Opposition Brief — Bettis Corp. v. Charles Wheatley Co.

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Supreme Court, U. &

SUPREME COURHK WU @ DEC 10 1975

WHGHAEE-RODAR TR, CLERK

INTHE |

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-472

BETTIS CORPORATION and ST. PAUL FIRE

AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Petitioners,

versus

CHARLES WHEATLEY COMPANY,

Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO GRANTING

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Timothy J. McNamara

DAVIDSON, MEAUX,

ONEBANE, DONOHOE,

BERNARD, TORIAN

& DIAZ

P. O. Drawer 3507

Lafayette, La. 70501

Telephone: (318) 233-2111

Attorneys for Respondent

SCOFIELDS’ QUALITY PRINTERS, P O BOX 53096. N 0. LA 70153 - 504/822 1611

eee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TATE COP THe CARE oc ccc cess cccescecens 2

ety we) Bk - | 4 y 4) RR 3

REASONS FOR REFUSING WRIT OF CER-

TIORARI

A. The exclusion provisions of Title 33

U.S.C. 905 of the L & H W Actbarthird

party claims against anemployer ......... 3

es orcs cee W NEV eh need vnsksevnesas 6

ee ek Was a ea eh ble 08s 16

i awk whee skassee es 27

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..........cccccccess 27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Service

Contracting, Inc., 5th Cir. (1973), 490 F.2d

ai ee ae Le Sais 4 kibe beeaves 7

American Mutual Liability Insurance Com-

pany v. Matthews, 2nd Cir. (1951), 18 F.2d

RE eS a esa ke dcb dale ke’ 7

Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v.

Erie Lackawanna Railroad Company, 92

CEE | seG Kah hence bederh beh ence aes 12,13,14

Brown v. American-HawaiianS.S. Company,

Bre Cie. CARBS), BUS Fe BGAG occ ccc ccesvecsenass 7

Cooper Stevedoring Company v. Fritz Kopke,

Inc., et al, 94 S.Ct. 2474 (1974) .............. 5,12,15

Drake v. Treadwell Const. Co., 299 F.2d 789

CEE scrap ssi sessocls Suid oande 17,18,19,21

CANT ERE PIE

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued)

Page

Empire Seafoods, Inc. v. Anderson, 398 F.2d

ik eek asco c eek ie be eee Cae vORR CA ees 20,21

General Electric Company v. Cuban

American Nickel Company, 396 F.2d 89, 5th

CREE Ucchus cha vdretebne hae buawed muah Sivens 8,9

Halliburton Company v. Norton Drilling

Company, 302 F.2d 431 at 434 .................. 7,8

Halycon Lines v. Haenn Ship Sealing & Refit-

ting Corporation, 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.Ct. 277

ERE aNaaedsnkss coun ante Wen bw has ekows 11,12,13,14

Horton & Horton, Inc. v. T/S J. E. Dyer, 428

F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. den., 400 U.S.

OOS; BA .GE: QUE CHBPED oiiccnannc vducvsvnccscdvcss 13

In Re Seaboard Shipping, 449 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.

1971), cert. den. 406 U.S. 949, 92 S.Ct. 2039

(1972)

eceded aan/dk kd oak ae ecw W ceehewe céaews 13

Loffland Brothers Company v. Roberts, 386

ok RS Se een re eee ae 6,10

Nations v. W. W. Morris and American

Motorists Insurance Company, 483 F.2d 577

Ss I 60 ne eoanwn eden deo eU ae dawns vs 5,8

Newport Airpack, Inc. v. U.S., 419 F.2d 342 (1

SE bar cie ceed oneenksaWenaWawbine dveeee 21

Ocean Drilling & Exploration Company v.

Berry Brothers Oilfield Service, 377 F.2d

ee IE os, dns os 0 00 bes nad kee 6 dcendens. 6,7,8,10

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued)

Page

Panico v. Whiting Milk Company, et al v.

United States, 335 F.Supp. 315 (U.S.D.C.,

RN UD ec on oe od ene aey REELS kk adi Ses 18

Ryan Stevedoring Company v. Pan-Atlantic

S.S. Corporation, 350 U.S. 124, 76 Supreme

RN DE 3500 5G is kde ac aheea ts ees Keke 24,26

United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 9th Cir.,

(1964), 355 F.2d 379, 402-404, cert. den .... 7,18,19,21

Watz v. Zapata Offshore Company, 431 F.2d

See Se tees NE, aS sich iwiicst drat avikekeaberhes 13

Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 1963,

372 U.S. 597, 83 S.Ct. 926, 10 L.Ed.2d1....... 17,18,

19,20,21,22

Wien Alaska Air Lines, Inc. v. U.S., 375 F.2d

ee Sg ES hahaa sxc eo b inn candevetunde ch 19,21

Statutes:

eee ns, PU IID ook ow ond cdc ek couch idacn 2

Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5

a IE (nc nncah Kea eulb chee amine uockoavs 16,18

Longshoremen’s & Harbor Workers’ Com-

pensation Act, Title 33, U.S.C., §§901 et

ROE ec eet iereeiwa na pete aw s0s Swe Cee EONS Oe ks passim

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-472

BETTIS CORPORATION and ST. PAUL FIRE

AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Petitioners,

versus

CHARLES WHEATLEY COMPANY,

Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO GRANTING

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE HONORABLES, THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND

JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES:

For the reasons hereafter set forth, CHARLES

WHEATLEY COMPANY, third party defendant-

appellee prays that this Honorable Court refuse the

writ of certiorari sought by petitioners.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

These proceedings were instituted by the wife and

child of Murray White, an employee of Charles

Wheatley Co., (Wheatley) who was killed due to an

explosion on a fixed platform in the Gulf of Mexico

upon which he was working. In suing Bettis

Corporation, the plaintiff alleged that the explosion

resulted from a defect in an “actuator” manufactured

by Bettis Corporation, which constituted acomponent

part of what is known as a “Wheatley Univalve

Launch Package”, an apparatus designed to clean

moisture from within natural gas transmission lines

connecting offshore drilling platforms. This

particular launch package, which was assembled by

Wheatley. was sold to Texas Eastern Transmission

Corporation (Texas Eastern) and was installed on its

offshore fixed platform. White's widow and child are

presently collecting compensation benefits to which

they were and are entitled under the provisions of the

Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation

Act, Title 33, U.S.C. Sections 901 et seq. (L & H W Act)

from appellee herein, Wheatley. They also instituted

an action in tort for damages against Texas Eastern

and the Bettis Corporation, the latter party having

manufactured the allegedly defective actuator valve

incorporated in the launch system.

Bettis and its insurer, St. Paul Fire & Marine

Insurance Company, filed third-party complaints

against Wheatley, seeking indemnity or contribution

in tort in the event that they should be held liable to

White's survivors on the principal demand. The trial

court, however, entered a Rule 54 (B) FRCP Order

DELLS OAM oS RRA ON I LEELG LG BREE BIGOT A

3

granting Wheatley’s motion to dismiss the third-party

complaint from which dismissal] Bettis and its insurer

appealed to the United States Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeals. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's

dismissal of the third-party complaint, prompting

Bettis and its insurer to make application to this

Honorable Court for a writ of certiorari.

QUESTION PRESENTED

The only issue presented by this application is

whether the third party claims for tort indemnifica-

tion or contribution brought by appellants should be

barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the

L &H W Act.

REASONS FOR REFUSING WRIT OF CERTIORARI

A. The exclusion provisions of Title 33

U.S.C. 905 of the L & H W Act bar third

party claims against an employer.

In constructing an argument in opposition to the

application for writs of certiorari, the writer begins

with the exclusionary provisions of the L & H W Act.

Title 33 Section 905 contained (prior to the 1972

amendment) the following pertinent language.

“The liability of an employer prescribed in

Section 904 of this Title shall be exclusive

and in place of all other liability of such

employer to the employee, his legal repre-

sentative, husband or wife, parents, de-

pendents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise

4

entitled to recover damages from such

employer at law or in admiralty on account of

such injury or death .. .” (Due to the time at

which this death occurred, the 1972 amend-

ments are not applicable to this case.

However, this particular provision was not

amended or changed by the 1972 Legisla-

tion.)

The language ‘and anyone otherwise entitled to re-

cover damages from such employer at law or in

admiralty on account of such injury or death” is

without doubt sufficient to cover claims brought by

third party tort feasors such as Bettis which arise out

of the death or injury of the employee. The immunity

provided for in Title 33 U.S.C. Section 905, cannot be

limited to actions brought by employees, their legal

representatives, relatives, dependents and survivors,

etc., without rendering the clause just quoted

purposeless. To read the statute so narrowly would

impute to Congress an intent to write into it a

meaningless provision which would operate as mere

surplusage. It is a fundamental principle of statutory

construction that all provisions of a statute are pre-

sumed to have a purpose and when the language of a

statute is clear and unambiguous its provisions

should be given effect. It is respectfully submitted that

the exclusionary provisions of the L & H W Act con-

strued together clearly mean what their language

unambiguously and unequivocally suggests — that

an employer is to be wrapped with complete immunity

from any and all actions arising out of or in any

manner connected with the death of his employee,

whether they be instituted by the employee, his

RAE ise Begin RCT Te TR REN ae ee

5

representatives, relatives, survivors, etc., or by third-

party claimants seeking indemnification or contribu-

tion in tort.

The obvious intent of the L & H W Act is to provide

the injured employee (or his survivors in case of

death) with a remedy against hisemployer regardless

of where the fault for his injuries lies. In return for

giving up the right to resist recovery by its employee

for job-related injuries, the employer is vested with

immunity from all actions brought by the employee.

his survivor, dependents, legal representatives. etc.,

or by third parties which arise out of or are related to

the job injury. See, Cooper Stevedoring Company v.

Fritz Kopke, Inc., et al, 94 S. Ct. 2474 (1974); see. also,

Nations v. W. W. Morris and American Motorists

Insurance Company, 483 F. 2d 577 (1973), cert. den. To

permit complete or partial reimbursement of third

party tort feasors at the expense of employers who are

also bound to make compensation payments to their

injured employees would subvert the exclusiveness of

remedy provisions of the L& HW Act. Such an

employer would be in the untenable position of having

to pay not only the compensation claims of his

employee, but the claims for reimbursement by third

party tort feasors. The aims of the act designed and im-

plemented to limit the liability of the employer for

work-related injuries sustained by his employees to

the payment of compensation benefits would be in-

directly circumvented by third-party claimants seek-

ing tort indemnification or contribution.

In passing the L & H W Act, Congress recognized

the tremendous burden of employers who in the course

of their large scale operations are often subjected to

TSE TN ee

6

claims for job-related injuries brought by employees.

Accordingly, Congress enacted the exclusionary

provisions referred to in order to lighten this burden.

It is respectfully submitted that to permit recovery on

the part of third party plaintiffs herein against the

employer would thwart the intent of Congress by

allowing circumvention of the exclusionary

provisions of the L & H W Act which provisions are

grounded on considerations of sound policy.

B. Jurisprudence.

The jurisprudence is well-settled that inasmuch as

the L & H W Act immunizes employers from any tort

liability in connection with the injuries or deaths of

their employees then ipso facto employers cannot be

held liable to third party claimants on the basis of any

negligence on their part which may have contributed

to the death of the employee. See, Loffland Brothers

Company v. Roberts, 386 F. 2d 540; Ocean Drilling &

Exploration Company v. Berry Brothers Oilfield

Service, 377 F. 2d 511 (ODECO).

In fact the Fifth Circuit in deciding the instant case

against third party claimants relied expressly upon

the ODECO case. In ODECO, employees of Berry

Brothers injured while performing repairs on an off-

shore drilling platform owned by ODECO, filed

actions in tort against ODECO alleging the latter's

failure to furnish a safe place to work as causative of

their injuries. At the same time the injured employees

received L & H W compensation benefits from Berry

Brothers to which they were entitled. ODECO third

partied Berry Brothers, the employer of the injured

employees. The Fifth Circuit, affirmed the trial court's

7

dismissal of the third party complaints. The court

there said,

“It is thus apparent that the Act's exclusive lia-

bility provision effectively abrogates any

independent tort liability of the employer to

its employees, thereby eliminating any basis

which may have existed for indemnification

on a tort theory. Thus while the employer may

continue, even in spite of the exclusive lia-

bility provision of the act, to remain liable for

indemnity on the basis of an express or im-

plied contractual obligation, in the absence of

such obligation, as here, there simply exists

no underlying tort liability upon which to base

a Claim for indemnity against the employer.”

(Citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 9th

Cir., (1964), 355 F. 2d 379, 402-404, cert. den.:

Halliburton Company v. Norton Drilling

Company, 302 F.2d 431 at 434; Brown v.

American-Hawaiian S. S. Company, 3rd Cir.

(1954), 211 F. 2d 1618; American Mutual Lia-

bility Insurance Company v. Matthews, 2nd

Cir. (1951), 18 F. 2d 322, 323-336). 377 F. 2d at

514-515.

The Fifth Circuit in the instant case was also im-

pressed with a more recent statement of the foregoing

rule announced in ODECO set forth in Aetna Casualty

& Surety Company v. Service Contracting, Inc., 5th

Cir. (1973), 490 F. 2d 299. There the Court said that

having paid workmen’s compensation to the

employee in accordance with the exclusive liability

provisions of the L & H W Act, Service Contracting

ao SERENE HG ‘

was not subject to any independent tort liability to its

employees. Without this underlying tort liability,

Service Contracting could not have been liable for in-

demnification in the absence of a written contract.

(Citing ODECO, and General Electric Company v.

Cuban American Nickel Company, 396 F. 2d 89, 5th

Cir. (1968) and Halliburton supra.

The breadth of the immunity afforded employers by

the exclusionary provisions of the L & H W Act was

recently recognized by the Fifth Circuit in Nations v.

W. W. Morris and American Motorists Insurance

Company, supra. In that case the plaintiff alleged that

he was entitled to a remedy in tort against his co-

employee whose negligence wes alleged to have

caused him injury while he was working on an oil

drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico. Although the

case involved a claim by one employee against

another, the court made the following pronounce-

ment which is applicable to the instant case.

“Sections 905 A [Section 905 A is the same as

Section 905 before the 1972 amendments. The

exclusive remedy provisions before and after

the amendments to the act are the same] and

933 (I) of the L & H completely obliterates the

rights of common, civil or maritime law

against employer and fellow employee.

Congress in its unlimited power has deter-

mined that the relationship gives rise only to

compensation liabilities. The nature of the

obligation is that there is no — the word is no

— obligation.”

3

“Here there is no gap — not even a tiny one.

L&H is complete and self-sufficient. It

affords specific rights by imposing specific

responsibilities. In return for sometimes

awesome obligations it extends to the

employer and fellow employees an absolute

civil immunity.” (Emphasis added.)

Although it is impossible to prove a negative, name-

ly that no law exists to support any such claim for

indemnity upon the employer who is otherwise

clothed by the immunity provisions of the L& H W

Act, still we do have some additional guides in the

jurisprudence of a positive nature in the Fifth Circuit

decision of General Electric Company v. Cuban-

American Nickel Company, 396 F. 2d 89 (C.A. 5, 1968).

In that case, one Salvadore Locicero, an employee of

GE, sued the Cuban-American Nickel Company for

personal injuries arising out of an industrial accident

at the company’s metal recovery plant in Port Nickel,

Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. Locicero, at the time

of the accident, was working as an electrician for GE

and a member of its repair crew. He was dispatched to

the switching station at Port Nickel to repair certain

equipment GE had warranted. Cuban-American was

in possession and control of the plant and, of course,

the switching station, and had an electrical engineer

and several electricians in its employ. On the day in

question the repair party was admitted to the

premises at Port Nickel and escorted to the switching

station by the Cuban-American employee charged

with responsibility for the station. The employee un-

Pa a =

10

locked the gate to the fence surrounding the station

and unlocked the door to the building containing the

electrical equipment to be repaired, gave the repair

party a diagram of the wiring of the station, and as-

sured the repair party that it could safely work on the

equipment because the station had been de-energized.

Unfortunately for Mr. Locicero, it was not. He

thereupon brought a negligence action against

Cuban-American and Cuban-American in turn third-

partied GE, the manufacturer of the equipment andthe

direct employer of Mr. Locicero. Note here that Cuban-

American was the vendee of GE with all of the usual

warranties of implied fitness of the product flowing

from GE to Cuban-American. The Court found that the

plaintiff Locicero was not negligent, that Cuban-

American was negligent but that its negligence was

passive while GE’s negligence was active so that

accordingly the District Court entered judgment for

complete indemnity in favor of the vendee, Cuban-

American against the manufacturer and vendor, GE.

GE appealed contending that the exclusive remedy

provision of the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation

Act completely precluded either indemnity in tort or

indemnity based on the breach of an implied contrac-

tual obligation. In an extensive and lengthy opinion

reviewing not only the Louisiana authorities inter-

preting the immunity provision of the Louisiana

Workmen's Compensation Act, but also maritime

authorities on the efficacy of the immunity afforded by

the L& HW Act to employers offshore (such as

ODECO and Loffland Brothers cases cited supra), the

Fifth Circuit concluded abso’utely and unequivocal-

ly that the Lower Court was w1 ong in granting indem-

nity in favor of Cuban-American and against GE in

NER ONIN eSMDEHLORANcaTeRRET INTE N onrtm 9 rn rormery ene?

11

spite of the fact that Cuban-American was GE's

vendee for whom GE was performing services under

contract at the time Locicero, GE's employee, was in-

jured.

To this point, the writer has relied exclusively on

Circuit Court of Appeals decisions to buttress the

argument that the application should be denied. It is

suggested, however, that there is a line of cases deal-

ing with the availability of the remedy of contribution

in non-collision maritime cases decided by this

Honorable Court which supports the contentions of

appellee herein. These cases imply that the exclusion

provisions of the L & H W Act are broad enough to

eliminate the third party claims filed herein.

In Halycon Lines v. Haenn Ship Sealing & Refitting

Corporation, 342 U.S. 282, 72 S. Ct. 277 (1952) a ship

repairman employed by Haenn sued Halycon for in-

juries incurred while he was repairing Halycon’s

ship, alleging negligence and unseaworthiness.

Because the plaintiff was eligible for compensation

benefits under the L& HW Act, he had no action

against his employer, Haenn. However, Halycon

brought a third party action against Haenn, the

employer, alleging that it was entitled to contribu-

tion, alleging in effect that the employer was along

with it a joint tort feasor. As of 1952 the rule allowing

contribution among joint tort feasors in collision

maritime cases had not been extended tonon-collision

maritime cases. This Honorable Court, with Justice

Black speaking for the majority, refrained from allow-

ing contribution, citing numerous factors. The opin-

ion did indicate that the majority was influenced by

12

the fact that Congress had “made fault unimportant in

determining the employer's responsibility to his

employee” and ‘made further inroads on traditional]

court law by abolition of the defenses of contributory

negligence and assumption of risk and by creation ofa

Statutory schedule of compensation.” 72 S. Ct. 277 at

280.

In a per curiam opinion rendered in Atlantic Coast

Line Railroad Company v. Erie Lackawanna Rail-

road Company, 92S. Ct. 1550 (1 972), thiscourtheldina

non-collision admiralty case that the District Court

had properly dismissed a third party tort feasor’s

claim for contribution against an injured brakeman’s

employer. In so holding this Honorable Court relied

upon its decision in Halycon.

In Cooper Stevedoring Company, Inc. v. Fritz

Kopke, Inc., et al, 1974 AMC 537, this Honorable Court

granted writs for the purpose of extinguishing the

confusion then existing as to whether there was con-

tribution in non-collision admiralty cases and in do-

ing so made some statements which are particularly

applicable to the case sub judice.

In that case, the plaintiff, a longshoreman employed

by Mid-Gulf Stevedores, was injured while loading

Cargo in a vessel owned and operated by Fritz Kopke

under a time charter to Alcoa Steamship Company.

The ship had been initially loaded with crates of cargo

by employees of another Stevedore, Cooper Stevedor-

ing Company, in Mobile, Alabama. The ship sailed to

Houston where the plaintiff was injured when load-

ing cargo on top ofthe crates. The plaintiff sued Kopke

13

and Alcoa (the vessel) to recover damages for his in-

juries. The vessel third partied Cooper seeking con-

tribution. The trial court, after finding that the vessel

was unseaworthy and that Cooper's employees had

negligently stowed the crates, divided the damages

between them and in effect granted the vessel's claim

for contribution.

Cooper appealed, alleging that the District Court

had erred in permitting contribution in a non-collision

maritime case. The Fifth Circuit rejected the latter

argument holding that the apparent prohibition

against contribution in non-collision maritime cases

announced in Halycon and Atlantic Coast Line, ap-

plied only where the joint tort feasor against whom

contribution is sought is immune from tort liability by

statute. The Fifth Circuit cited Horton & Horton, Inc. v.

T/S J. E. Dyer, 428 F. 2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. den.,

400 U.S. 993, 91 S. Ct. 461, (1971); Watz v. Zapata Off-

shore Company, 431 F. 2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970); In Re Sea-

board Shipping, 449 F. 2d 132 (2d Cir. 1971); cert. den.,

406 U.S. 949, 92 S. Ct. 2039, (1972) ). The court added.

“Sessions [the injured employee], in addition

to suing the vessel, could have proceeded

directly against Cooper Stevedoring [third

party defendant] as Cooper was not his

employer, and therefore, not shielded by the

limited liability of the Longshoremen's and

Harbor Workers’ Act." 479 F. 2d 1041 at 1042.

The obvious inference from this latter statement is

that the L & H W Act confers statutory immunity on

employers against claims for contribution and indem-

14

nification (indemnification being “only an extreme

form of contribution” as recognized by the admission

of counsel for Bettis and its insurer, in his rebutta]

brief filed with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,

page 1.).

On certiorari this Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit. In

permitting contribution against Cooper Stevedoring

Company this Court distinguished the Halycon and

Atlantic cases on the ground that they involved third

party actions against employers who were immune

from direct action by their employees under the

L & H W Act. With reference to the Halycon case in

particular, the court said,

“The Court [in Halycon]. . took cognizance of

the apparent trade-off in the Act between the

employer's limitation of liability and the

abrogation, in favor of the employee, of

common-law doctrines of contributory

negligence and assumption of risk. (Citations

omitted) Confronted with the possibility that

any workable rule of contribution might be

inconsistent with the balance Struck by Con-

gress in the Harbor Workers’ Act between the

interests of carriers, employers, employees

and their respective insurers, we refrained

from allowing contribution in the circum-

stances of that case.”

“These factors underlying our decision in

Halycon still have much force. Indeed. the

1972 amendments to the Harbor Workers’ Act

re-emphasized Congress’ determination that

SRLS Bg BS ng es eo ee

15

as between an employer and its injured

employee, the right to compensation under the

Act should be the employee's exclusive

remedy. But whatever weight these factors

were properly accorded in the factual circum-

stances presented in Halycon, they have no

application here. Unlike the injured worker in

Halycon, Sessions was not an employee of

Cooper and could have proceeded against the

vessel or Cooper or both of them to recover full

damages for his injury. Had Sessions done so,

either or both of the defendants could have

been held responsible for all or part of the

damages. Since Sessions could have elected to

make Cooper bear its share of the damages

caused by its negligence, we see no reason

why the Vessel should not be accorded the

same right. On the facts of this case. then, no

countervailing considerations detract from

the well-established maritime rule allowing

contribution between joint tort feasors.” 94

S. Ct. 2174 at 2178. (Emphasis added)

Without belaboring the point it is sufficient to con-

clude that this Honorable Court recognized in Cooper

Stevedoring that the legislation, the jurisprudence

and “countervailing” considerations of sound policy

indicate that the exclusive remedy provisions of the

L & H W Act clearly immunize employers from all ac-

tions in tort stemming from job related in juries, (fatal

or non-fatal) sustained by their employees, regardless

of whether the actions are instituted directly against

the employer by the employee or whether they are pur-

sued indirectly by third party claimants such as

—— ee od

16

appellants. It is respectfully submitted that a denial of

appellants’ application for writs of certiorari is dic-

tated.

REBUTTAL

In his petition for a writ of certiorari, counsel for

appellants cites what he considers to be “important”

reasons for the granting of the writ.

The appellants’ argument is by analogy. They com-

pare the “exclusivity provisions” of the L & H W Act

to similar almost identical provisions contained in the

Federal Employees Compensation Act (5 U.S.C. Sec.

8116 (C) (FECA), while ignoring the disanalogous

character of the employment of tax-paying citizens in

government service as opposed tothe private sectorof -

the economy. Appellants urge that inasmuch as the

exclusivity provisions of each act have for all prac-

tical purposes the same verbiage and that the purpose

of both federal compensation acts is the same — to

“give speedy and certain relief to injured workmen or

their dependents in the case of death —” that the two

respective provisions should be accorded identical

constructions or interpretations. Additionally they

cite the conflict in authority among the federal cir-

Cuits with regard to whether the United States Govern-

ment (the employer under the FECA) can be subjected

to third party claims for indemnification despite the

existence of the provision of that Act barring direct ac-

tions by its employees. Appellants apparently

assume that by resolving this conflict among the cir-

cuits concerning the breadth of the exclusive remedy

provisions of the FECA in favor of recovery by tort

Pega ae OPN REI PR FN Rt Fg NS

17

feasors of indemnity or contribution in tort from the

federal] fisc, this Honorable Court can at the same time

work a “reasonable” construction of the exclusivity

provisions of the L& HW Act which would allow

recovery on the third party demands against appellee.

Thus it is apparently the contention of the

appellants that the court should adopt an interpreta-

tion similar to that given by some courts to the FECA.

which is however, a different statute passed under a

different act with different purposes. Although both

acts are in essence federal compensation acts, the

L & H W Act covers private employers in private in-

dustry while the FECA applies solely to the United

States Government as employer. Further, it is sub-

mitted that the cases principally relied upon by the

appellants in interpreting the FECA exclusivity

provisions can be readily distinguished.

Specifically, Bettis, the manufacturer and its in-

surer, rely upon the Drake and Weyerhaeuser cases

(amply briefed and cited in appellants’ application for

writs), as the principal cases which indicate that ac-

tions for indemnification in tort are not barred by the

exclusivity provisions of the FECA. However. aclose

analysis of these two cases will reveal. we submit. that

actually there is no conflict between these two

decisions interpreting the exclusive remedy provi-

sion under the FECA and the decisions already noted

interpreting the exclusive remedy provision of the

L&HW Act, for, factually, there is no similarity

between the indemnitor and indemnitee in those cases

with the relationship between Bettis and Wheatley in

this case. What distinguishes Drake and

Weyerhaeuser from this case is that there is no

independent legal relationship between Bettis and

Wheatley the breach of which would serve to form an

18

independent cause of action between the two whereas

in both the Drake and Weyerhaeuser cases there was

such an independent relationship. This was noted in

the case of Panico v. Whiting Milk Company, et al v.

United States, 335 F. Supp. 315 (U.S. D.C., Mass. 1971)

which it is submitted represents a correct interpreta-

tion and application of the Drake and Weyerhaeuser

cases.

Panico involved an action for injuries received by

the driver of one mail truck in an accident in

Massachusetts involving two mail trucks and a milk

truck owned by the defendant milk company and op-

erated by the defendant driver who in turn filed a third

party complaint against the United States as the

employer of the driver of the other mail truck for tort

indemnity and contribution. The District Court held

that the United States, by paying compensation bene-

fits to the original plaintiff, the mail truck driver who

was injured by the joint actions of the milk truck

driver and the other mail truck driver, was clothed

with immunity under 5 U.S.C.A. Section 8116 (C), the

exclusive remedy provision of the FECA Act. Hence

the third party action against the United States was

dismissed. In so holding, the Court stated:

“There are two grounds for the court's order of

dismissal of the third-party action. The firstis

that allowance of the third-party claim would

avoid the exclusiveness of plaintiff Panico’s

remedy under 7 (b) of the Federal Employees

Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. 8116 (c). This isa

question as to which there has been aconflict

of authority among the Courts of Appeals for

various circuits. See, e.g., United Air Lines,

Inc. v. Wiener, 9 Cir., 1964, 335 F. 2d 379, 402-

19

404. and Wallenius Bremen G. m.b.H. v. Unit-

ed States, 4 Cir., 1969, 409 F. 2d 994, Murray v.

United States, 1968, 132 U.S.App. D.C. 91, 405

F. 2d 1361. There appears to be little dispute

that the government is not liable for contribu-

tion because payment of compensation

benefits to a federal employee extinguishes

the government’s liability to him; and accord-

ingly the motion to dismiss is allowed without

further discussion as to counts 2 and 4. The

division of authority relates to the third-party

plaintiffs’ claims under counts 1 and 3 for in-

demnity. We believe that the decisions of the

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Unit-

ed Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, Supra, and Wien

Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 9 Cir.,

1967, 375 F. 2d 736, state the better rule.

The Supreme Court decisions on which the

third-party plaintiffs rely, Weyerhaeuser S.S.

Co. v. United States, 1963, 372 U.S. 597, 83S. Ct.

926, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1, and Treadwell Const. Co. v.

United States, 1963, 372 U.S. 772, 83 S. Ct. 1102,

10 L. Ed. 2d 136, reversing Drake v. Treadwel]

Const. Co., 3rd Cir., 1962, 299 F. 2d 789, are dis-

tinguishable. Both cases involved tort feasors

who were related to each other independently

of the accident causing personal injuries, in

the Weyerhauser case by the historic admiral-

ty rule of divided damages and in the

Treadwell case by the contract between the

company and the United States for the

manufacture of a steel expansion tank.”

The Fifth Circuit has recognized that the distinction

made by the Court in Panico is a valid one and that its

20

interpretation of the significance of the Weyerhaeuser

case is correct. The correctness of the distinction made

in Panico was recognized in Empire Seafoods, Inc. v.

Anderson, 398 F. 2d 204 (1968), a case involving the

question of divided damages between a ship owner

who struck a bridge and the contractor building the

bridge. The contractor pointed to the exclusive

remedy provision provided in the Florida Workmen's

Compensation Act and the exclusive remedy provi-

sion provided for in the L & H W Act, Section 905(a)

and took the position that it could not be burdened with

a liability for injuries sustained by its employees in

addition to the liability imposed upon it by the Com-

pensation Act by using the divided damage rule in-

asmuch as to do so would be to permit something to be

done indirectly which could not be done directly,

citing any number of longshoremen and tortfeasor

cases where the employer escaped liability to a third

party for injuries to an employee by virtue of the ex-

clusive remedy provision where the party claiming

either contribution or indemnity in tort did not have

the benefit of a divided damages rule. In disposing of

this contention the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

stated that this was a case which required the applica-

tion of a divided damage rule inasmuch as it was a

collision between a vessel and a bridge under con-

struction, citing the Weyerhaeuser case. It then stated:

“The longshoremen and joint tortfeasor

cases relied upon by Cleary are not helpful

because the legal relationships of the parties

in those cases and the relationship in the case

sub judice, involving a maritime collision

between a vessel and a bridge, are not com-

parable and cannot be analogized.”

- ie fn) ee p> er: 2° sbhte us

1 kr a eee IRA BE on = Besta. +

21

By the same token, if longshoremen and joint

tortfeasor cases and cases for indemnity in tortcannot

be analogized to a maritime collision case in which

the divided damages rule is applicable, then logically

maritime collision cases are not analogous and com-

parable to platform accident cases on the outer con-

tinental shelf involving the application of Louisiana

surrogate law.

It is submitted that such decisions as United Air

Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 379 (9 C.C.A., 1964);

Wien Alaska Air Lines, Inc. v. U.S., 375 F. 2d 736 (9

C.C.A., 1967) and Newport Airpack, Inc. v. U.S., 419

F. 2d 342 (1 C.C.A., 1969) represent a true and correct

interpretation of the significance of the Weyerhaeuser

and Drake decisions and their significance regarding

the exclusive remedy provision in the FECA Act.

These cases clearly demonstrate that those few cases

so heavily relied upon by Bettis herein resulted from

an erroneous interpretation of the meaning of the

Weyerhaeuser and Drake cases, an interpretation at

variance with the Fifth Circuit's understanding and

interpretation of the effect of the Weyerhaeuser and

Drake cases, as exemplified by its comments on that

jurisprudence in the Empire Seafoods case just dis-

cussed. For example, United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener,

cited supra, involved 31 cases arising out of a mid-air

collision between a commercial airliner and a United

States Air Force jet fighter. The crew of the airliner

was found to be negligent as well as the pilot of the jet

fighter. The question then became whether the airline

was entitled to indemnity from the United States with

regard to the deaths of government employees aboard

the airliner at the time of the mid-air collision. The

District Court denied either contribution or tort in-

OTE Ba

22

demnity because of the exclusive remedy provision of

the FECA Act which clothed the United States with im-

munity from tort liability with respect to these deceas-

ed employees or their heirs. The airline appealed the

denial of its claim for tort indemnity or contribution

against the United States with respect to the nine

government employee cases, contending that the

Weyerhaeuser case demanded a different decision, one

which would permit the airline to obtain tort in-

demnity from the United States in spite of the ex-

clusive remedy provision of the FECA Act. In over-

ruling that contention and affirming the District

Court's action, the Court of Appeal, Ninth Circuit,

made a penetrating analysis of Weyerhaeuser and its

effect and compared and contrasted the decisions un-

der the L & H W Act. It stated:

“The Supreme Court in Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co.

v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 83 S. Ct. 926, 20

L.Ed.2d 1 (1963), held that the express

provisions of the statute do not qualify the his-

toric admiralty rule of divided damages in

mutual fault collision. The admiralty rule of

divided damages is to be distinguished from

the rule of indemnity urged upon us by United

since under admiralty law there arises from a

collision involving mutual fault the right to

apportionment of all damages resulting there-

from, including personal injuries, cargo dam-

age, and damage to the ships. The divided

damage rule is based upon the duty which

each shipowner owes the other to navigate

safely irrespective of any duty to the person

injured. On the other hand neither contribu-

tion nor indemnity may be awarded without

the support of liability on the part of the in-

23

demnitor to the person injured. The courts

have consistently held that in the absence of

an express or implied contract of indemnity or

in the absence of the indemnitor'’s liability to

the injured party, there can be no recovery for

indemnity. Christie v. Powder Power Tool

Corp., 124 F. Supp. 693 (D.D.C. 1954); Terminal

R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. United States, 182 F. 2d

149 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. den. 340, 825, 71S. Ct.

60, 95 L. Ed. 606; Slattery v. Marra Bros., supra;

Lo Bue v. United States, 188 F. 2d 800 (2d Cir.

1951); Drumgoole v. Virginia Electric & Power

Co., 170 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Va. 1959).

As pointed out in the Weyerhaeuser opinion

372 U.S. 602, 83S. Ct. 926, the exclusive liabili-

ty provision of the Federal Employees’ Com-

pensation Act is indistinguishable from Sec-

tion 5 of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor

Worker's Act, 33 U.S.C. 905. In construing this

statute the courts have held that an employer

may be liable for indemnity to another on the

basis of an express or implied contract of in-

demnity but that in the absence of a contrac-

tual duty, the exclusive liability provision

removed the underlying liability necessary

for indemnity. American Mutual Liability In-

surance Co. v. Matthews, 182 F. 2d 322 (2nd Cir.

1951); Lo Bue v. United States, supra; Crawford

v. Pope & Talbot, 206 F. 2d 784 (3rd Cir. 1953):

Brown v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 211

F. 2d 16 (3rd Cir. 1954). The courts said in

Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, supra, 206 F. 2d at

792:

“Authority is lacking ‘for saying that

differences in the degrees of fault (active or

24

passive negligence) between two

tortfeasors will without more strip one of

them, if he is an employer. of the protection

of a compensation act; and we are ata loss to

see any tenable principle which can support

such a result.’ Slattery v. Marra Bros., 2Cir.,

1951, 186 F. 2d 134, 139.”

Appellants contend on Page ’7 of their petition that in

Ryan Stevedoring Company v. Pan-Atlantic S. S. Cor-

poration, 350 U.S. 124, 76 Supreme Court 232, 1956,

“[T]his Court held that were the injuries to the

longshore-employee occurred through the fault of the

employer, the third party ship owner has a right to

receive full reimbursement from the stevedoring

employer. regardless of the existence of the “ex-

clusive liability” provision of the L& HW Act.”

Appellants took several statements from the text of

the Ryan opinion, setting them forth in support of

their averment that the exclusive remedy provisions

of the L & H W Act apply only to the “employee, and

those claiming under or through him.” They neglect-

ed, however, to quote the fullowing statements from

the opinion rendered therein. Thus it was also said by

this court:

“The Act[L & H W Act] nowhere expressly ex-

cludes or limits a shipowner’s right, as a third

person, to insure itself against such a lia-

bility either by a bond of indemnity, or the con-

tractors own agreement to save the ship-

owner harmless. Petitioner's agreement in the

instant case amounts to the latter, for, as will

be shown, it is a contractual undertaking to

25

stow the cargo “with reasonable safety” and

thus to save the shipowner harmless from

petitioners’ failure to do so.

“In the face of a formal bond of indemnity this

statute clearly does not cut off a shipowner's

right to recover from a bonding company the

reimbursement that the indemnitor, for good

consideration, has expressly contracted to

pay. Such a liability springs from an indepen-

dent contractual right. Itis not an actionbyor .

on behalf of the employee and it is not one to

recover damages, ‘‘on account of” an

employee's “injury or death”. Itisasimple ac-

tion to recover under a voluntary and self-

sufficient contract, a sum measured by

foreseeable damages occasioned to the

shipowner by the injury or death of a

longshoreman on a ship.

‘While the Compensation Act protects a

Stevedoring Contractor from actions brought

against it by its employees on account of a

contractor's tortious conduct causing injury

to the employee, the contractor has no logical

ground for relief from the full consequences of

its independent contractual obligation, volun-

tarily assumed to the shipowner, to load the

cargo properly.

“The shipowner’s action here is not founded

upon a tort or upon any duty which the

Stevedoring Contracting was to its employee.

The third party complaint is groumded upon

ALT Ty SMR

26

the contractors breach of its purely consen-

sual obligation owing to the shipowner to

stow the cargo in a reasonably safe manner.

Accordingly the shipowner’s action for in-

demnity on that basis is not barred by the

Compensation Act.”

Thus. it is clear that the basis for the Court's deci-

sion in Ryan is that there was an independent contrac-

tual undertaking running from the contractor to the

shipowner, which provided the basis for the ship-

owner's action by indemnity against the contractor.

The implication from this case is that in the absence of

such a contractual or consensual undertaking, the

shipowner’s claim for indemnity against the

contractor-employer would have been barred by vir-

tue of the provisions of the L & H W Act. The Ryan

case, in fact, stands for the proposition that in order for

there to be a right of indemnity or contribution in favor

of the third parties, there must be an independent con-

tractual right exercised against the employer in such

cases. In the instant case, there is no such contractual

relationship between Bettis, the manufacturer of the

allegedly faulty actuator, and Wheatley, the

assembler of the launch system which incorporated

the actuator. There is no warranty or contractual

undertaking running from Wheatley to Bettis. If any-

thing there is an implied contractual warranty of fit-

ness of the actuator running from Bettis, which manu-

factured the actuator which was installed in the

Wheatley Launch System, in favor of Wheatley, its

vendee!

Peak UA a sh Vi i ie Le oy oe ae

27

CONCLUSION

As this court recognized just last year in the Cooper

Stevedoring case, Congress in 1972 re-emphasized its

determination to further limit the employer's liability

to third parties while at the same time increasing his

already substantial burdens and obligations for

benefits to his employees under the L & H W Act. It is

most respectfully urged and contended that to grant

the relief petitioned for herein by Bettis Corporation

and its insurer would only serve to thwart the

acknowledged policy of the Congress of the United

States in this respect.

Respectfully submitted,

Timothy J. McNamara,

DAVIDSON, MEAUX,

ONEBANE & DONOHOE

P. O. Drawer 3507

Lafayette, Louisiana 70501

TIMOTHY J. MCNAMARA

Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing brief has been

served upon opposing counsel of record by placing the

same properly addressed in the United States Mail

with adequate postage affixed thereto this ____ day of

December, 1975.

TIMOTHY J. MCNAMARA

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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