Appendix — International Engineering Co. v. Rumsfeld

Supreme Court brief1976

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT,

7 ND TOP Pee ae ge

INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING Company, DIVISION OF

A-T-O, Inc.

Vv.

RES OLIE SANA BES TAEPEL DE OTH 1

Exuior L. Ricuarpson, Secretary of Defense, et al.,

Appellants.

No. 74-1192.

Argued Feb. 24, 1975.

Decided May 2, 1975.

Before Tamm and Leventruat, Circuit Judges, and

Muuer,* Judge, United States Court of Customs and Pat-

ent Appeals.

Tama, Circuit Judge:

Appellant challenges the propriety of the district court’s

issuance of a preliminary injunction against the United

States enjoining it from distributing certain test reports

submitted pursuant to a government contract because of

the likelihood that the Air Force erroneously failed to ree-

ognize appellee International Engineering Company’s

(IEC) proprietary interest in certain data contained in the

reports. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the in-

junction was improper as the district court lacked subject-

matter jurisdiction and order the injunction vacated and

the case dismissed.

I

In February, 1968, appellee TEC submitted to the United

States Air Force an unsolicited proposal concerning its

privately developed long-range navigation (LORAN C/D)

* Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 293(a).

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bomb/missile guidance systera. On July 7, 1969, the parties

contracted for construction of a bread-board model of the

LORAN C/D system (referred to by the parties as ‘‘ Unit

A’’), performance of certain laboratory and helicopter

flight tests, and delivery to the Air Force of a final report

on the tests. Specifically incorporated by reference as con-

tract clauses were forty-four contract provisions set forth

in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR),

32 C.F.R. pts. 1-30 (1974), including the ‘‘Rights in Tech-

nical Data’’ Clause (ASPR 7-104.9(a)) and the standard

‘‘disputes clause’? (ASPR 7-103.12), establishing mecha-

nisms for resolving contract disputes.

By the spring of 1970, IEC had developed a more com-

pact LORAN C/D system. Thereafter, on October 27, 1970,

the parties modified the contract to test the system with

the new developments. IEC again agreed to construct a

breadboard model of the new subsystem (referred to by the

parties as ‘‘Unit B’’ and to submit test reports.

In late March, 1971, the Air Force directed IEC to pro-

vide further information concerning the components and

processes to help it evaluate the test results. IEC submitted

the data, in an interim report, 71-05, and in its contractu-

ally-mandated Final Report 70-06-4. Both reports were

marked with notice of ‘‘limited rights,’’ restricting the Air

Force’s distribution rights to the Unit B data.

By letter of April 19, 1971, the Air Force contracting

officer questioned the propriety of the restrictive legend

(limited rights) on Final Report 70-06-4, referred appellee

to the ‘‘Rights in Technical Data’’ clause of the contract,

and requested a prompt response to ‘‘why the Government

does not have the right to remove the legends in question.”’

A. 46. IEC responded on June 15, 1971 that Unit B had

been ‘‘developed and built at contractor expense, and [had]

been made available for this effort on a no charge loan

basis.’?’ IEC maintained that its contractual obligation to

submit a final report ‘‘could have been met without inclu-

sion of proprietary information’’ and the ‘‘[i]f the Air

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Force requires unlimited rights’’ in the report, IEC would

revise the report by deleting the data. A. 48-49.

On June 30, 1971, the parties again negotiated a contract

modification which required IEC to conduct further tests

and submit test reports; on July 7th, the Air Force ac-

cepted Report 70-06-4.' On October 15, 1971, appellee sub-

mitted Interim Report 71-07 and then on December 10,

1971, Report 71-09 as the concluding report under its con- ;

tractual obligations; both reports contained limited rights ;

notices covering the same information submitted in Report ’

70-06-4. :

By letter on December 28, 1971, the contracting officer, 4

again referring to the ‘‘Rights in Data’’ clause, notified

IEC that Report 71-09, ‘‘even if found to be technically e

correct’’, would not be accepted until appellee either re- ;

moved or substantiated all proprietary markings. A. 50.

Expressing surprise that the issue had resurfaced, IEC

on January 5, 1972, reviewed the history of the parties’

course of dealing, asserted that Report 70-06-4 had been

accepted with proprietary restrictions, offered to delete

11EC maintains that the acceptance of the report created a rea-

sonable expectation that ‘‘the rights in data question had been

resolved in [I[EC’s] favor and that the Air Force would not object

to the attachment of the ‘limited rights’ legend on data in subse-

suent reports describing IEC private-developed processes and com-

ponents.’’ Appellee’s Br. at 19. See also IEC’s letter of Jan. 5, 1972,

A. 51. However, Air Force officials involved later indicated: ‘‘it

was decided that the contention over the proprietary markings was

a separate entity from the technical acceptance. . . .”’ Harshfield

Dep. Ex. 1. That latter view is clearly correct; part of the Rights

in Technical Data clause incorporated into the contract authorizes

the Government to correct or cancel any marking “‘ [n] otwithstand-

ing any provision of this contract concerning . . . acceptance.”’

ASPR 7-104, 9(a)(d). Although there is no record evidence of any

waiver or modification of that clause, the district court held that

the Government was estopped. International Engineering Co. v.

Richardson, 367 F.Supp. 640, 656 n.12 (D.D.C. 1973). We do not

reach the correctness of this holding.

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the data, and reiterated its belief that the restrictions were

appropriate. A. 51-52.

The next official exchange occurred on June 5, 1972, when

the Air Force again informed IEC that it had failed to

substantiate its limited rights notices and that the Air

Force intended to strike them and use the data with un-

limited rights. A.53-54. On June 26, 1972, representatives

of both parties participated in a two-hour meeting on the

matter; IEC was asked to provide further detail and writ-

ten documentation so that its claim could be forwarded to

higher headquarters. The Air Force agreed to treat the

data with limited rights during the pendency of the dis-

pute. Soon thereafter final payment was made on the con-

tract.

Not having received any additional documentation by

October, 1972, the contracting officer again notified IEC of

the Air Force’s intention to utilize the data with unlimited

rights. IEC immediately protested the report’s imminent

release to the Director of the Defense Documentation Cen-

ter and the Secretary of the Air Force. In December, 1972,

IEC received assurances that the material would not be

released until a decision was made on the ‘‘limited rights”’

question.

In January, 1973, the contracting officer’s technical and

legal advisors briefed headquarters personnel of the Air

Force Systems Command (AFSC) and United States Air

Foree (USAF). IEC’s counsel met with Counsel to the

Secretary of the Air Force and representatives of AFSC

and USAF. At the Secretary’s Counsel’s request, IEC

submitted further written materials on February 8, 1973.

A. 58-60. On March 16, 1973, the Air Force Chief of Staff

authorized AMSC to make a final decision on the dispute

after considering IEC’s February 8th submission. AMSC

returned the matter to the contracting officer for final de-

cision. That officer’s technical advisor concluded that the

letter of February 8th contained no information relevant

_

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to the issue and recommended striking the limited rights

notice. On May 9, 1973, IEC was so informed.

On May 10, 1973, IEC filed suit in district court for de-

claratory and injunctive relief and a temporary restrain-

ing order. IEC sought review of the contracting officer’s

decision to strike the proprietary notice, characterizing it

as agency action reviewable under section 10 of the Ad-

ministrative Procedure Act. (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).

The Air Force contended that the dispute arose under the

contract; that the officer’s decision did not constitute

agency action; that the proper forum for the claim was

either before the Armed Services Board of Contract Ap-

peals or the Court of Claims; and that thus the district

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or the suit was

barred by sovereign immunity.

Tn a Memorandum and Order filed July 10, 1973, the dis-

trict court held that the decision of a contracting officer,

acting pursuant to an ASPR provision incorporated into

a contract, constituted agency action and that the APA

served as a sovereign immunity. International Engineer-

ing Co. v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 818, 821-22 (D.D.C.

1973). However, the judge believed that the record of the

officer’s reasoning was insufficient to permit review of the

decision to strike the restrictive notice and remanded the

ease to the officer for a fuller exposition Jd. at 823-25.

After receiving that statement,? on October 24, 1973, the

2In his statement of reasons, the contracting officer noted that

‘TrJesolution of the data rights problems concerning Unit B is

difficult, and may be impossible for the Government to resolve.’’ He

emphasized that:

The Rights in Technical Data clause, y ragraph (d), places

the burden of substantiating the propriety of restrictive legends

on the contractor because his cooperation is needed to resolve

this type of problem. All pertinent records are in his possession.

Many important details are locked in his mind. It may be

necessary for him to explain the significance of some record

entries.

A. 63.

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district court entered a preliminary injunction.* Interna-

tional Engineering Co. v. Richardson, 367 F.Supp. 640

(D.D.C. 1973). This appeal followed.

II

This suit raises the special problems of jurisdiction and

sovereign immunity because in essence the United States is

the defendant here. The general rule of sovereign immunity

is that the United States cannot be sued without its con-

sent. E.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586,

The officer relied upon the contract clause which granted TEC

proprietary rights only if Unit B had been developed at private

expense and opined that development includes the demonstration by

testing that a prototype fulfills the developer's objective. He pointed

out that the Government regards even one percent Government

funding as precluding a finding of development at private expense

and as resulting in the Government obtaining 100 percent unlimited

rights. He indicated that a substantial possibility existed that the

final phases of development of Unit B—testing—were performed

with contract funds. Under any circumstance, he reemphasized that

IEC had failed to meet its contractually-allocated burden of sub-

stantiation. A. 62-76.

5 After reviewing its previous decision and holding that the APA

provided subject-matter jurisdiction and waived sovereign immu-

nity, the district court found that the interests identified in Sean-

well Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 187 U.S. App.D.C, 371, 424 F.2d

859 (1970)—IEC’s interest in preventing injury from any illegal,

arbitrary and capricious action by the contracting officer and the

public interest in having government contracts administered fairly

—dictated a limited review. The district court concluded that the

grant of a preliminary injunction was proper under the standards

established by this court in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v.

FPC, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (1958): 1) appellee

was likely to sueceed on the merits because the contracting officer

failed to provide minimal due process before striking the restrictive

legerids ; 2) appellee would be irreparably injured without relief in

that it would lose its competitive advantage; 3) the injunetion

would not substantially harm other interested persons; and 4) the

public interest would be served. 367 F.Supp. at 649-57. In light of

our conclusion on jurisdiction and sovereign immunity, infra, we

do not reach the remainder of the district court’s decision.

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61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941). The sovereign may

waive its immunity by statute, and such consent, if given,

may be subject to any conditions which Congress sees fit

to require. See, e. g., Sherwood v. United States, supra; ‘

Best Bearings Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 1177, 1179 4

(7th Cir. 1972). On the one hand, for contract actions

against the United States, Congress, through passage of

the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C, §§ 1346(a), 1491 (1970), has con-

sented to suit. For claims under $10,000, the Court of

Claims and the district courts have concurrent jurisdic-

tion; the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction for

claims over $10,000. Congress has, however, imposed condi-

tions on its waiver of sovereign immunity. The Court of

Claims has jurisdiction only to award damages, Glidden v.

Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 577, 82 S.Ct. 1459, 8 L.Ed.2d 671

(1962) ; it may neither grant declaratory, United States v.

King, 395 U.S. 1, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 23 L.Ed. 52 (1969), nor

injunctive relief, Glidden v. Zdanok, supra.

POP Le cert ar are ¥

On the other hand, we have held that Congress in enact-

ing the APA, made a more general waiver of sovereign

immunity in section 702° whenever that section is applic-

able. Seanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 137 U.S.App.

D.C. 371, 424 F.2d 859 (1970). The district court, relying

in large part on Scanwell, found jurisdiction in this case.

In its first opinion, 361 F.Supp. at 821-23, the court con-

cluded that IEC was ‘‘aggrieved’’ by agency action—the

‘The district court, when exercising concurrent jurisdiction, may

only adjudicate claims which would also be maintainable in the

Court of Claims. United States v, Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590-91,

61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941). Hence, in such situations, the

district court would have no authority to grant equitable relief.

Richardson v. Morris, 409 U.S. 464, 93 S.Ct. 629, 34 L.Ed.2d 647

(1973).

55 U.S.C. § 702 (1970) provides:

A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or

adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the

meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review

thereof.

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acts taken by the contracting officer pursuant to the Rights

in Technical Data clause ‘‘which has the force of law in

this Contract.’’* While conceding that Scanwell was not

directly on point, the court asserted that the primary con-

cerns identified in that case—plaintiff’s interest in pre-

venting economie injury and the public’s interest in pre-

venting arbitrary or capricious action—were present here

and justified accepting jurisdiction. Finally, the court said

that in exercising jurisdiction it was providing the only

forum from which appellee could obtain injunctive relief

as the Court of Claims and Armed Services Board of Con-

tract Appeals could not grant such relief.

In its second decision, 367 F.Supp. 640, the court began

from the premise that even if it possessed jurisdiction, the

decision to grant judicial relief was discretionary. Id. at

647-48; see M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 147 U.S.App.

D.C. 221, 455 F.2d 1289 (1971). The court then concluded

that relief was appropriate both to vindicate the interests

identified earlier and because of the court’s doubt over the

likelihood of the adequacy of a damage remedy in the Court

of Claims. Recognizing that neither the only potential

buyer of products relating to the data, the United States,

nor IEC itself foresaw any practical value in the informa-

° This portion of the district court’s opinion is particularly con-

fusing. In the text, reference is made to ‘‘ASPR 9-203(a)-(d)

which has the force of law in this Contract.2’’ That section instructs

contracting officers to include ASPR 7-104.9(a), the uniform Rights

in Technical Data contract clause, in any appropriate contract. In

the footnote, the court opines that there is no authority that ‘‘an

ASPR once incorporated as a contract clause parts with all identity

as a federal regulation governing certain acts of Contracting offi-

cers.’’ Presumably, the court is now discussing, as it has been all

along, ASPR 7-104.9(a) (not ASPR 9-203), which was incorporated

into the contract. In that same footnote, the court went on to note

that several cases had suggested that the ASPR had the force of law

and asserted its belief that IEC could invoke an ASPR ‘‘against

an administrative determination contrary to the regulation’s

terms.’’ 361 F.Supp. at 822 n.2.

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tion (except as for what type of research not to do), the

court opined it was ‘‘more important” that IEC received

injunctive, rather than compensatory, relief. 367 F.Supp.

at 649.

We must disagree with that analysis and conclusion. We

believe that this ease is a contract action falling squarely

within the purview of the Tucker Act; therefore, the APA

is inapplicable. As indicated below, several converging ave-

nues of analysis yield this conclusion. First, relianee on

interests identified in Scanwell are inappropriate here.

Moreover, we cannot accept the proposition that Congress

intended to alter drastically the limited remedies and

waiver of sovereign immunity embodied in the Tucker Act;

adopting IEC’s position would result in the destruction of

the Court of Claims by implication. Finally, under any cir-

cumstance, the APA is inapplicable by its own terms be-

cause of appellee’s adequate remedy before the Court of

Claims.

We start with our firm belief that the gravamen of ap-

pellee’s complaint is a claim for breach of contract. Al-

though the restrictive markings in question were affixed to

reports submitted pursuant to the contract, appellee con-

tends that the material at issue was not required to be

included in its reports, Appellee’s Br. at 7, 47; resolution

of that question is a matter of contract interpretation. The

major controversy concerns the Government’s rights in

the data under the contractually incorporated ‘‘Rights in

Technical Data’’ clause. Settlement of that dispute requires

interpretation of contract clauses to ascertain whether the

material should be considered ‘‘design’’ or ‘‘form, fit, or

function’’ data.

A reading of the district court opinions demonstrates its

recognition of the contractual underpinnings of the pro-

ceedings. The district court applied as one of alternative

standards of review ‘‘settled principles of contract law.’’

367 F.Supp. at 649. The court also determined that review

was appropriate because of the public interest in prevent-

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ing arbitrary or capricious decision-making in the adminis-

tration of government contracts, stating that the court

‘‘must undertake a limited review of the contracting offi-

cer’s decisions rendered pursuant to the Rights in Data

clause to determine whether it is likely that he acted ar-

bitrarily and without a rational basis.’’ Id. at 648, 650.

Clearly that function cannot be performed without refer-

ence to and incorporation of the contract.

We think that this situation is indistinguishable from

the one faced by this court in Aktiebolaget Bofors v.

United States, 90 U.S. App.D.C. 92, 194 F.2d 145 (1951),

involving a Swedish Corporation, Bofors, which owned a

trade secret used to manufacture a superior anti-aircraft

gun. Bofors entered into a government contract which

granted the United States an exclusive license to make and

use the guns. After the United States began to reveal the

trade secrets to others and after unsuccessfully attempting

to obtain equitable adjustments through informal negotia-

tions, Bofors instituted three suits, including one for dam-

ages and another for a declaratory judgment. District

Judge Holtzoff dismissed the actions for lack of jurisdic-

tion. In affirming, Judge Miller, speaking for the division,

found that the gist of the actions was breach of contract:

one who has lawfully acquired a trade secret may use

it in any manner without liability unless he acquired

it subject to a contractual limitation or restriction as

to its use. In that event a licensee who uses the secret

for purposes beyond the scope of the license granted

by the owner is liable for breach of contract, but he

commits no tort, because the only right of the owner

which he thereby invades is one created by the agree-

ment of disclosure. The owner could not maintain a

suit against him for damages arising from unlicensed

use without pleading and proving the contract. This

being true, the gist of the owner’s action is the breach

of the licensing agreement.

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Id. at 148 (footnotes omitted). IEC’s complaint here is no

different.’

In Bofors, Judge Miller also held that the APA did not

provide jurisdiction to hear either the damage or equity

suit and that jurisdiction lay in the Court of Claims. Id. at

149-50. We do not rest our present ruling on stare decisis,

however, because the Bofors decision preceded the exten-

sive jurisprudence in this circuit sustaining the APA as a

basis of jurisdiction,’ and thus it seems appropriate to

analyze whether the district court fairly applied the APA

and Scanwell to the claim of this government contractor.

We think it did not.

First, clearly beyond peradventure, this case is not the

type which falls within the rationale of our Scanwell hold-

ing. In Scanwell, we determined that a disappointed bidder

on a government contract was a person aggrieved under

the APA and had standing to seek a limited review of the

contract award; we also held that where applicable the

APA constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity. Although

the sovereign immunity holding has relevance here, our

7 Clearly, the dispute on its face involves the Government’s rights

under the licensing agreement (contract) to IEC’s trade secret.

Even assuming the validity of the district court’s finding of estop-

pel, see note 1 supra, the claim is still for breach of contract ; under

that theory IEC is alleging that the Government breached a licens-

ing agreement which gave them the use of the data with limited

rights.

8 Peoples v. Department of Agriculture, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 291,

427 F.2d 561 (1970) ; Seanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, supra;

see Pickus v. Board of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C.Cir. 1974);

Independent Broker-Dealers’ Trade Ass’n v. SEC, 142 U.S.App.

D.C. 384, 442 F.2d 132 (1971).

The district court was not apparently aware of the Bofors deci-

sion, for its opinions do not cite the case. Appellant relies upon it

only as authority for a peripheral issue and actually only cites the

district court opinion. Sce Appellant’s Br. at 21 n. 11. Although

part of the Bofors analysis was undercut by the cases cited above,

the obvious pertinence of the Bofors ruling should have been called

to the attention of the courts.

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direct concern in Scanwell was standing, ‘‘whether legis-

lation regulating governmental activity inures to the bene-

fit of those tangentially affected.’’ William F. Wilke, Inc.

v. Department of Army, 485 F.2d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 1973).

In contrast, while our focus in this case, as in Scanwell, is

upon the same judicial review section of the APA, the

question here is whether appellee has been aggrieved ‘‘by

agency action;’’ our inquiry is to determine whether the

decision by the contracting officer to strike IEC’s limited

rights designation constituted agency action.

Clearly, our Scanwell decision does not directly resolve

that question. Conceivably, the interests identified in

Scanwell which dictated a finding of standing may be ap-

plicable by analogy here and mandate a finding of agency

action. In fact, this type of analysis appears to be the

foundation of the district court opinions, especially the

reliance upon the identification of an equivalent public in-

terest as the one identified in Scanwell—the public interest

in having contracts administered fairly and in preventing

arbitrary and capricious decision-making by contracting

officers. See 367 F.Supp. at 648; 361 F.Supp. at 823. How-

ever, we are extremely reluctant to give that factor the

weight the district court attached to it in this situation.

What has been identified unsurprisingly is the publie’s in-

terest in minimizing the number of actions taken by con-

tracting officers which results in breaches of governmental

contracts and which may necessitate the payment of com-

pensatory damages by the government. This interest, of

course, is present in every decision made by an officer pur-

suant to a contract to which the Tucker Act applies.

The breadth of the district court’s holding poses the

greatest difficulty: to grant jurisdiction here by a finding

of agency action would enable a district court to entertain

a suit for injunctive relief each time a contracting officer

makes a determination adverse to a private contracting

party.

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We simply do not think that such a result is mandated

or that Congress intended to upset the carefully modulated

waiver of sovereign immunity and grant of remedies for

breach of contract embodied in the Tucker Act when it

passed the APA. The Fifth Circuit, faced with this pros-

pect in a case involving an injunction granted upon the

basis of APA jurisdiction, refused to find such jurisdiction :

Since the United States by reason of its nature acts

only through agents, it is hard to conceive of a claim

falling no matter how squarely within the Tucker Act

which could not be urged to involve as well agency

error subject to review under the APA. Little imagi-

nation is needed to foresee the consequences of a hold-

ing that such claims as they may be reviewed either

in a court having power to grant equitable relief

against the United States or in one having none. We

refuse to believe that Congress intended, in enacting

the APA, so to destroy the Court of Claims by impli-

cation.

Warner v. Cox, 487 F.2d 1301, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974). We

join in that assessment.’ We think it is clear that Congress

did not intend that every action taken by an employee of

a federal agency be within the ambit of the APA judicial

review section. We also believe that in light of the long-

standing Tucker Act remedy and the traditionally long-

recognized interest in preventing piecemeal disruption of

the procurement process, e. g., M. Steinthal & Co. v. Sea-

mans, supra, decisions made by contracting officers pur-

® Appellee points to Universal Fiberglass Corp. v. United States,

400 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1968), as support for a finding of jurisdic-

tion, asserting that in that case the Government was able to enforce

a contract in district court. We cannot accept the IEC’s argument

that ‘‘Universal Fiberglass clearly establishes jurisdiction’’; such

an assertion indicates a complete lack of understanding of the real

issues in this case—sovereign immunity and the extent of its waiver

for contract actions.

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suant to contract clauses fall outside the contemplation of

the statute.”

Moreover, the APA itself states that judicial review is

inappropriate where there exists some ‘‘other adequate

remedy in a court.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970). We have held

that the availability of a remedy in the Court of Claims

is such an adequate remedy. Mohawk Airlines, Ine. v.

C.A.B., 117 U.S.App. D.C. 326, 329 F.2d 894 (1964). The

district court, however, concluded that damages would be

an inadequate remedy, because of the speculative nature

of damages in light of the Government’s belief, as the only

potential buyer, that the information is useless except for

what not to do, and that injunctive relief would be appro-

priate in order to vindicate the public interest in proper

contract administration. We have already concluded that

this public interest factor should not be afforded the over-

riding weight that the district court gave to it. We further

question whether damages are impossible to award. We

see no barrier to the Court of Claims, if it decides that the

Government has breached the contract, awarding IEC the

10 Stripped of its plumage, this case is not too different than

Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 702,

69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949). The dispute in Larson con-

cerned interpretation of when payment was required upon a coal

shipment. After receiving an unfavorable ruling from the War

Assets Administration, plaintiff sued for equitable relief. The Court

found that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity and noted:

It is one thing to provide a method by which a citizen may be

compensated for a wrong done to him by the Government. It

is a far different matter to permit a court to exercise its

compulsive powers to restrain the Government from acting, or

to compel it to act... . The Government... cannot be stopped

in its tracks by any plaintiff who presents a disputed question

of property or contract.

Id. at 704 69 S.Ct. at 1468. Similarly, we see no persuasive reason

why IEC should not be limited to the alternative remedies Congress

has already provided.

Finally, the bar of sovereign immunity prevents the district court

from asserting jurisdiction through 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 7d.

POPE LE IP OSGI LAE ALTRI EIT AN SALINITIES RN AER IIE NL ILE EE ABO I EVE SE A, LLL EEG EL PAY PES TOIT Nee —

ON GB Hs PAKS ED ALLEN OME

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A-15

fair market value of its data. See Aktiebolaget Bofors v.

United States, 153 F.Supp. 397, 139 Ct.Cl. 642 (1957).”

In sum, we find compelling reasons not to endorse the

district court’s analysis, but to reaffirm the vitality of our

Bofors holding. IEC’s claim is for breach of contract, and

appellee should not be permitted to seek injunctive relief

in the district court. Section 702 is inapplicable to this case

and does not provide jurisdiction here. The case is reversed

and remanded with instructions to vacate the injunction

and dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

So ordered.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 74-1192

SepreMBER TERM, 1974

Civil Action 927-73

INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING Company, Division oF

A-T-O, Inc.

v.

Exuiotrr L. Ricuarpson, Secretary of Defense, et al.,

Appellants.

Before: Tamm and Leventuat, Circuit Judges; Jack R.

Muuer,* Judge U.S. Court of Customs and Patent

Appeals,

11 TEC has a further alternative remedy—before the General Ac-

counting Office. Assuming that the Government wrongfully discloses

the information, it still constitutes the only market for a LORAN

system. In that event, the Comptrolier General has the power to

cancel future procurements made to competitors who wrongfully

have acquired the information; IEC would then become the sole

supplier of the product.

* Sitting by designation pursuant to Title 28 U.S. Code Section

293 (a).

%

5

t

+ ARTETA

SF IPRA AES BS

A-16

Order

On consideration of appellee’s petition for rehearing, it is

OrverED by the Court that appellee’s aforesaid petition

is denied.

Per Curiam

For the Court:

/s/ Hucu E. Kure

Huge E. Kline

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 74-1192

SEPTEMBER TERM, 1974

Civil Action 927-73

INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING ComMPaANY, DIVISION OF

A-T-O, Inc.

Vv.

Exuiotr L. Ricnarpson, Secretary of Defense, et al.,

Appellants.

Order

Appellee’s suggestion for rehearing en banc having been

transmitted to the full Court and no Judge having requested

a vote thereon, it is

OrperED by the Court en banc that appellee’s aforesaid

suggestion for rehearing en banc is denied.

For the Court:

/s/ Hue E. Kune

Huge E. Kline

Clerk

4

B-1

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING Company, a Division of

A-T-O,Inc., Plaintiff

v.

Exuiot L. Ricnarpson et Au., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 927-73.

Oct. 24, 1973.

Memorandum Opinion

Cuaries R. Ricuey, District Judge.

Once again this case is before this Court on a Motion for

a Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff International

Engineering Company (IEC).’ In order to understand the

reasons advanced by Plaintiff in support of its Motion, and

the Court’s reasons for granting thereof, a review of the

history of this case will be helpful. The Court will sum-

marize only briefly the history prior to its earlier decision.

See International Engineering Company v. Elliot L. Rich-

ardson, et al., 361 F.Supp. 818, D.D.C. 1973.

I. History or THE CAsE

In late 1967, IEC conceived a system for guiding bombs

or missiles with what is referred to by the parties as a

LORAN C/D system. In February 1968, TEC submitted an

unsolicited proposal to the Air Force that detailed the proc-

esses and the performance characteristics of the compo-

nents as IEC had developed them at the time. This pro-

posal, submitted with a restrictive legend that limited its

1The Court reserves for future consideration Plaintiff’s Com-

plaint for Declaratory Judgment. The Court decides this Motion

for Preliminary Injunction on the pleadings and briefs of counsel

for the parties and upon able oral argument heard in open court on

July 31, 1973.

we aM

MEOMTR PELE 8 8 2a

B-2

distribution to Air Force personnel, resulted in the Govern-

ment’s award of a contract to IEC that called for Plaintiff

to design and construct a ‘‘helicopter flyable breadboard

LORAN Missile Guidance Subsystem.’’ (See Plaintiff’s

Exhibit D, Defendant’s Exhibit D). The system was to be

constructed and furnished by IEC for the purposes of

demonstration but was to remain the property of IEC; the

information resulting from demonstration of the system was

to be provided to the Government as set forth at Paragraph

(b)4 of T-119 incorporated by reference into the DD1423

Test Report as follows:

**(4) Description of test articles, including test config-

uration identification and photographs as appro-

priate.’’ Defendant’s Exhibit E.

The contract provision central to the instant dispute is

the Rights in Technical Data clause, an Armed Services

Procurement Regulation (7-104.9) incorporated by refer-

ence into the contract. Paragraph (b) of the Regulation

provides in pertinent part that:

**(1) The Government shall have unlimited rights in:

**(i) technical data resulting directly from perform-

ance of experimental, developmental or research

work which was specified as an element of perform-

ance in this or any other Government contract or

subcontract; ...

‘*(ii) technical data necessary to enable manufacture

of end-items, components and modifications, or to en-

able the performance of processes, when the end-

items, components, modifications or processes have

been, or are being developed under this or any other

Government contract or subcontract in which experi-

mental, developmental or research work is, or was

specified as an element of contract performance, ex-

cept technical data pertaining to items, components

RE NL SARE RRR Ey i 2

B-3

or processes developed at private expense.’’ (em-

phasis added).

‘**(iv) technical data pertaining to end-items, compo-

nents or processes which was prepared for the pur-

pose of identifying sources, size, configuration, mat-

ing and attachment characteristics, functional char-

acteristics and performance requirements (‘‘form,

fit and function’’ data, e.g., specification control

drawings, catalog sheets, envelope drawings, etc.) ;’’

(emphasis added).

‘*(2) The government shall have limited rights in:

‘*(ii) technical data pertaining to items, components

or processes developed at private expense, other

than such data as may be included in the data re-

ferred to in (b) (1) (i), (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi); pro-

vided that each piece of data to which limited rights

are to be asserted pursuant to (2)(i) and (ii) with

the following legend in which is inserted the number

of the prime contract under which the technical data

is to be delivered and the name of the contractor or

subcontractor by whom the technical data was fur-

Pe nies

Paragraph (d) of the same regulation provides for the

removal of unauthorized legends marked on data which the

contractor delivers to the Government. The contract inter-

pretation problem confronting the Court turns on the mean-

ing attached to the term ‘‘substantiate’’ as it appears in

paragraph (d) which is set forth as follows:

‘“(d) Removal of Unauthorized Markings. Notwith-

standing any provisions of the contract concerning in-

spection and acceptance, the Government may modify,

* The legend as set forth in ASPR 7-104.9 appears in the full

text of the regulation: 7-104.9 Right in Data, attached as Appendix

I to this Opinion.

B-4

remove, obliterate or ignore any marking not author-

ized by the terms of this contract on any technical data

furnished hereunder if—

‘**(i) the contractor fails to respond within sixty days

to a written inquiry by the Government concerning the

propriety of the use of the marking, or

‘*(ii) the Contractor’s response fails to substantiate

his contention that the use of the marking is authorized,

in which case the Government shall give written notice

to the Contractor.’’ (emphasis added)

During the time frame for constructing the ‘‘ Breadboard

system”’ called for in the contract, January 1968 through

June 1970, IEC developed an advanced circuitry LORAN

C/D Navigation System, at what it alleges to be substantial

private expense. As will be discussed in greater detail be-

low, the Government disagrees on the material fact of

whose money paid for the development of the Navigation

System and argues that the system was developed through

Government funding of the contract.’ The Government’s

position on the question of funding was made known after

the original contract had been modified twice to incorporate

the Navigation System into other parts of a LORAN

guided bomb and to run simulated tests on a computer, and

after IEC had submitted several technical reports which

contained a detailed description of the internal operations

in terms of mathematical and logic diagrams of TEC’s pre-

contract components that the Air Force Project Engineer,

Mr. Rustenberg, requested in the belief that the informa-

tion would be helpful to the Air Force in evaluating the test

results. (See Contracting Officer’s Statement of Reasons

for Decision of 2 October 1972; Rustenberg Deposition,

pages 29, 34-36). Between October 1970 and November 1970

*° The Court makes no finding as to this controverted and material

fact. However, it is the Court’s preliminary opinion that Plaintiff

did develop the system at private expense, and this Opinion sup-

ports the likelihood of Plaintiff's success on the merits.

B-5

IEC submitted technical reports which contained ‘limited

rights’’ legends intended to prevent the release of com-

ponents’ specifications to IEC’s competitors. The Air Force

never challenged the restrictive legend on the first report,

71-05. However, the first Contracting Officer assigned to

the IEC contract questioned the appropriateness of restric-

tive marking placed by IEC on the second Technical Report,

70-06-4, on the grounds that the restrictive legend was of

the kind used for proposals and not contract reports. IEC

offered to delete the material altogether and simply comply

with the limited requirements of the contract. IEC also

submitted an amended proprietary legend. In July 1971

the Contracting Officer decided to accept the amended mark-

ings without further question for the following reason:

‘the issuance of P0006 (a contract modification) di-

recting a continuation of the effort initiated under

P0003 (an earlier contract modification) constituted a

tacit acceptance by the Government.’’ (Exhibit 1 to

Harsfield deposition).

In so deciding, the Contracting Officer chose to reject the

request of the Contract Engineer, Mr. Rustenberg, that the

restrictive legend be ruled improper under the terms of the

contract. It is noteworthy that Mr. Rustenberg as early as

March 1971 requested the proprietary data to facilitate the

Air Force’s evaluation of the test results. (Rustenberg

Deposition, page 29).

Sometime before the submission of the third report, a

new Contracting Officer, Mr. Harsfield, began work on the

contract. Mr. Rustenberg served as technical advisor to the

new Contracting Officer and on his behalf reviewed the third

report. (Rustenberg Deposition, page 31). That report was

accepted as submitted without immediate objection.

It was in October and December 1971 respectively that

the third technical report and the final report on the orig-

inal contract and all modifications were submitted and, like

B-6

the earlier reports, they contained the detailed descriptions

of the components requested by Mr. Rustenberg and bore

proprietary legends. At the end of December 1971 and al-

most nine months later in June 1972, the Contracting Offi-

cer sent letters to IEC recommending that IEC remove the

proprietary markings or furnish substantiation to the con-

trary. IEC replied January 5, 1972 to the Contracting Off-

cer’s December 1971 correspondence but received no fur-

ther response from the Government until a letter was re-

ceived June 5, 1972, wherein the Contracting Officer stated

that the IEC submission ‘‘fails to justify the use of their

legend or show that any restriction is authorized.’’ (See

Plaintiff’s Exhibit M). He further noted that the reports

would be used with unlimited rights. IEC obtained an

agreement on the part of the Air Force not to release the

reports pending a meeting ‘‘to discuss the proprietary

rights question.’’ This meeting occurred June 26, 1972 and

was conducted by Mr. Harsfield. During the course of the

meeting, IEC submitted a three-page outline and made a

two hour oral presentation which was deemed vague by

the Contracting Officer who requested additional substan-

tiation. At no time during the meeting did Mr. Harsfield

question the ITEC position. (Harsfield Deposition, pp. 76-

77). Shortly thereafter, the Contracting Officer executed a

final acceptance on the contract and final payment was made

by the Air Force at the end of September 1972. The Con-

tracting Officer received no further efforts at substantiation

by IEC and, by letter dated October 2, 1972, informed the

Contractor that the reports would be used by the Govern-

ment with unlimited rights.

During January 1973 the Contracting Officer’s decision

was reviewed by personnel of the Headquarters, Air Force

Systems Command, and of the Chief of Staff, United States

Air Force and, later, by the Assistant General Counsel for

the Air Foree who requested that IEC submit further

written material and that the Contracting Officer consider

it. This material was submitted in IEC’s letter dated Feb-

B-7

ruary 8, 1973 and failed to change the opinion of the

Contracting Officer.

Plaintiff then brought this action to enjoin the Secretary

of the Air Force from releasing the reports. In particular,

IKC contended that it had met the burden of substantiating

its proprietary claim as it interpreted the import of the

term ‘‘substantiate.’’ Plaintiff further argued that the

Contracting Officer’s failure to provide reasons for not

agreeing with IEC’s proprietary claim made it impossible

to inveigh against his decision once further submissions

were sought. Defendant responded by challenging the jur-

isdiction of the Court.

In consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary

Injunction and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court

was confronted with close questions concerning the appli-

cation of sovereign immunity and permissible review under

the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.

(1970). The Court’s analysis led it to the conclusion that

the APA provided a basis for subject matter jurisdiction

and served as a waiver of sovereign immunity. Before turn-

ing to the question of the preliminary injunction, however,

the Court determined that a statement of reasons by the

Contracting Officer was essential to effective judicial re-

view. Therefore the Court denied Defendant’s Motion and

took under advisement Plaintiff’s Motion together with the

contract terms and IEC’s description of the Contracting

Officer’s actions upon which that motion was based. Rather

than step blindly, and therefore dangerously, into a pro-

curement operation foreign to the judicial process of eon-

flict resolution, the Court remanded the ease to the Con-

tracting Officer for an explanation of his actions sufficient

to permit the Court to proceed with its unique review of the

contract dispute at bar. As an interim measure the Court

requested and the Government agreed not to release the al-

leged proprietary data until the Court could review the

Contracting Officer’s statement of reasons and Plaintiff’s

LS LOVES BE PGP P0802

BRO NRANEIE LANIER WEE ENED FO ee an x : ei | zaKe.

SOREN REUSE SEER EA NEN

B-8

response thereto and rule on Plaintiff’s Motion for a Pre-

liminary Injunction.

The Court attempted through its Opinion and Order of

July 10, 1973 to obtain the information necessary for ef-

fectively resolving what the Court perceived as, in essence,

a familiar judicial problem of contract interpretation, but

a problem uniquely situated in the Federal procurement

field. In light of the information received pursuant to the

Court’s Order, the Court has had sufficient opportunity to

probe the interrelated ASPR provisions, the contract terms

and the positions of the parties to the extent that the

Court believes Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injune-

tion should be granted.

Il. THe Decision Hererxn To Grant Jupicirat Rewer Is

Wirnin Tue Covrt’s Discretion Anxp Is ApprRoprRIATE

Wuere A ContractinG Orricer Asuses His Recutatory

AUTHORITY

In view of the extraordinary relief the Court grants

Plaintiff in its Order issued of even date with this Memo-

randum Opinion, it is necessary to air the Court’s thoughts

regarding the appropriateness of the action taken herein.

Judicial forays into the procurement process are regarded

with skepticism in this Cireuit due in large part to the com-

plexity of the rules and regulations governing procurement

and the expertise required for efficient administration of

the procurement process within the regulatory web. See

M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 221, 455

F.2d 1289 (1971). Our Court of Appeals in past decisions

has highlighted the public interest in fairness and compli-

ance with regulations in lawsuits brought by disappointed

bidders on government contract, only to ultimately decide

that this interest is outweighed by the public interest in

efficient operation of government. See A. G. Schoonmaker

Co. v. Resor, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 250, 445 F.2d 726; M. Stein-

thal & Co. v. Seamans, supra. The Court of Appeal’s con-

cern in these cases with the inefficiencies that obtain from

PAM PI SPIES BOT TINE NE WLS one * NEC IM ee EA LDR OPPO E A

B-9

extensive review of contract awards prompted its determin-

ation that the District Courts should refuse to review ap-

peals from contract awards where the highly subjective

decision of a contracting officer who relied on specialized

technical knowledge is in question. In light of this concern,

the District of Columbia Circuit and the Fifth Cireuit have

held that where an agency or official other than the con-

tracting officer reviews the latter’s decision, courts will

defer to administrative expertise. For example, see Allen

M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Construction Co., 446 F.2d

261 (5th Cir. 1971) ; A. G. Schoonmaker Co. v. Resor, supra;

M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, supra.

As the above cases and other procurement cases like them

reflect courts’ efforts to balance the competing interests

that favor or oppose review, so does the history of this case

demonstrate this Court’s careful attempts to identify and

balance the competing interests. That weighing of interests

has led the Court to the opinion that the public interest,

as well as Plaintiff’s, is best served by granting Plantiff

the injunctive relief it seeks.

In deciding to review IEC’s claim under the Administra-

tive Procedure Act, supra, the Court relied on the landmark

decision by the United States Court of Appeals in Scanwell

Laboratories, Ine. v. Shaffer, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 424

F.2d 859 (1970). In Scanwell, the Court of Appeals held

that disappointed bidders for pti res contracts have

standing under the A.P.A., 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970), to

bring suit for declaratory and injunctive relief in order to

determine the validity of the agency’s actions. Although

Scanwell involved disappointed bidders whose legal rights

when denied a contract were somewhat unclear and the in-

stant case concerns a party under contract with the govern-

ment and possessing definite contractual rights, it is the

Court’s opinion in the setting of this case that review

should be made available to both ‘potential sellers and

REDE GE SIL NIL OIE GOEL: SATEEN SIE ELLIE EEG BY BE, SEB LS PEG MOLLER ITE LD IE,

eHiny RE POR IS BES yer

=e :

B-10

those already under government contract,’’* and that an

appropriate remedy should be made available ‘‘to correct

[governmental] overreaching.’’*’ Like the Court of Ap-

peals’ decision in Scanwell to abandon the traditional re-

fusal of courts to intervene in the procurement process, the

Court’s decision to intervene here is supported by two in-

terests: first, the interest in IEC as an individual allegedly

harmed by illegal, arbitrary and capricious action by the

contracting officer; and second, the interest of the public,

represented by IEC as a ‘‘private attorney general,’’ in

having government contracts administered fairly and ac-

cording to the regulations. Only if contractors are assured

fair and equitable treatment by contracting officers can the

long-term integrity, economic welfare and efficiency of the

procurement process be advanced.

Thus the Court regards this suit as one brought, in part,

in the public interest to prevent arbitrary or capricious

decision-making in the administration of government con-

tracts and, particularly, to restore the role of the contract-

ing officer to one who tests evidence by procedures suffi-

ciently adversary in nature to provide a reasonable guar-

antee of its reliability. See Scanwell Laboratories, Ine. v.

Shaffer, supra; Mobile Oil Corporation v. Federal Power

Commission, D.C.Cir., 483 F.2d 1238, 1973. It is no longer

reasonable for courts to take the position that regulations

governing contracting are for the protection of the govern-

ment and the public and not for the protection of those who

bid for and perhaps obtain contracts with government.°

The public interest cannot turn solely on efficient procure-

ment, but has to fasten on the fairness and integrity along

* Levanthal, ‘‘Publie Contracts and Administrative Law,’’ 52

ABAJ 35, 38 (1966).

5 Id.

® See ‘Governmental Contract Bid Protests: Judicial Review and

The Role of the Court of Claims,’’ 39 Chicago Law Review 84

(1973).

<4

B-11

with the efficiency of the procurement process which at this

point in this country’s history accounts for payments

amounting to more than one-half of all federal expendi-

tures.’ Negotiated contracts like IEC’s provide more than

half the dollar value of all federal procurements * and up-

wards of 85% of the dollar value of military procurements.°

In view of the mushrooming economie development of the

procurement process, the Court has determined that the

public interest would be best served by a limited and ex-

pedited review of the government’s administration of the

IEC contract, notwithstanding the delay in the completion

of the government’s feasibility studies in this defense area.

The government has noted in its submissions to the Court

that IEC’s components are technologically undesirable and

have no practical value to the government aside from pro-

viding future government contractors with a blueprint of

what not to do. In light of the purpose to which the govern-

ment intends to put the data in question, the Court is of the

opinion that review of this suit in no way delays procure-

ment for the national defense.” For the aforementioned

reasons, the Court believes this case ‘‘calls for an assertion

of an overriding public interest ‘in having agencies follow

the regulations which control government contracting.’ ”’

M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamons, supra, 147 U.S.App.D.C.

221, 455 F.2d 1289, quoting Seanwell Laboratories v. Shaf-

fer, supra, 424 F.2d at 864.

7U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the

United States 374, table 574 (1970).

See ‘‘Government Contract Bid Protests,’’ supra, 39 Chieago

Law Review at 816, footnote 10, where the author refers to the

Subcommittee on Federal Procurement and Regulation of the Joint

Economic Committee, 89th Congress, 1st Sess., Background Material

on Economie Impact of Federal Procurement 21 (1966).

* Td.

© Therefore, the Court has decided that those bidder suits where

Courts have refused to delay national defense procurement are not

controlling. See A. G. Schoomaker Co. v. Resor, supra, City Chem-

ical Corp. v. Shrefiler, 333 F.Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ; American

Standard, Ine. v. Laird, 326 F.Supp. 492 (D.D.C. 1971).

Rees “eae a

B-12

It is within this Court’s discretion to refuse to entertain

a suit for injunctive relief in light of the potentiality of a

damages remedy in the Court of Claims. M. Steinthal & Co.

v. Seamans, supra. However, the Court doubts both the

likelihood and adequacy of a damages remedy in the Court

of Claims. An effective remedy in damages arguably would

be IEC’s lost profits from unauthorized disclosure of its

trade secrets. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-708(2)

(1972 edition). However, there are few satisfactory meth-

ods to measuring the value of losses resulting from the

unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets. See Precision

Plating & Metal Finishing, Ine. v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,

435 F.2d 1262 (Sth Cir. 1970); Appeal of Joanell Labora-

tories, Inc., 72-1 BCA par. 9218. Especially where the only

potential buyer of products related to IEC’s trade secrets

refuses to recognize any practical value in the goods them-

selves. Most importantly, however, the Court is convinced

that irreparable injury would result from the unauthorized

disclosure of IEC’s trade secrets. Therefore, it is not sig-

nificant whether or not plaintiff could avail itself of dam-

ages to some amount not measured by anticipated profits

through successful adjudication of its rights in the Court

of Claims. It seems more important that IEC be able to

obtain the injunctive relief which the strength of its claim

merits, but which the Court of Claims cannot provide. See

United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 23 L.Ed.2d

52 (1969). The Court’s decision to proceed with its review

of Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction in light

of the recent submissions to the Court by the parties in this

ease, particularly the statement of reasons provided by the

contracting officer and his deposition, is within its disere-

tion and consistent with the viewpoint expressed by the

Court of Appeals in M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, supra,

where Judge Leventhal suggested the appropriateness of

intervention by the District Court in certain circumstances:

‘*To avoid any confusion, it is not being stated here

that the damages available to the disappointed bidder,

REI hE LP CE

B-13

which do not comprehend anticipated profit, are auto-

matically an ‘adequate’ legal remedy as to warrant dis-

missal for want of equity of every injunction action re-

gardless of the strength of plaintiff’s claim on the

merits.’’ 455 F.2d at 1302 (1970).

Ill. Tue Score or Review anp THE Nature or RELIEF

GRANTED

The absence of case law regarding the appropriate stand-

ard of review in a procurement dispute like the case at

bar presents the Court with two alternatives: (1) apply the

most appropriate Administrative Procedure Act standard

of review; or (2) evaluate the merits of the case in accord-

ance with settled principles of contract law. See United

States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., Inc., 412 U.S. 580,

93 S.Ct. 2389, 37 L.Ed.2d 187 (decided June 18, 1973). At

this stage in the litigation the Court need not decide the

merits. However, the appropriate standard of review takes

on significance in its limited application within the judicial

guidelines for issuing preliminary injunctive relief. The

standards for granting preliminary equitable relief are set

out in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Assn. v. FPC, 104 U.S.

App.D.C. 106, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (1958). Among those

standards is the requirement that there be a likelihood of

plaintiff’s success on the merits. (See page 651 infra). In

order to best apply the criteria set forth in Virginia Job-

bers, the Court shall undertake to evaluate the merits of

JEC’s claims under the appropriate APA standard as well

as under accepted contract law principles.

Although this Court relied on the decision in Scanwell

and the controlling interests identified therein in deciding

the appropriateness of review in the ease at bar, the Court

is unable to glean from Scaniell a clear articulation of the

scope of review appropriate to the case at bar. Therefore

the Court looks initially to the Administrative Procedure

Act for standards applicable to the review of the instant

complaint which challenges the Contract Officer’s contract

ea Mere nk

B-14

interpretations and the actions he has taken in response to

those interpretations. Fortunately, the Act provides stand-

ards that are applicable to the instant dispute." The review

section of the APA insulates certain agency actions from

review ‘‘to the extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial

review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discre-

tion by law.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). However, the interpre-

tation given § 701 in this Circuit provides this Court with a

good deal of latitude in determining the extent to which a

statute or regulation operates to make a discretionary de-

cision unreviewable, particularly where, as here, a procure-

ment regulation authorizes a discretionary determination

by the contracting officer. See Wheelabrator Corp. v. Cha-

fee, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 238, 455 F.2d 1306, 1311-1312 (1971) ;

Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 40 U.S.App.

D.C. 31, 483 F.2d 1137 (1970).

Several procurement cases in which courts have treated

questions of governmental overreaching find their genesis

in circumstances where the government accepts one bid

over another or decides to cancel a contract. In both situa-

tions the contracting officer, or the Secretary of the instant

agency depending upon the particular setting, takes action

pursuant to an express statutory mandate. See M. Steinthal

and Co. v. Seamans, supra; Udall v. Littell, 125 U.S.App.

D.C. 89, 366 F.2d 668 (1966); Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d

1207 (4 Cir., 1971). The approach of the courts in those

cases is apposite to the instant dispute involving the exer-

cise of administrative discretion pursuant to an Armed

Services Procurement Regulation incorporated by reference

into the IEC contract. Without question the relevant regu-

lation, ASPR 7-104.9, commits the interpretation of the

Technical Rights in Data Clause to the contracting officer.

11 Quite obviously in deciding to review this case and in determin-

ing that particular APA standards are applicable, the Court makes

clear its position that in no fashion can a government contract

shelter a contracting officer, who at all times is an agent of the gov-

ernment, from some standard of accountability under the APA.

B-15

(See Appendix). With respect to his interpretation, there-

fore, the Court may not directly review its legal propriety.

The Act commands that courts refrain from such review

where legal interpretation is entrusted to the agency, 5

U.S.C. § 701. However, the Act expressly provides that the

courts ‘‘shall... hold unlawful, ... agency actions, findings

and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’’ 5

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Under this provision, the Court must

undertake a limited review of the contracting officer’s deci-

sions rendered pursuant to the Rights in Data clause to

determine whether it is likely that he acted arbitrarily and

without a rational basis. Udall v. Littell, supra; M. Stein-

thal & Co. v. Seamans, supra.

The above background is important to an understanding

of the issues related to the Court’s decision to issue a pre-

liminary injunction, particularly the issue whether there is

a likelihood that IEC will prevail on the merits. That issue

along with several others is determinative of plaintiff’s

motion for a preliminary injunction. In Virginia Petroleum

Jobbers Assoc. v. FPC, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 259 F.2d 921

(1958), the United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit set forth four criteria to consider in

deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction. They

are as follows:

(a) That the petitioner has a strong likelihood of

prevailing upon the merits;

(b) That the petitioner would be irreparably injured

without such relief;

(c) That the stay or injunction would not substan-

tially harm other interested persons;

(d) That the public interest will not be significantly

harmed.

In addition to these four criteria governing the issuance

of a preliminary injunction, the Court’s consideration of

the government contractor’s claim should draw upon two

“ “?

PEM F

ppounen PL LMG TED, AHH ME SI NM

B-16

interrelated principles articulated by Judge Leventhal in

M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, supra, which apply where

determinations of procurement officials are before the

Court:

**(1) courts should not overturn any procurement de-

termination unless the aggrieved bidder demonstrates

that there was no rational basis for the agency’s deci-

sion; and (2) even in instances where such a determina-

tion is made, there is room for sound judicial discre-

tion, in the presence of overriding public interest con-

siderations, to refuse to entertain declaratory or in-

junctive actions in a pre-procurement context.’’ 455

F.2d at 1301.

The government contends that the Steimthal principles

severely limit this Court’s choice to apply the public inter-

est values of Scanwell to the facts of the case at bar. The

Court respectfully disagrees. The instant dispute is clearly

one of the ‘‘meritorious sheep”’ as described by the Court

of Appeals in Scanwell, supra, 424 F.2d at 872. After a

careful examination of the IEC contract and the extensive

memoranda, affidavits and depositions filed in this law suit,

it is the Court’s conclusion that the contracting officer and

his organization or staff violated the statutory boundaries

set by ASPR 7-104.9, and that the contracting officer in an

arbitrary and cavalier manner arrived at a determination

which is not reasonable.

A. Puarntirr Has A Liketinoop or Success On THE MERITS

IEC is before the Court seeking equitable relief in a

stringent form against government action. In these cireum-

stances IEC’s burden is heavy indeed and the Court must

restrict its inquiry to a determination of whether the deci-

sions of the contracting officer had a reasonable basis, or

appear to have had a reasonable basis for purposes of IEC’s

motion. The lessons taught by the bidder suits instruct the

Court to ‘‘fully take into account the discretion that is typ-

B-17

ically accorded officials in the procurement agencies by sta-

tutes and regulations.’’ M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans,

supra, 455 F.2d at 1301. In Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chaffee,

147 U.S.App.D.C. 238, 455 F.2d 1306 (1971) the Court of

Appeals further commented:

‘*In view of the public interest in expeditious procure-

ment a preliminary injunction cannot be justified unless

the court makes a considered judgment of a probability

of success on the merits. Likelihood of success is a re-

quirement of an injunction even though the court’s

probing and analysis may not be as comprehensive

when its injunction is limited to the period required

for a determination by the GAO on the protest.’’ 455

F.2d at 1317.

The Court has given the closest consideration to the facts

presented and determined that IEC has sufficiently demon-

strated its probability of success on the merits. It is clear

to the Court that the contracting officer’s process of deci-

sion-making in this instance was contrary to the ASPR re-

quirements that contracting officials make a meaningful in-

quiry and good faith effort in the exercise of their discre-

tion. Consequently, it was no accident that the contracting

officer’s final decision to obliterate the restrictive legend on

three IEC Reports and authorize the use of all the reports

with unlimited rights was unsupported by evidence and re-

flected legal conclusions that appear incorrect as a matter

of law.

The integrity of the procurement process turns on the

responsiveness of contracting officials to follow the regula-

tions in a manner that insures free and fair competition.

See A. G. Schoonmaker v. Resor, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 250,

445 F.2d 726 (1971): In the area of advertised bid proced-

ures, for example, the contracting officer’s discretion is

canalized through a regulatory structure setting forth the

criteria he should consider and the procedures he must fol-

B-18

low in awarding a contract. See 32 C.F.R. § 1.300-2 (1972) ;

41 C.F.R. §§ 1-1.301-2, 1-2.102(a). Since the contracting offi-

cer’s decisions as to whether a bidder is ‘‘responsive”’ to a

bid invitation or ‘‘responsible’’ to the extent that he can be

expected to satisfactorily perform the contract require the

contracting officer to make subjective judgments, courts de-

mand high standards of performance within the regulatory

guidelines to prevent against fraudulent or collusive con-

tract awards. See Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chafee, supra. It

is the Court’s opinion that the degree of care with which a

contracting officer awards a contract should presage the

exactitude with which he and other contracting officials issue

decisions during the course of the contract’s administra-

tion.

1. The Decision of the Contracting Officer to Strike Plain-

tiff’s Restrictive Legend Is Illegal Since It Did Not Com-

port With the Minimal Due Process Requirements of

ASPR 7-104.9(d).

The Court’s concern here is with the contracting officer’s

decision that IEC failed to ‘‘substantiate’’ or ‘‘show”’ the

propriety of the use of a limited rights legend on the data

it submitted in connection with reports 70-06-04, 70-07 and

70-09. The Air Force is prevented from removing such

legends or treating the data in issue with ‘‘unlimited

rights’’ until the contracting officer determines that the con-

tractor has failed to ‘‘substantiate his contention that the

use of the marking is authorized’’ and the officer provides

‘‘written notice’’ of such determination to the contractor.

It is clear to the Court that the contracting officer never

reached an independent decision with respect to IEC’s ef-

forts to substantiate the use of the restrictive legend and

therefore never made available to plaintiff a meaningful

notification of his decision that comported with the require-

ments of procedural due process such that plaintiff could

adequately challenge the decision either in its dealings with

the contracting officer or in an appeal to the Secretary of

the Air Force.

REE EER I ORR OE A RE AE” _

B-19

In the case at bar, Contracting Officer Harsfield, the sec-

ond of the two contracting officers on the IEC contract,

appears to have relied entirely on his advisors, particularly

Mr. Rustenberg, with the result that Mr. Harsfield’s deci-

sion was not made on the basis of the evidence before him

but on the untested opinion of his advisors. (See Harsfield

Deposition, pp. 76-77, 118-119; Rustenberg Deposition, pp.

63-65). Most importantly, that opinion was not provided

to IKC as required by the notification requirement of the

ASPR in issue. Insofar as the Contracting Officer relied on

Mr. Rustenberg’s definition of ‘‘function’’ as it appears in

paragraph (b)(1)(iv) of the Rights in Technical Data

clause of the contract to determine that IKC had failed to

substantiate its right to place a restrictive legend on the

data, Mr. Harsfield’s decision was unreasonable and unsup-

ported by the record before him. It does not appear to the

Court that a determination of what comes within the term

‘‘form, fit and function’? enjoys a breadth of discretion

drawing on technical expertise. Rather, the Contracting

Officer’s range of interpretations was limited by the Sched-

ule of the Contract which provides an understanding of the

nature of the data for which the Government contracted. In

reviewing the items specified for inclusion in the Final Test

Reports, it is apparent to the Court that the plain meaning

of items described excludes without question an integral

design of the IEC system. The Schedule of the Contract

makes reference to an attached DD Form 1423 that dis-

cussed the data IEC was required to deliver. The pertinent

part of that form is Data Item A002, Test Reports Develop-

ment, which explains the applicability of Data Item deserip-

tion T-119 which, in turn, specifies items to be included in

the Final Test Reports. With respect to IEC’s hardware

used in the test, that is, IEC’s processes and components

themselves, T-119 calls for data as follows:

“Description of Test Article, including test configura-

tion identification and photographs as appropriate.”’

£

“PRE ROANRE Pata DGS gE ey Data Bea id ee

B-20

The description of the ‘‘test article’’ is defined under the

heading Description of Test Apparatus found in Mil-Std-

831 (Defendants’ Exhibit F):

*¢5.6.10.1.1. Description of test apparatus. A descrip-

tion of test apparatus shall include a tabulation of all

instruments and equipment used, the manufacturers’

names, serial numbers, raises, accuracy, and dates of

latest calibration.’’

Thus IEC was expected to identify the components of the

system it was testing but under no reading of the above

could IEC be required to describe the internal operations,

the mathematical equations and logic diagrams, of the test

hardware. Yet that was Mr. Rustenberg’s conception of the

‘data requirements as adopted by the Contracting Officer.

The Contracting Officer’s letters of December 28, 1971,

June 5, 1972 or October 2, 1972 suggested to IEC, that

plaintiff had not substantiated its right to mark the reports

with restrictive legends. Therefore, IEC chose to respond

to each of those letters with a further attempt to establish

by the existence of competent evidence that IEC developed

the LOMISS processes and components at its own expense

prior to the inception of the contract. It seems that the rea-

sonableness of Plaintiffs’ efforts to convince the contracting

officer of the rightness of its position was negated by failure

of the Contracting Officer or his aides to reveal their con-

viction that IEC was required to deliver the data in which

it asserted proprietary rights, in part, because of opinions

such as the following: ‘‘significant testing of Unit B oc-

curred under Contract Modifications P0003 and P0006, and

... the precontract flight testing were only demonstrations

intended to obtain funding for significant and necessary

testing.’’ (Statement of Reasons for Contracting Officer’s

Decision of 2 October 1972, page 5). This speculation on the

part of the Contracting Officer is based on Mr. Rustenberg’s

impression that the testing of one IEC system, ‘Unit B”’,

before the contract Modification P0003 was awarded, was

B-21

not successful and only reached a satisfactory level of per-

formance during subsequent tests that in part were accom-

plished at government expense. This theory of Mr. Rusten-

berg has been adopted by the Contracting Officer though

there has never been a factual underpinning provided. Fur-

thermore, this opinion was never suggested to Plaintiff so

that IEC might test it in an adversary manner which the

Court believes appropriate.

The theory of Mr. Rustenberg appears to the Court to

have been the overriding basis of the Contracting Officer’s

final decision on October 2, 1972. Yet Mr. Rustenberg’s

theory had no foundation in facts gathered in the course of

IEC’s efforts to substantiate its claims. Indeed, IEC was

never advised that its efforts to demonstrate the develop-

ment of its processes and components at private expense

were futile in that the data in question was considered by

the Contracting Officer to be the product of federally funded

testing, which would preclude that opportunity to place re-

strictive legends on data submitted pursuant to the contract.

Where the Contracting Officer makes a discretionary de-

termination based upon his reading of the contract and the

field reports of his aides, the due process requirements of

the ASPR demand at the least that the Contracting Officer

independently review any staff opinion he adopts, that he

have a factual basis for his subjective reasons, and that he

notify the contractor accordingly. Here he had none, and

no adequate notice was provided. Instead his subjective

analysis began and ended with the unsubstantiated opinion

of the contract engineer. The Court must reject this deci-

sional process and the conclusions it generated as unfair,

unreasonable, and violative of the minimal due process re-

quirements of ASPR 7-104.9(d).

Thus the Court regards the contracting officer’s ultimate

decision to strike plaintiff’s legend as violative of proced-

ural due process requirements insofar as the instant regula-

tion on its face requires the contracting officer to reach an

= . ELE. OPT RIG I GME ay I net AN tg CERAM PEP OOP OARS a | eet

B-22

independent decision that IEC’s restrictive legend ‘‘was

not permitted by the terms of the contract’? and to make

the basis for that decision known to IEC. Although the

Court does not reach the issue, it is important to note that

ASPR 7-104.9(d) is seriously lacking in adequate standards

for striking a restrictive legend and in adequate procedures

including notice of specific objections by the contracting

officer, opportunity to present evidence and to cross-exam-

ine adverse witnesses. In addition, the regulation does not

provide for administrative findings and conclusions on the

record made before the contracting officer. By requiring a

statement of reasons and meaningful compliance with the

notification requirement by the contracting officer, the Court

in this case, hopefully, has moved the procurement process

closer to conformity with due process of law.

However, it is the Court’s concern that an ASPR, which

purports to authorize a contracting officer to strike a con-

tractor’s restrictive legend from data in which the con-

tractor claims a significant property interest, should pro-

vide procedures consistent with the requirements of pro-

cedural due process under the Fifth Amendment to the

United States Constitution. Since the striking of a contrac-

tor’s restrictive legend for data to which the contractor

claims a property interest and the subsequent delivery of

the data to the contractor’s competitors constitutes an ad-

judication of the contractor’s proprietary interest by the

contracting officer, adequate notice and a full hearing would

seem appropriate. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91

S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397

U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Sniadach v.

Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.

8d 349 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct.

1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.

593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); and Board of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 270, 33 L.Ed.2d 548

(1972).

PELE IRL E A TR OR RRR ENR yee Sem . ~ 2

ER an NPE AOS Pt G ENE ers” AAR

pte Pte

aaa I ce Oe ae ee ee

B-23

Finally, notwithstanding the due process violations by the

contracting officer noted ab ve, the Court believes IEC met

the regulatory test of sul iantiation. Although the Court

can accept the Government’s definition that ‘‘substantiate”’

means ‘‘to establish the existence of true or competent evi-

dence’’, the Court is inclined to agree with IEC that Plain-

tiff indeed provided competent evidence to the extent that

IEC could appreciate what the Contracting Officer was

searching for. IEC attempted to document in a written his-

tory the development of the processes and components al-

leged to have been developed at IEC expense. An Indepnd-

ent Audit Report was included. This evidence supported the

proposition that IEC incorporated its processes into cer-

tain components which existed as identifiable hardware

prior to July 1969 and independent of any Government

funding. (See Independent Audit Report, Rustenburg Dep-

osition, page 5).

The Court is on firm ground in interpreting the import

of the term ‘‘substantiate”’ in a different manner from the

Contracting Officer, even if such a reading is contrary to

the intention of the Government’s draftsman:

“If the Government had contracted with either

Steinthal or Pioneer and a dispute had arisen over the

meaning of the delivery schedule, the court would

have been faced with a familiar judicial problem of

contractual interpretation; it might decide that, re-

gardless of the intention of the Government’s drafts-

man, the amended IFB gave the contractor a reason-

able latitude as to the time of delivery. Such a decision

might very well be upheld by this court since it involves

the resolution of a contractual ambiguity, and under

familiar legal doctrine a court may well construe a pro-

vision strictly against the Government draftsman, giv-

ing the benefit of any doubt to the private party who

did not draft the particular provision.’ M. Steinthal &

Co. v. Seamans, supra, 455 F.2d at 1303.

PEE ELLE ELEN IEEE AAEM RUNES ARB HOY Se ARG NL:

TF REE COPS hs epaRaee

i el i a a ee ee

B-24

It is the Court’s opinion that Plaintiff met the burden of

substantiating the propriety of the limited rights legend

claim, as IEC understood that burden at the time the con-

tract was made.

2. The Government Is Estopped from Denying the Pro-

priety of Restrictive Legends Appearing on Final Re-

ports Submitted by IEC Subsequent to the Govern-

ment’s Acceptance of Report 70-06-04.

The important question raised by the Contractor here

is whether the Government has an unlimited right to use

and disclose to others for their use detailed design data re-

lating to IEC processes and components allegedly prepared

independent of the coutract funding and submitted to the

Government independent of any contract requirement but

as a cooperative response to the request of the Contract

Project Engineer. With respect to the above question, the

Court assumes as a threshold matter that the Government

obtained rights, either ‘‘limited’’ or ‘‘unlimited,’’ only in

the technical data which the Government specified was to

be delivered under the contract. The Court refers the

reader to Section III, page 652, of this Opinion and where

the Court concluded that the Air Force did not order de-

tailed design data of any of the components of either of

the systems tested under the contract. Accordingly, the

Government did not acquire any rights in data submitted

by IEC with restrictive markings that was not part of the

data ordered in the contract.

However, the Air Force did obtain possession of the

alleged trade secrets as a result of IEC’s response to Mr.

Rustenberg’s request. It is not clear whether the Air Force

through Mr. Rustenberg repeated its request for design

specifications at the time for submission of each Final Tech-

nical Report, however, IEC included the data each time and

marked it with restrictive legends. It is the Court’s opin-

ion that even in the absence of evidence supporting an ex-

press agreement of nondisclosure, IEC’s delivery of the

TL GREP OR RII RR EE » aspen

B-25

data with restrictive legends supports the existence of an

implied understanding that the data was received in con-

fidence. It is well settled that in the presence of an implied

agreement the Government is liable for the unauthorized

use and disclosure of proprietary data. See Horner vy.

United States, 86 F.Supp. 132, 114 Ct.Cl. 612 ; Comp.Dee.

B-155885, May 1965.

TEC contends that the restrictive legends demonstrate

its intention not to deliver the detailed proprietary data

to the Air Force with unlimited rights and that the Air

Force had no reason to believe otherwise. Plaintiff’s posi-

tion is supported by IEC’s effort to obtain the return of

its data by revising and resubmitting the Reports contain-

ing the challenged markings. In IEC’s letters of June 14,

1971 and January 5, 1972, respectively, IEC explained to

the Air Force its offer to revise Report 70-06-04 and made

clear its intention to retain a restrictive rights interest in

the technical data to which it attached a restrictive rights

legend in Reports 70-06-04, 71-07 and 71-09. The Air Force

never responded to TEC’s June 15, 1971 letter but accepted

the Report 70-06-04 and paid for it. As a consequence of

the Air Force’s failure to respond to that letter and the

Air Force’s decision to issue a Modification to the Contract,

Mod. P0006, IEC concluded that the Air Foree regarded

the restrictive legend on Report 70-06-04 to be proper. IEC

proceeded to submit the same data with the appropriate

restrictive legends in the next two reports in reliance on

the Air Force’s informed acquiescence in Plaintiff’s asser-

tions regarding Report 70-06-04. The Court believes Plain-

tiff’s reliance to have been justified in light of the Con-

tracting Officer’s position upon accepting the report (See

Exhibit 1 to Harsfield Deposition). The Government’s ac-

tions and Plaintiff’s reliance thereon have the effect of le-

gally estopping the Government from claiming that the

restrictive rights legends submitted on the Reports filed

after acceptance of 70-06-04 are improper. Equitable es-

* The Government argues that acquiescence is legally irrelevant

since the Contract Right in Technical Data clause, paragraph (4d),

PEEL act Be OPEC LD LIENS PEN KANG LE TEI CLEARS ED

B-26

toppel prevents the Government’s assertion of rights which -

might have existed had not the Government’s conduct ren-

dered it inequitable for this Court to permit the Govern-

ment to assert these rights against IEC. See Manloading

& Management Assoc., Inc. v. United States, Ct.Cl, 461

F.2d 1299 (1972).

B. Piarntirr Woutp Be IrreparasBLy INJuRED Witru Sucu

Rewer.

The Court has concluded that IEC will be irreparably in-

jured if the Government releases the technical data con-

taining IEC’s LOMISS processes and components to the

public. In taking the position that it is entitled to the data

marked with restrictive legends, the Government has con-

ceded the information is of a kind that would permit com-

petitors to reproduce, or as the Government desires, stay

far away from producing the IEC processes and components

in issue. Obviously, the release of such detailed data would

destroy any competitive advantage presently held by IEC.

The harm to IEC by public disclosure is found in the irre-

vocable loss of a competitive advantage and uncompensa-

ble economic hardship. The Court balances this with the

administrative burden the Government has complained of

in its review of proposals as a result of the delay occa-

sioned by this Court’s review of the alleged unfairness

in the Contracting Officer’s decision. The scales weigh de-

cisively in granting Plaintiff the preliminary relief it seeks.

Only a cry of ‘‘national security’? would turn this Court

from its purposeful review of the decision-making process

in question here. See Horne Brothers, Inc. v. Laird, 150

U.S.App.D.C. 177, 463 F.2d 1268 (1972).

provides that the Government’s acceptance of data does not pre-

clude the Government from obliterating any marking not author-

ized by the terms of the contract. The Court views the Govern-

ment’s acquiescence as relevant, indeed, since it resulted in IEC’s

reasonable reliance. Accordingly, the Government is estopped from

asserting the otherwise valid rights set forth in paragraph (d). See

3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, § 802 at 180 (5th Ed. 1941).

aati as NT aT PPE, BE LORE LT BA EOGNRE ES BLES: IOEIT ECMS ET

7 peace

SALLE LOE LE LOG CLRE LEAL ELN OYE IAS tg RMT ND CY yO

B-27

C. Tuts Insunctrion Wit Nor SussTanTIaLty Harm Oruer

INTERESTED Persons

The Government contends that the other defense con-

tractors are restless over the delay in the Government’s

consideration of their proposals, while it awaits this Court’s

determination regarding who presently has title to IEC’s

alleged proprietary data. It is the Court’s opinion that

defense contractors would experience considerably less

anxiety if they were to be assured through the actions of

this Court that the Government will not be permitted to

act in an arbitrary manner where the protection of their

trade secrets hangs in the balance. These contractors must

have an extensive interest in the degree to which a con-

tracting official will be permitted to determine that infor-

mation turned over to government officials in the course

of a contract as part of an effort to cooperate with their

review of the contractor’s work can be released to com-

petitors despite restrictive legends affixed to the informa-

tion at the time it was submitted.

The interest the Court seeks to safeguard here is central

to the welfare of the procurement process as reflected in

the Armed Services Regulation set forth below. The Gov-

ernment and the contractors will benefit in the long run

from the Court’s thorough application of the policy con-

siderations which underlie ASPR 9-202.1, set forth in per-

tinent part as follows:

**¥ 9-202.1 Background.

““(e) The Balancing of Interests. Tt is apparent that

there is no necessary correlation between the Government’s

need for technical data and its contractors’ economic inter-

ests therein. However, in balancing the Government’s re-

quirements for technical data against the contractor’s in-

terest in protecting his data, it should be recognized that

there may be a considerable identity of interest. This is

particularly true in the case of innovative contractors who

BE. 7 — —— ' ss Sg Aare ey

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SP Ree CTE et: s

B-28

can best be encouraged to develop at private expense items

of military usefulness where their rights in such items are

serupulously protected. It is equally important that the

Government foster successful contractual relationships and

encourage a ready flow of data essential to Government

needs by confining its acquisitions of technical data to cases

of actual need. Certainly the Government must not be

barred from bargaining and contracting to obtain such

technical data as it needs, even though that data may

normally not be disclosed in commercial practice. More-

over, when the Government pays for research and develop-

ment work which produces new knowledge, products or

processes, it has an obligation to foster technological prog-

ress through wide dissemination of the new and useful in-

formation derived from such work and where practicable

to provide competitive opportunities for supplying the new

products and utilizing the new processes. At the same time,

acquiring, maintaining, storing, retrieving, and distribut-

ing technical data in the vast quantities generated by mod-

ern technology is costly and burdensome for the Govern-

ment. For this reason alone, it would be necessary to con-

trol closely the extent and nature of data procurement.

Such control is also necessary to insure Government re-

spect for its contractors’ economic interest in technical

data relating to their privately developed items. The poli-

cies and procedures of this Part are framed in the light

of these considerations.’’

D. Pusiic IntErESt Witt Be SeErRveEp.

The Court’s comment in General Electric v. Seamans,

340 F.Supp. 636 (1972), is equally applicable here:

‘‘There is little doubt that the overriding public in-

terest lies in having the governmental agencies follow

their own regulations. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc.,

supra, at 424 F.2d 864.’’ 340 F.Supp. at 641.

OTE NT IT SCRUTINY YRC Be BI MTN LOE EE RENT SE IBS 8 =

Tet

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Vo

B-29

This case concerns the manner in which contracting officials

make discretionary determinations in their administration

of government contracts. It is imperative that such decis-

ions reflect a fair and objective consideration of the con-

tract itself along with any questioned actions taken by the

parties pursuant to contract terms from which the dispute

issues. Procurement activities cannot be allowed to ‘‘de-

teriorate into actions reflecting personal predilictions of

administrative officials, whether ascribable to whim, mis-

placed zeal, or impermissible influence.’’ Steinthal v. Sea-

mans, supra, 455 F.2d at 1305. The facts here indicate that

the Contracting Officer at the time of his decision in ques-

tion had responsibility for 110 contracts involving a total

of half a billion dollars, of which the IEC contract ac-

counted for less than 1% of his workload. For that reason,

the Government contends that the Contracting Officer was

entirely reasonable in relying so fully on the suggestions

of his advisors. The court must fault such ‘‘organiza-

tional’’ decisions whose roots are precariously implanted

in the quicksand of speculation. (See page 653, supra). It

is unreasonable for the Contracting Officer to accept un-

substantiated opinions of his advisors without testing them

for their adversariness. It is in the public interest that

reason and not convenience be the basis for a Contracting

Official’s decision.

IV. Conciusion

The critical decision-making stage for resolving disputes

arising under the Rights in Technical Data clause of any

Governmental contract is at the contracting officer level.

That is the intent of the Armed Services Procurement

Regulations. Therefore it is of absolute necessity that con-

tracting officers make decisions in a fair and reasoned

fashion. In circumstances like those before the Court

where a contracting officer relies upon the unsubstantiated

and untested opinions of his advisors, he betrays the basic

consideration of fairness which this Court demands of

EEA NS ARMA V5 Ns Pas a Cano

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Government officials acting pursuant to administrative

regulations. In addition, such reliance by a contracting offi-

cer effectively shields the questionable opinion from ade-

quate testing by accepted principles of procedural due

process. In the field of procurement, unless courts require

of contracting officers no less than the fairness referred to

above, small contractors will never be able to test the de-

cisions of the contracting officer when, as here, the con-

tractors cannot avail themselves of any administrative

remedies.

For the above reasons, the Court has decided to grant

IEC the preliminary injunction it seeks.

In addition to this Opinion, the Court, this day, the 23rd

of October, 1973, has entered Findings of Fact and Con-

clusions of Law and a separate Order.

APPENDIX

7-104.9 Rights in Data

(a) Basic Data Clause. In accordance with 9-203, insert the

following clause

Rieuts 1 Tecunicat Data (1965 Fes)

(a) Definitions

(1) Technical Data, as used in this clause, means techni-

eal writing, sound recordings, pictorial reproductions,

drawings, or other graphic representations and works of a

technical nature, whether or not copyrighted, which are

specified to be delivered pursuant to this contract. The

term does not include financial reports, cost analyses, and

other information incidental to contract administration.

(2) Limited Rights means rights to use, duplicate, and

disclose technical data in whole or in part, by or for the

Government, with the express limitation that such data

may not be released outside the Government, used, dupli-

B-31

cated, or disclosed in whole or in part, for manufacture or

procurement, except for:

work by or for the Government where the item or

process concerned is not otherwise reasonable avail-

able to enable timely performance of the work; and

as the interests of the United States may require;

provided, in either case, that the release of such data shall

be subject to the limitations of this paragraph (2).

(3) Unlimited Rights means rights to use, duplicate or

disclose technical data, in whole or in part, in any manner

and for any purpose whatsoever, and to have or permit

others to do so.

(b) Government Rights.

(1) The Government shall have unlimited rights in:

(i) technical data resulting directly from perform-

ance of experimental, developmental or research work

which was specified as an element of performance in

this or any other Government contract or subcontract ;

(ii) technical data necessary to enable manufacture

of end-items, components and modifications, or to en-

able the performance of processes, when the end-items,

components, modifications or processes have been, or

are being, developed under this or any other Govern-

ment contract ov subeontract in which experimental,

developmental or research work is, or was specified

as an element of contract performance, except techni-

cal data pertaining to items, components or processes

developed at private expense (but see ( 2) (ii) below);

(iii) technical data constituting corrections or

changes to Government-furnished data ;

(iv) technical data pertaining to end-items, com-

ponents or processes which was prepared for the pur-

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pose of identfying sources, size, configuration, mating

and attachment characteristics, functional character-

istics and performance requirements (‘‘form, fit and

function’’ data, e. g., specification control drawings,

catalog sheets, envelope drawings, etc.) ;

(v) manuals or instructional materials prepared for

installation, operation, maintenance or training pur-

poses;

(vi) other technical data which has been, or is norm-

ally furnished without restriction by the contractor

or subcontractor; and

(vii) technical data listed or described in an agree-

ment incorporated into the Schedule of this contract,

which the parties have predetermined, on the basis of

subparagraphs (i) thru (vi) above, and agreed will

be furnished with unlimited rights.

(2) The Government shall have limited rights in:

(i) technical data, listed or described in an agree-

ment incorporated into the Schedule of this contract,

which the parties have agreed will be furnished with

limited rights; and

(ii) technical data pertaining to items, components

or processes developed at private expense, other than

such data as may be included in the data referred td

in (b)(1)(i), (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi) ;

provided that each piece of data to which limited rights

are to be asserted pursuant to (2)(i) and (ii) above is

marked with the following legend in which is inserted the

number of the prime contract under which the technical

data is to be delivered and the name of the Contractor or

subcontractor by whom the technical data was generated:

Furnished under United States Government Contract

jC ar Shall not be either released outside the

Government, or used, duplicated, or disclosed in whole

B-33

or in part for manufacture or procurement, without

the written permission of ...... , except for: (i) emer-

gency repair or overhaul work by or for the Govern-

ment, where the item or process concerned is not oth.

erwise reasonably available to enable timely perform-

ance of the work; or (ii) release to a foreign govern-

ment, as the interests of the United States may re-

quire; provided that in either case the release, use,

duplication or disclosure hereof shall be subject to the

foregoing limitations. This legend shall be marked on

any reproduction hereof in whole or in part.

No legend shall be marked on, nor shall any limitation on

rights of use be asserted as to, any data which the Con-

tractor has previously delivered to the Government with-

out restriction. The limited rights provided for by this

paragraph (b)(2) shall not impair the right of the Gov-

ernment to use similar or identical data acquired from

other sources.

(c) Material Covered by Copyright.

(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of (b) above, the

Contractor agrees to and does hereby grant to the Govern-

ment, and to its officers, agents, and empioyees acting within

the scope of their official duties, a royalty free, nonexelu-

sive and irrevocable license throughout the world for Gov-

ernment purposes to publish, translate, reproduce, deliver,

perform, dispose of, and to authorize others so to do, all

technical data now or hereafter covered by copyright.

(2) No such copyrighted matter shall be ineluded in

technical data furnished hereunder without the written

permission of the copyright owner for the Government to

use such copyrighted matter in the manner described above.

(3) The Contractor shall report to the Government (or

higher-tier Contractor) promptly and in reasonable written

detail each notice or claim of copyright infringement re-

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PR RENDER AIOE ORE ME AE a OE REO ETI NE LOPE TES Rite 4 soa Ss B act - “y .

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:

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ceived by the Contractor with respect to any technical data

delivered hereunder.

(d) Removal of Unauthorized Markings. Notwithstand-

ing any provisions of this contract concerning inspection

and acceptance, the Government may modify, remove,

obliterate, or ignore any marking not authorized by the

terms of this contract on any technical data furnished here-

under, if—

(i) the Contractor fails to respond within sixty (60)

days to a written inquiry by the Government concern-

ing the propriety of the use of the marking, or

(ii) the Contractor’s response fails to substantiate

his contention that the use of the marking is autho-

rized, in which case the Government shall give written

notice to the Contractor.

(e) Relation to Patents. Nothing contained in this clause

shall imply a license to the Government under any patent

or be construed as affecting the scope of any license or

other right otherwise granted to the Government under

any patent.

Contract CLAUSES

(f) Limitation on Charges for Data. The Contractor

reconizes that the Government, or a foreign government

with funds derived through the Military Assistance Pro-

gram or otherwise through the United States Government,

may contract for property or services with respect to

which the vendor may be liable to the Contractor for

charges for the use of technical data on account of such a

contract. The Contractor further recognizes that it is the

policy of the Government not to pay in connection with its

contracts, or to allow to be paid in connection with con-

tracts made with funds derived through the Military As-

sistance Program or otherwise through the United States

Government, charges for data which the Government has

: es ae ee ees ; het

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S Fs; OE IPS ¥. Pee

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Perse 5.

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a right to use and disclose to others, which is in the public

domain, or which the Government has been given without

restrictions upon its use and disclosure to others. This

policy does not apply to reasonable reproduction, handling,

mailing, and similar administrative costs incident to the

furnishing of such data. In recognition of this policy, the

Contractor agrees to participate in and make appropriate

arrangements for the exclusion of such charges from such

contracts, or for the refund of amounts received by the

Contractor with respect to any such charges not so ex-

cluded.

(g) Acquisition of Data from Subcontractors.

(1) Whenever any technical data is to be obtained from

a subcontractor under this contract, the Contractor shall

use this same clause in the subcontract, without alteration,

and no other clause shall be used to enlarge or diminish

the Government’s or the Contractor’s rights in that sub-

contractor data which is required for the Government.

(2) Technical data required to be delivered by a sub-

contractor shall normally be delivered to the next higher-

tier Contractor. However, when there is a requirement in

the prime contract, or in the deferred order, for data which

may be supplied with limited rights pursuant to (b) (2)

above, a subcontractor may fulfill such requirement by

submitting such data directly to the Government rather

than through the prime Contractor.

(3) The Contractor and higher-tier subcontractors wil]

not use their power to award subcontracts as economic

leverage to acquire rights in data from their subcontractors

for themselves.

(b) Notice of Certain Limited Rights. In accordance

with 9-203(c), add the following paragraph (h) to the

above Basic Data Clause.

(h) The Contractor will promptly notify the Contracting

Officer in writing of the intended use of the performance

SNAG AERO GOOLE POLES EOL LOGS SELES NULL EL GRE: NETO LION Bi

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of the contract of any end-item, compcenent, modification

or process for which the Contractor intends to furnish data

with limited rights; provided, that no such notice is re-

quired with respect to standard commercial items which

are manufactured by more than one source of supply or

with respect to data which the parties have specified in

the Schedule would be furnished with limited rights. Sub-

contractors will notify the next higher-tier Contractor.

(1965 FEB)

(c) Technical Data Clause—Specifie Acquisition. In ac-

cordance with 9-203(d), insert the following clause.

Ricuts 1s Tecunicat Data—Speciric ACQUISITION

(1964 May)

(a) Definition. Technical Data as used in this clause

means technical writings, sound recordings, pictorial re-

productions, drawings, or other graphic representations

and works of a technical nature, whether or not copy-

righted, which are specified to be delivered pursuant to

this contract. The term does not include financial reports,

cost analyses, and other information incidental to contract

administration.

(b) Government Rights. The Government may duplicate,

use and disclose in any manner and for any purpose what-

soever, and have others so do, all or any part of the tech-

nical data delivered by the Contractor to the Government

under this contract.

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APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING Company, Division oF

A-T-O Ixc., Plaintiff,

v.

Exuior L. Ricuarpson, et au., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 927-73

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On May 10, 1973, International Engineering Company,

a Division of A-T-O Inc. (Hereinafter IEC), instituted

this action on its claim that the Defendant, Robert C. Sea-

mans, Jr., the Secretary of the Air Force (hereinafter

referred to as Defendant or the Air Force), had acted

arbitrarily, capriciously, in violation of law and without

rational foundation, under Regulations promulgated under

the authority of Defendant, Elliot L. Richardson, Secre-

tary of Defense (hereinafter referred to as Defendant

Richardson or the Department of Defense), in the deter-

mination that the restrictive proprietary legend attached

to IKC’s final reports Nos. 70-06-04, 71-07 and 71-09 sub-

mitted to the Air Force under Contract No. F33657-69-C-

1290 would be stricken therefrom and that these reports

would be circulated outside the Government. In addition

to its Verified Complaint, IEC filed Motions for a Tem-

porary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction,

and a Memorandum in Support of Said Motions. By this

Complaint IEC sought a declaratory judgment and an

injunction restraining the Air Force against any further

action to remove the restrictive legend from IEC’s reports

and a determination by this Court of IEC’s proprietary

claim to technical data contained in those reports. On May

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COP ROPENIEC ENS

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10, 1973, the Office of the United States Attorney for the

District of Columbia arranged with the Air Force to pre-

vent the disclosure of Plaintiff’s reports to the public pend-

ing a hearing on IEC’s Motion for a Temporary Restrain-

ing Order. By a stipulation filed with this Court on May

15, 1973, Defendants agreed not to release any of LEC’s

reports pending a determination by this Court on LEC’s

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. IEC’s Complaint was

verified by Elmer M. Lipsey, President of IEC, and signed

by counsel and was submitted with Exhibits A through S

attached.

On May 14, 1973, IEC filed a Notice To Take Depositions

Upon the Oral Examination of W. C. Rustenburg and R.

E. Harsfield on June 12, 1973.

On May 30, 1973, the Government filed a Motion to Dis-

miss or in the Alternative a Motion for Summary Judg-

ment and Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction,

a Statement of Material Facts, Affidavits of Major Ronald

Basso and Raphael E. Harsfield, Government Exhibits A

through K, and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities

in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Al-

ternative Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition

to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On June

4, 1973, the Government filed a Motion for a Protective

Order to prevent TEC from taking the depositions of W.

C. Rustenburg and Raphael FE. Harsfield.

On June 11, 1973, IEC filed an Opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment,

an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Or-

der, a Statement of Genuine Issues pursuant to Rule 9(h)

of the Rules of this Court, an Affidavit of James M. Me-

Hale, and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Motion for

Summary Judgment and Motion for a Protective Order.

IEC’s Motion for a Prelimirary Injunction and the

Government’s Motion to Dismiss were set to be heard by

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this Court on the morning of June 18, 1973. On June (4,

1973, the Government filed a ‘‘Reply to Plaintiff’s Oppo-

sition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Alterna-

tive for Summary Judgment.’’? This was not received by

IEC’s counsel until the afternoon of June 18, 1973. A hear-

ing was held in open court the morning of June 18, 1973.

On June 20, 1973, IEC filed a ‘‘Supplemental Memoran-

dum After Oral Argument in Opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss and in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for

a Preliminary Injunction.’’ At the same time, IEC filed a

proposed set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Also, IEC filed Exhibit T which was entered into the

record.

On July 10, 1973 this Court issued an Order and a Memo-

randum Opinion. By this Order it was directed first that

the matter be remanded to the Contracting Officer for the

purpose of obtaining from him a statement of reasons for

his decision regarding the inadequacy of IEC’s submis-

sions. Second, this Order directed the parties to appear in

open court on July 31, 1973 for the purpose of oral argu-

ment on two points: a) the legal properiety of the Con-

tracting Officer’s reasons for his decision to eradicate the

restrictive legends here contested and b) the extent to

which the opportunity to be heard is required by the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the contractual

procedure set forth in ASPR 7.104.9(a), Rights in Tech-

nical Data. Further, this Court ordered that the Defend-

ants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary

Judgment be denied without prejudice to renew said mo-

tion for summary judgment. And finally, this Court ordered

that Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order be denied.

On July 11, 1973 Plaintiff renewed his notice to take the

depositions of Messrs. W. C. Rustenburg and R. E. Hars-

field on July 23, 1973. At the Government’s request, their

depositions were actually taken on July 24, 1973.

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In accordance with the schedule established by this

Court’s July 10 Order, the Contracting Officer filed a State-

ment of Reasons for his 2 October 1972 Decision on July

20, 1973. Also in accordance with this Court’s schedule

established in its July 10, 1973 Order Plaintiff submitted

a response to the Contracting Officer’s Statement of Rea-

sons on July 26, 1973.

A hearing was held in open court on July 31, 1973. This

Court requested that parties submit further written ma-

terial regarding the questions posed by its Order of July

10, 1973. In accordance with the schedule established at

that hearing, Plaintiff submitted a Memorandum of Points

and Authorities addressing these questions on August 8,

1973. Defendants responded with a Supplemental Memo-

randum in Opposition to Motion of Plaintiff for a Pre-

liminary Injunction on August 13, 1973. On the basis of a

detailed consideration of all of the submissions and argu-

ments of all of the parties and the documentary exhibits,

the Verified Complaint and the depositions of Messrs.

Harsfield and Rustenburg, this Court makes the following

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support of its

Order entered this same day granting the Plaintiff’s Mo-

tion for a Preliminary Injunction.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff, International Engineering Co., a Division of

A-T-O, Ine. (hereinafter IEC, is a corporation incorporated

under the laws of the State of Ohio with its principal place

of business in the State of Ohio. IEC has offices in Spring-

field, Virginia.

2. Defendant, Elliot L. Richardson, was the Secretary of

Defense, with authority over activities of the Department

of Defense including procurement matters and the promul-

gation of the Armed Service Procurement Regulations,

and Defendant, Robert C. Seamans, Jr., was the Secretary,

Department of the Air Force, with authority over activities

C-5

of the Department of the Air Force including procurement

matters at the time this suit was filed. Presently James

Schlesinger has succeeded Mr. Richardson and John Me-

Lucas was succeeded Mr. Seamans. The caption of this case

is hereby ordered, pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure to be amended to acknowledge

such substitution.

3. In late 1967, IEC conceived a system for guiding bombs

or missiles with Loran C/D involving processes and certain

components not developed with Government Funds (see

Verified Complaint, Paragraph 5). The processes and the

performance characteristics of the components were spelled

out in detail in IEC Technical Proposal 101-68, dated Feb-

raary 3, 1968, which was submitted to the Air Force on

February 8, 1968 with a restrictive legend.

4. At that time the Air Force considered IEC’s is«port

‘‘proprietary’’ in that it described processes and compon-

ents not developed at Government expense or generally

available in the industry (see Rustenberg Deposition, Page

5).

5. In the one and one-half year period from January

1968 through June 1969, IEC incorporated its processes

into certain components which existed as identifiable hard-

ware prior to July 7, 1969 (see Verified Complaint, Para-

graphs 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15, Independent Audit Report,

Rustenberg Deposition, Page 5).

6. On July 7, 1969, IEC entered into a contract with the

Air Force to modify its system for test in a helieppter and

to perform certain laboratory and flight tests. That Con-

tract provided that the modified hardware system would

remain the sole property of IEC and that IEC would only

deliver to the Air Force Integration Design Data and a

Final Report (see Plaintiff’s Exhibit D, Defendants’ Exhi-

bit D, DD Form 1423 attached to the original Contract).

The only information required on the hardware to be used

in the tests is set forth at Paragraph (b)4 of T-119 incor-

a

so

ee

ERE PMT MN eer

i ci

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porated by reference into the DD 1423 Test Report require-

ment as follows:

**(4) Description of test article, including test config-

uration identification and photographs as appropri-

ate.’’? (Defendants’ Exhibit E.)

7. Also, in the two and one-half year period of January

1968 through June 30, 1970, IEC developed an advanced

circuitry Loran C/D Navigation System.

That system was demonstrated for over 300 hours in an

Aerocommander aircraft by IEC in that time period (see

Verified Complaint, Paragraphs 24, 25, 26 and 28, Inde-

pendent Audit Report) and generally proved to be effective

(see Rustenburg Deposition, Pages 38-40).

8. By Modification P00003 to the Contract, the Air Force

had IEC integrate these already existing components of

IEC’s Aerocommander Flight System into a Hybrid

KMU353A/B Guided Bomb Simulation Test System (see

Verified Complaint, Paragraph 30, Plaintiff’s Exhibit G,

Rustenburg Deposition, Page 40). Again, IEC retained its

hardware, and only Test Reports were to be provided to

the Air Force under the Contract.

9. In late 1969 efforts were made at the Aeronautical

Systems Division, AFSC at Wright-Patterson Air Force

Base to initiate competitive procurements based on IEC’s

processes and components. IEC protested to the Office of

the Secretary of the Air Force on the basis ef IEC’s pro-

prietary interests in these items. Mr. John Walsh, Deputy

to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, R&D, con-

vened a meeting at Wright-Patterson Air Foree Base on

January 19, 1970, which Mr. Rustenburg attended to dis-

cuss the impact of IEC’s claims on competitive procure-

ment. Subsequently, attempts at competitive procurement

were abandoned (see Rustenburg Deposition, Page 19).

10. Mr. Rustenburg was clearly aware of IEC’s claim to

protection of its data pertaining to components developed

C-7

at private expense and subsequently integrated into the test

system at the time he asked IEC to provide additional data

in connection with the Loran Guided Bomb project. In a

memorandum dated March 4, 1971, in which he commented

on a competitive proposal that he rated very highly, Mr.

Rustenburg said:

“‘Tf it is decided that IEC’s claims of proprietary data

are invalid then it is proposed that the LSI proposal

be funded.’’ (Rustenburg Deposition, Exhibit 1.)

11. In late March 1971, Mr. Rustenburg asked IEC for a

detailed description of the hardware used in the Helicopter

and KMU353A/B Bomb Simulation Test Programs includ-

ing a detailed description of the internal operations in terms

of mathematical equations and logic diagrams of IEC’s

precontract components. (See Rustenburg Deposition, Page

29, Verified Complaint, Paragraph 34.) Mr. Rustenburg

explained that this information would be helpful to the Air

Force in evaluating the test results (sce Rustenburg Dep-

osition, Pages, 29, 34-36).

12. IEC considered this as an Air Force request for in-

formation for evaluation purposes only and while under no

contractual duty to do so, provided the Air Force with Tech-

nical Report 71-05 which bore a restrictive legend appro-

priate for information voluntarily submitted to the Air

Force. Because Mr. Rustenburg asked that this same infor-

mation be incorporated into all Final Reports for the same

reason, Report 70-06-04, which contained the same informa-

tion in addition to KMU353A/B Bomb Simulation test re-

sults, was submitted with the same legend. (See Verified

Complaint, Paragraphs 35 and 36.) The Air Force has never

questioned the restrictive legend on Report 71-05. (See Rus-

tenburg Deposition, Page 30.)

13. By letter of April 19, 1971, the Contracting Officer in-

formed IKC that it had used the wrong form of restrictive

legend on Report 70-06-4 in that

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‘‘This final report is not a proposal but rather a re-

quirement of the contract.’’

The Contracting Officer did not indicate that a restrictive

legend was not authorized under the Contract; he simply

referred IEC to ASPR 7-104.9(a) which sets forth the ap-

propriate restrictive legends for Contract End Items (see

Plaintiff’s Exhibit H).

14. On May 28, 1971, near the end of the sixty (60) day

period for correction of legends under ASPR 9-202.3(d)

(3), the Contracting Officer reminded IEC of his April 17,

1971 letter and noted that:

‘At the date of this writing we have not received

your reply and unless it is forthwith submitted, the

legend will be removed and the contractor forfeits any

rights of appeal.’’

15. IEC responded to the Contracting Officer’s letters of

April 19, 1971 and of May 28, 1971, on June 15, 1971, within

the sixty (60) day period allowed by ASPR 9-202.3(d) (3).

In that letter IEC explained that the IEC LOMISS Sub-

system was included at the Government’s request in the

KMU353A/B Bomb Simulation Test System and that the

subsystem ‘‘was developed and built at contractor expense,

and has been made available for this effort on a no charge

loan basis.’’ Further, IEC explained that the Contract re-

quirements could have been met without inclusion of de-

tailed information on this subsystem data, but that it was

specifically requested by Air Force personnel to provide

them with a more meaningful report. Finally, IEC recom-

mended an amendment of the legend as set forth in Clause

21 of the Contract, but stated that if this was unacceptable

to the Air Force ‘‘the detailed subsystem descriptions re-

quire appropriate revision.’’ (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit J.)

16. The Air Force did not respond to IEC’s letter at all.

The Air Force did not return the report to IEC for revision

be ROA RE ae ao.

C-9

even though the present Contracting Officer concedes that

the report was the sole property of IEC at that time. (See

Harsfield Deposition, Page 23.) Nor did the Air Force in-

voke its right to withhold partial payment from IEC under

the Technical Data—Withholding of Payment (1966 Octo-

ber) Clause of the Contract.

17. The Air Force accepted IEC’s correction of the legend

and accepted IEC Report 70-06-4 with the Amended Legend

on a DD Form 250 dated July 7, 1971. As a result of that

acceptance IEC reasonably believed that the rights in data

question had been resolved and similar treatment would be

afforded future reports containing the same detailed infor-

mation on the IEC privately-developed processes and com-

ponents described in Report 70-06-4. (See Verified Com-

plaint, Paragraph 45.)

18. After receiving IEC’s Report No. 70-06-4 in April of

1971, Mr. Rustenburg accompanied the Contracting Officer

to a meeting with the Legal Officer and showed him the

report. At that time the Legal Officer concluded ‘‘that it

[Report No. 70-06-4] was not ‘proprietary’ ’’. However,

Mr. Rustenburg does not know on what the Legal Officer

based his opinion. Nor did Mr. Rustenburg indicate the date

of this meeting. (See Rustenburg Deposition, Pages 41 and

50.)

19. Mr. Rustenburg reviewed IEC’s letter of June 15,

1971 at the Contracting Officer’s request and provided writ-

ten comments in a memo of July 1, 1971. (See Attachment

1 to Exhibit 1 to Harsfield Deposition.)

20. In a subsequent verbal contact between Mr. Rusten-

burg and the Contracting Officer, it was decided that the

Rights in Data matter be dropped since in Report 70-06-4:

‘*. . . the issuance of P00006 directing a continuation

of the effort initiated under P00003 constituted a tacit

acceptance by the Government.’’ (Exhibit 1 to Hars-

field Deposition.)

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21. On October 15, 1971, IEC submitted Report 71-07 to

the Air Force; this report described the results of testing

under the original Contract. It contained, at the Air Force's

request, the same detailed information on the internal op-

erations of IEC developed components as was submitted in

Reports 71-07 and 70-06-4. Accordingly, TEC officials had

no reason to doubt that a restrictive legend limiting the use

of the report to internal Government purposes would be

acceptable. Again, the Government described the need for

the data for Air Force evaluation purposes and not for dis-

closure to its competitors. Again, Mr. Rustenburg reviewed

the report as technical advisor to the new Contracting Ofii-

cer, Mr. Harsfieid (see Rustenburg Deposition, Page 41).

No objection was raised to the restrictive legend and the

report was accepted as submitted,

22. On December 10, 1971, IEC submitted Final Report

71-09 on the original Contract and all modifications. That

report contained all of the information in Report 70-06-4 in-

cluding the same detailed description of the internal opera-

tions of the IEC developed processes and components. (See

Verified Complaint, Paragraph 49.) This report was marked

with a restrictive use legend on the data pertaining to the

detailed description of those components that IEC devel-

oped entirely at its own expense.

28. After the Contract was transferred from ASD to

ESD, a buyer reviewed the Contract file and advised the

new Contracting Officer, Mr. Harsfield, that:

** .. there had been some problem about the prior con-

tracting officer and the affixing of the proprietary data

on other documents within the contract.’’

The Contracting Officer doesn’t know whether this was be-

fore or after submission of Report 71-09 (see Harsfield

Deposition, Page 5). The Contracting Officer indicates that

the buyer probably received some information on this sub-

ject from Mr. Rustenburg (see Harsfield Deposition, Page

C-11

6). Beyond these facts Mr. Harsfield disclaims any personal

knowledge of the circumstances surrounding his letter of

December 28, 1971, in whieh he questioned the restrictive

legend on Report 71-09, However, he does recall receiving

a letter or report that backs up his letter (see Harsfield

Deposition, Page 7). At the depositions taken on July 24,

1978, Defendants Promised to provide Plaintiff with this

letter (see Harsfield Deposition, Pages 84-85), This letter

has not yet been filed with this Court.

24. The letter of December 28, 1971 (see Plaintiff's Ex-

hibit K) referred again to ASPR 7-104.9 which contains

the limited rights legend for contract end items. The letter

contained no statement that ‘‘Limited Rights’’ protection

would not be appropriate and no Findings of Fact or Con-

clusions of Law were offered, Recommendations were

made that IEC remove proprietary markings or furnish

substantiation to the contrary and a reply was requested

by January 5, 1979.

25. IEC replied by letter of January 5, 1972 (see Plain-

tiff’s Exhibit L). In that reply IEC reconstructed the pre-

contract events and developments and the prior history

of the rights in data question as explained in their earlier

correspondence with the prior Contracting Officer, Mr,

Hathaway. IRC pointed to the acceptance of Reports 70-

06-4 and 71-07 with restrictive legends after the rights in

data issue had surfaced as the basis for their belief that

the matter had been resolved. Finally, IEC Stated that if

the placement of the legend on the data Was not acceptable

to the Air Foree, IEC wanted the Reports back so it could

make appropriate revisions to the detailed subsystem de-

scriptions,

26. The Air Force did not return IEC’s Reports; nor did

the Air Force exercise its rights under the Technical Data

—Withholding of Payments Clause. During the five month

period between January and June, 1972, Mr. Harsfield’s

only action to resolve the matter was to request a one (1)

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page report from Mr. Rustenburg (see Harsfield Deposi-

tion, Page 17 and Exhibit 1).

27. Also a DD 250 accepting Report 71-09 was prepared

by Mr. Rustenburg, but it was not mailed to IEC. (See

Harsfield Deposition, pages 22-25.)

28. The Air Force replied to IEC’s January 5, 1972 letter

by a letter signed by Mr. Harsfield and dated June 5, 1972.

(See Plaintiff’s Exhibit M.) This letter does not respond

to any of the factual allegations made by IEC five months

earlier. It does not make any finding as to whether a re-

strictive legend is authorized by the Contract. This letter

concludes that IEC’s January 5, 1972 response to the Con-

tracting Officer’s letter of December 28, 1971 ‘‘fails to

justify the use of this legend or show that any restriction

is authorized.’’ The Contracting Officer then without any

prior notice to IEC, directed the obliteration of the legend

on Reports 71-09 and 70-06-4 on the grounds that:

‘* |. no response satisfactorily justifying use of this

or any other restrictive legend has been received from

the Contractor.’’

Again, no findings were made as to whether a restrictive

legend was authorized under the Contract. Finally Mr.

Harsfield, informed the Contractor that he had ‘‘author-

ized data in the above-mentioned reports to be used with

unlimited rights.’’

29. As soon as the Contracting Officer’s letter of June

5, 1972 was received at IEC, counsel was immediately con-

sulted and a telephone appeal was made to the Secretary

of the Air Force, followed on June 9, 1972 by TWXs to

ESD and the Office of the Secretary requesting continued

limited rights protection under ASPR 9-202.3(d). (See

Plaintiff’s Exhibit N.) It was agreed that the matter would

be further discussed with ESD and that the final decision

would be made in the Office of the Secretary of the Air

—

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C-13

Foree. A meeting was set up at ESD “to discuss the

proprietary rights question,’’ and the reports were af-

forded limited rights protection until further notice (See

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 0).

30. On June 26, 1972 a two-hour meeting was held at

ESD. Mr. Harsfield made a brief introduction in which he

stated that the purpose of the meeting was simply to dis-

cuss the problem and that no decision would be reached

by ESD, but that ESD would merely provide their com-

ments to the Secretary of the Air Force through Command

channels (see Harsfield Deposition, Exhibit 2).

31. Mr. Lipsey, IEC’s president, provided the attendees

with an outline of an oral presentation (see, Attachment 1

to Harsfield Affidavit dated May 16, 1973). Mr. Lipsey’s

nearly two-hour oral presentation was made in the form

of a historical narrative of IEC’s development of the

processes and components in question and the events that

subsequently occurred under the Contract. References were

made to items in the Air Force’s contract file and IEC

made a request for a Defense Contract Audit Agency

audit of all its books and records to establish the fund-

ing of development of specific components. TEC also re-

quested the return of its reports for limited rights legend.

In substance all of the material set forth in IEC counsel’s

letter of February 8, 1973 was presented at the June 26,

1972 meeting. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 8, Page 1 and Hars-

field Deposition, Page 84.) Even though Mr. Harsfield had

been furnished information from his technical advisors that

contract funds were used to complete the development of

the units involved, he did not confront IEC with these

allegations and he did not ask IEC for any specific or de-

tailed information in connection with any specific allega-

tion raised by his legal or technical advisors. (See Hars-

field Deposition, Pages 76-77.) Not only did Mr. Harsfiela

decline to question or comment on TEC’s presentation, but

his Technical Advisor also remained silent upon the advice

of Mr. Tracey, the ESD counsel. Thus the basis for the

C-14

Air Force’s claim to TEC’s data was not disclosed to TEC.

(See Rustenburg Deposition, Pages 55-56.)

32. At the close of TEC’s presentation, Mr. Harsfield

made some closing remarks in which he asked Mr. Lipsey

to provide an indication of what material on each page was

‘*proprietary’’ and a written narrative history of the de-

velopment of the processes and components alleged to

have been developed at IEC expense so that it could be

forwarded to higher headquarters. (See Exhibit 2 to Hars-

field Deposition.)

33. By letter of June 30, 1972 that Mr. Lipsey carried to

Hanscom Field, Mr. Lipsey submitted more specifically

marked copies of the Reports in question on July 4, 1972.

He then stated that he would attempt to provide a written

narrative of the development information provided at the

meeting by July 17, 1972. (See Verified Complaint, para-

graph 59.)

34. On July 13, 1972, the Contracting Officer agreed to

treat the Reports with limited rights ‘‘until an ultimate

decision is rendered as to whether data under question

is in fact ‘Limited’ or ‘unlimited.’ ’’ (See Defendants’

Exhibit I.)

35. Before any decision on the merits of the Rights in

Data question either at ESD, AFSC, Headquarters USFA,

or the Secretary of the Air Force, or complying with IEC’s

request for return of its Reports, Mr. Rustenburg executed

and Mr. Harsfield forwarded to TEC a DD 250 final ac-

ceptance on the Contract. Final payment followed quickly

and was accomplished by the Air Force at the end of

September 1972. (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit T, Items 2 and 3.)

36. Immediately after final payment was made and the

Contract was closed-out, the Contracting Officer issued his

letter of October 5, 1972 (see Defendants’ Exhibit J) with-

drawing his letter of July 18, 1972 and again directing un-

limited use of the Reports in question. Mr. Harsfield made

no finding as to whether the data should be ‘‘limited’’ or

C-15

‘‘unlimited’’ under the terms of the Contract and no re-

view of his decision was undertaken at AFSC, Headquar-

ters USAF or the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force

before it was issued (see Harsfield Deposition, Page 55.)

37. Before release of Reports by the Defense Documen-

tation Center (DDC), telegrams were dispatched to the

Director of DDC and the Office of the Secretary of the

Air Force protesting release of the Reports prior to a

decision on the merits of the Rights in Data question at

the Secretary of the Air Force level. On December 27.

1972, Mr. Sowder, Director of Technical Services, DDC,

confirmed to IEC counsel that the Reports had not and

would not be released pending a decision on the merits

of the Rights in Data question. (See Exhibit 2 attached to

Plaintiff’s Memorandum of August 8, 1973.)

38. Mr. Rustenburg and Mr. Tracey, ESD counsel, came

to Washington, D.C. in early January 1973, to make a

presentation to Headquarters AFSC on their actions in

this matter. The ‘ontracting Officer, Mr. Harsfield, did not

attend that preseiiation. Mr. Prahinski, AFSC counsel, and

Major Basso and others heard the presentation. That same

afternoon Air Force officials from the Pentagon eame over

to AFSC and the same presentation was made. However,

Mr. Reichart, the cognizant Assistant General Counsel of

the Air Force, was not present and Mr. Rustenburg can-

not identify any of the Pentagon attendees. No decision

was reached at that meeting. (See Rustenburg Deposition,

Pages 59-60.)

39. Apparently as a result of the morning meeting, Head-

quarters AFSC concluded that the ESD action was proper

and recommended that the Chief of Staff send IEC a tele-

gram to the effect that AFSC and Headquarters USAF

had reviewed the ESD action and found it proper and that

as a result no meetings planned with the Office of the

Secretary would be warranted and that the DDO “hold”?

on the reports should be released. (See AFSC TW X, Ex-

hibit 3, to Harsfield Deposition.) That TWX also requested

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permission to immediately order DDC to release the Re-

ports in question,

40. Apparently, Headquarters USAF disagreed with

AFSC since no telegram was sent and the meetings at the

Secretary of the Air Force level were held. Further, DDC

did not release the Reports but instead returned them to

ESD (see Rustenburg Deposition, pages 61-68).

41. IEC’s counsel met with Mr. Reichart, Counsel to

the Secretary of the Air Force in late January 1973. Rep-

resentatives of Headquarters USAF and AFSC were pres-

ent. At Mr. Reichart’s request, counsel for IEC prepared

the written narrative and position paper dated February

8, 1973 (see Plaintiff’s Exhibit S) for Mr. Reichart’s re-

view and consideration.

42. On March 16, 1973, the Chief of Staff of the Air

Force responded to AFSC’s January TWX. (See Hars-

field Deposition, Exhibit 4.) By that TWX, AFSC was

authorized ‘‘to make final decision with respect to...

[IEC’s] claim to proprietary rights under LOMISS Con-

tract.’’

However the Chief of Staff directed that

‘*As recommended by SAF/GC, consideration will be

given to information contained in IEC letter to SAF/

GC, same subject dated 8 February 1973.’

43. Apparently, AFSC redelegated the matter back to

ESD and the Contracting Officer to review his own ac-

tions and make a final decision on the merits of IEQ’s

claim to limited rights protection under the Contract. (See

Rustenburg Deposition, Pages 62-64.) Mr. Harsfield did

not review the matter and did not read the February 8,

1973 letter before the filing of this litigation. (See Hars-

field Deposition, Pages 118-119.) Mr. Rustenburg, how-

ever, read the February 8 letter. He spent perhaps 15

minutes glancing at the 50-page letter and concluded only

C-17

that it contained no technical information. (See Rusten-

burg Deposition, Pages 63-65.)

44. The Reports have been returned from DDC and are

in Mr. Rustenburg’s custody and have not been released

outside the Government. (See Rustenburg Deposition, Page

61.)

45. The same data is marked as restricted in all reports.

That data pertains to the internal functioning of the com-

ponents developed by ITEC outside the Contract and later

incorporated into the Contract test systems on a loan basis.

Release of this information, mathematical equations and

logic diagrams, would enable another competent manu-

facturer to make a component to perform the same fune-

tion (see Rustenberg Deposition, Pages 90-93).

46. Mr. Rustenburg believes and always has believed

that the word ‘‘function’’ as used in the terms ‘*form, fit

and function’? in ASPR 9-203(b)-(b)(1)(iv) relates not

only to the input and output of a component but relates

to the internal operation as well. All of his advice to the

Contracting Officer at ESD, AFSC and Headquarters

USAF was based on that belief. (See Rustenburg Deposi-

tion, page 94.)

47. Nevertheless, with the internal equations and logic

diagrams, reproduction of a similar component would be

simple and thus release of this information would eradicate

IEC’s competitive advantage in this field. (See Rusten-

burg Deposition, Page 95.)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the

subject matter of this action. 28 U.S.C. §¢ 1331, 1361, 2201

and 2202. 5 U.S.C. § 702.

2. The Administrative Procedure Act provides a basis

for subject matter jurisdiction in this suit and thus sov-

ereign immunity is waived. See Scanwell Laboratories,

C-18

Inc. v. Shaffer, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 371, 424 F.2d 859

(1970).

3. The Contracting Officer’s decisions of June 5, 1972

and October 2, 1972 directing the obliteration of certain

restrictive legends and authorizing that IEC’s data be

used with unlimited rights were erroneous as a matter of

law and were violative of plaintiff’s procedural due proc-

ess rights under the ASPR 7-104.9(d). The Air Force never

ordered data pertaining to the internal operations of any

of the components of either of these systems tested under

the Contract and therefore never acquired any rights in

the data marked by a restrictive legend. (See Mil-Std-831

and Data Item Description T-119 incorporated by reference

into DD1423 attached to Air Foree Contract F33657-69-C-

1290 and made a part thereof.)

4. The Air Force is estopped to deny IEC’s rights in

data position since IEC relied on the Air Force’s informed

acquiescence to IEC’s position on Report 70-06-04 when

the Air Force denied IEC the opportunity to revise that

report so as to delete the data on which it placed the re-

strictive rights legend. The Air Force subsequently denied

IEC’s request to perform a similar revision on Reports 71-

07 and 71-09. See United States v. Georgia Pacific Company,

421 F.2d 92 at 96 (9th Cir. 1970) ; Manloading and Manage-

ment Associates v. U.S., 198 Ct. Cl. 628, 461 F.2d 1299

(1972); Branch Banking and Trust Company v. United

States, 120 Ct. Cl. 72, 98 F. Supp. 757 (1951), cert. denied,

342 U.S. 893 (1951); Covington Industries, Inc., ASBCA

No. 12426, 68-2 BCA { 7286; and 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel

and Waiver, § 28.

5. ASPR requires that the data IEC marked with a re-

strictive legend pertaining to the internal operation of

components and processes developed at IEC’s expense be

afforded ‘‘limited rights’’ protection. The Air Force ecan-

not claim any rights in IEC’s data under ASPR 7-104.9

(b)(1)(iv) which refers to ‘‘form, fit and function data.’’

C-19

‘* ‘Form, fit and function’ data [is] data used in iden-

tifying various characteristics of an item, but ordi-

narily not disclosing manufacturing information.”’

See ‘‘The Department of Defense’s Dissemination to the

General Public of Data Acquired Under **Contract,”’ a

speech given by Lawrence Glassman, Chief Opinions

Branch, Patent Law Division, Office of the General Coun-

sel, U.S. Army Material Command, Washington, D.C., to

the Washington, D.C. Chapter of the National Contract

Management Association on April 19, 1972. (A copy of this

was attached to Plaintiff’s August 8, 1973 memorandum as

Exhibit 5).

6. Because of the violations of law in this case there was

no valid legal basis for the Air Force’s determination to

strike the restrictive legend from IECQ’s data.

7. Inasmuch as the Air Force’s determination to strike

the restrictive legend from IEC’s data was based on an

invalid action by the Defendants, there is a very strong

likelihood of success by IEC in its claim to ‘‘limited rights’?

protection for the data in dispute herein.

8. IEC has no adequate remedy at law to protect itself

from the devastating effect of the threatened disclosure of

the data pertaining to the processes and components de-

veloped at TEC’s expense and included in reports 71-05,

70-06-04, 71-07 and 71-09 at the Air Force’s request, Pro-

tection of trade secrets has traditionally provided a basis

for injunctive relief. (See Milgram, Trade Secrets, § 1.09).

This concept of irreparable injury arising out of mere dis-

closure of a trade secret has been specifically incorporated

into ASPR. See ASPR § 9-201.1(b). Moreover, the Comp-

troller General has consistently applied a form of injune-

tive relief to cases within his jurisdiction by directing the

cancellation of solicitations which will result in unauthor-

ized disclosure of information submitted under a restric-

tive legend. Gayston Corp., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-143711 (Dee.

ay a

Ucar th Santa Naaetg 1 CLI MEA. Hee LEG as Aiea gtk TE a he TM

BAAR LONE Cth QPOD bith Ds

C-20

22, 1960) (unpublished) ; Aircraftsmen, Inc., 41 Comp. Gen.,

148 (1961) ; Bausch Associates, Inc., Comp. Gen. 346 (1968) ;

see generally, Patents and Technical Data, George Wash-

ington University, Government Contracts Monograph No.

10, pages 174-178 (1967). Most importantly, a suit in the

Court of Claims for money damages is not an adequate

remedy for the injury caused by disclosure of a trade

secret. In addition, the Court of Claims has never awarded

money damages on the basis of a mere unauthorized dis-

closure of ‘‘proprietary data.’’ The conclusion that no

remedy, not even an inadequate remedy exists at law for

the specifie injury threatened here is supported by the

conclusion of a Government Commission benefitting from

two years of extensive research. (Sce Report of the Com-

mission on Gove nment Procurement, Vol. 4, page 131.)

9. IEC will sufie. irreparable injury if the restrictive

rights legend is stricken from its data and its data dissem-

inated to the public through the Defense Documentation

Center. The property right in a trade secret, such as IEC

claims in the technical data herein, disappears upon dis-

closure. See Milgrim, Trade Secrets, § 1.09.

10. It is most unlikely that any interested party will

suffer substantial harm as a result of this Court’s enjoin-

ing Defendants from disclosing the technical data to which

IEC has attached a restrictive rights legend. IEC’s data

has value for Defendants only to the extent that it can be

used for the evaluation of future development and procure-

ment of bomb systems. This purpose can be served under

the ‘‘limited rights’’ protection requested by IEC since

internal Government use is clearly allowed. If subsequently

it becomes necessary to obtain this information and pro-

vide it to other contractors, IEC’s offer to negotiate a sale

of this data under ASPR 9-202.2(f) provides adequate pro-

tection to the Defendants.

11. Restraining Defendants from disclosing TEC’s tech-

nical data to which IEC has attached a restrictive rights

C-21

legend is in the public interest. This Court has concluded

that the disclosure of IEC’s technical data to which it has

attached a propriety legend would be invalid and illegal.

Clearly the effect of such a disclosure on the wider pro-

curement community engaged in providing goods and serv-

ices to the Government would be devastating. Indeed,

ASPR 9-202.1(¢) recognizes the contractor’s interest in

protecting his data. Thus if IEC’s technical data could be

disclosed without regard to IEC’s due process rights, all

other Government contractors would be put on notice that

they can be likewise wronged if they make an attempt to

cooperate with Government officials by providing them with

useful information to which they claim a limited rights

interest. (See Report of the Commission on Government

Procurement, Vol. 4, Chapter 3 (1972)).

12. According full and proper weight to all pertinent

factors and considerations, including the decisions of the

Court of Appeals in inter alia, Virginia Petroleum Jobbers

Association v. FPC, 104 U.S.App. D.C. 106, 259 F.2d 921,

925 (1958), Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chaffee, 455 F.2d 1306

(D.C. Cir. 1971), M. Steinthal and Co., Inc. v. Seamans, 455

F.2d 1829 (D.C. Cir. 1971), Scanwell Laboratories, Inc.

Shaffer, 137 U.S. App. D.C. 371, 424 F.2d 859 (1970), and

more recently Murray v. Kunziqg, 462 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir.

1972) and Horne Bros., Inc. v. Laird, 462 F.2d 1268 (D.C.

1972), this Court has concluded that a preliminary injune-

tion should be issued directing defendants not to strike the

limited rights legend from IEC’s Reports Nos. 70-06-04, 71-

07, 71-09, until this Court has had the opportunity to render

a decision on the merits of IEC’s Complaint for a Declara-

tory Judgment.

‘ /s/ Crarues R. Ricuey

Charles R. Richey

United States District Judge

Dated: October 23, 1973

D-1

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

INTERNATIONAL ENGINEERING Company, Plaintiff,

v.

Exot L. Ricwarpson, er av., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 927-73.

July 10, 1973.

Memorandum Opinion

Cuar.es R. Ricuey, District J udge.

INTRODUCTION

This action arose out of a Complaint for a Declaratory

Judgment and Injunctive Relief under the Declaratory

Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331

ind the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 702) by

laintiff, International Engineering Company (hereinafter

EC or Plaintiff) against Defendants, Elliot Richardson,

secretary of Defense and Robert Seamans, Jr., Secretary

f the Air Force (hereinafter Government or Defendants).

laintiff seeks equitable relief to restrain Defendants from

eleasing to the Defense Documentation Center three Final

‘echnical Reports delivered by Plaintiff to the Air Force in

onnection with Government Contract F33657-69-C-1290

hereinafter referred to as Contract). Plaintiff delivered

he Reports with Restrictive Legends affixed that purported

0 limit the Government’s use of the research data con-

nined therein to circulation among Government Agencies

nly. Plaintiff alleges that it has a ‘*proprietary”’ interest

1 portions of the Reports and that the Contracting Offi-

er’s decision to the contrary reflected an unconstitutional

pplication of the Armed Services Procurement Regula-

| Soret

1-2

tions by depriving IEC of the due process to which it was

entitled. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that if the Armed

Services Procurement Regulations permit the Contracting

Officer to remove IEC’s ‘‘proprietary’’ legend without re-

quiring a hearing, such regulations violate the due process

clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Air Foree contends

that Plaintiff was afforded adequate due process consistent

with Armed Forces Regulation (ASPR) § 7-104.9(a), Rights

in Technical Data, incorporated by reference into the Con-

tract. Defendant urges that the technical data in issue is

part of the very material for which the Government con-

tracted and paid, and that the Government has every right

to distribute it to other Defense Department contractors.

Plaintiff seeks a Preliminary Injunction and Defendants

seek to have the Court dismiss the suit, or enter Summary

Judgment in their favor. Plaintiff additionally wants to

depose two Air Force officials but agrees to delay the depo-

sitions pending resolution of Defendant’s Motion to Dis-

miss.

Before turning to the questions presented, several facts

should be mentioned. On February 8, 1968, TEC submitted

a technical proposal to the Air Force reflecting LEC’s de-

velopment to date of a process for guiding bombs or missiles

with a Loran C’/D system (hereinafter LOMISS). As a

result of the proposal, the Air Force entered into a contract

with IEC effective May 29, 1969 to provide final and interim

reports of a flight test evalution of the LOMISS system,

From a data certificate executed by the parties March 8,

1969 and not included in the express terms of the Contract,

it appears that IEC agreed to furnish with unlimited rights

to the Government the information required to comply with

the initial data requirements of the Contract. The Contract

included at Part V a clause entitled ‘‘Data Provisions”’

which purported to delineate the rights of the parties in

data under the Contract to the exclusion of any documents

not expressly provided for in the Contract. The most im-

portant Contract provision relating to the respective rights

in data was ASPR § 7-104.9(d), incorporated by reference

D-3

into the Contract, with the pertinent provisions set forth

as follows:

**(d) Unmarked or Improperly Marked Technical Data

(1) Technical data received without a restrictive legend

shall be deemed to have been furnished with unlimited

rights. However, the contracting officer may permit the

contractor to place a restrictive legend on such data

within six months of its delivery if the contractor demon-

strates that the omission of the legend was inadvertent

and the use of the legend is authorized.

(2) Technical data received with a restrictive legend

not permitted by the terms of the contract shall be used

with limited rights pending inquiry to the contractor

whose name appears on the data as the originator. If

no response to a properly directed inquiry has been re-

ceived within 60 days, or if the response fails to show

that the restriction was authorized, the cognizant Gov-

ernment personnel shall obliterate such legend, notify

the contracior accordingly, and thereafter may use such

data as if it were acquired with unlimited rights.’’

The above Rights in Technical Data clause also provides

that INC would have a property interest in and that Air

Force would have only limited rights to the following:

“*. .. technical data pertaining to items, components, or

processes developed at private expense.’? ASPR 7-104.9

(a).

Under the ‘“‘Limited Rights’? provision, the Government

is entitled to circulate technical data generated at TEC’s

expense among Government personnel but not among Gov-

ernment contractors in competition with TEC,

This Contract was modified twice in 1970 and 1971 to

involve testing of more recently developed TEC processes

and components. At the time the Final Report under the

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D-4

first contract modification was to be filed, the Air Force

Project Engineer requested IEC to provide information

on processes and components to facilitate the Air Force’s

evaluation of the results of the simulation test program.

IKC responded by providing such information in the Final

Report but affixed to it a ‘‘Proprietary Notice’’ indicating

IEC developed this data at private expense. On two other

occasions IEC submitted Final Reports containing what

IEC considered extra-contractual information on processes

and components. Accordingly, restrictive legends indicat-

ing a proprietary interest were marked on the material.

After submission of the first report and, again, after the

later reports were given to the Government, the Contract-

ing Officer notified IEC by letter that the Air Force had

‘‘unlimited rights’’ to the Final Reports necessitating the

removal of the restrictive legends unless INC furnished

substantiation of its ‘‘proprietary notice.’’ On June 26,

1972 the Contracting Officer met with IEC representatives

to provide them with the opportunity to substantiate the

‘limited rights’’ legends contained in the three Final Re-

ports. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Contracting

Officer stated that IEC still had failed to substantiate its

claim and that further material should be submitted. IEC

failed to submit more information by July 17, 1972, as

promised. On October 2, 1972, the Contracting Officer in-

formed TEC that the Government would treat the data with

‘‘unlimited rights.’’ By agreement, the Government will

treat the data in question with ‘‘limited rights’? pending

a decision by the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for a Prelim-

inary Injunction.

Questions PRESENTED

1. Whether the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject

matter of this suit?, and

2. Whether the Contracting Officer’s failure to state

reasons for his decision to eradicate TEC’s restrictive leg-

ends frustrates effective judicial review?

(Saree

icbcve:

D-5

PE as .

ConcLusions

1. The Applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act

Serves as a Waiver of Sovereign Immunity,

As a threshold matter in this case, the Court is confronted

with questions of sovereign immunity and preclusion of

judicial review in relation to the actions of a Contracting

Officer under a Government Contract. Plaintiff seeks review

of the Contracting Officer’s determination of Plaintiff's

rights in technical data pursuant to ASPR 7-104.9(a),

under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5

U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV 1965-68), which provides:

‘‘A person suffering legal wrong because of agency

action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency

action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is en-

titled to judicial review thereof.’’

Plaintiff asserts that the action of the Contracting Officer

in deciding to strike IEC’s restrictive legends from the

Final Reports prepared by IEC under the Contract and

disclose those reports to the public through the Defense

Documentation Center was arbitrary and capricious, with-

out authority and without due process of law insofar as

Plaintiff was not given adequate notice or proper hearing

before its property was appropriate.’ Plaintiff additionally

* Although the Court is not at this time deciding Plaintiff's

contention that a formal administrative hearing is required in this

case, it is important for the Court to outline some thoughts on this

legal issue, while reserving the opportunity to make a final decision

on the basis of supplementary submissions and oral argument.

Beginning with the general constitutional norm that government

may not act against an individual before granting him a hearing,

the Court believes that in a manner consistent with the ASPR

37-104.9(d) procedure agreed to by the parties, notice and an op-

portunity to be heard were dutifully provided. Therefore, the

Court’s focus is on the nature of that opportunity to be heard. An

immediate issue which arises is whether the informal procedure

administered by the Contracting Officer resulted in a decision based

D-6

pleads that the Contracting Officer acted without due proc-

ess of law in issuing his decision without indication as to

what factors he considered relevant, what weight be at-

tached to those factors, or how he arrived at his conclusion.

In support of jurisdiction under the APA, Plaintiff has

shown that it is ‘‘aggrieved’’ by the Contracting Officer’s

acts within the meaning of a relevant statute, the Armed

Services Procurement Act, 10 U.S.C. chapter 137, and the

Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) promul-

gated thereunder, specifically ASPR 9-203(a)-(d) which

has the force of law in this Contract.* Therefore it is the

upon incomplete information, untested by the adversary process.

A second question is whether an adversary hearing as a functional

matter offers a better method for resolving the instant factual dis-

pute than the informal conference held June 26, 1972 with all

interested parties in attendance. Finally, the Court is concerned

whether the requirement of a formal hearing where a contractor’s

restrictive legends are challenged by a contracting officer is inappro-

priate to the contractual nature of the dispute and creates an un-

necessary impediment to the workings of the Government’s pro-

curement operation. The United States Court of Claims has indi-

eated that where a hearing is not required in the Contracting

Officer’s resolution of a contract dispute and his decision is appeal-

able to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, a contrac-

tor’s allegation that the Contracting Officer acted unconstitutionally

in assigning the contractor an undeterminabie burden of proof

simply will not stand. Plaintiff in Newport News, infra, footnote 2,

like the contractor here, argued that it was impossible to inveigh

against the Contracting Officer’s decision when the substance of

that decision was unknown.

?The Armed Services Procurement Regulations called to the

Court’s attention provide a procedure whereunder the Contracting

Officer determined contested rights in technical data. Defendant

has not directed the Court to any provisions of the Armed Services

Procurement Act, supra, or the Administrative Procedure <Act,

supra, which suggest that an ASPR once incorporated as a contract

clause parts with all identity as a federal regulation governing

certain acts of Contracting Officers. Several cases suggest that the

ASPR is law governing ‘‘the award and interpretation of contracts

as fully as if it were made a part thereof.’’ Chris Berg, Inc. v.

D-7

Court’s conclusion that the provisions of section 10 are ap-

plicable. In such a situation section 10 of the APA serves

as a waiver of sovereign immunity. Scanwell Laboratories

v. Shaffer, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 424 F.2d 859 (1970);

Kstrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961).

The Government urges that Scanwell is inapposite to the

case at bar since Plaintiffs in Scanwell were contractors

who lost contract awards because of alleged arbitrary

Government conduct under regulations designed to control

the contract letting process. However, the Court discerns

nothing in Defendants’ argument to support the proposi-

tion that a Government official’s conduct under federal reg-

ulations incorporated by reference into a Government Con-

tract is not reviewable under the APA. Nothing in the APA

or cases with which the Court is familiar support Defend-

ants’ contention. Although the case is not directly on point,

the Court in Scanwell des identify the primary concerns

a reviewing court should nave in deciding questions of jur-

isdiction. The Court there looked to the injury to Plain-

tiff’s economic livelihood and the public’s interest in pre-

venting the granting of contracts through arbitrary or ca-

pricious action. Here, Plaintiff alleges prospective loss of

2 complex system for guiding missiles developed by Plain-

tiff over several years at great expense. Additionally, the

public’s interest is apparent in preventing arbitrary or

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Appendix — International Engineering Co. v. Rumsfeld · 423 U.S. 1048 | Frix