Opposition Brief — United States v. Finley Coal Co.
Supreme Court brief1974
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IN THE | MICHAEL ROGAK. JR Cut
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1974 |
No. 74-382
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, - - Petitioner
versus
FINLEY COAL COMPANY and
CHARLES FINLEY, - - - - Respondents
On Petition For A Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals For the Sixth Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
BERT T. COMBS
1700 Kentucky Home Life Bldy.
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
EDWARD F. PRICHARD
Frankfort, Kentucky
JAMES S. WILSON
Pikeville, Kentucky
Attorneys for Respondents
TARRANT, COMBS, BLACKWELL & BULLITT
Of Counsel
WESTERFIELD-BONTE CO., INC., 619 W. KENTUCKY, LOUISVILLE, KY.
pier!
PAGE
RR OE SI ON occ in cs o'v rvs be evencsrnse 1- 2
Argument: The Regulations Promulgated by the Sec-
retary of the Interior Are Invalid Because the
Seeretary Failed to Follow the Procedures Required
Under 30 U.S.C. § 811 in Developing and Revising
Mandatory Safety Standards.........-....-++++55 2-20
I. The Rulemaking Authority Conferred by the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
ee ec bce dee cawecr eet se> 2- 6
Hi. The Act and Its Legislative History lestab-
lish That Criminal Prohibitious Were To Be
Contained in Mandatory Standards To Be Pro-
mulgated Only After Compliance With See-
I ia ores Le Ree Nan eek es okt wares 6-12
I. In Promulgating the Regulations in Issue, the
Secretary Was Engaged in the Development
and Revision of Mandatory Safety Standards
and Was Required to, But Did Not, Comply
With the Provisions of Section S11(¢)....... 12-17
IV. The Regulations in Issue Cannot Be Upheld
pd) | a ea 17-20
i eon ee eater Ae alas pais ne oe 6 68 31-22
CITATIONS
Cases: PAGE
Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U. S. 233 (1928)........ 5
Kelly v. United States Department of the Interior,
339 F. Supp. 1095 (E. D. Cal. 1972)........... 18, 19
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association v. Finch,
307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970)............... 18
Texaco, Inc. vy. Federal Power Commission, 412 F.
Pe tee Ce BE ss coves ksceeee banks foe's 19
Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314
eS Bole aaagiestie an ine Rb Reinet ania 18
United States v. Consolidated Coal Company, —_
F. 2d . (Nos. 73-2085, 73-2086, 6th Cir. 1974) 21
Statutes and Regulations:
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553...... 4, 6
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 83 Stat.
742, 30 U.S.C. 801, et seq. 2
Section 2, 30 UBC. GOO... cccccessccccese 7
Section 3, 30 U.S.C. 6802 7
Section 5, 30 U.S.C. §804 7
Section 101, 30 U.S.C. §811....2, 3-4, 5, 6, 7-8. 12, 16, 20
eee ee OO oe a eo ee ee
OPPS RAABRICEDEOD OOO 28 6
Section 109, 30 U.S.C. §819(b)................. 2
Section 201, 30 U.S.C. §841.............cc0c00- 8
Section 301, 30 U.S.C. §861...... 4, 5, 6, 8-9, 13, 17, 20
Section 304(a), 30 U.S.C. $864(a).2............ 12
Section 508, 30 U.S.C. $957.......... 4, 5,6, 13,17, 18
edi i FE ay | Reade SARE RSS OI ai Se ee EI 3
agi gt RT FGMa NE ea la Le ey I ate ay 12
Oe Pa ee eb ck aw ese yuo 12, 16, 19
We Re PMNS vi kbccncckeeceeeccsecn.. 12, 16, 19, 20
Miscellaneous:
H. Rep. No. 563, 91st Ce, set Mees... . x... 6,9-11,17
S. Rep. No. 411, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. .0.00.0..... 5
PP BOW MO: BIOS oobi vise bse cavesccteccecccces 13
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UMTED STATES
October Term, 1974
No. 74-382
Unirep STATES OF AMERICA, - - Petitioner
Vv.
Fixiey Coat CoMPpany and
CHARLES FINLEY, - - - - Respondents
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The United States has petitioned for a writ of
-ertiorari to review the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which affirmed
an order of the District Court dismissing Count VIT
of a pending indictment charging Finley Coal .Com-
pany, a partnership, and Charles Finley, the partner
in general supervision, with violating (1) interim
mandatory safety standards which are part of the Fed-
eral Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L.
2
Ce
7
91-173, Dee. 30, 1969, 83 Stat. 742, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960,
and (2) ‘Mandatory Health and Safety standards
amended and revised’ promulgated by the Secretary
of the Interior under the provisions of that Act.’
ARGUMENT
THE REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY THE SEC.
RETARY OF THE INTERIOR ARE INVALID BE.
CAUSE THE SECRETARY FAILED TO FOLLOW
THE PROCEDURES REQUIRED UNDER 30 US.C.
§ 811 IN DEVELOPING AND REVISING MANDA-
TORY SAFETY STANDARDS
I. The Rulemaking Authority Conferred by the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.
The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘*Act’’) was
enacted by Congress after extensive debate in both
houses and after a conference report that reconciled
the differences between the Senate bill and the House
bill. Because it did not have the expertise to establish
specific and workable health and safety standards ap-
plicable to underground coal mines in all parts of the
country, Congress provided in the Act that the stan-
dards enacted by it were interim standards and directed
that the Secretary of the Interior ‘‘shall’’ promulgate
improved standards and, in so doing, ‘‘shall’’ consult
with specified government officials and other interested
government agencies, representatives of the coal in-
'The penalty for willful violation of a mandatory health or
safety standard is one year imprisonment, a fine of $25,000 or both.
201 S.C. § 8190b
4
ad
dustry, and other interested persons and organizations,
with the opportunity for a public hearing if requested.
30 U.S.C. § 811. The Petitioner admits that consulta-
tions within government were not undertaken and that
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is correct if,
in promulgating the regulations in issue, the Secretary
was required to comply with the procedures under
30 U.S.C. 9 811.
The Act contains three separate and different grants
of rulemaking authority. Section 101 of the Act,
30 U.S.C. § 811, provides both a mandate and the pro-
cedure for the promulgation and revision of manda-
tory health and safety standards under the Act. See-
tion 811(a) provides in part:
“The Secretary shall, in accordance with the
procedures set forth in this section, develop,
promulgate and revise, as may be appropriate, im-
proved mandatory safety standards si
30 U.S.C. § 811(c) provides as follows:
“Tn the development and revision of mandatory
safety standards, the Secretary shall consult with
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
the Secretary of Labor and with other interested
Federal agencies, appropriate representatives of
State agencies, appropriate represcutatives of the
coal mine operators and miners, other interested
persons and organizations, and such advisory com-
mittees as he may appoint. Such development and
revision of mandatory safety standards shall be
based upon research, demonstrations, experiments,
and such other information as may be appropriate.
4
‘In addition to the attainment of the highest degree
of safety protection for miners, other considera-
tions shall be the latest available scieutific data in
the field, the technical feasibility of the standards,
and experience gained under this and other safety
statutes.’’
The second grant of rulemaking authority is con-
tained in section 301(d) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 861(d),
aud provides as follows:
“In any case where the provisions of Sections
862 to 878, inclusive, of this title provide that cer-
tain actions, conditions, or requirements shall be
carried out as prescribed by the Secretary, or the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, as
appropriate, the provisions of Section 593 of Title 5
shall apply unless either Secretary otherwise pro-
vides. Before granting any exception to a manda-
tory safety standard as authorized by this sub-
chapter, the findings of the Secretary or his au-
thorized representative shall be made publie and
shall be available to the representative of the
miners at the affected coal mine."
The third grant of rulemaking authority is found
i, section 508 of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 957, which
provides;
“The Secretary, the Secr tary of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare and the panel are authorized
to issue such regulations as each deems appropriate
to carry out any provision of thix Chapter.”’
*Section 553 of Tithe 5 referred to in section S61(d)
is part of
the Administrative Procedure Act, a sa r $ 551 of se q.
The courts have traditionally construed different
sections of the same statute in part passu. All parts of
the Act must be considered, compared and construed
together. Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U.S. 233 (1928).
Section 811(c) is the general formal rulemaking
procedure which the Secretary **shall’’ follow in the
‘development and revision of mandatory safety stan-
dards.”’ Sections 861(d) and 957 are limited grants of
rulemaking authority and are insufficient authority for
the development and revision of mandatory safety stan-
dards. Section 861(d) is a more informal procedure
for an entirely different and strictly limited purpose,
i.¢., it authorizes the Secretary to provide for **certain
actions, conditions or requirements’? when such diree-
tives are provided for in sections 862 to S78, inclusive.
More simply stated, this section merely authorizes the
Secretary to take any action which he is specifically
commanded to perform in sections 862 through 87s.
Section 957, on the other hand, ix authority for ad-
ministrative rulemaking only. Ut is codified under sub-
section 5—ADMINISTRATIVE. Provistoxs—and the legis-
lative history of the Act) shows conclusively that
Congress did not intend section 957 to apply in estab-
lishing safety standards. In the section-by-section
analysis contained in the Senate Committee Report it
ix stated that ‘where administrative regulations are
needed, the provisions of Section 409 Chow section 957 )
of this act would apply.”” Senate Report No. 91-411.
91st Congress, Ist Session, 87 (1969). Similarly, i
the House Report it ix stated that section 408 of the
Aetoas passed by the Plouse Chew section VT) “at
wees ee
ed
6
thorizes the Secretary to issue administrative regula-
tions to carry out the act.’’ H.R. Rep. No. 91-563,
Y1st Congress, Ist Session, 618 (1969). Thus, it was
clearly the intention of both the Senate and the House
to authorize the Secretary under section 957 only to
issue regulations necessary to carry out the administra-
live requirements of the Act. ,
Since section 957 is silent on the question of notice
and consultative and hearing procedure, the Secre-
tary must look to the Administrative Procedure Act
(5 U.S.C. § 553) for these requirements. Section 553
itself provides that when a statute by its terms pro-
vides for a hearing section 553 is inapplicable. It fol-
lows that section 957, since it is dependent on section
593, confers no greater authority on the Secretary than
does section 861(d) which also is dependent on sec-
tion 553.
II. The Act and Its Legislative History Establish That
Criminal Prohibitions Were To Be Contained in Manda-
tory Standards To Be Promulgated Only After Com-
pliance With Section 811.
The Act and the extensive legislative history which
underlies it display an undeviating Congressional in-
tent that the criminal prohibitions were to be contained
in mandatory health and safety standards and that
these standards were to be promulgated only after the
Secretary of the Interior had complied with the con-
sultative procedures contained in Section 101 of the
Act, 30 U.S.C. 8 811.0 This Congressional intent. is
clearly shown in the following sections of the Act:
§ 801. CoNcREsSION AL FixpIncs AND DECLARATION
oF PURPOSE.
““(g) it is the purpose of this chapter (1) to
establish interim mandatory health and safety
standards and to direct the Secretary of Health,
Edueation and Welfare and the Secretary of the
Interior to develop and promulgate improved
mandatory health or safety staudards to protect
the health and safety of the Nation’s coal miners;
9
§ 802. DEFINITIONS
(1) ‘mandatory health or safety standard’
means the interim mandatory health or safety
standards established by subchapters IL and ITI
of this chapter, aud the standards promulgated
pursuant to subchapter I of this chapter ;”’
§ 804. Interim Compliance PANEL—ESTABLISH-
MENT: COMPOSITION.
‘*(a) There is hereby established the Interim
Compliance Panel which shall be composed of five
members as follows:
(Assistant Secretary of Labor and others)
SUBCHAPTER I—HEALTH AND SAFETY
STANDARDS
§ 811. PRroMULGATION AND REVISION OF MANDATORY
HEALTH AND SAFETY STANDARDS—POWER OF SECRE-
TARY : TRANSMITTAL.
‘*(a) The Secretary shall, in accordance with
the procedures set forth in this section, develop,
promulgate, and revise, as may be appropriate,
improved mandatory safety standards for the pro-
tection of life and the prevention of injuries ina
Ss
coal mine, and shall, in accordance with the pro-
cedures set forth in this section, promulgate the
mandatory health standards transmitted to him by
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.”
* * *
“(e) In the development and revision of
mandatory safety standards, the Secretary shall
consult with the Secretary of Health, Educatio:.
wud Welfare, the Secretary of Labor. and with
other interested Federal ageucies, appropriate
representatives of State ageicies, appropriate rep-
resentatives of the coal mine operators and miners,
other interested persons and organizations. and
such advisory committees as he may appoint.”
SUBCHAPTER [I—-INTERIM MANDATORY
HEALTH STANDARDS
» S41. Manxpyrony Hearra Sraxpanns ror Uxper-
GROUND Mines; Exeronceuent: Review: Perpvosr,
(a) The provisions of sections 842 through
546 of this title and the applicable provisions of
section 878 of this title shall be interim mandatory
health standards im
SUBCHAPTER IIL — INTERIM MANDA-
TORY SAFETY STANDARDS FOR UNDER-
GROUND COAL MINES
§ 861. Manpatory Sarety Staxparps ror Uxper-
GROUND MINES—Coverace: Exvorcement: Review
(a) The provisions of sections 862 through
S78 of this title shall be interim mandatory safety
standards applicable to all underground coal mines
until superseded in whole or in part by improved
mandatory safety standards promulgated by the
Secretary under the provisions of section 811 of
this title
“*(b) The purpose of this subchapter is to pro-
vide for the immediate application of mandatory
safety standards developed on the basis of experi-
ence and advances in technology and to prevent
newly created hazards resulting from new tech-
nology in coal mining. The Secretary shall im-
mediately initiate studies, investigations, and re-
search to further upgrade such standards and to
develop and promulgate new and improved stan-
dards promptly that will previde increased pro-
tection to the miners.
*(¢) (Provision for public hearing)”
The intention of Congress ix cousistently expressed
throughout the Act that it was enacting interim stan-
dards ouly and that the Secretary* would promulgate
revised and improved standards after consultation with
designated groups and opportunity for a public hearing.
This intent as expressed in the Act is confirmed by
the legislative history. The Legislative History, Fed-
eral Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, H.R. Rep. No.
91-563, Committee on Education and Labor, 91st Con-
gress, Ist Session, page 585 contains the following:
“Subsection (a) of this section (U.S.C. 811)
requires the Secretary, in the manner described
later, to develop, promulgate, and revise manda-
tory safety standards for the protection of life and
the prevention of injuries in coal mines subject to
the Act.”
* = *
$Respondents are not charged with violating any health stan-
dard so the word **Seeretary”* as used herein means the Secretary
of the Interior
Ne on ae So net eke BUNT A a a TR
WP
ea ad Maa
10
“Subsection (b) provides that when he de-
velops mandatory safety standards, the Seeretary
must consult with interested persons and organi-
zations de
* * *
“Subsection (f) provides that the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Board of Review shall, as
soon as a matter is referred to it, issue notice and
hold a public hearing. Within 60 days after it has
finished the hearing, the Board must issue a report
to the Secretary setting forth findings of fact and
appropriate recommendations.’
At page 653 of the same publication appears the fol-
lowing:
The flexibility afforded in the establishment
of mandatory health and safety standard (sie) by
Title | of the bill is not accomplished at the ex-
pense of either the operator or the miner. An
elaborate system of development, consultation,
publication, notice, hearings, and review—admin-
istrative and judicial—is provided.”
At page 1041 of the same publication we find this-
“o. The Senate bill provided that, where the
safety standards in this title provide that the Sec-
retary prescribe how certain actions, conditions. or
requirements be carried out, the rulemaking pro-
Visions of 5 U.S.C, 553 will apply, unless the See-
retary otherwise provides. The House amendmeit
had no comparable provision. The conference
agreement adopts the Senate provision with a
modification to recognize that the Secretary of
Health. Education, and Welfare also needs this
11
authority. This provision is not intended to apply
when a safety mandatory standard is being pro-
posed. In lieu of the rulemaking provisions, the
Secretary could utilize the procedures of section
101.”°
At page 726 of this same publication is a statement by
Congressman Dent of Pennsylvania who, as Chairman
of the Subcommittee, Education and Labor, House of
Representatives, did much of the spade work in draft-
ing the bill:
“A number of mandatory safety standards in
this title are written in broad general language,
such as those relating to the transportation of men
and materials, fire protection, perniissiblity, and
welding. The committee considered it unnecessary
at this time, to write into the bill detailed require-
ments in these cases, since present provisions of
the Bureau's code, interpretations, regulations, and
instructions which cover these matters in very
great detail will still be preserved under this act
so long as they do not conflict or are not incon-
sistent with the provisions of this act. The eom-
mittee, however, expects that the Bureau of Mines
will carefully review all of these and quickly im-
prove and revise them, and publish them as manda-
tory standards in order to insure adequate safety
to the miners. This comment is of particular im-
portance in the case of the code which has not been
revised since 1953. Further, if a particular item
in the code or any of these publications is of sig-
nificance from a safety standpoint it should be
published as a standard.”’
pene aM
—y
i
Se ae
ee ee tee er ae bs
Brew. Kune
12
The foregoing makes it abundantly clear that man-
datory standards which would form the basis of a
criminal prosecution were to be promulgated by the
Secretary ouly after compliance with the consultative
provisions of section 811.
III. In Promulgating the Regulations in Issue, the Secre-
tary Was Engaged in the Development and Revision
of Mandatory Safety Standards and Was Required to,
But Did Not, Comply With the Provisions of Sec-
tion 811(c).
Count VII of the indictment charged violations of
30 U.S.C. § 864(a) and the regulations codified at
30 C.F.R. § 75.400. Section 864(a) provides that coal
dust, including float coal dust, loose coal, and other com-
bustible materials, shall be cleaned up and not be per-
mitted to accumulate. Regulation § 75.400-1 defines
the terms coal dust, float coal dust, and loose coal.
Regulation § 75.400-2 requires the establishment and
maintenance of a **program for regular cleanup and
removal of accumulations of coal and float coal dusts,
loose coal, and other combustibles’’ which program
shall be available to the Secretary or his authorized
representative.
The critical question becomes whether the Secretary.
in promulgating these regulations, was engaged in the
“development and revision of mandatory safety stan-
dards**? If so, the formal rulemaking procedure set
out in section 811(¢) had to he followed, irrespective
of any other statutory authority. Section 811(¢) makes
apparent on its face that Congress has carved out of
13
sections 861(d) and 957 any rulemaking power that
deals with either the development or revision of these
mandatory safety standards.
In promulgating these regulations, the Secretary
published on November 20, 1970, some forty-five (45)
printed pages headed ** Part 75—Mandatory Safety
Standards, Underground Coal Mines” (Federal Regis-
ter, Volume 35, No. 226—30 C.F.R. Part 75). The
conclusory words in the headnote of the Federal Regis-
ter in which the regulations are published are these:
“Mandatory Health and Safety Standards, Under-
ground Coal Mines, amended and revised as set forth
below is (sic) herewith promulgated and shall become
effective upon publication in the Federal Register.”’
(Emphasis added.) The front page of this publication
reads as follows:
“TITLE 30—MINERAL RESOURCES
Chapter I—Bureau of Mines
Department of the Interior
Subchapter O—Coal Mine Health and Safety
Part 75—Manpatory Saretry STanparps, Uxper-
GROUND Coat MINES |
‘Pursuant to the authority contained in para-
graph (d) of section 301 of the Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969 (Public Law 91-173), there
was published in the Feperat REGISTERED (sic) for
August 14, 1970 (35 F.R. 12911), a°notice of pro-
posed rulemaking setting forth proposed amend-
meits and a new Subpart S, ‘Approved Books and
Records,’ to Part 75 of Title 30, Code of Fed-
eral Regulations, regarding mandatory health and
safety standards in underground coal mines.
ee wer
+) ae eee eltel OR ae oh
14
‘Interested persons were afforded a period of
30 days from the date of publication of the notice
in which to submit written comments, suggestions,
or objections to the proposed amendments and the
proposed new Subpart S. The period for sub-
mitting written comments, suggestions or objee-
tions was subsequently extended to September 30,
1970, by a notice published in the Feperat Recister
for September 5, 1970 (35 F.R. 14146). Approx-
imately 21 associations, companies, and individuals
submitted comments, suggestions or objections.
All were given careful consideration. A summary
of the comments and an explanation of the actions
taken with respect to them will be prepared by the
Bureau of Mines and will be available 30 days from
the date of this publication in the Office of the
Deputy Director for Health and Safety, Room
4512, Burean of Mines, Department of the Interior,
Washington, D. C. 20240,
“Some of the standards have been revised as
suggested ; in other instances, revisions were made
in view of the comments received. Some of the
suggestions could not be adopted because they were
contrary to the statutory provisions.
“Part 75 of Title 30 Code of Federal Regu-
lations, Subchapter O—Coal Mine Health and
Safety—Mandatory Health and Safety Standards,
Underground Coal Mines, amended and revised as
set forth below is herewith promulgated and shall
become effective upon publication in the Feperan
REGISTER.
Walter J. Hickel
Secretary of the Interior
November 25, 1970."
lo
In the forty-tive pages that follow, the Secretary
sets forth the interim mandatory standards section by
section and, for the most part, puts meat on the bones
of the Act by adding more specific requirements than
those contained in the Act. The Secretary could not
have made it any plainer what kind of rulemaking he
Was engaged in. The Secretary thus followed the Con-
gressional mandate by promulgating revised manda-
tory safety standards, but he studiously avoided the
consultative procedures and the opportunity for public
hearing which Congress had so clearly spelled out in
the Act. This was uo insignificant error for, in pro-
ceeding as he did, he was establishing standards the
violation of which could result in the imposition of
criminal sanctions. The complaint of the United States
that the ruling below will frustrate criminal and civil
penalty proceedings aud will render numerous viola-
tions unpunishable ix inapposite. It begs the question
whether the regulations, having been promulgated as
they were, can be legal imperatives which can serve
as a basis for a criminal prosecution and conviction.
The further contention that the Secretary was merely
defining terms and interpreting. the manner in which
the sections would be enforced is absurdly simplistic.
What he purported to do went to the very substance
of the Act—setting the limits of coal mine safety as a
matter of law.
It ix therefore clear that the Secretary accomplished
his announced purpose, .¢., the regulations in issue in
fact constitute revised mandatory safety standards.
Petitioner attempts to minimize the coal dust regula-
weet et
eR rh
16
tious at 30 C.F.R. § 75.400-1 as definitional because
they lack *‘noveity’’ in that they were first issued in
1911 and were reaffirmed in 1950 by the Bureau of
Mines. But, in setting the standards of what is legal
and what is criminal in a coal mine, section 811(¢)
enjoins him to consider **the latest technical data in the
field, the technical feasibility of the standards, and
experieuce gained under this and other safety statutes.”’
Surely the technology of coal mining has changed since
1911. Perhaps the regulations should be novel. Dif-
ferent tools, different means for circulating air, and
different extraction procedures all may infiuence the
matter of what is to be considered coal dust. Those
agencies and persons designated in section 811(¢) may
have constructive suggestions about what is to be con-
sidered coal dust. But the Secretary has had the benefit
of none of these consideratious—considerations which
Congress required him to apply in drafting standards—
because he unilaterally promulgated standards and now
seeks to impose them as standards of criminality. This
is exactly the kind of rulemaking which requires con-
sultation pursuant to section S11(c).
Similarly, 30 C.F.R. § 75.400-2 requires that a
“program for regular cleanup” of coal dust must be
established and maintained and that “such program
shall be available to the Secretary or his authorized
representative.” The statute, however, requires only
that the dust be **cleaned up and not permitted to
accumulate.”’ A coal operator, therefore, could comply
with the command of the statute but not be able to
~how that the eleanup was the result of a regular pro-
7
gram which he could produce for the Secretary. Of
this, the Court of Appeals said, -*We conclude that
30 C.F.R. § 75.400-2 changed the standard in § 864(a).”’
IV. The Regulations in Issue Cannot Be Upheld
Urder Section 957.
In drafting the Act, Congress chose uot to rely
exclusively upon the existing rulemaking provisions
already available in the Administrative Procedure Act.
The following statement by the House managers of the
Act is informative (H.R. Rep. No. 91-563, Committee
on Education and Labor, 91st Congress, Ist Session,
1041 (1969) ):
“This provision (5 U.S.C, 553) is not intended
to apply when a mandatory safety standard is
being proposed. In “1eu of the rulemaking pro-
visions, the Secretary could utilize the procedures
of seetion 101.”
The United States relies primarily upon the argu-
ment that the regulations in issue are interpretative of
statutory standards and were promulgated under sec-
tion 957, apparently no longer seriously contending
that the regulations in issue may be upheld under sec-
tion 861(d). While the distinction between interpreta-
tive or legislative regulations enjoys some judicial
acceptance in cases arising under the Administrative
Procedure Act, it is not pertinent here in dealing with
a special and unique statute. As stated by the District
Court. this distinction “should not be applied to the
construction of this law since all disputed regulation»
~
Is
are cited in the indictment, together with statutory pro-
visions, for maintaining the criminal prosecution.”’
The applicability of 7'ertile Mills Securities Cor-
poration V. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941), cited
by the Govermnent, is dependent upon the Govern-
ment’s thesis that section 957 amounts to a grant of
general rulemaking authority to the Secretary. Tectile
Mills did not involve a criminal prosecution or a stat-
ute in which Congress had explicitly established and
required a consultative procedure peculiar to the in-
dustry. The authority of the Secretary to promulgate
definitional regulations is uot, per se, in issue iv this
case except when the Secretary secks to invade the
area of mandator™ safety staridards. Whilethe manda-
tory safety standards which pertain to Count VII of
the indictment happen to be cast in part in definitional
language, it is substance and not verbiage which deter-
mine< the issue. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Asso-
ciation NV. Finch, 307 ¥. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970).
In Kelly vy. United States Department of the In-
terior, 339 F. Supp. 1095 (.D. Cal. 1972), the court
considered a department regulation which the Secre-
tary had published without giving the thirty-day notice
required by the Administrative Procedure Act. The
Seeretary had claimed the “good cause’ exception to
the notice rule, but failed to give adequate supporting
reasons for using the exception. Finding that the regu-
lation had been promulgated illegally, the court made
an observation which is even more telling in the present
ease in which Congress has commanded more explicit
econsiltation than that provided for in the Administra-
tive Procedure Act:
Iv
“Voiding the present regulations on what at
first blush appears to be a technicality is not as
pointless as it may seem. We believe that the
30-day notice rule serves an important interest,
the right of the people to present their views to the
government agencies which increasingly permeate
their lives. The interchange of ideas between the
government and its citizenry provides a broader
base for intelligent decision-making and promotes
greater responsiveness to the needs of the people,
especially in cases such as this where Congress has
only roughed in its program.”’ Jd. at 1102.
It is clear that Congress considered even the dia-
logue provided for in the Adiministrative Procedure
Act inadequate for regulation of coal mine safety, since
it specifically provided for a more rigorous consulta-
tive procedure. Nevertheless, the basie judicial rea-
soning in Kelly is consistent with the Congressional
intent expressed in the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act. See also Teraco, Ine. v. Federal Power
Commission, 412 F. 2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969).
Even if the term ‘interpretative’ is thought te
have signifieance in analyzing what the Secretary did,
the reasonable meaning of that term is totally ineom-
patible with the effect of the specific regulations in
issue here. By establishing **No. 200° or **No, 207°
seive standards in 30 CLF_R. § 75.400-1, the Secretary
purports to establish the point at which a criminal
case is made out; and in 30 C.F.R. § 75.400-2, he estab-
lishes an affirmative requirement not stated in the
statutory st.ndards at ail. The statutory interim stan-
dard requires that coal dust be ‘cleaned up” and
net “permitted to accumulate.” but under CPLR.
aniawneny §
20
§ 7400-2, the operator could have accomplished this
and still be subject to a criminal sanction for not hav-
ing set up a “regular cleaning program.’’ This sub-
section obviously does not merely define a erimiual
offense, but rather, it establishes a new criminal offense.
The Government also argues that section 811(¢) was
intended to apply only to long term improvement in
nine safety based upon new research and technology
which could not be accomplished virtually contem-
poraneously with the effective date of the Act. See-
tion S11(¢) obviously was intended to authorize the
Secretary to promulgate regulations to improve mine
safety in the vears to come. It is equally clear, how-
ever, that, i enacting section 811(¢), Congress con-
templated the immediate revision and upgrading of
mandatory standards. 30 U.S.C. § 861(b) expressly
provides that the Secretary **shall immediately initiate
studies, investigations, and research to further upgrade
such standards and to develop and promulgate new
and improved standards promptly that will provide
increased protection to the miners * * *.”
That the regulations involved in this proceeding
are not administrative in uature would thus seem to be
hbevond argument. They are substantive standards,
violation of which will subject the operator to civil
penalties and in some cases to criminal sanctions. They
were referred to as standards by the Secretary when
he promulgated them, and the Secretary has con-
sistently treated the challenged regulations as con-
stituting mandatory safety standards as ix evidenced
hy the fact that their violation is charged in the pend-
ing prosecution.
21
CONCLUSION
Four years ago, Cougress directed the Bureau of
Mines to establish mandatory safety standards aid
itself established certain interim standards. The
Secretary promulgated in the Federal Register what
he termed revised mandatory standards. He has
assessed against respondents civil penalties for alleged
Violation of these standards and has sought and ob-
tained an indictment against respondents for allegedly
violating them.’ It is clear from the context of the Act
that the Secretary was to proceed with dispatch in obe-
dience to the Congressional mandate. Now, four years
later, there are no mandatory safety standards in the
Federal Register unless the Secretary was promulgat-
ing mandatory safety standards on November 20, 1970,
as he said he was.
Respondents submit that the Secretary has at-
tempted to comply with the Congressional mandate to
promulgate standards but has failed to follow the re-
quired procedure. It would be fortuitious for the
Secretary if this case were to be resolved so that what
he has done would be allowed to stand without the in-
convenience of having to do it the way he was told.
Then the Bureau of Mines could persist indetinitely
in its failure to engage in the consultation demanded
by Congress. Congress made a careful legislative judg-
‘The Petitioner has tried to convey the impression that all crim-
inal enforcement of mine safety is hanging in the balance in this
case. Respondents, after some investigation, have learned of only
one other criminal proceeding under the Aet. United States of
America ¥. Consolidated Coal Company, Gi Cir. 1974 (Nos, 73-2086.
73-2085 >.
»)
ment concerning the manner in which the discretion
delegated to the Secretary was to be exercised, and the
Secretary must abide by that judgment. The thought-
ful opinions of the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals correctly place upon the Secretary the responsi-
bility Congress intended him to bear. The petition
for certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submnitted,
Bert T. Comes
1700 Kentucky Home Life Bldg.
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Epwarp F. Pricuarp
Frankfort, Kentucky
JAMES S. WILSON
Pikeville, Kentucky
Attorneys for Respondents
Tarrant, Combs, Buackweu & Beitr
Of Counsel
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