Brief for the Respondent in Opposition — National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. Federal Communications Commission
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SUPREME COURT, & & JUL 29 1975
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBER TERM, 1974
No. 74-1550
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY
CoMMISSIONERS, Petitioner,
v.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS CoMMISSION, et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENT SOUTHERN PACIFIC
COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY IN OPPOSITION
THORMUND A. MILLER
RicHarp 8S. Kopr
JAMES M. Tosin
One Market Street
San Francisco, Cal, 94105
Hersert FE. Forrest
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Attorneys for Respondent :
Southern Pacific Communica- .
tions Company
STEPTOE & JOHNSON
2 1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. :
a Washington, D. C. 20036
* Of Counsel i
a July 29, 1975
ei
4 :
My Press or Byron S. ApAMs PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON, D. C. S
4
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ig a
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CURR ROU i cs ncecnsvinwadeeanatenaeenecnaes 2
PO 35.5 caccenwiehnsanes koneinenn Chasackenen 2
Questions Presented for Review ............. 0.000 2
A GE TD SBOE ok aN oie sscacbepdukicnsaces 3
ORE vives 5a bac teN candace Shewetwwacsecnreyees 9
COIR 9k. cok nds cece ie ints vote dec aceebewisennas 18
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CasEs:
Allocation of Frequencies Above 890 Mc, 27 F.C.C. 359
CREE. 06086 eRiwdedehans Ndataecncee ts ¥en ks ters 16
AT&T (TAT-4), 37 F.C.C. 1151 (1957) ............. 16
Belt System Tariff Offerings, 44 F.C.C. 2d 245 (1973),
46 F.C.C. 2d 413 (1974), affirmed, Bell Tel. Co. of
Pennsylvania v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3rd Cir.
1975), petition for certiorari denied, AT&T v.
FCC, 48 U.S.L.W. 3654 (June 16, 1975), petition
SOP CI I i. kk Kone binban eccanes 3, 10
Domestic Satellite Service, 42 F.C.C. 2d 654 (1973) .. 16
Economic Implications and Interrelationships Arising
from Policies and Practices Relating to Customer
Interconnection, Jurisdictional Separations and
Rate-Structures, 46 F.C.C. 2d 214 (1974), 49
F.C.C, 2d 1238 (1974), 50 F.C.C. 2d 574 (1974)
3, 8, 12
Establishment of Domestic Communication-Satellite
Facilities by Nongovernmental Entities, 35 F.C.C.
2d 844, reconsideration granted in part, 38 F.C.C.
OE COMER She N an dwame be nad (ceaak deck ¥abues 16
FCC v. RCA Communications Inc. (Three Circuits
Case), SH UG. OB CRUGRD css cvenvccccavessnas 10
POR RS EIR ODE TR OER TLR HOSS Aree
|
PITS ES ELSE, SOLE OD
ee
FRE EAE LAPS a INGE NIB NEN IS OR AIA Se =
li Table of Authorities Continued
Page
FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974) ......... 9, 10, 11
General Mobile Radio Service, 13 F.C.C. 1190 (1949)
Implementation of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969:
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 36 F.C.C. 2d
BEE EE WA wh hoe vpn en cence ws nenas'nedaeses
Report and Order, 49 F.C.C. 2d 1813 (1974) ...
Order, 50 F.C.C. 2d 814 (1975) ..............
Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co., 19 F.C.C. 1321 af-
firmed, RCA Communications vy. FCC, 238 F.2d 24
(D.C. Cir. 1956), certiorari denied, 352 U.S. 1004
SEE dts nad eUe RAVeas pW an kod ene dch naa esos
Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C, 2d 953
(1969), reconsideration denied, 21 F.C.C. 2d 190
(1970), modifications granted, 27 F.C.C. 2d 380
ER GSS pil ns ie Spiel ee
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1918) ..........
Network Project v. FCC, 511 F.2d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
Pacific Tel. € Tel. Co. v. Southern Pacific Communica-
tions Co., Case No. 9728 (Cal. PUC Decision No.
ae re
Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the
Interdependence of Computer and Communication
Service and Facilities, 38 FC.C. 2d 267 (1971), re-
consideration denied, 34 F.C.C. 2d 577 (1972),
modified, GTE Service Corp. v. United States, 474
TE, BOND hence case eesdceceeesenss
Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1980) ....
Specialized Common Carrier Inquiry:
Notice of Inquiry to Formulate Policy, Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, and Order, 24 F.C.C.
ET i wc hasstuews ise shaneerkeaes
First Report and Order, 29 F.C.C. 2d 870 (1971)
16
16
16
6
eS aap 2, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15
Table of Authorities Continued lil
Page
Memorandum Opinion and Order denying re-
consideration, 31 F.C.C. 2d 1106 (1971) (Pet.
BOG. TD) ci vccasccscsscvsccscnvessccvess 2, 4, 16
United Video, Inc., a Corporation, Application for a
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity to Oper-
ate a Telephone Company to Serve the Territory
Within the Corporate Limits of the Cities uf Tulsa
and Oklahoma City, Cause No. 24892 (Okla. Corp.
Comm. Nov. 14, 1974), petition in error pending
(Okla. Sup. Ct. No. 48045) ......cccssccscesees 17
Washington Utilities & Transportation Commission v.
FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975) (Pet. App. A),
petition for writ of certiorari pending, National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
v. FCC, No. 74-1550 ........ ». 22,4, 5, 8, 10, 13, 14, 17
STATUTES:
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.
BREE OF WOR. osc cwes hues cake naess ctundaeee cues 11
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
SR OSRE OC. COE. cava cdcenecdswessaunsecses 7, 13, 14, 15
ON RET, SUCRE si cbs se bicinecsdaanssecvesasacs 2
MISCELLANEOUS:
Hinehman, Walter R., Chief, Common Carrier Bureau,
Federal Communications Commission, Remarks
Before the Annual Conference of the International
Communications Association, San Francisco, Cali-
OE SO Bey BE hanson shir noes caccanensas 14
comoens PO RAVES ct RE
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1974
No. 74-1550
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY
CoMMISSIONERS, Petitioner,
V.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS CoMMISSION, et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENT SOUTHERN PACIFIC
COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY IN OPPOSITION
Southern Pacific Communications Company (South-
ern Pacific), a party intervenor to the proceedings in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit whose judgment is sought to be reviewed, respect-
fully submits this brief in opposition to the petition of
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Com-
missioners (NARUC) for a writ of certiorari in the
above-entitled proceeding.
aR ee nT EES
j
2
OPINIONS BELOW
The First Report and Order of the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (the Commission) is reported at
29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971), and appears as petitioner’s
Appendix C (Pet. App. C). The Commission’s Memo-
randum Opinion and Order denying reconsideration is
reported at 31 F.C.C.2d 1106 (1971), and appears as
petitioner’s Appendix D (Pet. App. D). The opinion
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit is reported at 573 F.2d 1142 (1975), and ap-
pears as petitioner’s Appendix A (Pet. App. A).
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered
on January 20, 1975. <A petition for rehearing was
denied by the Court of Appeals (Pet. App. B) on
March 12, 1975. The petition for a writ of certiorari
was filed on June 9, 1975. The time for all non-Fed-
eral respondents to file a response to the petition was
extended by the Clerk to and including July 29, 1975.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. § 1254(1).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the Commission acted within its author-
ity in adopting a general policy in a rule making pro-
ceeding that the public interest would be served by
permitting the entry of competing new carriers in the
field of specialized communications services, on the
basis of more than 200 comments and reply comments,
oral argument before the Commission en bane, and
detailed factual determinations, forecasts, and expert
judgments.
}
I
| ie ts MONE ADS AUN eter es eS tT
— SRE,
3
2. Whether the subsequent institution by the Com-
mission of a fact finding inquiry into the economic im-
plications and interrelationships of pricing practices
and regulatory policies, required reversal of the Com-
mission’s determination in an extensive rule making
proceeding that the anticipated beneficial effects from
the entry of competing specialized carriers outweighed
any possible adverse effects of competition upon exist-
ing carriers and their services.
3. Whether the failure of the Commission to discuss
environmental impact in adopting a general policy ex-
tending competition in the field of specialized commu-
nications services required reversal, where none of the
numerous parties participating in the general rule
making proceeding had raised the issue before the
Commission, and the issue was deemed by the Court of
Appeals to be too insubstantial, and disruptive of the
administrative process, to be considered for the first
time on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1969, after an evidentiary hearing commenced six
years earlier, the Commission authorized a new com-
mon carrier to provide specialized communications
common carrier private line service * between St. Louis
? Specialized common carriers are engaged in the transmission
of communications (voice, data, or both), between intercity loca-
tions by full-time dedicated private circuits giving their custo-
mers continuous communications without requiring the carriers
to establish a new connection for each call or message. See Bell
System Tariff Offerings, 44 F.C.C.2d 245 (1973), 46 F.C.C.2d 413,
416 (1974), affirmed Bell Tel. Co. of Pennsylvania v. FCC, 503
F.2d 1250 (8rd Cir. 1974), petition for certiorari denied, AT&T
v. FCC, 43 U.S.L.W. 3654 (June 16, 1975), petition for rehearing
pending.
Teer a Ceca or Rear TSOP aOR NSE
25 Rat eet
7
4
and Chicago in competition with the Bell System and
The Western Union Telegraph Company.? After a
large number of applications were thereupon filed by
various companies to construct and operate microwave
radio and other facilities to provide specialized com-
munications services, particularly for data transmis-
sion,® the Commission instituted a rule making pro-
ceeding to formulate policy and to establish rules with
respect to the specific issues, including particularly *
A. Whether as a general policy the public inter-
est would be served by permitting the entry of new
carriers in the specialized communications field;
and, if so,
B. Whether comparative hearings on the vari-
ous claims of economic mutual exclusivity among
the applicants are necessary or desirable in the
circumstances * * * ,
More than 200 comments and reply comments were
filed by interested parties, including the Department
of Justice and the Small Business Administration,’
2 Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969), re-
consideration denied, 21 F.C.C.2d 190 (1970), modifications
granted, 27 F.C.C.2d 380 (1971).
8 As of March 15, 1971, 33 applicants had submitted 46 separate
proposals for the operation of 1877 microwave stations. First
Report and Order, Specialized Common Carrier Inquiry, 29 F.C.C.
2d 870, 871 fn. 1 (1971) (Pet.App. 50a), reconsideration denied,
31 F.C.C.2d 1106 (1971) (Pet.App. 189a), affirmed Washington
Utilities & Transportation Commission v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142,
1145 fn. 1 (9th Cir. 1975) (Pet.App. 2a), petition for writ of
certiorari pending, National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners v. FCC, No. 74-1550.
4Notice of Inquiry to Formulate Policy, Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, and Order, Specialized Common Carrier Inquiry, 24
F.C.C.2d 318, 327 (1970).
5 See Appendix B to First Report and Order listing participat-
ing parties, Note 3 supra, 29 F.C.C.2d at 945-949,
4
ee PEMD EERIE EEN SOILS
5
and oral argument was presented before the Commis-
sion en bane on behalf of more than 30 parties over
two days.
In an extensive First Report and Order,’ the Com-
mission carefully reviewed and considered the various
contentions and materials submitted by the parties,
including specifically the new, diverse, and improved
services and benefits to be realized by the entry of addi-
tional competing specialized carriers, weighed against
the possible adverse effects of competition upon exist-
ing carriers and their services,’ and on the basis of
various subsidiary factual determinations, forecasts,
and expert judgments detailed in its report® unani-
mously reached the following ultimate findings and
conclusion: °
We find that: there is a public need and demand
for the proposed facilities and services and for
new and diverse sources of supply, competition in
the specialized communications field is reasonably
feasible, there are grounds for a reasonable ex-
pectation that new entry will have some beneficial
effects, and there is no reason to anticipate that
new entry would have any adverse impact on serv-
ice to the public by existing carriers such as to
outweigh the considerations supporting new entry.
We further find and conclude that a general pol-
icy in favor of the entry of new carriers in the
specialized communications field would serve the
public interest, convenience, and necessity.
® Note 3 supra. The First Report and Order covers 144 pages
in petitioner’s Appendix, pp. 48a-188a.
TNote 3 supra, 29 F.C.C.2d at 910-914 (Pet.App. 131a-138a),
513 F.2d at 1159 (Pet.App. 25a).
8 Note 3 supra, 513 F.2d at 1156 (Pet.App. 20a).
® Note 3 supra, 29 F.C.C.2d at 920 (Pet.App. 147a-148a).
a wy nd NC STA oe ie ae Li tarenin Maron tLe
i SIE pe a
6
The Commission also concluded that it would be con-
trary to the public interest and inconsistent with its
policy determination in favor of entry to attempt gen-
erally to limit entry among pending applicants by
holding comparative hearings on issues of economic
exclusivity.”
On reconsideration, the Commission rejected ‘‘the
somewhat novel, but legally dubious, claim’’ of the Na-
tional Association of Regulatory Utility Commission-
ers (NARUC), petitioner herein, that the Commis-
sion should pursue a policy of generating excess inter-
state earnings which should be applied to subsidize the
revenue requirements applicable to local exchange
services subject to state regulatory jurisdiction: ™
The Commission fully appreciates the objective of
the NARUC to minimize the rates and revenue re-
quirements of the telephone companies applicable
to intrastate local services. We do not believe,
however, that either as a matter of law or prac-
tice, this can be accomplished by arbitrarily in-
flating the cost of service subject to Federal juris-
diction and deflating by like amount the costs ap-
plicable to services subject to state jurisdiction.
The allocation of joint costs incurred in furnish-
ing telephone services subject to both Federal and
state jurisdiction is, of course, a complex and at
times controversial matter. Nevertheless, it is in-
cumbent upon Federal and state rate-making au-
thorities, as a matter of law to employ allocation
procedures which will fairly and reasonably re-
flect the legitimate costs of each service. See
Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930) ;
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913). Allo-
1 Note 3 supra, 29 F.C.C.2d at 923 (Pet.App. 153a).
1 Note 3 supra, 31 F.C.C.2d at 1108 (Pet.App. 192a-193a).
BL
NERS — ,
BLEED THROUGH
7
cations cannot and should not be designed to arti-
ficially shift any part of the revenue requirement
applicable to one jurisdiction into another. This,
clearly, would lead to confusion, if not chaos, in
maintaining a system of dual Federal/State regu-
lation on a rational and manageable basis. As the
NARUC is well aware, procedures and mecha-
nisms are available and have been employed over
the years on a cooperative Federal/State basis as
a means of establishing and maintaining fair and
equitable jurisdictional allocations. This proceed-
ing is not the appropriate forum to address that
subject.
Petitions for review were filed by the Washington
Publie Utilities Commission and NARUC, but not by
the Bell System or by Western Union. While the
petitions for review were pending, the Commission in
August, 1972, issued a notice of proposed rule making
to implement the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (NEPA),” and in December, 1974, issued a
report and order adopting rules and regulations in
which it identified enumerated types of facilities con-
sidered to be major and required that information re-
lating to such facilities be submitted to the Commis-
sion with applications for construction permits after
January 20, 1975, so that environmental impact state-
ments might be required where the environmental con-
sequences were considered to be significant.”
12Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Implementation of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 36 F.C.C.2d 108 (1972).
18 Report and Order, 49 F.C.C.2d 1318 (1974). Microwave
antenna towers over 100 feet, but other towers over 300 feet, are
considered major facilities. The Commission is giving considera-
tion to the disparity in treatment of tower heights. 50 F.C.C.2d
814 (1975).
BO AT Sel OR ¢
8
In April, 1974, the Commission instituted an inquiry
‘into the effect of current pricing practices and regu-
latory policies on the level and distribution of cus-
tomer charges for various telecommunications services,
and in particular on the extent to which various cate-
gories of customers are now or will be under alterna-
tive pricing practices and regulatory policies subsi-
dizing the services required by others.’?* In the no-
tice of inquiry, and later in a memorandum opinion
and order” and in a first supplemental notice,’® the
Commission emphasized that the purpose of the in-
quiry was to gather information, views, and comments
from interested persons for the benefit of the Commis-
sion, state utility commissions, regulated carriers, and
others, as primarily a fact-finding inquiry, and that it
was not proposing in the particular proceeding to
adopt any rules or policies, as such.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit issued its opinion and judgment on January
20, 1975," holding that petitioners had standing to
bring petitions for review, but affirming in all respects
that the Commission had met the substantive and pro-
cedural requirements of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, in weighing the asserted benefits
and possible adverse effects of competition, and in pro-
ceeding by rule making to determine policy; that the
14Notice of Inquiry, Economic Implications and Interrelation-
ships Arising From Policies and Practices Relating to Customer
Interconnection, Jurisdictional Separations and Rate-Structures,
46 F.C.C. 2d 214 (1974).
949 F.C.C.2d 1238 (1974).
1650 F.C.C.2d 574 (1974).
17 Note 3 supra (Pet.App. A).
)
i
q
eee y SAT CT PLESSIS ey ee A
9
Commission had properly given careful consideration
to the relevant factors in concluding that comparative
hearings for the applicants were neither necessary nor
desirable; and that in the particular circumstances of
this case, the balance should be struck against review
and reversal because the Commission had not consid-
ered the environmental impact of its policy, a matter
raised for the first time on appeal.
ARGUMENT
1. Contrary to NARUC’s contention, the Commis-
sion’s policy determination in this case to permit the
entry of new carriers in the field of specialized com-
munications is not in conflict with this Court’s ruling
in FPC v. Texaco, Inc.,* holding that a regulatory
agency cannot place exclusive reliance on the prevail-
ing price in the marketplace to determine whether
rate are ‘‘just and reasonable’? under its statutory
mandate.
In the Texaco ease, this Court held that an FPC or-
der which provided a blanket certificate procedure for
small producers of natural gas was too ambiguous be-
cause it did not disclose the basis of its order with suffi-
cient clarity. The FPC had not exercised its discre-
tion to insure that the sales price for the gas would be
‘just and reasonable’ as mandated by the applicable
statute.” For the purpose of the proceedings that
might occur on remand, this Court stressed that ‘‘the
prevailing price in the marketplace cannot be the final
measure of ‘just and reasonable’ rates’’, inasmuch as
the Congress had subjected producers to regulation
18 417 U.S. 380 (1974).
19 417 U.S. at 395-397.
LOLOL ALLY OLN GEILE OI
OO RA PD EASY
PROT S
POT ET en ee
Eee SION
4,
10
because it had recognized the anticompetitive condi-
tions in the industry.”
The Texaco case is completely inapposite here. As
the Court below recognized, the Commission was fully
conscious of the guidelines announced by this Court in
the Three Circuits ease, FCC v. RCA Communications
Tne." concerning the weight to be given competitive
considerations, and sought conscientiously to follow
them in concluding that the reasonable expectation of
some beneficial effects from the new entry outweighed
the possible adverse effects of competition upon exist-
ing carriers and services.” By no means did the Com-
mission thereby abdicate its regulatory functions to
the marketplace. Unlike the FPC in the Texaco case,
which merely asserted in generalities that it ‘‘shall
consider all relevant factors’’,” this Commission spe-
cifically and in express detail weighed all the relevant
considerations in reaching its conclusions, including
the nature and extent of the potential market, the pub-
lie need and demand for the specialized new and im-
proved services by diverse and flexible means offered
by the new carriers, and the insubstantial effect of the
new entry upon the resources, revenues, and services
0.417 U.S. at 397-399.
“1346 U.S. 86 (1953).
*2 Note 3 supra, 513 F.2d at 1159 (Pet.App. 23a). The Third
Cireuit has also ruled that the Commission’s First Report and
Order in the Specialized Common Carrier Inquiry ‘‘fully comports
with the principles articulated in RCA. * * * We regard the
listing of factors (independent of competition) and the identi-
fication of benefits (reasonably expected) as proof that the FCC
viewed competition as a means, rather than as a goal in and of
itself,’’ in this proceeding. Bell Tel. Co. of Pennsylvania v. FCC,
note 1 supra, 503 F.2d at 1271, 1272.
*3 Note 18 supra, 417 U.S. at 397.
ae RFA NAL LE SO BELLI EEE 8 TNL LS EPIL LIT ITE IIE DIE EL AP RE TE a
11
of the existing established carriers.** The Commission
pointed out that its disposition of the policy aspect did
not constitute a determination that all or any of the
pending applications will be granted, since each appli-
cation must still meet the applicable statutory stand-
ards and comport with the Commission’s established
policies, and each applicant must make a satisfactory
showing that it is qualified and the service it seeks to
offer is technically and economically sound and other-
wise in the public interest.” Thereafter, upon grant
of its applications, each applicant becomes subject to
the full sweep of Commission regulation over inter-
state carriers under the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended.
Unlike Texaco, where the market was characterized
by anticompetitive practices, and the Commission
merely indicated in generalities that it intended to
review new contract prices,” the Commission below
particularized how its rate making and regulatory
policies and practices would be appropriately adapted
to promote and maintain an environment of free and
open competition in the sale of specialized services.”
Unlike Teraco, where the Commission was found to
have placed exclusive reliance upon market factors,
rather than considering the market to be one relevant
factor to be taken into consideration,” the Commission
below did consider many other factors beyond the
24 Note 3 supra, 29 F.C.C.2d at 904-920 (Pet.App. 117a-147a).
5 Note 3 supra, 29 F.C.C.2d at 900 (Pet.App. 110a-111a).
26 Note 18 supra, 417 U.S. at 397-399.
27 Note 3 supra, 29 F.C.C.2d at 915-917 (Pet.App. 139a-142a).
28 Note 18 supra, 417 U.S. at 399, 400.
STBAPBS ALS PRA OG AGERE) SF PRE CPE Eg
THR OUGH
1M E RT Pag
a
12
marketplace, and retained jurisdiction to examine the
qualifications of each applicant and to review its pro-
cedures in the light of experience. It considered other
factors such as the desirability of avoiding delay in
the institution of services needed by the public now,
the benefit to the public in the availability of diverse
options, the lack of public detriment in the event some
new carriers should fail, and the ability of the Com-
mission to review the policy later in the light of
changed circumstances, in concluding that it would be
contrary to the public interest and inconsistent with
its policy determinations to attempt generally to limit
entry among pending applicants by holding compara-
tive hearings on issues of economic exclusivity.”
2. NARUC is incorrect that the Commission’s action
in 1974 instituting an inquiry into the economic impli-
cations and interrelationships of current pricing prac-
tices and regulatory policies is in any wise inconsistent
with the Commission’s policy in favor of entry of new
: carriers. The notice of inquiry and the subsequent
Commission memorandum opinion and order and sup-
plemental notice do not in the least question the sound-
ness of the First Report and Order in the Specialized
Common Carrier Inquiry,” but to the contrary stress
that the purpose of the inquiry is only to gather infor-
mation, views, and comments from interested persons
for possible future proceedings, but not to adopt any
rules or policies, as such, in the particular proceeding.”
paged aie os al
As the Court of Appeals below observed, ‘‘ Against
these benefits [of new entry], the Commission carefully
2929 F.C.C.2d at 923-927 (Pet.App. 153a-160a).
39 Note 3 supra.
31 Notes 14-16 supra.
SAS Sa ARS MIII at ais Sih NRTA TE aS NE
4
3
| SAAD EAT RL PLS ROA ES Fe PETARE ELIE LOE ORT ETN
13
weighed possible adverse effects of competition upon
existing carriers and their services (29 F.C.C.2d at
910-14) [Pet. App. 130a-138a] before finally conclud-
ing that a general policy of new entry would serve
the public interest, convenience, and necessity.’’ *
NARUC’s principal contention, that new entry would
siphon off interstate revenues and earnings from the
telephone companies used to subsidize local exchange
service, was rejected by the Commission as ‘legally
dubious’’, since ‘‘[a]llocations cannot and should not :
be designed to artificially shift any part of the revenue é
requirement applicable to one jurisdiction into an- :
other.’ ** The fact finding inquiry into economic im-
plications and interrelationships looks to the future,
not to any reevaluation of the Commission’s decision i
in the Specialized Common Carrier Inquiry to author- ‘
ize the entry of new carriers into the field of special-
ized communications, and the inquiry is not designed
or constituted so as to Produce a reversal of the Com-
mission’s policy.
3. Finally, NARUC’s contention that the Court of
Appeals below was required to reverse the Commis-
sion’s decision because the Commission had failed to
consider the environmental impact of its policy under
NEPA is wholly without substance. The Court of
Appeals recognized that it could remand even though
the issue had not been raised before the Commission,
but it also recognized that any damage that might be
done at the review stage to NEPA interests was
‘‘problematical and, in any event, slight’; that
NARUC’s claim of environmental impact did not ap-
;
82 Note 3 supra, 513 F.2d at 1159 (Pet.App. 25a).
33 Note 3 supra, 31 F.C.C.2d at 1108.
— CHP DESAI NRT PR NEARY ONT IE AE RT TERE ATES LEE TTT YENI ES |
Rpene Sr hera” os ee rae
14
pear particularly substantial, since the basie question
was who would furnish the service (the new or the
established carriers), not whether it would be fur-
nished, or how much; and that a resolution of the
NEPA issue now would create great delay, waste, and
expense outweighing any benefit from reviewing the
NEPA question at this late stage.** The matter was
well within the Court’s discretion.
Significantly, despite the expressed concern of
NARUC with the environmental impact of microwave
operation, neither NARUC nor any Federal or State
agency, including those expressly charged with envi-
ronmental responsibilities, sought to challenge any of
the specialized carrier applications pending before the
administrative agency, where environmental consider-
ations can be weighed in the context of the specifie pro-
posals for tower height, radiated power, site location,
and other characteristics of the radio microwave sta-
tions to be constructed.
4, Contrary to NARUC’s contentions (pp. 14-15),
there are no issues presented here of great public im-
portance or great precedential significance. The entry
of the specialized carriers is unlikely to have any sig-
nificant impact on telephone revenues—in the last eal-
endar year, the total annual revenues of both the spe-
cialized and the domestic satellite carriers amounted
to approximately $15 million, or less than 5/100 of one
per cent of the $31.6 billion in total revenues of the
telephone companies.” As the Commission pointed out
34 Note 3 supra, 513 F.2d at 1167-1169.
5 Remarks by Walter R. Hinchman, Chief, Common Carrier
Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, before the 28th
Annual Conference of the International Communications Associ-
ation, San Francisco, California, May 16, 1975.
15
in its First Report and Order, even if the most san-
guine expectations of the new carriers were realized,
there is no reason to believe that there would be any
substantial diversion of telephone revenues, or any
significant adverse impact on telephone users, the in-
stallation of large capacity systems to meet growing
requirements, or the realization of declining unit
costs.*® The insignificance of the NEPA issue can be
seen from the circumstances that it did not occur to a
single party filing the 200 pleadings before the Com-
mission, and only to one of the petitioners for review;
that the Commission after comprehensive considera-
tion could see no need to establish an effective date be-
fore January 20, 1975; and that since the effective
date of the new rules, it has played no significant role
in the processing and grant of microwave radio appli-
cations.
The assertion of NARUC (p. 15) that the Commis-
sion’s decision will fundamentally alter the structure
of communications services to the public is without
foundation. As the Commission observed, ‘‘we see no
reason whatsoever to assume that the [specialized car-
rier] applications would divert all or even a substan-
tial portion of that comparatively small percentage of
existing and projected Bell System business that is
vulnerable to competition.’ ** The Commission’s deci-
sion implements a continuing policy to foster compe-
tition in communications where it would serve some
3699 F.C.C.2d at 912 (Pet.App. 83).
37 Note 3 supra, 29 F.C.C.2d at 912 (Pet.App. 133a).
4
ee eee eee
16
public benefit." It should be noted that the implica-
tion of NARUC’s position that the Bell System is the
chosen instrument of domestic communications was
also breached by the Commission’s decision to permit
competition in providing private line and even long
distance telephone service by domestic satellite car-
riers, without challenge by NARUC.”
The assertions of NARUC, as the sole petitioner be-
fore this Court, must be measured against its primary
interest in this litigation in promoting a policy of gen-
erating excess interstate earnings to be applied to sub-
sidize local exchange revenue requirements, although
the Commission has said that this proceeding is not the
appropriate forum to address that subject. To be
noted is the absence of other petitioners with a public
or private interest in the resolution of the proceeding,
including any Federal or State agency charged with
38 E.g., international record common carrier services, Mackay
Radio and Telegraph Co., 19 F.C.C. 1321, 1334 (1955), affirmed
RCA Communications v. FCC, 238 F.2d 24, 27-28 (D.C. Cir. 1956),
certiorari denied, 352 U.S. 1004 (1957); transatlantic cables,
AT&T (TAT-4), 37 F.C.C. 1151, 1158-1159 (1957); Domestic
Satellite Service, 42 F.C.C.2d 654 (1973); domestic mobile tele-
phone service, General Mobile Radio Service, 13 F.C.C. 1190,
1218 (1949); private microwave use, Allocation of Frequencies
Above 890 Me, 27 F.C.C. 359, 412 (1959); data processing, Reg-
ulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence
of Computer and Communication Service and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.
2d 267 (1971), reconsideration denied, 34 F.C.C.2d 577 (1972),
modified GTE Service Corp. v. United States, 474 F.2d 724 (2d
Cir. 1973).
39 Establishment of Domestic Communication-Satellite Facilities
by Nongovernmental Entities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844, reconsideration
granted in part, 38 F.C.C.2d 665 (1972) ; Network Project v. FCC,
511 F.2d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
4° Note 3 supra, 31 F.C.C.2d at 1108 (Pet.App. 192a-193a).
ae LORE FLAN LIETLE LI ET NTN, PNRM LE LEE PRL CY EEDA CNT, WO LMR RINE HF
3 »,
17
public interest responsibilities, the established carriers
themselves, including the Bell System, Western Union,
or independent telephone companies, or any communi-
cations users or other members of the public. It is
particularly noteworthy that although the standing of
NARUC was accepted by the Court of Appeals as the
representative of state regulatory agencies,” in two
states where specialized carriers have sought state cer-
tificates of convenience and necessity to provide intra-
state communications service, the Corporation Com-
mission of the State of Oklahoma“ and the Public
Utilities Commission of the State of California “ have
both granted such certificates, with conditions, on the
basis of the benefits to the public to be realized by the
entry of competing carriers in meeting the growing
demand for specialized communications services.
41 Note 3 supra, 513 F.2d at 1154-1155 (Pet.App. 16a-18a) ;
but see concurring opinion of Circuit Judge Wallace rejecting
this position, 513 F.2d at 1169-1171 (Pet.App. 45a).
42 In the Matter of the Application of United Video, Inc., a Cor-
poration, for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity to Operate
a Telephone Company to Serve the Territory Within the Corpo-
rate Limits of the Cities of Tulsa and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
Cause No. 24892 (Okla.Corp.Comm. Nov. 14, 1974), petition in
error pending (Okla.Sup.Ct. No. 48045). Southern Pacific is
the successor in interest to the specialized carrier facilities of
United Video, Ine.
43 Interim Opinion, Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Southern Pacific
Communications Co., Case No, 9728 (Cal.PUC Decision No. 84167,
March 4, 1975).
tale
FO EEE Rien ene RM RIT Qe RCH
18
CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
THORMUND A. MILLER
RicuHarp 8. Kopr
JAMES M. Tosin
One Market Street
San Francisco, Cal, 94105
HeErBeErt E. Forrest
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Attorneys for Respondent
Southern Pacific Communica-
tions Company
STEPTOE & JOHNSON
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Of Counsel
July 29, 1975
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