Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — SIMS V. FOX (No. 74-1235)
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SUPREME COURT, U.8 WAR 5! 1575
IN THE §_MBECHAL ROA, 52.,
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1974
NO. 74-1235
GROVER WILLIAM SIMS, Second Lieutenant,
United States Air Force, 418-66-6972FV,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Vv.
CECIL E. FOX, Brigadier General, Etc.,
and DR. JOHN L. McLUCAS, Secretary of
the Air Force,
Defendants-Appellees
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Reginald C. Wisenbaker
Bennett, Saliba & Wisenbaker
P. O. Box 1685
Valdosta, Georgia
INDEX
TABLE OF CASES ==
OPINIONS BELOW -
JURISDICTION -
QUESTION PRESENTED
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED -
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT --
CONCLUSION --
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ---------
APPENDIX "A"
APPENDIX "B"
APPENDIX "C"
Ce a eS ee
7 - deacts PA OME APRS ERTS
SERIES GLO PELLETED NS TE NO
ty “i
BETES PRE ILI IT LET
TABLE OF CASES
Page
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U. S. 564, 92 S Ct. 2701, 33
LED 2d 548 (1972) ----- - 25
Joint Anti-Facist Refuggee Com-
mittee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 - 27
Norval Goss et.al. v. Eileen
Lopez et.al. U.S. °
43 Law Week 4181 — 25
‘Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U. Ss.
593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d
570 - -- --------- -- 27
Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 --- 27
United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303 naan -- 27
Wieman v. Updegroff, 344 U.S. 83 27
Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U.S. 433 -- 27
1
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1974
GROVER WILLIAM SIMS, Second Lieutenant,
United States Air Force, 418-66-6972FV,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Vv.
CECIL E. FOX, Brigadier General, Etc.,
and DR. JOHN L. MCLUCAS, Secretary of
the Air Force,
Defendants-Appellees
Fi al Dah bl
* .
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
ic a
baad oS
SOTO wy
Petitioner, GROVER WILLIAM SIMS,
respectfully prays that a Writ of Cer-
tiorari issue to review the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for
ie 2
the Fifth Circuit entered in the above
entitled case on December 30, 1974.
OPINIONS BELOW |
The en banc opinion of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit Appendix "A", infra pp 33-48
has not yet been reported.
The opinion of the three judge panel
of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit entered in this
case, Appendix "B", infra p 49-70
is reported at 492 F. 2d 1088.
The order of the District Court
filed in this case on June 9, 1973, in
the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Georgia, Val-
dosta Division, Appendix "C", pp 71-75
is not reported.
qd
ett ae
SRI OY BARI BE
AIL PRM ey EE ADT AD TO DEO RY OT PE
$
a.
$
JURISDICTION
The order of the District Court for
the Middle District of Georgia, Valdos-
ta Division dismissing Plaintiff/Appel-
lant's petition for failure to state a
claim was entered on June 9, 1973, Ap-
pendix "c", infra p 71. . The de-
cision of the threes Judge Panel of the
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit, reversing and remanding the
case was entered on April 19, 1974.
Appendix "B" pp 49-70. On July 24,
1974, the United States Court of Ap-
peals, Fifth Circuit,ordered a rehear-
ing en banc. Subsequently, on December
30, 1974, the United States Court of
Appeals, Fifth Circuit, en banc, en-
tered its judgment affirming the Dis-
trict Court Appendix "A", p 33-48
4
The jurisdiction of this court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1).
QUESTION PRESENTED
In 1972, Lt Sims, a 2nd Lieutenant,
in the United States Air Force, was
charged with certain acts of misconduct
in the Georgia State Courts. By order
of the Superior Court of Lowndes County
Georgia, the Lieutenant was sent to the
State Mental Hospital where his problem
was diagnosed as a Personality disorder,
sexual deviation, exhibitionism and with
Prognosis that under appropriate psycho-
therapy recurrence of symptoms are
usually nil.
After several months of treatment he
was released as cured. Subsequently,
the charges in the State Court were
disposed of by an entry of nolo conten-
dre plea and a discharge without
CERO OE FE EEE ESS
5
adjudication of guilt. The Lieutenant
was also examined by Air Force psychia-
trist who recommended that he be re-
tained in service. Two days later, the
same doctor changed his recommendation
recommending he be discharged. The Lieu-
tenant was ordered discharged with an
indication upon his discharged certifi-
cate casting reflections upon and im-
pugning his reputation and character.
Lieutenant Sims requested a hearing
prior to discharge in order to refute
and rebut the charges forming the basis
for his discharge. Upon denial of the
hearing, Lieutenant Sims filed a com-
plaint asking the District Court to en-
join the Air Force from discharging him
without a hearing. The District Court
dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim. (Appendix "C"). The
POH MTR FLY RANE BAG OIG
IRE GEMS SEMIS AS RAE WS OY OA
6
three Judge panel of the Circuit Court
held Lieutenant Sims was entitled to a
hearing prior to being discharged with
a certificate casting reflection upon
and impugning his character and reputa-
tion. (Appendix "B") The Circuit Court
en banc held that Lieutenant Sims had no
property right incontinued military em-
ployment nor was his liberty infringed
by the derogatory information forming
the basis for his discharge. (Appendix
"A")
The question presented is:
(1) Does a reserve officer in the
United States Air Force have sufficient
Liberty or property interest in his
military record and career to invoke the
minimum protection of the Due Process
Clause of the fifth amendment of the
Constitution of the United States when
APL PED AN Ia Oa ee et ee wep Re ise EM PNET” gOS SEITS Witte AICI ADR AE CRIN
7
the Air Force attempts to discharge him
for causes which substantially impugnes
his good name, character, and reputa-
tion?
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States:
» « e nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without
due process of law; .. .
10 USC 1163 (a) An officer of
a reserve component who has at
least three years of service as
a commissioned officer may not be
separated from that component
without his consent except under
an approved recommendation of a
board of officers convened by an
authority designated by the Secre-
tary concerned, or by the approved
sentence of a court-martial. This
subsection does not apply to a
separation under subsection (b) of
this section or under section 1003
of this title, to a dismissal un-
der section 1161 (a) of this
title, or to a transfer under sec-
tion 3352 or 8352.
8
10 USC 1162 (a) Subject to other
provisions of this title, reserve
commissioned officers may be dis-
charged at the pleasure of the
President. Other Reserves may be
discharged under regulations pres-
cribed by the Secretary concerned.
10 USC § 8447
(c) The President may vacate at
any time a temporary appointment
in a commissioned grade. Aug.
10, 1956, c. 1041, 70A Stat.
§ 1 (180) (D), 72 Stat. 1532.
Air Force Regulation 35.6 q 4-5, Re-
accomplishment of DD Form 214, effect-
ive 1 May 1974.
A current or former member of the
USAF may request reaccomplishment
of his DD Form 214 either in writ-
ing or in person from the CBPO
nearest his location. The member
must furnish the original DD Form
214 that he desires be reaccomplish-
ed. Upon receipt of written or
personal request the CBPO-DPMMR
will:
Wao
9
(a) Change by masking out the
member's original DD Form 214
the "reason and authority" item
and “reenlistment eligibility
code" item. These items should
be filed with a dashed line. Ex-
treme care must be taken in order
not to deface the member's ori-
ginal DD Form 214. The DD Form
214 will then be permanently
reproduced on white paper in two
copies. After reproduction both
copies will then be authenticated
by use of the official stamp main-
tained or supplied by the local
special orders authenticating
agency. Furnish one copy to the
custodian of the member's Master
Personnel Records as indicated
in AFM 35-14. Return original
copy of DD Form 214 to member.
(b) If the member insists, then
reaccomplish the DD Form 214 in
two copies. All information shown
on the original DD Form 214 will
be transcribed to the reaccom-
plished form with the exception
of “Reason and authority for
separation" and "Reenlistment
Eligibility Code." These items
will be left blank on the reac-
complished form and dash marks
will be entered. After reaccom-
plishment, both copies will be
authenticated by use of the of-
ficial stamp maintained or sup-
plied by the local special orders
authenticating agency. Return
LLLP PY ernreemmeng
Medien tar pe BOW gE
10
member's original copy of DD Form
214 to him for his personal file.
Furnish the original of the reac-
complished form to the member and
forward the second copy to the cus-
todian of the member's Master Per-
sonnel Records as indicated in AFM
35-14. [The reaccomplished DD Form
214 will be signed by an individual
authorized to sign DD Forms 214
(table 2, item 31.)]
Air Force Regulation 35-6 q 4-2, DD
Form 214, Report of Separation from
Active Duty.
(a) Preparation:
(1) The DD Form 214 is an
important record of service. It
should be carefully prepared to as-
Sure accuracy and completeness.
Corrections and changes during pre-
paration are to be avoided, but
where necessary should be neat and
legible and initialed on all copies
by the authenticating officer.
Once the original has been deli-
vered to the individual, no correc-
tions may be made to copies by the
separating activity. The recipi-
ent will be informed that making
any change or alteration of DD Form
214 is prohibited.
(2) The form is destined for
use within the civilian community
SE RARE NTL ERLE RE BP EISELE OIE EMD IPRA OE MET,
1l
where there is not a broad fami-
liarity with military abbrevi-
ations. Accordingly, abbrevia-
tions should be used sparingly.
Additionally, care should be
exercised to insure that copies
of DD Form 214 transmitted for the
information of various government
agencies are clearly legible.
(3) The authority for a mem-
ber's transfer or discharge will
be cited by reference to the appro-
priate regulation, instructions,
or manual, followed by the appro-
priate separation designation num-
ber (SDN), Or separation program
designator (SPD). (See table 2,
note 5.)
(4) Incomplete items will
contain the remark “see item 27"
(c below). If an item does not ap-
ply enter "NA". All entries, ex-
clusive of signature, will be type-
written. If more space is needed,
continue the items in item 27 or,
if necessary, on the reverse of the
form. Complete all items on the
face of the form first if possible,
so that carbons will need to be
moved but once.
(5) Except for members in
(8) below, use DD Form 124 (8
part). Except for member in (6)
and (7) below, attachment 2 re-
flects the authorized entries for
each item of DD Form 214 for members
ed
eH
12
of the Regular Air Force.
(6) Authorized entries for
members of the Reserve components
serving under the Non prior Ser-
vice Enlistment Program are shown
in attachment 6.
(7) Authorized entries for
members of the Reserve components
serving on active duty for train-
ing for a period of 90 days or
more are shown in attachment 7.
(8) For members separated
to continue in service (that is,
reenlistment, acceptance of Regu-
lar appointment, or discharge
from enlisted status to accept
commissioned grade), use DD Form
214 (3 part ).
b. Records Used. DD Form
214ws, Worksheet for Report of
Separation from Active Duty will
be used to prepare date for entry
on the DD Form 214. It will be
completed from information contain-
ed in the member's FRGP and person- .
nel data system (PDS) products
such as Uniform Officer Record
(UOR), Or Uniform Airman Record
(UAR) soft copy, or Uniform Mili-
tary Personnel Record (UMPR).
Extreme care will be taken to in-
sure the accuracy of all data.
When data in the PDS is found to
be incorrect, immediate action must
be taken to attempt correction be-
fore records close out.
$0 PBR Ls Sat eS Pit Se :
NT Er
13
4
sary eS |
c. When Records Are Not Avail-
able. When the DD Form 214 cannot
be completed due to loss, damage,
or delay in receipt of the FRGp,
every effort will be made to ob-
tain the records from the member's
last servicing CBPO or by applica-
tion to AFMPC/DPMDR, Randolph AFB
TX 78148. However, in no case
will the separation of 2 member be
delayed because of the absence of
information required to complete
the DD Form 214 in detail. In such
cases, the DD Form 214 will be ac-
complished to the extent possible,
making full use of PDS products
available, and reason for incom-
pleteness noted in item 27.
d. Distribution. Distribu-
tion instructions are contained in
paragraph 3-2 and attachments 5,
6, and 7. For members separated
to continue in service, distri-
bute according to (1) through (3)
below:
(1) Original. Present to
the member.
(2) Duplicate. Forward to
AFMPC/DPMDRR, Randolph AFB, TX
78148.
(3) Triplicate. Forward to
the appropriate director of Selec-
tive Service for the address in item
8b (or item 8c if item 8b is blank).
14
e. Correcting DD Form 214.
DD Form 215, Correction to DD
Form 214, Report of Separation
from Active Duty, will be used to
correct 2rrors in DD Form 214 dis-
covered after the original has been
delivered and/or distribution of
copies of the form has been made.
Except as specified in attachment
3 no field installation is author-
ized to issue a DD Form 215. If
correction of DD Form 214 is neces-
Sary after the member's actual de-
parture from the installation that
separated him, see attachment 3 for
the agency responsible for making
the necessary changes. The dis-
tribution of DD Forms 214 and 215
will be identical.
Air Force Regulation 36-2 4 d(4), Re-
commendation for Action is Appropriate:
A recommendation for action under
this regulation is appropriate when
any of the circumstances outlined
in this paragraph, or similar cir-
cumstances, exist. The records
listed in AFR 36-3 as warranting
recommendation for initiation of
action under that regulation for sub-
standard performance of duty may
not be used in conjunction with the
reasons listed in this paragraph as
the basis for initiation of action
under this regulation. However,
evidence of unfitness or unaccept-
able conduct which is not consider-
ed serious enough to warrant action
|
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i
’
SRGEMNCL OA GALI AIO EGE ETE MG VEG IBI LEC LEE LEL NOEL PILL BED LEWES IO GING ELEM MS CY LIE IG —
15
or separation under this regula-
tion may be used to support the
reasons for initiation of action
under AFR 36-3, if the misconduct
or unfitness did in fact contri-
bute to the officer's substandard
performance of duty. A nonproba-
tionary Regular commissioned of-
ficer or a probationary Regular
commissioned officer with exten-
sive service who is discharged
for any of the reasons stated in
a through e below, or similar rea-
sons, will be considered to have
been discharged because of moral
or professional dereliction. . .
MER ee Sear er
d. Sexual Perversion. This in-
cludes but is not limited to: ...
BS a a
(4) Indecent exposure.
Air Force Regulation 36-12, q 37, Dis-
charge as a Result of Board Action:
AFR's 35-62, and 36-3 establish
procedures for the separation of
officers who fail to meet the
standards of conduct and perform-
ance prescribed by the Secretary
of the Air Force. When the Secre-
tary of the Air Force, based on the
approved recommendations of a
board of officers, directs that
an officer be discharged for any
REET NL, POLE OT GU ENNRN RI SAAT H NP H II RRNA
i
‘
;
|
16
of the reasons outlined in those
regulations, discharge will be
accomplished under this paragraph.
The character of discharge will be
as determined by the Secretary of
the Air Force in accordance with
paragraph 5 of this regulation and
any other applicable criteria con-
tained in the regulation under
which action was initiated. (SDN
590 if initial action was under
AFR 35-62; SDN 587, homosexual; |
SDN 588 if action initiated under
AFR 36-2 for other reasons; SDN
589 if action initiated under
Ga. Laws 1958, pp. 324-326. Probation |
for first offenders, when applicable;
violation of terms of probation:
Section 1. Upon a verdict or plea
of guilty or a plea of nolo conten-
dere but before an adjudication of
guilt, the court may, in the case
of a defendant who has not been
previously convicted of a felony,
without entering a judgment of
guilt and with the consent of the
defendant, defer further proceeding
and place the defendant on proba-
tion as provided by the Statewide
Probation Act (Ga. L. 1956, p.
27). Upon violation of the terms
Of probation, or upon conviction
for another crime, the court may
enter an adjudication of guilt and
BpeRAR Ee AON ARTE EL GINO ETE A enw
17
proceed as otherwise provided.
No person may avail himself of
the provisions of this Act on more
than one occasion. '
Section 2. Upon fulfillment of the
terms of probation, or upon release
by the court prior to the termina-
tion of the period thereof, the |
defendant shall be discharged with-
out court adjudication of guilt. t
Such discharge shall completely z
exonerate the defendant of any
criminal purpose, shall not affect :
any civil right or liberties, and y
he shall not be considered to have
a criminal conviction. Should a
_ person be placed under probation
under this Act, a record of the
same shall be forwarded to the of-
fice of the State Probation Sys-
tem and to the Identification Divi-
sion of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation. |
RY PEEPS I OER SRS
Section 3. The probationer shall |
be informed of the terms of this’
Act at the time of imposition of
sentence.
Section 4. If otherwise allowable
by law in any subsequent prosecnu-
tion of the defendant for any
other offense, such prior finding
of guilt may be pleaded and proven
as if an adjudication of guilt had
been entered and relief had not
been granted pursuant to this Act.
PAV BEE OBIE RPL $F PEGE IAD LEME BILLER ULL 8 ODL Ns POET EE, |
18
Section 5. A defendant sentenced
pursuant to this Act shall have
the right to appeal in the same
manner and with the same scope
and same effect as if judgment
of conviction had been entered
and appealed from.
Section 6. This Act shall be ef-
fective as to all crimes committed
after the date of its approval.
Section 7. All laws and parts of
laws in conflict with this Act
are hereby repealed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case originated with petitioner
filing a complaint for injunction and
equitable relief in the United States
District Court in the Middle District of
Georgia, Valdosta Division. The juris-'
diction of that Court was invoked under
Article III, Section 2, of the Consti-
tution of the United States and 28 USC
§ 1331-A.
i
Petitioner alleged in his complaint
* petite eons bE Maines anves ing?
IFPI IS EOI EN | EAT EE IRI CG OOM ig eB OE ELI OE ELM EI LIS
'
19
that the Air Force was proceeding to
discharge him under 10 U.S.C. § 1162
and 8447 and Air Force Regulations §
36-2 p.- 14, supra. Pursuant to orders ;
from Randolph Air Force Base dated 14
May, 1973, petitioner was to be dis-
charged within ten days and his dis-
charge certificate was to indicate the
reasons for discharge as SDN 588 437
AFR 36-12 (supra. p. 15 ). Such a dis-
charge in simple terms carries on its
face a statement that the officer con-
cerned was discharged under Air Force
Regulations 36-2 dealing only with “un-
fitness, unacceptable conduct or in the
interest of national security."
The grounds for instituting the dis-
charge proceedings against petitioner
arose out of certain criminal charges
against petitioner in the Criminal Courts
ED RYE AE LIA LOLS CRONE LENDS LPS ILLITE LD ISELIN EPO OL CER AIRSET Moley gre? eos ‘aD
20
of Georgia. In the criminal proceed-
ing the petitioner, after extensive
psychiatric examination,treatment, and
rehabilitation entered a plea of nolo
contendre under the Georgia First Offen-
der Act (p. 16, supra.), was placed
on probation on January 4, 1973. Pursu-
ant to provisions of the act, on March
22, 1973 petitioner was discharged with-
out any adjudication of guilt and com-
plete exoneration of all criminal pur-
pose.
Upon receiving notice of the order of
discharge petitioner filed his complaint
in District Court asking for an oppor-
tunity to appear in person before the
decision making Board in order to refute
the charges which formed the basis for
his discharge and to offer evidence in
4
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3
4
3
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F
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4
rebuttal to these charges and offer
Oe FS tO Sco owy
21
evidence as to his fitness for continued
military service.
The District Court entered an ex
parte temporary restraining order to
maintain the status quo until the issues
were resolved. The Air Force by and
through the U.S. Attorney for the Middle
District of Georgia filed a motion to
dissolve the temporary restraining order
and to dismiss the complaint. The Dis-
trict Court, after consideration of
briefs submitted by plaintiff and de-
fendant, issued its memorandum and or-
der (app. "C" pe. 71 ) dismissing
plaintiff's complaint.
Forthwith plaintiff filed his notice
of Appeal to United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A
three Judge panel of the Fifth Circuit
reversed the District Court app. "B"
has LADEN ae a *
22
PP 49-70 - Upon granting of a mo-
tion for rehearing en banc, the full
court affirmed the District Court with
six of the fifteen Judges dissenting
app. "A" pp 33-48 .
During the interim between issuance
of the panel decision and the oral argu-
ments before the Fifth Circuit en banc
the Air Force modified its regulations
in regard to the placement of SDN number
on the certificate of discharge (DD Form
214). In lieu of entry of "SDN 588 par.
37 AFR 36-12", p. 15, supra, which
would have been entered in the space
entitled “Reason for Discharge" on the
Original and all copies of DD Form 214
under the old regulations, the new regu-
lations (AFR 35-6 44-5 supra p. 8 )
provide the original DD Form 214 will
have three dash marks (---) while the
23
copies of this form retained in his
permanent records will contain the same
disparaging information as provided un-
der the former regulations.
In substance petitioner has been or-
dered discharged from the United States
Air Force, not simply under the statutes
and regulation of the United States Con-
ferring upon the President power and
authority to discharge probationary Re-
serve Officer, but rather under Statutes
and regulations providing authority for
discharge of officers for unfitness and
unacceptable conduct. Petitioner has
and does fervently contend that under
these circumstances the due process
clause of the fifth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States re-
quires that he have a hearing to refute
the charges and offer evidence in
atlas id eae
24
rebuttal to the charges forming the
basis of this action of the Air Force
which deprives petitioner of a substan-
tial property and liberty interest. The
effect of the Judgment of the Circuit
Court upon petitioner is to deprive him
of his career in the Air Force, all
rights as a reserve officer and to limit
him in his ability to acquire civilian
employment in addition to having his
military records (which constitute a
significant property as well as liberty
interest in itself) containing informa-
tion impugning his character and fitness
for service all without ever affording
the petitioner of an opportunity to be
heard on the matter.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The decision below directly conflicts
with the due process principle enunciated
25-
in this Court's rulings in Norval Goss
et.al. v. Eileen Lopez et.al. ___U-S.
___, 43 Law Week 4181. In the Goss
Case this Court held that high school :
students suspended from school for
periods of ten days was entitled to the
protection of the due process clause
when the basis of this suspension was
misconduct on the part of the student.
The decision below is in direct con-
flict with the principles of due pro-
cess enunciated by this Court in Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 92
S Ct. 2701, 33 LED 2d 548 (1972). In
the Roth case this court held that the
due process clause affords protection
to both liberty and property interest;
and when a protected interest is imp1li-
cated, the right to some kind of prior
hearing is Paramount. To assert that the
s rier OE ORE SILE Be tal
26
petitioner had no property interest in
his military career one must totally
disregard all the facts in the record
as well as his common knowledge of the
Operation of the Air Force and other
branches of service. Petitioner had the
prospect of enjoying his full tour of
duty as a flying officer in the Air
— with the possibility of transfer-
ring to the regular service upon com-
pletion of his tour of active duty. If
he had not transferred to the regular
status he would have returned to non-
active reserve duty with definite
material benefits. Likewise, petition-
er's military record per se is a valu-
able asset to a member of the armed
services upon his return to civilian
status and when the accuracy of the
entries made therein is challenged the
LEGIONS IE LBNP GEE TOLE EPA
PIODIIEI LETS
27
minimal safe guards of due process come
into play. Furthermore, as conceded
by the Court below petitioner has a pro-
tected liberty interest and as this
Court stated in the Roth case "where a
person's good name, reputation, honor
and integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him,
notice and opportunity to be heard are
essential." Citing Wisconsin v. Con-
stantineau, 400 U.S. 433; Wieman v.
Updegroff 344 U.S. 83; Joint Anti-
Facist Refugge Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123; United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S.
331.
The decision in the District Court
is in direct conflict with the princi-
ples enunciated by this Court in Perry
v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct.
E
}
E
ARR
28
2694, 33 L.Ed. 24 570. In Perry this
court held that a college professor em-
ployed by university without any writ-
ten contractual tenure provisions have
a “property” interest in continued em-
ployment based upon "implied" contract,
circumstance of his service, or other
relevant facts and the state could not
deprive him of these rights without the
minimal safeguard of procedural due
process,
The principle in the Perry Case is
particularly applicable in the Case at
bar. Under the statutes applicable ie.
10 USC 1162, a reserve officer can be
discharged at the pleasure of the Presi-
dent. This is essentially the situation
that existed in the Perry Case where
the professor had no contractual right
to Continued Employment. Nevertheless,
aa
29
he had a property interest under an
“Implied Contract" theory. Likewise,
Lt. Sims, although a reserve officer
who served at the pleasure of the Presi-
dent under all the circumstances could
: expect to serve a full tour of duty
(barring any general reduction in
force), and then be entitled to the
benefits of a Reserve Officer; and as
such was entitled to a hearing before
being discharged under regulations cast-
ing reflections upon and greatly im-
pugning his character.
If the Judgment below is allowed to
stand the petitioner will have to live
the rest of his life with a military
record containing the disparaging im-
moral conduct as the grounds for dis-
charge without ever affording him the
opportunity to challenge the validity
PL ORL AL IOI POE PE GALEN IR NOG MIAMI ME
30 }
of these grounds or to offer evidence
of exoneration or mitigation of the
charges. The practical effect of this
is to deprive him of this opportunity
to participate in a lucrative profes-
sion in the United States either on a
part-time or a full time basis. Like-
wise, his discharge constitutes a
blemished passport back to civilian
which will bar the petitioner from ever
utilizing his service record in seeking
civilian employment because of the ac-
tion of the Air Force in arbitrarily
contaminating his record unjustly.
ei!
CONCLUSION
‘For these reasons this Court should
issue the Writ to review the decision
of United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.
‘
Reginald C. Wisenbaker
Bennett, Saliba & Wisenbaker
P. O. Box 1685
Valdosta, Georgia,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I have this
day served true and correct copies of
the foregoing Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
State of Georgia, by mail, by depositing
the same in a United States mail hos,
with first class postage prepaid.
bs ok
Bupaseseeee csr ener rene REneTeTeer ND SENT FE Ee
ar ah Bil a Nk ed nail aah Ae ii a a beeline) LORAINE LLY LTA IO OCT LIL RA AIINE AIP TOR A rg
| oe
- addressed to each of the following,
who constitute all counsel of record:
Thomas G. Wilson, Esquire
Appellate Section, Civil Division
United States Dept. of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530 |
This day of March, 1975.
All parties required to be served have
f
been served.
‘
Reginald C. Wisenbaker
APPENDIX "A" 33 2359
Grover William SIMS, Second Lieutenant, United States
Air Force, 418-66-6972FV, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Vv
Cecil E. FOX, Brigadier General, Etc, and Dr. John L.
McLucas, Secretary of the Air Force,
Defendants- Appellees.
No. 73-2707.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
April 19, 1974.
Air force officer brought action to have his discharge
enjoined on grounds that he was entitled to have a hearing
with minimal due process procedures before he could be
subjected to unfavorable action against him. The United
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, at ¢
Valdosta, J. Robert Elliott, Chief Judge, dismissed the com-
plaint, and plaintiff appefled. The Court of Appeals, Tuttle,
Circuit Judge, held that officer could not be legally separated
from Air Force by giving him a discharge which, though
characterized as “honorable,” carried with it a separation
designation number that signified a discharge on ground of
unfitness and/or unsuitability, without affording officer a
hearing at which he could personally be present and present
evidence, und that failure of officer to pursue administrative
remedies under statutes providing for correction of military
records and for review of discharges and dismissals did not
preclude officer from maintaining such action.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Synopecs, Syllabi and Key Number Clessification
COPYRIGHT @ 1914, by WEST PUBLISHING CO.
The and Number Clean!
ee Sdaamdaen Oak
PATROL IEPA LIMO TET MLE OD ORIEL! EIT 5 EAI I FETE BD AIEEE ET LAN IM TY EITM neti
34
2860 SIMS v. FOX
1. Armed Services 11
Air force officer, who had been charged in state courts
with several misdemeanors involving indecent exposure, could
not be legally separated from Air Force by giving him a
discharge which, though characterized as “honorable,” carried
with it a separation designation number that signified a
discharge on ground of unfitness and/or unsuitability, without
affording officer a hearing at which he could personally be
present and present evidence, including witnesses, on his
behalf, and at which he could make at least an effort to stave
off the impending threat to his future reputation and security.
2. Armed Services @=11
Statutes providing for correction of military records and
for review of discharges and dismissals were enacted initially
for purpose of avoiding a large number of “private” bills in
Congress by which formerly discharged service men sought to
have nature or character or type of discharge certificate
corrected because of real or imaginary defects in the military
system which they felt had prejudiced them. 10 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1552, 1553.
3. Armed Services o=11
Failure of air force officer to pursue administrative reme-
dies under statutes providing for correction of military records
and for review of discharges and dismissals did not preclude
officer from maintaining action based on claim that he could
not be discharged on grounds that he was “unfit” or “unsuita-
ble” and ineligible for recall, and also be deprived of his
reserve commission without minimal procedural due process.
10 U.S.C.A. §§ 1552, 1553.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Georgia.
Before TUTTLE, BELL and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges.
Tyce se _ on
GE LOE STB
35
TUTTLE, Circuit Judge:
This appeal raises the question whether the United States
Air Force can legally separate a reserve officer for cause by
giving him an “honorable” discharge which, however, carries
with it a “separation designation number 588” signifying a
discharge on the ground of “unfitness and/or unsuitability,” .
without affording such officer an opportunity for a hearing.
What is not before the Court is the right of the Air Force to
relieve a reserve officer from active duty with an unqualified
honorable discharge certificate as a part of a reduction in
force without a hearing. Lt. Sims contends that he cannot be
discharged on the grounds that he is “unfit” or “unsuitable”
and ineligible for recall, and also be deprived of his reserve
commission as an Air Force officer without minimum proce-
dural due process.
The facts may be briefly stated. The plaintiff whose mili-
tary career had heen entirely satisfactory was charged in the
Georgia Criminal Courts with several misdemeanors involving
indecent exposure. By order of the State Superior Court
judge he was sent to the Central State Hospital at Milledge-
ville, Georgia, where he remained for several months for a
period of extensive psychiatric care and treatment. Thereaft-
er, on March 22, 1973, the Georgia Superior Court judge
signed an order discharging Sims without any adjudication of
guiit as to all charges pending against him, which said order
completely exonerated him of any criminal purpose.’ -
1. This procedure is authorized by sections 27-2727 to 27-2732
Ga.Code Ann. The provisions of this statute are as follows:
Section 1
“Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere
(but) before an adjudication of guilt, the court may, in the case of
a defendant who has not been previously convicted of a felony,
without entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent of the
defendant, defer further proceeding and place the defendant on
probation as provided by the Statewide Probation Act (Georgia
laws 1956 p. 27). Upon violation of the terms
upon a conviction for another crime, the court may enter an
adjudication of guilt and proceed as otherwise provided. No
NS
RN nn tak ar eee at ee Sos
; ss .
,
PEEL LNG OIRL IY SRE LEAL, LISI RIG LILLE IE HHS AO TOOBIN PPM VIMIED ITY ae
36
2862 SIMS v. FOX
In the meantime, on January 24, 1973, Sims was notified in
writing of the initiation of administrative discharge proceed-
ings under Air Force Regulations 36-2 by the Commander of
his wing at the Moody Air Force Base in Georgia. Air Force
Regulations 36-2 are entitled “Administrative Discharge Pro-
cedures” and the subhead reads “This regulation establishes
criteria for identifying officers of the Air Force serving in the
active military service who, because of evidence of unfitness
or unacceptable conduct, should be required to show cause for
retention in the Air Force. It also prescribes procedures for
the disposition of cases involving such officers and those cases
approved under Air Force Regulations 35-62, Military Person-
nel Security Program, for further processing under this Regu-
lation.” The January, 1973 notice stated: “I am initiating
action against you under AFR 36-2 for the reasons outlined in
* 4D(4) of that Regulation.” Paragraph (4) deals with the
inquiry under Regulations 36-2. Subparagraph D({4) is en-
titled “Sexual Perversion” and reads: “This includes but is
not limited to: . . . (4) indecent exposure.”
Plaintiff was advised that he could submit written state-
ments within fifteen days and there was attached to the letter
an extract of a report of an investigation that had been made
by the appropriate Air Force officers. Sims responded on
February 7th and stated “I do not desire to comment on the
allegations contained in paragraph 2 to the attached letter.”
person may avai! himself of the provisions of this {Act} on more
than one occasion.”
Section 2
“Upon fulfillment of the terms of probation, or upon release by
the court prior to the termination of the period thereof, the
defendant shall be discharged without court adjudication of guilt.
Such discharge shall completely exonerate the defendant of any
criminal purpose, shall not affect any civil right or liberties, and
he shall not be considered to have a criminal conviction. Should
a person be placed under probation under this [act], a record of
the same shall be forwarded to the office of the State Probation
System and to the Identification Division of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.”
OE SANLEF PEPE LEG LTA E ABEND : CAFO IO POL PED Ye
REE LEAL APE VF
subject matter that may properly subject an officer to an:
—_— ————— ._
Ory _
OS PE AE EBL. ON NOPD PER LETU TELL
37
SIMS v. FOX 2383
Paragraph 2 contained the allegations as to the indecent
exposure already discussed above. Thereafter on February
27, 1973, the Commander Air Training Command recom-
mended to Headquarters U.S. Air Force that plaintiff be
given an honorable discharge from all appointments in the
United States Air Force. Under the regulations, since Sims
was a probationary reserve officer he was not entitled to a
hearing before obtaining a discharge as a matter of right.
The Commander recommended processing under section E,
Air Force Regulations 36-2, which provides for the Secretary
of the Air Force, Personnel Board, to review all the documen-
tury evidence, including that submitted by the officer, but
without the appearance of the officer or his representation by
counsel unless such appearance is determined by the Board to
be necessary.
On March 26, 1973, Lt. Sims submitted to the Commander
of his wing for forwarding to the Air Training Command a
letter expressing his desire to remain in the Air Force and he
accompanied this letter with a favorable letter of evaluation
relating to his duty performance as well as a report of his
psychiatric evaluation at Central State Hospital which con-
tained a statement “The prognosis in this type of disorder
with the appropriate treatment, which is primarily psycho-
therapy, is fairly good, and chances for recurrence of the
symptoms are usually nil.” Sims also forwarded a copy of the
order of the Superior Court discharging him from the state
criminal proceedings. ;
Following the ex parte consideration of Sims’ file proper
Air Force authorities notified his Commanding Officer at
Moody Air Force Base to have him discharged, and such
discharge was to be accomplished in the following manner:
“Show in orders and item 11(c), DD Form 214 [the discharge
certificate] reason and authority: SDN 588, 437, AFR 36-12
and this message.” The discharge was to be accomplished
within ten days. Prior to the expiration of this date Lt. Sims
filed his suit in the district court, seeking to have the dis-
SKS Ay: eee nee cc |
38
2364 SIMS v. FOX
charge enjoined on the grounds that he was entitled to have a
hearing with minimal due process procedures before he could
be subjected to this unfavorable action against him. The trial
court initially granted a temporary restraining order to stay
the discharge long enough for it to consider the Government's
motion to dismiss. After the hearing the court entered an
order dismissing the complaint on the ground that no due
process requirements would attach to the ordering of an
“honorable” discharge. The court granted a stay to afford
Sims an opportunity to appeal. Following the filing of an
appeal this Court extended the stay but ordered the appeal
expedited. Unfortunately, following oral argument we found
it necessary to have supplied excerpts from the relevant Air
Force Regulations, and further briefing on the question of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
the United States calling attention to the fact that the Secre-
tary of the Air Force may give an “honorable discharge” to
any member of the Air Force without a hearing. The position
of the defendant is that there are many kinds of “honorable
discharges” and this particular discharge certificate which the
Air Force has ordered given to Sims carries on its face
evidence of serious professional or moral misconduct such as
would seriously affect his reputation and opportunity for
success in civil life. For a young man twenty-three years of
age trained as an aircraft pilot, the result may be devastating.
It is clear that the notations which are required to be placed
on Sims’ Form 214 (the discharge certificate) even though it is
termed an “honorable discharge” make it perfectly plain that
he will have been discharged as a result of Board action which
had been undertaken because of his “unfitness, unacceptable
conduct, or in the interest of national security.” This follows
from the fact that the instructions for his discharge directed
that the discharge certificate contain an entry at the appropri-
ate place giving “reason and authority SDN 588 £37 AFR
Fain ae a ae
The real crux of this case is pointed up by the statements by’
-
7” PO LOC RD ANG IAP " s
39
SIMS v. FOX 2365
36-12." Paragraph 37 of Regulation 36-12 deals only with
separation as a “result of Board action” as to officers “who
fail to meet the standards of conduct and performance pre-
scribed by the Secretary of the Air Force.” It further pro-
vides that the designation SDN 588 would identify “action
initiated under AFR 36-2” on any of the grounds of unfitness
or unacceptable .conduct described in that regulation other
than of homosexuality which was assigned SDN 587. In other
words, any certificate of discharge bearing the designation
SDN 588 carries on its face a statement that the officer
concerned had been discharged under Air Force Regulation
36-2 dealing orily with “unfitness, unacceptable conduct or in
the interest of national security.” Moreover, as was readily
conceded during oral argument, such a discharge would make
such officer ineligible for recall to active duty. Furthermore,
the order to discharge Sims “from all appointments in the
United States Air Force” means, as we understand it, cancel-
ling his commission in the Air Force Reserve.
Simply stated, an honest inquiry into the basis for Sims’
discharge would demonstrate that he had been given a dis-
charge for reasons that would greatly undercut the status of
the discharge as “an honorable discharge.” The question we
are to face therefore is whether a lieutenant in the Air Force
can not only have his normal period of active duty terminated
for cause, and be deprived of his Reserve Commission, but also
have his future jeopardized by having to carry as his certifi-
cate of release from the service a document which impugns his
character or reputation without having at least an opportuni-
ly to make an oral presentation and witnesses on his behalf at
some kind of proceeding beyond that authorized under pre-
vailing regulations. We of course are not considering, as we
have no right to, what the Air Force Board of Officers, under
a proper regulation, should, or would, be likely to do if Lt.
Sims had been afforded a hearing in the true sense of the
word. We have cited some favorable aspects of his case above
merely to show that his contention that he ought to have an
Ao
eee |
a A ea ME thle nS ete
40
2366 SIMS v. FOX
opportunity to appear in person to argue his case either
personally or by counsel is not an empty gesture on his part.
The most important matter that Sims would normally wish
to present to an administrative tribunal would, of course, be
the disposition of his criminal case in the Georgia courts, and
also the evaluation of his performance of military duties
(which was certified by his commanding officer to be unexcep-
tionable), and the prognosis as to his psychological problem
made by the Georgia Central State Hospital.
There can be no doubt but that Sims’ discharge is a flawed
passport back to civil life. The detriment he will suffer is of
sufficient magnitude to create a genuine issue as to whether
the Air Force should not be required to provide him with a
hearing at which he could personally be present and make at
least an effort to stave off the impending threat to his future
reputation and security. As the Supreme Court said in Green
v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304, 81 S.Ct. 653, 655, 5 L.Ed.2d
670 (1961), when speaking of the need for granting an individ-
ual accused in a criminal case the absolute right to speak for
himself: “The most persuasive counsel may not be able to
speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting
eloquence, speak for himself.” The value to a person facing a
loss of a substantial right to speak for himself where no
counsel was permitted to speak for him is of course even
greater.
Moreover, Lt. Sims had a prospect of enjoying his full tour
of duty as a flying officer in the Air Force, subject only to
normal procedures that might fortuitously make it necessary
for his active duty to be terminated earlier. Here, he was
deprived of that expectation of continued service, see McDo-
well v. State of Texas, 465 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1971) because of
alleged misconduct.
Besides, he was to be deprived of his status as a reserve
officer, which carries with it intrinsically valuable emoluments
41
SIMS v. FOX
.
&
Me
Pe >
for service as a “week-end warrior” if he remained in certain
reserve categories.
We do not doubt that such a right as Sims possessed is
sufficiently similar to those rights which the courts have held
cannot be taken away without procedural due process as to
give validity to his contention here. See McDowell v. State of
Texas, supra: Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.
1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33
L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). For all that appears in this record he
would have continued to serve as an Air Force officer on
flying status for a period (which, however, is not made plain
in the record before us) but for the action taken because of his
acts of indecent exposure which triggered the proceedings
commenced against him by the letter of January 24, 1973.’
Even if this termination for cause of his Air Force status
were not in itself the deprivation of a right entitling him to
procedural due process, his discharge in a manner that marked
him as unfit to serve was of itself the deprivation of a
protected right. Such a right was described by the Supreme
Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701,
33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). In Roth the Court held that a failure
tu rehire a non-tenured teacher was permissible because noth-
ing damaging to Roth's reputation could be inferred from the
state’s action. The Court said:
“In declining to rehire the respondent, (the state] did not
make any charge against him that might seriously damage
his standing and associations in his community. It did not
2. This letter commenced by saying “I am initiating action against
you under AFR 36-2 for the reasons outlined in paragraph 4D(4) of
that regulation” Paragraph 4D(4) states as follows:
“(4) When recommendation for action is appropriate. A recom-
mendation for action under this regulation is appropriate when
any of the circumstances outlined in this paragraph or similar
circumstances exist re
“(d) Sexual perversion. This includes but is not limited to:
“{4] Indecent exposure.
4a
2368 SIMS v. FOX
base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, for exam-
ple, that he had been guilty of dishonesty, or immorality.
Had it done so, this would be a different case for ‘where a
person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him,
notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.’ Wis-
consin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 [, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27
L.Ed.2d 515] (1971); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
191 [, 73 S.Ct. 215, 219, 97 L.Ed. 216] (1952); Joint Anti-Fa-
cist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 [, 71 S.Ct.
624, 95 L.Ed. 817] (1951); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303, 316-317 [, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 1079, 90 L.Ed. 1252] (1946):
Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 352 [, 75 S.Ct. 790, 801, 99
L.Ed. 1129] (1955) (Douglas, J., concurring). See Cafeteria
& Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 [, 81
S.Ct. 1743, 1750, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230] (1961). In such a case, due
process would accord an opportunity to refute the charge’
before University officials [footnote not included]. In the
present case, however, there is no suggestion whatever that
the respondent’s ‘good name, reputation, honor, or integrity’
is at stake.” 408 U.S. 564, 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707.
Here, of course, there is precisely the ingredient which was
lacking in Roth. The Air Force seeks to discharge Lt. Sims in
a manner that denigrates his reputation, honor or integrity
because of the nature of the entries on the discharge certifi-
cate.
A somewhat similar case was decided by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit when it concluded that the
Court could intervene in a threatened expulsion of a cadet at
the United States Military Academy and his return to active
duty status where the cadet was denied a due process hearing.
The case of Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.
1972), dealt with action of the United States Military Acade-
my “separating” a third year cadet for deficiency in conduct
after receiving 107 demerits as of a certain date, 5 demerits in
excess of the 102 demerit allowance prescribed as a maximum
an
itn ar am
43
SIMS v. FOX 2369
for the period involved. The order of separation would also
subject cadet Hagopian to transfer to active duty in the
armed services. The cadet challenged the failure of the
academy officials to comport with the minimum due process
requirements in the procedures by which the demerits were
charged against him, since when these demerits accumulated
to the number of 102 this would warrant the termination of
his cadetship by the academy’s academic board. The court
held:
“We hold that the existing measures presently available to
a cadet for contesting an individual award of demerits are
sufficient to meet minimum standards of due process, but
that when an accumulation of awarded demerits renders the
cadet subject to separation, he must be granted a fair
hearing before being separated, including the right to per-
sonally appear and to present witnesses and other evidence
in his behalf.”
In a carefully consilered opinion the court recognized the
basic precept that:
“Such important matters, [the provision of rigorous and
exacting standards of discipline and behavior and personal
decorum for cadets] which are a part of the Army’s conduct
of military affairs and the standards adopted by it to
prepare men for military operations, should not be inter-
fered with by the judiciary.” Citing Orloff v. Willoughby,
345 U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953).
As is pointed out in the opinion, the court noted that the
academic board had a double function. It was first to deter-
mine whether the cadet in question had accumulated an
excessive amount of validly awarded demerits over the course
of the demerit period. Then, if so, it must then determine
whether the cadet’s “potential warrants retention,” so as to
allow probation rather than separation. In other words the
hoard had a responsibility of doing more than totalling the
number of «demerits and then exacting the maximum penalty
* Ira
44
2870 SIMS v. FOX
of dismissal from the academy if they equalled more than 102.
The board was charged with the requirement of determining
whether the cadet’s character, qualifications and other “poten-
tial” warranted his retention as a cadet. Here, too, the
hierarchy of the Air Force was required to consider the record
of Lt. Sims and make a recommendation to the “character” as_
well as the “type” of discharge. Moreover, it is undisputed
that the board could have rejected the initial recommendation
of Sims’ commanding officer that he be discharged from his
commission. Such a judgment would necessarily be on much
the same standards as that spoken of in Hagopian, i. e.
whether Lt. Sims “potential warrants retention” notwith-
standing the truth as to the original charges brought against
him. Relevant to this judgment would be the factors already
mentioned as to the disposition of his case in the state
criminal court, the certification as to the outstanding perform- |
ance of his duties by his superior officer, and the prognosis as.
to a possible recurrence of his psychiatric problem. As the
court in the Second Circuit said:
“Perhaps more importantly, with respect to certain of the
demerit awards and especially with respect to the subjective
evaluation of the cadet’s potential, the opportunity to per-
sonally appear and present his case may affect considerably
the credibility which the members of the Academic Bourd
attach to the cadet’s appeal.” ;
We read the word “credibility,” to cover more than credibility
as to the truth or falsity of the original charges.
The court further said:
“The opportunity to bring witnesses to appear in his behalf
may also strengthen the impact of his case above the frail
impression which a written submission would make.” 470
F.2d 201, 211.
We conclude as did the court in Hagopian and the earlier
case of Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967), (a
1 OF De pata IPN SM NG
45
SIMS v. FOX . 2871
case dealing with the dismissal of a third year student at the
_. Merchant Marine Academy) that at such a hearing:
“The [officer] must be allowed to appear and present evi-
dence, including witnesses, on his behalf. The importance
of informality in the proceeding militates against a require-
ment that the cadet be accorded the right to representation
by counsel before the Academic Board.”
We think the case of Pauls v. Secretary of Air Force, 457
F.2d 294 (1st Cir. 1972), in no way conflicts with what we
. decide here. In that case the particular officers involved had
their active service terminated among a grovp involved in a
reduction in force. They were not selected to appear before a
board to answer charges of misconduct for the purpose of
determining whether they were to be retained in the service.
[2] Finally, the appellees contend that the trial court did
not have jurisdiction of this matter because of the failure of
Lt. Sims to pursue available administrative remedies. In its
brief filed in this Court the government’s position is far from
clear. It states:
“Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies.
He has further administrative appeals under 10 U:S.C.
§ 1552 (32 CFR 865A) and 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (32 CFR 865B).”
It is apparent that neither of these forms of administrative
hearings would be available to Lt. Sims until after his dis-
charge had heen completed and his separation both as an
active and as a reserve officer had become final. The sections
were both enacted initially for the purpose of avoiding a large
number of “private” hills in Congress by which formerly
discharged service men sought to have the nature or character
or type of discharge certificate corrected because of real or
imaginary defects in the military system which they felt had
prejudiced them. Both sections are rather broad in their
language, but, upon request of the court, government counsel
undertook to make plain what it contended with respect to the
failure of Lt. Sims to pursue his administrative remedies.
ae |
46
a SIMS v. FOX
Counsel conceded that the diseharge review board, established
pursuant. ta 10 USC. § 1558 “ia not. authorized. ta qant. tha
administrative relief the court apparently is inquiring into.”
The government on the other hand contended that the Board
for Correction of Military Records established under 1c au-
thority of 10.U.S.C. § 1552 would permit the Secretary of the
Air Force to reinstate Lt. Sims if the Board or the Secretary
concluded that he had been improperly discharged.
As we understand it, this amounts to the contention that
Sims should accept his discharge containing the final determi-
nation by the Air Force Personnel Board that he was unfit to
retain his active duty or reserve status in the Air Force and
ineligible for recall and thereafter make application to the
Board for Correction of Military Records seeking a reinstate-
- ment which, if recommended, could be effected only by a
discretionary act by the Secretary of the Air Force.
While not called to our attention in the government’s brief,’
this argument is most strongly supported by these earlier
' decisions by this Court: McC 1966, 359 F.2d
491, cert. den. sub nom. M: , 1966, 385 U.S. 903,
87 S.Ct. 212, 17 L.Ed.2d 133; T: , 362 F.2d 801,
cert. den., 1966, 385 U.S. 941, 87 il, 17 L.Ed.2d 220; and
Stanford v. United States, 1969, 413 F.2d 1048. These cases
are all distinguishable. In none of them did the serviceman’s
attack on the validity of his discharge (“general” in McCurdy’s
case, “undesirable” in Tuggie’s case, and “dishonorable” in
‘ §Stanford’s) deal with the issue of procedural due process in
the hearings or review procedures which ultimately produced
the termination of the services of each.
McCurdy had a full hearing before the Board of Officers at
which this Court said “He was ably represented by both
military and civilian counsel. After a full hearing, the Board
found,” ete. Nothing appears from the per curiam opinion in
Tuggle that the airman had been denied a full hearing. In
Stanford, the court dealt with a challenge to the validity of a
court martial which had culminated in a dishonorable dis-
EPL ATO LNA 5 LEO DEL LUG EOI GALI he
47 .
SIMS v. FOX 2873
charge. His attack was based on the contention that he had
been denied the constitutional right to indictment by grand
jury and trial by petit jury. This Court pointed out the fact
that the constitution expressly excepts cases arising in the
armed forces from the guarantee of indictment and that the
Supreme Court had held that trial by jury was not guaranteed
in court martial proceedings, citing Whelchel v. McDonald,
1950, 340 U.S. 122, 71 S.Ct. 146, 95 L.Ed. 141.
In this case, the very defect which Lt. Sims asserts here as
the basis for his action in the court is one that would prevent
the preparation of the kind of record which should be made
available for all parties to use at any hearing before the Board
for Correction of Military Records. This contention being
based upon a procedural defect that goes to the preparation of
the record itself is not only a distinguishing characteristic
from the prior cases, but it seems clear that it requires a
hoiding that this case presents a proper issue for the court to
decide in the present litigation. Without an opportunity to
appear before the Personnel Board, it is impossible to see how
that Board could adequately appraise Lt. Sims as to his
potential for continued service in the Air Force.
Moreover, although perhaps in light of this court’s decision
in McCurdy, supra, not sufficient of itself to warrant judicial
intervention prior to actual discharge, we may also take
judicial notice of the fact that serious interruption of the
duties of a qualified flying officer of the Air Force might
have a substantially deleterious effect on his future capabili-
ties and opportunities for promotion so that a complete sepa-
ration from the service for a substantial period of time would
jeopardize his future in the service were he ultimately to
prevail?
[3] We conclude therefore that this action should not be
dismissed for failure of Lt. Sims to await his final discharge,
3. For a full discussion of the developing law in cases of this kind see
Judicial Review of Military Administrative Discharges, 83 Yale Law
Journal 33.
4
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48
2874 SIMS v. FOX
after which he should then seek to have that discharge sct
aside and seek reinstatement from the Secretary of the Air
Force rather than undertake to stay the discharge until he
had been accorded a hearing with minimum due process as we
have outlined above.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
Adm. Office, U.S. Courts—West Publishing Company, Saint Paul, Minn.
4
APPENDIX "B" 49 seen
Grover William SIMS, Second Lieutenant, United States Air |
Force 418-66-6972FV, Pilaintiff-Appellant,
- VW
Cecil E. FOX, Brigadier General, etc., and Dr. John L.
McLucas, Secretary of the Air Force,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 73-2707.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
Dec. 30, 1974.
Reserve air force officer sought to enjoin the Air Force
from discharging him without first giving him a hearing in
person for purpose of presenting proof of his fitness for
continued service. The United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia, J. Robert Elliott, Chief Judge,
dismissed the complaint and the plaintiff appealed. The
Court of Appeals, 492 F.2d 1088, reversed and remanded with
directions. On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals,
Coleman, Circuit Judge, held that reserve officer had no
“property right” in continued employment in the Air Force,
and that the Air Force’s action in honorably discharging
officer after he pleaded nolo contendere to charge of indecent
exposure did not deprive officer of “liberty” and officer was
not entitled to due process hearing prior to discharge where
officer’s discharge paper would not reveal reason for his
discharge, air force regulations denied employers or anyone
else the opportunity to learn circumstances of officer’s dis-
charge and officer did not deny truth of charges against him.
Judgment of District Court affirmed.
Bynopess, and Key Number Classification
COPYRIGHT © 1974, by WEST PUBLISHING CO.
The sate Number Cilassifi-
«asabbendibGuadéen. woe
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50
1963 SIMS v. FOX
Tuttle, Circuit Judge, with whom Wisdom, Bell, Goldberg,
Godbold and Morgan, Circuit Judges, joined, dissented and
filed opinion.
1. Constitutional Law ¢=277(2)
Under statute providing that reserve officers may be
discharged at the pleasure of the President, reserve air force
officer had no property right in continued employment in the
Air Force such as would entitle him to due process hearing
prior to his honorable discharge, despite contention that such
property right was conferred by officer’s expectation of full
tour of duty, by an implied promise of continued service or by
an “understanding” between himself and the Air Force. 10
U.S.C.A. § 1162; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.
2. Constitutional Law @=255(2)
Governmental attack on one’s good name, reputation,
honor and community standing can be a deprivation of liberty
within the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amends. 5, 14.
3 Constitutional Law ¢=255(2)
Governmental communication of derogatory information
to employers may constitute an attack on “liberty” within
meaning of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amends. 5, 14.
4 Constitutional Law @=83(1), 318(2)
Air Force’s honorable discharge of reserve officer follow-
ing officer’s plea of nolo contendere to charge of indecent
exposure in state court did not deprive officer of “liberty” and
officer was not entitled to due process hearing prior to such
discharge where officer’s discharge paper would not reveal
reason for discharge, air force regulations denied employers or
anyone else the opportunity to learn circumstances of the
discharge, there were no allegations indicating reasonably
anticipated likelihood that Air Force would reveal officer’s
record to potential employers and officer did not deny the
charges against him. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.
~ ADA Sea WTS,
SES OL SES T I LIPID PEE GE I EEF ORT IE Da EOF ES TEMPE SEE RE SG GE SOE LY ROTEL OL MCR VT BRET OR
31
SIMS v. FOX . ie
5S. Constitutional Law ¢=83(1)
Mere presence of derogatory information in an employer's
confidential files does not infringe protected “liberty.” U.S.C.
6. Constitutional Law pau
Government has not infringed “liberty” by permitting
others to learn reasons for discharge of government employee
unless it has perpetuated untrue charges. U.S.C.A.Const.
Amends. 5, 14.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Georgia.
Before BROWN, Chief Judge, and TUTTLE, WISDOM,
GEWIN, BELL, THORNBERRY, COLEMAN, GOLDBERG,
AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, DYER, SIMPSON, MORGAN,
CLARK, RONEY and GEE, Circuit Judges.
COLEMAN, Circuit Judge.
This is an action by Air Force Lieutenant William Sims
against Air Force General Cecil Fox and the Secretary of the
Air F Sims asks that the Air Force be enjoined from
discharging him without first giving him a hearing in person
to present proof: of his fitness for continued service.
The District Court dismissed Sims’ complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. A Panel of
this Court reversed, Sims v. Fox, 5 Cir., 1974, 492 F.2d 1088.
We granted the petition for rehearing en banc, and again
consider the correctness of the dismissal.
We affirm the Judgment of the District Court.
Lt. G. William Sims was ordered to active duty on July 14,
1971. His performance of duty was good. Until June, 1972
his off-duty life was unremarkable. In that month, Sims was
arrested for two separate acts of indecent exposure. Specifi-
cally, on June 20 and June 23 he was charged with exposing
his sexual organs to females. He was released on bond.
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52
1905 SIMS v. FOX
In September of 1972, Mrs. Carol Barnett, a civilian, report-
ed to military authorities that Sims on two occasions had
exposed himself to her minor children, ages six, nine, and four.
Sims was again charged with indecent exposure.
On 4 January, 1973, Sims was tried in a Georgia state court.
Under a Georgia statute providing for special treatment for
first offenders,’ he was allowed to plead nolo contendere and
was placed on probation for a year. Although the Georgia
Court made no adjudication of guilt, Sims has never denied
that he, in fact, committed the acts with which he was
charged.
On January 24, 1973, Sims was notified by his Wing Com-
mander that discharge proceedings* were being initiated.
l. 27-2727 through 27-2732, Ga.Code Ann.
2. The discharge procedure is that specified in Air Force Regulation |
36-2 which provides, in relevant part, that a Wing or Base Com-
mander, having received information indicating that an officer is
unfit for continued service, notifies the officer of the charges against
him and advises the officer that he has 15 days within which to
submit written statements and documentary evidence. If, after
considering the evidence, the Commander concludes that discharge
is appropriate, he forwards the documented case to Air Force
H
At Air Force Headcuarters, the case is referred to the Air Force
Personnel Board which, after reviewing the evidence. makes its
recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force. The Secretary is
the person who makes the final decision as to whether the officer
should be retained or discharged.
The Secretary's order to discharge a serviceman is not necessarily
the end of the matter. Following discharge. limited post-discharge
relief is available.
10 U.S.C. § 1552 provides:
“(a) The Secretary of a military department, under procedures
established by him and approved by the Secretary of Defense, and
acting through boards of civilians of the executive part of that
military department, may correct any military record of that
department when he considers it necessary to correct an error or
remove an injustice. Under procedures prescribed by him. the
Secretary of the Treasury may in the same manner correct any
military record of the Coast Guard. Except when procured by
fraud, a correction under this section is final and conclusive on all
officers of the United States.
POS POE CLL Ce ORE Pe
53
SIMS v. FOX 1306
Sims was given 15 days in which to submit written statements
characterizing him as “one of my most trustworthy subordi-
record under this section, the amount is found
claimant on account of his or another's service in the Army, Navy,
Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard, as the case may be.
= - om - a ° > —
“(d) Applicable current appropriations are available to continue
the pay, allowances, compensation,
than a or dismissal by sentence of a general court-mar-
tial) of any former member of an armed force under the jurisdic-
tion of his upon its own motion or upon the request of
the former member or, if he is dead, his surviving spouse, next of
kin, or legal representative. A motion or request for review must
be made within 15 ycars after the date of the discharge or
an organization recognized by the Administrator of Veterans’
Affairs under chapter 59 of title 38. As amended Pub.L. 87-651,
Title 1, § 110(a), Sept. 7, 1962, 76 Stat. 509.” {Emphasis added.]
PNAS TT RPE oe |
|
54
1907 SIMS v. FOX
tally and emotionally capable of performing his old duties and
occupation”, along with the Georgia court order which dis-
charged him without an adjudication of guilt. However, Sims
wrote his Commander that “this information does not deny
the basic allegations against me”.
Unpersuaded by the evidence submitted by Sims, the Secre-
tary of the Air Force ordered Sims honorably discharged.
The exact terms of the discharge are important. At the
time Sims was notified of his prospective discharge and at the
time the Panel heard Sims’ appeal, Air Force regulations
provided that the discharge certificate (DD Form 214) would
contain a code* which, upon inquiry, would reveal that Sims
was discharged because of “fail[ure] to meet the standards of
conduct and performance prescribed by the Secretary of the
Air Force”,* and would further reveal that the discharge was
related to Sims’ “unfitness, unacceptable conduct or in the
interest of national security.”* As the Panel observed,
“Simply stated, an honest inquiry into the basis for Sims’
discharge would demonstrate that {Sims} had been given a
discharge for reasons that would greatly undercut the sta-
tus of the discharge as ‘an honorable discharge.” . .
There can be no doubt but that Sims’ discharge [would be] 2 a
flawed passport back to civilfian] life.” 492 F.2d at 1091.
Since the rendition of the panel decision, there has been a
significant change in Air Force regulations. They now pro-
vide that the code explaining the reason for discharge will not
be put on the discharge certificate.’ The certificate “on its
face” does not reveal the reason for discharge. Furthermore,
the regulations specify that narrative reasons for discharge
can be obtained only by a former “member furnish{ing] the
original DD Form 214 for the period of service for which he
3. SDN 588 Par. 37 AFR 36-12.
4. Air Force Regulation 36-12.
S. Air Force Regulation 36-12.
6. Air Force Regulation 35-6, * 4-5, effective 1 May 1974.
BB oh RO
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pres
SE OT Le PLL EL OT i OLLIE DLL OLS LOL SLE LEE NEI TEPC OED
55
O™S v. FOX 19088
desires the narrative reasons for separation”.’ As explained
by Air Force correspondence, “narrative reasons for separa-
tion are to be furnished only to the member and then only
upon his request and provided the member can furnish the
original DD Form 214.” *
Sims’ contention is that notwithstanding the honorable
character of the discharge and notwithstanding the fact that
there is nothing on the face of the discharge paper (DD Form
214) to indicate the reason for discharge, he is entitled to a
pre-discharge hearing. Sims says that the Air Force, by
discharging him on the ground of sexual deviancy, is denying
him “liberty” and “property” and he is therefore entitled to
the “due process” guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
Sims raises these claims despite 10 U.S.C. § 1162 which
provides that a reserve officer such as Sims may be discharged
“at the pleasure of the President”.
I. The Property Claim
{1} Sims first claims that he has a “property right” in
continued employment in the Air Force. In his brief, Sims
says that the property right is conferred by his “expectation
of a full tour of duty”, by “an implied promise . .- . of
continued service . . .”, or by an “understanding” be-
tween himself and the Air Force.
A substantially similar claim was considered in Board of
Regents of State College v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701,
33_L,Ed.2d 548 (1972) In that case, a non-tenured state
college professor claimed, inter alia, that the State’s refusal to
renew his contract was a deprivation of his “property” and
that he was therefore entitled to a pre-discharge hearing.
The Supreme Court responded that a non-tenured professor,
who was given no right to contract renewal either by state
7. Air Force Regulation 35-6, “ 4-6, etfective 1 May 1974.
8. Official Air Force Correspondence 252100 dated April, 1974.
|
PRB ab he! LIS memes |
56
1909 SIMS v. FOX
law or by expressed or implied terms of his contract, had no
property interest in continued employment.
“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He
must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.
“{The] terms [of plaintiff's appointment] secured his in-
terest in employment up to June 30, 1969. But the impor-
tant fact in this case is that they specifically provided that
the respondent’s employment was to terminate on June 30.
They did not provide for contract renewal absent ‘sufficient
cause.’ Indeed, they made no provision for renewal whatso-
ever.
“Thus, the terms of the respondent’s appointment secured
absolutely no interest in re-employment for the next year.
They supported absolutely no possible claim of entitlement
to re-employment. Nor, significantly, was there any state
statute or University rule or policy that secured his interest
in re-emplcyment or that created any legitimate claim to it.
In these circumstances, the respondent surely had an ab-
stract concern in being rehired, but he did not have a
property interest sufficient to require the University au-
thorities to give him a hearing when they deciined to renew
nis contract of employment.” 92 S.Ct. at 2709-2710.
The present facts are similar to those in Roth in that there
is nothing in Sims’ contract or in any statute creating a right
to continued employment. The statute specifically negates
the right of a reserve officer to continued employment; re-
serve officers may be discharged “at the pleasure of the
President”, 10 U.S.C. § 1162. Thus, the statute explicitly
provides that one has no vested right to continue in the
employment of the United States Armed Forces. One who
may be discharged “at the pleasure” of another; i.e., arbitrari-
ly, for no cause whatsoever, simply has no property right to
SPL EMI L DI LALA LOE 5 KEIO ED DAR pate Be eae
57
SIMS v. FOX 1910
continued employment. The statute could not have expressed
that proviso in any more specific terms.
Apparently recognizing that the source of his alleged prop-
erty right to employment cannot lie in the statute, plaintiff
claims he is given such a right by “understanding” or “implied
promise”. That a property right may spring from such a
source is supported by language in Roth, supra, and also by
the holding in v. Si
2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) In the latter case, a non-tenured
professor complained, inter alia, that he had been deprived of
“property” because his contract had not been renewed. There
was no statute and no contract that gave him a right to
contract renewal. Rather, the plaintiff argued that the col-
lege had a “de facto” tenure policy. This policy was expressed
in the college’s faculty guide which provided:
“Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system.
The Administration of the College wishes the faculty mem-
ber to feel that he has permanent tenure as long as his
teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays
& cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and his superi-
ors, and as long as he is happy in his work.” 92 S.Ct. at
2699.
Additionally, plaintiff there relied upon guidelines published
by the state college board indicating that a person who had
been employed as a teacher enjoyed a form of tenure.
These “policies and practices” of the school and the Board of
Trustees, the Court said, could create a property interest. It
was not necessary that an employment contract or a statute
specifically create the interest.
The Perry case supports plaintiff's argument in the sense
that it indicates that there is no rigid limit to the sources of
property rights. Such rights may be derived from statutes,
from explicit contracts, or, as was true in Perry, from state
declared policies.
ey
58
1911 SIMS v. FOX q
But there are still limits on those things that can be |
considered “property rights”. Thare must be some reasonably
identifiable source from which the rights spring; they cannot |
emanate, as was said in Perry, from “mere subjective expect- ‘a
ancy”, 92 S.Ct. at 2700. The law still recognizes the immuta-
ble notion that something cannot spring from nothing. One
cannot create for himself a property by proclaiming its exist-
ence. :
In this case, Sims says he has a property right to continued
employment, but he can point to nothing other than his own
expectancy for the creation of that right. No statute created
it; indeed, the statute expressly denied its existence. Neither
has Sims pointed to any express terms in his contract or to
any governmental regulation that might have led him to
believe he had such a right. An Air Force contract or
regulation cannot grant that which Congress has specifically
withheld. The Air Force must act within the authority dele-
gated to it by Congress or, in certain cases, by the President. '
Any “regulations” or “contracts” attempted in excess of that
authority would be void.
i ight in continued mili employ-
ment because there is no source for it other than his own
“expectancy”. The applicable statute specifically denies the
right.
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II. The Liberty Claim
Appellant’s second theory is that the Air Force action under _
the circumstances of this case deprives him of “liberty”. The
“liberty” allegedly taken is his “good name, reputation, honor,
and community standing”. In this respect Sims’ contention is
less convincing than when the Panel originally decided his
appeal. At that time, appellant’s prospects were that he
would receive a discharge paper (Form DD 214) which on its ?
face would contain a code which, upon inquiry or investiga-
ppaigstaase reas
59 r. |
SIMS v. FOX 1912
tion, would reveal that he had been discharged for “unfitness,
unacceptable conduct, or in the interest of national security”.”
The Air Force no longer uses the code which would have
revealed the reason for his discharge. The discharge paper
which he is now about to receive will not reveal the reason for
the discharge. Moreover, Air Force regulations prescribe that
reasons for the separation are to be furnished only to the
serviceman.” |
Thus, as Air Force regulations now stand, appellant will
receive an honorable discharge which will not indicate the
reason for the discharge. Persons outside the military can
obtain the reason for discharge only in the remote event that
the Air Force disregards its own regulation. His contention
that his liberty interest is infringed by Air Force action is |
therefore necessarily reduced to a possibility that the Air
‘Force might allow the derogatory information to “escape”.
[2] It is, of course, established law that a governmental
attack on one’s “good name, reputation, honor, and communi-
ty standing” can be a deprivation of “liberty”, within the
meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This was
the holding in Wisconsin v. Constantineau
436-437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 510, 27 L.Ed 2d 515 (1971), which
involved the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute allowing
specified governmental officials to post in_public establish-
ments the names of persons who were not to be sold intoxicat-
ing liquors. The Supreme Court held this statute to be an
unconstitutional denial of “liberty” since the persons whose
names were posted were exposed to public embarrassment and
ridicule. One’s “good name, reputation, honor, and communi-
ty standing” cannot be taken from him, ‘the Court said,
without a hearing in which the truth of the posted matter
may be tested.
9%. Air Force Regulation 36-12.
10. Air Force Regulation 35-6, ‘ 4-6, effective 1May 1974.
OLE PLN AT TOE SII A
Sa
cane
60
1913 SIMS v. FOX
A more recent Supreme Court pronouncement that “liber-
ty” is lost when one’s “good name, reputation, honor, and
community standing” are falsely attacked is found in Roth,
supra, Where the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that plaintiff
(a non-tenured school teacher whose contract was not re-
newed) was not denied “liberty” within the meaning of the
cosines ie Soe eee fat bs bal tama seer
of dishonesty, or immorality, Had it done so, this would be
a different case. “—-——
“Similarly, there i is no suggestion that the state, in de-
clining to him_a stig-
ma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom te take
advantage of of other employment opportunities. :%
92 S.Ct. at 2707.
(3) In brief, Roth teaches that the government’s attack on
one’s reputation may infringe constitutionally protected liber-
ty in two respects: (1) governmental tion of one’s
community may be a denial of “ ; (2)
governmental communication of information to
employers may be an attack on “liberty”.
{4] Under the first test, plaintiff's reputation in his com-
‘munity has not. been attacked. The community in which
plaintiff will live after discharge can be expected never to
Knoxtrom_public records of the circumstances of his dis-
charge.
As to the second, Air Force lalla specifically deny
that employers, or anyo can learn of the circumstances
of the discharge. In the absence of allegations indicating a
reasonably anticipated likelihood that the Air Force, notwith-
LINE DEE LED LINE LEE LEIS © LEALL, OE ES AL FN ALOE LON LG BEL P IED
ee ee
61
SIMS v. FOX 1914
standing its regulations to the contrary, would reveal plain-
tiff's record to potential employers, the complaint is purely
speculative.
Infringement of “liberty”, as defined in the Roth guidelines,
is not, on substantial possibility, involved in this case.
[5] Thus the case is reduced to whether the mere presence
of derogatory information in an employer’s confidential files
is an infringement of liberty.
Arguably, the very presence of derogatory information in
an employer’s confidential records infringes protected “liber-
ty” since it denies a person the freedom he otherwise would
have to use his record for his own benefit by voluntarily
making it available to future employers. The contrary argu-
ment would be that the harm suffered by the mere presence
of damaging information in a confidential file is not substan-
tial enough to amount to an infringement of “liberty” in the
constitutional sense. In this Circuit the law on that subject is
1104
that sonstihational rights were violated because school offi-
cials had placed unfavorable memoranda in their files concern-
ing their activities on behalf of a teachers’ union. This Court
summarily disposed of the teachers’ claim saying that “lodg-
ing these memos, without more, in the instructors’ respective
files gives rise to no constitutionally based grievance”. The
mere presence of derogatory information in confidential files
is not an infringement of “liberty”.
Additionally, it is not to be overlooked that Sims has not
denied the truth of the charges against him. In his letter to
his commanding officer, Sims stipulated that “this informa-
tion does not deny the basic allegation”. As his counse!
explained at the en banc hearing, Sims seeks an Air Force
hearing not to refute the charges but only to present mitigat-
settled. In Collins v. Wolfson, 5 Cir, 1974, 498 F.2d 1100,
1104, state university teachers made various claims that the
ee ey fo! on
62
1915 SIMS v. FOX
claims that constitutionally guaranteed liberty is infringed
because the government is about to put the undenied truth jp.
its own records. This need not long detain us,
94 S.Ct. 1633, 1649, 40 L.Ed.2d 14 (1974), the Supreme Court
-fefers to an employee's “liberty” right as being the right to be
free from being “wrongfully stigmatized by untrue and un-
supported administrative charges’. —
[6] In conclusion, we hold, as basic propositions, (1) that
liberty is not infringed by the mere presence of derogatory
information in confidential files and (2) the government has
not infringed “liberty” unless it perpetuates untrue ore
Thus, in the absence of a denial of t of the
ing; there is no disputed fact requiring resolution as the
result of a hearing.
For the foregoing reasons we think the dismissal of the
complaint must be allowed to stand, making it unnecessary to
discuss the case in the light of Hodges v. Callaway, 5 Cir.,
1974 2 is " apd
1974, 499 F.2d 417 (exhaustion of administrative remedies) o
Aratt. 5. Kettat. MS 1S Se
L. 14 (post discharge evidentiary process sufficiently
protected “liberty” interest).
The Judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
TUTTLE, Circuit Judge, with whom WISDOM, BELL,
GOLDBERG, GODBOLD and MORGAN, Circuit Judges, join
(dissenting):
With utmost deference to the views of my colleagues I am
constrained to dissent.
I do so because I am fully convinced that Lt. Sims has a
“property” right and a “liberty” right, as these terms are
discussed in the majority opinion, to be protected under the
ing considerations. That makes this a case in which appellant —
“Tn the recent decision, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164,
allegedly offending material, there_is no necessity fora hear- |
Hokjaasee.
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rethink aaa
63
SIMS v. FOX 1916
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. As I read the majority
opinion, it holds that he has neither; it precludes this officer
from ever claiming the right to a personal appearance, either
before or after discharge, to undertake to convince those in
authority that, instead of being discharged for immoral con-
duct, his potential as an Air Force officer is such as to
warrant his retention in the service until the normal expira-
tion of his tour of duty. This follows, it seems to me, because
the Court holds that he has neither a property nor a liberty
interest to protect, and without either he, of course, has no
claim to procedural due process.
Because the opinion does not deal with the exhaustion of
administrative remedies, I refer only to what has been said
with respect to this in the panel opinion, calling attention,
however, to that part of footnote No. 2 of the majority
opinion, which cites 10 U.S.C.A. § 1553 and which italicizes the
language “a person who requests a review under this section
may appear before the board in person or by counsel or an
accredited representative of an organization recognized by the
Administrator of Veteran’s Affairs under chapter 59 of title
38.” I comment on this because, as stated in the panel
opinion, and as conceded at all times by the Government, the
provisions of § 155;} do not permit the board created thereun-
der to reinstate an airman or officer, once he has been
discharged. I am concerned lest the italicizing of the above
language may inadvertently convey the impression that such a
right is available after discharge.
Of course, as also commented on in the panel opinion, and as
conceded by the Government, § 1552 under which the Secre-
tary may reinstate an officer, does not guarantee a personal
appearance of a discharged airman or officer, seeking to have
his discharge revoked.
It is unnecessary to repeat the facts that led “i the filing of
this lawsuit. It seems fair to assume for the purpose of this
opinion that the majority would recognize that Lt. Sims is
being deprived of a “liberty” right, protected by the due
64
1917 SIMS v. FOX
process clause of the Fifth Amendment, were it not for the
change in regulations instituted by the Air Force since the
filing of this action. The majority concludes that the change
has the effect of keeping hidden the reason for discharge
because the Air Force merely retains information that Sims
has been discharged for the reasons outlined in paragraph S
4D(4) of Air Force Regulation 36-2 solely within its own
confidential files.
opinion of the Court comments on the fact that under
Air Force Regulation 35-6, paragraph 4-6, effective 1 May
1974; only the Air Force itself, and the officer, at his own
election, will now have the damaging information as to the
“reason for discharge.”
With deference, I feel constrained to say that this theory of
denying Lt. Sims a hearing with minimal due process is based
upon what to erroneous t what the
officer courts should be concerned about is to keep
from tial future employers the truth of the facts leading
i This, it seems to me, is to place
inci is on the cosmetic effect of the new form of
entries on the officer's di certificate rather than to
i » question whether he is entitled to have proce-
dural due process before the Air Force takes the action, based
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65
SIMS v. FOX 1918
expect a former officer of the United States Air Force, when
asked by a prospective employer what was meant by t y the twa two
dash marks that are now entered in all discharge certificates
opposite the entry “reason for discharge” would tell the truth.
Failure to do so would be a fraud on a prospective employer.
For Lt. Sims to answer this question under the proposed ‘
action of the Air Force, he would in honesty, be compelled to :
say “I was discharged for the reasons spelled out in Air Force 7
Regulations 36-2 as outlined in paragraph 4(d\4) of that ;
Regulation.” Then, upon being asked what is meant by that,
he would have to say “Sub-paragraph (d)(4) is entitled ‘sexual E
perversion’ and it reads ‘this includes but is not limited to E
i
(4) indecent exposvfre.’” The fact that this lan-
guage is not “communicated” by the Air Force to prospective
employers, either by having it inserted, as it was previously,
on the discharge certificate at the time this lawsuit was filed, ;
or in response to requests by future employers, makes no ‘
difference.
Lt. Sims has to live the rest of his life with his military /
record. The question before this Court, it seems to me, is
whether his military career should be terminated by the Air
Force forcing on him a discharge on the grounds of immoral k.
conduct without his being afforded any procedural due process '
to explain away or overcome the effects of his misconduct.
The wound resulting from a denial of an opportunity to this
officer to have such a hearing is much more than skin deep. |
It goes to the vitals of his future career.
Of course, this Court would not pretend to prejudge the
result of a proper hearing, if one were accorded to Lt. Sims.
If the Air Force, after according him whatever rights he is
entitled to under our concept of procedural due process, deter-
mines that no matter how much rehabilitation has been, or
can be, achieved, and no matter how satisfactory his military
record may be, his acts were such as to render him unfit to
continue service in the Air Force, then he would have to live
with the discharge certificate given him as a result of such
4
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At Ti RPRELOOEE ALLEN SEDO E BRIE |
66
1919 SIMS v. FOX
misconduct and that would be the end of the matter. His
only hope, and it is a hope that seems to justify the Court’s
intervention, is that before he is discharged for any reason
challenging his “good name, reputation, honor, or integrity”
he is entitled to such due process as we have described in the
panel opinion. He should have an opportunity to be present
and make an effort to persuade the appropriate officials that
such circumstances as he wishes to bring before them demon-
strate that he has sufficient potential to make him a proper
and suitable officer to remain in the service until the end of
his normal tour of duty. Under such circumstances, of course,
he would then receive a discharge certificate designating
normal termination of service, and this would be his passport
back to civil life.
However, the impression conveyed by the majority opinion
that the unsavory information designated by SDN 588, signi-
fying a discharge on the ground of “unfitness and/or unsuita-
bility,” is kept a closely-guarded secret within the Air Force
headquarters is not, in my opinion, borne out by the appropri-
ate regulations, as amended on July 2, 1974. These amended
regulations do away with the former requirement that, at the
proper space following the item “reason for discharge” an
entry be made which, when traced to the appropriate Air
Force regulations, clearly gives the reason for the discharge.
As heretofore pointed out this code number in Lt. Sims’ case
was 588, and it was a clear statement of the reasons for
discharge. Under the new regulations, no SDN entry is is made
on the original eenarge certificate which is given to the
officer himself. Instead, this space is filled with two dash
marks. However, there are a total of eight copies of this
discharge certificate provided for under these amended regu-
lations. Copy no. 2 is the master personnel record copy, and it
presumably remains at Air Force Headquarters. However,
copies 1 numbers 6 and & are nt to other i
lations e that copy no. 6 is to be “forwardfed] to
NG ANG PMO WASH DC 20310, for review and transmittal
EPL LILO LEGO LLL LLL LEO SEP. LEME LEO EAGER Ni EE ILE A REET LM He
oN
67
SIMS v. FOX 1928
to the appropriate state adjutant general.” (Emphasis added.]
Copy no. 8 is required by regulations to be “forward{ed] to
USAF RECTG SVC Randolph AFB TX 78148.” (This is
clearly the U.S. Air Force Recruiting Service, Randolph Air
Force Base, Texas.)
The Government does not in any way seek to minimize or
conceal the fact that these copies, containing the SDN desig-
nation are sent to the Air Force Recruiting Service Headquar-
ters and to the State Adjutant General of the officer’s home i
state, nor is any effort made to conceal the reason for this :
action. The reason is perfectly clear, but it is one which has
largely escaped the ‘the attention of the Court, other than the
comment in the original panel opinion calling attention to the
fact that the discharge given to Lt. Sims will carry a designa-
tion which makes him ineligible ever to return to service in
the Air Force, the Air Force Reserve, or | the . Air National
Guard. In the truest sense of the word he will have been
“blacklisted.” °
It is not the fact that the adjutant general of the state of
the residence of the airman or officer, (who incidentally, is a
state official, and who may share the unsavory record con-
cerning the officer with the state’s personnel computer, \o far
as the record discloses) that concerns me the most. It is the
purpose for which this information is transmitted to the state
adjutant general and to the Air Force Recruiting Service.
~ Any recruiting officer or state adjutant general who might,
at some future date be inclined to yield to Lt. Sims’ request
that he be permitted to serve in the National Guard or reserve
forces of the United States Air Force as an enlisted man or
officer in time of peace or on active duty in time of national
emergency will now have been permanently forbidden to do so
as the result of this discharge, based as it is on Air Force
Regulation 36-2 pursuant to AFR 36-12 SDN 588 and the
code number determining him to be unfit for further recall.
anaume tas te opportunity to participate in a
y lucrative profession, either full-time, or as a part-
Re, aie aa
-.
ORR AL SPIO LL ELD EOE LILO LAL LILLE IIA GE LOC. ENE SVLOOWEL. | GLP EIDE were ppc
mismo satan following
“{The Board of Regents] did not base the
had been guilty of dishonesty or immorality. Had it done so,
this would be a different case.” (Emphasis added.)
Also quoted is the following. “Similarly, there is no sugges-
tion that the state, in declining to responden
charge . . . thathehadbeenguiltyof . . immo-
rality.” Furthermore, it is clear that in discharging Sims the
Air Force “imposed on him a stigma or other disability that
foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employ-,
ment opportunities . . ..
This is a wholly separate matter from that discussed in the
majority opinion, dealing with Lt. Sims’ opportunities to ob-
tain jobs in the commercial world which, the Court seems to
consider unimpaired because his discharge certificate does not
on its face carry the perjorative words or code number.’
2. There is, of course, the further substantial question whether by
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69
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SIMS v. FOX ee. im
If there can be any doubt about the nature of the “liberty”
right of Lt. Sims which is here threatened, after reading the
exception stated in Roth, supra, the following language from
that opinion would, it seems to me, dispel any doubt. Immedi-
ately following the language: “the state, for example, did not
invoke any regulations to har the respondent from all other
public employment in state universities,” * the court said “had
it done so, this, again, would be a different case for ‘[t]o be
deprived not only of present government employment but of
future opportunity for it certainly is.no_small injury. ..
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, supra, 341
US. at 185, 71 S.Ct. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring). See
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41, 36 S.Ct. 7, 10, 60 L.Ed. 131.
The Court has held, for example, that a State, in regulating _
eligibility for a type of professional employment, cannot fore-
“itrwnrrrinnm CONtFAVENCIS] . - Due Process.’ Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238, 77 S.Ct. 752, 756, 1 L-Ed.2d
796, and, specifically, in a manner that denies the right to a
full prior hearing. Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 :
U.S. 96, 103, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 1180, 10 L.Ed.2d 224. See Cafete- i
ria Workers v. McElroy, supra, 367 U.S. at 898,81 S.Ct. at =;
1750. In the present case, however, this principle does not _
come into play.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573,
92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d 548.
Although I feel that the strength of Lt. Sims’ position with
respect to the protection of his liberty right is sufficient to
warrant the Court’s intervention with this proposed discharge
until he has had minimal due process I think some comment is
proper with respect to the existence of a property right, also.
i a coal SOIR PRET Sa EN
employment opportunities”, i. e. to follow his desire to participate in
the future in the reserve or National Guard programs of the Air 4
Force, and since the state adjutant general is a recipient of the
coded discharge. from any other state or military activities.
4. Here it did invoke regulations to effectively bar Sims from all
public employment in the military services of the United States and
é
of his own state =
eee,
lesen. Si «GIR 6 OK A LE PRET NL LOPE LES EEL LGA IPR AMELIE CE LEL EOL EA LIE PGE LE GOSS LESSIG AS —
70
1923 SIMS v. FOX
I have no doubt that the arbitrary determination by the
military officials involved that Lt. Sims shall be forever
barred from further military service in the United States,
without a hearing or proceeding that in any way approxi-
mates a trial is just as much a deprivation of a property right
as would be the action of a board of bar examiners to deny an
individual the right to a certificat» to practice law on constitu-
tionally suspect grounds. See Schware v. Board of Bar Exam-
iners, 353 U.S. 282, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 and Willner v.
Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96, 83 §.Ct. 1175, 10 L.Ed.2d
22A. As to its deprivation of such a right, the Court, in
language quoted with approva in Roth, said: “a State, in
regulating eligibility for a type of professional employment,
cannot foreclose a range of opportunities ‘ina manner .
that contravenes) . . - Due Process,” Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 US. 232, 238, 77 S.Ct. 752, 756, 1.
L.Ed.2d 796. How can Lt. Sims’ black listing from all future
military service for state or nation be distinguished?
In sum, I think that Lt. Sims’ liberty is threatened both as
to his potential for all future employment opportunities, re-
gardless of the absence of the unfavorable entry on the face
of his discharge certificate. I think this is clearly implied in
the language quoted from the Roth opinion. I also think that
his liberty and property rights are both threatened by the
attainder against his ever having the right to serve in the
state or federal military forces. The authority of the Presi-
dent to discharge an officer at his pleasure does not, it seems
to me, extend this right to bar him from competing with all
other citizens in the future to serve his country in the Air
Force, without some kind of trial or hearing with minimal
procedural due process.
7
APPENDIX "C"
re
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
(Number and title omitted)
(Piled: July 9, 1973)
The Plaintiff was commissioned a Re-
serve Second Lieutenant in the United
States Air Force on May 20, 1971. For
waged JV A AEN TN RR
reasons deemed sufficient by the Secre-
ee
tary of the Air Force, on May 2, 1973
the Secretary, acting through the Air
Force Military Personnel Center, oOr-
dered that all appointments held by the
Plaintiff be terminated and directed
that the Plaintiff be honorably dis-
charged pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §§ 1162
and 8447 and Air Force Regulation 36-2.
On May 8, 1973 the Plaintiff filed
a complaint in this Court asserting
that he was being denied rights of due
process guaranteed by the United States
72
Constitution and contending that he
would suffer irreparable injury unless
the Defendants were enjoined from per-
fecting his discharge. Among other
things, he contends that the Air Force
is obligated to give him a full hearing
on the question of his discharge.
Since it appeared to the Court that the
questions raised in the complaint would
be mooted by the Plaintiff's discharge
before a hearing could be had, a tem-
porary restraining order was issued
against the Defendants on May 8, 1973
barring any actions to change the Plain-
tiff's military status until further
order of the Court.
In due course the Defendants filed
a motion to dissolve the temporary re-
straining order which had been issued
and to dismiss the complaint and filed
ve .4
a brief in support thereof. Counsel
nes
i ; for the Plaintiff in turn filed their
brief in opposition to the Defendants’ |
motion. —
| The Court has given careful consider-
ation to ein metees and has concluded ~
that the Defendants' motion to dismiss
should be sustained. |
FE ee ee OR eee ey
The Plaintiff's contention that his
discharge without a hearing violates due
process is contrary to established law.
In Pauls v. Secretary of the Air Force,
457 F.2d 294 (1 Cir. 1972), it was said
at page 297: ' ;
PR ADL ae ne EAE A LES
j "It is well-established law that
j military officers serve as the
j pleasure of the President and f
have no constitutional right to i
be promoted or retained in ser- | f
f
&
&
f
;
vice and that the services of an
officer may be terminated with
or without reason."
(Citing cases)
fies anon mg ce TY PEM PONIES HEIR
‘ast
This issue was also dealt with by
the District Court of the District of
Columbia in Gutierrez v. Laird, 346 F.
Supp. 289 (1972).
It. was concluded in the Gutierrez
case that a Reserve Officer has no right
to a hearing prior to being given an
honorable discharge. |
| ° ORDER
According, the Defendants’ motion to
dismiss the complaint is sustained and
the complaint is hereby ordered dismiss-
ed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
| STAY :
This order shall be stayed for a
‘period of ten (10) days to allow Plain-
tiff to make application, if he wishes,
to the Court of Appeals for a further
stay.
FE OE LOE ILO PLOT OO RINT I OR TOE ED ONT OO AIR POPE EP LGA PIE eV GAZ ——
75
Entered this 9th day of July. 1973.
s/J. Robert Elliott
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.