Appendix — C. N. S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1975

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APPENDIX 1

2u the

Uniied States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 73-2073

C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc., Tuomas G.

Cours and Cayton Nassos,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., GIsELLE

STRAuUSBURGER, Guapys Lucas, Kimuis

Sates Company, Rospert W. Casey, and

NationaL Bank oF AusTIN,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 72 C 2433

James B. Parsons, Judge.

Argued November 12, 1974 — Decided January 13, 1975

Before CastiE, Senior Circuit Judge, Stevens and

SprecHer, Circuit Judges.

SprecHer, Circuit Judge. The sole issue presented is

whether promissory notes delivered to a bank for loans

used to purchase the assets of a small business enterprise

constitute ‘‘securities’’ under the Securities Exchange Act

of 1934, investing the maker of the notes with a jurisdic-

tional basis for bringing suit in the federal courts.

App. 2

I

According to the complaint, the ‘‘Village Well’’ is a

coin-operated laundry and dry cleaning business located

in Justice, Illinois, which had been owned and operated

by defendants Giselle Strausburger, Gladys Lueas and

G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., in accordance with a license

agreement from defendants Robert W. Casey and Kimlis

Sales Company.

On January 20, 1972, we plaintiffs purchased the fix-

tures, merchandise, business and good will of the Village

Well from Strausburger, Lucas and G. & G., having given

Kimlis a promissory note for $5,000 as an earnest money

deposit. As part of the transaction, the plaintiffs also

(1) assumed a chattel mortgage in the amount of $73,-

515.26 on the fixtures, which mortgage was held by de-

fendant National Bank of Austin, (2) gave the Austin

Bank an ‘‘evidence of indebtedness’’ in like amount, (3)

borrowed an additional $20,000 from the Austin Bank

evidenced by a note secured by a junior chattel mortgage,

and (4) paid a portion of the non-specified purchase price

to Strausburger, Lucas and G. & G.

Plaintiffs alleged that from September through Decem-

ber 1971, defendants Strausburger, Lucas and Casey repre-

sented orally and in writing that the monthly sales of the

Village Well ranged from $4,500 to $5,000, that October

1971 sales were about $4,800, that November 1971 sales

were $5,700, that December 1971 sales would exceed those

of November, and that defendants displayed to plaintiffs

books and records purporting to reflect such sales. Plain-

tiffs further alleged that these representations were all

false and that the books and records failed to reveal accu-

rately the actual! sales.

The plaintiffs operated the business for approximately

four months, spending substantial sums in promoting the

business, suffering financial losses and borrowing addi-

App. 3

tional capital funds to carry on. On May 19, 1972, plain-

tiffs sent defendants a notice of rescission. Since May 28,

the Village Well has been operated by Casey and Kimlis.

Plaintiffs sought rescission of all agreements with de-

fendants, repayment of consideration paid and cancella-

tion of obligations assumed. Plaintiffs relied exclusively

for federal jurisdiction upon section 10(b) of the Seeuri-

ties Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j) and Rule 10b-5

thereunder (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).

All six defendants filed motions to dismiss on the ground

that the 1934 Act does not apply to this transaction and

The district court denied all motions on May 2, 1973,

but, on motions for reconsideration, vacated that order.

On September 26, 1973, the motions by all defendants to

dismiss were granted ‘‘for reasons stated in the record.’’

The record discloses that the court conciuded that a ‘*eom-

mercial’’ note, particularly one not subjected to further

trading, as distinguished from an ‘‘investment”’ note, is

not a security within the 1934 Act.

I

As we pointed out in Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.,

Inc., 463 F.2d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 409 U.S.

1009 (1972), the six basic federal securities acts each in-

cludes ‘‘any note’’ within its definition of ‘*security.’’?

? Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) ; Securities

Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C, § 78c(a) (10); Pub-

lic Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, §2a() (16), 15 U.S.C.

§79b(a) (16); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 303(1), 15 U.S.C.

§ 77ccc(1); Investment Company Act of 1940, §2(a) (36), 15

U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36); and Investment Advisors Act of 1940,

§ 202(a) (18), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a) (18).

NN AID

App. 4

However the 1933 Act exempts from registration, but not

from the antifraud provisions of that act, any note *‘ which

arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of

which have been or are to be used for current transactions,

and which has a maturity . . . not exceeding nine

months.’’? The 1934 Act excludes from the definition of

a ‘‘security,’’ ‘‘any note... which has a maturity at the

time of issuance’ of not exceeding nine months, exclusive

of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of

which is likewise Jimited.’’*

In Sanders, we held that promissory notes with a

maturity not exceeding nine months but offered to the

public as an investment are ‘‘securities’’ within the mean-

ing of the 1934 Act despite the broad implications of the

exception inasmuch as Congress obviously intended to

protect such investors against fraud. 463 F.2d at 1079-80.

We said:

In other words, when Congress spoke of notes with

a maturity not exceeding nine months, it meant com-

mercial paper, not investment securities. When a

prospective borrower approaches a bank for a loan

and gives his note in consideration for it, the bank

has purchased commercial paper. But a person who

seeks to invest his money and receives a note in re-

tu:n for it has not purchased commercial paper in

the usual sense. He has purchased a security invest-

ment.

Id. at 1080.

2 Section 3(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(3). For a discussion of

the “current transactions” concept, see Comment, The Commercial

Paper Market and the Securities Act, 39 U. Cut, L. Rev. 362, 387-

89 (1972). Moreover, the words “current transactions” twice used

by Congress in the exemption emphasize the immediate need for

funds by a borrower as opposed to long-term employment of funds

by an investor.

2 Section 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78&c(a) (10).

nes WREELEGES OMIT ERO SN

App. 5

In effect, we are now called upon to consider a situation

Which is the reverse of Sanders. In Sanders we applied

a congressional-intent-revealed-in-context approach as

against a literal-text-reading of ‘‘any note [with] a ma-

turity ... of not exceeding nine months’’ as those words

are used in the exemption portion of the security defini-

tion of the 1934 Act, in order to avoid the exemption in

the case where the short-term notes were offered to the

investing public intended by Congress to be protected.

Here we are asked to give the same context-over-text con-

sideration to ‘‘any note’’ as those words are used in the

security definition itself of the 1934 Act, in order to avoid

federal jurisdiction of transactions claimed to fall beyond

the protection intended by Congress in the enactment of

the securities laws.

Analysis immediately reveals, however, much more seri-

ous differences between the two situations than the super-

ficial analogy might lead one to believe. In Sanders, the

effect of the contextual interpretation led to the non-appli-

cation of an exemption and therefore to the inclusion of

a kind of instrument within the protection of the 1934 Act.

The effect of applying the same interpretation to the defi-

nition itself would lead to the exclusion of a type of in-

strument from the protection of the 1934 Act. When the

Supreme Court has spoken of construing federal securities

legislation ‘‘not technically and restrictively, but flexibly

to effectuate its remedial purposes,’’* it has been speak-

ing of expanding the reach of protection, not diminishing

it; of increasing the types of covered documents and trans-

actions, not of decreasing them; of avoiding more frauds,

not less.

* SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195

(1963).

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App. 6

The inherent difficulty in purporting to find that Con-

gress intended to limit the reach of federal jurisdiction

exercised through securities legislation when it used the

words ‘‘any note’’ is therefore compounded by the fact

that the Supreme Court was in the process of expanding

that jurisdiction when it searched for and expounded the

congressional intent behind the securities acts. Under

ihese circumstances it is understandable that courts have

been struggling to answer the question here: are the

securities acts invoked every time a person borrows money

from a bank and gives his promissory note in return?

Ill

In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-

51 (1943), the Supreme Court, after noting that the defen-

dants had invoked the ejusdem generis rule and the ez-

pressio unius est exclusio alterius maxim in interpreting

the definition of a security tnder the 1933 Act, said:

However well these rules may serve at times to aid

in deciphering legislative intent, they long have been

subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe

the details of an act in conformity with its dominat-

ing general purpose, will read text in the light of

context and will interpret text so far as the meaning

of the words ‘fairly permits so as to carry out in

particular cases the generally expressed legislative

policy.

Id.

In SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969),

the Court, citing Joiner, said:

The meaning of particular phrases must be deter-

mined in context. . . . Congress itself has cautioned

that the same words may take on a different colora-

tion in different sections of the securities laws; both

the 1933 and 1934 Acts preface their lists of general

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App.7

definitions with the phrase ‘‘unless the context other-

wise requires.’’ 1933 Act, § 2, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C.

§$ 77b; 1934 Act, § 3, 48 Stat. 882, 15 U.S.C. § 78e.

Id. at 466.

“Finally, we are reminded that, in searching for the

meaning and scope of the word ‘security’ in the Act, form

should be disregarded for substance and the empharis

should be on economic reality. S.Z.C. vy. W. J. Howey Co.,

328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).’’ Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S.

332, 336 (1967). See also, Milnarik v. M-S Commodities,

Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 275-76 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.

887 (1972).

Accordingly, we commence our analysis with the lan-

guage of the statutes.° In the 1933 Act, the opening words

of section 2 read (15 U.S.C. § 77b):

Sec. 2. When used in this title, unless the context

otherwise requires—

(1) the term ‘‘security’’ means any note....

The only difference in the 1934 Act is the immaterial

cne that nine other definitions intercede between the con-

textual proviso and the security definition (15 U.S.C.

3 78c):

Section 3. (a) When used in this title, unless the

context otherwise requires—

(10) The term ‘‘security’’ means any note....

5In interpreting the definition of a security in the 1934 Act, the

Supreme Court has sanctioned recourse to the 1933 Act. Tcherepnin

v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36, 338 (1967).

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App. 8

Inasmuch as Congress specified the context-over-text

approach in both acts,* the next step is to discover what

‘‘context’’ applies in the circumstances of this case.

In Eason vy. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d

654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974), this

court rejected the purchaser-seller ‘‘standing’’ rule of the

Birnbaum case? in favor of an identification of persons

to whom the 1934 Act, and particularly section 10(b) and

Rule 10b-5, extended protection as members of the class

for whose special benefit the statute was enacted. In

Eason, Judge Stevens said:

Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Commission

have all used the term ‘‘investors’’ to describe the

class of persons protected by Rule 10b-5.

* * *

®The American Law Institute’s tentative draft of the Federal

Securities Code (Professor Louis Loss, Reporter), retains the “con-

text” language, stating that “[t|he definitions . . . apply for pur-

poses of this Code and the rules thereunder unless the context re-

quires otherwise.” ALI Fep. Securities Cope § 201(a) (Tent.

Draft No. 1, April, 1972). The Comment to this section notes that

“ijt seems advisable not to risk an inference of intended rigidity

from deletion of this caveat, however redundant it may be under the

modern approach to statutory construction.” The Comment con-

tinues :

A good example of the text-context clash, still unresolved, is

the question whether the discounting of an ordinary promissory

note by either the maker or the payee is a “sale” of a “security”

to the bank... .

... [T]his problem does not lend itself to precise statutory

solution. Too much depends on highly variegated circumstances.

7 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).

De RA ag OUT TR Da Rs EN ote erin ILRI TA, a an ts)

App. 9

The emphasis on the injured party’s status as an

investor indicates that the protection of the rule ex-

tends to persons who, in their capacity as investors,

suffer significant injury as a direct consequence of

fraud in connection with a securities transaction, even

though their participation in the transaction did not

involve either the purchase or the sale of a security.

Id. at 659.

Judge Stevens pointed out the language of section 10(b)

itself: §

It shall be unlawful for any person ... [t]o use or

employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of

any security registered on a national securities ex-

change or any security not so registered, any manipu-

lative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-

vention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-

sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the

public interest or for the protection of investors.

15 U.S.C. § 78] (emphasis added).

He concluded:

[1]n each case the plaintiff will have to demonstrate

membership in the ‘special class’? protected by Rule

10b-5 and injury as a direct consequence of the al-

leged violation.

* He also looked to language of Mr. Justice Douglas in his opin-

ion in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,

404 U.S. 6, 10, 12-13 (1971), where reference was twice made to

the Rule 10b-5 protection against injury “as an investor.” It should

also be noted that the Senate Report accompanying what became

the 1933 Act stated that “[t|he purpose of this bill is to protect the

investing public and honest business.” S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong.,

Ist Sess. 1 (1933). The Senate Report accompanying what became

the 1934 Act stated that section 10(b) “authorizes the Commission

... to prohibit or regulate . . . practices which it finds detrimental

to the interests of the investor.” S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d

Sess. 18 (1934).

AE oat Sa BRE EA PELL POL: aig AAD Gin ht 2 OE TO

App. 10

490 F.2d at 660.

The Eason test is applicable here in defining a security.

In SEC vy. C.M, Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1948),

the Supreme Court noted that:

In the Securities Act the term ‘‘security’’ was de-

fined to include by name or description many docu-

ments in which there is common trading for specula-

tion or investment ... such as notes....

Id, at 351 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court particularly considered the defini-

tion of ‘‘security’’ in the 1934 Act in Tcherepnin v.

Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967):

One of [the] central purposes [of the 1934 Act] is to

protect mvestors through the requirement of full dis-

closure by issuers of securities, and the definition of

security in § 3(a)(10) necessarily determines the

classes of investments and investors which will re-

ceive the Act’s protections,

Id. at 336 (emphasis added).

The ultimate question is whether the plaintiffs are

simply borrowers in a commercial transaction who are

not protected by the 1934 Act or investors in a securities

transaction who are protected.°

¢ IV

: . . .

: In one sense every lender of money is an investor since ,

: he places his money at risk in anticipation of a profit in

the form of interest. Also in a broad sense every investor

lends his money to a borrower who uses it for a price and

is expected to return it one day.

® Material misrepresentations were sufficiently pleaded and the

applicability of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 depends entirely upon

the definition of “security.”

rin rts eee SORT TORO INNER TIRE FERRO EER RAs aS PEERS ENTRAR LE Res

App. 11

On the other hand, the polarized extremes are concep-

tually identifiable: buying shares of the common stock

of a publicly-held corporation, where the impetus for the

transaction comes from the person with the money, is an

investment; borrowing money from a bank to finance the

purchase of an automobile, where the impetus for the

transaction comes from the person wo needs the money,

is a loan. In between is a gray area Which, in the absence

of further congressional indication of intent or Supreme

Court construction, has been and must be in the future

subjected to case-by-case treatment.

The Second Circuit held in Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey

Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971), that ‘‘notes is-

sued by one publicly owned company ¢o another publicly

owned company for $10,500,000, payable over a period of

20 years, in exchange for the assets of the latter easily

fall within the purview of the [1934] Act ....°”

&

After our decision in Sanders, supra, where we held

that notes with a maturity not exceeding nine months but

offered to the public as an investment were securities

under the 1934 Aci," the Second Circuit in Zeller v. Bogue

*9'The court refused to deal with the “hypothetical situation” of

whether “the issuance of notes in every private loan transaction”

comes within the scope of the 1934 Act.” 452 F.2d at 663.

11 $1,661,500 in notes were offered to and purchased by 42 in-

vestors. In addition, we relied upon Securities and Exchange Com-

mission’s Release No. 33-4412:

The legislative history of the [1933] Act makes clear that

section 3(a)(3) applies only to prime quality negotiable com-

mercial paper of a type not ordinarily purchased by the general

public, that is, paper used to facilitate well recognized types of

current operational business requirements and of a type eligible

for discounting by Federal Reserve banks.

26 Fed. Reg. 9159 (1961) (emphasis added).

ie a as NERD AAS RE RENEE ES PH PTT PR SN TN RE PI HONS IND a AE iNT ERS RE IARI

App. 12

Electric Manufacturing Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973), agreed with Sanders that

‘*the mere fact that a note has a maturity of less than nine

months does not take ... [it] out of Rule 10b-5, unless

. .. Lit] fits the general notion of ‘commercial paper’

....’ Id. at 800. In holding that a note issued by a parent

corporation to its subsidiary for loans by the subsidiary

in the amount of $315,310 to assist the parent’s operating

losses and deteriorating working capital position, was a

security, Judge Friendly sid:

It does not follow, however, that every transaction

. which involves promissory notes, whether of

less or more than nine months maturity, is within

Rule 10b-5. The Act is for the protection of investors,

and its provisions must be read accordingly ... .

[W]e see no reason to doubt that Beleo [subsidiary]

stood in the position of an investor, although perhaps

an involuntary one, with respect to Bouge [parent].

Id. (emphasis added).

The Third Cireuit held in Lino v. City Investing Co.,

487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973), that there was no federal

jurisdiction over material misstatements made in connec-

tion with Lino’s purchase from the franchiser of two

franchise licensing agreements, partially with cash and

partially with several promissory notes. Judge Hunter

said:

These were personal promissory notes issued by a

private party. There was no public offering of the

notes, and the issuer was the person claiming to be

defrauded. The notes were not procured for specula-

tion or investment, and there is no indication that

{the franchiser] was soliciting venture capital from

Lino.

App. 13

(The franchiser] was selling a certain contract right

to Lino, not buying his security. It simply lacks com-

mon sense to describe the transaction as [the fran-

chiser] purchasing . .. Lino’s security by paying him

the right to operate one of its Franchise Sales Cen-

ters.

Id. at 694-95.

The Fifth Circuit considered what it has called ‘‘the

commercial-investment dichotomy’’ in four recent cases.

In United States v. Rachal, 473 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (Sth

Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 927 (1973), a criminal case

under the 1933 Act, the court approved an instruction

given by the trial court which provided that the exemp-

tion of short-term notes from the registration provisions

of the 1933 Act applied only to commercial not investment

paper (that is, the Sanders rationale).

In Bellah v. First National Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th

Cir. 1974), the court held that a promissory note of six-

months maturity, secured by a deed of trust on real prop-

erty, issued for a bank loan needed by the makers (hus-

band and wife) to aid them in the development of their

livestock business, was commercial paper and not invest-

ment paper and hence the nete and deed were not securi-

ties.”

In McClure v. Firs: National Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th

Cir. 1974), a one-year promissory note and a deed of

12 Judge Gewin articulated two possible effects of not applying

the commercial-investment dichotomy, which he saw as indicia of

congressional intent that it be applied: (1) subjection of ordinary

commercial loan transactions to the registration requirements of the

1933 Act “would inevitably wreak havoc on the commercial paper

market” and (2) complaints spawned by a commercial loan trans-

action should find recourse in state not federal courts. 495 F.2d at

1114.

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App. 14

trust issued for a bank loan aileged to be needed to pay

the corporate obligations of a closely-held corporation,

were held not to be securities. Judge Roney analyzed

prior federal decisions and concluded:

The cases excluding certain notes from the coverage

of the Act generally involved underlying transactions

between payor and payee which were not of an invest-

ment nature.

* ¢* #

On the other hand, where notes have been deemed

securities within the meaning of the securities laws,

either of two factors, not present here, usually in-

dicated the investment overtones of the underlying

transactions. [The notes were either] offered to some

class of investors, [or] were ... acquired ... for

speculation or investment . . . [or the borrower ob-

tained! investment assets, directly or indirectly, in

exchange for its notes.*

Id. at 493-94.

18 Judge Roney also said:

We realize that our holding today that the Act does not ap-

ply to commercial notes of a longer duration than nine months,

taken with the decisions voiding the short-term exemption as

to investment paper, virtually writes that exemption out of the

law. On one hand, the Act covers all investment notes, no mat-

ter how short their maturity, because they are not encompassed

by the “any note” language of the exemption. On the other

hand, the Act does not cover any commercial notes, no matter

how long their maturity, because they fall outside the “any

note” definition of a security. Thus, the investment or commer-

cial nature of a note entirely controls the applicability of the

Act, depriving of all utility the exemption based on maturity-

length. The original scrivener of the definitional section may

well wonder what happened to his carefully drawn exemption

on the way to the courthouse, but if the judicial decisions do

not properly reflect the intent of Congress as to the coverage

of the Act, only that body can properly rectify the situation at

this point, if stare decisis is to apply and the Supreme Court

does not make some definitive decision contrary to the presently

decided cases.

497 F.2d at 494-95.

App. 15

Finally, the Fifth Cireuit held in SEC v. Continental

Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974), that

promissory notes with a maturity date of less than nine

months issued by a corporation in partial reimbursement

to its customers who had held open accounts when the

corporation’s trading in commodities futures options was

suspended by the California Commissioner of Corpora-

tions, were securities. Judge Gewin said:

[I]t is the character of the note, not its maturity date,

which determines coverage under both the registra-

tion provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, and the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The paramount concern in this inquiry is the na-

ture of the transaction in which the note is issued.

[T]he notes [here] were issued to rejuvenate and not

to liquidate the enterprise.

Once the resuscitative nature of the notes is estab-

lished, the conclusion is ineluctable that the notes were

investment and not commercial paper. Since revival

would inure to their benefit, recipients accepted the

notes with the hope of realizing a greater return on

their investments.

The commercial-investment dichotomy delineated to

some extent in the foregoing courts of appeals cases has

been further demarcated in recent district court cases:

Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot, 379 F. Supp. 250 (N.D.

PEEL EE PS SEI ONTO Gk BS Oe a ae a ae Br

App. 16

Ill. 1974) (series of short-term notes issued by travel

agency for bank loan to pay off current debts held not to

be securities); Joseph v. Norman’s Health Club, Inc., 336

F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (promissory notes given

for lifetime membership in health clubs held not to be

securities); City National Bank v. Vanderboom, 290 F.

Supp. 592, 608 (W.D. Ark. 1968), a/f’d, 422 F.2d 221 (8th

Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970) (notes given by

corporate organizers for bank loans to purchase corpo-

ration’s capital stock held not to be securities).

A comprehensive and perceptive student comment sug-

gests a long list of possible criteria to distinguish ordi-

nary commercial notes not protected by the act from in-

vestment notes or investment securities protected by the

act: (1) how is the instrument characterized in the busi-

ness community? (2) how are the proceeds to be used (if

for consumer goods or particular business goods or ser-

vices—not covered, but if for general financing of bor-

rower’s enterprise—covered)? (3) extent of reliance on

efforts of others (placing funds at great risk, giving note

payee extensive collateral rights, making repayment of

funds contingent upon some event, all tend to indicate

security rather than loan); (4) number of notes issued,

number of payees, dollar amount of transaction; (5) pay-

able on demand or if payable at fixed time, how long ‘is

the time between issuance and maturity? and (6) char-

acterization of notes on relevant financial statements.

Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of ‘‘Security”’

Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note Is a Note

Is a Note? 52 Nes. L. Rev. 478, 510-24 (1973).

bic aeeial HOS Eee ea a al a id

ED a “nal A

App. 17

These criteria are helpful but each case appears to re-

quire its own decision based upon its own facts."

The American Law Institute’s tentative draft of the

Federal Securities Code includes not only a definition of

**security’’ but also sets forth certain items which are not

included in the term ‘‘security’’ and hence are not sub-

ject to the registration, antifraud or other provisions.

One of the exclusions is ‘‘a note or other evidence of in-

debtedness issued in a mercantile transaction.’’ ALI Fen.

Securities Cove § 297(b)(3) (Reporter’s Revision of Text

of Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-3, Oct. 1974). However the term

‘‘mercantile transaction’’ is not defined.

The tentative code would exempt from registration re-

quirements ‘‘commercial paper with a denomination of

at least $100,000.’’ Jd. § 301(1). ‘‘Commercial paper’’ is

defined as

14In Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973), the

court noted:

Neither party has been able to suggest a “test” to us that

would aid in determining whether there has been a purchase

or sale of securities when a personal promissory note is involved.

Each assures us that wherever the line is, he is on the safe

side of it. The cases cited previously suggest that transactions

involving a corporation’s notes should be treated differently in

some instances than similar transactions involving an individ-

ual’s notes.

* * *

But we do not have to rule on that distinction now. Nor are

we determining that in other circumstances transactions involv-

ing personal notes do not constitute the purchase or sale of

securities. The courts will have to consider the complete con-

text of each transaction in making their determinations.

Id. at 696 n.15.

pee iriscmoscose: SOMES 5 SEATED, TC SE YY CRISES TRE PET AT

App. 18

(a) a note or banker’s or trade acceptance that is

payable on demand or matures or is renewed for not

more than nine months, exclusive of days of grace,

after the date of issue or renewal, or (b) any other

instrument or interest of primarily a mercantile char-

acter that the Commission designates by rule.

Id. § 216A.

Again, there is no definition of ‘‘mercantile character.’’

So we are left ultimately with the necessity for a case-by-

case factual determination.”

V

Although we have gone into what we believe is the

congressional and Supreme Court basis for the commer-

cial-investment dichotomy at some length in the hope that

prospective litigants in this circuit may be enlightened as

to its possible parameters, the application of the rule is

not difficult in this case.

1° The conclusion of the authors of one analysis (Lipton and Katz,

“Notes” Are (Are Not?) Always Securitics—A Review, 29 Bus.

Law. 861 (1974)) is:

Not every note is a security. The commercial context of the

underlying transaction has to be evaluated. Notes issued for

personal loans and consumer installment purchases are not

securities. Notes that are issued for investments and business

acquisitions as well as commercial paper sold outside the normal

institutional market are securities. The middle ground has been

narrowed, but will still from time to time create a problem. The

courts have seen the impact of the open “floodgates” in other

areas and should pay heed to the legislative intent and policy

considerations discussed above. The federal securities laws are

not the appropriate vehicle for consumer protection on install-

ment sales.

Id. at 866.

¥ GRAS IOI REEA LER RLO LETS Sa PIE YT IIS PIG EEE RAEN IN ROI NLP MO ETSI. INET, My oy

Fu

App. 19

Three promissory notes were involved in the present

transaction. The $20,000 note secured by a chattel mort-

gage was given to the National Bank of Austin as evi-

dence of a loan. The $73,515.26 note was given to the

Austin Bank upon the assumption by the makers of a

pre-existing chattel mortgage on the fixtures of the coin-

operated laundry and dry cleaning business which the

makers purchased. The complaint did not have attached

thereto a copy of either note, which would have seemed

a prudent procedure inasmuch as jurisdiction is depen-

dent upon them, but in any event nothing alleged in the

complaint indicated that these two notes represent any-

thing beyond the borrowing of money to make partial pay-

ment upon the purchase of the assets of a business.

Nothing alleged in the complaint indicated in any way

that the bank was an investor in the business or a co-

partner in the enterprise. The impetus for the transac-

tion appears to have come from the borrowers who needed

cash to complete the purchase. There is no allegation that

the bank solicited the plaintiffs to interest them in an

investment. The business enterprise involved was to be

operated by the plaintiffs, not by the bank or by the de-

fendants as an investment for the plaintiffs..° The com-

plaint was silent as to any of the factors which conceivably

might tend to transform an ordinary commercial loan into

an investment security.

The third note for $5,000 was an earnest money deposit

subsequentiy redeemed. This note served for a time as a

16 Paragraph 18 of the complaint alleged: ‘Plaintiffs began oper-

ating the Village Well on or about January 18, 1972 and continued

to operate said business for approximately four months.”

App. 20

cash substitute. Since the security definition of the 1934

Act ‘‘shall not include currency,’’’? this document does

not confer jurisdiction.

Inasmuch as no securities were involved, this transac-

tion is not subject to the 1934 Act or Rule 10b-5 and the

district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdic-

tion of the subject matter.

AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

1715 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10).

nh i A Somat

4s

App. 21

APPENDIX 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

C.N.S. EN'TERPRISES, INC.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

G & G ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

No. 72 C 2433

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

before

HON. JAMES B. PARSONS

Judge

September 26, 1973

3:45 o’clock, p.m.

The Court: Well, gentlemen, I have reviewed my own

decision in this matter which was rendered on May 2nd,

1973 recently in the light of research which was required

of me in other cases, and out of the clear sky and without

even having had the benefit of these arguments this after-

noon, concluded that I must have been in error because

of the case restriction placed upon instruments which are

the subject matter of litigation under the Securities Ex-

change Act both of 1933 and the one of 1934, that seek to

eause the parties and the litigation to comply with the

intent of Congress at the time of the enactment of the

statutes.

Qpptenesmmenainnes PO aermct ek ARTI RI BOE A AAEM ONT NS Ae AD Ms

2

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SSE RT BETES

ts

Ste MS

SENDS

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Bivins

App. 22

The statutes were enacted for the purpose of control-

ling and regulating the dealing in securities as such deal-

ing is commonly referred to as the engaging in purchase

and sale of stock by the public, for the purpose of making

money out of the purchase and the sale of the stock or

the purchase and sale of the security, and not for the pur-

pose of making money out of the security itself.

There is a very narrow difference in what I have said

between the two types of purposes. That was brought to

my attention by the necessity of having to distinguish

among those securities which are regulated by the SEC

in which some are called commercial and some are called

investment securities. There is a difference even within

those securities which are regulated by SEC between com-

mercial paper and investment paper.

In those securities so regulated, commercial paper is

that which is bought and discounted on sale for the pur-

pose of sale and making of the money out of the dealing

in the paper on short-term; where that that is bought for

investment purposes is bought for the purpose of holding

it for a substantial period of time.

I was thrown off when re-reading Sanders, which is

the Seventh Circuit’s last pronouncement, by the utiliza-

tion of its very fine judge of the Seventh Circuit, Judge

Sprecher, who is good in this field, of the language of

commercial paper as against investment paper. He says

when Congress spoke of notes with a maturity not exceed-

ing nine months it meant commercial paper, not invest-

ment securities, and he said that, ‘‘When a person who

seeks to invest his money and receives a note in return

for it, he has not purchased commercial paper in the usual

sense, he has purchased a security investment.”’

A CR, CRUE TEL PACE lier Fd 6 RMI Si

4

App. 23

Now, this is a utilization of the term which <; different

from that with relation to the situation which we find here

but, nevertheless, he does reflect in his footnotes the ex-

cellent analysis of the acts und of the limitations of the

applications of the acts found in Professor Loss’ works

on securities excliange, Professor Loss of Harvard Uni-

versity, where he says, and tries to insist, that neither of

the acts intended to include the short-term type of notes

that are of the kind which were specifically exempt by the

regulations under the Securities Act, Section 3(a)(3).

{ am convinced that beginning with that paragraph in

my opinion of May 2nd wherein I said, ‘‘ However, although

defendants’ contention is well-stated, I find that the prom-

issory notes involved in this case constituted securities

within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act of

1934—”’ et cetera, and quoted from the provision of Section

78(c)(10) of that act, which was that any note—“security”’

meant ‘fany note, stock, treasury stock, bonds, debenture,

certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing

agreement, or any oil, gas or other mineral royalty or

lease, any collateral trust certificate, any reorganization

certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment

contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit for

a security, or in general any instrument commonly known

as a security.’’

Tt is true that Congress sought to broaden it to the ex-

tent that it might include any type of investment where

the welfare of the public might be injured by transactions

by persons having inside knowledge while the public is

engaged in the buying and selling for its own profit of

securities, I am now of the opinion, and very definitely

of the opinion, that even the Skylab case does not ask

that I go that far as to include in a security to be covered

by the Securities Exchange Act the ordinary day-to-day

App. 24

note, promissory note, given in return for the lending of

money, where neither the giver nor the lender has any

interest in commercial or investment paper in which there

is a public interest because the institution or the paper

itself is addressed to public interests.

I am convinced that a promissory note given by an

ordinary borrower, such as you or I, to an ordinary lender

such as these defendants or such as the Austin Bank, in

the ordinary case such as this where the borrower says,

‘*I would like to have you finance, Mr. Bank, me in the

purchase of an automobile or finance me in the purchase

of a washing automat’’ or ‘‘finance me in the purchase

of a grocery store’’ or ‘‘finance me in the purchase of a

home’’—does not constitute a security in the sense that

the lender would be an investor in the public domain in

the enterprise of a borrower who himself seeks investment

in the public domain.

The investor, whether or not he or it has any control

over the enterprise, joins the enterprise in one sense or

another and contemplates that the earnings from his in-

vestment will reflect the fortunes of the enterprise.

The lender never considers himself nor the equity he

retains in the money that is lent a pari of the enterprise

of the borrower; he merely looks to the collateral, if there

be collateral, or, if there be none, to the integrity of the

borrower, not the enterprise for assurance that his loan

will return to him and that interest will be paid to him.

It is, as counsel for Kimless and Casey has indicated,

the difference between the borrower and lender where the

borrower seeks by his borrowing merely the obtaining of

money and the lender from his lending merely the inter-

est to be gained from the lending, and where neither is

4

&

fis barat Lael Bie aa tS ete

2 ae Nea EN ae a a Rif OER nM, EERE SIE NAS Ee Mt ee

App. 25

engaged in the business of making money »ut of borrowing

or lending or the sale of the things that were borrowed

or lent.

It is, indeed, as he indicated, the difference between the

borrowing here from Austin Bank by these two women,

for which they gave a promissory note, and the selling

by a lending institution at discount of hundreds or thou-

sands of the notes that it receives in return for loans that

it makes.

We do have such institutions such as Commercial Credit

Corporation, which engages in lending on small-scale

amounts from fifty to five hundred or—now I think it is

up to two thousand dollars—and those notes it then sells

at discount to larger institutions and, if they be long-term

notes, the larger institutions must determine whether or

not they will buy them at discount or take them on face

value and keep them for the interest, or buy them at lesser

discounts and keep them for longer periods of time.

In those transactions they are indeed engaged with the

buying and selling of securities even though they are buy-

ing and selling promissory notes, and I feel very sure that

those would come within the control of the Securities Ex-

change Act.

But if, on the other hand, I were to go and continue as

I did on May 2nd in this, I believe properly I would be

reversed for properly I would be wrong, and, further, I

would believe that it was not the intent of Congress that

each of the five of us be himself constantly under the sur-

veillance of the Securities Exchange Commissior as day-

to-day we walk in and out of our bank and give a note,

either secured or not secured, other than by our signature,

in return for the lend of money, which note sometimes we

renew every 90 days, but which notes do not constitute

App. 26

an investment of the lender in our businesses, our enter-

prises, our affairs, as indeed I think the situation is in

the case before me.

For these reasons, for the reasons set forth in the reci-

tation here to the record of counsel for the defendants

today, I apologize for my having gone off base on May

2nd, I grant the motion to reconsider, I have reconsidered

and, upon such reconsideration, 1 determine that the mo-

tions to dismiss of the defendants should be allowed, and

it is so ordered, adjudged and decreed.

CERTIFICATE

I Hereby Certify that I reported in shorthand the pro-

ceedings had in the above-entitled cause before the Hon.

James B. Parsons, one of the Judges of said Court, on

September 26, 1973, and that the foregoing transcript is

a true, correct and complete transcript of a portion of

my original shorthand notes so made as aforesaid.

/s/ Joseph R. Betz

Joseph R. Betz, Official Court Reporter

United States District Court

Northern District of [llinois

Eastern Division

a EE PRE ENE ELUENT

App. 27

APPENDIX 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

C.N.S. ENTERPRISES INC., THOMAS G. COULES

and CLAYTON NASSOS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

G. & G. ENTERPRISES INC., GISELLE STRAUSBUR-

GER, GLADYS LUCAS, KIMLIS SALES COMPANY,

ROBERT W. CASEY, and NATIONAL BANK

OF AUSTIN,

Defendants.

No. 72 C 2433

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs C.N.S. Enterprises Inc., Thomas G. Coules

and Clayton Nasses complain of defendants G. & G. En-

terprises Inc., Giselle Strausburger, Gladys Lucas, Kimlis

Sales Company, Robert W. Casey, and National Bank of

Austin as follows:

1. This action is brought to redress violations by cer-

tain defendants of Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-

change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78), and of Rule 10b-5 of

the General Rules and Regulations promulgated there-

under by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17

C.F.R. § 240 10b-5. The jurisdiction of this Court is based

upon Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,

15 U.S.C. § 78aa.

App. 28

2. Plaintiff C.N.S. Enterprises Ine. (hereinafter ‘C.

N.S.’’) is an Illinois corporation. Plairtiff Thomas G.

Coules (hereinafter ‘‘Coules’’) is a resident of I[linois

and is and at all times pertinent hereto has been an officer

and director of C.N.S. Plaintiff Clayton Nassos (herein-

after ‘‘Nassos’’) is a resident of Illinois and is and at all

times pertinent hereto has been an officer and director of

C.N.S.

3. Defendant Kimlis Sales Company (hereinafter

Kimlis) is an Illinois corporation with its principal place

of business in Chicago, Illinois.

4. Defendant Robert W. Casey (hereinafter ‘‘Casey’’)

is and at all times pertinent hereto has been an officer and

director of Kimlis.

5. Defendant G. & G. Enterprises Ine. (hereinafter

““G. & G.’’) is an Illinois corporation with its principal

place of business in Hinsdale, Lllinois.

6. Defendant Giselle Strausburger (hereinafter

‘*Strausburger’’) is and at all times pertinent hereto has

been an owner, officer and director of G. & G.

7. Defendant Gladys Lucas (hereinafter ‘‘Lucas’’) is

and at all times pertinent hereto has been an owner, offi-

cer and director of G. & G.

8. Defendant National Bank of Austin (hereinafter

‘*Austin’’) is a national bank with its principal place of

business in Chicago, Illinois. Austin is joined as a de-

fendant pursuant to Rule 19(a)(1) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, because in its absence complete relief

eannot be accorded among the remaining parties.

9. All of the transactions and the violations of Sec-

tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 herein-

after alleged occurred in this district.

App. 29

10. Commencing at some time prior to November,

1971, defendants G. & G., Strausburger, Lucas, Kimlis and

Casey instituted a program to find a purchaser and opera-

tor for the coin-operated laundry and dry cleaning busi-

ness known as the Village Well of Justice (hereinafter

‘Village Well’’), located at 8501 South Cork Avenue,

Justice, Illinois. At said time the Village Well was owned

and operated by defendants Strausburger, Lucas and

G. & G. in accordance with a license agreement between

and among said defendants and defendants Kimlis and

Casey.

11. In September, 1971, defendant Casey contacted

plaintiffs and informed them that the Village Well was

for sale and that he thought its purchase would be a profit-

able investment for plaintiffs.

12. On or about January 20, 1972 plaintiff C.N.S. pur-

chased trom defendants G. & G., Strausburger and Lucas

the fixtures, merchandise, business and good will of the

Village Well.

13. In connection with the purchase and as a part of

the purchase price plaintiffs were required to and did

perform the following acts:

(a) Assumed a chattel mortgage in the amount of

$73,515.26 on the fixtures being sold, which was held

by defendant Austin and executed an evidence of in-

debtedness to defendant Austin in the amount of

$73,515.26.

(b) Plaintiff C.N.S. transmitted to and subsequent-

ly redeemed from defendant Kimli§ a promissory

note in the amount of $5,000.00 (said jiromissory note

constituted an earnest money deposit).

a PRL ELAS LIT RE REINS: FOSSA Ce OES

App. 30

(ec) Entered into a junior chattel mortgage with

defendant Austin in the amount of $20,000.00 and exe-

cuted an evidence of indebtedness to defendant Austin

in like amount.

(d) Paid a portion of the purchase price to de-

fendants Strausburger, Lucas and G. & G. in cash.

14. In connection with plaintiffs’ purchase as afore-

said, the defendants (with the exception of defendant

Austin) conspired with each other to violate, and each of

them did violate Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange

Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j, and clauses (1), (2) and

(3) of Rule 10b-5 of the General Rules and Regulations

promulgated thereunder by the Securities and Exchange

Commission, 1 C.F.R. § 240 10b-5, by employing a devise,

scheme or artifice to defraud, by making untrue statements

of material facts and omitting to state material facts neces-

sary to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-

cumstances under which they were made not misleading’

and by engaging in an act, practice or course of business

which operated as a fraud or deceit upon plaintiffs. Such

violations were effected by use of instrumentalities of in-

terstate commerce.

15. Between September, 1971, and January 20, 1972

the following statements and representations of material

facts were made to plaintiffs by certain defendants, acting

on behalf of all of the defendants pursuant to their con-

spiracy :

(a) In September, 1971, defendant Casey orally

represented that the Village Well had been doing ap-

proximately $4,500.00 in sales per month.

(b) At various times in October and November

defendants Lucas and Strausburger orally represented

that the Village Well transacted monthly sales of be-

tween $4,800.00 and $5,500.00 and that said sales had

been progressively increasing.

App. 31

(c) On or about November 29, 1971 defendants

G. & G., Lucas and Strausburger represented in writ-

ing that in October, 1971, the Village Well had trans-

acted approximately $4,800.00 in sales (plus or minus

a variation of 5%).

(d) In December, 1971, defendants Strausburger,

Lucas and Casey represented orally and in writing

that sales at the Village Well in November, 1971

amounted to $5,700.00.

(ec) In December, 1971, defendants Strausburger

and Lucas orally represented that the sales at the

Village Well for the month of December, 1971, were

exceeding and would exceed those of November, 1971.

(f) At various times from October, 1971, to Jan-

uary, 1972, defendants Strausburger and Lucas dis-

played to plaintiffs books and records which purported

to reflect sales at the Village Well.

16. In fact the statements and representations as to

material facts set forth in paragraph 15 hereof were un-

true, or defendants omitted to state material facts neces-

sary in order to make the statements made, in the light

of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-

leading, in that:

(a) As of September, 1971, the Village Well was

not realizing sales of $4,500.00 per month.

‘b) The sales at the Village Well never amounted

to as much as $4,800.00.

(ce) The Village Well had not transacted within

five percent (5%) of $4,800.00 in sales in the month

of October, 1971. In the alternative defendants Straus-

burger and Lucas failed to inform plaintiffs that in

computing the total sales for the Village Well in Oc-

tober, 1971 as $4,800.00 (plus or minus five percent),

they included income due to the Village Well for dry

cleaning work done by the Village Well from a Down-

ers Grove laundromat operated by said defendants.

—_—— TEESE OIE EI RE IR Aitio DURR ag STRE RECNTRS

ST

App. 32

(d) The sales at the Village Well in November,

1971 were substantially less than $5,700.00.

(e) The sales at the Village Well in December,

1971 did not exceed those of November, 1971.

(f{) The books and records displayed to plaintiffs

failed to accurately reveal the sales at the Village

Well.

17. Defendants knew or should have known the material

facts set forth in paragraph 16 but they failed to state

those material facts to plaintiffs.

18. Plaintiffs began operating the Village Well on or

about January 18, 1972 and continued to operate said busi-

ness for approximately four months.

19. During the period of time in which plaintiffs operat-

ed the Village Well, they spent substantial sums of money

in promoting its business. Despite that fact, the monthly

sales at the Village Weil never approached the total

monthly sales as previously represented by the defen-

dants.

20. Because the total sales at the Village Well did not

approach the totals previously represented by defendants,

plaintiffs continued to suffer financial losses from the

operation of the Village Well and were required to borrow

additional capital funds from defendants Casey and Kimlis

in order to offset the operating losses.

21. On or about May 19, 1972 plaintiffs sent a Notice of

Rescission to defendants. (A copy of which is attached

hereto as Exhibit A.) (i

22. Continually since May 28, 1972 the Village Well

has been operated by defendants Casey and Kimlis.

23. By reason of the wrongful conduct of defendants,

plaintiffs have been damaged by loss of the use of the con-

sideration paid to defendants Strausburger and Lueas for

the Village Well, by being required to borrow sums of

App. 33

money from and become personally indebted to defendant

Austin, by being required to borrow additional sums of

money and become indebted to defendants Casey and Kim-

lis, and by being required to bear significant financial losses

in the operation of the Village Well.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray the Court to enter a

judgment in their favor as follows:

(a) Rescinding plaintiffs’ purchase of the Village

Well and all other related agreements, contracts and

obligations, requiring defendants G. & G., Strausbur-

ger and Lucas to pay plaintiffs all of the consideration

which plaintiffs paid for the Village Well, cancelling

all obligations assumed by plaintiffs as a result of

said purchase, and requiring defendants G. & G.,

Strausburger and Lucas to reassume all of said obli-

gations, including the lease on the premises, all agree-

ments, lines of credit and other obligations with de-

fendant Kimlis, and all notes and loans with defen-

dant Austin,

(b) In the alternative adjudging defendants (with

the exception of defendant Austin) jointly and several-

ly liable to plaintiffs for the full amount of plaintiffs’

damages.

(c) For their costs in this action.

(d) For such other and further relief as may be

just.

Edward H. Hatton

Russell J. Hoover

Jonathan T. Howe

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Jenner & Block

135 South LaSalle

Chieago, Illinois 60603

641-6060

— BOE EE aden RIP TROLL FRE REZ IR IEG ONG RE IELTS F GPRS SER, IER TE VIET TE WEB TLS

aoa eh

i a dat Sead Bike ae

App. 34

EXHIBIT A

NOTICE OF RESCISSION

TO: G&G Enterprises, Ine.

108 Kast Ogden Avenue

Hinsdale, Llinois

Justice Village Market

2740 Maple Avenue

Downers Grove, Illinois

National Bank of Austin

5645 West Lake Street

Chicago, Llinois 60644

Kimlis Sales Company

5145 South Ashland Avenue

Chicago, Illinois

Ms. Giselle Strausburger

Ms. Gladys Lucas

108 East Ogden Avenue

Hinsdale, Lllinois

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that C.N.S. Enterprises,

Ine., an Illinois corporation, and Thomas C. Coulis and

Clayton Nassas (‘‘Purchasers’’) do hereby tender notice

of the rescission of the agreement entered into on No-

veraber 29, 1971 with the G & G Enterprises, Ms. Straus-

burger and Ms. Lucas (‘‘Sellers’’) and of the bulk sale

of all fixtures, merchandise, business and good will of the

operation known as the Village Well of Justice, located

at 8901 South Court Avenue, Justice, Illinois, and all other

related agreements, contracts, and obligations, retroactive

to the 29th day of November, 1971, because of the material

breach and fraudulent misrepresentatiou of Sellers in the

inducement to Purchasers to enter into said agreement

and purchase.

SEE RRS AG IN OES ER a Ia ee SPL RE RE LOLS ALAIN ONE ty PAOD ee acme :

App. 35

Furthermore, you are hereby tendered all of said fix-

tures, merchandise, business and good will and all obliga-

tions and other agreements which have come into effect

since November 29, 1971, arising out of the operations of

said business. Effective the close of business, May 28,

1972, Purchaser shall tender back the above described

property, and disclaims all responsibility thereafter.

Demand is hereby made for the immediate return of

all moneys paid to Sellers by Purchasers, and the cancel-

lation of all obligations assumed by Purchasers and the

reassumption of said obligations by Sellers, including but

not limited to the lease on the premises, all agreements,

lines of credit and other obligations with Kimlis Sales

Company arising out of the aforementioned agreement,

and all notes and loans with the National Bank of Austin

and otherwise.

C.N.S. Enterprises, Ine.

Thomas C. Coulis

Clayton Nassas

By Tom Coulis

Dated: May 19, 1972.

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App. 36

APPENDIX 4

Statutes and Regulations Involved

Section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15

U.S.C. § 78¢) provides in pertinent part:

‘“‘(a) When used in this chapter, unless the con-

text otherwise requires—

* * *

(10) The term ‘security’ means any note.. .’’

Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15

U.S.C. § 78}) states in pertinent part:

“Tt shall be unlawful for any person, directly or

indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality

of interstate commerce or of the mails .

(b) to use or employ, in connection with the pur-

chase or sale of any security ... any manipulative

or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention

of such rules and regulations as the Commission may

prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public

interest or for the protection of investors.

Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission (17

C.F.R. § 240-10b-5) states:

‘*It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or

indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality

of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any

facility of any national securities exchange,

(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to

defraud,

(2) to make any untrue statement of a material

fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in

order to make the statements made, in the light of

the circumstances under which they were made, not

misleading or,

(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of

business which operates or would operate as a fraud

or deceit upon any person, in connection with the

purchase or sale of any security.’’

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Appendix — C. N. S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc. · 423 U.S. 825 | Frix