Appendix — Ross v. United States

Supreme Court brief1975

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APPENDIX A

Fifth Circuit Opinion and Judgment Copied

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 74-2969

April 21, 1975

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-A ppellee,

V.

DELOY C. Ross,

Defendant-A ppellant.

* * * *

Appeal from the United States District Court for

the Western District of Louisiana.

Before AINSWORTH, GODBOLD and SIMPSON, Cir-

cuit Judges.

AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Deloy C. Ross appeals from a judgment

of conviction entered after a jury trial on five counts

of evasion of federal income tax. He raises three issues

on this appeal: that the trial court improperly denied

in part his motion for discovery under Fed.R.Crim.P. 16;

that the prosecution failed to fulfill its obligation to

disclose evidence favorable to the defense under Brady

v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1194, 10

L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); and that the Government denied

him due process and violated his Fourth Amendment

rights in acquiring from a third party certain papers

and records allegedly belonging to him. We affirm the

conviction.

ROK TERI ep ean Unie

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I. Factual Background of the Investigation and Trial

In May 1969, two Internal Revenue Service agents

interviewed Deloy Ross and told him that they were

undertaking an investigation of his tax returns that

might lead to criminal charges. After conferring with

his accountant and attorney, Ross agreed to permit the

agents to inspect and hand copy business records to be

provided him at his accountant’s office. These records

included accounting books and corporate records of a

motel owned by Ross, of Ross Investments, Inc., and of

W. C. Ross & Son, a general store partnership between

Ross and his father (W. C. Ross) which was dissolved

in January 1968. These records were for tax years

1965 through 1969. It was agreed that none of the

records thus provided was to be Xeroxed or removed

by the IRS agents.

As part of their investigation the IRS agents inter-

viewed defendant’s step-brother, William Taylor. Defend-

ant had sold the store operated under the W. C. Ross

& Son partnership to Taylor in 1968, and several boxes

containing financial records of the partnership remained

there. In September 1970, Taylor took these records

to attorneys looking into his claims against his mother’s

estate. In March 1971, Taylor retrieved some of these

records and turned them over to the IRS agents, in

response to their request. The agents received the re-

maining records directly from the attorneys, with Tay-

lor’s permission. This investigation culminated in indict-

ments against Deloy Ross for evasion of income tax

owed by himself and his wife for 1966, 1967, and 1968,

and for evasion of income tax owed by Ross Investments,

Inc. for 1968 and 1969.

The Government’s case at trial was proved by the

“net worth” method, which is used to establish a tax-

payer’s true income when there is no direct proof of

the unreported income. The net worth method involves

APN IR TLS PIERRE FATAL ee ARISES IRN RARE PREAH on i ETON ‘ SIND AEN HA a PNM WARY

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: calculating the taxpayer’s assets and liabilities at the

beginning of the relevant tax period to establish an

initial net worth. The same calculation is performed as F

to assets and liabilities at the end of the tax period. }

If the taxpayer’s increase in net worth plus his living

expenses for that tax period exceed his reported income

and cannot be explained by receipt of nontaxable in-

come, the existence of unreported income may be in-

ferred.

Before trial defendant filed a written motion seeking

discovery from the Government of

A. All books, records, papers, documents, photo-

graphs, tangible objects and material obtained

from or belonging to the accused;

B. Copies of all books, records, papers, documents,

photographs, tangible objects and material ob-

tained from or belonging to the accused;

C. All books, records, papers, documents, tangible

objects and material from whomsoever obtained

which are favorable to the accused on the issue

of his guilt or punishment and which will aid

him in the preparation of his defense;

2 NORE SNPS TRIS SR EG IE OY LI ae oe

D. All books, records, papers, documents and physi-

cal material which the Government intends to of-

fer as evidence in this case.

This motion was granted, and the Government provided

defendant with a set of computations and data sheets it

developed in attempting to establish the amount of un- ;

reported income attributable to defendant and his en-

terprises during the years in question.

Ross sought to rebut the Government’s case by assert-

ing that he had a substantial cash accumulation from

years prior to the tax years in question, and that he

received large cash gifts (several hundred thousand

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dollars) from his father, W. C. Ross, who died in 1969.

The Government sought to refuse this assertion by of-

fering the testimony of an IRS agent who had analyzed

W. C. Ross’ personal income tax returns and the monthly

accounting statements of the W. C. Ross & Son partner-

ship from 1952 through 1968. The tax returns for 1952

through 1968 were introduced into evidence,’ as were

the accounting statements of W. C. Ross & Son for 1952

through 1964, except for 1956. Although a few monthly

statements for this period were not introduced, the vast

majority were. Defendant made no objection to the

introduction of this evidence.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.

Defendant filed several motions for a new trial, arguing

that the Government had seized the records of the W. C.

Ross & Son partnership from Taylor in violation of

defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights and in violation

of the Government’s agreement with him; also, that the

Government had failed to produce materials described

in defendant’= pretrial motion for discovery, which had

been granted by the court, as well as other evidence

required to be disclosed under Brady v. State of Mary-

land, supra. These post-trial motions were denied, and

defendant brought this appeal.

II. The Adequacy of Pretrial Discovery

A. Failure to Raise This Alleged Error at Trial

Defendant argues on this appeal that the trial court

partially denied his discovery motion. The record shows,

however, that the motion was granted by the trial

judge without qualification. Whether an error was com-

mitted is, of course, affected by the extent of defend-

1The Government also introduced certificates of assessments

and payments of W. C. Ross for the years 1941 through 1968. These,

in conjunction with the tax returns, showed that W. C. Ross earned

$147,000 during that period.

5a

ant’s efforts, under Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(g),*? to bring to

the court’s attention any alleged noncompliance by the

Government with his discovery requests.

The records of W. C. Ross & Son were introduced dur-

ing the prosecution’s case. Defendant was aware that

the boxes of records stored at his stepbrother’s business

contained the financial statements introduced into evi-

dence, yet no motion to suppress this evidence was offered

until defendant’s motion for a new trial, made after the

jury’s verdict was received and 43 witnesses and 1,300

pages of transcript later.* Moreover, during the prosecu-

tion’s case an IRS agent testified (and defense counsel

stipulated) that the stepbrother Taylor was the source

of the records.*

This Court and others have criticized failure to

raise alleged discovery errors promptly. See United

States v. Fink, 5 Cir., 1974, 502 F.2d 1, 7; United States

v. James, 5 Cir., 1974, 495 F.2d 434, 436-437; United

? Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(g) states, in relevant part:

If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is

brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed

to comply with this rule or with an order issued pursuant to

this rule, the court may order such party to permit the dis-

covery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant

a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evi-

dence the material not disclosed, or it may enter such other

order as it deems just under the circumstances.

* Defense counsel did attempt to lodge a general objection to all

documents introduced: “to be certain, Your Honor, if there is any-

thing that the Court ordered them to give us, and if they didn’t

do it, I want the record to reflect that.” Tr. at 381. The prosecution

objected, and the court properly treated defendant’s objection as

applying to the document then being introduced, which is not at

issue on this appeal.

*Cf. United States v. Hauff, 7 Cir., 1973, 473 F.2d 1350, 1353;

United States v. Baxter, 9 Cir., 1973, 492 F.2d 150, 173, where

defendants, upon learning that the Government had not complied

with their discovery requests, moved for a mistrial.

6a

States v. Baxter, supra. Defendant’s ample opportunity

to ask the trial court to order the Government to comply

with his request for documents must be taken into ac-

count in determining whether error was committed in

denying the motions for a new trial.

B. The Provisions of Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(b)

and the Standard of Review

Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(b) provides, in relevant part:

(b) Other Books, Papers, Documents, Tangible Ob-

jects or Places. Upon motion of a defendant the

court may order the attorney for the government

to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photo-

graph books, papers, documents, tangible objects,

buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof,

which are within the possession, custody or control

of the government, upon a showing of materiality

to the preparation of his defense and that the re-

quest is reasonable.

The operative terms of the rule are “materiality” and

“reasonable.” The phrase “the court may order” in the

text of Rule 16(b) clearly indicates that the granting of

discovery motions is a matter of the trial court’s discre-

tion. In judging the correctness of the trial court’s con-

clusion that the evidence not tendered by the Government

was not material and that defendant’s request for such

materials (as clarified and renewed in his motion for a

new trial) was not reasonable, we will not interfere

with the trial court’s ruling in the absence of a clear

abuse of discretion. United States v. Stone, 5 Cir., 1973,

’ See United States v. Armes, 6 Cir., 1972, 470 F.2d 1353, 1355;

United States v. Cook, 7 Cir., 1970, 432 F.2d 1093, 1101; United

States v. Indiviglio, 2 Cir., 1965, 352 F.2d 276, 280. See generally

Colella v. United States, 1 Cir., 1966, 360 F.2d 792, 800. Cf. United

States v. Wolfson, 2 Cir., 1969, 413 F.2d 804, 808.

RIEED ”"

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472 F.2d 909, 916.° We find no abuse of discretion in this

regard.

C. Materiality of the Disputed Documents

As a matter of general construction “[t]he meas-

ure of discovery permitted by the Rules of Criminal

Procedure is not intended to be as broad as in a civil

case.” Clay v. United States, 5 Cir., 1968, 397 F.2d 901,

915, vac. on other grounds sub nom. Giordano v. United

States, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1163, 22 L.Ed.2d 297

(1969). Materiality means more than that the evidence

in question bears some abstract logical relationship to the

issues in the case. See United States v. Schembari, 4 Cir.,

1978, 484 F.2d 931, 935 (fact that photographs in Gov-

ernment’s possession were of demonstration during which

defendant was arrested held insufficient to show mate-

riality) There must be some indication that the pretrial

disclosure of the disputed evidence would have enabled

the defendant significantly to alter the quantum of proof

in his favor. The extensiveness of the material which

the Government did produce, United States v. Hildebrand,

5 Cir., 1974, 506 F.2d 406, 409, and the availability of

the disputed material from other sources, including the

defendant’s own knowledge, must also be considered. See

United States v. Felts, 5 Cir., 1974, 497 F.2d 80, 82.’

* See United States v. Saitta, 5 Cir., 1971, 443 F.2d 830, 831;

United States v. Hancock, 5 Cir., 1971, 441 F.2d 1285, 1286; United

States v. Baxter, 9 Cir., 1973, 492 F.2d 150, 175; Mullins v. United

States, 8 Cir., 1973, 487 F.2d 581, 589; United States v. Smaldone,

10 Cir., 1973, 484 F.2d 311, 320-321; United States v. Newman, 3

Cir., 1973, 476 F.2d 733, 739; United States v. Armes, 6 Cir., 1972,

470 F.2d 1353, 1355; United States v. Lewis, 7 Cir., 1969, 406 F.2d

486, 492; United States v. Jordan, 2 Cir., 1968, 399 F.2d 610, 615;

Walsh v. United States, 1 Cir., 1967, 371 F.2d 436, 437.

* See United States v. Toombs, 5 Cir., 1974, 497 F.2d 88, 93;

United States v. Hancock, 5 Cir., 1971, 441 F.2d 1285, 1286-1287;

United States v. Bland, 5 Cir., 1970, 432 F.2d 96, 97; United States

v. Brawer, 2 Cir., 1974, 496 F.2d 703, 705; United States v. Barnes,

SPN ORLA aN oa |

Refersategts

8a

The Government gave defendant a complete sum-

mary of the computations and data on which it based its

calculation of defendant’s net worth and income for the

tax years in question. The only point on which the dis-

puted records were relevant was whether Ross’ father

had sufficient income to be able to make the cash gifts

that were the basis of one of Ross’ defenses. Defend-

ant’s accountant testified that copies of the profit and

loss statements of W. C. Ross & Son introduced by the

Government, as well as copies of those not introduced

from earlier years, were customarily kept on file in the

accountant’s office. Therefore, it is different to under-

stand how obtaining the Government’s copies of these

reports could have materially aided Ross’ defense, es-

pecially since defendant did not dispute the total amount

of income attributed by the Government to W. C. Ross

as evidenced by the tax returns, certificates of assess-

ments and payments, and the IRS agent’s testimony.

Documents showing W. C. Ross’ income from one source,

the partnership, for the months not covered in the Gov-

ernment’s proof, would be relevant only if defendant

disputed the amount of income attributable to W. C.

Ross from all sources combined. It follows that the re-

ceipts and other primary sources from which the tax re-

turns and accounting statements were prepared are also

not material, and would only have duplicated the testi-

mony of defendant’s accountant concerning his prepara-

tion of the returns and statements.

The most persuasive evidence that the trial court did

not err in his ruling on this issue is found in defend-

ant’s lack of interest in the documents until some of

them were introduced at trial. Deloy Ross’ testimony

shows he was well aware of the contents of these boxes

of records. He was also aware that the records were

8 Cir., 1973, 486 F.2d 776, 779; Xydas v. United States, 1971, 144

U.S.App.D.C. 184, 445 F.2d 660, 668.

EPR ISS SOLITON GRE IG ONE ELIMI EOL, LO LRG OTE IEE ODER LIT II TE ME OI

BLEED T

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no longer in the store as of the middle of 1971, two

years after the IRS began its investigation but nearly

two full years before any indictments were handed down.

D. Reasonableness of Defendant’s

Discovery Request

Irrespective of the materiality of the documents re-

quested by defendant, we believe the request was not

reasonable, as required by Rule 16(b), under all the cir-

cumstances. To be reasonable a request for documents

must not be unduly burdensome to the Government, and,

equally important, must be framed in sufficiently spe-

cific terms to show the Government what it must produce.

See United States v. Hauff, 7 Cir., 1978, 473 F.2d 1350,

1355. General descriptions of the materials sought and

conclusory arguments as to their materiality have been

rejected repeatedly as insufficient under Rule 16(b).

United States v. White, 5 Cir. 1971, 450 F.2d 264,

267.*

If a defendant is requesting documents he has

never seen, he obviously cannot designate specifically

the items sought, although a concrete showing of ma-

teriality is still required. See United States v. Hughes,

5 Cir., 1969, 413 F.2d 1244, 1254. In this case, however,

defendant was familiar with the disputed documents and

knew they had been removed from their place of storage;

yet nowhere in defendant’s discovery motion is there any

specific mention of these documents.’ Not until his mo-

* See United States v. Hughes, 5 Cir., 1969, 413 F.2d 1244, 1254;

Downing v. United States, 5 Cir., 1965, 348 F.2d 594, 599; United

States v. Moore, 6 Cir., 1971, 439 F.2d 1107, 1108; United States v.

Conder, 6 Cir., 1970, 423 F.2d 904, 910; United States v. Evanchik,

2 Cir., 1969, 413 F.2d 950, 953; United States v. Fioravanti, 3 Cir.,

1969, 412 F.2d 407, 411; United States v. Jordan, 2 Cir., 1968, 399

F.2d 610, 615.

®We do not believe that defendant’s request for all documents

“belonging” to him was sufficient to notify the Government that it

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tion for a new trial did defendant specifically request the

documents in question and specifically state why he be-

lieved they were material. Under the circumstances, de-

fendant’s discovery request was not sufficiently specific

to apprise the Government of what was sought or to

permit the trial court to determine in a timely fashion

whether material evidence had not been produced.

E. Harmless Error

If, contrary to our interpretation of this case, er-

ror was committed by the trial court, we are on-

vinced it was harmless. See United States v. Hiide-

brand, 5 Cir., 1975, 506 F.2d 406, 408-410." The evi-

dence of this defendant’s guilt is very substantial. The

Government showed that Ross had regularly withheld

substantial amounts of cash from his business deposits,

and had used some of this cash to purchase Treasury

bonds (the income from which was not reported) and

bank money orders, putting the remainder in a special

bank account. Ross’ defenses of prior cash accumula-

tion and gifts from his father were refuted by proof

that Ross, by his own admission, had invested all cf his

accumulated cash in his motel business, and by proof

that his father had insufficient income to make the large

cash gifts alleged.

was being asked for his father’s personal records and for the

records of a business no longer owned by the defendant. As the

District Court noted, whether Ross had legal title to the papers

was hardly clear. Moreover, proprietary interest is no longer a

relevant criterion under Rule 16(b). See United States v. Crisona,

S.D.N.Y., 1967, 271 F.Supp. 150, aff’d 2 Cir., 1969, 416 F.2d 107.

10 See United States v. Rojas, 5 Cir., 1974, 502 F.2d 1042, 1045;

United States v. White, 5 Cir., 1971, 450 F.2d 264, 268; United

States v. Hinkle, 1973, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 334, 487 F.2d 1205, 1206-

1207; United States v. Hauff, 7 Cir., 1973, 473 F.2d 1350, 1355;

United States v. Bryant, 1971, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 448 F.2d

1182, 1184; United States v. DeLeo, 1 Cir., 1970, 422 F.2d 487,

499; United States v. Crisona, 2 Cir., 1969, 416 F.2d 107, 115.

lla

This Court has held that “an error in adminis-

tering the discovery rules is not reversible absent a

showing that the error was prejudicial to the substantial

rights of the defendant.” United States v. James, 5

Cir., 1974, 495 F.2d 434, 436. See United States v. Mil-

ler, 5 Cir., 1974, 500 F.2d 751, 755; United States v.

Saitta, 5 Cir., 1971, 443 F.2d 830, 831; Mullins v.

United States, 8 Cir., 1973, 487 F.2d 581, 589; United

States v. Jordan, 2 Cir., 1968, 399 F.2d 610, 615. In

this case the accounting records introduced by the Gov-

ernment, although not produced before trial, were dis-

cussed in the IRS agent’s report, which was furnished to

defendant several days before the records were offered

in evidence. Thus, even if the records should have been

produced before trial, we believe defendant had sufficient

opportunity to consider this evidence, or at least to re

quest more time. See United States v. James, supra,

495 F.2d at 436-437; Pierce v. United States, 5 Cir.,

1969, 414 F.2d 163, 169; United States v. Amabile, 7

Cir., 1968, 395 F.2d 47, 52; United States v. Knohl, 2

Cir., 1967, 379 F.2d 427, 441-442. As for the few

monthly reports that were not introduced into evidence,

defendant has failed to show any prejudice from not re-

ceiving those documents.

On the basis of this inquiry into the materiality

of the evidence not produced, the reasonableness of de-

fendant’s discovery requests, and the possibility of preju-

dice, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

refusal to grant a new trial on grounds of noncompliance

with its discovery order. See United States v. Smaldone,

10 Cir., 1973, 484 F.2d 311, 320-321; Meyer v. United

States, 8 Cir., 1968, 396 F.2d 279, 283.

III. Failure to Disclose Brady Material

Defendant also contended in his motion for a new trial

that the Government had failed to disclose evidence favor-

UREN tt MRR ALLE 6 My he hy

12a

able and material to his defense, as required by Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215

(1963). The evidence not disclosed in this case is far

different in importance from the evidence prosecutors

have been required to divulge under Brady. Cf. Moore

v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706

(1972) (misidentification of defendant by prosecution

witness on an earlier occasion, and diagram of murder

scene showing poor vantage point of eyewitness) ; United

States v. Frick, 5 Cir., 1978, 490 F.2d 666, 671 (promise

not to oppose probation of Government witness) .™

Moreover, the trial court examined the documents

im camera and specifically found that none was ex-

culpatory—a method of dealing with Brady contentions

that this Court and others have approved. See United

States v. Sanchez, 5 Cir., 1975, 508 F.2d 388; Flanagan

v. Henderson, 5 Cir., 1974, 496 F.2d 1274, 1277; Tagli-

anetti v. United States, 1 Cir., 1968, 398 F.2d 558, 572,

aff’d 394 U.S. 316, 89 S.Ct. 1099, 22 L.Ed.2d 302 (1969).

We find no basis for overturning the trial court’s finding.

As was true in United States v. Register, 5 Cir., 1974,

496 F.2d 1072, 1081,

[a]n im camera examination by the trial judge con-

firmed the government’s statement that [the evi-

dence in question] contained no exculpatory Brady

material. We will not go beyond the trial court’s

finding to encourage shipping prosecutor’s files to

™ United States v. Tashman, 5 Cir., 1973, 478 F.2d 129 (un-

specified promise to coconspirator contingent upon the value of his

testimony); Evans v. Janing, 8 Cir., 1973, 489 F.2d 470 (police

report stating that an eyewitness had failed to identify a photo-

graph of the defendant); United States v. Poole, 7 Cir., 1967,

379 F.2d 645 (physician’s report in rape case concluding there

was no evidence of penetration); Barbee v. Warden, Maryland

Penitentiary, 4 Cir., 1964, 331 F.2d 842 (ballistics and finger-

print reports showing that a revolver not belonging to the de-

fendant was used in the crime); United States v. Wilkins, 2 Cir.,

1964, 326 F.2d 135 (existence of two disinterested eyewitnesses who

would have testified that defendant was not involved in robbery).

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the appellate court whenever the defense cries

Brady.

IV. Government Misconduct in Acquiring the Disputed

Documents

Defendant argues that in acquiring the business

records from his stepbrother Taylor, the Government

broke its promise not to remove or Xerox his records. It

is true that breach of a promise made to a defendant by

Government officials violates due process in some circum-

stances. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92

S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) ; United States v. Scan-

land, 5 Cir., 1974, 495 F.2d 1104, 1106. In this case,

however, there was no such breach. The IRS agents

asked defendant for records from 1965 through 1969.

He provided these at his accountant’s office on the con-

dition that they not remove or copy the records. The

agreement clearly related only to those specific records

and did not obligate the agents, as defendant argues, to

ignore documents discovered through other sources.

ST eae

SEER + EIT RSE:

ar

The manner in which the records were acquired

from Taylor was also entirely proper."* The IRS agents

YD ee SHO

secured some of these records from an attorney who han- :

dled Taylor’s claims against his mother’s estate and the

remaining records from Taylor himself. Obtaining these é

documents was proper, because they were undertaken

with the consent of Taylor and his attorney. See United i

States v. Thompson, 5 Cir., 1970, 421 F.2d 373; Holzhey i

v. United States, 5 Cir., 1955, 223 F.2d 823; United f

States v. DiPrima, 1 Cir., 1978, 472 F.2d 550; Shorey v. '

Warden, Maryland State Penitentiary, 4 Cir., 1968, 401

F.2d 474. Cf. Comment, Third-Party Consent Searches: :

** Because we have concluded that defendant cannot prevail on the

merits of this issue, we need not determine whether he has estab-

lished his standing to contest the searches at issue. See Brown :

v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973).

eS Das |

l4a

An Alternative Analysis, 41 U.Chi.L.Rev. 121 (1973).

The trial court correctly found that there was “not the

slightest evidence of any overbearing threat, trick or

deception on the government’s part.”

Having reviewed all of defendant’s contentions care-

fully, we find no reversible error.

Affirmed.

rer eo. LID linet

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

October Term, 1974

No. 74-2969

D. C. Docket Nos. CR-20,406 & CR-20,550

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-A ppellee,

versus

DELOY C. Ross,

Defendant-A ppellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Louisiana

Before AINSWORTH, GODBOLD and SIMPSON,

Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of

the record from the United Si. tes District Court for the

Western District of Louisiana, and was argued by coun-

sel;

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here

ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment

of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same

is hereby, affirmed.

April 21, 1975

Issued as Mandate:

_"

52! et FSA

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 74-2969

[Filed May 23, 1975, U. S. Court of Appeals,

Edward W. Wadsworth, Clerk]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DELOoY C. Ross,

Defendant-A ppellant.

ON CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION of

the appellant in the above numbered and entitled cause

for a stay of the mandate of this Court therein, to enable

appellant to apply for and to obtain a writ of certiorari

from the Supreme Court of the United States. IT IS

ORDERED that the issuance of the mandate of this

Court in said cause be, and the same is stayed to and

including June 15, 1975, the stay to continue in force

until the final disposition of the case by the Supreme

Court, provided that within the period above mentioned

there shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court the cer-

tificate of the Clerk of the Supreme Court that certio-

rari petition has been filed. IT IS FURTHER OR-

DERED that the Clerk shall issue the mandate upon the

filing of a copy of an order of the Supreme Court deny-

ing the writ, or upon the expiration of the stay granted

herein, unless the above mentioned certificate shall be

filed with the Clerk of this Court within that time.

/s/ Robert A. Ainsworth

United States Circuit Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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