Brief for the Respondent in Opposition — Jno. McCall Coal Co. v. Culbertson
Supreme Court brief1974
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(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE ~— Kind of Action .....
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J.H. FRANKS AND HIS COMMITTEE ARE MADE
INVOLUNTARY PLAINTIFFS ..............
THE DISTRICT COURT’S OPINION DATED
EE AEE. Fo veces bed evktess ose
THE SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL
COMPLAINT FILED JULY 23, 1968 ..........
DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER TO THE SECOND
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL COM-
PLAINT, AND DEFENDANTS’ FIRST AND
SECOND COUNTERCLAIMS ...............
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR AMENDMENT
AND/OR CLARIFICATION OF ORDER OF
Oa Soca thg 5 bil a-w.bin-o oot niet 0422 oe
A EET E SSO Pr eRe CERES STE e
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND JUDGMENT
ORDER ENTERED DECEMBER 15,1972 ......
J.H. FRANKS, WILLIAM M. CULBERTSON, JR.,
C.A. CLYBORNE, AND VERNICE H. CLY-
BORNE, EXECUTRIX OF THE WILL OF C.A.
CLYBORNE, DECEASED, ARE NOW DE-
BRE eS eee ee ee
THE RECORD IN THE DISTRICT COURT AND
BEFORE THE SPECIAL MASTER ...........
Oc eee p bab bead ses cb ne e's 22
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- 22
1.
(ii)
THE COAL AVAILABLE TO WHITEWOOD
DURING THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1948, TO
DECEMBER 31, 1955, AND THE COAL
SEU ONES «og 3's oe bv Wikies ene
DEFENDANTS KNEW DURING THE EN-
TIRE PERIOD JULY 1, 1948 TO DECEM-
BER 31, 1955, THAT WHITEWOOD WAS
PURCHASING VARIOUS TYPES OF COAL
FROM OTHER PARTIES, AND WAS MIX-
ING SUCH COALS WITH THE COAL
MINED ON THE GILLESPIE HINTON
LEASE, AND SHIPPING THE MIXED
COAL TO McCALL. DEFENDANTS ALSO
KNEW THAT IN 1950 AND THE EARLY
PART OF 1951, WHITEWOOD WAS
MINING JAWBONE COAL ON THE
HINTON TRACT, MIXING THE JAWBONE
WITH CARY COAL AND SHIPPING SAME
Co | ARES ie ae age Qe OP Pe a
THE EVIDENCE IS ENTIRELY INSUF-
FICIENT TO HAVE JUSTIFIED THE
SPECIAL MASTER, THE DISTRICT
COURT, OR THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS, IN DENYING WHITEWOOD
RELIEF HEREIN ON THE GROUND
THAT IT DID NOT COME INTO COURT
por ge hl go ers Sree
A. The Alleged Misconduct of Whitewood,
During The Period 1948 to 1955 Is Not
Sufficiently Connected With, Or Related
To, The Present Controversy Between
Plaintiff And Defendants, To Justify The
Application Of The “Clean Hands”
Se 2.2 » 6’ Och a2 120 Ere. bb O-8 a 8.6.6.9
rear eee Oe 6 6 CAs. S.8 2.06 2.6 0 6 6 2. 0 6
Page
Cases:
(iti)
B. The Doctrine of Unclean Hands Is Not
Applicable To This Case, Since The
Evidence Shows Clearly That The De-
fendants Were Not Injured Or Damaged
In Any Way By Whitewood’s Alleged
Wrongful Conduct
C. The Clean Hands Maxim Is Subject To
Reasonable Limitations. The Maxim Is
Not One Of Absolutes And Should Be
Applied In The Court’s Discretion, So As
To Accomplish Its Purpose Of Promoting
Public Policy And The Integrity Of The
Courts
IN FINDING THAT WHITEWOOD WAS
ENTITLED TO RECOVER FROM DE.
FENDANTS, BUT THAT DEFENDANTS
WERE NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER
UNDER THEIR SECOND COUNTER.
CLAIM AGAINST WHITEWOOD, THE
SPECIAL MASTER NECESSARILY
FOUND THAT WHITEWOOD WAS NOT
GUILTY OF FRAUDULENT CONDUCT
WHICH PRECLUDED RELIEF TO WHITE.
WOOD
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, IN
AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT ENTERED
BY THE DISTRICT COURT, DID NOT
FAIL TO CONSIDER THE “CLEAN
HANDS” DEFENSE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Baue v. Embalmers Federal Labor Union (Mo.) 376
S.W.2d 230
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Te eet ee Ce ae el ae ae al ea
PSE SSD Rie OE) ah eS bee io
Page
(iv)
Page
Carr v. Yokohama Specie Bank, Limited (CCA 9th
INI. M5 hg Site ob onaie ine bikk b's Oo 2 a 0 60 44
Darter v. Greenville Community Hotel Corporation
2 a rarer - 44-45
Ford v. Buffalo Eagle Colliery Company (CCA 4th
SE I Ra SS. Sie.5 hs ok oe ves eee 41
Heck v. Morgan, 106 S.E. 413, 88 W.Va. 102 ........... 37
thrig v. thrig, 88 S.E. 1010, 78 W.Va. 360 ............. 37
Keystone Driller Company v. General Excavator
Co., 290 US. 240, 78 L. Ed. 293,54S.Ct.146 ...... 41
Miller Todd Coal Co. v. Adrain Fuel Co., 1 S.E.2d
en rh hea ss bk ne Se Oe be 6 S'8 37
Waller v. Eanes, Admr. (Va.) 157S.E.721 ........... 41,42
White v. Graham, 164 S.E. 664, 112 W.Va. 451 ......... 37
Other Authorities:
ok ok nap ee wie b eee es 0s 36
Ns a wales eh bos k bb esa. 39
27 Am. Jur. 2d 668,669 ........ ae oP ares yk eh sf 41
ess 6 or Gwe oe ied db dn Sa Oo > 0 .wie eo 0s 41
ET POEM Nove pews okeboesonwvstens 41
Volume 5, Moore’s Federal Practice, pages 2710,
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1974
No. 74-358
JNO. McCALL COAL COMPANY, INC., a Maryland
corporation, CLYBORNE, INC., a West Virginia corpor-
ation, and VERNICE H. CLYBORNE, Executrix of the
will of C.A. Clyborne, deceased,
Petitioners,
RUTH M. CULBERTSON, Executrix of the will of
William M. Culbertson, Jr., deceased, last surviving
partner of the partnership of J.H. Franks and William
M. Culbertson, Jr., doing business as Whitewood
Smokeless Coal Company,
Respondent.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
William M. Culbertson, Jr., J.H. Franks, Whitewood
Smokeless Coal Company, Jno. McCall Coal Company,
2
Inc., and C.A. Clyborne, when referred to separately,
will be designated as Culbertson, Franks, Whitewood,
McCall and Clyborne, respectively. Jno. McCall Coal
Company, Inc., Clyborne, Inc., and C.A. Clyborne,
swhen referred to collectively, will be referred to as
defendants.
REFERENCES TO RECORD AND EXHIBITS
This case was tried before the District Court on
October 10, 11 and 12, 1966. Following the hearing in
the District Court, the case was referred to W.T.
ancock, Special Master. References to the transcript of
e hearing in the District Court will be Ct. Tr. ;
References to the exhibits filed in the District Court
il be Pi. Ct. Ex. “a: Se: ome o
References to the transcript of the hearings before the
Special Master will be Tr. . References to the
exhibits filed before the Special Master will be Pl. Ex.
_ or Ds. Ex. . References to the Appendix to
he Petition filed herein will be App.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED |
1. Would the evidence heard in the District Court,
and by the Special Master, have justified a finding that
itewood was guilty of unclean hands to an extent .
hich would deny it relief in a court of equity?
2. Did the District Court commit prejudicial error in
ailing to make a specific finding of fact with reference
o the defense of unclean hands? |
!
3
3. Did the Circuit Court of Appeals, in failing to
discuss, or make a specific finding with reference to the
defense of unclean hands, deprive petitioners of
property without due process of law, in violation of
Amendment V to the Constitution of the United
States?
4. Did the Circuit Court of Appeals, in failing to
make a specific finding with reference to the defense of
unclean hands, so far depart from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanction
such a departure by the District Court, as to call for an
exercise of this Court’s power of supervision?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Kind of Action
This is a civil action instituted by William M.
Culbertson, Jr., a member of a partnership known as
Whitewood Smokeless Coal Company, formerly engaged
in mining and shipping coal in Buchanan County,
Virginia, for the purpose of requiring defendants to
account for the proceeds of sales of Whitewood’s coal
shipped by Whitewood to McCall. during the period
July 1, 1948 to December 31, 1955. less agreed sales
commissions, and to recover the amount due. with
interest and punitive damages. The Complaint also asks
that defendants be required to return to Whitewood the
sales commissions retained by McCall on sales with
respect to which McCall did not properly account.
The Complaint alleged, and the proof showed, that
by virtue of a written lease, dated June 20. 1947, from
4
J.H. Franks and C.A. Clyborne, to Culbertson and
Franks (Pl. Ct. Ex. 1), the latter were given the right
and privilege of mining, by deep mining methods, the
Cary seam of coal located on the Hinton tract of
approximately 1,100 acres of land, and the Gillespie
tract of 2,314 acres of land, all of which land was
located in Buchanan County, Virginia. In consideration
of such mining rights, Franks and Culbertson agreed to
pay to Clyborne and Franks, as lessors, certain royalties
on all coal mined.
The said lease agreement further provided as follows:
“It is further covenanted and agreed between all
the parties herein and by the Lessees that C.A.
Clybore or his assignee shall be the Exclusive
Distributor for the entire output of all coal mined
and produced from all of the tracts of land under
this lease during the entire life of this lease and
any renewal thereof;
“The said C.A. Clyborne as Exclusive Distri-
butor covenants for himself and his Assignee that:
he will use all reasonable and diligent efforts in
selling and disposing of said coal at the besi
available market price; in consideration of said
services as Exclusive Distributor, the said C.A.
Clyborne or his Assignee shall receive a sales
commission of Twenty Cents (20¢) per net ton of
two thousand (2,000) pounds of all coal sold. In
the event that market conditions become such that
the selling expenses for handling this coal increases
or selling costs can be shown that justify any
change, the said C.A. Clyborne as distributor or
sales agent shall receive eight per cent (8%) of the
realized price on any coal sold as sales com-
mission.”
5
The above mentioned agreement was prepared by
defendants’ attorney.
Shortly after the execution of said agreement,
Clyborne orally assigned to McCall such rights as he,
Clyborne, had thereunder to act as “exclusive distri-
butor,” or “sales agent,” for Whitewood’s coal.
Following said oral assignment, }.{cCall designated
defendant Clyborne, Inc., as its agent to sell the
Whitewood coal, and agreed to pay Clyborne, Inc. 70%
of the commissions received from Culbertson and
Franks. McCall retained 30% of the commissions
received. Clyborne and wife owned practically all of the
Clyborne, Inc. stock.
During the period July 1, 1948 to June 15, 1954,
Whitewood Smokeless Coal Company, a partnership
consisting of J.H. Franks and William M. Culbertson,
Jr., was engaged in mining coal in Buchanan County,
Virginia, which coal it delivered in railroad cars at its
tipple to McCall, Whitewood’s alleged sales agent. The
coal was usually consigned to McCall at the railway
company’s scales at either Bluefield, West Virginia or
Portsmouth or Roanoke, Virginia. Except in rare
instances, Whitewood did not know the destinations of
its coal, or the names of the purchasers.
Franks became ill about June 15, 1954, and retired
from the firm and thereafter Culbertson continued to
mine coal in the name of Whitewood Smokeless Coal
Company, and this coal was likewise delivered in
railroad cars, at Whitewood’s tipple, to McCall. During
the period July 1, 1948 to December 31, 1955,
Whitewood delivered to McCall a total of 246,014.10
tons of coal which McCall sold, or otherwise disposed
of.
6
DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER
The Answer filed on behalf of defendants alleges that
during the period June 1947 through January 1949,
McCall paid to Whitewood the prices received by
McCall for Whitewood’s coal, less the agreed selling
commissions. The Answer further alleges “that effective
February 1, 1949, by mutual agreement, the agency
portion of said Exclusive Distributorship Agreement was
terminated, and that thereafter the said Jno. McCall
Coal Company, Inc. purchased the coal from the
plaintiff, trading as Whitewood Smokeless Coal Com-
pany, at prices agreed upon between the parties from
time to time, and which prices were thereafter paid by
Jno. McCall Coal Company, Inc. to the said Whitewood
Smokeless Coal Company in the ordinary course of
business.”
The Answer also pleads the 5 and 10 year Statutes of
Limitations.
Thus the two questions initially presented to the
District Court were first, whether the “agency portion”
of the agreement dated June 20, 1947 (PI. Ct. Ex. 1)
was terminated by mutual agreement of the parties as
of February 1, 1949, as contended by defendants, and
if not, whether plaintiff's claim was barred by the 5 or
10 year statute of limitations.
J.H. FRANKS AND HIS COMMITTEE ARE
MADE INVOLUNTARY PLAINTIFFS
At the hearing in the District Court, Culbertson
testified that when Franks ceased working and
5
withdrew from the partnership in June of 1954, he and
Franks entered into two written agreements GL ct
Exs. 25 and 26), by the terms of which he, Culbertson,
took over all of the assets of the partnership, consisting
largely of obsolete mining equipment, and assumed and
paid Whitewood’s debts and liabilities, and took the
position that he, Culbertson, had the right to maintain
this action in his own name.
However, at the hearing in the District Court,
defendants called as witnesses Mrs. Cora Franks, the
wife of J.H. Franks, J.C. Franks, the son of J.H.
Franks, and Dr. Joseph Robinson, and the testimony of
these witnesses indicated that J.H. Franks was mentally
incompetent when he entered into the two written
agreements with Culbertson (PI. Ct. Exs. 25 and 26).
Upon the completion of such testimony, counsel for
Culbertson moved the Court to make J.H. Franks a
party to the action. However, the District Court held
that the questions of agency, and statute of limitations,
should first be decided, and if these questions were
decided in favor of Whitewood, then Whitewood’s
motion to make J.H. Franks a party, would be
considered.
Following the hearing in the District Court. J.H.
Franks was adjudged a mental incompetent, following
which Culbertson again moved for an order making J.H.
Franks, and his committee, involuntary plaintiffs to this
action.
Later, the District Court, in its Memorandum dated
July 18, 1967, held that J.H. Franks lacked sufficient
mental competency or understanding at the time of the
execution of the agreements in question (PI. Ct. Exs. 25
and 26), to adequately comprehend their legal signifi-
8
cance, and that said agreements were not binding on
Franks. The Court also held that J.H. Franks was an
indispensable party to this action.
Later, on July 25, 1967, over defendants’ objection,
the District Court entered an order making Franks and
his committee involuntary plaintiffs herein.
In the District Court’s Memorandum dated July 18,
1967, the Court said: “I find nothing in the evidence,
however, to suggest that Mr. Culbertson made any false
or fraudulent representations or exercised any undue
influence to or over Mr. Franks to induce him to sign
these writings. In fact just the contrary appears, for
Mrs. Franks testified that she remembered that on at
least one occasion Culbertson tried to get her husband
to join with him in prosecuting a suit against these
defendants. Culbertson testified to other attempts to
get Mr. Franks to join with him in this action, and
there is no evidence in contradiction.”
The Court’s statement is fully supported by the
testimony of Mrs. Cora Franks. (Ct. Tr. 483-489) and
by Culbertson’s testimony (Ct. Tr. 368-375; 436-444).
At the time in question, J.H. Franks was 79 years of
age and in bad health. Mrs. Cora Franks was 78 years
of age.
THE DISTRICT COURT’S OPINION
DATED SEPTEMBER 28, 1967
On September 28, 1967, the District Court handed
down its written opinion, which is reported in 275 F.
Supp. 662 (App. la). The District Court, in its Findings
9
of Fact and Conclusions of Law held in substance
(App. 40a - 42a):
1. Pursuant to the terms of the written lease and
agreement dated June 20, 1947, between Franks,
Culbertson and Clyborne (PI. Ct. Ex. 1), McCall, as
Clyborne’s assignee, became the exclusive sales agent for
the sale of all coal mined and produced by Whitewood,
from the lands described in said lease.
2. The said agreement was not changed or modified
as of February 1, 1949, as testified by Clyborne, but to
the contrary, the agreement continued in full force and
effect during the entire period June 20, 1947 to
December 31, 1955, except that the agreement with
respect to McCall’s sales commissions was modified.
3. During the period July 1, 1948 to September 23,
1948, pursuant to said lease and agreement dated June
20, 1947, McCall was entitled to receive for its services
in selling Whitewood’s coal 20¢ per net ton. During the
period September 23, 1948 to September 3, 1951,
pursuant to said lease and agreement dated June 20,
1947, McCall was entitled to receive for its services in
selling Whitewood’s coal a commission of 8% of the
selling price. During the period September 3, 1951 to
December 31, 1955, pursuant to an oral agreement
between Franks and Culbertson and McCall, later
confirmed by correspondence (PI. Ct. Exs. 4 and 5)
McCall was entitled to receive for its services in selling
Whitewood’s coal a commission of 25c per net ton.
4. During the entire period July 1, 1948 to
December 31, 1955, Franks and Culbertson believed,
and were justified in believing, that McCall was paying
to Whitewood for its coal, the sales prices réceived by
McCall for said coal, less the commissions to which
anaes
10
McCall was entitled under the written agreement dated
June 20, 1947, as modified by the agreement effective
September 3, 1951.
5. During the period July 1, 1948 to December 31,
1955, neither Franks nor Culbertson had reasonable
cause or grounds to believe, or suspect, that McCall was
not accounting to Whitewood for the proceeds of sales
of Whitewood’s coal, less McCall’s agreed selling |
commissions.
6. During the period July 1, 1948 to Decemoer 31,
1955, McCall did not pay to Whitewood the full
proceeds of sales of Whitewood’s coal, less McCall’s
agreed selling commissions. To the contrary, during said
entire period McCall, through copies of orders and mine
sheets furnished by McCall to Whitewood, consistently
concealed from Whitewood the prices received by
McCall for Whitewood’s coal.
7. Neither Franks nor Culbertson knew, or had
reasonable cause to believe, until the latter part of
1963, that McCall, during the period July 1, 1948 to
December 31, 1955, had misrepresented to Whitewood,
or was concealing from Whitewood, the prices obtained
by McCall for Whitewood’s coal, or that during said
period Mccall had underpaid Whitewood for its coal.
The District Court also held that certain evidence
offered by Whitewood with respect to transactions
between defendants and Pine Oaks Coal Corporation,
during the period 1955-1961, was admissible for the
purpose of showing a general plan or scheme on
McCall’s part to deceive. We quote from the District
Court’s opinion discussing the Pine Oaks evidence (App.
23a-24a):
“We reach this decision because it appears that
the circumstances in the Pine Uaks case, as shown
by the record, were so similar in nature and point
of time to those of the instant case that they tend
to show a genera! plan or scheme on the part of
McCall to deceive. A detailed recital here of the
facts and circumstances of the Pine Oaks case
would seem to be unnecessary to a resolution of
the issues involved in the case before us. Suffice it
to say that Pine Oaks, becoming suspicious that
McCall was not properly accounting to it, engaged
counsel to take the matter up with McCall.
Counsel so employed wrote McCall requesting
permission to examine McCall’s books. McCall
responded by saying it was not indebted to Pine
Oaks in any amount, but that Pine Oaks was
indebted to it for an amount ‘largely in excess of
the amount due for coal invoiced,’ plaintiffs’
Exhibit No. 12, see also McCall’s testimony, Tr.
194. Later, there was a conference between
McCall, Clyborne, and their attorneys on the one
hand, and Pine Oaks and its attorneys on the
other, at which it was agreed that Pine Oaks could
audit McCall’s books, Tr. 194-200. However. the
next day McCall’s check, dated December 20,
1961, for $33,671.05, payable to Pine Oaks Coal
Corporation, was mailed out of McCall’s Baltimore
office to Pine Oaks, accompanied by a letter,
plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 13. McCail posted on its
ledger a credit memorandum in favor of Pine Oaks
in the sum of $44,807.38, Tr. 194-5, indicating
the advances it had made Pine Oaks against coal
shipped amounted to only $11,136.33, leaving
owing to Pine Oaks a balance of $33,671.05,
which Pine Oaks later accepted as a satisfactory
adjustment of the account.
* * a * *
12
“All of the testimony concerning the sales of
Pine Oaks’ coal by McCall was offered by
Culbertson for the purpose of showing that McCall
perpetrated a fraud on Pine Oaks, similar to the
alleged fraud perpetrated by McCall on White-
wood, and such testimony is now admitted into
evidence and considered by the Court for that
purpose only.”
THE SECOND AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL
COMPLAINT FILED JULY 23, 1968
The Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint
alleged that during the period July 1, 1948 to
December 31, 1955, inclusive, Whitewood, with the
knowledge, consent and approval of defendants, pur-
chased a substantial tonnage of coal, not mined on the
property referred to in said lease and agreement, dated
June 20, 1947, and shipped and delivered the purchased
coal to McCall with the understanding and agreement
that McCall would account to Whitewood, for the
proceeds of sales of said purchased coal, on the same
basis, and for the same sales commissions, that McCall
was required to account to Whitewood, for the coal
mined and produced by Whitewood, from the /eased
property, and shipped to McCall. It was further alleged
that McCall did not so account, but to the contrary,
wilfully and intentionally misrepresented to Whitewood,
the prices received by McCall, for the coal purchased by
Whitewood, and shipped to McCall, and wilfully and
intentionally underpaid Whitewood for said coal.
The order of July 23, 1968, permitting plaintiff to
file his Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint,
also referred the case to W.T. Hancock, Special Master.
13
DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER TO THE SECOND
AMENDED AND SUPPMENTAL COM-
PLAINT, AND DEFENDANTS’ FIRST AND
SECOND COUNTERCLAIMS.
Defendants’ answer asserted that the cause of action
pleaded in the Second Amended and Supplemental
Complaint was barred by the West Virginia Statute of
Limitations. The answer also alleged that the Second
Amended and Supplemental Complaint was fraudulent
and was not filed in good faith.
Defendants’ Answer to the Second Amended and
Supplemental Complaint also contained two
counterclaims against plaintiff — the First Counterclaim
and the Second Counterclaim: ‘
The First Counterclaim alleged that by virtue of said
lease and agreement dated June 20, 1947 (PI. Ct. Ex. 1)
Whitewood was required to ship to McCall all of the
coal mined by Whitewood on the property described in
the lease, but contrary to the terms of said lease and
agreement, and without McCall’s knowledge, consent or
approval, Whitewood sold to other parties, a substantial
quantity of the coal mined by Whitewood on said
leased property; that Whitewood had fraudulently
concealed said sales from McCall; and that McCall was
damaged thereby.
The Second Counterclaim alleged that it was
Whitewood’s duty under said lease and agreement, to
ship to McCall only the coal mined on said leased
property, but that Whitewood, without McCall’s
knowledge, consent or approval, purchased a large
quantity of coal, inferior in quality to the coal mined
on said lease, and mixed the purchased coal with the
coal mined on the leased property, and shipped the
\
14
mixed coal to McCall; and that McCall, without
knowledge of the facts, shipped said coal to its
customers and thereby sustained damage.
Defendants alleged in their First and Second
Counterclaims that Whitewood was guilty of fraud, and
demanded compensatory and punitive damages.
A considerable amount of evidence pertaining to said
Counterclaims, was introduced before the Special
Master, but in the end, defendants apparently
abandoned both Counterclaims, since they did not
mention either of the Counterclaims in their briefs to
the Special Master or the District Court. The Special
Master and the District Court found against defendants
on both Counterclaims and the Counterclaims were not
involved on the appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR AMENDMENT AND/OR
CLARIFICATION OF ORDER OF REFERENCE
On December 17, 1968, at a hearing before the
Special Master, plaintiff offered in evidence a schedule
prepared by B.F. Jones, a certified public accountant—
said schedule being identified as Plaintiff's Exhibit No.
19. The exhibit purported to show all of the coal
shipped by Whitewood to McCall, the prices received by
McCall for the coal, the prices paid by McCail to
Whitewood, and the commissions deducted by McCall.
Defendants objected to the exhibit on the ground
that the Cary coal mined by Whitewood from the
Hinton-Gillespie lease, and shipped to McCall, was not
shown separately from other coal purchased or
otherwise acquired by Whitewood, and also shipped to
15
McCall. Defendants contended that the exhibit was
inadmissible, because it did not identify any particular
car of coal as coming from the Hinton-Gillespie tract or
as being acquired by Whitewood from other sources.
Plaintiff contended that there was an implied
agreement between Whitewood and McCall that the
Cary coal mined on the Hinton-Gillespie tract, and
shipped to McCall, and coal acquired by Whitewc .d
from other sources and shipped to McCall, would all be
accounted for on the same basis and in the same
manner, and that therefore, it was immaterial that none
of the shipments made by Whitewood to McCall, could
be identified as coming from the Hinton-Gillespie tract,
or from other sources.
At that time, (Tr. 316) the Special Master stated that
he would reserve his ruling on the admissibility of
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 19. The discussion of this exhibit
between counsel for plaintiff and defendants appears on
pages 302-316 of the transcript.
Later, on March 19, 1969, at a hearing before the
Special Master, and after plaintiff had rested his case,
counsel for defendants requested the Special Master to
tule on the admissibility of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 19,
prior to the introduction by defendants of their
evidence. Thereupon, the Special Master ruled that the
Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 19 would be received in
evidence, (Tr. 1131-2).
Counsel for defendants then requested an adjourn-
ment of the hearings before the Special Master in order
to give defendants an opportunity to present the matter
to the District Court, and obtain the Court’s ruling on
the admissibility of Plaintiff's Exhibit 19. Such
permission was granted, and on February 4, 1970,
16
defendants filed their Motion for Amendment and/or
Clarification of Order of Reference, and the Motion was
argued before the District Court.
Later,, by an order entered on April 24, 1970, the
District Court denied in part, and granted in part, said
motion. W/e quote from said order:
“The Court has reviewed with the Special
Master the evidence adduced before him and,
considering it in light of all the circumstances
surrounding the parties and their modus operandi
we reach the conclusion that the plaintiff has
made a prima facie showing sufficient to raise and
support an implied understanding that the same
‘commission arrangement the parties had with
' reference to the Hinton-Gillespie coal would be
applied to the outside coal as well, and further,
that since essentially the same circumstances are
found to exist, on the quéstion of concealment of
prices received for the purchased coal as those
_ previously found to have existed, with reference to
the prices received for the leased coal, our previous
ruling on the question of the tolling of the statute
of limitations as to the leased coal will also apply
to and govern the question of the tolling of the
statute of limitations’ with reference to the
purchased coal. We reserve, however, the right to
re-examine these questions and possibly reach
contra conclusions ut the close of all the evidence.
We further find from plaintiff's evidence that it is
not now possible for him to separate by quantity
the coal shipped off the Hinton-Gillespie lease
from the coal shipped from purchased coal, and
that unless the defendants can by their own
evidence establish a reasonably accurate basis for
such separation, the Special Master shall ascertain
and determine the amounts, if any, due and owing
with respect to all coal shipped and delivered by
reese cee ee a RE AT TUONO OP TO OT
17
the plaintiff to the defendants without regard to
the source of such coal.”
However, apparently defendants abandoned their
contention that the coal mined on the leased property,
and shipped to McCall, should have been shown
separately from the other coal purchased, or otherwise
acquired by Whitewood, and shipped to McCall, since
they did not object to the action of the Special Master
or the District Court, in overruling this contention, and
did not present that issue to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for review.
THE SPECIAL MASTER’S REPORT OF
MAY 3, 1972
The Special Master’s report contains Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. Many of the Special Master’s
findings are not now material, since they were not
presented for review in the Circuit Court of Appeals.
However, included in the Special Master’s Findings of
Fact, although not in the order shown in the report, or
in the exact words of the Special Master, are the
following Findings of Fact (App. 73a-77a):
1. During the period July 1, 1948 to December 31.
1955, Whitewood shipped to McCall, 246,014.10 tons
of coal which McCall accepted and sold to others.
2. The major portion of this coal was from the
leased property described in the Agreement of June 20,
1947, but a substantial portion thereof was coal
purchased by Whitewood from others, and it was
impossible to determine what part of the coal shipped
was leasehold coal and what part was purchased coal.
18
3. McCall knew, and consented to the shipping of
outside coal by Whitewood to McCall, and there was an
implied agreement between McCall and Whitewood, that
all coal shipped by Whitewood to McCall would be
accounted for as required by the Agreement of June
20, 1947.
4. In certain instances, McCall paid Whitewood for
its coal, an amount greater than the full proceeds of
sales, less agreed selling commissions, the total of said
overpayments being $1,462.96. In 630 instances McCall
paid Whitewood the full proceeds of sales less the
agreed selling commissions. In 1,050 transactions McCall
paid Whitewood for its coal, an amount which was less
than the full proceeds of sales, less the agreed selling
commissions, the total of these “underpayments”’ being
$50,337.23. During said period, the net amount of such
underpayments by McCall to Whitewood, for all coal
shipped by Whitewood to McCall was $48,874.28.
5. The commissions deducted and retained by
McCall, in those instances -where it “underpaid”
Whitewood, amounted ta $56,092.07, and all of such
commissions were on sales as to which the selling prices
were wilfully and _ intentionally underreported to
Whitewood.
6. During the period July 1, 1948 to December 31,
1955, without Whitewood’s knowledge, consent or
approval, McCall sold 37,027.95 tons of Whitewood’s
oal to American Southern Export Company, and
erican Southern Export Company realized a profit
f 20¢ per ton on the resale of said coal. The
efendants “effectively controlled American Southern
nd enjoyed substantially its business and its profits.”
]9
7. The commissions deducted by McCall from its
settlements with Whitewood for the coal sold to
American Southern Export Company, exclusive of
commissions on the underpayments previously referred
to, amounted to $6,569.52.
Under Conclusions of Law, the Special Master found
as follows (App. 77a-78a):
“1. Under the written agreement of June 20,
1947, as modified from time to time by the
parties, and the subsequent implied agreement
between Whitewood and McCall that the terms of
the written agreement would apply to all of the
coal shipped by Whitewood to McCall, McCall
acted in a fiduciary capacity as agent for
Whitewood in the selling of such coal, and is
accountable to Whitewood for the price at which
it sold all of the coal mined on the leasehold and
shipped by Whitewood to McCall during the period
July 1, 1948 to December 31, 1955, and all of the
coal mined on property other than said leasehold,
and purchased by Whitewood, and shipped to
McCall during said period.
“2. Neither the West Virginia statute of limita-
tions nor the defense of laches is available to
defendants in bar of plaintiff's claims asserted in
this action.
“3. McCall underpaid Whitewood in the amount
of $48,874.28 for the coal shipped by Whitewood
to McCall during the period July 1, 1948 to
December 31, 1955, and defendants are indebted
to plaintiff in that amount.
“4. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the
aforesaid $48,874.28 at the rate of 6% per annum
from December 31, 1955 until paid.
“5. McCall was not entitled, by reason of its
improper conduct, to deduct the otherwise proper
20
commissions in the amount of $56,092.07 for the
transactions in which it underpaid Whitewood
during the period July 1, 1948 to December 31,
1955, and defendants are indebted to plaintiff in
that amount. |
“6. By reason of their undisclosed self-dealing
in the sale of Whitewood’s coal to American
Southern Export Company during the period July
1, 1948 to December 31, 1955, defendants are
indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $7,405.59.
“7. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the
aforesaid $7,405.59 at the rate of 6% per annum
from December 31, 1955 until paid.
“8. McCall was not entitled, by reason of the
relationship that existed between defendants and
American Southern, to deduct the otherwise
proper commissions in the amount of $6,569.52
(exclusive of such as are included among the
commissions referred to in Conclusion of Law No.
5 above) for its sales of Whitewood’s coal to
American Southern during the period July 1, 1948
to December 31, 1955, and the defendants are
indebted to plaintiff in that amount.
* * * x
“13. Plaintiff owes nothing to defendants on
account of coal mined from the _ leasehold
described in the agreement of June 20, 1947 and
shipped by Whitewood to others than McCall
during the period June 20, 1947 to December 31,
1955, or as damages because of coal shipped by
Whitewood to McCall which came elsewhere than
from the leasehold; nor are defendants entitled to
recover punitive damages from plaintiff in this
action.”
The Special Master in said report also found that
plaintiff was not entitled to recover from defendants on
21
account of certain other claims made by plaintiff
against defendants, and should not recover attorney’s
fees and accounting fees from defendant. However.
none of the claims decided adversely to plaintiff are
now in issue.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND JUDGMENT ORDER
ENTERED DECEMBER 15, 1972
In said Memorandum Decision and Judgment Order,
which has not been published, the District Court
affirmed the Special Master’s report as filed, and
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff against defend-
ants in the sum of $176,1964. _ ith interest from
December 15, 1972 until paid, sts (App. 79a).
J.H. FRANKS, WILLIAM M. CULBERTSON,
JR., C.A. CLYBORNE, AND VERNICE H.
CLYBORNE, EXECUTRIX OF THE WILL
OF C.A. CLYBORNE, DECEASED, ARE
NOW DECEASED.
J.H. Franks died prior to the completion of the
hearings before the Special Master, and William M.
Culbertson, Jr. and C.A. Clyborne died subsequent to
the completion of said hearings. Vernice H. Clyborne,
Executrix of the will of C.A. Clyborne, deceased, died a
short time prior to the filing of the Petition For Writ of
Certiorari herein. In the event that plaintiff recovers
fror the defendants, such recovery, after the payient
of attorney’s fees and expenses, will be divided equally
22
between the estates of J.H. Franks and William M.
Culbertson, Jr.
THE RECORD IN THE DISTRICT COURT
AND BEFORE THE SPECIAL MASTER
Hearings in the District Court were held on October
10, 11 and 12, 1966, and January 15, 1968. The
transcript of the evidence in the District Court consists
of approximately 600 pages, and approximately 40
exhibits, some of them quite voluminous, were
introduced in the District Court.
The hearings before the Special Master consumed
nine (9) days. The transcript of the evidence before the
Special Master consists of approximately 1,600 pages.
There were 84 exhibits, several quite voluminous, filed
before the Special Master.
The opinions filed by the District Court, and the
Special Master’s report, indicate that the District Court
and the Special Master gave the case the most careful
consideration, and were quite careful to protect the
interests of the defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since a detailed statement of the facts involved
herein appears in the District Court’s Memorandum
Opinion dated September 28, 1967 (App. 1a), and the
Special Master’s report (App. 43a), and only the
question of Whitewood’s “unclean hands” has been
presented by petitioner to this Court for review, we will
= ee.
23
limit our statement of the facts to the evidence bearing
upon that particular issue.
1. The Coal Available To Whitewood During The Period
July 1, 1948, To December 31, 1955, And The Coal
Shipped To McCall.
During the period June 20, 1947, to December 31,
1955, Whitewood mined from the Gillespie and Hinton
tracts, leased from Clyborne and Franks, 229,209.27
tons of Cary coal, or at least paid the lessors royalty on
that tonnage.
However, 14,963.83 tons were mined prior to July
20, 1948, the date Whitewood began operating its
tipple. This 14,963.83 tons was sold by Whitewood to
others, with the knowledge, consent and approval of
defendants. As to this there is no dispute.
7,271.17 of said tonnage, on which royalty was
paid, was Jawbone coal, but Whitewood was not
required under the lease to pay royalty on the Jawbone
coal to the lessors.
Therefore, the Cary tons mined by Whitewood on
the Gillespie Hinton lease which McCall was entitled to
receive during the period July 20, 1948, to December
31, 1955, was 206,974.27 tons. See Special Master’s
report (App. 53a) and Plaintiff's Exhibit 20.
However, during the period July 1, 1948, to
December 31, 1955, Whitewood actually shipped
McCall 246,014.10 tons of coal (App. 48a). The excess
over and above 206,974.27 tons consisted of Jawbone,
Cary, Red Ash and Big Banner coal, which Whitewood
had purchased from other persons, or had mined from
the Jawbone seam on the M. D. Hinton tract.
24
The purchased coal was as follows:
Jawbone 3,170.80 tons
Cary 40,589.17 tons
Red Ash 2,005.17 tons
Big Banner 5,570.40 tons
Total Tons Purchased 51,335.54 tons
See Plaintiff's Exhibit 20 and Special Master’s report
(App. 53a and 54a).
Whitewood had only one tipple. Therefore, all of the
Cary coal mined on the Hinton Gillespie tract, all of
the Jawbone mined from the Jawbone seam on the
Hinton tract, and all of the coal purchased by
Whitewood, was run through this one tipple and mixed
and commingled, and thereafter it was impossible to
separate or identify the various coals.
2. Defendants Knew During The Entire Period July 1,
1948 To December 31, 1955, That Whitewood Was
Purchasing Various Types Of Coal From Other Parties,
And Was Mixing Such Coals With The Coal Mined On
The Gillespie Hinton Lease, And Shipping The Mixed
Coal To McCall. Defendants Also Knew That In 1950
And The Early Part Of 1951, Whitewood Was Mining
On The Hinton Tract, Mixing The
And Shipping Same To
J
i
g
5
As pointed out above, during the period July |, 1948
to December 31, 1955, Whitewood operated only one
tipple. All Cary coal mined by Whitewood from the
Gillespie Hinton lease, all Jawbone coal mined from the
Jawbone seam on the M. D. Hinton tract, and all coal
purchased by Whitewood from others, was run through
the same tipple, and mixed and commingled. and
25
thereafter it was impossible to distinguish the leasehold
coal from the other coals. These facts were well known
to defendants during the entire period.
During the period in question, Whitewood’s mining
conditions were quite bad. Frequently rock and slate
from the top of the mine would fall, and such rock,
slate and other impurities would become mixed with’
the coal. Whitewood had no washer, or other cleaning
facilities, and therefore it was not possible to keep all
of the impurities out of the coal (TR. 432-435). These
facts were also well known to defendants.
During the hearings before the Special Master, C. A.
Clyborne testified that during the period July 1, 1948
to December 31, 1955, Whitewood shipped to McCall a
total of 46,310 tons of coal not mined on the leased
premises, but that he did not know until December
1967, two years after the institution of this action, that
this 46,310 tons of coal was mixed with the Cary coal,
and shipped to McCall (Tr. 233-4).
However, the Special Master refused to accept
Clyborne’s testimony. We quote from the Special
Master's report (App. 50a):
“The evidence clearly shows that defendants had
every reason to know Mca.) was receiving outside
coal from Whitewood in addition to the leasehold
coal. The royalty reports filed with the Trustee,
Perkinson, to whom royalty payments for the
leasehold coal were made by Whitewood. would
have disclosed that fact to Clyborne. He knew or
should have known in what quantities Whitewood
was shipping to McCall. and as the owner and
recipient of a share in the royalties he knew or
should have known the quantities of leasehold coal
on which royalties were reported and paid by
26
Whitewood. The difference would have been quite
apparent from only a casual examination. Perkin-
son also, an officer of Clyborne, Inc., knew or
should have known both of these things. (Tr. 147,
148, 171-172, 246-248).
“The evidence further shows that Clyborne did
in fact know McCall was receiving outside coal
from Whitewood: and that he had no objection to
such shipments by Whitewood, at least so long as
the coal was of a quality comparable to the
leasehold coal. (Tr. 160-162, 164, 166, 200-205,
232-233, 238-241). Plaintiffs Exhibits 21, 22, 23,
46, 41, 42, 43 and 44 show that Perkinson knew
it, and it is a fair inference, from those Exhibits,
that Clyborne also knew it. See also Defendants’
Exhibit 11, Clyborne’s letter of February 14, 1951
to Culbertson. Furthermore, Clyborne had an
inspector who visited and observed Whitewood’s
operation on a fairly regular basis, reporting to
Clyborne (Tr. 218-219, 241-242). And the record
does not show that McCall ever rejected or refused
to sell one single car of any coal shipped to it by
Whitewood. Culbertson said McCall sold all of it.
(Tr. 436). Complaints, yes; corrective action, none.
Moreover, it appears that McCall at times was
almost desperate for coal, shipping Whitewood’s
coal in the name of others, some 61 cars, and the
coal of others in the name of Whitewood, some 22
cars. (Plaintiffs Exhibits 32, 39, 33, Tr.
1079-1083).”
Plaintiffs Exhibits 21, 22, 23, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44
referred to by the Special Master, are all letters from
Robert E. Perkinson, McCall’s representative at Cly-
borne’s Bluefield, West Virginia office, to W. M.
Culbertson, Jr. These letters show beyond the slightest
doubt, that during the entire period in question,
aa —
\
27
defendants knew that Whitewood was shipping the
outside coal to McCall, and actually encouraged and
invited such shipments.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 21, dated August 8, 1952, reads as
follows:
“Referring to our ‘phone conversation the
forepart of the week regarding coal from J. H.
McGlothlin Coal Company and McGlothlin Bros.
Coal Company.
“‘We are enclosing copies of laboratory reports.
You can readily see that coal from McGlothlin
Bros., with 32.32% Volatile, is not suitable for
loading with your coal. Coal from the J. H.
McGlothlin Mine should be cleaned up before
taking additional tonnage.”
Plaintiffs Exhibit 22, dated July 6, 1955, reads, in
part, as follows:
“In line with our telephone conversation last
week, we suggest that you make every effort to
control the quality of your coal, ioading oniy a
low Ash product. Louis Hunter will be glad to
work along with you, inspecting the trucks and the
mines from whom you are buying the coal, as it is
absolutely essential that you load a better quality
coal than indicated by the above three analyses.”
Plaintiffs Exhibit 23, dated November 26. 1955,
reads as follows:
“On November !oth Louis Hunter sampled four
cars of your nut and slack loaded at Doran.
“We understand this coal consisted of a mixture
of Tiller, Atwhone and Red Ash. You will note
that the cormposite Ash of the 12 cars ran 12.73%.
“The market today is very selective and there
are very few outlets for coal analyzing as high in
28
Ash as yours. Suggest you take steps to reduce
your ash content.”
The letter just referred to shows that McCall did not
object to the shipment of Jawbone, or other purchased
coal, if the Ash content could be reduced. However, as
previously pointed out, Culbertson testified that
Whitewood ceased shipping Jawbone to McCall in the
early part of 1951.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 40, dated February 10, 1950, reads
as follows: ;
“Enclosed is an order for four cars RCM, in line
with your conversation with Mr. Clyborne. As we
understand it, cars shipped against this order will
contain a mixture of coal.
“Please do not load over four cars of this mixed
coal. We are behind on our Government contract
for your Mine Run and since your coal not mixed
is running so high in Ash, we are absolutely afraid
to apply any mixed coal on this contract.”
Plaintiffs Exhibit 41, dated: July 3, 1952, reads as
follows:
“Enclosed is copy of analysis obtained from
sample taken by you from Shelton Mine.
“This analysis shows up satisfactorily, if the
sample was taken properly. By this 1 mean if
proper percentage of slack was taken in proportion
to percentage of lump.”
Plaintiffs Exhibit 42, dated March 16, 1955, reads as
follows:
“Enclosed is copy of a complete analysis
covering sample of your ROM taken from N&W
24795.
“This is very punk stuff and suggest that you
discontinue buying this off quality coal, as it
29
certainly will ruin your record with the govern-
ment and bring your average analysis down to such
an extent that we will not ‘have a Chinaman’s
chance in obtaining the business this year.
“I am afraid the eight or nine cars that you
have already shipped are going to play havoc.”
Plaintiffs Exhibit 43, dated December 19, 1951,
reads as follows:
“Enclosed analysis covering sample of coal from
Stanley Harris and Russell Stinson, taken at your
direction, shows the following:
“ASH : 10.47%
“This coal is of such poor quality, our
Suggestion is that you would be better off by
forgetting about it.”
Plaintiff's Exhibit 44, dated August 20, 1952, reads
as follows:
“We are enclosing the following Bureau of
Mines’ analysis covering shipments made by you
under the new contract with the Government:
“Sample dated Juiy 31 — 302.00 tons — Fuel Yard #2
“Sample No. 12 undated 272.00 tons — Fuel Yard #2
“Sample dated August 7 157.00 tons — Fuel Yard #2
“Sample dated August 5 184.00 tons — Fuel Yard #2
“Please note that the Volatile content on your
coal ran from a low of 26% to a high of 27.30%.
This is entirely out of reason and indicates that a
considerable amount of Red Ash or other coal is
being mixed with your Mine Run.
“If your Volatile continues to run 27%, we may
as well start working to place your coal elsewhere,
for the chances are the Government will cancel
this contract.”
However, despite McCall’s numerous complaints con-
cerning the quality of the coal shipped by Whitewood,
30
McCall continued te accept and sell, every car of
coal shipped by Whitewood. During the entire period
in controversy, McCall never rejected or refused to sell -
one single car of Whitewood’s coal. During the entire
period in question, McCall made monthly settlements
with Whitewood and in these monthly settlements
purported to account to Whitewood for the proceeds of
coal sold, less selling commissions. As pointed out
above, McCall was penalized at times for impurities in
the Whitewood coal. However, these penalties were
passed on to and paid by Whitewood. There is no
evidence in the record that McCall ever paid a single
penalty for which it was not reimbursed by Whitewood.
2. The Jawbone Coal
Jack Persinger, a certified public accountant, pre-
pared Plaintiffs Exhibit 20 introduced before the
Special Master. According to this exhibit, during the
period July 20, 1948, to December 31, 1951, the total
tonnage of coal shipped by Whitewood to McCall was
167,254.00 tons. During the same period, the total
tonnage of Jawbone coal available to Whitewood for
shipping, was 26,700.68 tons.
Therefore, the total Jawbone available to Whitewood
during the period in question was 15.96% of the
167,254 tons of coal shipped by Whitewood to McCall.
However, during this same period Whitewood shipped
to McCall, and to other purchasers, a total of
201,858.05 tons. Therefore, the Jawbone coal shipped
during tha! period would be 13.22% of 201,858.05
tons, the total tonnage shipped by Whitewood to all
i
31
parties. During the period in question, 34,604.05 tons
of coal was shipped by Whitewood to parties other than
McCall.
Siace Whitewood had only one tipple, and all coal
mined by Whitewood, and all coal purchased by
Whitewood, was mun through the same tipple, and
mixed and commingled, it was not thereafter possible
to identify any particular car of coal as coming from
the Cary lease, the M. D. Hinton Jawbone lease, or
purchased coal. Under these circumstances, it is not
possible to determine how much of the Jawbone coal
available to Whitewood during the period in question
was actually received by McCall.
Culbertson testified that Jawbone coal was a “high
Ash coal” but otherwise it was a “very good coal” (Tr.
431).
Culbertson further testified that he could not recall
that defendants had ever objected to Whitewood
acquiring outside coal and shipping it to McCall, but
that in the early part of 1951, Clyborne did request
Whitewood to discontinue shipping Jawbone (Tr. 422-3,
429-430, 488). Thereupon Culbertson assured Clyborne
that Whitewood would discontinue shipping Jawbone to
McCall. In the early part of 1951, Whitewood shut
down its Jawbone mine and did not thereafter ship any
Jawbone coal to McCall (Tr. 429-30, 488). Later, in
November 1955, after Whitewood had mined out the
Cary coal on the Gillespie Hinton lease, it again opened
its Jawbone mine and continued mining Jawbone
through 1955, 1957, 1958 and 1959. However, none of
such Jawbone was shipped to McCall (Tr. 487-8).
Culbertson testified that the reason Whitewood
shipped Jawbone coal te McCall, to be applied on
Wer ween
32
government orders, was that Universal Coal Company,
in which Clyborne had an interest, also had a
comparable government contract, and that Universal
was shipping Jawbone, acquired from Whitewood, on its
contract with the government. Under these circumstan-
ces, Whitewood, in 1950 and early 1951, also shipped
Jawbone to McCall, to be applied on Whitewood’s
government contract (Tr. 431-2).
Clyborme testified that for many years he had had an
interest in Universal Coal Company, owning 380 shares
of its stock; that Universal had a tipple and ran
Jawbone coal through the tipple “until we raised
hallelujah; and stopped it.” (Tr. 168-9).
After Whitewood ceased shipping Jawbone to McCall
in the early part of 1951, McCall continued to accept
and sell all coal shipped to it by Whitewood, and
purported to account to Whitewood, each math, for
the full proceeds of sales, less selling commissions, and
any penalties that had been inflicted.
Shortly after December 31, 1955, the Cary seam of
coal on the Gillespie Hinton lease was mined out and
Whitewood ceased shipping coal to McCall. Thereafter
McCall and Whitewood fully settled their accounts.
Neither of defendants ever made a claim of any kind
against Whitewood on account of the mixing and
shipment of such coal, until subsequent to July
23, 1968, when defendants filed their First and Second
Counterclaims.
Hmm Denk 253% eae Nhi, $I BANS 6 AN EL ae ital eNO Tad a meena
33
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE IS_ ENTIRELY _IN-
SUFFICIENT TO HAVE JUSTIFIED THE
SPECIAL MASTER, THE DISTRICT
COURT, OR THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS, IN DENYING WHITEWOOD
RELIEF HEREIN ON THE GROUND THAT
IT DID NOT COME INTO COURT WITH
CLEAN HANDS.
The basis of defendants’ claim that Whitewood did
not come into Court with clean hands, and thus is not
entitled to recover the proceeds of sales of its coal, is
that during the period July |, 1948 to December 31,
1955. Whitewood, without the knowledge, consent or
approval of defendants, and for the purpose of
defrauding defendants, purchased outside coal, and
mined Jawbone coal from the Jawbone seam on the M.
D. Hinton tract, and mixed the coals with Cary coal
mined on the Gillespie Hinton tract, and shipped the
mixed coals to McCall. However, the evidence heard in
the District Court and by the Special Master shows
clearly and conclusively that the defense of White-
wood’s “unclean hands” is an_ utterly frivolous
contention.
As has been shown, the defendants knew at all times
that Whitewcod had only one tipple. Defendants knew
that Whitewood was mining Cary coal from the
Gillespie Hinton lease, Jawbone coal from the Jawbone
seam on the M. D. Hinton tract, and purchasing outside
coal, and that all of the coal was run through
Whitewood’s tipple and mixed and commingled, and
34
that McCall received a substantial amount of the mixed
tonnage.
Defendants’ inspectors visited Whitewood’s operation
at regular intervals and reported to McCall. The only
purpose in having inspectors on the job was to check
on the source and the quality of the coal received by
Whitewood, and the shipments to McCall, and it can be
assumed that defendants’ inspectors did their job
properly. These inspectors must have seen the pur-
chased coal arriving in trucks, and being dumped into
Whitewood’s tipple along with the Cary coal mined on
the Gillespie Hinton lease, and the Jawbone mined by
Whitewood on the Hinton tract.
Although McCall complained from time to time
about the quality of the coal it received, and in the
early part of 1951 requested Whitewood to discontinue
shipping Jawbone, McCall continued to do business
with Whitewood, and accepted and sold every car of
coal shipped to it by Whitewood, until about December
31, 1955, when the Cary coal on the Gillespie Hinton
lease was mined out, and purported to account to
Whitewood for the proceeds of sales, less selling
commissions, and any penalties that might have been
inflicted.
There is no substantial evidence in the record to the
effect that Whitewood ever attempted to conceal its
operations from defendants, or to defraud defendants in
any way. To the contrary, Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 21, 22,
23, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44 filed before the Special
Master — all being letters from Robert E. Perkinson,
McCall’s representative, to Culbertson — indicate clearly
that McCall was kept fully informed as to the sources,
ait ee ala
SS a ee
et eee oc
Pe ee ee
35
and analyses, of the outside coal shipped by Whitewood
to McCall.
If, however, the evidence heard in the District Court
and by the Special Master, could possibly have justified
a finding that Whitewood, during the period 1948 to
1955, acted wrongfully toward defendants, such
conduct is not sufficient to deny Whitewood the right
to now recover from defendants, the proceeds of sales
of Whitewood’s coal, which defendants received during
the period 1948 to 1955, and for which they have not
accounted. There are many reasons why the “clean
hands” doctrine has no application whatever to the
facts of this case.
A.The Alleged Misconduct Of Whitewood,
During The Period 1948 To 1955 Is Not
Sufficiently Connected With, Or Related To,
The Present Controversy Between Plaintiff
And Defendants, To Justify The Application
Of The “Clean Hands” Doctrine.
As we have previously pointed out during the period
July 1, 1948 to December 31, 1955, Whitewood
shipped to McCall a total of 246,014.10 tons of coal.
Approximately 50,000 tons of this coal was purchased
by Whitewood from other persons. Some of the coal
shipped by Whitewood to McCall was Jawbone coal
mined from the Jawbone seam on the Hinton tract.
McCall, with full knowledge of the facts, accepted all of
said coal and sold it but fraudulently concealed from
Whitewood the actual proceeds of sales of the coal, and
fraudulently underpaid Whitewood for the coal. Now
36
that defendants’ fraudulent conduct has been dis-
covered, and judicially ascertained in this case, the
defendants contend that plaintiff is not entitled to
recover such proceeds of sales, for the reason that
Whitewood was guilty of improper conduct in mixing
the outside coal with the leasehold coal, and shipping
the mixed coal to McCall.
However, if under the circumstances, Whitewood was
guilty of any improper conduct, such conduct is not
sufficiently connected with, or related to, the present
action which was brought to recover from defendants
the proceeds of sales of Whitewood’s coal, less the
selling commissions, and any penalties which might have
been inflicted.
“Generally, the applicability of the maxim, ‘he
who comes into equity must come with clean
hands,’ depends upon the connection between the
complainant’s iniquitous acts and the defendant’s
conduct, which the complainant relies upon as
establishing his cause of action. Relief is not to be
denied because of general iniquitous conduct on
the part of the complainant or because of the
latter's wrongdoing in the course of a transaction
between him and a third person, or because of a
wrong practiced by both parties on a third person,
or because of misconduct by a company taken
over by the plaintiff where the latter put a stop to
the misconduct as soon as knowledge of it was
acquired. In other words, the maxim may not be
invoked by reason of acts which are not shown to
have been connected with the transaction giving
rise to the suit or otherwise to have been related
to the defendant or anything in which he was
interested.”
2/ Am. Jur. 2d 678-679
eco BE AKG Ae eed TAN AINE AEA Al li RP Rm Me TN OO aE ae a i tar atebt
37
In the case of Heck v. Morgan, 106 S.E. 413, 88
W.Va. 102, Syl. 9 reads as follows:
“The maxim, ‘He who comes into ecuity must
come with clean hands,’ does not deprive a suitor
of a right to appeal to a court of equity on
account of general iniyuitous conduct uncon-
nected with the act of the defendant which the
complainant party sets up as his ground or cause
of action, but only when the evil practice; and
wrongful conduct pertain to the particular n.atter
Or transaction in respect to which judicial
protection or redress is sought.”
Other West Virginia cases hold that fraud or
misconduct of a plaintiff pertaining to transactions
distinct from those constituting the subject matter of
plaintiffs suit against defendant, is not sufficient to
preclude relief under the principle that plaintiff in
equity must come with clean hands.
thrig vs. thrig, 88 S.E. 1010, 78 W. Va. 360
Bias vs. Bias, 155 S.E. 898, 109 W. Va. 621
White vs. Graham, 164 S.E. 664, 112 W. Va. 451
* Miller Todd Coal Co. vs, Adrian Fuel Co., 1 §.E.2d
873, 121 W. Va. 138
If, in fact, Whitewood was guilty of any improper
conduct towards defendants during the years 1948 to
1955, such conduct was not related to, or connected
with plaintiffs present claims against defendants. Any
such conduct on Whitewood’s part is entirely too
remote, and unrelated to plaintiff's right to recover the
proceeds of sales of Whitewood’s coal, in this action.
38
B.The Doctrine Of Unclean Hands Is Not
Applicable To This Case, Since The Evidence
Shows Clearly That The Defendants Were Not
Injured Or Damaged In Any Way By
Whitewood’s Alleged Wrongful Conduct.
As we have previously pointed out, defendants’
answer to the Second Amended and Supplementzi
Complaint, contained two counterclaims — the First
Counterclaim and the Second Counterclaim. The
Second Counterclaim alleged that it was Whitewood’s
duty, under said lease and agreement (P1. Ct. Ex. No.
1), to ship to McCall only the coal mined on the leased
premises, but that Whitewood, without McCall’s
knowledge, consent or approval, purchased a large
quantity of coal, inferior in quality to the coal mined
on said lease, and mixed the purchased coal with the
coal’ mined on the leased property, and shipped the
mixed coal to McCall, and that McCall, without
knowledge of the fats, shipped said coal to its
customers and thereby sustained damage.
A considerable amount of evidence was heard by the
Special Master with reference to the mixing and
shipping of the outside coal by Whitewood to McCall.
However, it soon developed that during the entire
period 1948 to 1955, McCall was fully aware of the
mixing and shipping of the outside coal and actually
encouraged such shipments by Whitewood.
The evidence was so clear and convincing that
defendants abandoned their two counterclaims and did
not even refer to them in their briefs to the Special
Master, to the District Court, or to the Circuit Court of
Appeals.
39
The Special Master held that defendants were not
entitled to recover from Whitewood on either of the
counterclaims and this finding was approved by the
District Court. Defendants did not complain of this
finding in the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Therefore, it clearly appears that defendants’ damage
claims against Whitewood, for the mixing and shipping
of said outside coal by Whitewood to McCall, have been
fully adjudicated and decided adversely to defendants,
and defendants are not now in a position to assert that
they were in fact damaged in any way by Whitewood’s
conduct in mixing and shipping the outside coal. Under
these circumstances, the clean hands doctrine has no
application whatever to this case.
“As a general rule, the doctrine of unclean
hands is applicable only where the party seeking to
invoke it was injured by the alleged wrongful
conduct. If the alleged wrongful conduct of the
complainart appears not to have injured, damaged,
or prejudiced the defendant, the maxim may not
be successfully invoked, where the wrongful
conduct was not contrary to law or public policy.
Thus, it has been held that the maxim should not
be applied where the defendant has not been
seriously harmed and the wrong complained of can
be corrected. A fortiori, where the defendant has
profited by the wrongful conduct, he is in no
position to invoke the maxim.”
27 Am. Jur. 2d 681.
40
C.The Clean Hands Maxim Is Subject To
Reasonable Limitations. The Maxim Is Not
One Of Absolutes And Should Be Applied In
The Court’s Discretion, So As To Accomplish
Its Purpose Of Promoting Public Policy And
The Integrity Of The Courts.
The defendants in this case have been found guilty of
gross and repeated frauds in the selling of Whitewood’s
coal. They not only deceived Whitewood with reference
to the prices they were receiving on the sale of
Whitewood’s coal, but without Whitewood’s knowledge,
consent or approval, the defendants sold Whitewood’s
coal to American Southern Export Company, a
corporation in which the defendants had substantial
interest, and which they controlled. (See Special
Master’s Report, App. 76a).
However, defendants’ fraudulent practices were not
limited to Whitewood. McCall, while acting as sales
agent for Pine Oaks Coal Corporation, during the period
1955 to 1961 inclusive, wilfully and intentionally
misrepresented to Pine Oaks the prices it received for
Pine Oaks coal, and wilfully and intentionally underpaid
Pine Oaks for its coal. (See D. Ct.’s Memorandum
Opinion filed September 28, 1967, App. 22a - 27a).
Under these circumstances, would the application of
the clean hands doctrine to the facts of this case, and
the denial of plaintiffs right to recover from
defendants, advance right and justice, and promote
public policy? We respectfully submit that the answer
to this question should be an emphatic no.
“The clean hands maxim is subject to reasonable
limitations. Generally, it may be invoked only to
prevent affirmative equitable relief. The maxim is
—
41
not one of absolutes and should be applied in the
court’s discretion, so as to accomplish the purpose
of promoting public policy and the integrity of the
courts.”
27 Am. Jur. 2d 669.
“* * Thus, the requirements of public policy will
be considered in determining the applicability of
the maxim.” (clean hands maxim)
27 Am. Jur. 2d 668.
“The maxim is not used, however, merely as a
means of punishing a complainant for wrongful,
immoral or illegal acts. It is applied in the interest
of. the public and to protect the court and the
defendant, but not to favor him.”
27 Am. Jur. 2d 671.
To the same effect, see: Ford y. Buffalo Eagle
Colliery Co. (CCA 4th) 122 F.2d 555; Keystone Driller
Co. v. General Excavator Co. 290 U.S. 240. 78 L.Ed.
293, 54 S. Ct. 146; Baue v. Embalmers Federal Labor
Union (Mo.) 376 S.W.2d 230: Waller v. Eanes Admr.
(Va.j 157 S. E. 721.
“It is generally recognized that though the
parties are in pari delicto, equity may intervene
from motives of public pelicy. Thus, although the
parties are shown to have been in pari delicto, the
court will grant relief to one of them if its
forbearance will be productive of an offense
against public morals or good conscience or be a
reflection upon the integrity of the court, or
productive of perjury.”
27 Am. Jur. 2d 677-8.
“It very clearly appears in Virginia that the
equitable maxim that he who comes into’ equity
must come with clean hands is subservient to the
42
public policy of the state and cannot be invoked
in contravention thereof. * * While, as said in
Nunnally vy. Stokes, a party cannot make his own
fradulent conduct a ground of defense or recovery,
he may nevertheless show all of the facts and
invoke well recognized equitable doctrines, if
applicable, to prevent the greater wrong.”
Waller vs. Eanes, Admr. (Va.) 157 S.E. 721,
725.
We certainly do not concede that Whitewood was c
guilty of fraudulent or improper conduct in its dealings
with the defendants, and submit that the evidence does
not justify any such finding. However, if the evidence
could possibly justify such a finding, nevertheless for
the reasons shown, the clean hands doctrine has no
application to this case, and should not defeat
plaintiff's right to recover.
Oe eee
IN FINDING THAT WHITEWOOD WAS
ENTITLED TO RECOVER FROM DEFEND-
ANTS, BUT THAT’ DEFENDANTS WERE
NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER UNDER
THEIR SECOND COUNTERCLAIM
AGAINST WHITEWOOD, THE SPECIAL
MASTER NECESSARILY FOUND THAT
WHITEWOOD WAS NOT GUILTY OF
FRAUDULENT CONDUCT WHICH PRE-
CLUDED RELIEF TO WHITEWOOD.
ea Ah ANA Rete ak wei eidleethh ia NE Boe aiees ARG bind abbeitnn ede eds)
Under Conclusion of Law, the Special Master found:
“13. Plaintiff owes nothing to defendants on
account of coal mined from the _ leasehold
43
described in the agreement of June 20, 1947 and
shipped by Whitewood to others than McCall
during the period June 10, 1947 to December 31,
1955, or as damages because of coal shipped by
Whitewood to McCall which came elsewhere than
from the leasehold; nor are defendants entitled to
recover punitive damages from plaintiff in this
action.” (App. 78a)
The “clean hands” defense now being asserted by
defendants, is based entirely on Whitewood’s alleged
fraudulent conduct in acquiring outside coal, mixing the
outside coal with Cary coal minéd on the Gillespie
Hinton lease, znd shipping the mixed coals to McCall,
without McCall’s knowledge, consent or approval.
Precisely the same facts were alleged in support of
defendants’ Second Counterclaim.
However, the evidence heard by the Special Master
showed clearly that defendants were not entitled to
recover damages from Whitewood, on account of
defendants’ Second Counterclaim, and the Special
Master expressly so held. In fact, the evidence in
support of the First and Second Counterclaims was so
weak, and unsubstantial, that the defendants abandoned
their counterclaims, and did not mention either
counterclai..1 in their briefs filed with the Special
Master, the District Court, or in the Circuit Court of
Appeals. Neither was the dismissal of ‘the two
counterclaims in the District Court, assigned as error in
the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Therefore, if defendants’ evidence in support of their
Second Counterclaim, as so weak and unsubstantial
that defendants simply abandoned the counterclaims,
and the Special Master and the District Court decided
the counterclaims adversely to defendants, but awarded
Dine ese roto nem NR OAS HO RNS MPT EN REO
44
plaintiff a substantial recovery against defendants, how
can it now be logically contended that Whitewood was
guilty of fraudulent conduct during the period 1948 to
1955, which precludes plaintiffs right to recover herein.
Such a contention is without’ any substantial basis, and
is utterly frivolous. ;
We are not aware of any rule of law that required
either the Special Master or the District Court to make
a specific finding to the effect that Whitewood was not .
guilty of “unclean hands’. It was sufficient that the
affirmative facts found by the Special Master and the
District Court, considered as a whole, completely
negatived defendants clear hands contention. .
In Carr v. Yokohama Specie Bank, Limited (CCA 9th
Cir. 1952), 200 F.2d 251, 255, the court, in discussing
the requirements of Rule 52, stated:
“The question whether the showing made is
clear and convincing is one for the trial court. And
the federal rule relating to findings of a trial court
does not require the court to make findings on all
facts presented or to make detailed evidentiary
findings; if the findings are sufficient to support
the ultimate conclusion of the court they are
sufficient. * * * Nor is it necessary that the trial
court make findings asserting the negative of each
issue of fact raised. It is sufficient if the special
affirmative facts found by the court, construed as
a whole, negative each rejected contention. The
ultimate test as to the adequacy of findings will
always be whether they are sufficiently compre-
hensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a
basis for decision and whether they are supported
by the evidence.”
Carr -v. Yokohama Specie Bank, Limited, above
referred to, was cited with approval in Darter y.
45
Greenville Community Hotel Corporation (CCA 4th
Cis.), 305 F.2d 70, 75.
[a i
“The ultimate test as to the adequacy of
findings is whether they are sufficiently compre-
hensive and pertinent to the issue to form a basis
for the decision and whether they are supported
by the evidence.”
Vol. SA Moore’s Federal Practice, pg. 2710.
“And the court need not find on every issue
requested, but a finding of such essential facts as
lay a basis for the decision is sufficient.”
Vol. SA Moore’s Federal Practice, pp. 2713-4.
“* * ‘Clearly the rule does not require the court to
make elaborate findings ... upon all such facts as
wili present every possible view of the gise.’
Findings of the trial court ‘are to be construed
liberally in support of a judgment or older (sic)
... Whenever, from facts found, other facts may
be inferred which will support the judgment, such
inferences will be deemed to have been drawn.’ ”
Vol. SA Moore’s Federal Practice, p. 2716.
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, IN
AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT ENTERED
BY THE DISTRICT COURT, DID NOT FAIL
TO CONSIDER THE “CLEAN HANDS”
DEFENSE.
The Petition for Certiorari states repeatedly that
neither the Special Master, the District Court, nor the
Circuit Court of Appeals considered the issue whether
Whitewood had been guilty of fraudulent conduct
46
which foreclosed it from relief in a court of equity.
However, these statements are most inaccurate, and
without any basis whatever.
We have previously pointed out that the Special
Master, in finding that plaintiff was entitled to recover
from defendants, and that defendants were not entitled
to recover damages from Whitewood, on their Second
Counterclaim, necessarily found that Whitewood was
not guilty of fraudulent conduct toward defendants,
precluding it from relief in equity. This conclusion is
inescapable.
We quote from the Special Master’s Findings of Fact
(App. 73a-74a):
**3. McCall knew and consented to the shipping
of outside coal to McCall by Whitewood, and
neither McCall nor Whitewood made any dis-
tinction between the leasehold coal and the
outside coal. Both McCall and Whitewood treated
their transactions with each other as to all of the
coal in the same manner.
“4. There was an implied agreement between
Whitewood and McCall that the same terms would
apply to all of the coal shipped by Whitewood to
McCall, that is, that McCall, as sales agent for
Whitewood, would account to Whitewood for the
outside coal in the same way that the agreement
of June 30, 1947 required it to account for the
leasehold coal.”
The District Court in its Memorandum Decision and
Judgment Order, dated December 15, 1972, stated
(App. 79a):
“The Special Master having filed his report and
the parties having noted their objections and
exceptions thereto, the Court, after careful con-
shh ih a) an
47
sideration of the objections and exceptions and of
the record in this case, is of the opinion that the
findings of fact of the Special Master, viewed in
the light of the requirement of Rule 53(e)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the
Court ‘accept the Master’s findings of fact unless
clearly erroneous,’ are supported by the evidence
and that the conclusions of law set forth in the
report correctly apply the relevant legal principles.
It is accordingly hereby ORDERED that said
report be, and it is, hereby confirmed as filed.”
In view of what has been shown, how can it possibly
be charged that neither the Special Master nor the
District Court, considered the issue whether Whitewood
had been guilty of fraudulent conduct which foreclosed
it from relief. The facts found by the Special Master,
and confirmed by the District Court, make it entirely
clear that the “clean hands” issue was considered by
the Special Master and the District Court and decided
adversely to defendants.
It is true that the Circuit Court of Appeals did not
discuss the “‘clean hands” issue, or make a specific
finding with reference thereto. However, the Court did
state (App. 90a):
“Neither our review of the record nor any point
raised on appeal leaves us with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake was committed by the
district court in its factual findings and we cannot
say that they are clearly erroneous. We therefore
find no merit in this aspect of the appeal.”
This statement clearly shows that the Circuit Court
of Appeals did in fact consider every point urged by
defendants on appeal, but found that there was no
merit in any of the assignments of error.
48
The “clean hands” issue was raised in the Circuit
Court of Appeals. The point was briefed and argued
before the Court, by counsel for the parties. Later
defendants filed a petition for rehearing on the sole
ground that the “clean hands” defense had not even
been considered by the Circuit Court of Appeals. The
rehearing was denied. Under these circumstances, it is
inconceivable that the Circuit Court of Appeals did not
consider the “‘clean hands” issue.
We know of no rule of law that required the Circuit
Court of Appeals to discuss the “clean hands’’ issue,
and make a specific finding with reference thereto. No
doubt the Circuit Court of Appeals felt that the point
had so little merit, that it did not require or justify
discussion.
However, even though the Circuit Court of Appeals
did not discuss the “clean hands’’ issue, or make a
specific finding with reference thereto, it is perfectly
clear that the court did consider the point and decided
it adversely to defendants. No other inference is
possible.
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully submit
that the Petition for Certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH M. SANDERS
620 Law & Commerce Buiiding
Bluefield, West Virginia
Attorney for Respondent
Of Counsel
JOSEPH M. SANDERS, JR.
FRED O. BLUE
QD.
Ww
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