Appendix — Ross v. United States
Supreme Court brief1975
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APPENDIX A
Fifth Circuit Opinion and Judgment Copied
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 74-2969
April 21, 1975
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-A ppellee,
V.
DELOY C. Ross,
Defendant-A ppellant.
* * * *
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Western District of Louisiana.
Before AINSWORTH, GODBOLD and SIMPSON, Cir-
cuit Judges.
AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge:
Defendant Deloy C. Ross appeals from a judgment
of conviction entered after a jury trial on five counts
of evasion of federal income tax. He raises three issues
on this appeal: that the trial court improperly denied
in part his motion for discovery under Fed.R.Crim.P. 16;
that the prosecution failed to fulfill its obligation to
disclose evidence favorable to the defense under Brady
v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1194, 10
L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); and that the Government denied
him due process and violated his Fourth Amendment
rights in acquiring from a third party certain papers
and records allegedly belonging to him. We affirm the
conviction.
ROK TERI ep ean Unie
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Ao. eERTRE NSS ee |
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I. Factual Background of the Investigation and Trial
In May 1969, two Internal Revenue Service agents
interviewed Deloy Ross and told him that they were
undertaking an investigation of his tax returns that
might lead to criminal charges. After conferring with
his accountant and attorney, Ross agreed to permit the
agents to inspect and hand copy business records to be
provided him at his accountant’s office. These records
included accounting books and corporate records of a
motel owned by Ross, of Ross Investments, Inc., and of
W. C. Ross & Son, a general store partnership between
Ross and his father (W. C. Ross) which was dissolved
in January 1968. These records were for tax years
1965 through 1969. It was agreed that none of the
records thus provided was to be Xeroxed or removed
by the IRS agents.
As part of their investigation the IRS agents inter-
viewed defendant’s step-brother, William Taylor. Defend-
ant had sold the store operated under the W. C. Ross
& Son partnership to Taylor in 1968, and several boxes
containing financial records of the partnership remained
there. In September 1970, Taylor took these records
to attorneys looking into his claims against his mother’s
estate. In March 1971, Taylor retrieved some of these
records and turned them over to the IRS agents, in
response to their request. The agents received the re-
maining records directly from the attorneys, with Tay-
lor’s permission. This investigation culminated in indict-
ments against Deloy Ross for evasion of income tax
owed by himself and his wife for 1966, 1967, and 1968,
and for evasion of income tax owed by Ross Investments,
Inc. for 1968 and 1969.
The Government’s case at trial was proved by the
“net worth” method, which is used to establish a tax-
payer’s true income when there is no direct proof of
the unreported income. The net worth method involves
APN IR TLS PIERRE FATAL ee ARISES IRN RARE PREAH on i ETON ‘ SIND AEN HA a PNM WARY
3a
: calculating the taxpayer’s assets and liabilities at the
beginning of the relevant tax period to establish an
initial net worth. The same calculation is performed as F
to assets and liabilities at the end of the tax period. }
If the taxpayer’s increase in net worth plus his living
expenses for that tax period exceed his reported income
and cannot be explained by receipt of nontaxable in-
come, the existence of unreported income may be in-
ferred.
Before trial defendant filed a written motion seeking
discovery from the Government of
A. All books, records, papers, documents, photo-
graphs, tangible objects and material obtained
from or belonging to the accused;
B. Copies of all books, records, papers, documents,
photographs, tangible objects and material ob-
tained from or belonging to the accused;
C. All books, records, papers, documents, tangible
objects and material from whomsoever obtained
which are favorable to the accused on the issue
of his guilt or punishment and which will aid
him in the preparation of his defense;
2 NORE SNPS TRIS SR EG IE OY LI ae oe
D. All books, records, papers, documents and physi-
cal material which the Government intends to of-
fer as evidence in this case.
This motion was granted, and the Government provided
defendant with a set of computations and data sheets it
developed in attempting to establish the amount of un- ;
reported income attributable to defendant and his en-
terprises during the years in question.
Ross sought to rebut the Government’s case by assert-
ing that he had a substantial cash accumulation from
years prior to the tax years in question, and that he
received large cash gifts (several hundred thousand
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dollars) from his father, W. C. Ross, who died in 1969.
The Government sought to refuse this assertion by of-
fering the testimony of an IRS agent who had analyzed
W. C. Ross’ personal income tax returns and the monthly
accounting statements of the W. C. Ross & Son partner-
ship from 1952 through 1968. The tax returns for 1952
through 1968 were introduced into evidence,’ as were
the accounting statements of W. C. Ross & Son for 1952
through 1964, except for 1956. Although a few monthly
statements for this period were not introduced, the vast
majority were. Defendant made no objection to the
introduction of this evidence.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.
Defendant filed several motions for a new trial, arguing
that the Government had seized the records of the W. C.
Ross & Son partnership from Taylor in violation of
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights and in violation
of the Government’s agreement with him; also, that the
Government had failed to produce materials described
in defendant’= pretrial motion for discovery, which had
been granted by the court, as well as other evidence
required to be disclosed under Brady v. State of Mary-
land, supra. These post-trial motions were denied, and
defendant brought this appeal.
II. The Adequacy of Pretrial Discovery
A. Failure to Raise This Alleged Error at Trial
Defendant argues on this appeal that the trial court
partially denied his discovery motion. The record shows,
however, that the motion was granted by the trial
judge without qualification. Whether an error was com-
mitted is, of course, affected by the extent of defend-
1The Government also introduced certificates of assessments
and payments of W. C. Ross for the years 1941 through 1968. These,
in conjunction with the tax returns, showed that W. C. Ross earned
$147,000 during that period.
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ant’s efforts, under Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(g),*? to bring to
the court’s attention any alleged noncompliance by the
Government with his discovery requests.
The records of W. C. Ross & Son were introduced dur-
ing the prosecution’s case. Defendant was aware that
the boxes of records stored at his stepbrother’s business
contained the financial statements introduced into evi-
dence, yet no motion to suppress this evidence was offered
until defendant’s motion for a new trial, made after the
jury’s verdict was received and 43 witnesses and 1,300
pages of transcript later.* Moreover, during the prosecu-
tion’s case an IRS agent testified (and defense counsel
stipulated) that the stepbrother Taylor was the source
of the records.*
This Court and others have criticized failure to
raise alleged discovery errors promptly. See United
States v. Fink, 5 Cir., 1974, 502 F.2d 1, 7; United States
v. James, 5 Cir., 1974, 495 F.2d 434, 436-437; United
? Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(g) states, in relevant part:
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is
brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed
to comply with this rule or with an order issued pursuant to
this rule, the court may order such party to permit the dis-
covery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant
a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evi-
dence the material not disclosed, or it may enter such other
order as it deems just under the circumstances.
* Defense counsel did attempt to lodge a general objection to all
documents introduced: “to be certain, Your Honor, if there is any-
thing that the Court ordered them to give us, and if they didn’t
do it, I want the record to reflect that.” Tr. at 381. The prosecution
objected, and the court properly treated defendant’s objection as
applying to the document then being introduced, which is not at
issue on this appeal.
*Cf. United States v. Hauff, 7 Cir., 1973, 473 F.2d 1350, 1353;
United States v. Baxter, 9 Cir., 1973, 492 F.2d 150, 173, where
defendants, upon learning that the Government had not complied
with their discovery requests, moved for a mistrial.
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States v. Baxter, supra. Defendant’s ample opportunity
to ask the trial court to order the Government to comply
with his request for documents must be taken into ac-
count in determining whether error was committed in
denying the motions for a new trial.
B. The Provisions of Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(b)
and the Standard of Review
Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(b) provides, in relevant part:
(b) Other Books, Papers, Documents, Tangible Ob-
jects or Places. Upon motion of a defendant the
court may order the attorney for the government
to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photo-
graph books, papers, documents, tangible objects,
buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof,
which are within the possession, custody or control
of the government, upon a showing of materiality
to the preparation of his defense and that the re-
quest is reasonable.
The operative terms of the rule are “materiality” and
“reasonable.” The phrase “the court may order” in the
text of Rule 16(b) clearly indicates that the granting of
discovery motions is a matter of the trial court’s discre-
tion. In judging the correctness of the trial court’s con-
clusion that the evidence not tendered by the Government
was not material and that defendant’s request for such
materials (as clarified and renewed in his motion for a
new trial) was not reasonable, we will not interfere
with the trial court’s ruling in the absence of a clear
abuse of discretion. United States v. Stone, 5 Cir., 1973,
’ See United States v. Armes, 6 Cir., 1972, 470 F.2d 1353, 1355;
United States v. Cook, 7 Cir., 1970, 432 F.2d 1093, 1101; United
States v. Indiviglio, 2 Cir., 1965, 352 F.2d 276, 280. See generally
Colella v. United States, 1 Cir., 1966, 360 F.2d 792, 800. Cf. United
States v. Wolfson, 2 Cir., 1969, 413 F.2d 804, 808.
RIEED ”"
4
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472 F.2d 909, 916.° We find no abuse of discretion in this
regard.
C. Materiality of the Disputed Documents
As a matter of general construction “[t]he meas-
ure of discovery permitted by the Rules of Criminal
Procedure is not intended to be as broad as in a civil
case.” Clay v. United States, 5 Cir., 1968, 397 F.2d 901,
915, vac. on other grounds sub nom. Giordano v. United
States, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 L.Ed.2d 297
(1969). Materiality means more than that the evidence
in question bears some abstract logical relationship to the
issues in the case. See United States v. Schembari, 4 Cir.,
1978, 484 F.2d 931, 935 (fact that photographs in Gov-
ernment’s possession were of demonstration during which
defendant was arrested held insufficient to show mate-
riality) There must be some indication that the pretrial
disclosure of the disputed evidence would have enabled
the defendant significantly to alter the quantum of proof
in his favor. The extensiveness of the material which
the Government did produce, United States v. Hildebrand,
5 Cir., 1974, 506 F.2d 406, 409, and the availability of
the disputed material from other sources, including the
defendant’s own knowledge, must also be considered. See
United States v. Felts, 5 Cir., 1974, 497 F.2d 80, 82.’
* See United States v. Saitta, 5 Cir., 1971, 443 F.2d 830, 831;
United States v. Hancock, 5 Cir., 1971, 441 F.2d 1285, 1286; United
States v. Baxter, 9 Cir., 1973, 492 F.2d 150, 175; Mullins v. United
States, 8 Cir., 1973, 487 F.2d 581, 589; United States v. Smaldone,
10 Cir., 1973, 484 F.2d 311, 320-321; United States v. Newman, 3
Cir., 1973, 476 F.2d 733, 739; United States v. Armes, 6 Cir., 1972,
470 F.2d 1353, 1355; United States v. Lewis, 7 Cir., 1969, 406 F.2d
486, 492; United States v. Jordan, 2 Cir., 1968, 399 F.2d 610, 615;
Walsh v. United States, 1 Cir., 1967, 371 F.2d 436, 437.
* See United States v. Toombs, 5 Cir., 1974, 497 F.2d 88, 93;
United States v. Hancock, 5 Cir., 1971, 441 F.2d 1285, 1286-1287;
United States v. Bland, 5 Cir., 1970, 432 F.2d 96, 97; United States
v. Brawer, 2 Cir., 1974, 496 F.2d 703, 705; United States v. Barnes,
SPN ORLA aN oa |
Refersategts
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The Government gave defendant a complete sum-
mary of the computations and data on which it based its
calculation of defendant’s net worth and income for the
tax years in question. The only point on which the dis-
puted records were relevant was whether Ross’ father
had sufficient income to be able to make the cash gifts
that were the basis of one of Ross’ defenses. Defend-
ant’s accountant testified that copies of the profit and
loss statements of W. C. Ross & Son introduced by the
Government, as well as copies of those not introduced
from earlier years, were customarily kept on file in the
accountant’s office. Therefore, it is different to under-
stand how obtaining the Government’s copies of these
reports could have materially aided Ross’ defense, es-
pecially since defendant did not dispute the total amount
of income attributed by the Government to W. C. Ross
as evidenced by the tax returns, certificates of assess-
ments and payments, and the IRS agent’s testimony.
Documents showing W. C. Ross’ income from one source,
the partnership, for the months not covered in the Gov-
ernment’s proof, would be relevant only if defendant
disputed the amount of income attributable to W. C.
Ross from all sources combined. It follows that the re-
ceipts and other primary sources from which the tax re-
turns and accounting statements were prepared are also
not material, and would only have duplicated the testi-
mony of defendant’s accountant concerning his prepara-
tion of the returns and statements.
The most persuasive evidence that the trial court did
not err in his ruling on this issue is found in defend-
ant’s lack of interest in the documents until some of
them were introduced at trial. Deloy Ross’ testimony
shows he was well aware of the contents of these boxes
of records. He was also aware that the records were
8 Cir., 1973, 486 F.2d 776, 779; Xydas v. United States, 1971, 144
U.S.App.D.C. 184, 445 F.2d 660, 668.
EPR ISS SOLITON GRE IG ONE ELIMI EOL, LO LRG OTE IEE ODER LIT II TE ME OI
BLEED T
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no longer in the store as of the middle of 1971, two
years after the IRS began its investigation but nearly
two full years before any indictments were handed down.
D. Reasonableness of Defendant’s
Discovery Request
Irrespective of the materiality of the documents re-
quested by defendant, we believe the request was not
reasonable, as required by Rule 16(b), under all the cir-
cumstances. To be reasonable a request for documents
must not be unduly burdensome to the Government, and,
equally important, must be framed in sufficiently spe-
cific terms to show the Government what it must produce.
See United States v. Hauff, 7 Cir., 1978, 473 F.2d 1350,
1355. General descriptions of the materials sought and
conclusory arguments as to their materiality have been
rejected repeatedly as insufficient under Rule 16(b).
United States v. White, 5 Cir. 1971, 450 F.2d 264,
267.*
If a defendant is requesting documents he has
never seen, he obviously cannot designate specifically
the items sought, although a concrete showing of ma-
teriality is still required. See United States v. Hughes,
5 Cir., 1969, 413 F.2d 1244, 1254. In this case, however,
defendant was familiar with the disputed documents and
knew they had been removed from their place of storage;
yet nowhere in defendant’s discovery motion is there any
specific mention of these documents.’ Not until his mo-
* See United States v. Hughes, 5 Cir., 1969, 413 F.2d 1244, 1254;
Downing v. United States, 5 Cir., 1965, 348 F.2d 594, 599; United
States v. Moore, 6 Cir., 1971, 439 F.2d 1107, 1108; United States v.
Conder, 6 Cir., 1970, 423 F.2d 904, 910; United States v. Evanchik,
2 Cir., 1969, 413 F.2d 950, 953; United States v. Fioravanti, 3 Cir.,
1969, 412 F.2d 407, 411; United States v. Jordan, 2 Cir., 1968, 399
F.2d 610, 615.
®We do not believe that defendant’s request for all documents
“belonging” to him was sufficient to notify the Government that it
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tion for a new trial did defendant specifically request the
documents in question and specifically state why he be-
lieved they were material. Under the circumstances, de-
fendant’s discovery request was not sufficiently specific
to apprise the Government of what was sought or to
permit the trial court to determine in a timely fashion
whether material evidence had not been produced.
E. Harmless Error
If, contrary to our interpretation of this case, er-
ror was committed by the trial court, we are on-
vinced it was harmless. See United States v. Hiide-
brand, 5 Cir., 1975, 506 F.2d 406, 408-410." The evi-
dence of this defendant’s guilt is very substantial. The
Government showed that Ross had regularly withheld
substantial amounts of cash from his business deposits,
and had used some of this cash to purchase Treasury
bonds (the income from which was not reported) and
bank money orders, putting the remainder in a special
bank account. Ross’ defenses of prior cash accumula-
tion and gifts from his father were refuted by proof
that Ross, by his own admission, had invested all cf his
accumulated cash in his motel business, and by proof
that his father had insufficient income to make the large
cash gifts alleged.
was being asked for his father’s personal records and for the
records of a business no longer owned by the defendant. As the
District Court noted, whether Ross had legal title to the papers
was hardly clear. Moreover, proprietary interest is no longer a
relevant criterion under Rule 16(b). See United States v. Crisona,
S.D.N.Y., 1967, 271 F.Supp. 150, aff’d 2 Cir., 1969, 416 F.2d 107.
10 See United States v. Rojas, 5 Cir., 1974, 502 F.2d 1042, 1045;
United States v. White, 5 Cir., 1971, 450 F.2d 264, 268; United
States v. Hinkle, 1973, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 334, 487 F.2d 1205, 1206-
1207; United States v. Hauff, 7 Cir., 1973, 473 F.2d 1350, 1355;
United States v. Bryant, 1971, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 448 F.2d
1182, 1184; United States v. DeLeo, 1 Cir., 1970, 422 F.2d 487,
499; United States v. Crisona, 2 Cir., 1969, 416 F.2d 107, 115.
lla
This Court has held that “an error in adminis-
tering the discovery rules is not reversible absent a
showing that the error was prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the defendant.” United States v. James, 5
Cir., 1974, 495 F.2d 434, 436. See United States v. Mil-
ler, 5 Cir., 1974, 500 F.2d 751, 755; United States v.
Saitta, 5 Cir., 1971, 443 F.2d 830, 831; Mullins v.
United States, 8 Cir., 1973, 487 F.2d 581, 589; United
States v. Jordan, 2 Cir., 1968, 399 F.2d 610, 615. In
this case the accounting records introduced by the Gov-
ernment, although not produced before trial, were dis-
cussed in the IRS agent’s report, which was furnished to
defendant several days before the records were offered
in evidence. Thus, even if the records should have been
produced before trial, we believe defendant had sufficient
opportunity to consider this evidence, or at least to re
quest more time. See United States v. James, supra,
495 F.2d at 436-437; Pierce v. United States, 5 Cir.,
1969, 414 F.2d 163, 169; United States v. Amabile, 7
Cir., 1968, 395 F.2d 47, 52; United States v. Knohl, 2
Cir., 1967, 379 F.2d 427, 441-442. As for the few
monthly reports that were not introduced into evidence,
defendant has failed to show any prejudice from not re-
ceiving those documents.
On the basis of this inquiry into the materiality
of the evidence not produced, the reasonableness of de-
fendant’s discovery requests, and the possibility of preju-
dice, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
refusal to grant a new trial on grounds of noncompliance
with its discovery order. See United States v. Smaldone,
10 Cir., 1973, 484 F.2d 311, 320-321; Meyer v. United
States, 8 Cir., 1968, 396 F.2d 279, 283.
III. Failure to Disclose Brady Material
Defendant also contended in his motion for a new trial
that the Government had failed to disclose evidence favor-
UREN tt MRR ALLE 6 My he hy
12a
able and material to his defense, as required by Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215
(1963). The evidence not disclosed in this case is far
different in importance from the evidence prosecutors
have been required to divulge under Brady. Cf. Moore
v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706
(1972) (misidentification of defendant by prosecution
witness on an earlier occasion, and diagram of murder
scene showing poor vantage point of eyewitness) ; United
States v. Frick, 5 Cir., 1978, 490 F.2d 666, 671 (promise
not to oppose probation of Government witness) .™
Moreover, the trial court examined the documents
im camera and specifically found that none was ex-
culpatory—a method of dealing with Brady contentions
that this Court and others have approved. See United
States v. Sanchez, 5 Cir., 1975, 508 F.2d 388; Flanagan
v. Henderson, 5 Cir., 1974, 496 F.2d 1274, 1277; Tagli-
anetti v. United States, 1 Cir., 1968, 398 F.2d 558, 572,
aff’d 394 U.S. 316, 89 S.Ct. 1099, 22 L.Ed.2d 302 (1969).
We find no basis for overturning the trial court’s finding.
As was true in United States v. Register, 5 Cir., 1974,
496 F.2d 1072, 1081,
[a]n im camera examination by the trial judge con-
firmed the government’s statement that [the evi-
dence in question] contained no exculpatory Brady
material. We will not go beyond the trial court’s
finding to encourage shipping prosecutor’s files to
™ United States v. Tashman, 5 Cir., 1973, 478 F.2d 129 (un-
specified promise to coconspirator contingent upon the value of his
testimony); Evans v. Janing, 8 Cir., 1973, 489 F.2d 470 (police
report stating that an eyewitness had failed to identify a photo-
graph of the defendant); United States v. Poole, 7 Cir., 1967,
379 F.2d 645 (physician’s report in rape case concluding there
was no evidence of penetration); Barbee v. Warden, Maryland
Penitentiary, 4 Cir., 1964, 331 F.2d 842 (ballistics and finger-
print reports showing that a revolver not belonging to the de-
fendant was used in the crime); United States v. Wilkins, 2 Cir.,
1964, 326 F.2d 135 (existence of two disinterested eyewitnesses who
would have testified that defendant was not involved in robbery).
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OR ae PRT EIT ET OOM ONDY! OLAMURN YS IIT AEP EAL LE IRENA TIMES M S RT I IF REE FE ORE IID
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the appellate court whenever the defense cries
Brady.
IV. Government Misconduct in Acquiring the Disputed
Documents
Defendant argues that in acquiring the business
records from his stepbrother Taylor, the Government
broke its promise not to remove or Xerox his records. It
is true that breach of a promise made to a defendant by
Government officials violates due process in some circum-
stances. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92
S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) ; United States v. Scan-
land, 5 Cir., 1974, 495 F.2d 1104, 1106. In this case,
however, there was no such breach. The IRS agents
asked defendant for records from 1965 through 1969.
He provided these at his accountant’s office on the con-
dition that they not remove or copy the records. The
agreement clearly related only to those specific records
and did not obligate the agents, as defendant argues, to
ignore documents discovered through other sources.
ST eae
SEER + EIT RSE:
ar
The manner in which the records were acquired
from Taylor was also entirely proper."* The IRS agents
YD ee SHO
secured some of these records from an attorney who han- :
dled Taylor’s claims against his mother’s estate and the
remaining records from Taylor himself. Obtaining these é
documents was proper, because they were undertaken
with the consent of Taylor and his attorney. See United i
States v. Thompson, 5 Cir., 1970, 421 F.2d 373; Holzhey i
v. United States, 5 Cir., 1955, 223 F.2d 823; United f
States v. DiPrima, 1 Cir., 1978, 472 F.2d 550; Shorey v. '
Warden, Maryland State Penitentiary, 4 Cir., 1968, 401
F.2d 474. Cf. Comment, Third-Party Consent Searches: :
** Because we have concluded that defendant cannot prevail on the
merits of this issue, we need not determine whether he has estab-
lished his standing to contest the searches at issue. See Brown :
v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973).
eS Das |
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An Alternative Analysis, 41 U.Chi.L.Rev. 121 (1973).
The trial court correctly found that there was “not the
slightest evidence of any overbearing threat, trick or
deception on the government’s part.”
Having reviewed all of defendant’s contentions care-
fully, we find no reversible error.
Affirmed.
rer eo. LID linet
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
October Term, 1974
No. 74-2969
D. C. Docket Nos. CR-20,406 & CR-20,550
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-A ppellee,
versus
DELOY C. Ross,
Defendant-A ppellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana
Before AINSWORTH, GODBOLD and SIMPSON,
Circuit Judges
JUDGMENT
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of
the record from the United Si. tes District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana, and was argued by coun-
sel;
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here
ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment
of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same
is hereby, affirmed.
April 21, 1975
Issued as Mandate:
_"
52! et FSA
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 74-2969
[Filed May 23, 1975, U. S. Court of Appeals,
Edward W. Wadsworth, Clerk]
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DELOoY C. Ross,
Defendant-A ppellant.
ON CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION of
the appellant in the above numbered and entitled cause
for a stay of the mandate of this Court therein, to enable
appellant to apply for and to obtain a writ of certiorari
from the Supreme Court of the United States. IT IS
ORDERED that the issuance of the mandate of this
Court in said cause be, and the same is stayed to and
including June 15, 1975, the stay to continue in force
until the final disposition of the case by the Supreme
Court, provided that within the period above mentioned
there shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court the cer-
tificate of the Clerk of the Supreme Court that certio-
rari petition has been filed. IT IS FURTHER OR-
DERED that the Clerk shall issue the mandate upon the
filing of a copy of an order of the Supreme Court deny-
ing the writ, or upon the expiration of the stay granted
herein, unless the above mentioned certificate shall be
filed with the Clerk of this Court within that time.
/s/ Robert A. Ainsworth
United States Circuit Judge
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.