Appendix — International Engineering Co. v. Rumsfeld
Supreme Court brief1976
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
ALL NE LIT PIL TIALLY EE NI NY IT UE OS NERS SELL AI EW REET TT RO
EUR Ne stone C6 CIE RII SI Be ES v a oy Bh Ba GPE DAE AEA LODE FOLD INE oe ee
4
A-1
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT,
7 ND TOP Pee ae ge
INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING Company, DIVISION OF
A-T-O, Inc.
Vv.
RES OLIE SANA BES TAEPEL DE OTH 1
Exuior L. Ricuarpson, Secretary of Defense, et al.,
Appellants.
No. 74-1192.
Argued Feb. 24, 1975.
Decided May 2, 1975.
Before Tamm and Leventruat, Circuit Judges, and
Muuer,* Judge, United States Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals.
Tama, Circuit Judge:
Appellant challenges the propriety of the district court’s
issuance of a preliminary injunction against the United
States enjoining it from distributing certain test reports
submitted pursuant to a government contract because of
the likelihood that the Air Force erroneously failed to ree-
ognize appellee International Engineering Company’s
(IEC) proprietary interest in certain data contained in the
reports. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the in-
junction was improper as the district court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction and order the injunction vacated and
the case dismissed.
I
In February, 1968, appellee TEC submitted to the United
States Air Force an unsolicited proposal concerning its
privately developed long-range navigation (LORAN C/D)
* Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 293(a).
RRA os REP ELLE RR =
SALTER ARE AE OVER ENS 98 PE He
EAN AAPA RA SALAS LE AE YALE LORE IS DOT AIAN
A-2
bomb/missile guidance systera. On July 7, 1969, the parties
contracted for construction of a bread-board model of the
LORAN C/D system (referred to by the parties as ‘‘ Unit
A’’), performance of certain laboratory and helicopter
flight tests, and delivery to the Air Force of a final report
on the tests. Specifically incorporated by reference as con-
tract clauses were forty-four contract provisions set forth
in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR),
32 C.F.R. pts. 1-30 (1974), including the ‘‘Rights in Tech-
nical Data’’ Clause (ASPR 7-104.9(a)) and the standard
‘‘disputes clause’? (ASPR 7-103.12), establishing mecha-
nisms for resolving contract disputes.
By the spring of 1970, IEC had developed a more com-
pact LORAN C/D system. Thereafter, on October 27, 1970,
the parties modified the contract to test the system with
the new developments. IEC again agreed to construct a
breadboard model of the new subsystem (referred to by the
parties as ‘‘Unit B’’ and to submit test reports.
In late March, 1971, the Air Force directed IEC to pro-
vide further information concerning the components and
processes to help it evaluate the test results. IEC submitted
the data, in an interim report, 71-05, and in its contractu-
ally-mandated Final Report 70-06-4. Both reports were
marked with notice of ‘‘limited rights,’’ restricting the Air
Force’s distribution rights to the Unit B data.
By letter of April 19, 1971, the Air Force contracting
officer questioned the propriety of the restrictive legend
(limited rights) on Final Report 70-06-4, referred appellee
to the ‘‘Rights in Technical Data’’ clause of the contract,
and requested a prompt response to ‘‘why the Government
does not have the right to remove the legends in question.”’
A. 46. IEC responded on June 15, 1971 that Unit B had
been ‘‘developed and built at contractor expense, and [had]
been made available for this effort on a no charge loan
basis.’?’ IEC maintained that its contractual obligation to
submit a final report ‘‘could have been met without inclu-
sion of proprietary information’’ and the ‘‘[i]f the Air
ee as vy oe er ee ee ee ea Pe NI BN 8 Pie lth eh DAP OMA RINE EWEN SE” 0 HEE TRC A
A-3
Force requires unlimited rights’’ in the report, IEC would
revise the report by deleting the data. A. 48-49.
On June 30, 1971, the parties again negotiated a contract
modification which required IEC to conduct further tests
and submit test reports; on July 7th, the Air Force ac-
cepted Report 70-06-4.' On October 15, 1971, appellee sub-
mitted Interim Report 71-07 and then on December 10,
1971, Report 71-09 as the concluding report under its con- ;
tractual obligations; both reports contained limited rights ;
notices covering the same information submitted in Report ’
70-06-4. :
By letter on December 28, 1971, the contracting officer, 4
again referring to the ‘‘Rights in Data’’ clause, notified
IEC that Report 71-09, ‘‘even if found to be technically e
correct’’, would not be accepted until appellee either re- ;
moved or substantiated all proprietary markings. A. 50.
Expressing surprise that the issue had resurfaced, IEC
on January 5, 1972, reviewed the history of the parties’
course of dealing, asserted that Report 70-06-4 had been
accepted with proprietary restrictions, offered to delete
11EC maintains that the acceptance of the report created a rea-
sonable expectation that ‘‘the rights in data question had been
resolved in [I[EC’s] favor and that the Air Force would not object
to the attachment of the ‘limited rights’ legend on data in subse-
suent reports describing IEC private-developed processes and com-
ponents.’’ Appellee’s Br. at 19. See also IEC’s letter of Jan. 5, 1972,
A. 51. However, Air Force officials involved later indicated: ‘‘it
was decided that the contention over the proprietary markings was
a separate entity from the technical acceptance. . . .”’ Harshfield
Dep. Ex. 1. That latter view is clearly correct; part of the Rights
in Technical Data clause incorporated into the contract authorizes
the Government to correct or cancel any marking “‘ [n] otwithstand-
ing any provision of this contract concerning . . . acceptance.”’
ASPR 7-104, 9(a)(d). Although there is no record evidence of any
waiver or modification of that clause, the district court held that
the Government was estopped. International Engineering Co. v.
Richardson, 367 F.Supp. 640, 656 n.12 (D.D.C. 1973). We do not
reach the correctness of this holding.
bacco 3
SS CRA emis aeRO Zag PRA CEN ER IE SOL LITT BIT EINE IAI ee |
. _ - — anvets =
PANE Piven 4 LE Atlan Spe hen he MEAS) I AIT 0 RTE
r DAP ATA TAPS PII ANAM nly ee NIRS SCA Aba ORT x = |
— Retr Lea ame
A-4
the data, and reiterated its belief that the restrictions were
appropriate. A. 51-52.
The next official exchange occurred on June 5, 1972, when
the Air Force again informed IEC that it had failed to
substantiate its limited rights notices and that the Air
Force intended to strike them and use the data with un-
limited rights. A.53-54. On June 26, 1972, representatives
of both parties participated in a two-hour meeting on the
matter; IEC was asked to provide further detail and writ-
ten documentation so that its claim could be forwarded to
higher headquarters. The Air Force agreed to treat the
data with limited rights during the pendency of the dis-
pute. Soon thereafter final payment was made on the con-
tract.
Not having received any additional documentation by
October, 1972, the contracting officer again notified IEC of
the Air Force’s intention to utilize the data with unlimited
rights. IEC immediately protested the report’s imminent
release to the Director of the Defense Documentation Cen-
ter and the Secretary of the Air Force. In December, 1972,
IEC received assurances that the material would not be
released until a decision was made on the ‘‘limited rights”’
question.
In January, 1973, the contracting officer’s technical and
legal advisors briefed headquarters personnel of the Air
Force Systems Command (AFSC) and United States Air
Foree (USAF). IEC’s counsel met with Counsel to the
Secretary of the Air Force and representatives of AFSC
and USAF. At the Secretary’s Counsel’s request, IEC
submitted further written materials on February 8, 1973.
A. 58-60. On March 16, 1973, the Air Force Chief of Staff
authorized AMSC to make a final decision on the dispute
after considering IEC’s February 8th submission. AMSC
returned the matter to the contracting officer for final de-
cision. That officer’s technical advisor concluded that the
letter of February 8th contained no information relevant
_
RRS RTA MIR ANE IEP ON EAL STAT NLLL LN E IN AN IIL PEON ED EIA phaaes
Beas RICK A Wt
A-5
to the issue and recommended striking the limited rights
notice. On May 9, 1973, IEC was so informed.
On May 10, 1973, IEC filed suit in district court for de-
claratory and injunctive relief and a temporary restrain-
ing order. IEC sought review of the contracting officer’s
decision to strike the proprietary notice, characterizing it
as agency action reviewable under section 10 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
The Air Force contended that the dispute arose under the
contract; that the officer’s decision did not constitute
agency action; that the proper forum for the claim was
either before the Armed Services Board of Contract Ap-
peals or the Court of Claims; and that thus the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or the suit was
barred by sovereign immunity.
Tn a Memorandum and Order filed July 10, 1973, the dis-
trict court held that the decision of a contracting officer,
acting pursuant to an ASPR provision incorporated into
a contract, constituted agency action and that the APA
served as a sovereign immunity. International Engineer-
ing Co. v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 818, 821-22 (D.D.C.
1973). However, the judge believed that the record of the
officer’s reasoning was insufficient to permit review of the
decision to strike the restrictive notice and remanded the
ease to the officer for a fuller exposition Jd. at 823-25.
After receiving that statement,? on October 24, 1973, the
2In his statement of reasons, the contracting officer noted that
‘TrJesolution of the data rights problems concerning Unit B is
difficult, and may be impossible for the Government to resolve.’’ He
emphasized that:
The Rights in Technical Data clause, y ragraph (d), places
the burden of substantiating the propriety of restrictive legends
on the contractor because his cooperation is needed to resolve
this type of problem. All pertinent records are in his possession.
Many important details are locked in his mind. It may be
necessary for him to explain the significance of some record
entries.
A. 63.
PRA RORMRERS SNARE RE aR RAINS ERT EI AIT CAE ET
SOP Le a ay TS ee
pO Sass
. + - . ' S aia otethe:
a — . Unite vert ae iW ‘ uw vane
A-6
district court entered a preliminary injunction.* Interna-
tional Engineering Co. v. Richardson, 367 F.Supp. 640
(D.D.C. 1973). This appeal followed.
II
This suit raises the special problems of jurisdiction and
sovereign immunity because in essence the United States is
the defendant here. The general rule of sovereign immunity
is that the United States cannot be sued without its con-
sent. E.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586,
The officer relied upon the contract clause which granted TEC
proprietary rights only if Unit B had been developed at private
expense and opined that development includes the demonstration by
testing that a prototype fulfills the developer's objective. He pointed
out that the Government regards even one percent Government
funding as precluding a finding of development at private expense
and as resulting in the Government obtaining 100 percent unlimited
rights. He indicated that a substantial possibility existed that the
final phases of development of Unit B—testing—were performed
with contract funds. Under any circumstance, he reemphasized that
IEC had failed to meet its contractually-allocated burden of sub-
stantiation. A. 62-76.
5 After reviewing its previous decision and holding that the APA
provided subject-matter jurisdiction and waived sovereign immu-
nity, the district court found that the interests identified in Sean-
well Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 187 U.S. App.D.C, 371, 424 F.2d
859 (1970)—IEC’s interest in preventing injury from any illegal,
arbitrary and capricious action by the contracting officer and the
public interest in having government contracts administered fairly
—dictated a limited review. The district court concluded that the
grant of a preliminary injunction was proper under the standards
established by this court in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v.
FPC, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (1958): 1) appellee
was likely to sueceed on the merits because the contracting officer
failed to provide minimal due process before striking the restrictive
legerids ; 2) appellee would be irreparably injured without relief in
that it would lose its competitive advantage; 3) the injunetion
would not substantially harm other interested persons; and 4) the
public interest would be served. 367 F.Supp. at 649-57. In light of
our conclusion on jurisdiction and sovereign immunity, infra, we
do not reach the remainder of the district court’s decision.
neg AANA ES. URRIERN RNGNEEE ANREP TSN PIE EN TIED NI eR Cri
(RAR EIEN ONL Compt R TE?
A-7
61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941). The sovereign may
waive its immunity by statute, and such consent, if given,
may be subject to any conditions which Congress sees fit
to require. See, e. g., Sherwood v. United States, supra; ‘
Best Bearings Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 1177, 1179 4
(7th Cir. 1972). On the one hand, for contract actions
against the United States, Congress, through passage of
the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C, §§ 1346(a), 1491 (1970), has con-
sented to suit. For claims under $10,000, the Court of
Claims and the district courts have concurrent jurisdic-
tion; the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction for
claims over $10,000. Congress has, however, imposed condi-
tions on its waiver of sovereign immunity. The Court of
Claims has jurisdiction only to award damages, Glidden v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 577, 82 S.Ct. 1459, 8 L.Ed.2d 671
(1962) ; it may neither grant declaratory, United States v.
King, 395 U.S. 1, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 23 L.Ed. 52 (1969), nor
injunctive relief, Glidden v. Zdanok, supra.
POP Le cert ar are ¥
On the other hand, we have held that Congress in enact-
ing the APA, made a more general waiver of sovereign
immunity in section 702° whenever that section is applic-
able. Seanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 137 U.S.App.
D.C. 371, 424 F.2d 859 (1970). The district court, relying
in large part on Scanwell, found jurisdiction in this case.
In its first opinion, 361 F.Supp. at 821-23, the court con-
cluded that IEC was ‘‘aggrieved’’ by agency action—the
‘The district court, when exercising concurrent jurisdiction, may
only adjudicate claims which would also be maintainable in the
Court of Claims. United States v, Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590-91,
61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941). Hence, in such situations, the
district court would have no authority to grant equitable relief.
Richardson v. Morris, 409 U.S. 464, 93 S.Ct. 629, 34 L.Ed.2d 647
(1973).
55 U.S.C. § 702 (1970) provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof.
eS EARNER HIERN RO IR NEY TRE ARTE RN NIL I ES MER ENN NER ATE AE SE Sree |
POOR COPY
A-8
acts taken by the contracting officer pursuant to the Rights
in Technical Data clause ‘‘which has the force of law in
this Contract.’’* While conceding that Scanwell was not
directly on point, the court asserted that the primary con-
cerns identified in that case—plaintiff’s interest in pre-
venting economie injury and the public’s interest in pre-
venting arbitrary or capricious action—were present here
and justified accepting jurisdiction. Finally, the court said
that in exercising jurisdiction it was providing the only
forum from which appellee could obtain injunctive relief
as the Court of Claims and Armed Services Board of Con-
tract Appeals could not grant such relief.
In its second decision, 367 F.Supp. 640, the court began
from the premise that even if it possessed jurisdiction, the
decision to grant judicial relief was discretionary. Id. at
647-48; see M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 147 U.S.App.
D.C. 221, 455 F.2d 1289 (1971). The court then concluded
that relief was appropriate both to vindicate the interests
identified earlier and because of the court’s doubt over the
likelihood of the adequacy of a damage remedy in the Court
of Claims. Recognizing that neither the only potential
buyer of products relating to the data, the United States,
nor IEC itself foresaw any practical value in the informa-
° This portion of the district court’s opinion is particularly con-
fusing. In the text, reference is made to ‘‘ASPR 9-203(a)-(d)
which has the force of law in this Contract.2’’ That section instructs
contracting officers to include ASPR 7-104.9(a), the uniform Rights
in Technical Data contract clause, in any appropriate contract. In
the footnote, the court opines that there is no authority that ‘‘an
ASPR once incorporated as a contract clause parts with all identity
as a federal regulation governing certain acts of Contracting offi-
cers.’’ Presumably, the court is now discussing, as it has been all
along, ASPR 7-104.9(a) (not ASPR 9-203), which was incorporated
into the contract. In that same footnote, the court went on to note
that several cases had suggested that the ASPR had the force of law
and asserted its belief that IEC could invoke an ASPR ‘‘against
an administrative determination contrary to the regulation’s
terms.’’ 361 F.Supp. at 822 n.2.
= aoe TC ety pares ‘ “Exa)
IRR RINT SENOS PEALE LLORES EPA
A-9
tion (except as for what type of research not to do), the
court opined it was ‘‘more important” that IEC received
injunctive, rather than compensatory, relief. 367 F.Supp.
at 649.
We must disagree with that analysis and conclusion. We
believe that this ease is a contract action falling squarely
within the purview of the Tucker Act; therefore, the APA
is inapplicable. As indicated below, several converging ave-
nues of analysis yield this conclusion. First, relianee on
interests identified in Scanwell are inappropriate here.
Moreover, we cannot accept the proposition that Congress
intended to alter drastically the limited remedies and
waiver of sovereign immunity embodied in the Tucker Act;
adopting IEC’s position would result in the destruction of
the Court of Claims by implication. Finally, under any cir-
cumstance, the APA is inapplicable by its own terms be-
cause of appellee’s adequate remedy before the Court of
Claims.
We start with our firm belief that the gravamen of ap-
pellee’s complaint is a claim for breach of contract. Al-
though the restrictive markings in question were affixed to
reports submitted pursuant to the contract, appellee con-
tends that the material at issue was not required to be
included in its reports, Appellee’s Br. at 7, 47; resolution
of that question is a matter of contract interpretation. The
major controversy concerns the Government’s rights in
the data under the contractually incorporated ‘‘Rights in
Technical Data’’ clause. Settlement of that dispute requires
interpretation of contract clauses to ascertain whether the
material should be considered ‘‘design’’ or ‘‘form, fit, or
function’’ data.
A reading of the district court opinions demonstrates its
recognition of the contractual underpinnings of the pro-
ceedings. The district court applied as one of alternative
standards of review ‘‘settled principles of contract law.’’
367 F.Supp. at 649. The court also determined that review
was appropriate because of the public interest in prevent-
REZ AR) OME RPE NRO PARE Na ANTES A AYO PR IVT POTTER ERIE KEIO ees dal iey Pa GEN “>
POOR COPY
PNP FEE UNE merci
LE PLE ES LIM I I GE IS ET ETE ELT NE aN AB
A-10
ing arbitrary or capricious decision-making in the adminis-
tration of government contracts, stating that the court
‘‘must undertake a limited review of the contracting offi-
cer’s decisions rendered pursuant to the Rights in Data
clause to determine whether it is likely that he acted ar-
bitrarily and without a rational basis.’’ Id. at 648, 650.
Clearly that function cannot be performed without refer-
ence to and incorporation of the contract.
We think that this situation is indistinguishable from
the one faced by this court in Aktiebolaget Bofors v.
United States, 90 U.S. App.D.C. 92, 194 F.2d 145 (1951),
involving a Swedish Corporation, Bofors, which owned a
trade secret used to manufacture a superior anti-aircraft
gun. Bofors entered into a government contract which
granted the United States an exclusive license to make and
use the guns. After the United States began to reveal the
trade secrets to others and after unsuccessfully attempting
to obtain equitable adjustments through informal negotia-
tions, Bofors instituted three suits, including one for dam-
ages and another for a declaratory judgment. District
Judge Holtzoff dismissed the actions for lack of jurisdic-
tion. In affirming, Judge Miller, speaking for the division,
found that the gist of the actions was breach of contract:
one who has lawfully acquired a trade secret may use
it in any manner without liability unless he acquired
it subject to a contractual limitation or restriction as
to its use. In that event a licensee who uses the secret
for purposes beyond the scope of the license granted
by the owner is liable for breach of contract, but he
commits no tort, because the only right of the owner
which he thereby invades is one created by the agree-
ment of disclosure. The owner could not maintain a
suit against him for damages arising from unlicensed
use without pleading and proving the contract. This
being true, the gist of the owner’s action is the breach
of the licensing agreement.
ae ERED AIRED EEG ROSE! LEER AIO FOL AA PSE ee ee a
A-11
Id. at 148 (footnotes omitted). IEC’s complaint here is no
different.’
In Bofors, Judge Miller also held that the APA did not
provide jurisdiction to hear either the damage or equity
suit and that jurisdiction lay in the Court of Claims. Id. at
149-50. We do not rest our present ruling on stare decisis,
however, because the Bofors decision preceded the exten-
sive jurisprudence in this circuit sustaining the APA as a
basis of jurisdiction,’ and thus it seems appropriate to
analyze whether the district court fairly applied the APA
and Scanwell to the claim of this government contractor.
We think it did not.
First, clearly beyond peradventure, this case is not the
type which falls within the rationale of our Scanwell hold-
ing. In Scanwell, we determined that a disappointed bidder
on a government contract was a person aggrieved under
the APA and had standing to seek a limited review of the
contract award; we also held that where applicable the
APA constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity. Although
the sovereign immunity holding has relevance here, our
7 Clearly, the dispute on its face involves the Government’s rights
under the licensing agreement (contract) to IEC’s trade secret.
Even assuming the validity of the district court’s finding of estop-
pel, see note 1 supra, the claim is still for breach of contract ; under
that theory IEC is alleging that the Government breached a licens-
ing agreement which gave them the use of the data with limited
rights.
8 Peoples v. Department of Agriculture, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 291,
427 F.2d 561 (1970) ; Seanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, supra;
see Pickus v. Board of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C.Cir. 1974);
Independent Broker-Dealers’ Trade Ass’n v. SEC, 142 U.S.App.
D.C. 384, 442 F.2d 132 (1971).
The district court was not apparently aware of the Bofors deci-
sion, for its opinions do not cite the case. Appellant relies upon it
only as authority for a peripheral issue and actually only cites the
district court opinion. Sce Appellant’s Br. at 21 n. 11. Although
part of the Bofors analysis was undercut by the cases cited above,
the obvious pertinence of the Bofors ruling should have been called
to the attention of the courts.
OL J IO EE SY
me z we i a a
— — ee ee
i
kK
E
;
29 GRIESE LEME RIM
ee
A-12
direct concern in Scanwell was standing, ‘‘whether legis-
lation regulating governmental activity inures to the bene-
fit of those tangentially affected.’’ William F. Wilke, Inc.
v. Department of Army, 485 F.2d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 1973).
In contrast, while our focus in this case, as in Scanwell, is
upon the same judicial review section of the APA, the
question here is whether appellee has been aggrieved ‘‘by
agency action;’’ our inquiry is to determine whether the
decision by the contracting officer to strike IEC’s limited
rights designation constituted agency action.
Clearly, our Scanwell decision does not directly resolve
that question. Conceivably, the interests identified in
Scanwell which dictated a finding of standing may be ap-
plicable by analogy here and mandate a finding of agency
action. In fact, this type of analysis appears to be the
foundation of the district court opinions, especially the
reliance upon the identification of an equivalent public in-
terest as the one identified in Scanwell—the public interest
in having contracts administered fairly and in preventing
arbitrary and capricious decision-making by contracting
officers. See 367 F.Supp. at 648; 361 F.Supp. at 823. How-
ever, we are extremely reluctant to give that factor the
weight the district court attached to it in this situation.
What has been identified unsurprisingly is the publie’s in-
terest in minimizing the number of actions taken by con-
tracting officers which results in breaches of governmental
contracts and which may necessitate the payment of com-
pensatory damages by the government. This interest, of
course, is present in every decision made by an officer pur-
suant to a contract to which the Tucker Act applies.
The breadth of the district court’s holding poses the
greatest difficulty: to grant jurisdiction here by a finding
of agency action would enable a district court to entertain
a suit for injunctive relief each time a contracting officer
makes a determination adverse to a private contracting
party.
RQ = SS CeO ICON DS ITT PR DEE PTS IOUS ae
ep . ve RISE EOE De PAV He “ See Rew> e Si A ee 8 NETGEAR ET LSS ALES LONI
A-138
We simply do not think that such a result is mandated
or that Congress intended to upset the carefully modulated
waiver of sovereign immunity and grant of remedies for
breach of contract embodied in the Tucker Act when it
passed the APA. The Fifth Circuit, faced with this pros-
pect in a case involving an injunction granted upon the
basis of APA jurisdiction, refused to find such jurisdiction :
Since the United States by reason of its nature acts
only through agents, it is hard to conceive of a claim
falling no matter how squarely within the Tucker Act
which could not be urged to involve as well agency
error subject to review under the APA. Little imagi-
nation is needed to foresee the consequences of a hold-
ing that such claims as they may be reviewed either
in a court having power to grant equitable relief
against the United States or in one having none. We
refuse to believe that Congress intended, in enacting
the APA, so to destroy the Court of Claims by impli-
cation.
Warner v. Cox, 487 F.2d 1301, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974). We
join in that assessment.’ We think it is clear that Congress
did not intend that every action taken by an employee of
a federal agency be within the ambit of the APA judicial
review section. We also believe that in light of the long-
standing Tucker Act remedy and the traditionally long-
recognized interest in preventing piecemeal disruption of
the procurement process, e. g., M. Steinthal & Co. v. Sea-
mans, supra, decisions made by contracting officers pur-
® Appellee points to Universal Fiberglass Corp. v. United States,
400 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1968), as support for a finding of jurisdic-
tion, asserting that in that case the Government was able to enforce
a contract in district court. We cannot accept the IEC’s argument
that ‘‘Universal Fiberglass clearly establishes jurisdiction’’; such
an assertion indicates a complete lack of understanding of the real
issues in this case—sovereign immunity and the extent of its waiver
for contract actions.
Page eS nf 5 — ~ . on, - *
BLE ELS 1 RBA N HIRE ND FHT NN TTI RM RIO NY Dye YT SEMEL BME ND PTS A aah REIMER NMI SHRM tn PLE LE TRIN LS a
DmnnnDod eroDpDyv
Pio Pe EP EREN EBRD ROLLS DEI A As SILANE LEAN NAGS WODERP BL GRIN GT DYER FL Tae! 7
A-14
suant to contract clauses fall outside the contemplation of
the statute.”
Moreover, the APA itself states that judicial review is
inappropriate where there exists some ‘‘other adequate
remedy in a court.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970). We have held
that the availability of a remedy in the Court of Claims
is such an adequate remedy. Mohawk Airlines, Ine. v.
C.A.B., 117 U.S.App. D.C. 326, 329 F.2d 894 (1964). The
district court, however, concluded that damages would be
an inadequate remedy, because of the speculative nature
of damages in light of the Government’s belief, as the only
potential buyer, that the information is useless except for
what not to do, and that injunctive relief would be appro-
priate in order to vindicate the public interest in proper
contract administration. We have already concluded that
this public interest factor should not be afforded the over-
riding weight that the district court gave to it. We further
question whether damages are impossible to award. We
see no barrier to the Court of Claims, if it decides that the
Government has breached the contract, awarding IEC the
10 Stripped of its plumage, this case is not too different than
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 702,
69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949). The dispute in Larson con-
cerned interpretation of when payment was required upon a coal
shipment. After receiving an unfavorable ruling from the War
Assets Administration, plaintiff sued for equitable relief. The Court
found that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity and noted:
It is one thing to provide a method by which a citizen may be
compensated for a wrong done to him by the Government. It
is a far different matter to permit a court to exercise its
compulsive powers to restrain the Government from acting, or
to compel it to act... . The Government... cannot be stopped
in its tracks by any plaintiff who presents a disputed question
of property or contract.
Id. at 704 69 S.Ct. at 1468. Similarly, we see no persuasive reason
why IEC should not be limited to the alternative remedies Congress
has already provided.
Finally, the bar of sovereign immunity prevents the district court
from asserting jurisdiction through 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 7d.
POPE LE IP OSGI LAE ALTRI EIT AN SALINITIES RN AER IIE NL ILE EE ABO I EVE SE A, LLL EEG EL PAY PES TOIT Nee —
ON GB Hs PAKS ED ALLEN OME
Re cm ans . . .
LR Say FI ELE PIR EEE EDL EISENSTEIN PLS ET NOELLE LOA ALIENS ELE IAL ES
Bk Rae tae te FADS On mh NR OEE a AD I RS 5 WBE
A-15
fair market value of its data. See Aktiebolaget Bofors v.
United States, 153 F.Supp. 397, 139 Ct.Cl. 642 (1957).”
In sum, we find compelling reasons not to endorse the
district court’s analysis, but to reaffirm the vitality of our
Bofors holding. IEC’s claim is for breach of contract, and
appellee should not be permitted to seek injunctive relief
in the district court. Section 702 is inapplicable to this case
and does not provide jurisdiction here. The case is reversed
and remanded with instructions to vacate the injunction
and dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
So ordered.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 74-1192
SepreMBER TERM, 1974
Civil Action 927-73
INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING Company, Division oF
A-T-O, Inc.
v.
Exuiotrr L. Ricuarpson, Secretary of Defense, et al.,
Appellants.
Before: Tamm and Leventuat, Circuit Judges; Jack R.
Muuer,* Judge U.S. Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals,
11 TEC has a further alternative remedy—before the General Ac-
counting Office. Assuming that the Government wrongfully discloses
the information, it still constitutes the only market for a LORAN
system. In that event, the Comptrolier General has the power to
cancel future procurements made to competitors who wrongfully
have acquired the information; IEC would then become the sole
supplier of the product.
* Sitting by designation pursuant to Title 28 U.S. Code Section
293 (a).
%
5
t
+ ARTETA
SF IPRA AES BS
A-16
Order
On consideration of appellee’s petition for rehearing, it is
OrverED by the Court that appellee’s aforesaid petition
is denied.
Per Curiam
For the Court:
/s/ Hucu E. Kure
Huge E. Kline
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 74-1192
SEPTEMBER TERM, 1974
Civil Action 927-73
INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING ComMPaANY, DIVISION OF
A-T-O, Inc.
Vv.
Exuiotr L. Ricnarpson, Secretary of Defense, et al.,
Appellants.
Order
Appellee’s suggestion for rehearing en banc having been
transmitted to the full Court and no Judge having requested
a vote thereon, it is
OrperED by the Court en banc that appellee’s aforesaid
suggestion for rehearing en banc is denied.
For the Court:
/s/ Hue E. Kune
Huge E. Kline
Clerk
4
B-1
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING Company, a Division of
A-T-O,Inc., Plaintiff
v.
Exuiot L. Ricnarpson et Au., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 927-73.
Oct. 24, 1973.
Memorandum Opinion
Cuaries R. Ricuey, District Judge.
Once again this case is before this Court on a Motion for
a Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff International
Engineering Company (IEC).’ In order to understand the
reasons advanced by Plaintiff in support of its Motion, and
the Court’s reasons for granting thereof, a review of the
history of this case will be helpful. The Court will sum-
marize only briefly the history prior to its earlier decision.
See International Engineering Company v. Elliot L. Rich-
ardson, et al., 361 F.Supp. 818, D.D.C. 1973.
I. History or THE CAsE
In late 1967, IEC conceived a system for guiding bombs
or missiles with what is referred to by the parties as a
LORAN C/D system. In February 1968, TEC submitted an
unsolicited proposal to the Air Force that detailed the proc-
esses and the performance characteristics of the compo-
nents as IEC had developed them at the time. This pro-
posal, submitted with a restrictive legend that limited its
1The Court reserves for future consideration Plaintiff’s Com-
plaint for Declaratory Judgment. The Court decides this Motion
for Preliminary Injunction on the pleadings and briefs of counsel
for the parties and upon able oral argument heard in open court on
July 31, 1973.
we aM
MEOMTR PELE 8 8 2a
B-2
distribution to Air Force personnel, resulted in the Govern-
ment’s award of a contract to IEC that called for Plaintiff
to design and construct a ‘‘helicopter flyable breadboard
LORAN Missile Guidance Subsystem.’’ (See Plaintiff’s
Exhibit D, Defendant’s Exhibit D). The system was to be
constructed and furnished by IEC for the purposes of
demonstration but was to remain the property of IEC; the
information resulting from demonstration of the system was
to be provided to the Government as set forth at Paragraph
(b)4 of T-119 incorporated by reference into the DD1423
Test Report as follows:
**(4) Description of test articles, including test config-
uration identification and photographs as appro-
priate.’’ Defendant’s Exhibit E.
The contract provision central to the instant dispute is
the Rights in Technical Data clause, an Armed Services
Procurement Regulation (7-104.9) incorporated by refer-
ence into the contract. Paragraph (b) of the Regulation
provides in pertinent part that:
**(1) The Government shall have unlimited rights in:
**(i) technical data resulting directly from perform-
ance of experimental, developmental or research
work which was specified as an element of perform-
ance in this or any other Government contract or
subcontract; ...
‘*(ii) technical data necessary to enable manufacture
of end-items, components and modifications, or to en-
able the performance of processes, when the end-
items, components, modifications or processes have
been, or are being developed under this or any other
Government contract or subcontract in which experi-
mental, developmental or research work is, or was
specified as an element of contract performance, ex-
cept technical data pertaining to items, components
RE NL SARE RRR Ey i 2
B-3
or processes developed at private expense.’’ (em-
phasis added).
‘**(iv) technical data pertaining to end-items, compo-
nents or processes which was prepared for the pur-
pose of identifying sources, size, configuration, mat-
ing and attachment characteristics, functional char-
acteristics and performance requirements (‘‘form,
fit and function’’ data, e.g., specification control
drawings, catalog sheets, envelope drawings, etc.) ;’’
(emphasis added).
‘*(2) The government shall have limited rights in:
‘*(ii) technical data pertaining to items, components
or processes developed at private expense, other
than such data as may be included in the data re-
ferred to in (b) (1) (i), (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi); pro-
vided that each piece of data to which limited rights
are to be asserted pursuant to (2)(i) and (ii) with
the following legend in which is inserted the number
of the prime contract under which the technical data
is to be delivered and the name of the contractor or
subcontractor by whom the technical data was fur-
Pe nies
Paragraph (d) of the same regulation provides for the
removal of unauthorized legends marked on data which the
contractor delivers to the Government. The contract inter-
pretation problem confronting the Court turns on the mean-
ing attached to the term ‘‘substantiate’’ as it appears in
paragraph (d) which is set forth as follows:
‘“(d) Removal of Unauthorized Markings. Notwith-
standing any provisions of the contract concerning in-
spection and acceptance, the Government may modify,
* The legend as set forth in ASPR 7-104.9 appears in the full
text of the regulation: 7-104.9 Right in Data, attached as Appendix
I to this Opinion.
B-4
remove, obliterate or ignore any marking not author-
ized by the terms of this contract on any technical data
furnished hereunder if—
‘**(i) the contractor fails to respond within sixty days
to a written inquiry by the Government concerning the
propriety of the use of the marking, or
‘*(ii) the Contractor’s response fails to substantiate
his contention that the use of the marking is authorized,
in which case the Government shall give written notice
to the Contractor.’’ (emphasis added)
During the time frame for constructing the ‘‘ Breadboard
system”’ called for in the contract, January 1968 through
June 1970, IEC developed an advanced circuitry LORAN
C/D Navigation System, at what it alleges to be substantial
private expense. As will be discussed in greater detail be-
low, the Government disagrees on the material fact of
whose money paid for the development of the Navigation
System and argues that the system was developed through
Government funding of the contract.’ The Government’s
position on the question of funding was made known after
the original contract had been modified twice to incorporate
the Navigation System into other parts of a LORAN
guided bomb and to run simulated tests on a computer, and
after IEC had submitted several technical reports which
contained a detailed description of the internal operations
in terms of mathematical and logic diagrams of TEC’s pre-
contract components that the Air Force Project Engineer,
Mr. Rustenberg, requested in the belief that the informa-
tion would be helpful to the Air Force in evaluating the test
results. (See Contracting Officer’s Statement of Reasons
for Decision of 2 October 1972; Rustenberg Deposition,
pages 29, 34-36). Between October 1970 and November 1970
*° The Court makes no finding as to this controverted and material
fact. However, it is the Court’s preliminary opinion that Plaintiff
did develop the system at private expense, and this Opinion sup-
ports the likelihood of Plaintiff's success on the merits.
B-5
IEC submitted technical reports which contained ‘limited
rights’’ legends intended to prevent the release of com-
ponents’ specifications to IEC’s competitors. The Air Force
never challenged the restrictive legend on the first report,
71-05. However, the first Contracting Officer assigned to
the IEC contract questioned the appropriateness of restric-
tive marking placed by IEC on the second Technical Report,
70-06-4, on the grounds that the restrictive legend was of
the kind used for proposals and not contract reports. IEC
offered to delete the material altogether and simply comply
with the limited requirements of the contract. IEC also
submitted an amended proprietary legend. In July 1971
the Contracting Officer decided to accept the amended mark-
ings without further question for the following reason:
‘the issuance of P0006 (a contract modification) di-
recting a continuation of the effort initiated under
P0003 (an earlier contract modification) constituted a
tacit acceptance by the Government.’’ (Exhibit 1 to
Harsfield deposition).
In so deciding, the Contracting Officer chose to reject the
request of the Contract Engineer, Mr. Rustenberg, that the
restrictive legend be ruled improper under the terms of the
contract. It is noteworthy that Mr. Rustenberg as early as
March 1971 requested the proprietary data to facilitate the
Air Force’s evaluation of the test results. (Rustenberg
Deposition, page 29).
Sometime before the submission of the third report, a
new Contracting Officer, Mr. Harsfield, began work on the
contract. Mr. Rustenberg served as technical advisor to the
new Contracting Officer and on his behalf reviewed the third
report. (Rustenberg Deposition, page 31). That report was
accepted as submitted without immediate objection.
It was in October and December 1971 respectively that
the third technical report and the final report on the orig-
inal contract and all modifications were submitted and, like
B-6
the earlier reports, they contained the detailed descriptions
of the components requested by Mr. Rustenberg and bore
proprietary legends. At the end of December 1971 and al-
most nine months later in June 1972, the Contracting Offi-
cer sent letters to IEC recommending that IEC remove the
proprietary markings or furnish substantiation to the con-
trary. IEC replied January 5, 1972 to the Contracting Off-
cer’s December 1971 correspondence but received no fur-
ther response from the Government until a letter was re-
ceived June 5, 1972, wherein the Contracting Officer stated
that the IEC submission ‘‘fails to justify the use of their
legend or show that any restriction is authorized.’’ (See
Plaintiff’s Exhibit M). He further noted that the reports
would be used with unlimited rights. IEC obtained an
agreement on the part of the Air Force not to release the
reports pending a meeting ‘‘to discuss the proprietary
rights question.’’ This meeting occurred June 26, 1972 and
was conducted by Mr. Harsfield. During the course of the
meeting, IEC submitted a three-page outline and made a
two hour oral presentation which was deemed vague by
the Contracting Officer who requested additional substan-
tiation. At no time during the meeting did Mr. Harsfield
question the ITEC position. (Harsfield Deposition, pp. 76-
77). Shortly thereafter, the Contracting Officer executed a
final acceptance on the contract and final payment was made
by the Air Force at the end of September 1972. The Con-
tracting Officer received no further efforts at substantiation
by IEC and, by letter dated October 2, 1972, informed the
Contractor that the reports would be used by the Govern-
ment with unlimited rights.
During January 1973 the Contracting Officer’s decision
was reviewed by personnel of the Headquarters, Air Force
Systems Command, and of the Chief of Staff, United States
Air Force and, later, by the Assistant General Counsel for
the Air Foree who requested that IEC submit further
written material and that the Contracting Officer consider
it. This material was submitted in IEC’s letter dated Feb-
B-7
ruary 8, 1973 and failed to change the opinion of the
Contracting Officer.
Plaintiff then brought this action to enjoin the Secretary
of the Air Force from releasing the reports. In particular,
IKC contended that it had met the burden of substantiating
its proprietary claim as it interpreted the import of the
term ‘‘substantiate.’’ Plaintiff further argued that the
Contracting Officer’s failure to provide reasons for not
agreeing with IEC’s proprietary claim made it impossible
to inveigh against his decision once further submissions
were sought. Defendant responded by challenging the jur-
isdiction of the Court.
In consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court
was confronted with close questions concerning the appli-
cation of sovereign immunity and permissible review under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.
(1970). The Court’s analysis led it to the conclusion that
the APA provided a basis for subject matter jurisdiction
and served as a waiver of sovereign immunity. Before turn-
ing to the question of the preliminary injunction, however,
the Court determined that a statement of reasons by the
Contracting Officer was essential to effective judicial re-
view. Therefore the Court denied Defendant’s Motion and
took under advisement Plaintiff’s Motion together with the
contract terms and IEC’s description of the Contracting
Officer’s actions upon which that motion was based. Rather
than step blindly, and therefore dangerously, into a pro-
curement operation foreign to the judicial process of eon-
flict resolution, the Court remanded the ease to the Con-
tracting Officer for an explanation of his actions sufficient
to permit the Court to proceed with its unique review of the
contract dispute at bar. As an interim measure the Court
requested and the Government agreed not to release the al-
leged proprietary data until the Court could review the
Contracting Officer’s statement of reasons and Plaintiff’s
LS LOVES BE PGP P0802
BRO NRANEIE LANIER WEE ENED FO ee an x : ei | zaKe.
SOREN REUSE SEER EA NEN
B-8
response thereto and rule on Plaintiff’s Motion for a Pre-
liminary Injunction.
The Court attempted through its Opinion and Order of
July 10, 1973 to obtain the information necessary for ef-
fectively resolving what the Court perceived as, in essence,
a familiar judicial problem of contract interpretation, but
a problem uniquely situated in the Federal procurement
field. In light of the information received pursuant to the
Court’s Order, the Court has had sufficient opportunity to
probe the interrelated ASPR provisions, the contract terms
and the positions of the parties to the extent that the
Court believes Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injune-
tion should be granted.
Il. THe Decision Hererxn To Grant Jupicirat Rewer Is
Wirnin Tue Covrt’s Discretion Anxp Is ApprRoprRIATE
Wuere A ContractinG Orricer Asuses His Recutatory
AUTHORITY
In view of the extraordinary relief the Court grants
Plaintiff in its Order issued of even date with this Memo-
randum Opinion, it is necessary to air the Court’s thoughts
regarding the appropriateness of the action taken herein.
Judicial forays into the procurement process are regarded
with skepticism in this Cireuit due in large part to the com-
plexity of the rules and regulations governing procurement
and the expertise required for efficient administration of
the procurement process within the regulatory web. See
M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 221, 455
F.2d 1289 (1971). Our Court of Appeals in past decisions
has highlighted the public interest in fairness and compli-
ance with regulations in lawsuits brought by disappointed
bidders on government contract, only to ultimately decide
that this interest is outweighed by the public interest in
efficient operation of government. See A. G. Schoonmaker
Co. v. Resor, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 250, 445 F.2d 726; M. Stein-
thal & Co. v. Seamans, supra. The Court of Appeal’s con-
cern in these cases with the inefficiencies that obtain from
PAM PI SPIES BOT TINE NE WLS one * NEC IM ee EA LDR OPPO E A
B-9
extensive review of contract awards prompted its determin-
ation that the District Courts should refuse to review ap-
peals from contract awards where the highly subjective
decision of a contracting officer who relied on specialized
technical knowledge is in question. In light of this concern,
the District of Columbia Circuit and the Fifth Cireuit have
held that where an agency or official other than the con-
tracting officer reviews the latter’s decision, courts will
defer to administrative expertise. For example, see Allen
M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Construction Co., 446 F.2d
261 (5th Cir. 1971) ; A. G. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, supra;
M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, supra.
As the above cases and other procurement cases like them
reflect courts’ efforts to balance the competing interests
that favor or oppose review, so does the history of this case
demonstrate this Court’s careful attempts to identify and
balance the competing interests. That weighing of interests
has led the Court to the opinion that the public interest,
as well as Plaintiff’s, is best served by granting Plantiff
the injunctive relief it seeks.
In deciding to review IEC’s claim under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, supra, the Court relied on the landmark
decision by the United States Court of Appeals in Scanwell
Laboratories, Ine. v. Shaffer, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 424
F.2d 859 (1970). In Scanwell, the Court of Appeals held
that disappointed bidders for pti res contracts have
standing under the A.P.A., 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970), to
bring suit for declaratory and injunctive relief in order to
determine the validity of the agency’s actions. Although
Scanwell involved disappointed bidders whose legal rights
when denied a contract were somewhat unclear and the in-
stant case concerns a party under contract with the govern-
ment and possessing definite contractual rights, it is the
Court’s opinion in the setting of this case that review
should be made available to both ‘potential sellers and
REDE GE SIL NIL OIE GOEL: SATEEN SIE ELLIE EEG BY BE, SEB LS PEG MOLLER ITE LD IE,
eHiny RE POR IS BES yer
=e :
B-10
those already under government contract,’’* and that an
appropriate remedy should be made available ‘‘to correct
[governmental] overreaching.’’*’ Like the Court of Ap-
peals’ decision in Scanwell to abandon the traditional re-
fusal of courts to intervene in the procurement process, the
Court’s decision to intervene here is supported by two in-
terests: first, the interest in IEC as an individual allegedly
harmed by illegal, arbitrary and capricious action by the
contracting officer; and second, the interest of the public,
represented by IEC as a ‘‘private attorney general,’’ in
having government contracts administered fairly and ac-
cording to the regulations. Only if contractors are assured
fair and equitable treatment by contracting officers can the
long-term integrity, economic welfare and efficiency of the
procurement process be advanced.
Thus the Court regards this suit as one brought, in part,
in the public interest to prevent arbitrary or capricious
decision-making in the administration of government con-
tracts and, particularly, to restore the role of the contract-
ing officer to one who tests evidence by procedures suffi-
ciently adversary in nature to provide a reasonable guar-
antee of its reliability. See Scanwell Laboratories, Ine. v.
Shaffer, supra; Mobile Oil Corporation v. Federal Power
Commission, D.C.Cir., 483 F.2d 1238, 1973. It is no longer
reasonable for courts to take the position that regulations
governing contracting are for the protection of the govern-
ment and the public and not for the protection of those who
bid for and perhaps obtain contracts with government.°
The public interest cannot turn solely on efficient procure-
ment, but has to fasten on the fairness and integrity along
* Levanthal, ‘‘Publie Contracts and Administrative Law,’’ 52
ABAJ 35, 38 (1966).
5 Id.
® See ‘Governmental Contract Bid Protests: Judicial Review and
The Role of the Court of Claims,’’ 39 Chicago Law Review 84
(1973).
<4
B-11
with the efficiency of the procurement process which at this
point in this country’s history accounts for payments
amounting to more than one-half of all federal expendi-
tures.’ Negotiated contracts like IEC’s provide more than
half the dollar value of all federal procurements * and up-
wards of 85% of the dollar value of military procurements.°
In view of the mushrooming economie development of the
procurement process, the Court has determined that the
public interest would be best served by a limited and ex-
pedited review of the government’s administration of the
IEC contract, notwithstanding the delay in the completion
of the government’s feasibility studies in this defense area.
The government has noted in its submissions to the Court
that IEC’s components are technologically undesirable and
have no practical value to the government aside from pro-
viding future government contractors with a blueprint of
what not to do. In light of the purpose to which the govern-
ment intends to put the data in question, the Court is of the
opinion that review of this suit in no way delays procure-
ment for the national defense.” For the aforementioned
reasons, the Court believes this case ‘‘calls for an assertion
of an overriding public interest ‘in having agencies follow
the regulations which control government contracting.’ ”’
M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamons, supra, 147 U.S.App.D.C.
221, 455 F.2d 1289, quoting Seanwell Laboratories v. Shaf-
fer, supra, 424 F.2d at 864.
7U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 374, table 574 (1970).
See ‘‘Government Contract Bid Protests,’’ supra, 39 Chieago
Law Review at 816, footnote 10, where the author refers to the
Subcommittee on Federal Procurement and Regulation of the Joint
Economic Committee, 89th Congress, 1st Sess., Background Material
on Economie Impact of Federal Procurement 21 (1966).
* Td.
© Therefore, the Court has decided that those bidder suits where
Courts have refused to delay national defense procurement are not
controlling. See A. G. Schoomaker Co. v. Resor, supra, City Chem-
ical Corp. v. Shrefiler, 333 F.Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ; American
Standard, Ine. v. Laird, 326 F.Supp. 492 (D.D.C. 1971).
Rees “eae a
B-12
It is within this Court’s discretion to refuse to entertain
a suit for injunctive relief in light of the potentiality of a
damages remedy in the Court of Claims. M. Steinthal & Co.
v. Seamans, supra. However, the Court doubts both the
likelihood and adequacy of a damages remedy in the Court
of Claims. An effective remedy in damages arguably would
be IEC’s lost profits from unauthorized disclosure of its
trade secrets. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-708(2)
(1972 edition). However, there are few satisfactory meth-
ods to measuring the value of losses resulting from the
unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets. See Precision
Plating & Metal Finishing, Ine. v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,
435 F.2d 1262 (Sth Cir. 1970); Appeal of Joanell Labora-
tories, Inc., 72-1 BCA par. 9218. Especially where the only
potential buyer of products related to IEC’s trade secrets
refuses to recognize any practical value in the goods them-
selves. Most importantly, however, the Court is convinced
that irreparable injury would result from the unauthorized
disclosure of IEC’s trade secrets. Therefore, it is not sig-
nificant whether or not plaintiff could avail itself of dam-
ages to some amount not measured by anticipated profits
through successful adjudication of its rights in the Court
of Claims. It seems more important that IEC be able to
obtain the injunctive relief which the strength of its claim
merits, but which the Court of Claims cannot provide. See
United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 23 L.Ed.2d
52 (1969). The Court’s decision to proceed with its review
of Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction in light
of the recent submissions to the Court by the parties in this
ease, particularly the statement of reasons provided by the
contracting officer and his deposition, is within its disere-
tion and consistent with the viewpoint expressed by the
Court of Appeals in M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, supra,
where Judge Leventhal suggested the appropriateness of
intervention by the District Court in certain circumstances:
‘*To avoid any confusion, it is not being stated here
that the damages available to the disappointed bidder,
REI hE LP CE
B-13
which do not comprehend anticipated profit, are auto-
matically an ‘adequate’ legal remedy as to warrant dis-
missal for want of equity of every injunction action re-
gardless of the strength of plaintiff’s claim on the
merits.’’ 455 F.2d at 1302 (1970).
Ill. Tue Score or Review anp THE Nature or RELIEF
GRANTED
The absence of case law regarding the appropriate stand-
ard of review in a procurement dispute like the case at
bar presents the Court with two alternatives: (1) apply the
most appropriate Administrative Procedure Act standard
of review; or (2) evaluate the merits of the case in accord-
ance with settled principles of contract law. See United
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., Inc., 412 U.S. 580,
93 S.Ct. 2389, 37 L.Ed.2d 187 (decided June 18, 1973). At
this stage in the litigation the Court need not decide the
merits. However, the appropriate standard of review takes
on significance in its limited application within the judicial
guidelines for issuing preliminary injunctive relief. The
standards for granting preliminary equitable relief are set
out in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Assn. v. FPC, 104 U.S.
App.D.C. 106, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (1958). Among those
standards is the requirement that there be a likelihood of
plaintiff’s success on the merits. (See page 651 infra). In
order to best apply the criteria set forth in Virginia Job-
bers, the Court shall undertake to evaluate the merits of
JEC’s claims under the appropriate APA standard as well
as under accepted contract law principles.
Although this Court relied on the decision in Scanwell
and the controlling interests identified therein in deciding
the appropriateness of review in the ease at bar, the Court
is unable to glean from Scaniell a clear articulation of the
scope of review appropriate to the case at bar. Therefore
the Court looks initially to the Administrative Procedure
Act for standards applicable to the review of the instant
complaint which challenges the Contract Officer’s contract
ea Mere nk
B-14
interpretations and the actions he has taken in response to
those interpretations. Fortunately, the Act provides stand-
ards that are applicable to the instant dispute." The review
section of the APA insulates certain agency actions from
review ‘‘to the extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial
review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discre-
tion by law.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). However, the interpre-
tation given § 701 in this Circuit provides this Court with a
good deal of latitude in determining the extent to which a
statute or regulation operates to make a discretionary de-
cision unreviewable, particularly where, as here, a procure-
ment regulation authorizes a discretionary determination
by the contracting officer. See Wheelabrator Corp. v. Cha-
fee, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 238, 455 F.2d 1306, 1311-1312 (1971) ;
Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 40 U.S.App.
D.C. 31, 483 F.2d 1137 (1970).
Several procurement cases in which courts have treated
questions of governmental overreaching find their genesis
in circumstances where the government accepts one bid
over another or decides to cancel a contract. In both situa-
tions the contracting officer, or the Secretary of the instant
agency depending upon the particular setting, takes action
pursuant to an express statutory mandate. See M. Steinthal
and Co. v. Seamans, supra; Udall v. Littell, 125 U.S.App.
D.C. 89, 366 F.2d 668 (1966); Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d
1207 (4 Cir., 1971). The approach of the courts in those
cases is apposite to the instant dispute involving the exer-
cise of administrative discretion pursuant to an Armed
Services Procurement Regulation incorporated by reference
into the IEC contract. Without question the relevant regu-
lation, ASPR 7-104.9, commits the interpretation of the
Technical Rights in Data Clause to the contracting officer.
11 Quite obviously in deciding to review this case and in determin-
ing that particular APA standards are applicable, the Court makes
clear its position that in no fashion can a government contract
shelter a contracting officer, who at all times is an agent of the gov-
ernment, from some standard of accountability under the APA.
B-15
(See Appendix). With respect to his interpretation, there-
fore, the Court may not directly review its legal propriety.
The Act commands that courts refrain from such review
where legal interpretation is entrusted to the agency, 5
U.S.C. § 701. However, the Act expressly provides that the
courts ‘‘shall... hold unlawful, ... agency actions, findings
and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’’ 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Under this provision, the Court must
undertake a limited review of the contracting officer’s deci-
sions rendered pursuant to the Rights in Data clause to
determine whether it is likely that he acted arbitrarily and
without a rational basis. Udall v. Littell, supra; M. Stein-
thal & Co. v. Seamans, supra.
The above background is important to an understanding
of the issues related to the Court’s decision to issue a pre-
liminary injunction, particularly the issue whether there is
a likelihood that IEC will prevail on the merits. That issue
along with several others is determinative of plaintiff’s
motion for a preliminary injunction. In Virginia Petroleum
Jobbers Assoc. v. FPC, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 259 F.2d 921
(1958), the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit set forth four criteria to consider in
deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction. They
are as follows:
(a) That the petitioner has a strong likelihood of
prevailing upon the merits;
(b) That the petitioner would be irreparably injured
without such relief;
(c) That the stay or injunction would not substan-
tially harm other interested persons;
(d) That the public interest will not be significantly
harmed.
In addition to these four criteria governing the issuance
of a preliminary injunction, the Court’s consideration of
the government contractor’s claim should draw upon two
“ “?
PEM F
ppounen PL LMG TED, AHH ME SI NM
B-16
interrelated principles articulated by Judge Leventhal in
M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, supra, which apply where
determinations of procurement officials are before the
Court:
**(1) courts should not overturn any procurement de-
termination unless the aggrieved bidder demonstrates
that there was no rational basis for the agency’s deci-
sion; and (2) even in instances where such a determina-
tion is made, there is room for sound judicial discre-
tion, in the presence of overriding public interest con-
siderations, to refuse to entertain declaratory or in-
junctive actions in a pre-procurement context.’’ 455
F.2d at 1301.
The government contends that the Steimthal principles
severely limit this Court’s choice to apply the public inter-
est values of Scanwell to the facts of the case at bar. The
Court respectfully disagrees. The instant dispute is clearly
one of the ‘‘meritorious sheep”’ as described by the Court
of Appeals in Scanwell, supra, 424 F.2d at 872. After a
careful examination of the IEC contract and the extensive
memoranda, affidavits and depositions filed in this law suit,
it is the Court’s conclusion that the contracting officer and
his organization or staff violated the statutory boundaries
set by ASPR 7-104.9, and that the contracting officer in an
arbitrary and cavalier manner arrived at a determination
which is not reasonable.
A. Puarntirr Has A Liketinoop or Success On THE MERITS
IEC is before the Court seeking equitable relief in a
stringent form against government action. In these cireum-
stances IEC’s burden is heavy indeed and the Court must
restrict its inquiry to a determination of whether the deci-
sions of the contracting officer had a reasonable basis, or
appear to have had a reasonable basis for purposes of IEC’s
motion. The lessons taught by the bidder suits instruct the
Court to ‘‘fully take into account the discretion that is typ-
B-17
ically accorded officials in the procurement agencies by sta-
tutes and regulations.’’ M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans,
supra, 455 F.2d at 1301. In Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chaffee,
147 U.S.App.D.C. 238, 455 F.2d 1306 (1971) the Court of
Appeals further commented:
‘*In view of the public interest in expeditious procure-
ment a preliminary injunction cannot be justified unless
the court makes a considered judgment of a probability
of success on the merits. Likelihood of success is a re-
quirement of an injunction even though the court’s
probing and analysis may not be as comprehensive
when its injunction is limited to the period required
for a determination by the GAO on the protest.’’ 455
F.2d at 1317.
The Court has given the closest consideration to the facts
presented and determined that IEC has sufficiently demon-
strated its probability of success on the merits. It is clear
to the Court that the contracting officer’s process of deci-
sion-making in this instance was contrary to the ASPR re-
quirements that contracting officials make a meaningful in-
quiry and good faith effort in the exercise of their discre-
tion. Consequently, it was no accident that the contracting
officer’s final decision to obliterate the restrictive legend on
three IEC Reports and authorize the use of all the reports
with unlimited rights was unsupported by evidence and re-
flected legal conclusions that appear incorrect as a matter
of law.
The integrity of the procurement process turns on the
responsiveness of contracting officials to follow the regula-
tions in a manner that insures free and fair competition.
See A. G. Schoonmaker v. Resor, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 250,
445 F.2d 726 (1971): In the area of advertised bid proced-
ures, for example, the contracting officer’s discretion is
canalized through a regulatory structure setting forth the
criteria he should consider and the procedures he must fol-
B-18
low in awarding a contract. See 32 C.F.R. § 1.300-2 (1972) ;
41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.301-2, 1-2.102(a). Since the contracting offi-
cer’s decisions as to whether a bidder is ‘‘responsive”’ to a
bid invitation or ‘‘responsible’’ to the extent that he can be
expected to satisfactorily perform the contract require the
contracting officer to make subjective judgments, courts de-
mand high standards of performance within the regulatory
guidelines to prevent against fraudulent or collusive con-
tract awards. See Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, supra. It
is the Court’s opinion that the degree of care with which a
contracting officer awards a contract should presage the
exactitude with which he and other contracting officials issue
decisions during the course of the contract’s administra-
tion.
1. The Decision of the Contracting Officer to Strike Plain-
tiff’s Restrictive Legend Is Illegal Since It Did Not Com-
port With the Minimal Due Process Requirements of
ASPR 7-104.9(d).
The Court’s concern here is with the contracting officer’s
decision that IEC failed to ‘‘substantiate’’ or ‘‘show”’ the
propriety of the use of a limited rights legend on the data
it submitted in connection with reports 70-06-04, 70-07 and
70-09. The Air Force is prevented from removing such
legends or treating the data in issue with ‘‘unlimited
rights’’ until the contracting officer determines that the con-
tractor has failed to ‘‘substantiate his contention that the
use of the marking is authorized’’ and the officer provides
‘‘written notice’’ of such determination to the contractor.
It is clear to the Court that the contracting officer never
reached an independent decision with respect to IEC’s ef-
forts to substantiate the use of the restrictive legend and
therefore never made available to plaintiff a meaningful
notification of his decision that comported with the require-
ments of procedural due process such that plaintiff could
adequately challenge the decision either in its dealings with
the contracting officer or in an appeal to the Secretary of
the Air Force.
REE EER I ORR OE A RE AE” _
B-19
In the case at bar, Contracting Officer Harsfield, the sec-
ond of the two contracting officers on the IEC contract,
appears to have relied entirely on his advisors, particularly
Mr. Rustenberg, with the result that Mr. Harsfield’s deci-
sion was not made on the basis of the evidence before him
but on the untested opinion of his advisors. (See Harsfield
Deposition, pp. 76-77, 118-119; Rustenberg Deposition, pp.
63-65). Most importantly, that opinion was not provided
to IKC as required by the notification requirement of the
ASPR in issue. Insofar as the Contracting Officer relied on
Mr. Rustenberg’s definition of ‘‘function’’ as it appears in
paragraph (b)(1)(iv) of the Rights in Technical Data
clause of the contract to determine that IKC had failed to
substantiate its right to place a restrictive legend on the
data, Mr. Harsfield’s decision was unreasonable and unsup-
ported by the record before him. It does not appear to the
Court that a determination of what comes within the term
‘‘form, fit and function’? enjoys a breadth of discretion
drawing on technical expertise. Rather, the Contracting
Officer’s range of interpretations was limited by the Sched-
ule of the Contract which provides an understanding of the
nature of the data for which the Government contracted. In
reviewing the items specified for inclusion in the Final Test
Reports, it is apparent to the Court that the plain meaning
of items described excludes without question an integral
design of the IEC system. The Schedule of the Contract
makes reference to an attached DD Form 1423 that dis-
cussed the data IEC was required to deliver. The pertinent
part of that form is Data Item A002, Test Reports Develop-
ment, which explains the applicability of Data Item deserip-
tion T-119 which, in turn, specifies items to be included in
the Final Test Reports. With respect to IEC’s hardware
used in the test, that is, IEC’s processes and components
themselves, T-119 calls for data as follows:
“Description of Test Article, including test configura-
tion identification and photographs as appropriate.”’
£
“PRE ROANRE Pata DGS gE ey Data Bea id ee
B-20
The description of the ‘‘test article’’ is defined under the
heading Description of Test Apparatus found in Mil-Std-
831 (Defendants’ Exhibit F):
*¢5.6.10.1.1. Description of test apparatus. A descrip-
tion of test apparatus shall include a tabulation of all
instruments and equipment used, the manufacturers’
names, serial numbers, raises, accuracy, and dates of
latest calibration.’’
Thus IEC was expected to identify the components of the
system it was testing but under no reading of the above
could IEC be required to describe the internal operations,
the mathematical equations and logic diagrams, of the test
hardware. Yet that was Mr. Rustenberg’s conception of the
‘data requirements as adopted by the Contracting Officer.
The Contracting Officer’s letters of December 28, 1971,
June 5, 1972 or October 2, 1972 suggested to IEC, that
plaintiff had not substantiated its right to mark the reports
with restrictive legends. Therefore, IEC chose to respond
to each of those letters with a further attempt to establish
by the existence of competent evidence that IEC developed
the LOMISS processes and components at its own expense
prior to the inception of the contract. It seems that the rea-
sonableness of Plaintiffs’ efforts to convince the contracting
officer of the rightness of its position was negated by failure
of the Contracting Officer or his aides to reveal their con-
viction that IEC was required to deliver the data in which
it asserted proprietary rights, in part, because of opinions
such as the following: ‘‘significant testing of Unit B oc-
curred under Contract Modifications P0003 and P0006, and
... the precontract flight testing were only demonstrations
intended to obtain funding for significant and necessary
testing.’’ (Statement of Reasons for Contracting Officer’s
Decision of 2 October 1972, page 5). This speculation on the
part of the Contracting Officer is based on Mr. Rustenberg’s
impression that the testing of one IEC system, ‘Unit B”’,
before the contract Modification P0003 was awarded, was
B-21
not successful and only reached a satisfactory level of per-
formance during subsequent tests that in part were accom-
plished at government expense. This theory of Mr. Rusten-
berg has been adopted by the Contracting Officer though
there has never been a factual underpinning provided. Fur-
thermore, this opinion was never suggested to Plaintiff so
that IEC might test it in an adversary manner which the
Court believes appropriate.
The theory of Mr. Rustenberg appears to the Court to
have been the overriding basis of the Contracting Officer’s
final decision on October 2, 1972. Yet Mr. Rustenberg’s
theory had no foundation in facts gathered in the course of
IEC’s efforts to substantiate its claims. Indeed, IEC was
never advised that its efforts to demonstrate the develop-
ment of its processes and components at private expense
were futile in that the data in question was considered by
the Contracting Officer to be the product of federally funded
testing, which would preclude that opportunity to place re-
strictive legends on data submitted pursuant to the contract.
Where the Contracting Officer makes a discretionary de-
termination based upon his reading of the contract and the
field reports of his aides, the due process requirements of
the ASPR demand at the least that the Contracting Officer
independently review any staff opinion he adopts, that he
have a factual basis for his subjective reasons, and that he
notify the contractor accordingly. Here he had none, and
no adequate notice was provided. Instead his subjective
analysis began and ended with the unsubstantiated opinion
of the contract engineer. The Court must reject this deci-
sional process and the conclusions it generated as unfair,
unreasonable, and violative of the minimal due process re-
quirements of ASPR 7-104.9(d).
Thus the Court regards the contracting officer’s ultimate
decision to strike plaintiff’s legend as violative of proced-
ural due process requirements insofar as the instant regula-
tion on its face requires the contracting officer to reach an
= . ELE. OPT RIG I GME ay I net AN tg CERAM PEP OOP OARS a | eet
B-22
independent decision that IEC’s restrictive legend ‘‘was
not permitted by the terms of the contract’? and to make
the basis for that decision known to IEC. Although the
Court does not reach the issue, it is important to note that
ASPR 7-104.9(d) is seriously lacking in adequate standards
for striking a restrictive legend and in adequate procedures
including notice of specific objections by the contracting
officer, opportunity to present evidence and to cross-exam-
ine adverse witnesses. In addition, the regulation does not
provide for administrative findings and conclusions on the
record made before the contracting officer. By requiring a
statement of reasons and meaningful compliance with the
notification requirement by the contracting officer, the Court
in this case, hopefully, has moved the procurement process
closer to conformity with due process of law.
However, it is the Court’s concern that an ASPR, which
purports to authorize a contracting officer to strike a con-
tractor’s restrictive legend from data in which the con-
tractor claims a significant property interest, should pro-
vide procedures consistent with the requirements of pro-
cedural due process under the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Since the striking of a contrac-
tor’s restrictive legend for data to which the contractor
claims a property interest and the subsequent delivery of
the data to the contractor’s competitors constitutes an ad-
judication of the contractor’s proprietary interest by the
contracting officer, adequate notice and a full hearing would
seem appropriate. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91
S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.
8d 349 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct.
1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); and Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 270, 33 L.Ed.2d 548
(1972).
PELE IRL E A TR OR RRR ENR yee Sem . ~ 2
ER an NPE AOS Pt G ENE ers” AAR
pte Pte
aaa I ce Oe ae ee ee
B-23
Finally, notwithstanding the due process violations by the
contracting officer noted ab ve, the Court believes IEC met
the regulatory test of sul iantiation. Although the Court
can accept the Government’s definition that ‘‘substantiate”’
means ‘‘to establish the existence of true or competent evi-
dence’’, the Court is inclined to agree with IEC that Plain-
tiff indeed provided competent evidence to the extent that
IEC could appreciate what the Contracting Officer was
searching for. IEC attempted to document in a written his-
tory the development of the processes and components al-
leged to have been developed at IEC expense. An Indepnd-
ent Audit Report was included. This evidence supported the
proposition that IEC incorporated its processes into cer-
tain components which existed as identifiable hardware
prior to July 1969 and independent of any Government
funding. (See Independent Audit Report, Rustenburg Dep-
osition, page 5).
The Court is on firm ground in interpreting the import
of the term ‘‘substantiate”’ in a different manner from the
Contracting Officer, even if such a reading is contrary to
the intention of the Government’s draftsman:
“If the Government had contracted with either
Steinthal or Pioneer and a dispute had arisen over the
meaning of the delivery schedule, the court would
have been faced with a familiar judicial problem of
contractual interpretation; it might decide that, re-
gardless of the intention of the Government’s drafts-
man, the amended IFB gave the contractor a reason-
able latitude as to the time of delivery. Such a decision
might very well be upheld by this court since it involves
the resolution of a contractual ambiguity, and under
familiar legal doctrine a court may well construe a pro-
vision strictly against the Government draftsman, giv-
ing the benefit of any doubt to the private party who
did not draft the particular provision.’ M. Steinthal &
Co. v. Seamans, supra, 455 F.2d at 1303.
PEE ELLE ELEN IEEE AAEM RUNES ARB HOY Se ARG NL:
TF REE COPS hs epaRaee
i el i a a ee ee
B-24
It is the Court’s opinion that Plaintiff met the burden of
substantiating the propriety of the limited rights legend
claim, as IEC understood that burden at the time the con-
tract was made.
2. The Government Is Estopped from Denying the Pro-
priety of Restrictive Legends Appearing on Final Re-
ports Submitted by IEC Subsequent to the Govern-
ment’s Acceptance of Report 70-06-04.
The important question raised by the Contractor here
is whether the Government has an unlimited right to use
and disclose to others for their use detailed design data re-
lating to IEC processes and components allegedly prepared
independent of the coutract funding and submitted to the
Government independent of any contract requirement but
as a cooperative response to the request of the Contract
Project Engineer. With respect to the above question, the
Court assumes as a threshold matter that the Government
obtained rights, either ‘‘limited’’ or ‘‘unlimited,’’ only in
the technical data which the Government specified was to
be delivered under the contract. The Court refers the
reader to Section III, page 652, of this Opinion and where
the Court concluded that the Air Force did not order de-
tailed design data of any of the components of either of
the systems tested under the contract. Accordingly, the
Government did not acquire any rights in data submitted
by IEC with restrictive markings that was not part of the
data ordered in the contract.
However, the Air Force did obtain possession of the
alleged trade secrets as a result of IEC’s response to Mr.
Rustenberg’s request. It is not clear whether the Air Force
through Mr. Rustenberg repeated its request for design
specifications at the time for submission of each Final Tech-
nical Report, however, IEC included the data each time and
marked it with restrictive legends. It is the Court’s opin-
ion that even in the absence of evidence supporting an ex-
press agreement of nondisclosure, IEC’s delivery of the
TL GREP OR RII RR EE » aspen
B-25
data with restrictive legends supports the existence of an
implied understanding that the data was received in con-
fidence. It is well settled that in the presence of an implied
agreement the Government is liable for the unauthorized
use and disclosure of proprietary data. See Horner vy.
United States, 86 F.Supp. 132, 114 Ct.Cl. 612 ; Comp.Dee.
B-155885, May 1965.
TEC contends that the restrictive legends demonstrate
its intention not to deliver the detailed proprietary data
to the Air Force with unlimited rights and that the Air
Force had no reason to believe otherwise. Plaintiff’s posi-
tion is supported by IEC’s effort to obtain the return of
its data by revising and resubmitting the Reports contain-
ing the challenged markings. In IEC’s letters of June 14,
1971 and January 5, 1972, respectively, IEC explained to
the Air Force its offer to revise Report 70-06-04 and made
clear its intention to retain a restrictive rights interest in
the technical data to which it attached a restrictive rights
legend in Reports 70-06-04, 71-07 and 71-09. The Air Force
never responded to TEC’s June 15, 1971 letter but accepted
the Report 70-06-04 and paid for it. As a consequence of
the Air Force’s failure to respond to that letter and the
Air Force’s decision to issue a Modification to the Contract,
Mod. P0006, IEC concluded that the Air Foree regarded
the restrictive legend on Report 70-06-04 to be proper. IEC
proceeded to submit the same data with the appropriate
restrictive legends in the next two reports in reliance on
the Air Force’s informed acquiescence in Plaintiff’s asser-
tions regarding Report 70-06-04. The Court believes Plain-
tiff’s reliance to have been justified in light of the Con-
tracting Officer’s position upon accepting the report (See
Exhibit 1 to Harsfield Deposition). The Government’s ac-
tions and Plaintiff’s reliance thereon have the effect of le-
gally estopping the Government from claiming that the
restrictive rights legends submitted on the Reports filed
after acceptance of 70-06-04 are improper. Equitable es-
* The Government argues that acquiescence is legally irrelevant
since the Contract Right in Technical Data clause, paragraph (4d),
PEEL act Be OPEC LD LIENS PEN KANG LE TEI CLEARS ED
B-26
toppel prevents the Government’s assertion of rights which -
might have existed had not the Government’s conduct ren-
dered it inequitable for this Court to permit the Govern-
ment to assert these rights against IEC. See Manloading
& Management Assoc., Inc. v. United States, Ct.Cl, 461
F.2d 1299 (1972).
B. Piarntirr Woutp Be IrreparasBLy INJuRED Witru Sucu
Rewer.
The Court has concluded that IEC will be irreparably in-
jured if the Government releases the technical data con-
taining IEC’s LOMISS processes and components to the
public. In taking the position that it is entitled to the data
marked with restrictive legends, the Government has con-
ceded the information is of a kind that would permit com-
petitors to reproduce, or as the Government desires, stay
far away from producing the IEC processes and components
in issue. Obviously, the release of such detailed data would
destroy any competitive advantage presently held by IEC.
The harm to IEC by public disclosure is found in the irre-
vocable loss of a competitive advantage and uncompensa-
ble economic hardship. The Court balances this with the
administrative burden the Government has complained of
in its review of proposals as a result of the delay occa-
sioned by this Court’s review of the alleged unfairness
in the Contracting Officer’s decision. The scales weigh de-
cisively in granting Plaintiff the preliminary relief it seeks.
Only a cry of ‘‘national security’? would turn this Court
from its purposeful review of the decision-making process
in question here. See Horne Brothers, Inc. v. Laird, 150
U.S.App.D.C. 177, 463 F.2d 1268 (1972).
provides that the Government’s acceptance of data does not pre-
clude the Government from obliterating any marking not author-
ized by the terms of the contract. The Court views the Govern-
ment’s acquiescence as relevant, indeed, since it resulted in IEC’s
reasonable reliance. Accordingly, the Government is estopped from
asserting the otherwise valid rights set forth in paragraph (d). See
3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 802 at 180 (5th Ed. 1941).
aati as NT aT PPE, BE LORE LT BA EOGNRE ES BLES: IOEIT ECMS ET
7 peace
SALLE LOE LE LOG CLRE LEAL ELN OYE IAS tg RMT ND CY yO
B-27
C. Tuts Insunctrion Wit Nor SussTanTIaLty Harm Oruer
INTERESTED Persons
The Government contends that the other defense con-
tractors are restless over the delay in the Government’s
consideration of their proposals, while it awaits this Court’s
determination regarding who presently has title to IEC’s
alleged proprietary data. It is the Court’s opinion that
defense contractors would experience considerably less
anxiety if they were to be assured through the actions of
this Court that the Government will not be permitted to
act in an arbitrary manner where the protection of their
trade secrets hangs in the balance. These contractors must
have an extensive interest in the degree to which a con-
tracting official will be permitted to determine that infor-
mation turned over to government officials in the course
of a contract as part of an effort to cooperate with their
review of the contractor’s work can be released to com-
petitors despite restrictive legends affixed to the informa-
tion at the time it was submitted.
The interest the Court seeks to safeguard here is central
to the welfare of the procurement process as reflected in
the Armed Services Regulation set forth below. The Gov-
ernment and the contractors will benefit in the long run
from the Court’s thorough application of the policy con-
siderations which underlie ASPR 9-202.1, set forth in per-
tinent part as follows:
**¥ 9-202.1 Background.
““(e) The Balancing of Interests. Tt is apparent that
there is no necessary correlation between the Government’s
need for technical data and its contractors’ economic inter-
ests therein. However, in balancing the Government’s re-
quirements for technical data against the contractor’s in-
terest in protecting his data, it should be recognized that
there may be a considerable identity of interest. This is
particularly true in the case of innovative contractors who
BE. 7 — —— ' ss Sg Aare ey
x LECLR BES LETS SE POSTINGS SE EP ALTE IE VOR LA OGM ILLO I EP i AE
SP Ree CTE et: s
B-28
can best be encouraged to develop at private expense items
of military usefulness where their rights in such items are
serupulously protected. It is equally important that the
Government foster successful contractual relationships and
encourage a ready flow of data essential to Government
needs by confining its acquisitions of technical data to cases
of actual need. Certainly the Government must not be
barred from bargaining and contracting to obtain such
technical data as it needs, even though that data may
normally not be disclosed in commercial practice. More-
over, when the Government pays for research and develop-
ment work which produces new knowledge, products or
processes, it has an obligation to foster technological prog-
ress through wide dissemination of the new and useful in-
formation derived from such work and where practicable
to provide competitive opportunities for supplying the new
products and utilizing the new processes. At the same time,
acquiring, maintaining, storing, retrieving, and distribut-
ing technical data in the vast quantities generated by mod-
ern technology is costly and burdensome for the Govern-
ment. For this reason alone, it would be necessary to con-
trol closely the extent and nature of data procurement.
Such control is also necessary to insure Government re-
spect for its contractors’ economic interest in technical
data relating to their privately developed items. The poli-
cies and procedures of this Part are framed in the light
of these considerations.’’
D. Pusiic IntErESt Witt Be SeErRveEp.
The Court’s comment in General Electric v. Seamans,
340 F.Supp. 636 (1972), is equally applicable here:
‘‘There is little doubt that the overriding public in-
terest lies in having the governmental agencies follow
their own regulations. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc.,
supra, at 424 F.2d 864.’’ 340 F.Supp. at 641.
OTE NT IT SCRUTINY YRC Be BI MTN LOE EE RENT SE IBS 8 =
Tet
Cees
Vo
B-29
This case concerns the manner in which contracting officials
make discretionary determinations in their administration
of government contracts. It is imperative that such decis-
ions reflect a fair and objective consideration of the con-
tract itself along with any questioned actions taken by the
parties pursuant to contract terms from which the dispute
issues. Procurement activities cannot be allowed to ‘‘de-
teriorate into actions reflecting personal predilictions of
administrative officials, whether ascribable to whim, mis-
placed zeal, or impermissible influence.’’ Steinthal v. Sea-
mans, supra, 455 F.2d at 1305. The facts here indicate that
the Contracting Officer at the time of his decision in ques-
tion had responsibility for 110 contracts involving a total
of half a billion dollars, of which the IEC contract ac-
counted for less than 1% of his workload. For that reason,
the Government contends that the Contracting Officer was
entirely reasonable in relying so fully on the suggestions
of his advisors. The court must fault such ‘‘organiza-
tional’’ decisions whose roots are precariously implanted
in the quicksand of speculation. (See page 653, supra). It
is unreasonable for the Contracting Officer to accept un-
substantiated opinions of his advisors without testing them
for their adversariness. It is in the public interest that
reason and not convenience be the basis for a Contracting
Official’s decision.
IV. Conciusion
The critical decision-making stage for resolving disputes
arising under the Rights in Technical Data clause of any
Governmental contract is at the contracting officer level.
That is the intent of the Armed Services Procurement
Regulations. Therefore it is of absolute necessity that con-
tracting officers make decisions in a fair and reasoned
fashion. In circumstances like those before the Court
where a contracting officer relies upon the unsubstantiated
and untested opinions of his advisors, he betrays the basic
consideration of fairness which this Court demands of
EEA NS ARMA V5 Ns Pas a Cano
B-30
Government officials acting pursuant to administrative
regulations. In addition, such reliance by a contracting offi-
cer effectively shields the questionable opinion from ade-
quate testing by accepted principles of procedural due
process. In the field of procurement, unless courts require
of contracting officers no less than the fairness referred to
above, small contractors will never be able to test the de-
cisions of the contracting officer when, as here, the con-
tractors cannot avail themselves of any administrative
remedies.
For the above reasons, the Court has decided to grant
IEC the preliminary injunction it seeks.
In addition to this Opinion, the Court, this day, the 23rd
of October, 1973, has entered Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law and a separate Order.
APPENDIX
7-104.9 Rights in Data
(a) Basic Data Clause. In accordance with 9-203, insert the
following clause
Rieuts 1 Tecunicat Data (1965 Fes)
(a) Definitions
(1) Technical Data, as used in this clause, means techni-
eal writing, sound recordings, pictorial reproductions,
drawings, or other graphic representations and works of a
technical nature, whether or not copyrighted, which are
specified to be delivered pursuant to this contract. The
term does not include financial reports, cost analyses, and
other information incidental to contract administration.
(2) Limited Rights means rights to use, duplicate, and
disclose technical data in whole or in part, by or for the
Government, with the express limitation that such data
may not be released outside the Government, used, dupli-
B-31
cated, or disclosed in whole or in part, for manufacture or
procurement, except for:
work by or for the Government where the item or
process concerned is not otherwise reasonable avail-
able to enable timely performance of the work; and
as the interests of the United States may require;
provided, in either case, that the release of such data shall
be subject to the limitations of this paragraph (2).
(3) Unlimited Rights means rights to use, duplicate or
disclose technical data, in whole or in part, in any manner
and for any purpose whatsoever, and to have or permit
others to do so.
(b) Government Rights.
(1) The Government shall have unlimited rights in:
(i) technical data resulting directly from perform-
ance of experimental, developmental or research work
which was specified as an element of performance in
this or any other Government contract or subcontract ;
(ii) technical data necessary to enable manufacture
of end-items, components and modifications, or to en-
able the performance of processes, when the end-items,
components, modifications or processes have been, or
are being, developed under this or any other Govern-
ment contract ov subeontract in which experimental,
developmental or research work is, or was specified
as an element of contract performance, except techni-
cal data pertaining to items, components or processes
developed at private expense (but see ( 2) (ii) below);
(iii) technical data constituting corrections or
changes to Government-furnished data ;
(iv) technical data pertaining to end-items, com-
ponents or processes which was prepared for the pur-
B-32
pose of identfying sources, size, configuration, mating
and attachment characteristics, functional character-
istics and performance requirements (‘‘form, fit and
function’’ data, e. g., specification control drawings,
catalog sheets, envelope drawings, etc.) ;
(v) manuals or instructional materials prepared for
installation, operation, maintenance or training pur-
poses;
(vi) other technical data which has been, or is norm-
ally furnished without restriction by the contractor
or subcontractor; and
(vii) technical data listed or described in an agree-
ment incorporated into the Schedule of this contract,
which the parties have predetermined, on the basis of
subparagraphs (i) thru (vi) above, and agreed will
be furnished with unlimited rights.
(2) The Government shall have limited rights in:
(i) technical data, listed or described in an agree-
ment incorporated into the Schedule of this contract,
which the parties have agreed will be furnished with
limited rights; and
(ii) technical data pertaining to items, components
or processes developed at private expense, other than
such data as may be included in the data referred td
in (b)(1)(i), (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi) ;
provided that each piece of data to which limited rights
are to be asserted pursuant to (2)(i) and (ii) above is
marked with the following legend in which is inserted the
number of the prime contract under which the technical
data is to be delivered and the name of the Contractor or
subcontractor by whom the technical data was generated:
Furnished under United States Government Contract
jC ar Shall not be either released outside the
Government, or used, duplicated, or disclosed in whole
B-33
or in part for manufacture or procurement, without
the written permission of ...... , except for: (i) emer-
gency repair or overhaul work by or for the Govern-
ment, where the item or process concerned is not oth.
erwise reasonably available to enable timely perform-
ance of the work; or (ii) release to a foreign govern-
ment, as the interests of the United States may re-
quire; provided that in either case the release, use,
duplication or disclosure hereof shall be subject to the
foregoing limitations. This legend shall be marked on
any reproduction hereof in whole or in part.
No legend shall be marked on, nor shall any limitation on
rights of use be asserted as to, any data which the Con-
tractor has previously delivered to the Government with-
out restriction. The limited rights provided for by this
paragraph (b)(2) shall not impair the right of the Gov-
ernment to use similar or identical data acquired from
other sources.
(c) Material Covered by Copyright.
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of (b) above, the
Contractor agrees to and does hereby grant to the Govern-
ment, and to its officers, agents, and empioyees acting within
the scope of their official duties, a royalty free, nonexelu-
sive and irrevocable license throughout the world for Gov-
ernment purposes to publish, translate, reproduce, deliver,
perform, dispose of, and to authorize others so to do, all
technical data now or hereafter covered by copyright.
(2) No such copyrighted matter shall be ineluded in
technical data furnished hereunder without the written
permission of the copyright owner for the Government to
use such copyrighted matter in the manner described above.
(3) The Contractor shall report to the Government (or
higher-tier Contractor) promptly and in reasonable written
detail each notice or claim of copyright infringement re-
POOR COPY
PR RENDER AIOE ORE ME AE a OE REO ETI NE LOPE TES Rite 4 soa Ss B act - “y .
¢
:
B-34
ceived by the Contractor with respect to any technical data
delivered hereunder.
(d) Removal of Unauthorized Markings. Notwithstand-
ing any provisions of this contract concerning inspection
and acceptance, the Government may modify, remove,
obliterate, or ignore any marking not authorized by the
terms of this contract on any technical data furnished here-
under, if—
(i) the Contractor fails to respond within sixty (60)
days to a written inquiry by the Government concern-
ing the propriety of the use of the marking, or
(ii) the Contractor’s response fails to substantiate
his contention that the use of the marking is autho-
rized, in which case the Government shall give written
notice to the Contractor.
(e) Relation to Patents. Nothing contained in this clause
shall imply a license to the Government under any patent
or be construed as affecting the scope of any license or
other right otherwise granted to the Government under
any patent.
Contract CLAUSES
(f) Limitation on Charges for Data. The Contractor
reconizes that the Government, or a foreign government
with funds derived through the Military Assistance Pro-
gram or otherwise through the United States Government,
may contract for property or services with respect to
which the vendor may be liable to the Contractor for
charges for the use of technical data on account of such a
contract. The Contractor further recognizes that it is the
policy of the Government not to pay in connection with its
contracts, or to allow to be paid in connection with con-
tracts made with funds derived through the Military As-
sistance Program or otherwise through the United States
Government, charges for data which the Government has
: es ae ee ees ; het
ROR PRES SE EIN GET a rey Dae ES. SP EEN WELTER GINO INO REE TRES Opin, PEST. SEDER NE ete mer, nies
S Fs; OE IPS ¥. Pee
RI.
Perse 5.
B-35
a right to use and disclose to others, which is in the public
domain, or which the Government has been given without
restrictions upon its use and disclosure to others. This
policy does not apply to reasonable reproduction, handling,
mailing, and similar administrative costs incident to the
furnishing of such data. In recognition of this policy, the
Contractor agrees to participate in and make appropriate
arrangements for the exclusion of such charges from such
contracts, or for the refund of amounts received by the
Contractor with respect to any such charges not so ex-
cluded.
(g) Acquisition of Data from Subcontractors.
(1) Whenever any technical data is to be obtained from
a subcontractor under this contract, the Contractor shall
use this same clause in the subcontract, without alteration,
and no other clause shall be used to enlarge or diminish
the Government’s or the Contractor’s rights in that sub-
contractor data which is required for the Government.
(2) Technical data required to be delivered by a sub-
contractor shall normally be delivered to the next higher-
tier Contractor. However, when there is a requirement in
the prime contract, or in the deferred order, for data which
may be supplied with limited rights pursuant to (b) (2)
above, a subcontractor may fulfill such requirement by
submitting such data directly to the Government rather
than through the prime Contractor.
(3) The Contractor and higher-tier subcontractors wil]
not use their power to award subcontracts as economic
leverage to acquire rights in data from their subcontractors
for themselves.
(b) Notice of Certain Limited Rights. In accordance
with 9-203(c), add the following paragraph (h) to the
above Basic Data Clause.
(h) The Contractor will promptly notify the Contracting
Officer in writing of the intended use of the performance
SNAG AERO GOOLE POLES EOL LOGS SELES NULL EL GRE: NETO LION Bi
POOR COPY
ED THROUGH
B-36
of the contract of any end-item, compcenent, modification
or process for which the Contractor intends to furnish data
with limited rights; provided, that no such notice is re-
quired with respect to standard commercial items which
are manufactured by more than one source of supply or
with respect to data which the parties have specified in
the Schedule would be furnished with limited rights. Sub-
contractors will notify the next higher-tier Contractor.
(1965 FEB)
(c) Technical Data Clause—Specifie Acquisition. In ac-
cordance with 9-203(d), insert the following clause.
Ricuts 1s Tecunicat Data—Speciric ACQUISITION
(1964 May)
(a) Definition. Technical Data as used in this clause
means technical writings, sound recordings, pictorial re-
productions, drawings, or other graphic representations
and works of a technical nature, whether or not copy-
righted, which are specified to be delivered pursuant to
this contract. The term does not include financial reports,
cost analyses, and other information incidental to contract
administration.
(b) Government Rights. The Government may duplicate,
use and disclose in any manner and for any purpose what-
soever, and have others so do, all or any part of the tech-
nical data delivered by the Contractor to the Government
under this contract.
C-1
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING Company, Division oF
A-T-O Ixc., Plaintiff,
v.
Exuior L. Ricuarpson, et au., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 927-73
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On May 10, 1973, International Engineering Company,
a Division of A-T-O Inc. (Hereinafter IEC), instituted
this action on its claim that the Defendant, Robert C. Sea-
mans, Jr., the Secretary of the Air Force (hereinafter
referred to as Defendant or the Air Force), had acted
arbitrarily, capriciously, in violation of law and without
rational foundation, under Regulations promulgated under
the authority of Defendant, Elliot L. Richardson, Secre-
tary of Defense (hereinafter referred to as Defendant
Richardson or the Department of Defense), in the deter-
mination that the restrictive proprietary legend attached
to IKC’s final reports Nos. 70-06-04, 71-07 and 71-09 sub-
mitted to the Air Force under Contract No. F33657-69-C-
1290 would be stricken therefrom and that these reports
would be circulated outside the Government. In addition
to its Verified Complaint, IEC filed Motions for a Tem-
porary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction,
and a Memorandum in Support of Said Motions. By this
Complaint IEC sought a declaratory judgment and an
injunction restraining the Air Force against any further
action to remove the restrictive legend from IEC’s reports
and a determination by this Court of IEC’s proprietary
claim to technical data contained in those reports. On May
POOR COPY
COP ROPENIEC ENS
tien ane ra
C-2
10, 1973, the Office of the United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia arranged with the Air Force to pre-
vent the disclosure of Plaintiff’s reports to the public pend-
ing a hearing on IEC’s Motion for a Temporary Restrain-
ing Order. By a stipulation filed with this Court on May
15, 1973, Defendants agreed not to release any of LEC’s
reports pending a determination by this Court on LEC’s
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. IEC’s Complaint was
verified by Elmer M. Lipsey, President of IEC, and signed
by counsel and was submitted with Exhibits A through S
attached.
On May 14, 1973, IEC filed a Notice To Take Depositions
Upon the Oral Examination of W. C. Rustenburg and R.
E. Harsfield on June 12, 1973.
On May 30, 1973, the Government filed a Motion to Dis-
miss or in the Alternative a Motion for Summary Judg-
ment and Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
a Statement of Material Facts, Affidavits of Major Ronald
Basso and Raphael E. Harsfield, Government Exhibits A
through K, and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Al-
ternative Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition
to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On June
4, 1973, the Government filed a Motion for a Protective
Order to prevent TEC from taking the depositions of W.
C. Rustenburg and Raphael FE. Harsfield.
On June 11, 1973, IEC filed an Opposition to Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment,
an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Or-
der, a Statement of Genuine Issues pursuant to Rule 9(h)
of the Rules of this Court, an Affidavit of James M. Me-
Hale, and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Motion for
Summary Judgment and Motion for a Protective Order.
IEC’s Motion for a Prelimirary Injunction and the
Government’s Motion to Dismiss were set to be heard by
C-3
this Court on the morning of June 18, 1973. On June (4,
1973, the Government filed a ‘‘Reply to Plaintiff’s Oppo-
sition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Alterna-
tive for Summary Judgment.’’? This was not received by
IEC’s counsel until the afternoon of June 18, 1973. A hear-
ing was held in open court the morning of June 18, 1973.
On June 20, 1973, IEC filed a ‘‘Supplemental Memoran-
dum After Oral Argument in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss and in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
a Preliminary Injunction.’’ At the same time, IEC filed a
proposed set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Also, IEC filed Exhibit T which was entered into the
record.
On July 10, 1973 this Court issued an Order and a Memo-
randum Opinion. By this Order it was directed first that
the matter be remanded to the Contracting Officer for the
purpose of obtaining from him a statement of reasons for
his decision regarding the inadequacy of IEC’s submis-
sions. Second, this Order directed the parties to appear in
open court on July 31, 1973 for the purpose of oral argu-
ment on two points: a) the legal properiety of the Con-
tracting Officer’s reasons for his decision to eradicate the
restrictive legends here contested and b) the extent to
which the opportunity to be heard is required by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the contractual
procedure set forth in ASPR 7.104.9(a), Rights in Tech-
nical Data. Further, this Court ordered that the Defend-
ants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary
Judgment be denied without prejudice to renew said mo-
tion for summary judgment. And finally, this Court ordered
that Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order be denied.
On July 11, 1973 Plaintiff renewed his notice to take the
depositions of Messrs. W. C. Rustenburg and R. E. Hars-
field on July 23, 1973. At the Government’s request, their
depositions were actually taken on July 24, 1973.
POOR COPY
C-4
In accordance with the schedule established by this
Court’s July 10 Order, the Contracting Officer filed a State-
ment of Reasons for his 2 October 1972 Decision on July
20, 1973. Also in accordance with this Court’s schedule
established in its July 10, 1973 Order Plaintiff submitted
a response to the Contracting Officer’s Statement of Rea-
sons on July 26, 1973.
A hearing was held in open court on July 31, 1973. This
Court requested that parties submit further written ma-
terial regarding the questions posed by its Order of July
10, 1973. In accordance with the schedule established at
that hearing, Plaintiff submitted a Memorandum of Points
and Authorities addressing these questions on August 8,
1973. Defendants responded with a Supplemental Memo-
randum in Opposition to Motion of Plaintiff for a Pre-
liminary Injunction on August 13, 1973. On the basis of a
detailed consideration of all of the submissions and argu-
ments of all of the parties and the documentary exhibits,
the Verified Complaint and the depositions of Messrs.
Harsfield and Rustenburg, this Court makes the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support of its
Order entered this same day granting the Plaintiff’s Mo-
tion for a Preliminary Injunction.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff, International Engineering Co., a Division of
A-T-O, Ine. (hereinafter IEC, is a corporation incorporated
under the laws of the State of Ohio with its principal place
of business in the State of Ohio. IEC has offices in Spring-
field, Virginia.
2. Defendant, Elliot L. Richardson, was the Secretary of
Defense, with authority over activities of the Department
of Defense including procurement matters and the promul-
gation of the Armed Service Procurement Regulations,
and Defendant, Robert C. Seamans, Jr., was the Secretary,
Department of the Air Force, with authority over activities
C-5
of the Department of the Air Force including procurement
matters at the time this suit was filed. Presently James
Schlesinger has succeeded Mr. Richardson and John Me-
Lucas was succeeded Mr. Seamans. The caption of this case
is hereby ordered, pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to be amended to acknowledge
such substitution.
3. In late 1967, IEC conceived a system for guiding bombs
or missiles with Loran C/D involving processes and certain
components not developed with Government Funds (see
Verified Complaint, Paragraph 5). The processes and the
performance characteristics of the components were spelled
out in detail in IEC Technical Proposal 101-68, dated Feb-
raary 3, 1968, which was submitted to the Air Force on
February 8, 1968 with a restrictive legend.
4. At that time the Air Force considered IEC’s is«port
‘‘proprietary’’ in that it described processes and compon-
ents not developed at Government expense or generally
available in the industry (see Rustenberg Deposition, Page
5).
5. In the one and one-half year period from January
1968 through June 1969, IEC incorporated its processes
into certain components which existed as identifiable hard-
ware prior to July 7, 1969 (see Verified Complaint, Para-
graphs 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15, Independent Audit Report,
Rustenberg Deposition, Page 5).
6. On July 7, 1969, IEC entered into a contract with the
Air Force to modify its system for test in a helieppter and
to perform certain laboratory and flight tests. That Con-
tract provided that the modified hardware system would
remain the sole property of IEC and that IEC would only
deliver to the Air Force Integration Design Data and a
Final Report (see Plaintiff’s Exhibit D, Defendants’ Exhi-
bit D, DD Form 1423 attached to the original Contract).
The only information required on the hardware to be used
in the tests is set forth at Paragraph (b)4 of T-119 incor-
a
so
ee
ERE PMT MN eer
i ci
C-6
porated by reference into the DD 1423 Test Report require-
ment as follows:
**(4) Description of test article, including test config-
uration identification and photographs as appropri-
ate.’’? (Defendants’ Exhibit E.)
7. Also, in the two and one-half year period of January
1968 through June 30, 1970, IEC developed an advanced
circuitry Loran C/D Navigation System.
That system was demonstrated for over 300 hours in an
Aerocommander aircraft by IEC in that time period (see
Verified Complaint, Paragraphs 24, 25, 26 and 28, Inde-
pendent Audit Report) and generally proved to be effective
(see Rustenburg Deposition, Pages 38-40).
8. By Modification P00003 to the Contract, the Air Force
had IEC integrate these already existing components of
IEC’s Aerocommander Flight System into a Hybrid
KMU353A/B Guided Bomb Simulation Test System (see
Verified Complaint, Paragraph 30, Plaintiff’s Exhibit G,
Rustenburg Deposition, Page 40). Again, IEC retained its
hardware, and only Test Reports were to be provided to
the Air Force under the Contract.
9. In late 1969 efforts were made at the Aeronautical
Systems Division, AFSC at Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base to initiate competitive procurements based on IEC’s
processes and components. IEC protested to the Office of
the Secretary of the Air Force on the basis ef IEC’s pro-
prietary interests in these items. Mr. John Walsh, Deputy
to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, R&D, con-
vened a meeting at Wright-Patterson Air Foree Base on
January 19, 1970, which Mr. Rustenburg attended to dis-
cuss the impact of IEC’s claims on competitive procure-
ment. Subsequently, attempts at competitive procurement
were abandoned (see Rustenburg Deposition, Page 19).
10. Mr. Rustenburg was clearly aware of IEC’s claim to
protection of its data pertaining to components developed
C-7
at private expense and subsequently integrated into the test
system at the time he asked IEC to provide additional data
in connection with the Loran Guided Bomb project. In a
memorandum dated March 4, 1971, in which he commented
on a competitive proposal that he rated very highly, Mr.
Rustenburg said:
“‘Tf it is decided that IEC’s claims of proprietary data
are invalid then it is proposed that the LSI proposal
be funded.’’ (Rustenburg Deposition, Exhibit 1.)
11. In late March 1971, Mr. Rustenburg asked IEC for a
detailed description of the hardware used in the Helicopter
and KMU353A/B Bomb Simulation Test Programs includ-
ing a detailed description of the internal operations in terms
of mathematical equations and logic diagrams of IEC’s
precontract components. (See Rustenburg Deposition, Page
29, Verified Complaint, Paragraph 34.) Mr. Rustenburg
explained that this information would be helpful to the Air
Force in evaluating the test results (sce Rustenburg Dep-
osition, Pages, 29, 34-36).
12. IEC considered this as an Air Force request for in-
formation for evaluation purposes only and while under no
contractual duty to do so, provided the Air Force with Tech-
nical Report 71-05 which bore a restrictive legend appro-
priate for information voluntarily submitted to the Air
Force. Because Mr. Rustenburg asked that this same infor-
mation be incorporated into all Final Reports for the same
reason, Report 70-06-04, which contained the same informa-
tion in addition to KMU353A/B Bomb Simulation test re-
sults, was submitted with the same legend. (See Verified
Complaint, Paragraphs 35 and 36.) The Air Force has never
questioned the restrictive legend on Report 71-05. (See Rus-
tenburg Deposition, Page 30.)
13. By letter of April 19, 1971, the Contracting Officer in-
formed IKC that it had used the wrong form of restrictive
legend on Report 70-06-4 in that
EP NSF MEETS. a |
CAEN >
C-8
‘‘This final report is not a proposal but rather a re-
quirement of the contract.’’
The Contracting Officer did not indicate that a restrictive
legend was not authorized under the Contract; he simply
referred IEC to ASPR 7-104.9(a) which sets forth the ap-
propriate restrictive legends for Contract End Items (see
Plaintiff’s Exhibit H).
14. On May 28, 1971, near the end of the sixty (60) day
period for correction of legends under ASPR 9-202.3(d)
(3), the Contracting Officer reminded IEC of his April 17,
1971 letter and noted that:
‘At the date of this writing we have not received
your reply and unless it is forthwith submitted, the
legend will be removed and the contractor forfeits any
rights of appeal.’’
15. IEC responded to the Contracting Officer’s letters of
April 19, 1971 and of May 28, 1971, on June 15, 1971, within
the sixty (60) day period allowed by ASPR 9-202.3(d) (3).
In that letter IEC explained that the IEC LOMISS Sub-
system was included at the Government’s request in the
KMU353A/B Bomb Simulation Test System and that the
subsystem ‘‘was developed and built at contractor expense,
and has been made available for this effort on a no charge
loan basis.’’ Further, IEC explained that the Contract re-
quirements could have been met without inclusion of de-
tailed information on this subsystem data, but that it was
specifically requested by Air Force personnel to provide
them with a more meaningful report. Finally, IEC recom-
mended an amendment of the legend as set forth in Clause
21 of the Contract, but stated that if this was unacceptable
to the Air Force ‘‘the detailed subsystem descriptions re-
quire appropriate revision.’’ (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit J.)
16. The Air Force did not respond to IEC’s letter at all.
The Air Force did not return the report to IEC for revision
be ROA RE ae ao.
C-9
even though the present Contracting Officer concedes that
the report was the sole property of IEC at that time. (See
Harsfield Deposition, Page 23.) Nor did the Air Force in-
voke its right to withhold partial payment from IEC under
the Technical Data—Withholding of Payment (1966 Octo-
ber) Clause of the Contract.
17. The Air Force accepted IEC’s correction of the legend
and accepted IEC Report 70-06-4 with the Amended Legend
on a DD Form 250 dated July 7, 1971. As a result of that
acceptance IEC reasonably believed that the rights in data
question had been resolved and similar treatment would be
afforded future reports containing the same detailed infor-
mation on the IEC privately-developed processes and com-
ponents described in Report 70-06-4. (See Verified Com-
plaint, Paragraph 45.)
18. After receiving IEC’s Report No. 70-06-4 in April of
1971, Mr. Rustenburg accompanied the Contracting Officer
to a meeting with the Legal Officer and showed him the
report. At that time the Legal Officer concluded ‘‘that it
[Report No. 70-06-4] was not ‘proprietary’ ’’. However,
Mr. Rustenburg does not know on what the Legal Officer
based his opinion. Nor did Mr. Rustenburg indicate the date
of this meeting. (See Rustenburg Deposition, Pages 41 and
50.)
19. Mr. Rustenburg reviewed IEC’s letter of June 15,
1971 at the Contracting Officer’s request and provided writ-
ten comments in a memo of July 1, 1971. (See Attachment
1 to Exhibit 1 to Harsfield Deposition.)
20. In a subsequent verbal contact between Mr. Rusten-
burg and the Contracting Officer, it was decided that the
Rights in Data matter be dropped since in Report 70-06-4:
‘*. . . the issuance of P00006 directing a continuation
of the effort initiated under P00003 constituted a tacit
acceptance by the Government.’’ (Exhibit 1 to Hars-
field Deposition.)
POOR COPY
—
|
|
|
t Leth ean
Vie
epee
SSP 6. FE LID OL A EA OR LAI A BO
C-10
21. On October 15, 1971, IEC submitted Report 71-07 to
the Air Force; this report described the results of testing
under the original Contract. It contained, at the Air Force's
request, the same detailed information on the internal op-
erations of IEC developed components as was submitted in
Reports 71-07 and 70-06-4. Accordingly, TEC officials had
no reason to doubt that a restrictive legend limiting the use
of the report to internal Government purposes would be
acceptable. Again, the Government described the need for
the data for Air Force evaluation purposes and not for dis-
closure to its competitors. Again, Mr. Rustenburg reviewed
the report as technical advisor to the new Contracting Ofii-
cer, Mr. Harsfieid (see Rustenburg Deposition, Page 41).
No objection was raised to the restrictive legend and the
report was accepted as submitted,
22. On December 10, 1971, IEC submitted Final Report
71-09 on the original Contract and all modifications. That
report contained all of the information in Report 70-06-4 in-
cluding the same detailed description of the internal opera-
tions of the IEC developed processes and components. (See
Verified Complaint, Paragraph 49.) This report was marked
with a restrictive use legend on the data pertaining to the
detailed description of those components that IEC devel-
oped entirely at its own expense.
28. After the Contract was transferred from ASD to
ESD, a buyer reviewed the Contract file and advised the
new Contracting Officer, Mr. Harsfield, that:
** .. there had been some problem about the prior con-
tracting officer and the affixing of the proprietary data
on other documents within the contract.’’
The Contracting Officer doesn’t know whether this was be-
fore or after submission of Report 71-09 (see Harsfield
Deposition, Page 5). The Contracting Officer indicates that
the buyer probably received some information on this sub-
ject from Mr. Rustenburg (see Harsfield Deposition, Page
C-11
6). Beyond these facts Mr. Harsfield disclaims any personal
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding his letter of
December 28, 1971, in whieh he questioned the restrictive
legend on Report 71-09, However, he does recall receiving
a letter or report that backs up his letter (see Harsfield
Deposition, Page 7). At the depositions taken on July 24,
1978, Defendants Promised to provide Plaintiff with this
letter (see Harsfield Deposition, Pages 84-85), This letter
has not yet been filed with this Court.
24. The letter of December 28, 1971 (see Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit K) referred again to ASPR 7-104.9 which contains
the limited rights legend for contract end items. The letter
contained no statement that ‘‘Limited Rights’’ protection
would not be appropriate and no Findings of Fact or Con-
clusions of Law were offered, Recommendations were
made that IEC remove proprietary markings or furnish
substantiation to the contrary and a reply was requested
by January 5, 1979.
25. IEC replied by letter of January 5, 1972 (see Plain-
tiff’s Exhibit L). In that reply IEC reconstructed the pre-
contract events and developments and the prior history
of the rights in data question as explained in their earlier
correspondence with the prior Contracting Officer, Mr,
Hathaway. IRC pointed to the acceptance of Reports 70-
06-4 and 71-07 with restrictive legends after the rights in
data issue had surfaced as the basis for their belief that
the matter had been resolved. Finally, IEC Stated that if
the placement of the legend on the data Was not acceptable
to the Air Foree, IEC wanted the Reports back so it could
make appropriate revisions to the detailed subsystem de-
scriptions,
26. The Air Force did not return IEC’s Reports; nor did
the Air Force exercise its rights under the Technical Data
—Withholding of Payments Clause. During the five month
period between January and June, 1972, Mr. Harsfield’s
only action to resolve the matter was to request a one (1)
GR A ath ae Rte rr
Bil Re CIEL SE HIE AOE AE
Vee S
ee
be Seriatis ads La D taain ae OPOe Bie PAL AR nt DDE
CO Ee ee oi
pet
Bisse
C-12
page report from Mr. Rustenburg (see Harsfield Deposi-
tion, Page 17 and Exhibit 1).
27. Also a DD 250 accepting Report 71-09 was prepared
by Mr. Rustenburg, but it was not mailed to IEC. (See
Harsfield Deposition, pages 22-25.)
28. The Air Force replied to IEC’s January 5, 1972 letter
by a letter signed by Mr. Harsfield and dated June 5, 1972.
(See Plaintiff’s Exhibit M.) This letter does not respond
to any of the factual allegations made by IEC five months
earlier. It does not make any finding as to whether a re-
strictive legend is authorized by the Contract. This letter
concludes that IEC’s January 5, 1972 response to the Con-
tracting Officer’s letter of December 28, 1971 ‘‘fails to
justify the use of this legend or show that any restriction
is authorized.’’ The Contracting Officer then without any
prior notice to IEC, directed the obliteration of the legend
on Reports 71-09 and 70-06-4 on the grounds that:
‘* |. no response satisfactorily justifying use of this
or any other restrictive legend has been received from
the Contractor.’’
Again, no findings were made as to whether a restrictive
legend was authorized under the Contract. Finally Mr.
Harsfield, informed the Contractor that he had ‘‘author-
ized data in the above-mentioned reports to be used with
unlimited rights.’’
29. As soon as the Contracting Officer’s letter of June
5, 1972 was received at IEC, counsel was immediately con-
sulted and a telephone appeal was made to the Secretary
of the Air Force, followed on June 9, 1972 by TWXs to
ESD and the Office of the Secretary requesting continued
limited rights protection under ASPR 9-202.3(d). (See
Plaintiff’s Exhibit N.) It was agreed that the matter would
be further discussed with ESD and that the final decision
would be made in the Office of the Secretary of the Air
—
Ry
a
id igOe To
C-13
Foree. A meeting was set up at ESD “to discuss the
proprietary rights question,’’ and the reports were af-
forded limited rights protection until further notice (See
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 0).
30. On June 26, 1972 a two-hour meeting was held at
ESD. Mr. Harsfield made a brief introduction in which he
stated that the purpose of the meeting was simply to dis-
cuss the problem and that no decision would be reached
by ESD, but that ESD would merely provide their com-
ments to the Secretary of the Air Force through Command
channels (see Harsfield Deposition, Exhibit 2).
31. Mr. Lipsey, IEC’s president, provided the attendees
with an outline of an oral presentation (see, Attachment 1
to Harsfield Affidavit dated May 16, 1973). Mr. Lipsey’s
nearly two-hour oral presentation was made in the form
of a historical narrative of IEC’s development of the
processes and components in question and the events that
subsequently occurred under the Contract. References were
made to items in the Air Force’s contract file and IEC
made a request for a Defense Contract Audit Agency
audit of all its books and records to establish the fund-
ing of development of specific components. TEC also re-
quested the return of its reports for limited rights legend.
In substance all of the material set forth in IEC counsel’s
letter of February 8, 1973 was presented at the June 26,
1972 meeting. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 8, Page 1 and Hars-
field Deposition, Page 84.) Even though Mr. Harsfield had
been furnished information from his technical advisors that
contract funds were used to complete the development of
the units involved, he did not confront IEC with these
allegations and he did not ask IEC for any specific or de-
tailed information in connection with any specific allega-
tion raised by his legal or technical advisors. (See Hars-
field Deposition, Pages 76-77.) Not only did Mr. Harsfiela
decline to question or comment on TEC’s presentation, but
his Technical Advisor also remained silent upon the advice
of Mr. Tracey, the ESD counsel. Thus the basis for the
C-14
Air Force’s claim to TEC’s data was not disclosed to TEC.
(See Rustenburg Deposition, Pages 55-56.)
32. At the close of TEC’s presentation, Mr. Harsfield
made some closing remarks in which he asked Mr. Lipsey
to provide an indication of what material on each page was
‘*proprietary’’ and a written narrative history of the de-
velopment of the processes and components alleged to
have been developed at IEC expense so that it could be
forwarded to higher headquarters. (See Exhibit 2 to Hars-
field Deposition.)
33. By letter of June 30, 1972 that Mr. Lipsey carried to
Hanscom Field, Mr. Lipsey submitted more specifically
marked copies of the Reports in question on July 4, 1972.
He then stated that he would attempt to provide a written
narrative of the development information provided at the
meeting by July 17, 1972. (See Verified Complaint, para-
graph 59.)
34. On July 13, 1972, the Contracting Officer agreed to
treat the Reports with limited rights ‘‘until an ultimate
decision is rendered as to whether data under question
is in fact ‘Limited’ or ‘unlimited.’ ’’ (See Defendants’
Exhibit I.)
35. Before any decision on the merits of the Rights in
Data question either at ESD, AFSC, Headquarters USFA,
or the Secretary of the Air Force, or complying with IEC’s
request for return of its Reports, Mr. Rustenburg executed
and Mr. Harsfield forwarded to TEC a DD 250 final ac-
ceptance on the Contract. Final payment followed quickly
and was accomplished by the Air Force at the end of
September 1972. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit T, Items 2 and 3.)
36. Immediately after final payment was made and the
Contract was closed-out, the Contracting Officer issued his
letter of October 5, 1972 (see Defendants’ Exhibit J) with-
drawing his letter of July 18, 1972 and again directing un-
limited use of the Reports in question. Mr. Harsfield made
no finding as to whether the data should be ‘‘limited’’ or
C-15
‘‘unlimited’’ under the terms of the Contract and no re-
view of his decision was undertaken at AFSC, Headquar-
ters USAF or the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
before it was issued (see Harsfield Deposition, Page 55.)
37. Before release of Reports by the Defense Documen-
tation Center (DDC), telegrams were dispatched to the
Director of DDC and the Office of the Secretary of the
Air Force protesting release of the Reports prior to a
decision on the merits of the Rights in Data question at
the Secretary of the Air Force level. On December 27.
1972, Mr. Sowder, Director of Technical Services, DDC,
confirmed to IEC counsel that the Reports had not and
would not be released pending a decision on the merits
of the Rights in Data question. (See Exhibit 2 attached to
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of August 8, 1973.)
38. Mr. Rustenburg and Mr. Tracey, ESD counsel, came
to Washington, D.C. in early January 1973, to make a
presentation to Headquarters AFSC on their actions in
this matter. The ‘ontracting Officer, Mr. Harsfield, did not
attend that preseiiation. Mr. Prahinski, AFSC counsel, and
Major Basso and others heard the presentation. That same
afternoon Air Force officials from the Pentagon eame over
to AFSC and the same presentation was made. However,
Mr. Reichart, the cognizant Assistant General Counsel of
the Air Force, was not present and Mr. Rustenburg can-
not identify any of the Pentagon attendees. No decision
was reached at that meeting. (See Rustenburg Deposition,
Pages 59-60.)
39. Apparently as a result of the morning meeting, Head-
quarters AFSC concluded that the ESD action was proper
and recommended that the Chief of Staff send IEC a tele-
gram to the effect that AFSC and Headquarters USAF
had reviewed the ESD action and found it proper and that
as a result no meetings planned with the Office of the
Secretary would be warranted and that the DDO “hold”?
on the reports should be released. (See AFSC TW X, Ex-
hibit 3, to Harsfield Deposition.) That TWX also requested
i
4
s
a
£
$
2
i
i
C-16
permission to immediately order DDC to release the Re-
ports in question,
40. Apparently, Headquarters USAF disagreed with
AFSC since no telegram was sent and the meetings at the
Secretary of the Air Force level were held. Further, DDC
did not release the Reports but instead returned them to
ESD (see Rustenburg Deposition, pages 61-68).
41. IEC’s counsel met with Mr. Reichart, Counsel to
the Secretary of the Air Force in late January 1973. Rep-
resentatives of Headquarters USAF and AFSC were pres-
ent. At Mr. Reichart’s request, counsel for IEC prepared
the written narrative and position paper dated February
8, 1973 (see Plaintiff’s Exhibit S) for Mr. Reichart’s re-
view and consideration.
42. On March 16, 1973, the Chief of Staff of the Air
Force responded to AFSC’s January TWX. (See Hars-
field Deposition, Exhibit 4.) By that TWX, AFSC was
authorized ‘‘to make final decision with respect to...
[IEC’s] claim to proprietary rights under LOMISS Con-
tract.’’
However the Chief of Staff directed that
‘*As recommended by SAF/GC, consideration will be
given to information contained in IEC letter to SAF/
GC, same subject dated 8 February 1973.’
43. Apparently, AFSC redelegated the matter back to
ESD and the Contracting Officer to review his own ac-
tions and make a final decision on the merits of IEQ’s
claim to limited rights protection under the Contract. (See
Rustenburg Deposition, Pages 62-64.) Mr. Harsfield did
not review the matter and did not read the February 8,
1973 letter before the filing of this litigation. (See Hars-
field Deposition, Pages 118-119.) Mr. Rustenburg, how-
ever, read the February 8 letter. He spent perhaps 15
minutes glancing at the 50-page letter and concluded only
C-17
that it contained no technical information. (See Rusten-
burg Deposition, Pages 63-65.)
44. The Reports have been returned from DDC and are
in Mr. Rustenburg’s custody and have not been released
outside the Government. (See Rustenburg Deposition, Page
61.)
45. The same data is marked as restricted in all reports.
That data pertains to the internal functioning of the com-
ponents developed by ITEC outside the Contract and later
incorporated into the Contract test systems on a loan basis.
Release of this information, mathematical equations and
logic diagrams, would enable another competent manu-
facturer to make a component to perform the same fune-
tion (see Rustenberg Deposition, Pages 90-93).
46. Mr. Rustenburg believes and always has believed
that the word ‘‘function’’ as used in the terms ‘*form, fit
and function’? in ASPR 9-203(b)-(b)(1)(iv) relates not
only to the input and output of a component but relates
to the internal operation as well. All of his advice to the
Contracting Officer at ESD, AFSC and Headquarters
USAF was based on that belief. (See Rustenburg Deposi-
tion, page 94.)
47. Nevertheless, with the internal equations and logic
diagrams, reproduction of a similar component would be
simple and thus release of this information would eradicate
IEC’s competitive advantage in this field. (See Rusten-
burg Deposition, Page 95.)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter of this action. 28 U.S.C. §¢ 1331, 1361, 2201
and 2202. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
2. The Administrative Procedure Act provides a basis
for subject matter jurisdiction in this suit and thus sov-
ereign immunity is waived. See Scanwell Laboratories,
C-18
Inc. v. Shaffer, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 371, 424 F.2d 859
(1970).
3. The Contracting Officer’s decisions of June 5, 1972
and October 2, 1972 directing the obliteration of certain
restrictive legends and authorizing that IEC’s data be
used with unlimited rights were erroneous as a matter of
law and were violative of plaintiff’s procedural due proc-
ess rights under the ASPR 7-104.9(d). The Air Force never
ordered data pertaining to the internal operations of any
of the components of either of these systems tested under
the Contract and therefore never acquired any rights in
the data marked by a restrictive legend. (See Mil-Std-831
and Data Item Description T-119 incorporated by reference
into DD1423 attached to Air Foree Contract F33657-69-C-
1290 and made a part thereof.)
4. The Air Force is estopped to deny IEC’s rights in
data position since IEC relied on the Air Force’s informed
acquiescence to IEC’s position on Report 70-06-04 when
the Air Force denied IEC the opportunity to revise that
report so as to delete the data on which it placed the re-
strictive rights legend. The Air Force subsequently denied
IEC’s request to perform a similar revision on Reports 71-
07 and 71-09. See United States v. Georgia Pacific Company,
421 F.2d 92 at 96 (9th Cir. 1970) ; Manloading and Manage-
ment Associates v. U.S., 198 Ct. Cl. 628, 461 F.2d 1299
(1972); Branch Banking and Trust Company v. United
States, 120 Ct. Cl. 72, 98 F. Supp. 757 (1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 893 (1951); Covington Industries, Inc., ASBCA
No. 12426, 68-2 BCA { 7286; and 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel
and Waiver, § 28.
5. ASPR requires that the data IEC marked with a re-
strictive legend pertaining to the internal operation of
components and processes developed at IEC’s expense be
afforded ‘‘limited rights’’ protection. The Air Force ecan-
not claim any rights in IEC’s data under ASPR 7-104.9
(b)(1)(iv) which refers to ‘‘form, fit and function data.’’
C-19
‘* ‘Form, fit and function’ data [is] data used in iden-
tifying various characteristics of an item, but ordi-
narily not disclosing manufacturing information.”’
See ‘‘The Department of Defense’s Dissemination to the
General Public of Data Acquired Under **Contract,”’ a
speech given by Lawrence Glassman, Chief Opinions
Branch, Patent Law Division, Office of the General Coun-
sel, U.S. Army Material Command, Washington, D.C., to
the Washington, D.C. Chapter of the National Contract
Management Association on April 19, 1972. (A copy of this
was attached to Plaintiff’s August 8, 1973 memorandum as
Exhibit 5).
6. Because of the violations of law in this case there was
no valid legal basis for the Air Force’s determination to
strike the restrictive legend from IECQ’s data.
7. Inasmuch as the Air Force’s determination to strike
the restrictive legend from IEC’s data was based on an
invalid action by the Defendants, there is a very strong
likelihood of success by IEC in its claim to ‘‘limited rights’?
protection for the data in dispute herein.
8. IEC has no adequate remedy at law to protect itself
from the devastating effect of the threatened disclosure of
the data pertaining to the processes and components de-
veloped at TEC’s expense and included in reports 71-05,
70-06-04, 71-07 and 71-09 at the Air Force’s request, Pro-
tection of trade secrets has traditionally provided a basis
for injunctive relief. (See Milgram, Trade Secrets, § 1.09).
This concept of irreparable injury arising out of mere dis-
closure of a trade secret has been specifically incorporated
into ASPR. See ASPR § 9-201.1(b). Moreover, the Comp-
troller General has consistently applied a form of injune-
tive relief to cases within his jurisdiction by directing the
cancellation of solicitations which will result in unauthor-
ized disclosure of information submitted under a restric-
tive legend. Gayston Corp., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-143711 (Dee.
ay a
Ucar th Santa Naaetg 1 CLI MEA. Hee LEG as Aiea gtk TE a he TM
BAAR LONE Cth QPOD bith Ds
C-20
22, 1960) (unpublished) ; Aircraftsmen, Inc., 41 Comp. Gen.,
148 (1961) ; Bausch Associates, Inc., Comp. Gen. 346 (1968) ;
see generally, Patents and Technical Data, George Wash-
ington University, Government Contracts Monograph No.
10, pages 174-178 (1967). Most importantly, a suit in the
Court of Claims for money damages is not an adequate
remedy for the injury caused by disclosure of a trade
secret. In addition, the Court of Claims has never awarded
money damages on the basis of a mere unauthorized dis-
closure of ‘‘proprietary data.’’ The conclusion that no
remedy, not even an inadequate remedy exists at law for
the specifie injury threatened here is supported by the
conclusion of a Government Commission benefitting from
two years of extensive research. (Sce Report of the Com-
mission on Gove nment Procurement, Vol. 4, page 131.)
9. IEC will sufie. irreparable injury if the restrictive
rights legend is stricken from its data and its data dissem-
inated to the public through the Defense Documentation
Center. The property right in a trade secret, such as IEC
claims in the technical data herein, disappears upon dis-
closure. See Milgrim, Trade Secrets, § 1.09.
10. It is most unlikely that any interested party will
suffer substantial harm as a result of this Court’s enjoin-
ing Defendants from disclosing the technical data to which
IEC has attached a restrictive rights legend. IEC’s data
has value for Defendants only to the extent that it can be
used for the evaluation of future development and procure-
ment of bomb systems. This purpose can be served under
the ‘‘limited rights’’ protection requested by IEC since
internal Government use is clearly allowed. If subsequently
it becomes necessary to obtain this information and pro-
vide it to other contractors, IEC’s offer to negotiate a sale
of this data under ASPR 9-202.2(f) provides adequate pro-
tection to the Defendants.
11. Restraining Defendants from disclosing TEC’s tech-
nical data to which IEC has attached a restrictive rights
C-21
legend is in the public interest. This Court has concluded
that the disclosure of IEC’s technical data to which it has
attached a propriety legend would be invalid and illegal.
Clearly the effect of such a disclosure on the wider pro-
curement community engaged in providing goods and serv-
ices to the Government would be devastating. Indeed,
ASPR 9-202.1(¢) recognizes the contractor’s interest in
protecting his data. Thus if IEC’s technical data could be
disclosed without regard to IEC’s due process rights, all
other Government contractors would be put on notice that
they can be likewise wronged if they make an attempt to
cooperate with Government officials by providing them with
useful information to which they claim a limited rights
interest. (See Report of the Commission on Government
Procurement, Vol. 4, Chapter 3 (1972)).
12. According full and proper weight to all pertinent
factors and considerations, including the decisions of the
Court of Appeals in inter alia, Virginia Petroleum Jobbers
Association v. FPC, 104 U.S.App. D.C. 106, 259 F.2d 921,
925 (1958), Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chaffee, 455 F.2d 1306
(D.C. Cir. 1971), M. Steinthal and Co., Inc. v. Seamans, 455
F.2d 1829 (D.C. Cir. 1971), Scanwell Laboratories, Inc.
Shaffer, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 371, 424 F.2d 859 (1970), and
more recently Murray v. Kunziqg, 462 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir.
1972) and Horne Bros., Inc. v. Laird, 462 F.2d 1268 (D.C.
1972), this Court has concluded that a preliminary injune-
tion should be issued directing defendants not to strike the
limited rights legend from IEC’s Reports Nos. 70-06-04, 71-
07, 71-09, until this Court has had the opportunity to render
a decision on the merits of IEC’s Complaint for a Declara-
tory Judgment.
‘ /s/ Crarues R. Ricuey
Charles R. Richey
United States District Judge
Dated: October 23, 1973
D-1
APPENDIX D
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING Company, Plaintiff,
v.
Exot L. Ricwarpson, er av., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 927-73.
July 10, 1973.
Memorandum Opinion
Cuar.es R. Ricuey, District J udge.
INTRODUCTION
This action arose out of a Complaint for a Declaratory
Judgment and Injunctive Relief under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331
ind the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 702) by
laintiff, International Engineering Company (hereinafter
EC or Plaintiff) against Defendants, Elliot Richardson,
secretary of Defense and Robert Seamans, Jr., Secretary
f the Air Force (hereinafter Government or Defendants).
laintiff seeks equitable relief to restrain Defendants from
eleasing to the Defense Documentation Center three Final
‘echnical Reports delivered by Plaintiff to the Air Force in
onnection with Government Contract F33657-69-C-1290
hereinafter referred to as Contract). Plaintiff delivered
he Reports with Restrictive Legends affixed that purported
0 limit the Government’s use of the research data con-
nined therein to circulation among Government Agencies
nly. Plaintiff alleges that it has a ‘*proprietary”’ interest
1 portions of the Reports and that the Contracting Offi-
er’s decision to the contrary reflected an unconstitutional
pplication of the Armed Services Procurement Regula-
| Soret
1-2
tions by depriving IEC of the due process to which it was
entitled. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that if the Armed
Services Procurement Regulations permit the Contracting
Officer to remove IEC’s ‘‘proprietary’’ legend without re-
quiring a hearing, such regulations violate the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Air Foree contends
that Plaintiff was afforded adequate due process consistent
with Armed Forces Regulation (ASPR) § 7-104.9(a), Rights
in Technical Data, incorporated by reference into the Con-
tract. Defendant urges that the technical data in issue is
part of the very material for which the Government con-
tracted and paid, and that the Government has every right
to distribute it to other Defense Department contractors.
Plaintiff seeks a Preliminary Injunction and Defendants
seek to have the Court dismiss the suit, or enter Summary
Judgment in their favor. Plaintiff additionally wants to
depose two Air Force officials but agrees to delay the depo-
sitions pending resolution of Defendant’s Motion to Dis-
miss.
Before turning to the questions presented, several facts
should be mentioned. On February 8, 1968, TEC submitted
a technical proposal to the Air Force reflecting LEC’s de-
velopment to date of a process for guiding bombs or missiles
with a Loran C’/D system (hereinafter LOMISS). As a
result of the proposal, the Air Force entered into a contract
with IEC effective May 29, 1969 to provide final and interim
reports of a flight test evalution of the LOMISS system,
From a data certificate executed by the parties March 8,
1969 and not included in the express terms of the Contract,
it appears that IEC agreed to furnish with unlimited rights
to the Government the information required to comply with
the initial data requirements of the Contract. The Contract
included at Part V a clause entitled ‘‘Data Provisions”’
which purported to delineate the rights of the parties in
data under the Contract to the exclusion of any documents
not expressly provided for in the Contract. The most im-
portant Contract provision relating to the respective rights
in data was ASPR § 7-104.9(d), incorporated by reference
D-3
into the Contract, with the pertinent provisions set forth
as follows:
**(d) Unmarked or Improperly Marked Technical Data
(1) Technical data received without a restrictive legend
shall be deemed to have been furnished with unlimited
rights. However, the contracting officer may permit the
contractor to place a restrictive legend on such data
within six months of its delivery if the contractor demon-
strates that the omission of the legend was inadvertent
and the use of the legend is authorized.
(2) Technical data received with a restrictive legend
not permitted by the terms of the contract shall be used
with limited rights pending inquiry to the contractor
whose name appears on the data as the originator. If
no response to a properly directed inquiry has been re-
ceived within 60 days, or if the response fails to show
that the restriction was authorized, the cognizant Gov-
ernment personnel shall obliterate such legend, notify
the contracior accordingly, and thereafter may use such
data as if it were acquired with unlimited rights.’’
The above Rights in Technical Data clause also provides
that INC would have a property interest in and that Air
Force would have only limited rights to the following:
“*. .. technical data pertaining to items, components, or
processes developed at private expense.’? ASPR 7-104.9
(a).
Under the ‘“‘Limited Rights’? provision, the Government
is entitled to circulate technical data generated at TEC’s
expense among Government personnel but not among Gov-
ernment contractors in competition with TEC,
This Contract was modified twice in 1970 and 1971 to
involve testing of more recently developed TEC processes
and components. At the time the Final Report under the
OT Te sc Tt o
2 ah ADIGE ALR selade eA RR cee |
4
;
‘
2
5
¢
%
-
D-4
first contract modification was to be filed, the Air Force
Project Engineer requested IEC to provide information
on processes and components to facilitate the Air Force’s
evaluation of the results of the simulation test program.
IKC responded by providing such information in the Final
Report but affixed to it a ‘‘Proprietary Notice’’ indicating
IEC developed this data at private expense. On two other
occasions IEC submitted Final Reports containing what
IEC considered extra-contractual information on processes
and components. Accordingly, restrictive legends indicat-
ing a proprietary interest were marked on the material.
After submission of the first report and, again, after the
later reports were given to the Government, the Contract-
ing Officer notified IEC by letter that the Air Force had
‘‘unlimited rights’’ to the Final Reports necessitating the
removal of the restrictive legends unless INC furnished
substantiation of its ‘‘proprietary notice.’’ On June 26,
1972 the Contracting Officer met with IEC representatives
to provide them with the opportunity to substantiate the
‘limited rights’’ legends contained in the three Final Re-
ports. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Contracting
Officer stated that IEC still had failed to substantiate its
claim and that further material should be submitted. IEC
failed to submit more information by July 17, 1972, as
promised. On October 2, 1972, the Contracting Officer in-
formed TEC that the Government would treat the data with
‘‘unlimited rights.’’ By agreement, the Government will
treat the data in question with ‘‘limited rights’? pending
a decision by the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for a Prelim-
inary Injunction.
Questions PRESENTED
1. Whether the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject
matter of this suit?, and
2. Whether the Contracting Officer’s failure to state
reasons for his decision to eradicate TEC’s restrictive leg-
ends frustrates effective judicial review?
(Saree
icbcve:
D-5
PE as .
ConcLusions
1. The Applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act
Serves as a Waiver of Sovereign Immunity,
As a threshold matter in this case, the Court is confronted
with questions of sovereign immunity and preclusion of
judicial review in relation to the actions of a Contracting
Officer under a Government Contract. Plaintiff seeks review
of the Contracting Officer’s determination of Plaintiff's
rights in technical data pursuant to ASPR 7-104.9(a),
under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV 1965-68), which provides:
‘‘A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is en-
titled to judicial review thereof.’’
Plaintiff asserts that the action of the Contracting Officer
in deciding to strike IEC’s restrictive legends from the
Final Reports prepared by IEC under the Contract and
disclose those reports to the public through the Defense
Documentation Center was arbitrary and capricious, with-
out authority and without due process of law insofar as
Plaintiff was not given adequate notice or proper hearing
before its property was appropriate.’ Plaintiff additionally
* Although the Court is not at this time deciding Plaintiff's
contention that a formal administrative hearing is required in this
case, it is important for the Court to outline some thoughts on this
legal issue, while reserving the opportunity to make a final decision
on the basis of supplementary submissions and oral argument.
Beginning with the general constitutional norm that government
may not act against an individual before granting him a hearing,
the Court believes that in a manner consistent with the ASPR
37-104.9(d) procedure agreed to by the parties, notice and an op-
portunity to be heard were dutifully provided. Therefore, the
Court’s focus is on the nature of that opportunity to be heard. An
immediate issue which arises is whether the informal procedure
administered by the Contracting Officer resulted in a decision based
D-6
pleads that the Contracting Officer acted without due proc-
ess of law in issuing his decision without indication as to
what factors he considered relevant, what weight be at-
tached to those factors, or how he arrived at his conclusion.
In support of jurisdiction under the APA, Plaintiff has
shown that it is ‘‘aggrieved’’ by the Contracting Officer’s
acts within the meaning of a relevant statute, the Armed
Services Procurement Act, 10 U.S.C. chapter 137, and the
Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) promul-
gated thereunder, specifically ASPR 9-203(a)-(d) which
has the force of law in this Contract.* Therefore it is the
upon incomplete information, untested by the adversary process.
A second question is whether an adversary hearing as a functional
matter offers a better method for resolving the instant factual dis-
pute than the informal conference held June 26, 1972 with all
interested parties in attendance. Finally, the Court is concerned
whether the requirement of a formal hearing where a contractor’s
restrictive legends are challenged by a contracting officer is inappro-
priate to the contractual nature of the dispute and creates an un-
necessary impediment to the workings of the Government’s pro-
curement operation. The United States Court of Claims has indi-
eated that where a hearing is not required in the Contracting
Officer’s resolution of a contract dispute and his decision is appeal-
able to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, a contrac-
tor’s allegation that the Contracting Officer acted unconstitutionally
in assigning the contractor an undeterminabie burden of proof
simply will not stand. Plaintiff in Newport News, infra, footnote 2,
like the contractor here, argued that it was impossible to inveigh
against the Contracting Officer’s decision when the substance of
that decision was unknown.
?The Armed Services Procurement Regulations called to the
Court’s attention provide a procedure whereunder the Contracting
Officer determined contested rights in technical data. Defendant
has not directed the Court to any provisions of the Armed Services
Procurement Act, supra, or the Administrative Procedure <Act,
supra, which suggest that an ASPR once incorporated as a contract
clause parts with all identity as a federal regulation governing
certain acts of Contracting Officers. Several cases suggest that the
ASPR is law governing ‘‘the award and interpretation of contracts
as fully as if it were made a part thereof.’’ Chris Berg, Inc. v.
D-7
Court’s conclusion that the provisions of section 10 are ap-
plicable. In such a situation section 10 of the APA serves
as a waiver of sovereign immunity. Scanwell Laboratories
v. Shaffer, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 424 F.2d 859 (1970);
Kstrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961).
The Government urges that Scanwell is inapposite to the
case at bar since Plaintiffs in Scanwell were contractors
who lost contract awards because of alleged arbitrary
Government conduct under regulations designed to control
the contract letting process. However, the Court discerns
nothing in Defendants’ argument to support the proposi-
tion that a Government official’s conduct under federal reg-
ulations incorporated by reference into a Government Con-
tract is not reviewable under the APA. Nothing in the APA
or cases with which the Court is familiar support Defend-
ants’ contention. Although the case is not directly on point,
the Court in Scanwell des identify the primary concerns
a reviewing court should nave in deciding questions of jur-
isdiction. The Court there looked to the injury to Plain-
tiff’s economic livelihood and the public’s interest in pre-
venting the granting of contracts through arbitrary or ca-
pricious action. Here, Plaintiff alleges prospective loss of
2 complex system for guiding missiles developed by Plain-
tiff over several years at great expense. Additionally, the
public’s interest is apparent in preventing arbitrary or
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.