer-

tain density of population in a given neighborhood,

or standards for the type and quality of construction,

ete. The only issue presented here, for the first time,

is whether or not a municipality may claim the spe-

cific right to keep others away. Therefore, the defend-

32

ants’ assertion that the result of this case will destroy

or harmfully restrict the zoning and land-use plan-

ning power of municipalities is neither pertinent nor

correct. No “traditional” powers to zone are affected

by the holding in the case.

As contended by plaintiffs on pages 7 and 8 of their

Trial Brief,

“This case is a study in anti-planning, the refusal

of a city to come to grips with the fact that it has

joined a metropolitan complex and is no longer

the sleepy small town that it once was. In a world

in which nothing is as unchanging as change,

Petaluma wants to stay the same. The means to

that end is to draw up the bridge over the moat

and turn people away. This is not the use of police

power, but the abdication of that power....

“Tn a large sense this case sets up the consti-

tutional protections against a single small city’s

passing laws to keep people away, to maintain

‘small town character’ at the expense of depriving

people of mobility, their right to travel, and of

decent housing or perhaps any housing at all....

“Tn a narrower sense, this case [holds] .. . that

local police power may [not] be used to shift the

burden of providing housing to other cities in a

metropolitan region which have their own police

power and their own problems. This issue...

[questions] the jurisdiction of one town to visit

its problems on another.

“The prospective resident turned away at Peta-

luma does not disappear into the hinterland, but

presents himself in some other suburb of the same

metroplex, perhaps in some town with as many

problems or more than Petaluma... . By this

33

means, Petaluma legislates its problems into prob-

lems for Napa, Vallejo or Walnut Creek. May

Petaluma pass a law to bind the whole world?

See, Bosselman, ‘Can the Town of Ramapo Pass

a Law to Bind the Rights of the Whole World?’

1 Fla.State L.Rev. 234 (1973)... .”

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND

PERMANENT INJUNCTION

The court has made its findings of fact and con-

clusions of law in this action. On those findings and

conclusions the court grants its declaratory judgment

and permanent injunction as follows:

1. The court decrees that the following resolu-

tions and ordinances of the City of Petaluma, inso- —

far as they purport to limit the natural population

growth of the area, violate the United States Con-

stitution for the reasons, and limited to those rea-

sons, set forth in the conclusions of law made by the

court in this action:

(a) The Petaluma Official Development Policy,

June 7, 1971, Resolution No. 5760 N.C.S.;

(b) The Petaluma Environmental Design Plans

and Maps, March 27, 1962, Resolution No. 6008

N.CS. ;

(c) The Resolution of Policy Respecting Resi-

dential Policv and Population Growth, April 17,

1972, Resolution No. 6028 N.C.S.

(d) The Petaluma Residential Development

System, August 21, 1972, Resolution No. 6113

N.CS.

(e) The Petaluma Housing Element, Septem-

ber 5, 1972, Resolution No. 6126 N.C.S.

oF PEE LIELS DIDOT PR AE eae aim)

34

(f) All elements of the City of Petaluma gen-

eral plan, the Petaluma zoning law, the Petalu-

ma subdivision law, or other land use ordinances

of the city, that implement the unconstitutional

elements contained in a (a) through

(e) above.

2. The City of Petaluma, Helen Putnam, Robert

A. Brunner, John W. Cavanagh, Robert E. Daly,

James L. Harberson, Fred V. Mattei, and William

A. Perry, and their municipal agents, servants, em-

ployees, contractors, attorneys, and each of the suc-

cessors in interest to all such persons, and all of

them, are hereby permanently enjoined from enforc-

ing in any manner the resolutions and ordinances

described in paragraph 1(a) through 1(f) above, and

the other policies and actions of the city which may

have the effect, the intent, directly or indirectly, of

placing any numerical limitation, whether definite or

approximate, upon the number of persons permitted

to enter the City of Petaluma in order to establish

residence. Such persons are prohibited from taking

any action of any nature, formal or informal, that

preserves, duplicates, replaces, reinstates in another

form, or otherwise furthers any of the ordinances

resolutions, municipal actions, planning, administra-

tion of specific land use proposals, or other actions

or omissions held bv this court to violate the United

States Constitution in paragraph one of this declara-

tory indgment and injunction.

3. The court retains jurisdiction over the subject

matter of this action and over all of the narties, in-

35

cluding those for whom plaintiffs have standing to

sue, and their agents, servants, employees, contrac-

tors, members of the Petaluma City Council, attor-

neys, clerks and others serving municipal functions

for the City of Petaluma and subject to its orders

and control, and all of their successors in interest, to

determine on motion on appropriate notice and sub-

ject to the court’s discretion any further controversies

within the subject matter of this litigation, the find-

ings of fact, conclusions of law, this declaratory judg-

ment or the foregoing injunction in this action.

4. In the event that such further controversies

shall arise between the parties, it is the intention of

the court to appoint a special master whose function

it shall be to hear evidence and to make proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law which may

thus arise. Such findings and conclusions shall be sub-

ject to immediate review by this court.

(a) The parties may, if they so desire, within a

period of thirty davs from the date of this order,

submit to the court a list of no more than three per-

sons whom they believe to be especially qualified to

fulfill the position of special master which is de-

seribed above.

(hb) Such special master shall he compensated at

a rate set hy the court. The sums due for such serv-

ices, alone with other appropriate legal sums. shal]

he naid by the narty who fails to prevail in such

actions.

5 The pleintiffe shall have their casts of suit,

ee eae Cee OT a oe

36

Appendix B

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

Construction Industry Association of

Sonoma County, a California non-

profit corporation, et al.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellees. | wo, 74-2100

vs.

The City of Petaluma, a California

charter city,

Defendants-A ppellants. ;

OPINION

[August 13, 1975]

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Before: BARNES and CHOY, Circuit Judges,

and EAST,* District Judge.

CHOY, Circuit Judge:

The City of Petaluma (the City) appeals from a

district court decision voiding as unconstitutional cer-

tain aspects of its five-year housing and zoning plan.

We reverse.

Statement of Facts

The City is located in southern Sonoma County,

about 40 miles north of San Francisco. In the 1950’s

and 1960’s Petaluma was a relatively self-sufficient

*Honorable William G. East, Senior United States District Judge,

District of Oregon, sitting by designation.

x ae SEER ER IE LEAL LEADON PAM DALI ir 8 St DE ALES EPO ATG ome —

te eae AE Mine PF

‘ 1g WEDD ie7 say a

—— ER Dag OL GEL AES EE SERA

town. It experienced a steady population growth

from 10,315 in 1950 to 24,870 in 1970. Eventually, the

City was drawn into the Bay Area metropolitan

housing market as people working in San Francisco

and San Rafael became willing to commute longer

distances to secure relatively inexpensive housing

available there. By November 1972, according to un-

official figures, Petaluma’s population was at 30,500,

a dramatic increase of almost 25 per cent in little

over two years.

The increase in the City’s population, not surpris-

ingly, is reflected in the increase in the number of its

housing units. From 1964 to 1971, the following num-

ber of residential housing units were completed:

UE cicspesecineens 270 ft 379

BNE wpetincecnn 440 IT Victkecsiascsnes 398

Be enkicsansnlnns 321 BE aedteeecnsin 591

EEE siciniactermnans 234 SIE 891

In 1970 and 1971, the years of the most rapid growth,

demand for housing in the City was even greater

than above indicated. Taking 1970 and 1971 together,

builders won approval of a total of 2000 permits al-

though only 1482 were actually completed at the end

of 1971.

Alarmed by the accelerated rate of growth in 1970

and 1971, the demand for even more housing, and the

sprawl of the City eastward, the City adopted a tem-

porary freeze on development in early 1971. The con-

struction and zoning change moratorium was _ in-

tended to give the City Council] and the Citv plan-

ners an opportunity to studv the housing and zoning

situation and to develop short and long range plans.

> OMe & iti

rs ZBL AL LA NM WHS een,

38

The Council made specific findings with respect to

housing patterns and availability in Petaluma, in-

cluding the following: That from 1960-1970 hous-

ing had been in almost unvarying 6000 square-foot

lots laid out in regular grid patterns; that there was

a density of approximately 4.5 housing units per acre

in the sing'> femily home areas; that during 1960-

1970, 88 per cent of housing permits issued were for

single-family detached homes; that in 1970, 83 per

cent of Petaluma’s housing was single family dwell-

ings; that the bulk of recent development (largely

single family homes) occurred on the eastern portion

of the City, causing a large deficiency in moderately

priced multi-family and apartment units on the east

side.

To correct the imbalance between single-family and

multi-family dwellings, curb the sprawl of the City

on the east, and retard the accelerating growth of the

City, the Council in 1972 adopted several resolutions,

which collectively are called the “Petaluma Plan”

(the Plan).

The Plan, on its face limited to a five-year period

(1972-1977).' fixes a housing development growth rate

*

1The district court found that although the Plan is ostensibly

limited to a five-year period, official attempts have been made to

perpetuate the Plan beyond 1977. Such attempts include the urban

extension line (see text infra) and the agreement to purchase from

the Sonoma County Water Agency only 9.8 million gallons of water

per day through the year 1990. This flow is sufficient to support

a population of 55,000. If the City were to grow at a rate of about

500 housing units per year (approximately three persons per unit),

the City would reach a population of 55,000 about the year 1990.

The 55,000 figure was mentioned by City officials as the projected

optimal (and maximum) size of Petaluma. See, e.g., R.T. at 135-43,

145-46. -

PRAT PT DEERE ISPS on ART * i8 2 te. LER STR PRLS Sek F s C8

39

not to exceed 500 dwelling units per year.? Each

dwelling unit represents approximately three people.

The 500 unit figure is somewhat misleading, however,

because it applies only to housing units (hereinafter

referred to as “development-units”) that are part of

projects involving five units or more. Thus, the 500

unit figure does not reflect any housing and popula-

tion growth due to construction of single family

homes or even four-unit apartment buildings not part

of any larger project.

The Plan also positions a 200 foot wide “green-

belt” around the City,’ to serve as a boundary for

urban expansion for at least five years, and with

respect to the east and north sides of the City, for

perhaps ten to fifteen years. One of the most innova-

tive features of the Plan is the Residential Devel-

opment Control System which provides procedures

and criteria for the award of the annual 500 devel-

opment-unit permits. At the heart of the allocation

procedure is an intricate point system, whereby a

builder accumulates points for conformity by his

projects with the City’s general plan and environ-

mental design plans, for good architectural design,

and for providing low and moderate income dwelling

units and various recreational facilities. The Plan

further directs that allocations of building permits

2The allotment for each year is not an inflexible limitation. The

Plan does provide for a 10 percent variance (50 units) below or

above the 500 unit annual figure, but the expectation of the Council

is that not more than 2500 units will be constructed during the

five-year period.

8At some points this urban extension line is about .25 mile

beyond the present City limits.

REAR Rete YN Ce at AE,

EE POOL, AOL TELL GPRD PS LORE OE OE EESTI NEO IO EE te ee eR ene

are to be divided as evenly as feasible between the

west and east sections of the City and between single-

family dwellings and multiple residential units (in-

cluding rental units),* that the sections of the City

closest to the center are to be developed first in order

to cause ‘‘infilling” of vacant area, and that 8 to 12

per cent of the housing units approved be for low and

moderate income persons.

In a provision of the Plan, intended to maintain

the close-in rural space outside and surrounding

Petaluma, the City solicited Sonoma County to estab-

lish stringent subdivision and appropriate acreage

parcel controls for the areas outside the urban exten-

sion line of the City and to limit severly further resi-

dential infiling.

Purpose of the Plan

The purpose of the Plan is much disputed in this

case. According to general statements in the Plan

itself, the Plan was devised to ensure that ‘‘develop-

ment in the next five years, will take place in a rea-

sonable, orderly, attractive manner, rather than in a

completely haphazard and unattractive manner.” The

controversial 500 unit limitation on residential devel-

opment-units was adopted by the City “[i]n order

to protect its small town character and surrounding

4By providing for the increase of multi-family dwellings (in-

eluding townhouses as well as rental apartments), the Plan allows

increased density. Whereas, during the years just preceding the

Plan, housing density was about 4.5 units per acre, under the

Plan single-family housing will consist of not only low (4.5 units

per acre) but also medium density (4.5 to 10 units per acre).

And multi-family housing, to comprise about half of the housing

under the Plan, will be built at a density of 10 or more units

per acre.

nT EOP LEIS DOB. SI CME AED EAE INA BELIEVE BESE, C ACLAOLLE

a # GRRE AMATO A ODBC DS CT er vemnepmeseue -

se tene

41

open space.” The other features of the Plan were

designed to encourage an east-west balance in devel-

opment, to provide for variety in densities and build-

ing types and wide ranges in prices and rents, to

ensure infilling of close-in vacant areas, and to pre-

vent the sprawl of the City to the east and north.

The Builders Association of Sonoma County (the

Association) argues and the district court found,

however, that the Plan was primarily enacted “to

limit Petaluma’s demographic and market growth in

housing and in the immigration of new residents.”

375 F.Supp. 574, 576.

Market Demand and Effect of the Plan

In 1970 and 1971, housing permits were allotted at

the rate of 1000 annually, and there was no indica-

tion that without some governmental control on

growth consumer demand would subside or even re-

main at the 1000 unit per year level. Thus, if Peta-

luma had imposed a flat 500-unit limitation on all

residential housing the effect of the Plan would

clearly be to retard to a substantial degree the nat-

ural growth rate of the City. Petaluma, however, did

not apply the 500-unit limitation across the board.

but instead exempted all projects of four units or

less. Because appellees failed to introduce any evi-

dence whatsoever as to the number of exemnt units

5After the appellees initiated this suit, the City attempted to

show that the Plan was implemented to prevent the over-taxing of

available water and sewage facilities. We find it unnecessary, how-

ever, to consider the claim that sewage and water problems justified

implementation of the Plan.

cic LIE ELLIO COLDER PE OO = BO lg PE A, OVE

expected to be built during the five-year period, the

effect of the 500 development-unit limitation on the

natural growth in housing is uncertain. For purposes

of this decision, however, we will assume that the 500

development-unit growth rate is in fact below the

reasonably anticipated market demand for such units

and that absent the Petaluma Plan, the City would

grow at a faster rate.

According to undisputed expert testimony at trial,

if the Plan (limiting housing starts to approximately

6 per cent of existing housing stock each year) were

to be adopted by municipalities throughout the

region, the impact on the housing market would be

substantial. For the decade 1970 to 1980, the short-

fall in needed housing in the region would be about

105,000 units (or 25 per cent of the units needed).

Further, the aggregate effect of a proliferation of the

Plan throughout the San Francisco region would be

a decline in regional housing stock quality, a loss of

the mobility of current and prospective residents and

a deterioration in the quality and choice of housing

available to income earners with real incomes of

$14,000 per vear or less. If, however, the Plan were

considered by itself and with respect to Petaluma

only, there is no evidence to suggest that there would

he a deterioration in the quality and choice of hous-

ing available there to persons in the lower and mid-

dle income brackets. Actually, the Plan inereases the

availability of multi-family units (owner-ocenpied °

and rental units) and low-income units which were

rarely constructed in the pre-Plan days.

Ah BERTI Lp INE A SOD Ma NE

: se-0t * A eas Yate RE LE Or

Rete reer rae SIA eh ORIEN PD DY BA LI RTD I od ue

43

Court Proceedings

‘wo landowners (the Landowners) and the Associ-

ation instituted this suit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and its

officers and council members, claiming that the Peta-

luma Plan was unconstitutional. The district court

ruled that certain aspects of the Plan unconstitution-

ally denied the right to travel in so far as they tended

‘“‘to limit the natural population of the area.” 375

F.Supp. 574, 588, The court enjoined the City and its

agents from implementing the unconstitutional ele-

ments of the Plan, but the order was stayed by Jus-

tice Douglas pending this appeal.

Jurisdiction

The City, on two wholly separate grounds, chal-

lenges the power of the district court to hear the suit

below. The City contends that a court has no jurisdic-

tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to

entertain a suit against members of a city council.

Relying on City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507

(1973), which held that a city is not a “person” under

§ 1983, the City argues that its councilmen, similarly,

are not “persons.” This court, however, has recently

faced the very issue raised by the City and has held

that a city official is a “person” within the meaning

of §1983 and that a district court has jurisdiction

under 28 1.8.C. § 1343 over an action to enjoin him

from enforcing an unconstitutional statute. Ybarra v.

City of the Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250,

953 (9th Cir. 1974).

DALAT FE LS EE Ta IP RY —_

ee eT ne

TP Ae SET, OS

44

The district court had jurisdiction not only under

§ 1343 but also under the general federal question

statute, 28 U.S.C. 1331. It does not appear to a legal

certainty that the amount in controversy is less than

$10,000. See St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red

Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938).

Standing

The City also challenges the standing of the Associ-

ation and the Landowners to maintain the suit. The

standing requirement raises the threshhold question in

every federal case whether plaintiff has made out a

“case or controversy” between himself and the defend-

ant within the meaning of Article III of the Constitu-

tion. In order to satisfy the constitutional require-

ment that courts decide only cases or controversies

and to ensure the requisite concreteness of facts and

adverseness of parties, plaintiff must show that he has

a “personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,”

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), or that he

has suffered “some threatened or actual injury result-

ing from the putatively illegal action.” Linda R.S.

v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973). Further, the

plaintiff must satisfy the additional court-imposed

standing requirement that the “interest sought to be

protected by the complainant is arguably within the

zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the

statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” As-

sociation of Data Processing Service Organizations,

Ine. v. Camp, 297 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). A corollary

to the “zone of interest” requirement. is the well-

recognized general rule that ‘‘even when the plaintiff

45

has alleged injury sufficient to meet the ‘case or con-

troversy’ requirement, . . . the plaintiff must assert

his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his

claim to relief on the Jegal rights or interests of third

parties.” Warth v. Seldin, ........... EI AOb dasionn UE abas , slip

op. at 8 (1975); accord, United States v. Raines, 362

U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.

249, 256 (1953).

Appellees casily satisfy the “injury in fact” stand-

ing requirement. The Association alleges it has suf-

fered in its own right monetary damages due to lost

revenues, Sonoma County builders contribute dues

to the Association in a sum proportionate to the

amount of business the builders do in the area. Thus,

in a very real sense a restriction on building in Pet-

aluma causes economic injury to the Association.®

The two Landowners also have already suffered or

are threatened with a direct injury. It is their posi-

tion that the Petaluma Plan operated, of itself, to

adversely affect the value and marketabilty of their

land for residential uses, and such an allegation is

sufficient to show that they have a personal stake

in the outcome of the controversy. See Golden v.

Planning Board of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y. 2d

359, 365-66, 285 N.F. 2d 291, 294, 334 N.Y.S. 2d 138,

142, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).

*Even assuming arquendo that the Association i’self has not

suffered a direct injury, it nonetheless has standing to represent

the interests of its own members, most if not all of whom have

suffered or are threatened with a direet injury. See Warth v.

Seldin, U.S. at , slip op. at 20; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405

U.S. 727, 734-41 (1972).

46

Although appellees have suffered or are threatened

with direct personal injury, the “zone of interest” re-

quirement poses a huge stumbling block to their at-

tempt to show standing. The primary federal claim

upon which this suit is based—the right to travel or

migrate—is a claim asserted not on the appellees’

own behalf, but on behalf of a group of unknown

third parties allegedly excluded from living in Petal-

uma. Although individual builders, the Association,

and the Landowners are admittedly adversely affected

by the Petaluma Plan, their economic interests are

undisputedly outside the zone of interest to be pro-

tected by any purported constitutional right to travel.

Accordingly, appellees’ right to travel claim “falls

squarely within the prudential standing rule that nor-

mally bars litigants from asserting the rights or legal

interests of others in order to obtain relief from in-

jury to themselves.” Warth v. Seldin, U.S. at. ........ .

slip op. at 18. ;

There are several exceptions to this general rule,

but plaintiffs do not fall within any of them. Con-

gress may grant standing by statute to persons who

might otherwise lack standing, td., but here no stat-

ute expressly or by clear implication grants to per-

sons in appellees’ position a right of action based on

third parties’ right to travel. On several occasions,

the Sunreme Court has granted standing to persons

whom a criminal statute directly affected to challenge

the statute on the ground that if enforced it would

infringe the rights of third parties. F’.q., Doe ». Bol-

ton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973): Griswold v. Con-

nectient, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). No comparison,

47

however, may be iairly drawn between appellees and

the doctors facing criminal sanctions in Bolton and

Griswold. Nor do appellees allege that the Petaluma

Plan precludes or otherwise adversely affects a rela-

tionship existing between them and the persons whose

rights allegedly have been violated. Cf. NAACP v.

Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958). The only con-

nection between any of the appellees and any of the

persons who purportedly are excluded from Petal-

uma is the possibility that but for the Plan they

would be parties to a purchase-sale agreement.’ There

exists no special, on-going relationship between appel-

lees and those whose rights allegedly are violated

which militates in favor of granting standing. Cf.

NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 458-60; Pierce v.

Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925) ;

Washington Utilities &} Transportation Commission

y. FCC, —. Pe Gn ees (9th Cir. 1975); Akron

Board of Education v. State Board of Education of

Ohio, 490 F.2d 1285, 1289-90 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,

417 U.S. 932 (1974). Nor have the Association and the

Landowners shown that their prosecution of the suit

is necessary to ensure protection of the rights asserted.

Cf. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 237

(1969) ; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 459; Barrows

v. Jackson, 346 U.S. at 257. Assuming arguendo that

the constitutional right to travel applies to this case,

7The Association does not allege that a contractual or other

relationship proteeted under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1982 actually

exists between its members and any particular person excluded

from residence in the town, or that any such relationship was either

punished or disrupted by the City. Compare Sullivan v. Little

Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969) with Warth v. Seldin, .....

Ue. % ...... n.22, slip op. at 23 n.22.

— |

those individuals whose mobility is impaired may

bring suit on their own behalf and on behalf of those

similarly situated. Although Warth v. Seldin denied

standing to a group of low-income and minority-

group plaintiffs challenging exclusionary zoning prac-

tices, the case is no bar to a suit against the City

brought by a proper group of plaintiffs. The Court

in Warth v. Seldin left open the federal court doors

for plaintiffs who have some interest in a particular

housing project and who, but for the restrictive zon-

ing ordinances, would be able to reside in the com-

munity.

Although we conclude that appellees lack standing

to assert the rights of third parties, they nonetheless

have standing to maintain claims based on violations

of rights personal to them. Accordingly, appellees

have standing to challenge the Petaluma Plan on the

grounds asserted in their complaint that the Plan is

arbitrary and thus violative of their due process

rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. and

that the Plan poses an unreasonable burden on inter-

state commerce. See Steel Hill Development, Inc. v.

Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir.

1972): Sisters of Providence of St. Maru of the

Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396, 400

(N.D. Til. 1971). The fact that one of the Landown-

er’s property lies wholly outside the present City

houndaries and that the other’s pronerty lies mostly

outside the houndaries is no har to their challenging

the Citv’s Plan which has a direct, intended and im-

mediate effect on the property. See Scott vr. City of

[Resa SE ET RISES SOS LLP BERS OIE SELES PALE LG LI EIEN REED RELL IE AE

» — , Las ene -

ADAPT

49

Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 548-49, 492 P.2d 1137,

1141-42, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749-50 (1972).

Other Challenges to the Plan

Although the district court rested its decision

solely on the right to travel claim,* all the facts and

legal conclusions necessary to resolve appellees’ other

claims are part of the record. ‘Thus, in order to pro-

mote judicial economy, we now dispose of the other

challenges to the Plan.* See Blaney v. Florida Na-

tional Bank at Orlando, 357 B.2d 27, 28 (5th Cir.

1966) ; Necchi v. Neccht Sewing Machine Sales Corp.,

348 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir. 19165), cert. denied, 383

U.S. 909 (1966).

Substantive Due .Process

Appellees claim that the Plam is arbitrary and un-

reasonable and, thus, violative: of the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amemdment. According to

8Since the court struck down the Pan on the right to travel

ground, the court believed it unnecessary to consider plaintiffs’

contentions that the Plan was invalid wnder the commerce clause

and under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment. 375 F. Supp. at 586.

°In discussing whether the Plan, althtonugh a burden on the right

to travel, was justified by a compellimg state interest, the court

serutinized the Plan’s purpose. According to the court, the preserva-

tion of the City’s small town characterr and the slowing down of

the rate of growth by limiting the ntaumber of new homeowners

were not within the public welfare. 3755 F. Supp. at 586. Thus, in

light of this finding, it would be a wasttefy] exercise to remand the

ease for consideration of the substantijye due process issue. The

court has already made clear its conclusion that the avowed pur-

poses of the plan do not amount to leegitimate governmental in-

terests.

ay

PARTIE YO” F

30

appellees, the Plan is nothing more than an exclu-

slonary zoning device,’ designed solely to insulate

Petaluma from the urban complex in which it finds

itself. The Association and the Landowners reject,

as falling outside the scope of any legtimate govern-

mental interest, the City’s avowed purposes in imple-

menting the Plan—the preservation of Petaluma’s

small town character and the avoidance of the social

and evironmental problems caused by an uncontrolled

growth rate.

In attacking the validity of the Plan, appellees

rely heavily on the district court’s finding that the

express purpose and the actual effect of the Plan is

to exclude substantial numbers of people who would

otherwise elect to move to the City. 375 F. Supp. at

581. The existence of an exclusionary purpose and

effect reflects, however, only one side of the zoning

10Exelusionary zoning” is a phrase popularly used to describe

suburban zoning regulations which have the effect, if not also the

purpose, of preventing the migration of low and middle-income

persons. Since a large percentage of racial minorities fall within

the low and middle income brackets, exclusionary zoning regula-

tions may also effectively wall out racial minorities. See generally

Aloi, Goldberg & White, Racial and Economic Segregation by Zon-

ing: Death Knell for Home Rule? 1969 U. Tol. L. Rev. 65 (1969) ;

Bigham & Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning Practices: An Examination

of the Current Controversy, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 1111 (1972); David-

off & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land

Use Controls, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 509 (1971) ; Note, Exclusionary

Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 Harv. Li. Rev. 1645 (1971).

Most court challenges to and comment upon so-called exclusionary

zoning focus on such traditional zoning devices as height limita-

tions, minimum square footage and minimum lot size requirements,

and the prohibition of multi-family dwellings or mobile homes. The

Petaluma Plan is unique in that although it assertedly slows the

growth rate it replaces the past pattern of single-family detached

homes with an assortment of housing units, varying in price and

design.

POOR COP"

;OPY

51

regulation. Practically all zoning restrictions have

as a purpose and effect the exclusion of some activ-

ity or type of structure or a certain density of inhab-

itants. And in reviewing the reasonableness of a zon-

ing ordinance, our inquiry does not terminate with

a finding that it is for an exclusionary purpose.'! We

must determine further whether the exclusion hears

any rational relationship to a legitimate state inter-

est. If it does not, then the zoning regulation is in-

valid. If, on the other hand, a legitimate state inter-

est is furthered by the zoning regulation, we must

defer to the legislative act. Being neither a super

legislature nor a zoning board of appeal, a federal

court is without authority to weigh and reappraise the

factors considered or ignored by the legislative body

in passing the challenged zoning regulation.’? The

reasonableness, not the wisdom, of the Petaluma Plan

is at issue in this suit.

It is well settled that zoning regulations “must find

their justification in some aspect of the police power,

asserted for the public welfare.” Village of Euclid v.

11Our inquiry here is not unlike that involved in a case alleging

denial of equal protection of the laws. The mere showing of some

discrimination by the state is not sufficient to prove an invasion of

one’s constitutional rights. Most legislation to some extent dis-

criminates between various classes of persons, business enterprises,

or other entities. However, absent a suspect classification or invasion

of fundamental rights, equal protection rights are violated only

where the classification does not bear a rational relationship to a

legitimate state interest. See Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos

Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974).

12 Appellees’ brief is unnecessarily oversize (125 pages) mainly

beeause it is rife with quotations from writers on regional planning,

economie regulation and sociological policies and themes. These

types of considerations are more appropriate for legislative bodies

than for courts.

TT Pe Te

rei ati tals calc

PDE LADO the AR IE | 8 ta

52

Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). The

concept of the public welfare, however, is not limited

to the regulation of noxious activities or dangerous

structures. As the Court stated in Berman v. Parker,

348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954):

The concept of the public welfare is brioad and

inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual

as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.

It is within the power of the legislature tto deter-

mine that the community should be beauitiful as

well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-

balanced as well as carefully patrolled.

(citations omitted). Accord, Village of Belle ‘Terre v.

Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 6, 9 (1974).

In determining whether the City’s interest in pre-

serving its small town character and in avoiding

uncontrolled and rapid growth falls within the broad

concept of “public welfare”, we are considerably as-

sisted by two recent cases. Belle Terre, supra, and

Ybarra v. City of Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d

250 (9th Cir. 1974), each of which upheld as not

unreasonable a zoning regulation much more restric-

tive than the Petaluma Plan, are dispositive of the

due process issue in this case.

In Belle Terre the Supreme Court rejected numer-

ous challenges’* to a village’s restricting land! use to

13The plaintiffs in Belle Terre claimed inter alia that the

ordinance interferred with a person’s right to travel and right to

migrate to and settle within a state.

The Supreme Court held that since the ordinance was mot aimed

at transients, there was no infringement of anyone’s right’ to travel.

416 U.S. at 7. Although due to appellees’ lack of standing -we do not

reach today the right to travel issue, we note that the Petaluma

Plan is not aimed at transients, nor does it penalize those who have

OR OG FEE ILI LO OBOE AE

53

one-family’* dwellings excluding lodging houses,

boarding houses, fraternity houses or multiple-dwell-

ing houses. By absolutely prohibiting the construc-

tion of or conversion of a building to other than

single-family dwelling, the village ensured that it

would never grow, if at all, much larger than its

population of 700 living in 220 residences. Nonethe-

less, the Court found that the prohibition of board-

ing houses and other multi-family dwellings was rea-

sonable and within the public welfare because such

dwellings present urban problems, such as the occu-

pation of a given space by more people, the increase

in traffic and parked cars and the noise that comes

with increased crowds. According to the Court,

A quiet place where yards are wide, people few,

and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate

guidelines in a land-use project addressed to

family needs. This goal is a permissible one

within Berman v. Parker, supra. The police

power is not confined to elimination of filth,

stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay

out zones where family values, youth values, and

the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air

make the area a sanctuary for people.

416 U.S. at 9. While dissenting from the majority

opinion in Belle Terre on the ground that the regula-

recently exercised their right to travel. See CEEED v. California

Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 118 Cal.

Rptr. 315, 332-34 (1974); cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,

342 (1972).

14The word “family” as used in the ordinance meant one or more

persons related by blood, adoption or marriage, living together as

a single housekeeping unit. Two or fewer persons living together,

though not related by blood, adoption or marriage were considered

a “family”. 416 U.S. at 2.

SPREE DIS ER IN ee |

54

tion unreasonably burdened the exercise of First

Amendment associational rights, Mr. Justice Mar-

shall concurred in the Court’s express holding that a

local entity’s zoning power is extremely broad:

[LJocal zoning authorities may properly act in

furtherance of the objectives asserted to be

served by the ordinance at issue here: restricting

uncontrolled growth, solving traffic problems,

keeping rental costs at a reasonable level, and

making the community attractive to families.

The police power which provides the justifica-

tion for zoning is not narrowly confined. And, it

is appropriate that we afford zoning authorities

considerable latitude in choosing the means by

which to implement such purposes.

416 U.S. at 13-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (empha-

sis added) (citations omitted).

Following the Belle Terre decision, this court in

Los Altos Hills had an opportunity to review a zon-

ing ordinance providing that a housing lot shall con-

tain not less than one acre and that no lot shall be

occupied by more than one primary dwelling unit.

The ordinance as a practical matter prevented poor

people from living in Los Altos Hills and restricted

the density, and thus the population, of the town. This

court, nonetheless, found that the ordinance was ra-

tionally related to a legitimate governmental interest

—the preservation of the town’s rural environment—

and, thus, did not violate the equal protection clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment. 503 F.2d at 254.

Both the Belle Terre ordinance and the Los Altos

Hills regulation had the purpose and effect of per-

55

manently restricting growth; nonetheless, the court

in each case upheld the particular law before it on

the ground that the regulation served a legitimate

governmental interest falling within the concept of the

public welfare: the preservation of quiet family

neighborhoods (Belle Terre) and the preservation of

a rural environment (Los Altos Hills). Even less

restrictive or exclusionary than the above zoning

ordinances is the Petaluma Plan which, unlike those

ordinances, does not freeze the population at present

or near-present levels.’* Further, unlike the Los Altos

Hills ordinance and the various zoning regulations

struck down by state courts in recent years, the

Petaluma Plan does not have the undesirable effect

of walling out any particular income class nor any

racial minority group.’®

15[nder the Petaluma Plan, the population is expected to increase

at the rate of about 1500 persons annually. This rate approxi-

mates the rate of growth in the 1960’s and represents about a 6

percent inerease per year over the present population.

16Although appellees have attempted to align their business in-

terests in attacking the Plan with legitimate housing needs of the

urban poor and racial minorities, the Association has not alleged

nor ean it allege, based on the record in this case, that the Plan

has the purpose and effect of excluding poor persons and racial

minorities. Cf. Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v.

Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E. 2d 390 (1959). Contrary to the

picture painted by appellees, the Petaluma Plan is “inclusionary”

to the extent that it offers new opportunities, previously unavail-

able, to minorities and low and moderate-income persons. Under the

pre-Plan system single family, middle-income housing dominated

the Petaluma market, and as a result low and moderate income

persons were unable to secure housing in the area. The Plan

radically changes the previous building pattern and requires that

housing permits be evenly divided between single family and multi-

family units and that approximately eight to twelve per cent of

the units be constructed specifically for low and moderate income

persons.

In stark contrast, each of the exclusionary zoning regulations

invalidated by state courts in recent years impeded the ability of

cece |

we rey Te - ¥ nie LD Ae TNO. deta Mel HBT oes 8 sth LSS I ae tte 2 fw Be Ra SPR rel Stara de

Although we assume that some persons desirous of

living in Petaluma will be excluded under the hous-

ing permit limitation and that, thus, the Plan may

frustrate some legitimate regional housing needs, the

Plan is not arbitrary or unreasonable. We agree with

appellees that unlike the situation in the past most

municipalities today are neither isolated nor wholly

independent from neighboring municipalities and

that, consequently, unilateral land use decisions by

one local entity affect the needs and resources of an

entire region. See, c.g., Golden v. Planning Board of

Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334

N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) ;

National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa.

504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Note, Phased Zoning: Reg-

ulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land Develop-

ment, 26 Stan. L. Rey. 585, 605 (1974). It does not

necessarily follow, however, that the due process

rights of builders and landowners are violated merely

heeause a loeal entity exercises in its own self-inter-

est the nolice power lawfully delegated to it hy the

(4 aere minimum lot); Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax

County v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959) (rezoning

to minimum two acre lots with the effect of keeping poor in another

section of municipality).

’ ae beets Cates Ba RNC

OLN OE ILL DIOL IES ON LR Oe

57

state. See Belle Terre, supra; Los Altos Hills, supra.

If the present system of delegated zoning power does

not effectively serve the state interest in furthering

the general welfare of the region or entire state, it

is the state legislature’s and not the federal courts’

role to intervene and adjust the system. As stated

supra, the federal court is not a super zoning board

and should not be called on to mark the point at

which legitimate local interests in promoting the wel-

fare of the community are outweighed by legitimate

regional interests. See Note, supra, at 608-11.

We conclude therefore that under Belle Terre and

Los Altos Hills the concept of the public welfare is

sufficiently broad to uphold Petaluma’s desire to pre-

serve its small town character, its open spaces and

low density of population, and to grow at an orderly

and deliberate pace.’

170ur decision upholding the Plan as not in violation of the

appellees’ due process rights should not be read as a permanent

endorsement of the Plan. In a few years the City itseif for good

reason may abandon the Plan or the state may decide to alter its

laws delegating its zoning power to the local authorities; or to meet

legitimate regional needs, regional zoning authorities may be es-

tablished. See, e.g., Cal. Gov. Code §§ 66600 et seg. (San Francisco

Bay Conservation and Development Commission) ; Cal Gov. Code

§§ 66801, 67000 et seq. (Tahoe Regional Planning Agency) ; Public

Resources Code §§ 27000 et seq. (California Coastal Zone Conser-

vation Commission). To be sure, housing needs in metropolitan

areas like the San Francisco Bay Area are pressing and the needs

are not being met by present methods of supplying housing. How-

ever, the federal court is not the proper forum for resolving these

problems. The controversy stirred up by the present litigation, as

indicated by the number and variety of amici on each side, and

the complex economic, political and social factors involved in this

case are compelling evidence that resolution of the important

housing and environmental issues raised here is exclusively the

domain of the legislature.

Sa en at

PvEiE SARL 6.8 AL ALLELES POR BEE Ee EN AI OTD TM

58

Commerce Clause

The district court found that housing in Petaluma

and the surrounding areas is produced substantially

through goods and services in interstate commerce

and that curtailment of residential growth in Peta-

luma will cause serious dislocation to commerce. 375

F. Supp. at 577, 579. Our ruling today, however, that

the Petaluma Plan represents a reasonable and

legitimate exercise of the police power obviates the

necessity of remanding the case for consideration of

appellees’ claim that the Plan nanan d burdens

interstate commerce.

It is well settled that a state regulation validly

based on the police power does not impermissibly

burden interstate commerce where the regulation nei-

ther discriminates against interstate commerce nor

operates to disrupt its required tniformity. Huron

Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 441, 448 (1960). As

stated by the Supreme Court almost 25 years ago:

When there is a reasonable basis for legislation

to protect the social, as distinguished from the

economic, welfare of a community, it is not for

this Court because of the Commerce Clause to

deny the exercise locally of the sovereign power

of the [state].

Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641 (1951). It is

wholly beyond a court’s limited authority under the

Commerce Clause to review state legislation by bal-

ancing reasonable social welfare legislation against

its incidental burden on commerce. Brotherhood of

Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock

59

Island & Pacific Railroad Co., 393 U.S. 129, 136

(1968).

Consequently, since the local regulation here is

rationally related to the social and environmental

welfare of the community and does not discriminate

against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its

required uniformity, appellees’ claim that the Plan

unreasonably burdens commerce must fail.*

Reversed.

18Qur decision today conforms with others which have upheld

reasonable state environmental legislation despite some burden

incidentally placed on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Huron Cement

Co. v. Detroit, supra (air pollution statute) ; Procter & Gamble

Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ........

U.S. .... (1975) (ban on phosphate detergents); American Can

Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 15 Or. App. 618, 517

P.2d 691 (1973) (ban on non-returnable beverage containers).

pyre & moangrrdy

ee ee ery

a ae ons . ; <> sc anne ieee

60

Appendix C

United States Court of Appeals

For the Ninth Circuit

No. 74-2100

Construction Industry Association of |

Sonoma County, a nonprofit corpora-

tion, et al.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellees,

Vs.

The City of Petaluma, a California

charter city,

Defendants-A ppellants.

:

[Filed Oct. 2, 1975]

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

ORDER

Before: Barnes and Cuow, Circuit Judges, and East,*

District Judge,

The panel as constituted in the above case has voted

to deny the petition for rehearing and to reject the

suggestion for rehearing en banc.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion

for rehearing en bane and no judge of the court has

voted to grant rehearing en banc. F.R.App.P. 35(b).

The petition for rehearing is denied and the sugges-

tion for rehearing en bane is rejected.

*Hon. William G. East, Senior United States District Judge,

District of Oregon, sitting by designation,

61

Appendix D

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

Case No. C-73-663-LHB

Construction Industry Association of ’

Sonoma County, a nonprofit corpora-

tion, et al.,

Plaintiff,

Vs.

The City of Petaluma, a California

charter city,

Defendant. |

NOTICE OF SPREADING OF MANDATE

To:

Arata, Misuraca, Clement & Haley

717 College Avenue

Santa Rosa, CA 95402

Joseph H. Henderson

1200 College Avenue

Santa Rosa, CA 95402

Edouard E. Robert

133% Kentucky Street

Petaluma, CA 94952

Sturgis, Deu-Dulk Douglas & Anderson

1322 Webster Street

Oakland, CA 94612

ie eR a ee hk eee |

62

Notice is hereby given that the Mandate of the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to this Court

was spread on the minutes of this Court on October

14, 1975.

( ) Affirming

(X) Reversing

( ) Reversing and Remanding (with instructions)

Dated: October 15, 1975.

Clerk of Court

/s/ Theodore H. Kast

by: Theodore H. Kast

Deputy Clerk.

RAE ELI EEO LON EEN OP SN III NE

63

Appendix E

United States Court of Appeals

For the Ninth Circuit

No. 74-2100 DC# C 73-663-LHB

Construction Industry Association of )

Sonoma County, a nonprofit corpora-

tion, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vs.

The City of Petaluma, a California

charter city,

Defendants. |

[Filed Oct. 14, 1975]

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

JUDGMENT

This Cause came on to be heard on the Transcript

of the Record from tlie United States District Court

for the Northern District of Californ.. and was duly

submitted.

On Consideration Whereof, It is now here ordered

and adjudged by this Court, that the judgment of the

said District Court in this Cause be, and hereby is

REVERSED.

SPR AEN OE OO TA SEN SC AINE ONL AS CD ot Ltn ORE

64

With costs in this Court in favor of the Appellant

and against Appellee in the amount of $1,325.44.

Printing Appellant’s briefs $1,260.44

Docket fee 50.00

Clerk’s fee 1500

$1,325.44

Filed and entered August 13, 1975.

A True Copy

Attest Oct. 9, 1975

Emil E. Melfi, Jr.,

Clerk

J. N. Iway,

Deputy.

Pa ARNE Seg OIE Re QL IPR tes TN eee

65

Appendix F

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE I

Section 8. The Congress shall have Power... To

regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among

the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. ...

ARTICLE IIT

Section 1. The judicial Power of the United

States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in

such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time

to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the

supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices

during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,

receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall

not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all

Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Consti-

tution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties

made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ;

—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public

Ministers and Consuls ;—to all Cases of admiralty and

maritime Jurisdiction ;—to Controversies to which the

United States shall be a Party ;—to Controversies be-

tween two or more States ;—between a State and Citi-

zens of another State;—bhetween Citizens of different

states,—between Citizens of the same State claiming

Lands under Grants of different States, and between

» State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,

Citizens or Subjects. ...

Pee eS SE

22 OG SE POI SALIENCE LEV OI GL BOSD GOODS IT! ELIS GES

PILE LER ELOY OGY IL BM IER A IEP

——e——— SST on he

PEAR WAA CR Ae

66

AMENDMENT IX

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain

rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage

others retained by the people.

AMENDMENT X

The powers not delegated to the United States by

the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,

are reserved to the States respectively, or to the

people.

AMENDMENT XIV

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the

United States, and subject to the jurisdiction there-

of, are citizens of the United States and the State

wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce

any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-

nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any

State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma · 424 U.S. 934 | Frix