Memorandum — Houston Endowment, Inc. v. Dunlop

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Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-176

HouUSTON ENDOWMENT, INC., PETITIONER

v.

JOHN T. DUNLOP, SECRETARY OF LABOR

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT

IN OPPOSITION

Petitioner contends (1) that the equal pay pro-

visions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as added,

77 Stat. 56, 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1), are inapplicable,

since the work performed by its male and female

employees was not shown to be substantially identi-

cal; (2) that it was denied due process because the

district court’s injunction was overly broad; and (3)

that it was denied due process because the district

court ruled against it from the bench.

(1)

2

This action was brought by the Secretary of Labor

in the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Texas, to enjoin petitioner from violat-

ing the equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor Stand-

ards Act, supra.

The evidence showed that petitioner owned, op-

erated and managed several office buildings in Hous-

ton, Texas (A. 2).* It employed a number of male

and female custodial employees to clean offices, rest-

rooms, corridors and stairwells of the buildings in

the evenings. The female custodial employees had

responsibility for either cleaning or vacuuming and

cleaning. Those who only vacuumed were assigned

six floors of a particular office building; they were

required to carry vacuums from floor to floor (A.

51).

Those who cleaned and vacuumed ordinarily were

assigned two floors (Tr. 29). They were required

to vacuum all rugs and spot clean them by hand

(A. 34, 35), to dry mop all tiled floors (A. 76, 172),

to empty trash cans into a bag attached to a large

wheeled supply cart which they pushed from office

to office (A. 38, 39, 78), and to spot clean walls,

polish doorknobs and desks, dust venetian blinds and

clean women’s lavatories on each of the assigned

floors (A. 73, 76, 164, 172).

The male custodians also had responsibility for

vacuuming and cleaning (A. 55, 156; Tr. 243-245,

262-263). Some of them were assigned to vacuum

1“A.” refers to the joint appendix of the parties in the court

of appeals. “Tr.” refers to the trial transcript.

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3

only; others to clean and disinfect the men’s lava-

tories (A. 67, 133; Tr. 77, 389) ; the rest of the male

custodians were assigned to clean, scrub and wax

tiled floors with the use of adaptable motor-driven

machines (Pet. App. C-3).

The female custodial employees were paid $0.10

per hour less than the male custodial employees

(Pet. App. C-4).

The district court found that the men and women

performed janitorial work which, although not iden-

tical, was so “substantially similar’ as to meet the

Act’s “equal work” concept (Pet. App. C-6; A. 20);

that use of the machines by some of the male cus-

todial employees required no greater skill, responsi-

bility or effort than that required of female cus-

todial employees in performing their duties (ibid.) ;

and that petitioner had not offered “any objective

evidence that the duties performed by men as a class

required greater effort over a significant period of

time than that performed by women as a class so

as to justify any wage differential” (7ibid.). The

court concluded that petitioner therefore violated the

equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards

Act (Pet. App. C-7). It enjoined petitioner from

committing further violations and, pursuant to the

Act, awarded restitution to certain of the female cus-

todial employees (Pet. App. D-1—D-6). The court of

appeals affirmed per curiam (Pet. App. A-1).

1. a. Petitioner contends (Pet. 10) that the equal

pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act are

inapplicable to the instant case, since the district

4

court did not find that the work performed by male

and female custodial employees was “substantially

identical.” It is well established, however, that the

test for determining whether the Act’s “equal work”

concept is applicable is whether the jobs are closely

1 lated and job performance requires “equal skill,

effort, and responsibility” and “similar working con-

ditions” (29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1)). See also Corning

Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 198-200.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, no court that has

considered the issue has required that the work to

which male and female employees are assigned must

be substantially identical before the equal pay provi-

sions are applicable. See Brennan v. City Stores,

Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 238, n. 8 (C.A. 5); Hodgson v.

Fairmont Supply Co., 454 F.2d 490, 493 (C.A. 4);

Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (C.A.

3), certiorari denied, 398 U.S. 905; Hodgson v. Mil-

ler Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221, 227 (C.A. 7).

In the instant case, although male and female

custodial employees were assigned to different duties,

their duties were closely related and there is ample

evidence supporting the district court’s conclusion

that their work required equal skill, effort, and re-

sponsibility, and was performed under similar work-

ing conditions. The evidence showed that both sexes

were responsible for cleaning and vacuuming—tasks

which required the same kind and amount of physical

exertion, which were equally routinized, and which

required no particular skills.

b. Petitioner also contends (Pet. 7-9) that the Act

does not permit a court to look behind an employer’s

5

job classifications if there is a reasonable basis for

them. In the instant case, however, there was no

finding that petitioner’s classifications were “reason-

able” or based upon any factors other than the sex

of the employees.* Once the Secretary has demon-

strated that the work being performed by male and

female employees is substantially equal in skill, effort

and responsibility, the burden then shifts to the em-

ployer to show some factor other than sex which

justifies the salary disparity. Corning Glass Works

v. Brennan, supra, 417 U.S. at 204. Petitioner

failed to meet this burden.

2. Petitioner contends (Pet. 13-18) that it was

denied due process because the district court’s in-

junction was not limited to the establishments and

employees involved in the litigation. It is well estab-

lished, however, that an injunction “should operate

as an effective deterrent to a repetition of the unlaw-

ful conduct” (United States v. Crescent Amusement

Co., 323 U.S. 173, 186; McComb v. Jacksonville

Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192-193). A company-wide

decree is particularly appropriate where, as here, the

violations are shown to be the result of company

policy and are found at several separate establish-

ments controlled by the employer (Pet. App. C-1—

C-2). See, e.g., Brennan v. J. M. Fields, Inc., 488 F.2d

443 (C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 419 U.S. 881; Tobin

v. Frost-Arnett Co., 13 WH Cases 566, 34 CCH Lab.

2 Although the compliance officer stated that there was a

“reasonable basis” to “argue” that the jobs were not equal

(Pet. 7-8), the Secretary of Labor made no such determination.

6

Cas. § 71,220 (%.D. Tenn.), affirmed, 264 F.2d 246

(C.A. 6); Chambers Construction Co. v. Mitchell, 233

F.2d 717, 725 (C.A. 8); J. P. Stevens & Co. v. Na-

tional Labor Relations Board, 380 F.2d 292 (C.A. 2),

certiorari denied, 389 U.S. 1005; National Labor

Relations Board v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,

408 F.2d 374 (C.A. 5).

The injunction gave petitioner adequate notice of

the practices from which it was required to refrain:

providing unequal pay to male and female employees

whose work requires substantially equal skill, effort,

and responsibility. Contrary to petitioner’s asser-

tion, the injunction does not expose it to the “risk”

of contempt if it incorrectly evaluates job categories

not at issue in the instant case; petitioner will “still

be able to raise questions of law and of good faith

as freely as in the original suit for an injunction”

(Mitchell v. Pidcock, 299 F.2d 281, 287 (C.A. 5)).

3. Petitioner further contends (Pet. 18-19) that

it was denied due process because the district court

ruled against it from the bench at the conclusion of

the evidence. Petitioner assumes that the court’s

ruling had been reduced to writing prior to the time

when petitioner offered the testimony of two wit-

nesses. But the record does not support this assump-

tion; it is just as likely that the court was speaking

extemporaneously or from notes taken during the

presentation of petitioner’s case. Thus there is no

reason to suppose that the district court did not ac-

cord full and fair consideration to petitioner’s evi-

dence.

7

For the foregoing reasons, it is therefore respect-

fully submitted that the petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari should be denied.

ROBERT H. BoRK,

Solicitor General.

WILLIAM J. KILBERG,

Solicitor of Labor,

CARIN ANN CLAUSS,

Associate Solicitor,

SYLVIA S. ELLISON,

MELANIE FRANCO NUSSDORF,

Attorneys,

Department of Labor.

SEPTEMBER 1975.

% ov. s. sovarnmenr printine orrice; 1975 593127 36

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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