Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — SIMS V. FOX (No. 74-1235)

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SUPREME COURT, U.8 WAR 5! 1575

IN THE §_MBECHAL ROA, 52.,

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

NO. 74-1235

GROVER WILLIAM SIMS, Second Lieutenant,

United States Air Force, 418-66-6972FV,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

CECIL E. FOX, Brigadier General, Etc.,

and DR. JOHN L. McLUCAS, Secretary of

the Air Force,

Defendants-Appellees

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Reginald C. Wisenbaker

Bennett, Saliba & Wisenbaker

P. O. Box 1685

Valdosta, Georgia

INDEX

TABLE OF CASES ==

OPINIONS BELOW -

JURISDICTION -

QUESTION PRESENTED

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND

REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED -

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT --

CONCLUSION --

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ---------

APPENDIX "A"

APPENDIX "B"

APPENDIX "C"

Ce a eS ee

7 - deacts PA OME APRS ERTS

SERIES GLO PELLETED NS TE NO

ty “i

BETES PRE ILI IT LET

TABLE OF CASES

Page

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408

U. S. 564, 92 S Ct. 2701, 33

LED 2d 548 (1972) ----- - 25

Joint Anti-Facist Refuggee Com-

mittee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 - 27

Norval Goss et.al. v. Eileen

Lopez et.al. U.S. °

43 Law Week 4181 — 25

‘Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U. Ss.

593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d

570 - -- --------- -- 27

Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 --- 27

United States v. Lovett,

328 U.S. 303 naan -- 27

Wieman v. Updegroff, 344 U.S. 83 27

Wisconsin v. Constantineau,

400 U.S. 433 -- 27

1

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

GROVER WILLIAM SIMS, Second Lieutenant,

United States Air Force, 418-66-6972FV,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

CECIL E. FOX, Brigadier General, Etc.,

and DR. JOHN L. MCLUCAS, Secretary of

the Air Force,

Defendants-Appellees

Fi al Dah bl

* .

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

ic a

baad oS

SOTO wy

Petitioner, GROVER WILLIAM SIMS,

respectfully prays that a Writ of Cer-

tiorari issue to review the judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for

ie 2

the Fifth Circuit entered in the above

entitled case on December 30, 1974.

OPINIONS BELOW |

The en banc opinion of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit Appendix "A", infra pp 33-48

has not yet been reported.

The opinion of the three judge panel

of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit entered in this

case, Appendix "B", infra p 49-70

is reported at 492 F. 2d 1088.

The order of the District Court

filed in this case on June 9, 1973, in

the United States District Court for

the Middle District of Georgia, Val-

dosta Division, Appendix "C", pp 71-75

is not reported.

qd

ett ae

SRI OY BARI BE

AIL PRM ey EE ADT AD TO DEO RY OT PE

$

a.

$

JURISDICTION

The order of the District Court for

the Middle District of Georgia, Valdos-

ta Division dismissing Plaintiff/Appel-

lant's petition for failure to state a

claim was entered on June 9, 1973, Ap-

pendix "c", infra p 71. . The de-

cision of the threes Judge Panel of the

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth

Circuit, reversing and remanding the

case was entered on April 19, 1974.

Appendix "B" pp 49-70. On July 24,

1974, the United States Court of Ap-

peals, Fifth Circuit,ordered a rehear-

ing en banc. Subsequently, on December

30, 1974, the United States Court of

Appeals, Fifth Circuit, en banc, en-

tered its judgment affirming the Dis-

trict Court Appendix "A", p 33-48

4

The jurisdiction of this court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

In 1972, Lt Sims, a 2nd Lieutenant,

in the United States Air Force, was

charged with certain acts of misconduct

in the Georgia State Courts. By order

of the Superior Court of Lowndes County

Georgia, the Lieutenant was sent to the

State Mental Hospital where his problem

was diagnosed as a Personality disorder,

sexual deviation, exhibitionism and with

Prognosis that under appropriate psycho-

therapy recurrence of symptoms are

usually nil.

After several months of treatment he

was released as cured. Subsequently,

the charges in the State Court were

disposed of by an entry of nolo conten-

dre plea and a discharge without

CERO OE FE EEE ESS

5

adjudication of guilt. The Lieutenant

was also examined by Air Force psychia-

trist who recommended that he be re-

tained in service. Two days later, the

same doctor changed his recommendation

recommending he be discharged. The Lieu-

tenant was ordered discharged with an

indication upon his discharged certifi-

cate casting reflections upon and im-

pugning his reputation and character.

Lieutenant Sims requested a hearing

prior to discharge in order to refute

and rebut the charges forming the basis

for his discharge. Upon denial of the

hearing, Lieutenant Sims filed a com-

plaint asking the District Court to en-

join the Air Force from discharging him

without a hearing. The District Court

dismissed the complaint for failure to

state a claim. (Appendix "C"). The

POH MTR FLY RANE BAG OIG

IRE GEMS SEMIS AS RAE WS OY OA

6

three Judge panel of the Circuit Court

held Lieutenant Sims was entitled to a

hearing prior to being discharged with

a certificate casting reflection upon

and impugning his character and reputa-

tion. (Appendix "B") The Circuit Court

en banc held that Lieutenant Sims had no

property right incontinued military em-

ployment nor was his liberty infringed

by the derogatory information forming

the basis for his discharge. (Appendix

"A")

The question presented is:

(1) Does a reserve officer in the

United States Air Force have sufficient

Liberty or property interest in his

military record and career to invoke the

minimum protection of the Due Process

Clause of the fifth amendment of the

Constitution of the United States when

APL PED AN Ia Oa ee et ee wep Re ise EM PNET” gOS SEITS Witte AICI ADR AE CRIN

7

the Air Force attempts to discharge him

for causes which substantially impugnes

his good name, character, and reputa-

tion?

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND

REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-

tion of the United States:

» « e nor be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without

due process of law; .. .

10 USC 1163 (a) An officer of

a reserve component who has at

least three years of service as

a commissioned officer may not be

separated from that component

without his consent except under

an approved recommendation of a

board of officers convened by an

authority designated by the Secre-

tary concerned, or by the approved

sentence of a court-martial. This

subsection does not apply to a

separation under subsection (b) of

this section or under section 1003

of this title, to a dismissal un-

der section 1161 (a) of this

title, or to a transfer under sec-

tion 3352 or 8352.

8

10 USC 1162 (a) Subject to other

provisions of this title, reserve

commissioned officers may be dis-

charged at the pleasure of the

President. Other Reserves may be

discharged under regulations pres-

cribed by the Secretary concerned.

10 USC § 8447

(c) The President may vacate at

any time a temporary appointment

in a commissioned grade. Aug.

10, 1956, c. 1041, 70A Stat.

§ 1 (180) (D), 72 Stat. 1532.

Air Force Regulation 35.6 q 4-5, Re-

accomplishment of DD Form 214, effect-

ive 1 May 1974.

A current or former member of the

USAF may request reaccomplishment

of his DD Form 214 either in writ-

ing or in person from the CBPO

nearest his location. The member

must furnish the original DD Form

214 that he desires be reaccomplish-

ed. Upon receipt of written or

personal request the CBPO-DPMMR

will:

Wao

9

(a) Change by masking out the

member's original DD Form 214

the "reason and authority" item

and “reenlistment eligibility

code" item. These items should

be filed with a dashed line. Ex-

treme care must be taken in order

not to deface the member's ori-

ginal DD Form 214. The DD Form

214 will then be permanently

reproduced on white paper in two

copies. After reproduction both

copies will then be authenticated

by use of the official stamp main-

tained or supplied by the local

special orders authenticating

agency. Furnish one copy to the

custodian of the member's Master

Personnel Records as indicated

in AFM 35-14. Return original

copy of DD Form 214 to member.

(b) If the member insists, then

reaccomplish the DD Form 214 in

two copies. All information shown

on the original DD Form 214 will

be transcribed to the reaccom-

plished form with the exception

of “Reason and authority for

separation" and "Reenlistment

Eligibility Code." These items

will be left blank on the reac-

complished form and dash marks

will be entered. After reaccom-

plishment, both copies will be

authenticated by use of the of-

ficial stamp maintained or sup-

plied by the local special orders

authenticating agency. Return

LLLP PY ernreemmeng

Medien tar pe BOW gE

10

member's original copy of DD Form

214 to him for his personal file.

Furnish the original of the reac-

complished form to the member and

forward the second copy to the cus-

todian of the member's Master Per-

sonnel Records as indicated in AFM

35-14. [The reaccomplished DD Form

214 will be signed by an individual

authorized to sign DD Forms 214

(table 2, item 31.)]

Air Force Regulation 35-6 q 4-2, DD

Form 214, Report of Separation from

Active Duty.

(a) Preparation:

(1) The DD Form 214 is an

important record of service. It

should be carefully prepared to as-

Sure accuracy and completeness.

Corrections and changes during pre-

paration are to be avoided, but

where necessary should be neat and

legible and initialed on all copies

by the authenticating officer.

Once the original has been deli-

vered to the individual, no correc-

tions may be made to copies by the

separating activity. The recipi-

ent will be informed that making

any change or alteration of DD Form

214 is prohibited.

(2) The form is destined for

use within the civilian community

SE RARE NTL ERLE RE BP EISELE OIE EMD IPRA OE MET,

1l

where there is not a broad fami-

liarity with military abbrevi-

ations. Accordingly, abbrevia-

tions should be used sparingly.

Additionally, care should be

exercised to insure that copies

of DD Form 214 transmitted for the

information of various government

agencies are clearly legible.

(3) The authority for a mem-

ber's transfer or discharge will

be cited by reference to the appro-

priate regulation, instructions,

or manual, followed by the appro-

priate separation designation num-

ber (SDN), Or separation program

designator (SPD). (See table 2,

note 5.)

(4) Incomplete items will

contain the remark “see item 27"

(c below). If an item does not ap-

ply enter "NA". All entries, ex-

clusive of signature, will be type-

written. If more space is needed,

continue the items in item 27 or,

if necessary, on the reverse of the

form. Complete all items on the

face of the form first if possible,

so that carbons will need to be

moved but once.

(5) Except for members in

(8) below, use DD Form 124 (8

part). Except for member in (6)

and (7) below, attachment 2 re-

flects the authorized entries for

each item of DD Form 214 for members

ed

eH

12

of the Regular Air Force.

(6) Authorized entries for

members of the Reserve components

serving under the Non prior Ser-

vice Enlistment Program are shown

in attachment 6.

(7) Authorized entries for

members of the Reserve components

serving on active duty for train-

ing for a period of 90 days or

more are shown in attachment 7.

(8) For members separated

to continue in service (that is,

reenlistment, acceptance of Regu-

lar appointment, or discharge

from enlisted status to accept

commissioned grade), use DD Form

214 (3 part ).

b. Records Used. DD Form

214ws, Worksheet for Report of

Separation from Active Duty will

be used to prepare date for entry

on the DD Form 214. It will be

completed from information contain-

ed in the member's FRGP and person- .

nel data system (PDS) products

such as Uniform Officer Record

(UOR), Or Uniform Airman Record

(UAR) soft copy, or Uniform Mili-

tary Personnel Record (UMPR).

Extreme care will be taken to in-

sure the accuracy of all data.

When data in the PDS is found to

be incorrect, immediate action must

be taken to attempt correction be-

fore records close out.

$0 PBR Ls Sat eS Pit Se :

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13

4

sary eS |

c. When Records Are Not Avail-

able. When the DD Form 214 cannot

be completed due to loss, damage,

or delay in receipt of the FRGp,

every effort will be made to ob-

tain the records from the member's

last servicing CBPO or by applica-

tion to AFMPC/DPMDR, Randolph AFB

TX 78148. However, in no case

will the separation of 2 member be

delayed because of the absence of

information required to complete

the DD Form 214 in detail. In such

cases, the DD Form 214 will be ac-

complished to the extent possible,

making full use of PDS products

available, and reason for incom-

pleteness noted in item 27.

d. Distribution. Distribu-

tion instructions are contained in

paragraph 3-2 and attachments 5,

6, and 7. For members separated

to continue in service, distri-

bute according to (1) through (3)

below:

(1) Original. Present to

the member.

(2) Duplicate. Forward to

AFMPC/DPMDRR, Randolph AFB, TX

78148.

(3) Triplicate. Forward to

the appropriate director of Selec-

tive Service for the address in item

8b (or item 8c if item 8b is blank).

14

e. Correcting DD Form 214.

DD Form 215, Correction to DD

Form 214, Report of Separation

from Active Duty, will be used to

correct 2rrors in DD Form 214 dis-

covered after the original has been

delivered and/or distribution of

copies of the form has been made.

Except as specified in attachment

3 no field installation is author-

ized to issue a DD Form 215. If

correction of DD Form 214 is neces-

Sary after the member's actual de-

parture from the installation that

separated him, see attachment 3 for

the agency responsible for making

the necessary changes. The dis-

tribution of DD Forms 214 and 215

will be identical.

Air Force Regulation 36-2 4 d(4), Re-

commendation for Action is Appropriate:

A recommendation for action under

this regulation is appropriate when

any of the circumstances outlined

in this paragraph, or similar cir-

cumstances, exist. The records

listed in AFR 36-3 as warranting

recommendation for initiation of

action under that regulation for sub-

standard performance of duty may

not be used in conjunction with the

reasons listed in this paragraph as

the basis for initiation of action

under this regulation. However,

evidence of unfitness or unaccept-

able conduct which is not consider-

ed serious enough to warrant action

|

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SRGEMNCL OA GALI AIO EGE ETE MG VEG IBI LEC LEE LEL NOEL PILL BED LEWES IO GING ELEM MS CY LIE IG —

15

or separation under this regula-

tion may be used to support the

reasons for initiation of action

under AFR 36-3, if the misconduct

or unfitness did in fact contri-

bute to the officer's substandard

performance of duty. A nonproba-

tionary Regular commissioned of-

ficer or a probationary Regular

commissioned officer with exten-

sive service who is discharged

for any of the reasons stated in

a through e below, or similar rea-

sons, will be considered to have

been discharged because of moral

or professional dereliction. . .

MER ee Sear er

d. Sexual Perversion. This in-

cludes but is not limited to: ...

BS a a

(4) Indecent exposure.

Air Force Regulation 36-12, q 37, Dis-

charge as a Result of Board Action:

AFR's 35-62, and 36-3 establish

procedures for the separation of

officers who fail to meet the

standards of conduct and perform-

ance prescribed by the Secretary

of the Air Force. When the Secre-

tary of the Air Force, based on the

approved recommendations of a

board of officers, directs that

an officer be discharged for any

REET NL, POLE OT GU ENNRN RI SAAT H NP H II RRNA

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16

of the reasons outlined in those

regulations, discharge will be

accomplished under this paragraph.

The character of discharge will be

as determined by the Secretary of

the Air Force in accordance with

paragraph 5 of this regulation and

any other applicable criteria con-

tained in the regulation under

which action was initiated. (SDN

590 if initial action was under

AFR 35-62; SDN 587, homosexual; |

SDN 588 if action initiated under

AFR 36-2 for other reasons; SDN

589 if action initiated under

Ga. Laws 1958, pp. 324-326. Probation |

for first offenders, when applicable;

violation of terms of probation:

Section 1. Upon a verdict or plea

of guilty or a plea of nolo conten-

dere but before an adjudication of

guilt, the court may, in the case

of a defendant who has not been

previously convicted of a felony,

without entering a judgment of

guilt and with the consent of the

defendant, defer further proceeding

and place the defendant on proba-

tion as provided by the Statewide

Probation Act (Ga. L. 1956, p.

27). Upon violation of the terms

Of probation, or upon conviction

for another crime, the court may

enter an adjudication of guilt and

BpeRAR Ee AON ARTE EL GINO ETE A enw

17

proceed as otherwise provided.

No person may avail himself of

the provisions of this Act on more

than one occasion. '

Section 2. Upon fulfillment of the

terms of probation, or upon release

by the court prior to the termina-

tion of the period thereof, the |

defendant shall be discharged with-

out court adjudication of guilt. t

Such discharge shall completely z

exonerate the defendant of any

criminal purpose, shall not affect :

any civil right or liberties, and y

he shall not be considered to have

a criminal conviction. Should a

_ person be placed under probation

under this Act, a record of the

same shall be forwarded to the of-

fice of the State Probation Sys-

tem and to the Identification Divi-

sion of the Federal Bureau of In-

vestigation. |

RY PEEPS I OER SRS

Section 3. The probationer shall |

be informed of the terms of this’

Act at the time of imposition of

sentence.

Section 4. If otherwise allowable

by law in any subsequent prosecnu-

tion of the defendant for any

other offense, such prior finding

of guilt may be pleaded and proven

as if an adjudication of guilt had

been entered and relief had not

been granted pursuant to this Act.

PAV BEE OBIE RPL $F PEGE IAD LEME BILLER ULL 8 ODL Ns POET EE, |

18

Section 5. A defendant sentenced

pursuant to this Act shall have

the right to appeal in the same

manner and with the same scope

and same effect as if judgment

of conviction had been entered

and appealed from.

Section 6. This Act shall be ef-

fective as to all crimes committed

after the date of its approval.

Section 7. All laws and parts of

laws in conflict with this Act

are hereby repealed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case originated with petitioner

filing a complaint for injunction and

equitable relief in the United States

District Court in the Middle District of

Georgia, Valdosta Division. The juris-'

diction of that Court was invoked under

Article III, Section 2, of the Consti-

tution of the United States and 28 USC

§ 1331-A.

i

Petitioner alleged in his complaint

* petite eons bE Maines anves ing?

IFPI IS EOI EN | EAT EE IRI CG OOM ig eB OE ELI OE ELM EI LIS

'

19

that the Air Force was proceeding to

discharge him under 10 U.S.C. § 1162

and 8447 and Air Force Regulations §

36-2 p.- 14, supra. Pursuant to orders ;

from Randolph Air Force Base dated 14

May, 1973, petitioner was to be dis-

charged within ten days and his dis-

charge certificate was to indicate the

reasons for discharge as SDN 588 437

AFR 36-12 (supra. p. 15 ). Such a dis-

charge in simple terms carries on its

face a statement that the officer con-

cerned was discharged under Air Force

Regulations 36-2 dealing only with “un-

fitness, unacceptable conduct or in the

interest of national security."

The grounds for instituting the dis-

charge proceedings against petitioner

arose out of certain criminal charges

against petitioner in the Criminal Courts

ED RYE AE LIA LOLS CRONE LENDS LPS ILLITE LD ISELIN EPO OL CER AIRSET Moley gre? eos ‘aD

20

of Georgia. In the criminal proceed-

ing the petitioner, after extensive

psychiatric examination,treatment, and

rehabilitation entered a plea of nolo

contendre under the Georgia First Offen-

der Act (p. 16, supra.), was placed

on probation on January 4, 1973. Pursu-

ant to provisions of the act, on March

22, 1973 petitioner was discharged with-

out any adjudication of guilt and com-

plete exoneration of all criminal pur-

pose.

Upon receiving notice of the order of

discharge petitioner filed his complaint

in District Court asking for an oppor-

tunity to appear in person before the

decision making Board in order to refute

the charges which formed the basis for

his discharge and to offer evidence in

4

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4

3

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4

rebuttal to these charges and offer

Oe FS tO Sco owy

21

evidence as to his fitness for continued

military service.

The District Court entered an ex

parte temporary restraining order to

maintain the status quo until the issues

were resolved. The Air Force by and

through the U.S. Attorney for the Middle

District of Georgia filed a motion to

dissolve the temporary restraining order

and to dismiss the complaint. The Dis-

trict Court, after consideration of

briefs submitted by plaintiff and de-

fendant, issued its memorandum and or-

der (app. "C" pe. 71 ) dismissing

plaintiff's complaint.

Forthwith plaintiff filed his notice

of Appeal to United States Circuit Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A

three Judge panel of the Fifth Circuit

reversed the District Court app. "B"

has LADEN ae a *

22

PP 49-70 - Upon granting of a mo-

tion for rehearing en banc, the full

court affirmed the District Court with

six of the fifteen Judges dissenting

app. "A" pp 33-48 .

During the interim between issuance

of the panel decision and the oral argu-

ments before the Fifth Circuit en banc

the Air Force modified its regulations

in regard to the placement of SDN number

on the certificate of discharge (DD Form

214). In lieu of entry of "SDN 588 par.

37 AFR 36-12", p. 15, supra, which

would have been entered in the space

entitled “Reason for Discharge" on the

Original and all copies of DD Form 214

under the old regulations, the new regu-

lations (AFR 35-6 44-5 supra p. 8 )

provide the original DD Form 214 will

have three dash marks (---) while the

23

copies of this form retained in his

permanent records will contain the same

disparaging information as provided un-

der the former regulations.

In substance petitioner has been or-

dered discharged from the United States

Air Force, not simply under the statutes

and regulation of the United States Con-

ferring upon the President power and

authority to discharge probationary Re-

serve Officer, but rather under Statutes

and regulations providing authority for

discharge of officers for unfitness and

unacceptable conduct. Petitioner has

and does fervently contend that under

these circumstances the due process

clause of the fifth amendment to the

Constitution of the United States re-

quires that he have a hearing to refute

the charges and offer evidence in

atlas id eae

24

rebuttal to the charges forming the

basis of this action of the Air Force

which deprives petitioner of a substan-

tial property and liberty interest. The

effect of the Judgment of the Circuit

Court upon petitioner is to deprive him

of his career in the Air Force, all

rights as a reserve officer and to limit

him in his ability to acquire civilian

employment in addition to having his

military records (which constitute a

significant property as well as liberty

interest in itself) containing informa-

tion impugning his character and fitness

for service all without ever affording

the petitioner of an opportunity to be

heard on the matter.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The decision below directly conflicts

with the due process principle enunciated

25-

in this Court's rulings in Norval Goss

et.al. v. Eileen Lopez et.al. ___U-S.

___, 43 Law Week 4181. In the Goss

Case this Court held that high school :

students suspended from school for

periods of ten days was entitled to the

protection of the due process clause

when the basis of this suspension was

misconduct on the part of the student.

The decision below is in direct con-

flict with the principles of due pro-

cess enunciated by this Court in Board

of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 92

S Ct. 2701, 33 LED 2d 548 (1972). In

the Roth case this court held that the

due process clause affords protection

to both liberty and property interest;

and when a protected interest is imp1li-

cated, the right to some kind of prior

hearing is Paramount. To assert that the

s rier OE ORE SILE Be tal

26

petitioner had no property interest in

his military career one must totally

disregard all the facts in the record

as well as his common knowledge of the

Operation of the Air Force and other

branches of service. Petitioner had the

prospect of enjoying his full tour of

duty as a flying officer in the Air

— with the possibility of transfer-

ring to the regular service upon com-

pletion of his tour of active duty. If

he had not transferred to the regular

status he would have returned to non-

active reserve duty with definite

material benefits. Likewise, petition-

er's military record per se is a valu-

able asset to a member of the armed

services upon his return to civilian

status and when the accuracy of the

entries made therein is challenged the

LEGIONS IE LBNP GEE TOLE EPA

PIODIIEI LETS

27

minimal safe guards of due process come

into play. Furthermore, as conceded

by the Court below petitioner has a pro-

tected liberty interest and as this

Court stated in the Roth case "where a

person's good name, reputation, honor

and integrity is at stake because of

what the government is doing to him,

notice and opportunity to be heard are

essential." Citing Wisconsin v. Con-

stantineau, 400 U.S. 433; Wieman v.

Updegroff 344 U.S. 83; Joint Anti-

Facist Refugge Committee v. McGrath,

341 U.S. 123; United States v. Lovett,

328 U.S. 303; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S.

331.

The decision in the District Court

is in direct conflict with the princi-

ples enunciated by this Court in Perry

v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct.

E

}

E

ARR

28

2694, 33 L.Ed. 24 570. In Perry this

court held that a college professor em-

ployed by university without any writ-

ten contractual tenure provisions have

a “property” interest in continued em-

ployment based upon "implied" contract,

circumstance of his service, or other

relevant facts and the state could not

deprive him of these rights without the

minimal safeguard of procedural due

process,

The principle in the Perry Case is

particularly applicable in the Case at

bar. Under the statutes applicable ie.

10 USC 1162, a reserve officer can be

discharged at the pleasure of the Presi-

dent. This is essentially the situation

that existed in the Perry Case where

the professor had no contractual right

to Continued Employment. Nevertheless,

aa

29

he had a property interest under an

“Implied Contract" theory. Likewise,

Lt. Sims, although a reserve officer

who served at the pleasure of the Presi-

dent under all the circumstances could

: expect to serve a full tour of duty

(barring any general reduction in

force), and then be entitled to the

benefits of a Reserve Officer; and as

such was entitled to a hearing before

being discharged under regulations cast-

ing reflections upon and greatly im-

pugning his character.

If the Judgment below is allowed to

stand the petitioner will have to live

the rest of his life with a military

record containing the disparaging im-

moral conduct as the grounds for dis-

charge without ever affording him the

opportunity to challenge the validity

PL ORL AL IOI POE PE GALEN IR NOG MIAMI ME

30 }

of these grounds or to offer evidence

of exoneration or mitigation of the

charges. The practical effect of this

is to deprive him of this opportunity

to participate in a lucrative profes-

sion in the United States either on a

part-time or a full time basis. Like-

wise, his discharge constitutes a

blemished passport back to civilian

which will bar the petitioner from ever

utilizing his service record in seeking

civilian employment because of the ac-

tion of the Air Force in arbitrarily

contaminating his record unjustly.

ei!

CONCLUSION

‘For these reasons this Court should

issue the Writ to review the decision

of United States Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit.

‘

Reginald C. Wisenbaker

Bennett, Saliba & Wisenbaker

P. O. Box 1685

Valdosta, Georgia,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that I have this

day served true and correct copies of

the foregoing Petition for Writ of

Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the

State of Georgia, by mail, by depositing

the same in a United States mail hos,

with first class postage prepaid.

bs ok

Bupaseseeee csr ener rene REneTeTeer ND SENT FE Ee

ar ah Bil a Nk ed nail aah Ae ii a a beeline) LORAINE LLY LTA IO OCT LIL RA AIINE AIP TOR A rg

| oe

- addressed to each of the following,

who constitute all counsel of record:

Thomas G. Wilson, Esquire

Appellate Section, Civil Division

United States Dept. of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530 |

This day of March, 1975.

All parties required to be served have

f

been served.

‘

Reginald C. Wisenbaker

APPENDIX "A" 33 2359

Grover William SIMS, Second Lieutenant, United States

Air Force, 418-66-6972FV, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv

Cecil E. FOX, Brigadier General, Etc, and Dr. John L.

McLucas, Secretary of the Air Force,

Defendants- Appellees.

No. 73-2707.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

April 19, 1974.

Air force officer brought action to have his discharge

enjoined on grounds that he was entitled to have a hearing

with minimal due process procedures before he could be

subjected to unfavorable action against him. The United

States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, at ¢

Valdosta, J. Robert Elliott, Chief Judge, dismissed the com-

plaint, and plaintiff appefled. The Court of Appeals, Tuttle,

Circuit Judge, held that officer could not be legally separated

from Air Force by giving him a discharge which, though

characterized as “honorable,” carried with it a separation

designation number that signified a discharge on ground of

unfitness and/or unsuitability, without affording officer a

hearing at which he could personally be present and present

evidence, und that failure of officer to pursue administrative

remedies under statutes providing for correction of military

records and for review of discharges and dismissals did not

preclude officer from maintaining such action.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Synopecs, Syllabi and Key Number Clessification

COPYRIGHT @ 1914, by WEST PUBLISHING CO.

The and Number Clean!

ee Sdaamdaen Oak

PATROL IEPA LIMO TET MLE OD ORIEL! EIT 5 EAI I FETE BD AIEEE ET LAN IM TY EITM neti

34

2860 SIMS v. FOX

1. Armed Services 11

Air force officer, who had been charged in state courts

with several misdemeanors involving indecent exposure, could

not be legally separated from Air Force by giving him a

discharge which, though characterized as “honorable,” carried

with it a separation designation number that signified a

discharge on ground of unfitness and/or unsuitability, without

affording officer a hearing at which he could personally be

present and present evidence, including witnesses, on his

behalf, and at which he could make at least an effort to stave

off the impending threat to his future reputation and security.

2. Armed Services @=11

Statutes providing for correction of military records and

for review of discharges and dismissals were enacted initially

for purpose of avoiding a large number of “private” bills in

Congress by which formerly discharged service men sought to

have nature or character or type of discharge certificate

corrected because of real or imaginary defects in the military

system which they felt had prejudiced them. 10 U.S.C.A.

§§ 1552, 1553.

3. Armed Services o=11

Failure of air force officer to pursue administrative reme-

dies under statutes providing for correction of military records

and for review of discharges and dismissals did not preclude

officer from maintaining action based on claim that he could

not be discharged on grounds that he was “unfit” or “unsuita-

ble” and ineligible for recall, and also be deprived of his

reserve commission without minimal procedural due process.

10 U.S.C.A. §§ 1552, 1553.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Mid-

dle District of Georgia.

Before TUTTLE, BELL and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges.

Tyce se _ on

GE LOE STB

35

TUTTLE, Circuit Judge:

This appeal raises the question whether the United States

Air Force can legally separate a reserve officer for cause by

giving him an “honorable” discharge which, however, carries

with it a “separation designation number 588” signifying a

discharge on the ground of “unfitness and/or unsuitability,” .

without affording such officer an opportunity for a hearing.

What is not before the Court is the right of the Air Force to

relieve a reserve officer from active duty with an unqualified

honorable discharge certificate as a part of a reduction in

force without a hearing. Lt. Sims contends that he cannot be

discharged on the grounds that he is “unfit” or “unsuitable”

and ineligible for recall, and also be deprived of his reserve

commission as an Air Force officer without minimum proce-

dural due process.

The facts may be briefly stated. The plaintiff whose mili-

tary career had heen entirely satisfactory was charged in the

Georgia Criminal Courts with several misdemeanors involving

indecent exposure. By order of the State Superior Court

judge he was sent to the Central State Hospital at Milledge-

ville, Georgia, where he remained for several months for a

period of extensive psychiatric care and treatment. Thereaft-

er, on March 22, 1973, the Georgia Superior Court judge

signed an order discharging Sims without any adjudication of

guiit as to all charges pending against him, which said order

completely exonerated him of any criminal purpose.’ -

1. This procedure is authorized by sections 27-2727 to 27-2732

Ga.Code Ann. The provisions of this statute are as follows:

Section 1

“Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere

(but) before an adjudication of guilt, the court may, in the case of

a defendant who has not been previously convicted of a felony,

without entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent of the

defendant, defer further proceeding and place the defendant on

probation as provided by the Statewide Probation Act (Georgia

laws 1956 p. 27). Upon violation of the terms

upon a conviction for another crime, the court may enter an

adjudication of guilt and proceed as otherwise provided. No

NS

RN nn tak ar eee at ee Sos

; ss .

,

PEEL LNG OIRL IY SRE LEAL, LISI RIG LILLE IE HHS AO TOOBIN PPM VIMIED ITY ae

36

2862 SIMS v. FOX

In the meantime, on January 24, 1973, Sims was notified in

writing of the initiation of administrative discharge proceed-

ings under Air Force Regulations 36-2 by the Commander of

his wing at the Moody Air Force Base in Georgia. Air Force

Regulations 36-2 are entitled “Administrative Discharge Pro-

cedures” and the subhead reads “This regulation establishes

criteria for identifying officers of the Air Force serving in the

active military service who, because of evidence of unfitness

or unacceptable conduct, should be required to show cause for

retention in the Air Force. It also prescribes procedures for

the disposition of cases involving such officers and those cases

approved under Air Force Regulations 35-62, Military Person-

nel Security Program, for further processing under this Regu-

lation.” The January, 1973 notice stated: “I am initiating

action against you under AFR 36-2 for the reasons outlined in

* 4D(4) of that Regulation.” Paragraph (4) deals with the

inquiry under Regulations 36-2. Subparagraph D({4) is en-

titled “Sexual Perversion” and reads: “This includes but is

not limited to: . . . (4) indecent exposure.”

Plaintiff was advised that he could submit written state-

ments within fifteen days and there was attached to the letter

an extract of a report of an investigation that had been made

by the appropriate Air Force officers. Sims responded on

February 7th and stated “I do not desire to comment on the

allegations contained in paragraph 2 to the attached letter.”

person may avai! himself of the provisions of this {Act} on more

than one occasion.”

Section 2

“Upon fulfillment of the terms of probation, or upon release by

the court prior to the termination of the period thereof, the

defendant shall be discharged without court adjudication of guilt.

Such discharge shall completely exonerate the defendant of any

criminal purpose, shall not affect any civil right or liberties, and

he shall not be considered to have a criminal conviction. Should

a person be placed under probation under this [act], a record of

the same shall be forwarded to the office of the State Probation

System and to the Identification Division of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation.”

OE SANLEF PEPE LEG LTA E ABEND : CAFO IO POL PED Ye

REE LEAL APE VF

subject matter that may properly subject an officer to an:

—_— ————— ._

Ory _

OS PE AE EBL. ON NOPD PER LETU TELL

37

SIMS v. FOX 2383

Paragraph 2 contained the allegations as to the indecent

exposure already discussed above. Thereafter on February

27, 1973, the Commander Air Training Command recom-

mended to Headquarters U.S. Air Force that plaintiff be

given an honorable discharge from all appointments in the

United States Air Force. Under the regulations, since Sims

was a probationary reserve officer he was not entitled to a

hearing before obtaining a discharge as a matter of right.

The Commander recommended processing under section E,

Air Force Regulations 36-2, which provides for the Secretary

of the Air Force, Personnel Board, to review all the documen-

tury evidence, including that submitted by the officer, but

without the appearance of the officer or his representation by

counsel unless such appearance is determined by the Board to

be necessary.

On March 26, 1973, Lt. Sims submitted to the Commander

of his wing for forwarding to the Air Training Command a

letter expressing his desire to remain in the Air Force and he

accompanied this letter with a favorable letter of evaluation

relating to his duty performance as well as a report of his

psychiatric evaluation at Central State Hospital which con-

tained a statement “The prognosis in this type of disorder

with the appropriate treatment, which is primarily psycho-

therapy, is fairly good, and chances for recurrence of the

symptoms are usually nil.” Sims also forwarded a copy of the

order of the Superior Court discharging him from the state

criminal proceedings. ;

Following the ex parte consideration of Sims’ file proper

Air Force authorities notified his Commanding Officer at

Moody Air Force Base to have him discharged, and such

discharge was to be accomplished in the following manner:

“Show in orders and item 11(c), DD Form 214 [the discharge

certificate] reason and authority: SDN 588, 437, AFR 36-12

and this message.” The discharge was to be accomplished

within ten days. Prior to the expiration of this date Lt. Sims

filed his suit in the district court, seeking to have the dis-

SKS Ay: eee nee cc |

38

2364 SIMS v. FOX

charge enjoined on the grounds that he was entitled to have a

hearing with minimal due process procedures before he could

be subjected to this unfavorable action against him. The trial

court initially granted a temporary restraining order to stay

the discharge long enough for it to consider the Government's

motion to dismiss. After the hearing the court entered an

order dismissing the complaint on the ground that no due

process requirements would attach to the ordering of an

“honorable” discharge. The court granted a stay to afford

Sims an opportunity to appeal. Following the filing of an

appeal this Court extended the stay but ordered the appeal

expedited. Unfortunately, following oral argument we found

it necessary to have supplied excerpts from the relevant Air

Force Regulations, and further briefing on the question of

exhaustion of administrative remedies.

the United States calling attention to the fact that the Secre-

tary of the Air Force may give an “honorable discharge” to

any member of the Air Force without a hearing. The position

of the defendant is that there are many kinds of “honorable

discharges” and this particular discharge certificate which the

Air Force has ordered given to Sims carries on its face

evidence of serious professional or moral misconduct such as

would seriously affect his reputation and opportunity for

success in civil life. For a young man twenty-three years of

age trained as an aircraft pilot, the result may be devastating.

It is clear that the notations which are required to be placed

on Sims’ Form 214 (the discharge certificate) even though it is

termed an “honorable discharge” make it perfectly plain that

he will have been discharged as a result of Board action which

had been undertaken because of his “unfitness, unacceptable

conduct, or in the interest of national security.” This follows

from the fact that the instructions for his discharge directed

that the discharge certificate contain an entry at the appropri-

ate place giving “reason and authority SDN 588 £37 AFR

Fain ae a ae

The real crux of this case is pointed up by the statements by’

-

7” PO LOC RD ANG IAP " s

39

SIMS v. FOX 2365

36-12." Paragraph 37 of Regulation 36-12 deals only with

separation as a “result of Board action” as to officers “who

fail to meet the standards of conduct and performance pre-

scribed by the Secretary of the Air Force.” It further pro-

vides that the designation SDN 588 would identify “action

initiated under AFR 36-2” on any of the grounds of unfitness

or unacceptable .conduct described in that regulation other

than of homosexuality which was assigned SDN 587. In other

words, any certificate of discharge bearing the designation

SDN 588 carries on its face a statement that the officer

concerned had been discharged under Air Force Regulation

36-2 dealing orily with “unfitness, unacceptable conduct or in

the interest of national security.” Moreover, as was readily

conceded during oral argument, such a discharge would make

such officer ineligible for recall to active duty. Furthermore,

the order to discharge Sims “from all appointments in the

United States Air Force” means, as we understand it, cancel-

ling his commission in the Air Force Reserve.

Simply stated, an honest inquiry into the basis for Sims’

discharge would demonstrate that he had been given a dis-

charge for reasons that would greatly undercut the status of

the discharge as “an honorable discharge.” The question we

are to face therefore is whether a lieutenant in the Air Force

can not only have his normal period of active duty terminated

for cause, and be deprived of his Reserve Commission, but also

have his future jeopardized by having to carry as his certifi-

cate of release from the service a document which impugns his

character or reputation without having at least an opportuni-

ly to make an oral presentation and witnesses on his behalf at

some kind of proceeding beyond that authorized under pre-

vailing regulations. We of course are not considering, as we

have no right to, what the Air Force Board of Officers, under

a proper regulation, should, or would, be likely to do if Lt.

Sims had been afforded a hearing in the true sense of the

word. We have cited some favorable aspects of his case above

merely to show that his contention that he ought to have an

Ao

eee |

a A ea ME thle nS ete

40

2366 SIMS v. FOX

opportunity to appear in person to argue his case either

personally or by counsel is not an empty gesture on his part.

The most important matter that Sims would normally wish

to present to an administrative tribunal would, of course, be

the disposition of his criminal case in the Georgia courts, and

also the evaluation of his performance of military duties

(which was certified by his commanding officer to be unexcep-

tionable), and the prognosis as to his psychological problem

made by the Georgia Central State Hospital.

There can be no doubt but that Sims’ discharge is a flawed

passport back to civil life. The detriment he will suffer is of

sufficient magnitude to create a genuine issue as to whether

the Air Force should not be required to provide him with a

hearing at which he could personally be present and make at

least an effort to stave off the impending threat to his future

reputation and security. As the Supreme Court said in Green

v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304, 81 S.Ct. 653, 655, 5 L.Ed.2d

670 (1961), when speaking of the need for granting an individ-

ual accused in a criminal case the absolute right to speak for

himself: “The most persuasive counsel may not be able to

speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting

eloquence, speak for himself.” The value to a person facing a

loss of a substantial right to speak for himself where no

counsel was permitted to speak for him is of course even

greater.

Moreover, Lt. Sims had a prospect of enjoying his full tour

of duty as a flying officer in the Air Force, subject only to

normal procedures that might fortuitously make it necessary

for his active duty to be terminated earlier. Here, he was

deprived of that expectation of continued service, see McDo-

well v. State of Texas, 465 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1971) because of

alleged misconduct.

Besides, he was to be deprived of his status as a reserve

officer, which carries with it intrinsically valuable emoluments

41

SIMS v. FOX

.

&

Me

Pe >

for service as a “week-end warrior” if he remained in certain

reserve categories.

We do not doubt that such a right as Sims possessed is

sufficiently similar to those rights which the courts have held

cannot be taken away without procedural due process as to

give validity to his contention here. See McDowell v. State of

Texas, supra: Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.

1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33

L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). For all that appears in this record he

would have continued to serve as an Air Force officer on

flying status for a period (which, however, is not made plain

in the record before us) but for the action taken because of his

acts of indecent exposure which triggered the proceedings

commenced against him by the letter of January 24, 1973.’

Even if this termination for cause of his Air Force status

were not in itself the deprivation of a right entitling him to

procedural due process, his discharge in a manner that marked

him as unfit to serve was of itself the deprivation of a

protected right. Such a right was described by the Supreme

Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701,

33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). In Roth the Court held that a failure

tu rehire a non-tenured teacher was permissible because noth-

ing damaging to Roth's reputation could be inferred from the

state’s action. The Court said:

“In declining to rehire the respondent, (the state] did not

make any charge against him that might seriously damage

his standing and associations in his community. It did not

2. This letter commenced by saying “I am initiating action against

you under AFR 36-2 for the reasons outlined in paragraph 4D(4) of

that regulation” Paragraph 4D(4) states as follows:

“(4) When recommendation for action is appropriate. A recom-

mendation for action under this regulation is appropriate when

any of the circumstances outlined in this paragraph or similar

circumstances exist re

“(d) Sexual perversion. This includes but is not limited to:

“{4] Indecent exposure.

4a

2368 SIMS v. FOX

base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, for exam-

ple, that he had been guilty of dishonesty, or immorality.

Had it done so, this would be a different case for ‘where a

person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at

stake because of what the government is doing to him,

notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.’ Wis-

consin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 [, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27

L.Ed.2d 515] (1971); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,

191 [, 73 S.Ct. 215, 219, 97 L.Ed. 216] (1952); Joint Anti-Fa-

cist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 [, 71 S.Ct.

624, 95 L.Ed. 817] (1951); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.

303, 316-317 [, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 1079, 90 L.Ed. 1252] (1946):

Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 352 [, 75 S.Ct. 790, 801, 99

L.Ed. 1129] (1955) (Douglas, J., concurring). See Cafeteria

& Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 [, 81

S.Ct. 1743, 1750, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230] (1961). In such a case, due

process would accord an opportunity to refute the charge’

before University officials [footnote not included]. In the

present case, however, there is no suggestion whatever that

the respondent’s ‘good name, reputation, honor, or integrity’

is at stake.” 408 U.S. 564, 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707.

Here, of course, there is precisely the ingredient which was

lacking in Roth. The Air Force seeks to discharge Lt. Sims in

a manner that denigrates his reputation, honor or integrity

because of the nature of the entries on the discharge certifi-

cate.

A somewhat similar case was decided by the Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit when it concluded that the

Court could intervene in a threatened expulsion of a cadet at

the United States Military Academy and his return to active

duty status where the cadet was denied a due process hearing.

The case of Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.

1972), dealt with action of the United States Military Acade-

my “separating” a third year cadet for deficiency in conduct

after receiving 107 demerits as of a certain date, 5 demerits in

excess of the 102 demerit allowance prescribed as a maximum

an

itn ar am

43

SIMS v. FOX 2369

for the period involved. The order of separation would also

subject cadet Hagopian to transfer to active duty in the

armed services. The cadet challenged the failure of the

academy officials to comport with the minimum due process

requirements in the procedures by which the demerits were

charged against him, since when these demerits accumulated

to the number of 102 this would warrant the termination of

his cadetship by the academy’s academic board. The court

held:

“We hold that the existing measures presently available to

a cadet for contesting an individual award of demerits are

sufficient to meet minimum standards of due process, but

that when an accumulation of awarded demerits renders the

cadet subject to separation, he must be granted a fair

hearing before being separated, including the right to per-

sonally appear and to present witnesses and other evidence

in his behalf.”

In a carefully consilered opinion the court recognized the

basic precept that:

“Such important matters, [the provision of rigorous and

exacting standards of discipline and behavior and personal

decorum for cadets] which are a part of the Army’s conduct

of military affairs and the standards adopted by it to

prepare men for military operations, should not be inter-

fered with by the judiciary.” Citing Orloff v. Willoughby,

345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953).

As is pointed out in the opinion, the court noted that the

academic board had a double function. It was first to deter-

mine whether the cadet in question had accumulated an

excessive amount of validly awarded demerits over the course

of the demerit period. Then, if so, it must then determine

whether the cadet’s “potential warrants retention,” so as to

allow probation rather than separation. In other words the

hoard had a responsibility of doing more than totalling the

number of «demerits and then exacting the maximum penalty

* Ira

44

2870 SIMS v. FOX

of dismissal from the academy if they equalled more than 102.

The board was charged with the requirement of determining

whether the cadet’s character, qualifications and other “poten-

tial” warranted his retention as a cadet. Here, too, the

hierarchy of the Air Force was required to consider the record

of Lt. Sims and make a recommendation to the “character” as_

well as the “type” of discharge. Moreover, it is undisputed

that the board could have rejected the initial recommendation

of Sims’ commanding officer that he be discharged from his

commission. Such a judgment would necessarily be on much

the same standards as that spoken of in Hagopian, i. e.

whether Lt. Sims “potential warrants retention” notwith-

standing the truth as to the original charges brought against

him. Relevant to this judgment would be the factors already

mentioned as to the disposition of his case in the state

criminal court, the certification as to the outstanding perform- |

ance of his duties by his superior officer, and the prognosis as.

to a possible recurrence of his psychiatric problem. As the

court in the Second Circuit said:

“Perhaps more importantly, with respect to certain of the

demerit awards and especially with respect to the subjective

evaluation of the cadet’s potential, the opportunity to per-

sonally appear and present his case may affect considerably

the credibility which the members of the Academic Bourd

attach to the cadet’s appeal.” ;

We read the word “credibility,” to cover more than credibility

as to the truth or falsity of the original charges.

The court further said:

“The opportunity to bring witnesses to appear in his behalf

may also strengthen the impact of his case above the frail

impression which a written submission would make.” 470

F.2d 201, 211.

We conclude as did the court in Hagopian and the earlier

case of Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967), (a

1 OF De pata IPN SM NG

45

SIMS v. FOX . 2871

case dealing with the dismissal of a third year student at the

_. Merchant Marine Academy) that at such a hearing:

“The [officer] must be allowed to appear and present evi-

dence, including witnesses, on his behalf. The importance

of informality in the proceeding militates against a require-

ment that the cadet be accorded the right to representation

by counsel before the Academic Board.”

We think the case of Pauls v. Secretary of Air Force, 457

F.2d 294 (1st Cir. 1972), in no way conflicts with what we

. decide here. In that case the particular officers involved had

their active service terminated among a grovp involved in a

reduction in force. They were not selected to appear before a

board to answer charges of misconduct for the purpose of

determining whether they were to be retained in the service.

[2] Finally, the appellees contend that the trial court did

not have jurisdiction of this matter because of the failure of

Lt. Sims to pursue available administrative remedies. In its

brief filed in this Court the government’s position is far from

clear. It states:

“Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies.

He has further administrative appeals under 10 U:S.C.

§ 1552 (32 CFR 865A) and 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (32 CFR 865B).”

It is apparent that neither of these forms of administrative

hearings would be available to Lt. Sims until after his dis-

charge had heen completed and his separation both as an

active and as a reserve officer had become final. The sections

were both enacted initially for the purpose of avoiding a large

number of “private” hills in Congress by which formerly

discharged service men sought to have the nature or character

or type of discharge certificate corrected because of real or

imaginary defects in the military system which they felt had

prejudiced them. Both sections are rather broad in their

language, but, upon request of the court, government counsel

undertook to make plain what it contended with respect to the

failure of Lt. Sims to pursue his administrative remedies.

ae |

46

a SIMS v. FOX

Counsel conceded that the diseharge review board, established

pursuant. ta 10 USC. § 1558 “ia not. authorized. ta qant. tha

administrative relief the court apparently is inquiring into.”

The government on the other hand contended that the Board

for Correction of Military Records established under 1c au-

thority of 10.U.S.C. § 1552 would permit the Secretary of the

Air Force to reinstate Lt. Sims if the Board or the Secretary

concluded that he had been improperly discharged.

As we understand it, this amounts to the contention that

Sims should accept his discharge containing the final determi-

nation by the Air Force Personnel Board that he was unfit to

retain his active duty or reserve status in the Air Force and

ineligible for recall and thereafter make application to the

Board for Correction of Military Records seeking a reinstate-

- ment which, if recommended, could be effected only by a

discretionary act by the Secretary of the Air Force.

While not called to our attention in the government’s brief,’

this argument is most strongly supported by these earlier

' decisions by this Court: McC 1966, 359 F.2d

491, cert. den. sub nom. M: , 1966, 385 U.S. 903,

87 S.Ct. 212, 17 L.Ed.2d 133; T: , 362 F.2d 801,

cert. den., 1966, 385 U.S. 941, 87 il, 17 L.Ed.2d 220; and

Stanford v. United States, 1969, 413 F.2d 1048. These cases

are all distinguishable. In none of them did the serviceman’s

attack on the validity of his discharge (“general” in McCurdy’s

case, “undesirable” in Tuggie’s case, and “dishonorable” in

‘ §Stanford’s) deal with the issue of procedural due process in

the hearings or review procedures which ultimately produced

the termination of the services of each.

McCurdy had a full hearing before the Board of Officers at

which this Court said “He was ably represented by both

military and civilian counsel. After a full hearing, the Board

found,” ete. Nothing appears from the per curiam opinion in

Tuggle that the airman had been denied a full hearing. In

Stanford, the court dealt with a challenge to the validity of a

court martial which had culminated in a dishonorable dis-

EPL ATO LNA 5 LEO DEL LUG EOI GALI he

47 .

SIMS v. FOX 2873

charge. His attack was based on the contention that he had

been denied the constitutional right to indictment by grand

jury and trial by petit jury. This Court pointed out the fact

that the constitution expressly excepts cases arising in the

armed forces from the guarantee of indictment and that the

Supreme Court had held that trial by jury was not guaranteed

in court martial proceedings, citing Whelchel v. McDonald,

1950, 340 U.S. 122, 71 S.Ct. 146, 95 L.Ed. 141.

In this case, the very defect which Lt. Sims asserts here as

the basis for his action in the court is one that would prevent

the preparation of the kind of record which should be made

available for all parties to use at any hearing before the Board

for Correction of Military Records. This contention being

based upon a procedural defect that goes to the preparation of

the record itself is not only a distinguishing characteristic

from the prior cases, but it seems clear that it requires a

hoiding that this case presents a proper issue for the court to

decide in the present litigation. Without an opportunity to

appear before the Personnel Board, it is impossible to see how

that Board could adequately appraise Lt. Sims as to his

potential for continued service in the Air Force.

Moreover, although perhaps in light of this court’s decision

in McCurdy, supra, not sufficient of itself to warrant judicial

intervention prior to actual discharge, we may also take

judicial notice of the fact that serious interruption of the

duties of a qualified flying officer of the Air Force might

have a substantially deleterious effect on his future capabili-

ties and opportunities for promotion so that a complete sepa-

ration from the service for a substantial period of time would

jeopardize his future in the service were he ultimately to

prevail?

[3] We conclude therefore that this action should not be

dismissed for failure of Lt. Sims to await his final discharge,

3. For a full discussion of the developing law in cases of this kind see

Judicial Review of Military Administrative Discharges, 83 Yale Law

Journal 33.

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2874 SIMS v. FOX

after which he should then seek to have that discharge sct

aside and seek reinstatement from the Secretary of the Air

Force rather than undertake to stay the discharge until he

had been accorded a hearing with minimum due process as we

have outlined above.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the

trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this

opinion.

Adm. Office, U.S. Courts—West Publishing Company, Saint Paul, Minn.

4

APPENDIX "B" 49 seen

Grover William SIMS, Second Lieutenant, United States Air |

Force 418-66-6972FV, Pilaintiff-Appellant,

- VW

Cecil E. FOX, Brigadier General, etc., and Dr. John L.

McLucas, Secretary of the Air Force,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 73-2707.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 30, 1974.

Reserve air force officer sought to enjoin the Air Force

from discharging him without first giving him a hearing in

person for purpose of presenting proof of his fitness for

continued service. The United States District Court for the

Middle District of Georgia, J. Robert Elliott, Chief Judge,

dismissed the complaint and the plaintiff appealed. The

Court of Appeals, 492 F.2d 1088, reversed and remanded with

directions. On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals,

Coleman, Circuit Judge, held that reserve officer had no

“property right” in continued employment in the Air Force,

and that the Air Force’s action in honorably discharging

officer after he pleaded nolo contendere to charge of indecent

exposure did not deprive officer of “liberty” and officer was

not entitled to due process hearing prior to discharge where

officer’s discharge paper would not reveal reason for his

discharge, air force regulations denied employers or anyone

else the opportunity to learn circumstances of officer’s dis-

charge and officer did not deny truth of charges against him.

Judgment of District Court affirmed.

Bynopess, and Key Number Classification

COPYRIGHT © 1974, by WEST PUBLISHING CO.

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50

1963 SIMS v. FOX

Tuttle, Circuit Judge, with whom Wisdom, Bell, Goldberg,

Godbold and Morgan, Circuit Judges, joined, dissented and

filed opinion.

1. Constitutional Law ¢=277(2)

Under statute providing that reserve officers may be

discharged at the pleasure of the President, reserve air force

officer had no property right in continued employment in the

Air Force such as would entitle him to due process hearing

prior to his honorable discharge, despite contention that such

property right was conferred by officer’s expectation of full

tour of duty, by an implied promise of continued service or by

an “understanding” between himself and the Air Force. 10

U.S.C.A. § 1162; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

2. Constitutional Law @=255(2)

Governmental attack on one’s good name, reputation,

honor and community standing can be a deprivation of liberty

within the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. U.S.C.A.

Const. Amends. 5, 14.

3 Constitutional Law ¢=255(2)

Governmental communication of derogatory information

to employers may constitute an attack on “liberty” within

meaning of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. U.S.C.A.

Const. Amends. 5, 14.

4 Constitutional Law @=83(1), 318(2)

Air Force’s honorable discharge of reserve officer follow-

ing officer’s plea of nolo contendere to charge of indecent

exposure in state court did not deprive officer of “liberty” and

officer was not entitled to due process hearing prior to such

discharge where officer’s discharge paper would not reveal

reason for discharge, air force regulations denied employers or

anyone else the opportunity to learn circumstances of the

discharge, there were no allegations indicating reasonably

anticipated likelihood that Air Force would reveal officer’s

record to potential employers and officer did not deny the

charges against him. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.

~ ADA Sea WTS,

SES OL SES T I LIPID PEE GE I EEF ORT IE Da EOF ES TEMPE SEE RE SG GE SOE LY ROTEL OL MCR VT BRET OR

31

SIMS v. FOX . ie

5S. Constitutional Law ¢=83(1)

Mere presence of derogatory information in an employer's

confidential files does not infringe protected “liberty.” U.S.C.

6. Constitutional Law pau

Government has not infringed “liberty” by permitting

others to learn reasons for discharge of government employee

unless it has perpetuated untrue charges. U.S.C.A.Const.

Amends. 5, 14.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Mid-

dle District of Georgia.

Before BROWN, Chief Judge, and TUTTLE, WISDOM,

GEWIN, BELL, THORNBERRY, COLEMAN, GOLDBERG,

AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, DYER, SIMPSON, MORGAN,

CLARK, RONEY and GEE, Circuit Judges.

COLEMAN, Circuit Judge.

This is an action by Air Force Lieutenant William Sims

against Air Force General Cecil Fox and the Secretary of the

Air F Sims asks that the Air Force be enjoined from

discharging him without first giving him a hearing in person

to present proof: of his fitness for continued service.

The District Court dismissed Sims’ complaint for failure to

state a claim upon which relief could be granted. A Panel of

this Court reversed, Sims v. Fox, 5 Cir., 1974, 492 F.2d 1088.

We granted the petition for rehearing en banc, and again

consider the correctness of the dismissal.

We affirm the Judgment of the District Court.

Lt. G. William Sims was ordered to active duty on July 14,

1971. His performance of duty was good. Until June, 1972

his off-duty life was unremarkable. In that month, Sims was

arrested for two separate acts of indecent exposure. Specifi-

cally, on June 20 and June 23 he was charged with exposing

his sexual organs to females. He was released on bond.

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52

1905 SIMS v. FOX

In September of 1972, Mrs. Carol Barnett, a civilian, report-

ed to military authorities that Sims on two occasions had

exposed himself to her minor children, ages six, nine, and four.

Sims was again charged with indecent exposure.

On 4 January, 1973, Sims was tried in a Georgia state court.

Under a Georgia statute providing for special treatment for

first offenders,’ he was allowed to plead nolo contendere and

was placed on probation for a year. Although the Georgia

Court made no adjudication of guilt, Sims has never denied

that he, in fact, committed the acts with which he was

charged.

On January 24, 1973, Sims was notified by his Wing Com-

mander that discharge proceedings* were being initiated.

l. 27-2727 through 27-2732, Ga.Code Ann.

2. The discharge procedure is that specified in Air Force Regulation |

36-2 which provides, in relevant part, that a Wing or Base Com-

mander, having received information indicating that an officer is

unfit for continued service, notifies the officer of the charges against

him and advises the officer that he has 15 days within which to

submit written statements and documentary evidence. If, after

considering the evidence, the Commander concludes that discharge

is appropriate, he forwards the documented case to Air Force

H

At Air Force Headcuarters, the case is referred to the Air Force

Personnel Board which, after reviewing the evidence. makes its

recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force. The Secretary is

the person who makes the final decision as to whether the officer

should be retained or discharged.

The Secretary's order to discharge a serviceman is not necessarily

the end of the matter. Following discharge. limited post-discharge

relief is available.

10 U.S.C. § 1552 provides:

“(a) The Secretary of a military department, under procedures

established by him and approved by the Secretary of Defense, and

acting through boards of civilians of the executive part of that

military department, may correct any military record of that

department when he considers it necessary to correct an error or

remove an injustice. Under procedures prescribed by him. the

Secretary of the Treasury may in the same manner correct any

military record of the Coast Guard. Except when procured by

fraud, a correction under this section is final and conclusive on all

officers of the United States.

POS POE CLL Ce ORE Pe

53

SIMS v. FOX 1306

Sims was given 15 days in which to submit written statements

characterizing him as “one of my most trustworthy subordi-

record under this section, the amount is found

claimant on account of his or another's service in the Army, Navy,

Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard, as the case may be.

= - om - a ° > —

“(d) Applicable current appropriations are available to continue

the pay, allowances, compensation,

than a or dismissal by sentence of a general court-mar-

tial) of any former member of an armed force under the jurisdic-

tion of his upon its own motion or upon the request of

the former member or, if he is dead, his surviving spouse, next of

kin, or legal representative. A motion or request for review must

be made within 15 ycars after the date of the discharge or

an organization recognized by the Administrator of Veterans’

Affairs under chapter 59 of title 38. As amended Pub.L. 87-651,

Title 1, § 110(a), Sept. 7, 1962, 76 Stat. 509.” {Emphasis added.]

PNAS TT RPE oe |

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54

1907 SIMS v. FOX

tally and emotionally capable of performing his old duties and

occupation”, along with the Georgia court order which dis-

charged him without an adjudication of guilt. However, Sims

wrote his Commander that “this information does not deny

the basic allegations against me”.

Unpersuaded by the evidence submitted by Sims, the Secre-

tary of the Air Force ordered Sims honorably discharged.

The exact terms of the discharge are important. At the

time Sims was notified of his prospective discharge and at the

time the Panel heard Sims’ appeal, Air Force regulations

provided that the discharge certificate (DD Form 214) would

contain a code* which, upon inquiry, would reveal that Sims

was discharged because of “fail[ure] to meet the standards of

conduct and performance prescribed by the Secretary of the

Air Force”,* and would further reveal that the discharge was

related to Sims’ “unfitness, unacceptable conduct or in the

interest of national security.”* As the Panel observed,

“Simply stated, an honest inquiry into the basis for Sims’

discharge would demonstrate that {Sims} had been given a

discharge for reasons that would greatly undercut the sta-

tus of the discharge as ‘an honorable discharge.” . .

There can be no doubt but that Sims’ discharge [would be] 2 a

flawed passport back to civilfian] life.” 492 F.2d at 1091.

Since the rendition of the panel decision, there has been a

significant change in Air Force regulations. They now pro-

vide that the code explaining the reason for discharge will not

be put on the discharge certificate.’ The certificate “on its

face” does not reveal the reason for discharge. Furthermore,

the regulations specify that narrative reasons for discharge

can be obtained only by a former “member furnish{ing] the

original DD Form 214 for the period of service for which he

3. SDN 588 Par. 37 AFR 36-12.

4. Air Force Regulation 36-12.

S. Air Force Regulation 36-12.

6. Air Force Regulation 35-6, * 4-5, effective 1 May 1974.

BB oh RO

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SE OT Le PLL EL OT i OLLIE DLL OLS LOL SLE LEE NEI TEPC OED

55

O™S v. FOX 19088

desires the narrative reasons for separation”.’ As explained

by Air Force correspondence, “narrative reasons for separa-

tion are to be furnished only to the member and then only

upon his request and provided the member can furnish the

original DD Form 214.” *

Sims’ contention is that notwithstanding the honorable

character of the discharge and notwithstanding the fact that

there is nothing on the face of the discharge paper (DD Form

214) to indicate the reason for discharge, he is entitled to a

pre-discharge hearing. Sims says that the Air Force, by

discharging him on the ground of sexual deviancy, is denying

him “liberty” and “property” and he is therefore entitled to

the “due process” guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

Sims raises these claims despite 10 U.S.C. § 1162 which

provides that a reserve officer such as Sims may be discharged

“at the pleasure of the President”.

I. The Property Claim

{1} Sims first claims that he has a “property right” in

continued employment in the Air Force. In his brief, Sims

says that the property right is conferred by his “expectation

of a full tour of duty”, by “an implied promise . .- . of

continued service . . .”, or by an “understanding” be-

tween himself and the Air Force.

A substantially similar claim was considered in Board of

Regents of State College v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701,

33_L,Ed.2d 548 (1972) In that case, a non-tenured state

college professor claimed, inter alia, that the State’s refusal to

renew his contract was a deprivation of his “property” and

that he was therefore entitled to a pre-discharge hearing.

The Supreme Court responded that a non-tenured professor,

who was given no right to contract renewal either by state

7. Air Force Regulation 35-6, “ 4-6, etfective 1 May 1974.

8. Official Air Force Correspondence 252100 dated April, 1974.

|

PRB ab he! LIS memes |

56

1909 SIMS v. FOX

law or by expressed or implied terms of his contract, had no

property interest in continued employment.

“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly

must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He

must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.

“{The] terms [of plaintiff's appointment] secured his in-

terest in employment up to June 30, 1969. But the impor-

tant fact in this case is that they specifically provided that

the respondent’s employment was to terminate on June 30.

They did not provide for contract renewal absent ‘sufficient

cause.’ Indeed, they made no provision for renewal whatso-

ever.

“Thus, the terms of the respondent’s appointment secured

absolutely no interest in re-employment for the next year.

They supported absolutely no possible claim of entitlement

to re-employment. Nor, significantly, was there any state

statute or University rule or policy that secured his interest

in re-emplcyment or that created any legitimate claim to it.

In these circumstances, the respondent surely had an ab-

stract concern in being rehired, but he did not have a

property interest sufficient to require the University au-

thorities to give him a hearing when they deciined to renew

nis contract of employment.” 92 S.Ct. at 2709-2710.

The present facts are similar to those in Roth in that there

is nothing in Sims’ contract or in any statute creating a right

to continued employment. The statute specifically negates

the right of a reserve officer to continued employment; re-

serve officers may be discharged “at the pleasure of the

President”, 10 U.S.C. § 1162. Thus, the statute explicitly

provides that one has no vested right to continue in the

employment of the United States Armed Forces. One who

may be discharged “at the pleasure” of another; i.e., arbitrari-

ly, for no cause whatsoever, simply has no property right to

SPL EMI L DI LALA LOE 5 KEIO ED DAR pate Be eae

57

SIMS v. FOX 1910

continued employment. The statute could not have expressed

that proviso in any more specific terms.

Apparently recognizing that the source of his alleged prop-

erty right to employment cannot lie in the statute, plaintiff

claims he is given such a right by “understanding” or “implied

promise”. That a property right may spring from such a

source is supported by language in Roth, supra, and also by

the holding in v. Si

2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) In the latter case, a non-tenured

professor complained, inter alia, that he had been deprived of

“property” because his contract had not been renewed. There

was no statute and no contract that gave him a right to

contract renewal. Rather, the plaintiff argued that the col-

lege had a “de facto” tenure policy. This policy was expressed

in the college’s faculty guide which provided:

“Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system.

The Administration of the College wishes the faculty mem-

ber to feel that he has permanent tenure as long as his

teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays

& cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his superi-

ors, and as long as he is happy in his work.” 92 S.Ct. at

2699.

Additionally, plaintiff there relied upon guidelines published

by the state college board indicating that a person who had

been employed as a teacher enjoyed a form of tenure.

These “policies and practices” of the school and the Board of

Trustees, the Court said, could create a property interest. It

was not necessary that an employment contract or a statute

specifically create the interest.

The Perry case supports plaintiff's argument in the sense

that it indicates that there is no rigid limit to the sources of

property rights. Such rights may be derived from statutes,

from explicit contracts, or, as was true in Perry, from state

declared policies.

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58

1911 SIMS v. FOX q

But there are still limits on those things that can be |

considered “property rights”. Thare must be some reasonably

identifiable source from which the rights spring; they cannot |

emanate, as was said in Perry, from “mere subjective expect- ‘a

ancy”, 92 S.Ct. at 2700. The law still recognizes the immuta-

ble notion that something cannot spring from nothing. One

cannot create for himself a property by proclaiming its exist-

ence. :

In this case, Sims says he has a property right to continued

employment, but he can point to nothing other than his own

expectancy for the creation of that right. No statute created

it; indeed, the statute expressly denied its existence. Neither

has Sims pointed to any express terms in his contract or to

any governmental regulation that might have led him to

believe he had such a right. An Air Force contract or

regulation cannot grant that which Congress has specifically

withheld. The Air Force must act within the authority dele-

gated to it by Congress or, in certain cases, by the President. '

Any “regulations” or “contracts” attempted in excess of that

authority would be void.

i ight in continued mili employ-

ment because there is no source for it other than his own

“expectancy”. The applicable statute specifically denies the

right.

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II. The Liberty Claim

Appellant’s second theory is that the Air Force action under _

the circumstances of this case deprives him of “liberty”. The

“liberty” allegedly taken is his “good name, reputation, honor,

and community standing”. In this respect Sims’ contention is

less convincing than when the Panel originally decided his

appeal. At that time, appellant’s prospects were that he

would receive a discharge paper (Form DD 214) which on its ?

face would contain a code which, upon inquiry or investiga-

ppaigstaase reas

59 r. |

SIMS v. FOX 1912

tion, would reveal that he had been discharged for “unfitness,

unacceptable conduct, or in the interest of national security”.”

The Air Force no longer uses the code which would have

revealed the reason for his discharge. The discharge paper

which he is now about to receive will not reveal the reason for

the discharge. Moreover, Air Force regulations prescribe that

reasons for the separation are to be furnished only to the

serviceman.” |

Thus, as Air Force regulations now stand, appellant will

receive an honorable discharge which will not indicate the

reason for the discharge. Persons outside the military can

obtain the reason for discharge only in the remote event that

the Air Force disregards its own regulation. His contention

that his liberty interest is infringed by Air Force action is |

therefore necessarily reduced to a possibility that the Air

‘Force might allow the derogatory information to “escape”.

[2] It is, of course, established law that a governmental

attack on one’s “good name, reputation, honor, and communi-

ty standing” can be a deprivation of “liberty”, within the

meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This was

the holding in Wisconsin v. Constantineau

436-437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 510, 27 L.Ed 2d 515 (1971), which

involved the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute allowing

specified governmental officials to post in_public establish-

ments the names of persons who were not to be sold intoxicat-

ing liquors. The Supreme Court held this statute to be an

unconstitutional denial of “liberty” since the persons whose

names were posted were exposed to public embarrassment and

ridicule. One’s “good name, reputation, honor, and communi-

ty standing” cannot be taken from him, ‘the Court said,

without a hearing in which the truth of the posted matter

may be tested.

9%. Air Force Regulation 36-12.

10. Air Force Regulation 35-6, ‘ 4-6, effective 1May 1974.

OLE PLN AT TOE SII A

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1913 SIMS v. FOX

A more recent Supreme Court pronouncement that “liber-

ty” is lost when one’s “good name, reputation, honor, and

community standing” are falsely attacked is found in Roth,

supra, Where the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that plaintiff

(a non-tenured school teacher whose contract was not re-

newed) was not denied “liberty” within the meaning of the

cosines ie Soe eee fat bs bal tama seer

of dishonesty, or immorality, Had it done so, this would be

a different case. “—-——

“Similarly, there i is no suggestion that the state, in de-

clining to him_a stig-

ma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom te take

advantage of of other employment opportunities. :%

92 S.Ct. at 2707.

(3) In brief, Roth teaches that the government’s attack on

one’s reputation may infringe constitutionally protected liber-

ty in two respects: (1) governmental tion of one’s

community may be a denial of “ ; (2)

governmental communication of information to

employers may be an attack on “liberty”.

{4] Under the first test, plaintiff's reputation in his com-

‘munity has not. been attacked. The community in which

plaintiff will live after discharge can be expected never to

Knoxtrom_public records of the circumstances of his dis-

charge.

As to the second, Air Force lalla specifically deny

that employers, or anyo can learn of the circumstances

of the discharge. In the absence of allegations indicating a

reasonably anticipated likelihood that the Air Force, notwith-

LINE DEE LED LINE LEE LEIS © LEALL, OE ES AL FN ALOE LON LG BEL P IED

ee ee

61

SIMS v. FOX 1914

standing its regulations to the contrary, would reveal plain-

tiff's record to potential employers, the complaint is purely

speculative.

Infringement of “liberty”, as defined in the Roth guidelines,

is not, on substantial possibility, involved in this case.

[5] Thus the case is reduced to whether the mere presence

of derogatory information in an employer’s confidential files

is an infringement of liberty.

Arguably, the very presence of derogatory information in

an employer’s confidential records infringes protected “liber-

ty” since it denies a person the freedom he otherwise would

have to use his record for his own benefit by voluntarily

making it available to future employers. The contrary argu-

ment would be that the harm suffered by the mere presence

of damaging information in a confidential file is not substan-

tial enough to amount to an infringement of “liberty” in the

constitutional sense. In this Circuit the law on that subject is

1104

that sonstihational rights were violated because school offi-

cials had placed unfavorable memoranda in their files concern-

ing their activities on behalf of a teachers’ union. This Court

summarily disposed of the teachers’ claim saying that “lodg-

ing these memos, without more, in the instructors’ respective

files gives rise to no constitutionally based grievance”. The

mere presence of derogatory information in confidential files

is not an infringement of “liberty”.

Additionally, it is not to be overlooked that Sims has not

denied the truth of the charges against him. In his letter to

his commanding officer, Sims stipulated that “this informa-

tion does not deny the basic allegation”. As his counse!

explained at the en banc hearing, Sims seeks an Air Force

hearing not to refute the charges but only to present mitigat-

settled. In Collins v. Wolfson, 5 Cir, 1974, 498 F.2d 1100,

1104, state university teachers made various claims that the

ee ey fo! on

62

1915 SIMS v. FOX

claims that constitutionally guaranteed liberty is infringed

because the government is about to put the undenied truth jp.

its own records. This need not long detain us,

94 S.Ct. 1633, 1649, 40 L.Ed.2d 14 (1974), the Supreme Court

-fefers to an employee's “liberty” right as being the right to be

free from being “wrongfully stigmatized by untrue and un-

supported administrative charges’. —

[6] In conclusion, we hold, as basic propositions, (1) that

liberty is not infringed by the mere presence of derogatory

information in confidential files and (2) the government has

not infringed “liberty” unless it perpetuates untrue ore

Thus, in the absence of a denial of t of the

ing; there is no disputed fact requiring resolution as the

result of a hearing.

For the foregoing reasons we think the dismissal of the

complaint must be allowed to stand, making it unnecessary to

discuss the case in the light of Hodges v. Callaway, 5 Cir.,

1974 2 is " apd

1974, 499 F.2d 417 (exhaustion of administrative remedies) o

Aratt. 5. Kettat. MS 1S Se

L. 14 (post discharge evidentiary process sufficiently

protected “liberty” interest).

The Judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

TUTTLE, Circuit Judge, with whom WISDOM, BELL,

GOLDBERG, GODBOLD and MORGAN, Circuit Judges, join

(dissenting):

With utmost deference to the views of my colleagues I am

constrained to dissent.

I do so because I am fully convinced that Lt. Sims has a

“property” right and a “liberty” right, as these terms are

discussed in the majority opinion, to be protected under the

ing considerations. That makes this a case in which appellant —

“Tn the recent decision, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164,

allegedly offending material, there_is no necessity fora hear- |

Hokjaasee.

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rethink aaa

63

SIMS v. FOX 1916

Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. As I read the majority

opinion, it holds that he has neither; it precludes this officer

from ever claiming the right to a personal appearance, either

before or after discharge, to undertake to convince those in

authority that, instead of being discharged for immoral con-

duct, his potential as an Air Force officer is such as to

warrant his retention in the service until the normal expira-

tion of his tour of duty. This follows, it seems to me, because

the Court holds that he has neither a property nor a liberty

interest to protect, and without either he, of course, has no

claim to procedural due process.

Because the opinion does not deal with the exhaustion of

administrative remedies, I refer only to what has been said

with respect to this in the panel opinion, calling attention,

however, to that part of footnote No. 2 of the majority

opinion, which cites 10 U.S.C.A. § 1553 and which italicizes the

language “a person who requests a review under this section

may appear before the board in person or by counsel or an

accredited representative of an organization recognized by the

Administrator of Veteran’s Affairs under chapter 59 of title

38.” I comment on this because, as stated in the panel

opinion, and as conceded at all times by the Government, the

provisions of § 155;} do not permit the board created thereun-

der to reinstate an airman or officer, once he has been

discharged. I am concerned lest the italicizing of the above

language may inadvertently convey the impression that such a

right is available after discharge.

Of course, as also commented on in the panel opinion, and as

conceded by the Government, § 1552 under which the Secre-

tary may reinstate an officer, does not guarantee a personal

appearance of a discharged airman or officer, seeking to have

his discharge revoked.

It is unnecessary to repeat the facts that led “i the filing of

this lawsuit. It seems fair to assume for the purpose of this

opinion that the majority would recognize that Lt. Sims is

being deprived of a “liberty” right, protected by the due

64

1917 SIMS v. FOX

process clause of the Fifth Amendment, were it not for the

change in regulations instituted by the Air Force since the

filing of this action. The majority concludes that the change

has the effect of keeping hidden the reason for discharge

because the Air Force merely retains information that Sims

has been discharged for the reasons outlined in paragraph S

4D(4) of Air Force Regulation 36-2 solely within its own

confidential files.

opinion of the Court comments on the fact that under

Air Force Regulation 35-6, paragraph 4-6, effective 1 May

1974; only the Air Force itself, and the officer, at his own

election, will now have the damaging information as to the

“reason for discharge.”

With deference, I feel constrained to say that this theory of

denying Lt. Sims a hearing with minimal due process is based

upon what to erroneous t what the

officer courts should be concerned about is to keep

from tial future employers the truth of the facts leading

i This, it seems to me, is to place

inci is on the cosmetic effect of the new form of

entries on the officer's di certificate rather than to

i » question whether he is entitled to have proce-

dural due process before the Air Force takes the action, based

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65

SIMS v. FOX 1918

expect a former officer of the United States Air Force, when

asked by a prospective employer what was meant by t y the twa two

dash marks that are now entered in all discharge certificates

opposite the entry “reason for discharge” would tell the truth.

Failure to do so would be a fraud on a prospective employer.

For Lt. Sims to answer this question under the proposed ‘

action of the Air Force, he would in honesty, be compelled to :

say “I was discharged for the reasons spelled out in Air Force 7

Regulations 36-2 as outlined in paragraph 4(d\4) of that ;

Regulation.” Then, upon being asked what is meant by that,

he would have to say “Sub-paragraph (d)(4) is entitled ‘sexual E

perversion’ and it reads ‘this includes but is not limited to E

i

(4) indecent exposvfre.’” The fact that this lan-

guage is not “communicated” by the Air Force to prospective

employers, either by having it inserted, as it was previously,

on the discharge certificate at the time this lawsuit was filed, ;

or in response to requests by future employers, makes no ‘

difference.

Lt. Sims has to live the rest of his life with his military /

record. The question before this Court, it seems to me, is

whether his military career should be terminated by the Air

Force forcing on him a discharge on the grounds of immoral k.

conduct without his being afforded any procedural due process '

to explain away or overcome the effects of his misconduct.

The wound resulting from a denial of an opportunity to this

officer to have such a hearing is much more than skin deep. |

It goes to the vitals of his future career.

Of course, this Court would not pretend to prejudge the

result of a proper hearing, if one were accorded to Lt. Sims.

If the Air Force, after according him whatever rights he is

entitled to under our concept of procedural due process, deter-

mines that no matter how much rehabilitation has been, or

can be, achieved, and no matter how satisfactory his military

record may be, his acts were such as to render him unfit to

continue service in the Air Force, then he would have to live

with the discharge certificate given him as a result of such

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66

1919 SIMS v. FOX

misconduct and that would be the end of the matter. His

only hope, and it is a hope that seems to justify the Court’s

intervention, is that before he is discharged for any reason

challenging his “good name, reputation, honor, or integrity”

he is entitled to such due process as we have described in the

panel opinion. He should have an opportunity to be present

and make an effort to persuade the appropriate officials that

such circumstances as he wishes to bring before them demon-

strate that he has sufficient potential to make him a proper

and suitable officer to remain in the service until the end of

his normal tour of duty. Under such circumstances, of course,

he would then receive a discharge certificate designating

normal termination of service, and this would be his passport

back to civil life.

However, the impression conveyed by the majority opinion

that the unsavory information designated by SDN 588, signi-

fying a discharge on the ground of “unfitness and/or unsuita-

bility,” is kept a closely-guarded secret within the Air Force

headquarters is not, in my opinion, borne out by the appropri-

ate regulations, as amended on July 2, 1974. These amended

regulations do away with the former requirement that, at the

proper space following the item “reason for discharge” an

entry be made which, when traced to the appropriate Air

Force regulations, clearly gives the reason for the discharge.

As heretofore pointed out this code number in Lt. Sims’ case

was 588, and it was a clear statement of the reasons for

discharge. Under the new regulations, no SDN entry is is made

on the original eenarge certificate which is given to the

officer himself. Instead, this space is filled with two dash

marks. However, there are a total of eight copies of this

discharge certificate provided for under these amended regu-

lations. Copy no. 2 is the master personnel record copy, and it

presumably remains at Air Force Headquarters. However,

copies 1 numbers 6 and & are nt to other i

lations e that copy no. 6 is to be “forwardfed] to

NG ANG PMO WASH DC 20310, for review and transmittal

EPL LILO LEGO LLL LLL LEO SEP. LEME LEO EAGER Ni EE ILE A REET LM He

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67

SIMS v. FOX 1928

to the appropriate state adjutant general.” (Emphasis added.]

Copy no. 8 is required by regulations to be “forward{ed] to

USAF RECTG SVC Randolph AFB TX 78148.” (This is

clearly the U.S. Air Force Recruiting Service, Randolph Air

Force Base, Texas.)

The Government does not in any way seek to minimize or

conceal the fact that these copies, containing the SDN desig-

nation are sent to the Air Force Recruiting Service Headquar-

ters and to the State Adjutant General of the officer’s home i

state, nor is any effort made to conceal the reason for this :

action. The reason is perfectly clear, but it is one which has

largely escaped the ‘the attention of the Court, other than the

comment in the original panel opinion calling attention to the

fact that the discharge given to Lt. Sims will carry a designa-

tion which makes him ineligible ever to return to service in

the Air Force, the Air Force Reserve, or | the . Air National

Guard. In the truest sense of the word he will have been

“blacklisted.” °

It is not the fact that the adjutant general of the state of

the residence of the airman or officer, (who incidentally, is a

state official, and who may share the unsavory record con-

cerning the officer with the state’s personnel computer, \o far

as the record discloses) that concerns me the most. It is the

purpose for which this information is transmitted to the state

adjutant general and to the Air Force Recruiting Service.

~ Any recruiting officer or state adjutant general who might,

at some future date be inclined to yield to Lt. Sims’ request

that he be permitted to serve in the National Guard or reserve

forces of the United States Air Force as an enlisted man or

officer in time of peace or on active duty in time of national

emergency will now have been permanently forbidden to do so

as the result of this discharge, based as it is on Air Force

Regulation 36-2 pursuant to AFR 36-12 SDN 588 and the

code number determining him to be unfit for further recall.

anaume tas te opportunity to participate in a

y lucrative profession, either full-time, or as a part-

Re, aie aa

-.

ORR AL SPIO LL ELD EOE LILO LAL LILLE IIA GE LOC. ENE SVLOOWEL. | GLP EIDE were ppc

mismo satan following

“{The Board of Regents] did not base the

had been guilty of dishonesty or immorality. Had it done so,

this would be a different case.” (Emphasis added.)

Also quoted is the following. “Similarly, there is no sugges-

tion that the state, in declining to responden

charge . . . thathehadbeenguiltyof . . immo-

rality.” Furthermore, it is clear that in discharging Sims the

Air Force “imposed on him a stigma or other disability that

foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employ-,

ment opportunities . . ..

This is a wholly separate matter from that discussed in the

majority opinion, dealing with Lt. Sims’ opportunities to ob-

tain jobs in the commercial world which, the Court seems to

consider unimpaired because his discharge certificate does not

on its face carry the perjorative words or code number.’

2. There is, of course, the further substantial question whether by

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SIMS v. FOX ee. im

If there can be any doubt about the nature of the “liberty”

right of Lt. Sims which is here threatened, after reading the

exception stated in Roth, supra, the following language from

that opinion would, it seems to me, dispel any doubt. Immedi-

ately following the language: “the state, for example, did not

invoke any regulations to har the respondent from all other

public employment in state universities,” * the court said “had

it done so, this, again, would be a different case for ‘[t]o be

deprived not only of present government employment but of

future opportunity for it certainly is.no_small injury. ..

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, supra, 341

US. at 185, 71 S.Ct. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring). See

Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41, 36 S.Ct. 7, 10, 60 L.Ed. 131.

The Court has held, for example, that a State, in regulating _

eligibility for a type of professional employment, cannot fore-

“itrwnrrrinnm CONtFAVENCIS] . - Due Process.’ Schware v. Board of

Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238, 77 S.Ct. 752, 756, 1 L-Ed.2d

796, and, specifically, in a manner that denies the right to a

full prior hearing. Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 :

U.S. 96, 103, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 1180, 10 L.Ed.2d 224. See Cafete- i

ria Workers v. McElroy, supra, 367 U.S. at 898,81 S.Ct. at =;

1750. In the present case, however, this principle does not _

come into play.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573,

92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d 548.

Although I feel that the strength of Lt. Sims’ position with

respect to the protection of his liberty right is sufficient to

warrant the Court’s intervention with this proposed discharge

until he has had minimal due process I think some comment is

proper with respect to the existence of a property right, also.

i a coal SOIR PRET Sa EN

employment opportunities”, i. e. to follow his desire to participate in

the future in the reserve or National Guard programs of the Air 4

Force, and since the state adjutant general is a recipient of the

coded discharge. from any other state or military activities.

4. Here it did invoke regulations to effectively bar Sims from all

public employment in the military services of the United States and

é

of his own state =

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lesen. Si «GIR 6 OK A LE PRET NL LOPE LES EEL LGA IPR AMELIE CE LEL EOL EA LIE PGE LE GOSS LESSIG AS —

70

1923 SIMS v. FOX

I have no doubt that the arbitrary determination by the

military officials involved that Lt. Sims shall be forever

barred from further military service in the United States,

without a hearing or proceeding that in any way approxi-

mates a trial is just as much a deprivation of a property right

as would be the action of a board of bar examiners to deny an

individual the right to a certificat» to practice law on constitu-

tionally suspect grounds. See Schware v. Board of Bar Exam-

iners, 353 U.S. 282, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 and Willner v.

Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96, 83 §.Ct. 1175, 10 L.Ed.2d

22A. As to its deprivation of such a right, the Court, in

language quoted with approva in Roth, said: “a State, in

regulating eligibility for a type of professional employment,

cannot foreclose a range of opportunities ‘ina manner .

that contravenes) . . - Due Process,” Schware v.

Board of Bar Examiners, 353 US. 232, 238, 77 S.Ct. 752, 756, 1.

L.Ed.2d 796. How can Lt. Sims’ black listing from all future

military service for state or nation be distinguished?

In sum, I think that Lt. Sims’ liberty is threatened both as

to his potential for all future employment opportunities, re-

gardless of the absence of the unfavorable entry on the face

of his discharge certificate. I think this is clearly implied in

the language quoted from the Roth opinion. I also think that

his liberty and property rights are both threatened by the

attainder against his ever having the right to serve in the

state or federal military forces. The authority of the Presi-

dent to discharge an officer at his pleasure does not, it seems

to me, extend this right to bar him from competing with all

other citizens in the future to serve his country in the Air

Force, without some kind of trial or hearing with minimal

procedural due process.

7

APPENDIX "C"

re

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

(Number and title omitted)

(Piled: July 9, 1973)

The Plaintiff was commissioned a Re-

serve Second Lieutenant in the United

States Air Force on May 20, 1971. For

waged JV A AEN TN RR

reasons deemed sufficient by the Secre-

ee

tary of the Air Force, on May 2, 1973

the Secretary, acting through the Air

Force Military Personnel Center, oOr-

dered that all appointments held by the

Plaintiff be terminated and directed

that the Plaintiff be honorably dis-

charged pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §§ 1162

and 8447 and Air Force Regulation 36-2.

On May 8, 1973 the Plaintiff filed

a complaint in this Court asserting

that he was being denied rights of due

process guaranteed by the United States

72

Constitution and contending that he

would suffer irreparable injury unless

the Defendants were enjoined from per-

fecting his discharge. Among other

things, he contends that the Air Force

is obligated to give him a full hearing

on the question of his discharge.

Since it appeared to the Court that the

questions raised in the complaint would

be mooted by the Plaintiff's discharge

before a hearing could be had, a tem-

porary restraining order was issued

against the Defendants on May 8, 1973

barring any actions to change the Plain-

tiff's military status until further

order of the Court.

In due course the Defendants filed

a motion to dissolve the temporary re-

straining order which had been issued

and to dismiss the complaint and filed

ve .4

a brief in support thereof. Counsel

nes

i ; for the Plaintiff in turn filed their

brief in opposition to the Defendants’ |

motion. —

| The Court has given careful consider-

ation to ein metees and has concluded ~

that the Defendants' motion to dismiss

should be sustained. |

FE ee ee OR eee ey

The Plaintiff's contention that his

discharge without a hearing violates due

process is contrary to established law.

In Pauls v. Secretary of the Air Force,

457 F.2d 294 (1 Cir. 1972), it was said

at page 297: ' ;

PR ADL ae ne EAE A LES

j "It is well-established law that

j military officers serve as the

j pleasure of the President and f

have no constitutional right to i

be promoted or retained in ser- | f

f

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f

;

vice and that the services of an

officer may be terminated with

or without reason."

(Citing cases)

fies anon mg ce TY PEM PONIES HEIR

‘ast

This issue was also dealt with by

the District Court of the District of

Columbia in Gutierrez v. Laird, 346 F.

Supp. 289 (1972).

It. was concluded in the Gutierrez

case that a Reserve Officer has no right

to a hearing prior to being given an

honorable discharge. |

| ° ORDER

According, the Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the complaint is sustained and

the complaint is hereby ordered dismiss-

ed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.

| STAY :

This order shall be stayed for a

‘period of ten (10) days to allow Plain-

tiff to make application, if he wishes,

to the Court of Appeals for a further

stay.

FE OE LOE ILO PLOT OO RINT I OR TOE ED ONT OO AIR POPE EP LGA PIE eV GAZ ——

75

Entered this 9th day of July. 1973.

s/J. Robert Elliott

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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