Appendix — C. N. S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc.
Supreme Court brief1975
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APPENDIX 1
2u the
Uniied States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 73-2073
C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc., Tuomas G.
Cours and Cayton Nassos,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., GIsELLE
STRAuUSBURGER, Guapys Lucas, Kimuis
Sates Company, Rospert W. Casey, and
NationaL Bank oF AusTIN,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
No. 72 C 2433
James B. Parsons, Judge.
Argued November 12, 1974 — Decided January 13, 1975
Before CastiE, Senior Circuit Judge, Stevens and
SprecHer, Circuit Judges.
SprecHer, Circuit Judge. The sole issue presented is
whether promissory notes delivered to a bank for loans
used to purchase the assets of a small business enterprise
constitute ‘‘securities’’ under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, investing the maker of the notes with a jurisdic-
tional basis for bringing suit in the federal courts.
App. 2
I
According to the complaint, the ‘‘Village Well’’ is a
coin-operated laundry and dry cleaning business located
in Justice, Illinois, which had been owned and operated
by defendants Giselle Strausburger, Gladys Lueas and
G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., in accordance with a license
agreement from defendants Robert W. Casey and Kimlis
Sales Company.
On January 20, 1972, we plaintiffs purchased the fix-
tures, merchandise, business and good will of the Village
Well from Strausburger, Lucas and G. & G., having given
Kimlis a promissory note for $5,000 as an earnest money
deposit. As part of the transaction, the plaintiffs also
(1) assumed a chattel mortgage in the amount of $73,-
515.26 on the fixtures, which mortgage was held by de-
fendant National Bank of Austin, (2) gave the Austin
Bank an ‘‘evidence of indebtedness’’ in like amount, (3)
borrowed an additional $20,000 from the Austin Bank
evidenced by a note secured by a junior chattel mortgage,
and (4) paid a portion of the non-specified purchase price
to Strausburger, Lucas and G. & G.
Plaintiffs alleged that from September through Decem-
ber 1971, defendants Strausburger, Lucas and Casey repre-
sented orally and in writing that the monthly sales of the
Village Well ranged from $4,500 to $5,000, that October
1971 sales were about $4,800, that November 1971 sales
were $5,700, that December 1971 sales would exceed those
of November, and that defendants displayed to plaintiffs
books and records purporting to reflect such sales. Plain-
tiffs further alleged that these representations were all
false and that the books and records failed to reveal accu-
rately the actual! sales.
The plaintiffs operated the business for approximately
four months, spending substantial sums in promoting the
business, suffering financial losses and borrowing addi-
App. 3
tional capital funds to carry on. On May 19, 1972, plain-
tiffs sent defendants a notice of rescission. Since May 28,
the Village Well has been operated by Casey and Kimlis.
Plaintiffs sought rescission of all agreements with de-
fendants, repayment of consideration paid and cancella-
tion of obligations assumed. Plaintiffs relied exclusively
for federal jurisdiction upon section 10(b) of the Seeuri-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j) and Rule 10b-5
thereunder (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).
All six defendants filed motions to dismiss on the ground
that the 1934 Act does not apply to this transaction and
The district court denied all motions on May 2, 1973,
but, on motions for reconsideration, vacated that order.
On September 26, 1973, the motions by all defendants to
dismiss were granted ‘‘for reasons stated in the record.’’
The record discloses that the court conciuded that a ‘*eom-
mercial’’ note, particularly one not subjected to further
trading, as distinguished from an ‘‘investment”’ note, is
not a security within the 1934 Act.
I
As we pointed out in Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.,
Inc., 463 F.2d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1009 (1972), the six basic federal securities acts each in-
cludes ‘‘any note’’ within its definition of ‘*security.’’?
? Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) ; Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C, § 78c(a) (10); Pub-
lic Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, §2a() (16), 15 U.S.C.
§79b(a) (16); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 303(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77ccc(1); Investment Company Act of 1940, §2(a) (36), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36); and Investment Advisors Act of 1940,
§ 202(a) (18), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a) (18).
NN AID
App. 4
However the 1933 Act exempts from registration, but not
from the antifraud provisions of that act, any note *‘ which
arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of
which have been or are to be used for current transactions,
and which has a maturity . . . not exceeding nine
months.’’? The 1934 Act excludes from the definition of
a ‘‘security,’’ ‘‘any note... which has a maturity at the
time of issuance’ of not exceeding nine months, exclusive
of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of
which is likewise Jimited.’’*
In Sanders, we held that promissory notes with a
maturity not exceeding nine months but offered to the
public as an investment are ‘‘securities’’ within the mean-
ing of the 1934 Act despite the broad implications of the
exception inasmuch as Congress obviously intended to
protect such investors against fraud. 463 F.2d at 1079-80.
We said:
In other words, when Congress spoke of notes with
a maturity not exceeding nine months, it meant com-
mercial paper, not investment securities. When a
prospective borrower approaches a bank for a loan
and gives his note in consideration for it, the bank
has purchased commercial paper. But a person who
seeks to invest his money and receives a note in re-
tu:n for it has not purchased commercial paper in
the usual sense. He has purchased a security invest-
ment.
Id. at 1080.
2 Section 3(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(3). For a discussion of
the “current transactions” concept, see Comment, The Commercial
Paper Market and the Securities Act, 39 U. Cut, L. Rev. 362, 387-
89 (1972). Moreover, the words “current transactions” twice used
by Congress in the exemption emphasize the immediate need for
funds by a borrower as opposed to long-term employment of funds
by an investor.
2 Section 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78&c(a) (10).
nes WREELEGES OMIT ERO SN
App. 5
In effect, we are now called upon to consider a situation
Which is the reverse of Sanders. In Sanders we applied
a congressional-intent-revealed-in-context approach as
against a literal-text-reading of ‘‘any note [with] a ma-
turity ... of not exceeding nine months’’ as those words
are used in the exemption portion of the security defini-
tion of the 1934 Act, in order to avoid the exemption in
the case where the short-term notes were offered to the
investing public intended by Congress to be protected.
Here we are asked to give the same context-over-text con-
sideration to ‘‘any note’’ as those words are used in the
security definition itself of the 1934 Act, in order to avoid
federal jurisdiction of transactions claimed to fall beyond
the protection intended by Congress in the enactment of
the securities laws.
Analysis immediately reveals, however, much more seri-
ous differences between the two situations than the super-
ficial analogy might lead one to believe. In Sanders, the
effect of the contextual interpretation led to the non-appli-
cation of an exemption and therefore to the inclusion of
a kind of instrument within the protection of the 1934 Act.
The effect of applying the same interpretation to the defi-
nition itself would lead to the exclusion of a type of in-
strument from the protection of the 1934 Act. When the
Supreme Court has spoken of construing federal securities
legislation ‘‘not technically and restrictively, but flexibly
to effectuate its remedial purposes,’’* it has been speak-
ing of expanding the reach of protection, not diminishing
it; of increasing the types of covered documents and trans-
actions, not of decreasing them; of avoiding more frauds,
not less.
* SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195
(1963).
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App. 6
The inherent difficulty in purporting to find that Con-
gress intended to limit the reach of federal jurisdiction
exercised through securities legislation when it used the
words ‘‘any note’’ is therefore compounded by the fact
that the Supreme Court was in the process of expanding
that jurisdiction when it searched for and expounded the
congressional intent behind the securities acts. Under
ihese circumstances it is understandable that courts have
been struggling to answer the question here: are the
securities acts invoked every time a person borrows money
from a bank and gives his promissory note in return?
Ill
In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-
51 (1943), the Supreme Court, after noting that the defen-
dants had invoked the ejusdem generis rule and the ez-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius maxim in interpreting
the definition of a security tnder the 1933 Act, said:
However well these rules may serve at times to aid
in deciphering legislative intent, they long have been
subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe
the details of an act in conformity with its dominat-
ing general purpose, will read text in the light of
context and will interpret text so far as the meaning
of the words ‘fairly permits so as to carry out in
particular cases the generally expressed legislative
policy.
Id.
In SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969),
the Court, citing Joiner, said:
The meaning of particular phrases must be deter-
mined in context. . . . Congress itself has cautioned
that the same words may take on a different colora-
tion in different sections of the securities laws; both
the 1933 and 1934 Acts preface their lists of general
BOF epee 1 tae
°° ACLS IOR. Sale ba OS ott PES vet vg Shah ‘ ONS eR NT AR hl St Ne A oe dp UK De Nd ed Pi A
App.7
definitions with the phrase ‘‘unless the context other-
wise requires.’’ 1933 Act, § 2, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C.
§$ 77b; 1934 Act, § 3, 48 Stat. 882, 15 U.S.C. § 78e.
Id. at 466.
“Finally, we are reminded that, in searching for the
meaning and scope of the word ‘security’ in the Act, form
should be disregarded for substance and the empharis
should be on economic reality. S.Z.C. vy. W. J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).’’ Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S.
332, 336 (1967). See also, Milnarik v. M-S Commodities,
Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 275-76 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
887 (1972).
Accordingly, we commence our analysis with the lan-
guage of the statutes.° In the 1933 Act, the opening words
of section 2 read (15 U.S.C. § 77b):
Sec. 2. When used in this title, unless the context
otherwise requires—
(1) the term ‘‘security’’ means any note....
The only difference in the 1934 Act is the immaterial
cne that nine other definitions intercede between the con-
textual proviso and the security definition (15 U.S.C.
3 78c):
Section 3. (a) When used in this title, unless the
context otherwise requires—
(10) The term ‘‘security’’ means any note....
5In interpreting the definition of a security in the 1934 Act, the
Supreme Court has sanctioned recourse to the 1933 Act. Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36, 338 (1967).
Erman
i ea PRLS ARS IE
al a ES TSS >
SR a cE EGE ek RETR IEE © NS AAR LOE BEDI ERO RNS AONE NEE TO AMELIA SAN aD AT CS FURAN AB
App. 8
Inasmuch as Congress specified the context-over-text
approach in both acts,* the next step is to discover what
‘‘context’’ applies in the circumstances of this case.
In Eason vy. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d
654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974), this
court rejected the purchaser-seller ‘‘standing’’ rule of the
Birnbaum case? in favor of an identification of persons
to whom the 1934 Act, and particularly section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, extended protection as members of the class
for whose special benefit the statute was enacted. In
Eason, Judge Stevens said:
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Commission
have all used the term ‘‘investors’’ to describe the
class of persons protected by Rule 10b-5.
* * *
®The American Law Institute’s tentative draft of the Federal
Securities Code (Professor Louis Loss, Reporter), retains the “con-
text” language, stating that “[t|he definitions . . . apply for pur-
poses of this Code and the rules thereunder unless the context re-
quires otherwise.” ALI Fep. Securities Cope § 201(a) (Tent.
Draft No. 1, April, 1972). The Comment to this section notes that
“ijt seems advisable not to risk an inference of intended rigidity
from deletion of this caveat, however redundant it may be under the
modern approach to statutory construction.” The Comment con-
tinues :
A good example of the text-context clash, still unresolved, is
the question whether the discounting of an ordinary promissory
note by either the maker or the payee is a “sale” of a “security”
to the bank... .
... [T]his problem does not lend itself to precise statutory
solution. Too much depends on highly variegated circumstances.
7 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
De RA ag OUT TR Da Rs EN ote erin ILRI TA, a an ts)
App. 9
The emphasis on the injured party’s status as an
investor indicates that the protection of the rule ex-
tends to persons who, in their capacity as investors,
suffer significant injury as a direct consequence of
fraud in connection with a securities transaction, even
though their participation in the transaction did not
involve either the purchase or the sale of a security.
Id. at 659.
Judge Stevens pointed out the language of section 10(b)
itself: §
It shall be unlawful for any person ... [t]o use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities ex-
change or any security not so registered, any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78] (emphasis added).
He concluded:
[1]n each case the plaintiff will have to demonstrate
membership in the ‘special class’? protected by Rule
10b-5 and injury as a direct consequence of the al-
leged violation.
* He also looked to language of Mr. Justice Douglas in his opin-
ion in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 10, 12-13 (1971), where reference was twice made to
the Rule 10b-5 protection against injury “as an investor.” It should
also be noted that the Senate Report accompanying what became
the 1933 Act stated that “[t|he purpose of this bill is to protect the
investing public and honest business.” S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 1 (1933). The Senate Report accompanying what became
the 1934 Act stated that section 10(b) “authorizes the Commission
... to prohibit or regulate . . . practices which it finds detrimental
to the interests of the investor.” S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 18 (1934).
AE oat Sa BRE EA PELL POL: aig AAD Gin ht 2 OE TO
App. 10
490 F.2d at 660.
The Eason test is applicable here in defining a security.
In SEC vy. C.M, Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1948),
the Supreme Court noted that:
In the Securities Act the term ‘‘security’’ was de-
fined to include by name or description many docu-
ments in which there is common trading for specula-
tion or investment ... such as notes....
Id, at 351 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court particularly considered the defini-
tion of ‘‘security’’ in the 1934 Act in Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967):
One of [the] central purposes [of the 1934 Act] is to
protect mvestors through the requirement of full dis-
closure by issuers of securities, and the definition of
security in § 3(a)(10) necessarily determines the
classes of investments and investors which will re-
ceive the Act’s protections,
Id. at 336 (emphasis added).
The ultimate question is whether the plaintiffs are
simply borrowers in a commercial transaction who are
not protected by the 1934 Act or investors in a securities
transaction who are protected.°
¢ IV
: . . .
: In one sense every lender of money is an investor since ,
: he places his money at risk in anticipation of a profit in
the form of interest. Also in a broad sense every investor
lends his money to a borrower who uses it for a price and
is expected to return it one day.
® Material misrepresentations were sufficiently pleaded and the
applicability of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 depends entirely upon
the definition of “security.”
rin rts eee SORT TORO INNER TIRE FERRO EER RAs aS PEERS ENTRAR LE Res
App. 11
On the other hand, the polarized extremes are concep-
tually identifiable: buying shares of the common stock
of a publicly-held corporation, where the impetus for the
transaction comes from the person with the money, is an
investment; borrowing money from a bank to finance the
purchase of an automobile, where the impetus for the
transaction comes from the person wo needs the money,
is a loan. In between is a gray area Which, in the absence
of further congressional indication of intent or Supreme
Court construction, has been and must be in the future
subjected to case-by-case treatment.
The Second Circuit held in Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey
Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971), that ‘‘notes is-
sued by one publicly owned company ¢o another publicly
owned company for $10,500,000, payable over a period of
20 years, in exchange for the assets of the latter easily
fall within the purview of the [1934] Act ....°”
&
After our decision in Sanders, supra, where we held
that notes with a maturity not exceeding nine months but
offered to the public as an investment were securities
under the 1934 Aci," the Second Circuit in Zeller v. Bogue
*9'The court refused to deal with the “hypothetical situation” of
whether “the issuance of notes in every private loan transaction”
comes within the scope of the 1934 Act.” 452 F.2d at 663.
11 $1,661,500 in notes were offered to and purchased by 42 in-
vestors. In addition, we relied upon Securities and Exchange Com-
mission’s Release No. 33-4412:
The legislative history of the [1933] Act makes clear that
section 3(a)(3) applies only to prime quality negotiable com-
mercial paper of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general
public, that is, paper used to facilitate well recognized types of
current operational business requirements and of a type eligible
for discounting by Federal Reserve banks.
26 Fed. Reg. 9159 (1961) (emphasis added).
ie a as NERD AAS RE RENEE ES PH PTT PR SN TN RE PI HONS IND a AE iNT ERS RE IARI
App. 12
Electric Manufacturing Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973), agreed with Sanders that
‘*the mere fact that a note has a maturity of less than nine
months does not take ... [it] out of Rule 10b-5, unless
. .. Lit] fits the general notion of ‘commercial paper’
....’ Id. at 800. In holding that a note issued by a parent
corporation to its subsidiary for loans by the subsidiary
in the amount of $315,310 to assist the parent’s operating
losses and deteriorating working capital position, was a
security, Judge Friendly sid:
It does not follow, however, that every transaction
. which involves promissory notes, whether of
less or more than nine months maturity, is within
Rule 10b-5. The Act is for the protection of investors,
and its provisions must be read accordingly ... .
[W]e see no reason to doubt that Beleo [subsidiary]
stood in the position of an investor, although perhaps
an involuntary one, with respect to Bouge [parent].
Id. (emphasis added).
The Third Cireuit held in Lino v. City Investing Co.,
487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973), that there was no federal
jurisdiction over material misstatements made in connec-
tion with Lino’s purchase from the franchiser of two
franchise licensing agreements, partially with cash and
partially with several promissory notes. Judge Hunter
said:
These were personal promissory notes issued by a
private party. There was no public offering of the
notes, and the issuer was the person claiming to be
defrauded. The notes were not procured for specula-
tion or investment, and there is no indication that
{the franchiser] was soliciting venture capital from
Lino.
App. 13
(The franchiser] was selling a certain contract right
to Lino, not buying his security. It simply lacks com-
mon sense to describe the transaction as [the fran-
chiser] purchasing . .. Lino’s security by paying him
the right to operate one of its Franchise Sales Cen-
ters.
Id. at 694-95.
The Fifth Circuit considered what it has called ‘‘the
commercial-investment dichotomy’’ in four recent cases.
In United States v. Rachal, 473 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (Sth
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 927 (1973), a criminal case
under the 1933 Act, the court approved an instruction
given by the trial court which provided that the exemp-
tion of short-term notes from the registration provisions
of the 1933 Act applied only to commercial not investment
paper (that is, the Sanders rationale).
In Bellah v. First National Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th
Cir. 1974), the court held that a promissory note of six-
months maturity, secured by a deed of trust on real prop-
erty, issued for a bank loan needed by the makers (hus-
band and wife) to aid them in the development of their
livestock business, was commercial paper and not invest-
ment paper and hence the nete and deed were not securi-
ties.”
In McClure v. Firs: National Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th
Cir. 1974), a one-year promissory note and a deed of
12 Judge Gewin articulated two possible effects of not applying
the commercial-investment dichotomy, which he saw as indicia of
congressional intent that it be applied: (1) subjection of ordinary
commercial loan transactions to the registration requirements of the
1933 Act “would inevitably wreak havoc on the commercial paper
market” and (2) complaints spawned by a commercial loan trans-
action should find recourse in state not federal courts. 495 F.2d at
1114.
= : a ot a> i .. RIMS . —
5 REEL LL TLE IE OTTER CE 2 ERR FRR ph Al 7 Se OR RUNES EM
App. 14
trust issued for a bank loan aileged to be needed to pay
the corporate obligations of a closely-held corporation,
were held not to be securities. Judge Roney analyzed
prior federal decisions and concluded:
The cases excluding certain notes from the coverage
of the Act generally involved underlying transactions
between payor and payee which were not of an invest-
ment nature.
* ¢* #
On the other hand, where notes have been deemed
securities within the meaning of the securities laws,
either of two factors, not present here, usually in-
dicated the investment overtones of the underlying
transactions. [The notes were either] offered to some
class of investors, [or] were ... acquired ... for
speculation or investment . . . [or the borrower ob-
tained! investment assets, directly or indirectly, in
exchange for its notes.*
Id. at 493-94.
18 Judge Roney also said:
We realize that our holding today that the Act does not ap-
ply to commercial notes of a longer duration than nine months,
taken with the decisions voiding the short-term exemption as
to investment paper, virtually writes that exemption out of the
law. On one hand, the Act covers all investment notes, no mat-
ter how short their maturity, because they are not encompassed
by the “any note” language of the exemption. On the other
hand, the Act does not cover any commercial notes, no matter
how long their maturity, because they fall outside the “any
note” definition of a security. Thus, the investment or commer-
cial nature of a note entirely controls the applicability of the
Act, depriving of all utility the exemption based on maturity-
length. The original scrivener of the definitional section may
well wonder what happened to his carefully drawn exemption
on the way to the courthouse, but if the judicial decisions do
not properly reflect the intent of Congress as to the coverage
of the Act, only that body can properly rectify the situation at
this point, if stare decisis is to apply and the Supreme Court
does not make some definitive decision contrary to the presently
decided cases.
497 F.2d at 494-95.
App. 15
Finally, the Fifth Cireuit held in SEC v. Continental
Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974), that
promissory notes with a maturity date of less than nine
months issued by a corporation in partial reimbursement
to its customers who had held open accounts when the
corporation’s trading in commodities futures options was
suspended by the California Commissioner of Corpora-
tions, were securities. Judge Gewin said:
[I]t is the character of the note, not its maturity date,
which determines coverage under both the registra-
tion provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The paramount concern in this inquiry is the na-
ture of the transaction in which the note is issued.
[T]he notes [here] were issued to rejuvenate and not
to liquidate the enterprise.
Once the resuscitative nature of the notes is estab-
lished, the conclusion is ineluctable that the notes were
investment and not commercial paper. Since revival
would inure to their benefit, recipients accepted the
notes with the hope of realizing a greater return on
their investments.
The commercial-investment dichotomy delineated to
some extent in the foregoing courts of appeals cases has
been further demarcated in recent district court cases:
Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot, 379 F. Supp. 250 (N.D.
PEEL EE PS SEI ONTO Gk BS Oe a ae a ae Br
App. 16
Ill. 1974) (series of short-term notes issued by travel
agency for bank loan to pay off current debts held not to
be securities); Joseph v. Norman’s Health Club, Inc., 336
F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (promissory notes given
for lifetime membership in health clubs held not to be
securities); City National Bank v. Vanderboom, 290 F.
Supp. 592, 608 (W.D. Ark. 1968), a/f’d, 422 F.2d 221 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970) (notes given by
corporate organizers for bank loans to purchase corpo-
ration’s capital stock held not to be securities).
A comprehensive and perceptive student comment sug-
gests a long list of possible criteria to distinguish ordi-
nary commercial notes not protected by the act from in-
vestment notes or investment securities protected by the
act: (1) how is the instrument characterized in the busi-
ness community? (2) how are the proceeds to be used (if
for consumer goods or particular business goods or ser-
vices—not covered, but if for general financing of bor-
rower’s enterprise—covered)? (3) extent of reliance on
efforts of others (placing funds at great risk, giving note
payee extensive collateral rights, making repayment of
funds contingent upon some event, all tend to indicate
security rather than loan); (4) number of notes issued,
number of payees, dollar amount of transaction; (5) pay-
able on demand or if payable at fixed time, how long ‘is
the time between issuance and maturity? and (6) char-
acterization of notes on relevant financial statements.
Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of ‘‘Security”’
Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note Is a Note
Is a Note? 52 Nes. L. Rev. 478, 510-24 (1973).
bic aeeial HOS Eee ea a al a id
ED a “nal A
App. 17
These criteria are helpful but each case appears to re-
quire its own decision based upon its own facts."
The American Law Institute’s tentative draft of the
Federal Securities Code includes not only a definition of
**security’’ but also sets forth certain items which are not
included in the term ‘‘security’’ and hence are not sub-
ject to the registration, antifraud or other provisions.
One of the exclusions is ‘‘a note or other evidence of in-
debtedness issued in a mercantile transaction.’’ ALI Fen.
Securities Cove § 297(b)(3) (Reporter’s Revision of Text
of Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-3, Oct. 1974). However the term
‘‘mercantile transaction’’ is not defined.
The tentative code would exempt from registration re-
quirements ‘‘commercial paper with a denomination of
at least $100,000.’’ Jd. § 301(1). ‘‘Commercial paper’’ is
defined as
14In Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973), the
court noted:
Neither party has been able to suggest a “test” to us that
would aid in determining whether there has been a purchase
or sale of securities when a personal promissory note is involved.
Each assures us that wherever the line is, he is on the safe
side of it. The cases cited previously suggest that transactions
involving a corporation’s notes should be treated differently in
some instances than similar transactions involving an individ-
ual’s notes.
* * *
But we do not have to rule on that distinction now. Nor are
we determining that in other circumstances transactions involv-
ing personal notes do not constitute the purchase or sale of
securities. The courts will have to consider the complete con-
text of each transaction in making their determinations.
Id. at 696 n.15.
pee iriscmoscose: SOMES 5 SEATED, TC SE YY CRISES TRE PET AT
App. 18
(a) a note or banker’s or trade acceptance that is
payable on demand or matures or is renewed for not
more than nine months, exclusive of days of grace,
after the date of issue or renewal, or (b) any other
instrument or interest of primarily a mercantile char-
acter that the Commission designates by rule.
Id. § 216A.
Again, there is no definition of ‘‘mercantile character.’’
So we are left ultimately with the necessity for a case-by-
case factual determination.”
V
Although we have gone into what we believe is the
congressional and Supreme Court basis for the commer-
cial-investment dichotomy at some length in the hope that
prospective litigants in this circuit may be enlightened as
to its possible parameters, the application of the rule is
not difficult in this case.
1° The conclusion of the authors of one analysis (Lipton and Katz,
“Notes” Are (Are Not?) Always Securitics—A Review, 29 Bus.
Law. 861 (1974)) is:
Not every note is a security. The commercial context of the
underlying transaction has to be evaluated. Notes issued for
personal loans and consumer installment purchases are not
securities. Notes that are issued for investments and business
acquisitions as well as commercial paper sold outside the normal
institutional market are securities. The middle ground has been
narrowed, but will still from time to time create a problem. The
courts have seen the impact of the open “floodgates” in other
areas and should pay heed to the legislative intent and policy
considerations discussed above. The federal securities laws are
not the appropriate vehicle for consumer protection on install-
ment sales.
Id. at 866.
¥ GRAS IOI REEA LER RLO LETS Sa PIE YT IIS PIG EEE RAEN IN ROI NLP MO ETSI. INET, My oy
Fu
App. 19
Three promissory notes were involved in the present
transaction. The $20,000 note secured by a chattel mort-
gage was given to the National Bank of Austin as evi-
dence of a loan. The $73,515.26 note was given to the
Austin Bank upon the assumption by the makers of a
pre-existing chattel mortgage on the fixtures of the coin-
operated laundry and dry cleaning business which the
makers purchased. The complaint did not have attached
thereto a copy of either note, which would have seemed
a prudent procedure inasmuch as jurisdiction is depen-
dent upon them, but in any event nothing alleged in the
complaint indicated that these two notes represent any-
thing beyond the borrowing of money to make partial pay-
ment upon the purchase of the assets of a business.
Nothing alleged in the complaint indicated in any way
that the bank was an investor in the business or a co-
partner in the enterprise. The impetus for the transac-
tion appears to have come from the borrowers who needed
cash to complete the purchase. There is no allegation that
the bank solicited the plaintiffs to interest them in an
investment. The business enterprise involved was to be
operated by the plaintiffs, not by the bank or by the de-
fendants as an investment for the plaintiffs..° The com-
plaint was silent as to any of the factors which conceivably
might tend to transform an ordinary commercial loan into
an investment security.
The third note for $5,000 was an earnest money deposit
subsequentiy redeemed. This note served for a time as a
16 Paragraph 18 of the complaint alleged: ‘Plaintiffs began oper-
ating the Village Well on or about January 18, 1972 and continued
to operate said business for approximately four months.”
App. 20
cash substitute. Since the security definition of the 1934
Act ‘‘shall not include currency,’’’? this document does
not confer jurisdiction.
Inasmuch as no securities were involved, this transac-
tion is not subject to the 1934 Act or Rule 10b-5 and the
district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter.
AFFIRMED.
A true Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
1715 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10).
nh i A Somat
4s
App. 21
APPENDIX 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
C.N.S. EN'TERPRISES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
G & G ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
No. 72 C 2433
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
before
HON. JAMES B. PARSONS
Judge
September 26, 1973
3:45 o’clock, p.m.
The Court: Well, gentlemen, I have reviewed my own
decision in this matter which was rendered on May 2nd,
1973 recently in the light of research which was required
of me in other cases, and out of the clear sky and without
even having had the benefit of these arguments this after-
noon, concluded that I must have been in error because
of the case restriction placed upon instruments which are
the subject matter of litigation under the Securities Ex-
change Act both of 1933 and the one of 1934, that seek to
eause the parties and the litigation to comply with the
intent of Congress at the time of the enactment of the
statutes.
Qpptenesmmenainnes PO aermct ek ARTI RI BOE A AAEM ONT NS Ae AD Ms
2
tre
<u
SSE RT BETES
ts
Ste MS
SENDS
a
Bivins
App. 22
The statutes were enacted for the purpose of control-
ling and regulating the dealing in securities as such deal-
ing is commonly referred to as the engaging in purchase
and sale of stock by the public, for the purpose of making
money out of the purchase and the sale of the stock or
the purchase and sale of the security, and not for the pur-
pose of making money out of the security itself.
There is a very narrow difference in what I have said
between the two types of purposes. That was brought to
my attention by the necessity of having to distinguish
among those securities which are regulated by the SEC
in which some are called commercial and some are called
investment securities. There is a difference even within
those securities which are regulated by SEC between com-
mercial paper and investment paper.
In those securities so regulated, commercial paper is
that which is bought and discounted on sale for the pur-
pose of sale and making of the money out of the dealing
in the paper on short-term; where that that is bought for
investment purposes is bought for the purpose of holding
it for a substantial period of time.
I was thrown off when re-reading Sanders, which is
the Seventh Circuit’s last pronouncement, by the utiliza-
tion of its very fine judge of the Seventh Circuit, Judge
Sprecher, who is good in this field, of the language of
commercial paper as against investment paper. He says
when Congress spoke of notes with a maturity not exceed-
ing nine months it meant commercial paper, not invest-
ment securities, and he said that, ‘‘When a person who
seeks to invest his money and receives a note in return
for it, he has not purchased commercial paper in the usual
sense, he has purchased a security investment.”’
A CR, CRUE TEL PACE lier Fd 6 RMI Si
4
App. 23
Now, this is a utilization of the term which <; different
from that with relation to the situation which we find here
but, nevertheless, he does reflect in his footnotes the ex-
cellent analysis of the acts und of the limitations of the
applications of the acts found in Professor Loss’ works
on securities excliange, Professor Loss of Harvard Uni-
versity, where he says, and tries to insist, that neither of
the acts intended to include the short-term type of notes
that are of the kind which were specifically exempt by the
regulations under the Securities Act, Section 3(a)(3).
{ am convinced that beginning with that paragraph in
my opinion of May 2nd wherein I said, ‘‘ However, although
defendants’ contention is well-stated, I find that the prom-
issory notes involved in this case constituted securities
within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934—”’ et cetera, and quoted from the provision of Section
78(c)(10) of that act, which was that any note—“security”’
meant ‘fany note, stock, treasury stock, bonds, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing
agreement, or any oil, gas or other mineral royalty or
lease, any collateral trust certificate, any reorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit for
a security, or in general any instrument commonly known
as a security.’’
Tt is true that Congress sought to broaden it to the ex-
tent that it might include any type of investment where
the welfare of the public might be injured by transactions
by persons having inside knowledge while the public is
engaged in the buying and selling for its own profit of
securities, I am now of the opinion, and very definitely
of the opinion, that even the Skylab case does not ask
that I go that far as to include in a security to be covered
by the Securities Exchange Act the ordinary day-to-day
App. 24
note, promissory note, given in return for the lending of
money, where neither the giver nor the lender has any
interest in commercial or investment paper in which there
is a public interest because the institution or the paper
itself is addressed to public interests.
I am convinced that a promissory note given by an
ordinary borrower, such as you or I, to an ordinary lender
such as these defendants or such as the Austin Bank, in
the ordinary case such as this where the borrower says,
‘*I would like to have you finance, Mr. Bank, me in the
purchase of an automobile or finance me in the purchase
of a washing automat’’ or ‘‘finance me in the purchase
of a grocery store’’ or ‘‘finance me in the purchase of a
home’’—does not constitute a security in the sense that
the lender would be an investor in the public domain in
the enterprise of a borrower who himself seeks investment
in the public domain.
The investor, whether or not he or it has any control
over the enterprise, joins the enterprise in one sense or
another and contemplates that the earnings from his in-
vestment will reflect the fortunes of the enterprise.
The lender never considers himself nor the equity he
retains in the money that is lent a pari of the enterprise
of the borrower; he merely looks to the collateral, if there
be collateral, or, if there be none, to the integrity of the
borrower, not the enterprise for assurance that his loan
will return to him and that interest will be paid to him.
It is, as counsel for Kimless and Casey has indicated,
the difference between the borrower and lender where the
borrower seeks by his borrowing merely the obtaining of
money and the lender from his lending merely the inter-
est to be gained from the lending, and where neither is
4
&
fis barat Lael Bie aa tS ete
2 ae Nea EN ae a a Rif OER nM, EERE SIE NAS Ee Mt ee
App. 25
engaged in the business of making money »ut of borrowing
or lending or the sale of the things that were borrowed
or lent.
It is, indeed, as he indicated, the difference between the
borrowing here from Austin Bank by these two women,
for which they gave a promissory note, and the selling
by a lending institution at discount of hundreds or thou-
sands of the notes that it receives in return for loans that
it makes.
We do have such institutions such as Commercial Credit
Corporation, which engages in lending on small-scale
amounts from fifty to five hundred or—now I think it is
up to two thousand dollars—and those notes it then sells
at discount to larger institutions and, if they be long-term
notes, the larger institutions must determine whether or
not they will buy them at discount or take them on face
value and keep them for the interest, or buy them at lesser
discounts and keep them for longer periods of time.
In those transactions they are indeed engaged with the
buying and selling of securities even though they are buy-
ing and selling promissory notes, and I feel very sure that
those would come within the control of the Securities Ex-
change Act.
But if, on the other hand, I were to go and continue as
I did on May 2nd in this, I believe properly I would be
reversed for properly I would be wrong, and, further, I
would believe that it was not the intent of Congress that
each of the five of us be himself constantly under the sur-
veillance of the Securities Exchange Commissior as day-
to-day we walk in and out of our bank and give a note,
either secured or not secured, other than by our signature,
in return for the lend of money, which note sometimes we
renew every 90 days, but which notes do not constitute
App. 26
an investment of the lender in our businesses, our enter-
prises, our affairs, as indeed I think the situation is in
the case before me.
For these reasons, for the reasons set forth in the reci-
tation here to the record of counsel for the defendants
today, I apologize for my having gone off base on May
2nd, I grant the motion to reconsider, I have reconsidered
and, upon such reconsideration, 1 determine that the mo-
tions to dismiss of the defendants should be allowed, and
it is so ordered, adjudged and decreed.
CERTIFICATE
I Hereby Certify that I reported in shorthand the pro-
ceedings had in the above-entitled cause before the Hon.
James B. Parsons, one of the Judges of said Court, on
September 26, 1973, and that the foregoing transcript is
a true, correct and complete transcript of a portion of
my original shorthand notes so made as aforesaid.
/s/ Joseph R. Betz
Joseph R. Betz, Official Court Reporter
United States District Court
Northern District of [llinois
Eastern Division
a EE PRE ENE ELUENT
App. 27
APPENDIX 3
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
C.N.S. ENTERPRISES INC., THOMAS G. COULES
and CLAYTON NASSOS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
G. & G. ENTERPRISES INC., GISELLE STRAUSBUR-
GER, GLADYS LUCAS, KIMLIS SALES COMPANY,
ROBERT W. CASEY, and NATIONAL BANK
OF AUSTIN,
Defendants.
No. 72 C 2433
COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs C.N.S. Enterprises Inc., Thomas G. Coules
and Clayton Nasses complain of defendants G. & G. En-
terprises Inc., Giselle Strausburger, Gladys Lucas, Kimlis
Sales Company, Robert W. Casey, and National Bank of
Austin as follows:
1. This action is brought to redress violations by cer-
tain defendants of Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78), and of Rule 10b-5 of
the General Rules and Regulations promulgated there-
under by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17
C.F.R. § 240 10b-5. The jurisdiction of this Court is based
upon Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
App. 28
2. Plaintiff C.N.S. Enterprises Ine. (hereinafter ‘C.
N.S.’’) is an Illinois corporation. Plairtiff Thomas G.
Coules (hereinafter ‘‘Coules’’) is a resident of I[linois
and is and at all times pertinent hereto has been an officer
and director of C.N.S. Plaintiff Clayton Nassos (herein-
after ‘‘Nassos’’) is a resident of Illinois and is and at all
times pertinent hereto has been an officer and director of
C.N.S.
3. Defendant Kimlis Sales Company (hereinafter
Kimlis) is an Illinois corporation with its principal place
of business in Chicago, Illinois.
4. Defendant Robert W. Casey (hereinafter ‘‘Casey’’)
is and at all times pertinent hereto has been an officer and
director of Kimlis.
5. Defendant G. & G. Enterprises Ine. (hereinafter
““G. & G.’’) is an Illinois corporation with its principal
place of business in Hinsdale, Lllinois.
6. Defendant Giselle Strausburger (hereinafter
‘*Strausburger’’) is and at all times pertinent hereto has
been an owner, officer and director of G. & G.
7. Defendant Gladys Lucas (hereinafter ‘‘Lucas’’) is
and at all times pertinent hereto has been an owner, offi-
cer and director of G. & G.
8. Defendant National Bank of Austin (hereinafter
‘*Austin’’) is a national bank with its principal place of
business in Chicago, Illinois. Austin is joined as a de-
fendant pursuant to Rule 19(a)(1) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, because in its absence complete relief
eannot be accorded among the remaining parties.
9. All of the transactions and the violations of Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 herein-
after alleged occurred in this district.
App. 29
10. Commencing at some time prior to November,
1971, defendants G. & G., Strausburger, Lucas, Kimlis and
Casey instituted a program to find a purchaser and opera-
tor for the coin-operated laundry and dry cleaning busi-
ness known as the Village Well of Justice (hereinafter
‘Village Well’’), located at 8501 South Cork Avenue,
Justice, Illinois. At said time the Village Well was owned
and operated by defendants Strausburger, Lucas and
G. & G. in accordance with a license agreement between
and among said defendants and defendants Kimlis and
Casey.
11. In September, 1971, defendant Casey contacted
plaintiffs and informed them that the Village Well was
for sale and that he thought its purchase would be a profit-
able investment for plaintiffs.
12. On or about January 20, 1972 plaintiff C.N.S. pur-
chased trom defendants G. & G., Strausburger and Lucas
the fixtures, merchandise, business and good will of the
Village Well.
13. In connection with the purchase and as a part of
the purchase price plaintiffs were required to and did
perform the following acts:
(a) Assumed a chattel mortgage in the amount of
$73,515.26 on the fixtures being sold, which was held
by defendant Austin and executed an evidence of in-
debtedness to defendant Austin in the amount of
$73,515.26.
(b) Plaintiff C.N.S. transmitted to and subsequent-
ly redeemed from defendant Kimli§ a promissory
note in the amount of $5,000.00 (said jiromissory note
constituted an earnest money deposit).
a PRL ELAS LIT RE REINS: FOSSA Ce OES
App. 30
(ec) Entered into a junior chattel mortgage with
defendant Austin in the amount of $20,000.00 and exe-
cuted an evidence of indebtedness to defendant Austin
in like amount.
(d) Paid a portion of the purchase price to de-
fendants Strausburger, Lucas and G. & G. in cash.
14. In connection with plaintiffs’ purchase as afore-
said, the defendants (with the exception of defendant
Austin) conspired with each other to violate, and each of
them did violate Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j, and clauses (1), (2) and
(3) of Rule 10b-5 of the General Rules and Regulations
promulgated thereunder by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 1 C.F.R. § 240 10b-5, by employing a devise,
scheme or artifice to defraud, by making untrue statements
of material facts and omitting to state material facts neces-
sary to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made not misleading’
and by engaging in an act, practice or course of business
which operated as a fraud or deceit upon plaintiffs. Such
violations were effected by use of instrumentalities of in-
terstate commerce.
15. Between September, 1971, and January 20, 1972
the following statements and representations of material
facts were made to plaintiffs by certain defendants, acting
on behalf of all of the defendants pursuant to their con-
spiracy :
(a) In September, 1971, defendant Casey orally
represented that the Village Well had been doing ap-
proximately $4,500.00 in sales per month.
(b) At various times in October and November
defendants Lucas and Strausburger orally represented
that the Village Well transacted monthly sales of be-
tween $4,800.00 and $5,500.00 and that said sales had
been progressively increasing.
App. 31
(c) On or about November 29, 1971 defendants
G. & G., Lucas and Strausburger represented in writ-
ing that in October, 1971, the Village Well had trans-
acted approximately $4,800.00 in sales (plus or minus
a variation of 5%).
(d) In December, 1971, defendants Strausburger,
Lucas and Casey represented orally and in writing
that sales at the Village Well in November, 1971
amounted to $5,700.00.
(ec) In December, 1971, defendants Strausburger
and Lucas orally represented that the sales at the
Village Well for the month of December, 1971, were
exceeding and would exceed those of November, 1971.
(f) At various times from October, 1971, to Jan-
uary, 1972, defendants Strausburger and Lucas dis-
played to plaintiffs books and records which purported
to reflect sales at the Village Well.
16. In fact the statements and representations as to
material facts set forth in paragraph 15 hereof were un-
true, or defendants omitted to state material facts neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, in that:
(a) As of September, 1971, the Village Well was
not realizing sales of $4,500.00 per month.
‘b) The sales at the Village Well never amounted
to as much as $4,800.00.
(ce) The Village Well had not transacted within
five percent (5%) of $4,800.00 in sales in the month
of October, 1971. In the alternative defendants Straus-
burger and Lucas failed to inform plaintiffs that in
computing the total sales for the Village Well in Oc-
tober, 1971 as $4,800.00 (plus or minus five percent),
they included income due to the Village Well for dry
cleaning work done by the Village Well from a Down-
ers Grove laundromat operated by said defendants.
—_—— TEESE OIE EI RE IR Aitio DURR ag STRE RECNTRS
ST
App. 32
(d) The sales at the Village Well in November,
1971 were substantially less than $5,700.00.
(e) The sales at the Village Well in December,
1971 did not exceed those of November, 1971.
(f{) The books and records displayed to plaintiffs
failed to accurately reveal the sales at the Village
Well.
17. Defendants knew or should have known the material
facts set forth in paragraph 16 but they failed to state
those material facts to plaintiffs.
18. Plaintiffs began operating the Village Well on or
about January 18, 1972 and continued to operate said busi-
ness for approximately four months.
19. During the period of time in which plaintiffs operat-
ed the Village Well, they spent substantial sums of money
in promoting its business. Despite that fact, the monthly
sales at the Village Weil never approached the total
monthly sales as previously represented by the defen-
dants.
20. Because the total sales at the Village Well did not
approach the totals previously represented by defendants,
plaintiffs continued to suffer financial losses from the
operation of the Village Well and were required to borrow
additional capital funds from defendants Casey and Kimlis
in order to offset the operating losses.
21. On or about May 19, 1972 plaintiffs sent a Notice of
Rescission to defendants. (A copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit A.) (i
22. Continually since May 28, 1972 the Village Well
has been operated by defendants Casey and Kimlis.
23. By reason of the wrongful conduct of defendants,
plaintiffs have been damaged by loss of the use of the con-
sideration paid to defendants Strausburger and Lueas for
the Village Well, by being required to borrow sums of
App. 33
money from and become personally indebted to defendant
Austin, by being required to borrow additional sums of
money and become indebted to defendants Casey and Kim-
lis, and by being required to bear significant financial losses
in the operation of the Village Well.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray the Court to enter a
judgment in their favor as follows:
(a) Rescinding plaintiffs’ purchase of the Village
Well and all other related agreements, contracts and
obligations, requiring defendants G. & G., Strausbur-
ger and Lucas to pay plaintiffs all of the consideration
which plaintiffs paid for the Village Well, cancelling
all obligations assumed by plaintiffs as a result of
said purchase, and requiring defendants G. & G.,
Strausburger and Lucas to reassume all of said obli-
gations, including the lease on the premises, all agree-
ments, lines of credit and other obligations with de-
fendant Kimlis, and all notes and loans with defen-
dant Austin,
(b) In the alternative adjudging defendants (with
the exception of defendant Austin) jointly and several-
ly liable to plaintiffs for the full amount of plaintiffs’
damages.
(c) For their costs in this action.
(d) For such other and further relief as may be
just.
Edward H. Hatton
Russell J. Hoover
Jonathan T. Howe
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Jenner & Block
135 South LaSalle
Chieago, Illinois 60603
641-6060
— BOE EE aden RIP TROLL FRE REZ IR IEG ONG RE IELTS F GPRS SER, IER TE VIET TE WEB TLS
aoa eh
i a dat Sead Bike ae
App. 34
EXHIBIT A
NOTICE OF RESCISSION
TO: G&G Enterprises, Ine.
108 Kast Ogden Avenue
Hinsdale, Llinois
Justice Village Market
2740 Maple Avenue
Downers Grove, Illinois
National Bank of Austin
5645 West Lake Street
Chicago, Llinois 60644
Kimlis Sales Company
5145 South Ashland Avenue
Chicago, Illinois
Ms. Giselle Strausburger
Ms. Gladys Lucas
108 East Ogden Avenue
Hinsdale, Lllinois
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that C.N.S. Enterprises,
Ine., an Illinois corporation, and Thomas C. Coulis and
Clayton Nassas (‘‘Purchasers’’) do hereby tender notice
of the rescission of the agreement entered into on No-
veraber 29, 1971 with the G & G Enterprises, Ms. Straus-
burger and Ms. Lucas (‘‘Sellers’’) and of the bulk sale
of all fixtures, merchandise, business and good will of the
operation known as the Village Well of Justice, located
at 8901 South Court Avenue, Justice, Illinois, and all other
related agreements, contracts, and obligations, retroactive
to the 29th day of November, 1971, because of the material
breach and fraudulent misrepresentatiou of Sellers in the
inducement to Purchasers to enter into said agreement
and purchase.
SEE RRS AG IN OES ER a Ia ee SPL RE RE LOLS ALAIN ONE ty PAOD ee acme :
App. 35
Furthermore, you are hereby tendered all of said fix-
tures, merchandise, business and good will and all obliga-
tions and other agreements which have come into effect
since November 29, 1971, arising out of the operations of
said business. Effective the close of business, May 28,
1972, Purchaser shall tender back the above described
property, and disclaims all responsibility thereafter.
Demand is hereby made for the immediate return of
all moneys paid to Sellers by Purchasers, and the cancel-
lation of all obligations assumed by Purchasers and the
reassumption of said obligations by Sellers, including but
not limited to the lease on the premises, all agreements,
lines of credit and other obligations with Kimlis Sales
Company arising out of the aforementioned agreement,
and all notes and loans with the National Bank of Austin
and otherwise.
C.N.S. Enterprises, Ine.
Thomas C. Coulis
Clayton Nassas
By Tom Coulis
Dated: May 19, 1972.
ee es
sh
_ se rear
mio ea Re Se
ECTS ERS
PDAS
PVR Rite dad Gade SK pas aa lk ate PR RS noe PS RTS
J oe recnadt Fa.
feiss
Be RG
ae
haa
App. 36
APPENDIX 4
Statutes and Regulations Involved
Section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. § 78¢) provides in pertinent part:
‘“‘(a) When used in this chapter, unless the con-
text otherwise requires—
* * *
(10) The term ‘security’ means any note.. .’’
Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. § 78}) states in pertinent part:
“Tt shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce or of the mails .
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security ... any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission (17
C.F.R. § 240-10b-5) states:
‘*It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to
defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading or,
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.’’
LILLE LOL AIGA LOLA (0° ENG OL BLOT OO RG
De ih DR PEF
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