Petition for A Writ of Certiorari — Harron v. United Hospital Center Inc.

LISRAKY

Tr. &

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNIT

PE = O54"

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

ex rel HENRY R. COBELL,

Respondent, )

Vv. )

THE HONORABLE JOHN P. SHARP )

AND THE BLACKFEET TRIBAL

COURT, )

Petitioners.

)

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN T. McDERMOTT

Director

Indian Law Program

University of Montana

School of Law

Missoula, Montana 59801

Counsel for Petitioners

TOPICAL INDEX

Page

OPINIONS BELOW------------------------ 2

JURISDICTION------------------------- 2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED------------------ 3

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED---------------.~-- 5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE --------------- 5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT-------- 14

ARGUMENT-----------------------~---~- 16

CONCLUSION-----------------~---~----- 29

APPENDIX

A. Opinion of the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

filed September 5, 1974------- 31

Memorandum Opinion, Order and

Judgment of the U.S. District

Court for the District of

Montana filed December 15, 1972-45

Memorandum Opinion and Order

of the U.S. District Court

for the District of Montana

filed December 6, 1972------- 61

Constitutional and Statutory

Provisions Involved---------- 79

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page

Ex Parte Hawk 321 U.S. 114 (1944) -—...__. 16

——— arte Hawk,

Ex Parte Lee Fong Fook, 74 F.Supp. 68

(N.D. Calif. 1948)

--- 16

U.S. 128 (1952)-----__ 1

Kennerly Vv. District Court, 400 U.s. 423

(1971)- 14, 15, 22, 24, 26, 27,

29

Gusik v, Schilder, 340

May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) -----___ 23

4

4 O'Neal vy, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe,

§ F. nd 1 t Cir. —— _ a3,

17, 18

~~ «-xHilliams v. Lee, 358 u.s, 217 (1959)-—~---- 45,

i 17, 18, 20, 22

. Williams vy. y.s

+> 431 F.2d 873 (Sth Cir.

: 1973)- ——a=s 16

: Worcester y, Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)

; 515 (1832) ee

; 21

STATUTES

Wheeler-Howard Act,

48 Stat. 986, 25 U.S.C.

461 et seq.--

- 25

Lory — om) te

Se ee Oe eT

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES--Continued

Page

Public Law 280, 67 Stat. 588------------ 28

1968 Civil Rights Act, Title II, section

202, 82 Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C. 8 1302---- 17

1968 Civil Rights Act, Titie II, section

203, 82 Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C. § 1303---- ae

9

1968 Civil Rights Act, Title IV, section

402, 82 Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C. 8 1322---- 28

Blackfeet Tribal Law and Order Code,

Chapter 3, Section 1 26

Section 2 26,

27

CONSTITUTIONS

U.S. Constitution, Article I, section 8 21

Blackfeet Tribal Constitution, Article

IV, section 1(k) 26

1

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

ex rel HENRY R. COBELL,

Respondent, )

\

V., é ES tk

THE HONORABLE JOHN P. SHARP ) ‘

AND THE BLACKFEET TRIBAL

COURT, )

Petitioners.

)

A

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

The honorable John P. Sharp and the

Blackfeet Tribal Court respectfully peti-

tion that a writ of certiorari issue to

review the judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

entered in this case on September 5, 1974.

ae |

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

filed on September 5, 1974, is printed

as Appendix A hereto and is reported at

503 F.2d 790 (1974).

The Memorandum Opinion, Order and

Judgment of the United States District

Court for the District of Montana, filed

on December 15, 1972, denying respondent's

motion for reconsideration, is printed as

Appendix B hereto.

The Memorandum Opinion and Order of

the United States District Court for the

District of Montana, filed on December 6,

1972, is printed as Appendix C hereto.

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit entered judgment in

this case on September 5, 1974. On Novem-

ber 4, 1974, the Court of Appeals entered

-3-

its order granting respondent-appellant's

motion for extension of time for filing

a petition for rehearing, and also on

November 4, 1974 entered its order denying

the petition for rehearing.

The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under Title 28 U.S.C. sections

1254(1) and 2101(c),; and under Rule 22(3),

Supreme Court Rules.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

(1) Whether a person aggrieved by

an order of an Indian tribal court must

exhaust available tribal court remedies

before seeking a writ of habeas corpus

from a United States District Court pur-

suant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303 ?

(2) Whether Indian tribal courts

must give full faith and credit to state

court judgments where the state courts

do not recognize judgments rendered by

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Indian tribal courts?

(3) Whether the Blackfeet Indian

Nation, by tribal ordinance and without

complying with applicable provisions of

P.L. 280 and the Indian Civil Rights Act,

could transfer jurisdiction over marriage,

divorce, and related matter to courts of

the state of Montana, thereby leaving the

Blackfeet Tribal Court without jurisdic-

tion to render a decree affecting the

custody of children of divorced tribal

members?

(4) Whether the Blackfeet Tribal

Court could assume jurisdiction over

Blackfeet Indian children found on the

Blackfeet Indian Reservation and, having

determined that the welfare of the chil-

dren was in jeopardy, enter a temporary

decree inconsistent with an outstanding

interlocutory state court decree con-

cerning the custody of the children.

-5-

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent provisions of Article I,

Section 8 of the Constitution of the

United States, of the Whee ler-Howard Act

(48 Stat. 984), of Public Law 280

(67 Stat. 588), of the 1968 Civil Rights

Act (82 Stat. 77), of the Blackfeet Tribal

Constitution, and of the Law and Order

Code of the Blackfeet Tribe are set forth

in Appendix D hereto.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The basic issue in this case is the

legality of an order of the Blackfeet

Tribal Court, asserting control over two

Blackfeet Indian children in contraven-

tion of a temporary state court order.

Joan and Henry Cobell are both en-

ers of the Blackfeet Indian

rolled memb

Tribe. Married on October 17, 1963 on

the Blood Indian Reserve in Alberta,

-6-

Canada, they subsequently had two chil-

dren, Rodney and Venetta. Both are

minors, and although they possess a sub-

stantial amount of Indian blood neither

is eligible for enrollment in the Black-

feet Tribe.

In August of 1971, Joan Cobell filed

for divorce in the state district court

in Great Falls, Montana. Henry counter-

claimed and a decree was entered on

December 22, 1971 giving custody of the

minor children to Henry. Actual custody

of the children was apparently sur-

rendered to Henry soon thereafter. Then

in August, 1972, Joan petitioned the

State District Court for a modification

of the December 22nc decree. A Temporary

Order was entered on August 4, 1972 grant-

ing custody of the children to Joan until

such time as a hearing could be held. On

~~

August 14, 1972, a hearing was held and

the court thereafter granted permanent

custody to Joan. Under the authority of

this order, she took the children to her

home on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation.

Following an appeal to the Montana Supreme

Court, the State District Court on Septem-

ber 26, 1972 vacated its August Order and

granted temporary custody of the children

to Henry. In spite of this order, the

children remained on the Blackfeet Indian

Reservation in the custody of Joan Cobell.

On October 6, 1972, Leona Conway,

the children's maternal grandmother,

petitioned the Blackfeet Tribal Court to

take custody of the children. Finding

that the two young children were "“with-

out adequate supervision" and were

"suffering emotionally and pyschologically

because of the uncertainty of the custody

and adult supervision,” the Tribal Court

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entered a temporary ex parte order on the

same day placing the children "under the

care, custody and control of this court."

The order further provided that the two

children could not be removed from the

reservation without further order of the

Tribal Court. This order was by its

terms clearly temporary, lasting only un-

til a final determination upon the

question of custody was made by the state

court. The order plainly indicates that

the tribal court would enforce such a

final state court decree provided that

it was satisfied that the custody pro-

visions were for the best interests of the

children. A copy of this order was sent

to Henry Cobell at his last known address.

Rather than seeking relief from the

Tribal Court order either by moving to va-

cate the order on any of the grounds

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subsequently raised in the federal habeas

proceeding or by appealing the trial

court's order to the Blackfeet appellate

court, Henry filed a petition for a writ

of labeas corpus in the United States

District Court for the District of Mon-

tana. Jurisdiction in this court was

based on Title 25 U.S.C. §1303.

On December 6, 1972, the District

Court granted the petition. Appellants

Blackfeet Tribal Court and Chief Judge

John Sharp filed a motion for reconsidera-

tion which was denied by the District

Court's order of December 15, 1972.

Leona Conway, the Blackfeet Tribal

Court, and Judge Sharp filed notices of

appeal from the orders of December 6 and

December 15 granting the writ of habeas

corpus. Separate appeals were perfected

and were consolidated by stipulation. The

-10-

district court stayed its order seven

days to permit appellants to make ap-

plication to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for a stay

pending appeal. The stay was continued

by a single judge of the Court of Ap-

peals until January 2, 1973. On Jan-

uary 3, 1973, the Court of Appeals

dissolved the stay on the grounds "that

the best interests of the children will

not be served by staying the decision of

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the United States District Court.” Al-

: though the order was not received by the

Blackfeet Tribal Court for nearly a week,

the Tribal Court on the very day the order

was filed in San Francisco, January ‘3, in

demonstration of its good faith, entered

an order vacating its October 6th re-

straining order and directed Joan Cobell

to deliver custody of the children to,

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Henry Cobell. Within a week Henry picked

up the children and took them to Billings,

Montana. Joan and Henry subsequently

took part in state court proceedings to

determine final custody of the children.

The issues presented by the ép-

pellants on appeal to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

were:

1. The trial court erred in refusing

to dismiss the petition for the writ of

habeas corpus on the ground that

petitioners failed to exhaust available

tribal court remedies.

2. The trial court erred in holding

that the tribal court must enforce .the

judgments and interlocutory decrees of

state courts.

3. The trial court erred in holding

that the tribal court procedures employed

REL PRTAPR ae SPINCN ase

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in this case violated petitioner's

federally protected rights; and, alterna-

tively, if the tribal court procedures did

violate Henry's rights, the court im-

properly granted an unconditional writ of

habeas corpus.

4. This controversy is not moot,

even though the Cobell Children are not

presently on the Blackfeet Reservation,

and so are not now within the jurisdic-

tion of the tribal court.

The Court of Appeals, in its opinion

filed September 5, 1974, (reported at 503

F.2d 790 (1974)) affirmed the judgment of

the District Court. It found:

(1) That exhaustion of tribal rem-

edies was not an inflexible requirement,

and in this case exhaustion was not

practical since it appeared that Henry

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Cobell lacked meaningful remedy in che

Tribal Court.

| (2) That the controversy was not

| moot since the underlying conflict be-

tween the Tribal Court and the state

courts still existed.

(3) That the October 6, 1972 order

of the Tribal Court was unlawful because

the Tribal Court was without jurisdiction;

the Blackfeet Tribe had “relinquished”

jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, and

adoption by way of provisions in Chapter

3 of the Blackfeet Tribal Law and Order

Code and that this relinquishment en-

compassed a surrender of jurisdiction

over custody determinations incident to

divorce. ;

Subsequently, on November 4, 1974,

the Court of Appeals granted the motion

of appellants Blackfeet Tribal Court and ;

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Judge Sharp for extension of time for fil-

ing a petition for rehearing. The

pekttsion for rehearing, which urged that

the Court of Appeals had overlooked this

Court's decision in Kennerly v. District

Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971) in finding a

relinquishment of jurisdiction, was

denied without opinion by the same order.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

As the court below recognized this

case involves the conflicting jurisdic-

tional claims of the Montana state courts

and the Blackfeet Tribal Court. The

decisions of the District Court and the

Court of Appeals are inconsistent with:

(1) United States Constitution which

recognizes the inherent sovereignity of

Indian tribes, (2) the Indian Civil Rights

Act by which Congress attempted to balance

the personal rights of individual Indians

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(3) several decisions of this court, name-

ly Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 Lest

Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U. S. 423

(197}) which uphold the Indian right to

self-government, and (4) decision of a

other federal courts, particularly O'Neal

v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d

1140 (8th sg 1973), sie saan exhaustion

of tribal court remedies. ,

This Court should grant the Writ of

Certiorari in this case in order to re-

solve crucial conflicts in the inter-

pretation and application of the Indian

Civil Rights Act and to resolve the

continuing and expanding conflict between

state governments and tribal governments )

concerning jurisdiction over events oc-

curring on Indian Reservations. This case ,

presents conflicts typical of those coming

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before state and federal courts with in-

creasing regularity, but with totally

inconsistent resolutions.

ARGUMENT

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

EXHAUSTION OF TRIBAL COURT REMEDIES WAS

NOT REQUIRED IN THIS CASE.

In Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944)

this Court established the "exhaustion

doctrine" which requires one detained

under a state court judgment to exhaust

all state remedies before seeking relief

in federal courts. Congress, in enacting

28 U.S.C. 2254 gave its approval to the

"exhaustion doctrine." This doctrine has

been extended to military prisoners,

Gusik v. Schilder,' 340 U.S. 128 (1952),

federal prisoners, Williams v. U.S., 431

F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1970) and to aliens

being deported, Ex parte Lee Fong Fook,

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74 F. Supp. 68,(N.D. Calif. 1948). There

seems to be no reason why the exhaustion

doctrine should not also apply to those

in custody under Indian Tribal Court

judgments. Indeed there are compelling

reasons why an exhaustion requirement

should be applied to suits brought under

the Indian Bill of Rights, 25 U.S.C.

§ 1302. As the Eighth Circuit emphasized

in O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe,

482 F.2d 1140, 1146 (8th Cir. 1973)

"(t]he adoption of the Indian Bill

of Rights was not meant to detract

from the generally recognized policy,

stated in the Williams case, of

preserving the ‘authority of tribal

courts. '"

The O'Neal court concluded that an ex~

haustion requirement was supported by the

Indian Civil Rights Act itself, as well

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-18-

as by this Court's decision in Williams v.

Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).

The court below did not disagree with

O'Neal but applied the exhaustion doctrine

in a way which ignored the policies behind

such a requirement as well as the undis-

puted facts in this case. Its finding

that exhaustion was not required in this

case was based on the fact that the tribal

judge indicated that he would not have

rescinded his order. Assuming arguendo

that the tribal judge indicated that he

would not have been persuaded to rescind

his order and that this fact makes further

relief from the tribal court "unavailable",

the undisputed fact remains that the Black-

feet Law and Order Code establishes a

Blackfeet Appellate Court with jurisdic-

tion to hear appeal from judgments and

decrees issued by any of the tribal judges,

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Thus Henry Cobell, petitioner below, had

a right to appeal the tribal court's order

to the Blackfeet Appellate Court and his

failure to do so constitutes a deliberate

bypassing of available tribal court

remedies. The petition for federal habeas

corpus should have been denied on this

basis alone.

II

IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE TRANSFER

OF JURISDICTION OVER CUSTODY MATTERS TO

THE STATE OF MONTANA, THE COURTS BELOW

ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE BLACKFEET TRIBAL

COURT COULD NOT, IN THE ABSENCE OF A

SPECIFIC GRANT OF AUTHORITY FROM CONGRESS,

DECLINE TO HONOR THE DECREE OF THE STATE

COURT.

A.

IN THE ABSENCE OF A GOVERNING ACT OF CON-

GRESS A TRIBAL COURT NEED NOT ENFORCE A

JUDGMENT OR DECREE FROM A STATE COURT.

In its opinion of December 15, 1972,

the District Court recognized that under

the holdings of this Court from Worcester

v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) to

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Williams v. Lee, supra, Indian Tribes and

their tribal courts possess sovereign

powers except as limited by treaties and

Acts of Congress. Thus it is well estab-

lished that Indian Tribes require no

specific grant of authority from Congress

to act in matters essential to tribal self-

government. The District Court misapplied

this principle and held that the Tribal

Court's order was unlawful in the absence

of a specific grant from Congress because

the matter involved here was not essential

to tribal self-goverment. However, it can

hardly be denied that the welfare of

Indian children on an Indian Reservation

is a matter essential to tribal self-

government. Thus, the court below should

have held that the Tribal Court order

would be valid unless prohibited by an Act

of Congress. As no Act of Congress

-21l-

prohibits the Blackfeet Tribal Court from

entering decress affecting the custody of

Blackfeet Indian children within the

Blackfeet Indian Reservation nor requires

tribal courts to give full faith and cred-

it to state court judgments, the Tribal

Court decree should have been upheld.

B.

THE HOLDING THAT THE POWER TO MAKE A CUS-

TODY DETERMINATION IS NOT A MATTER

ESSENTIAL TO TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

ESTABLISHES A PRECEDENT WHICH DANGEROUSLY

UNDERMINES DECISIONS OF THIS COURT REGARD-

ING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY.

Indian Tribes are recognized as sov~

ereign by the Constitution of the United

States. Article I, Section 8, clause 3

provides that Congress shall have power to

regulate commerce with foreign nations,

and among the several states, and with the

Indian Tribes.

This Court has acknowledged the sov~

ereignty of Indian Tribes, Worcester V-

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Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), and

has defined that sovereignty as extending

to all matters essential to tribal self-

government. Williams v. Lee, supra. It

has protected that sovereignty by holding

that a state may not acquire jurisdiction

regarding matters essential to tribal

self-government except by complying with

the requirements of the governing Acts of

Congress. Kennerly v. District Court,

400 U.S. 423 (1971).

Although this Court has not estab-

lished guidelines regarding what are

matters essential to tribal self-

government, it seems beyond question that

the power to exercise custody over the

minor children of tribal members, present

on the reservation, to prevent foreseeable

harm to the children, is a power essential

to tribal self-government. Under the

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doctrine of parens patriae, such a power

is one of the traditional standards of

internal sovereignty, and it has never

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been held by this Court that the Full

Faith and Credit Clause applies to child

custody decrees issued by states. See

Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion

in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536

(1953).

In view of the fact that the chal-

lenged tribal power seems almost cer-

tainly to be one essential to tribal

self-government, it becomes clear that it

was the conflict with the decreee of the

Montana state court that prompted the

courts below to hold that a specific

grant of authority was required to vali-

date the Tribal Court order. If internal

tribal sovereignty is to mean anything,

there will be times when it conflicts with

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-24-

state sovereignty. The mere existence of

such a conflict cannot be the basis for

limiting tribal authority unless the con-

cept of Indian self-determination is to

be abandoned.

Cx

IN LIGHT OF THIS COURT'S HOLDING IN

KENNERLY v. DISTRICT COURT, IT WAS ERROR

FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO HOLD THAT THE

BLACKFEET TRIBE COULD IN ABSENCE OF

COMPLIANCE BY THE STATE OR BY THE TRIBE

WITH GOVERNING ACTS OF CONGRESS, RELIN-

QUISH TO THE STATE OF MONTANA JURISDICTION

OVER MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, ADOPTION, AND

CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS.

Affirming the District Court's hold-

ing that the Tribal Court's order of

October 6, 1972 was unlawful, the Court of

Appeals held that through the Blackfeet

Tribal Law and Order Code, the Blackfeet

Tribe had relinquished jurisdiction over

marriage, divorce, and adoption to the

state of Montana, and that this relin-

gquishment encompassed a surrender of

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jurisdiction over custody determinations

incident to divorce actions.

The Blackfeet Tribe is a federally

recognized Indian Tribe organized and in-

corporated under the Wheeler-Howard Act

(48 Stat. 986, 25 U.S.C. §461 et seq.).

The Tribe adopted a Constitution under

this Act which was approved by the Sec~

retary of the Interior on December 13,

1935 and has been amended at various

times since then.

There is no question that at the time

the Blackfeet Constitution was approved,

the Tribe had jurisdiction over marriage,

divorce, adoption, and custody determina-

tions incident to divorce when the pro-

ceedings involved Tribal Members. The

Wheeler-Howard Act (25 U.S.C. §476),

provides that any tribe organizing under

the Act shall have all the powers vested

PPI RAL ie IS

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in any Indian Tribe by existing law. In

addition, the Tribal Constitution pro-

vided that jurisdiction should extend to

all Tribal members. Blackfeet Constitu-

tion, Art. VI, Section 1(k). The question

is whether the Tribal Law and Order Code,

which was enacted subsequent to the adop-

tion of the Tribal Constitution, may, in

light of the Kennerly decision, be held to

have transferred such jurisdiction to the

state of Montana.

The pertinent provisions of the Law

and Order Code are found in Chapter 3,

entitled "Domestic Relations." They are

Sections 1 and 2 and provide as follows:

Sec. 1 Marriages

All members of the Blackfeet Indian

Tribe shall hereafter be governed by

State Law and subject to State juris-

diction with respect to marriage

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hereafter consummated. Common law

marriages and Indian custom marriages

shall not be recognized within the

Blackfeet Reservation.

Sec. 2 Divorces

All divorces must be consummated in

accordance with the State Law of

Montana. Indian custom divorces are

from this time on illegal and will

not be recognized as lawful on the

Blackfeet Reservation.

It is doubtful that the intent of the

Tribe was to relinquish any jurisdiction

by these provisions, but in any event it

is indisputable that the provisions could

not, under Kennerly, transfer any juris-

diction to the state unless and until the

State of Montana complied with existing

federal law.

Before the Court in Kennerly was the

-2 8-

very same Blackfeet Tribal Law and Order

Code involved here. This Court held in

‘Kennerly that provisions in Chapter 2 of

the Code could not suffice to transfer

jurisdiction over civil matters because

neither the Tribe nor the State of Montana

had complied with the requirements of

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either of the Acts of Congress governing

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the transfer of jurisdiction from Indian

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Tribes to states.

Kennerly is directly in point here.

The governing Acts of Congress are the

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same two which were in effect when

Kennerly was decided: Public Law 280, 67

Stat. 588 and the 1968 Civil Rights Act,

82 Stat. 77 (25 U.S.C. §1322). The re-

quirements of neither were complied with

to transfer jurisdiction over marriage,

divorce, and custody determinations

incident to divorce from the Tribe to the

-29-

State of Montana. Therefore, it is sub-

mitted that there could not have been any

transfer of such jurisdiction from the

Blackfeet Tribe to the State and that it

was error on the part of the Court of

Appeals to so hold.

CONCLUSION

The holdings of the Court of Appeals

undermine the concept of Tribal sover-

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eignty which has been consistently upheld =

by this Court. The holding that there may

be a transfer of jurisdiction from the

Blackfeet Tribe to the State of Montana in

the absence of couphionie with governing

Acts of Congress is directly in conflict

with this Court'd decision in the

Kennerly case. For these reasons, it is

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respectfully submitted that the Writ of

i

Certiorari be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN T. McDERMOTT

University of Montana

School of Law

Missoula, Montana 59801

Counsel for Petitioners

‘

January 31, 1975 :

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