Brief Amicus Curiae — Procter & Gamble Co. v. Chicago (No. 74-1109)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Interest of the Soap and Detergent Association ...... 1

Argument—The Decision Below Sanctions Local Reg-

ulations Which Unconstitutionally Burden that

‘*Free Access to Every Market in the Nation’’

Which the Commerce Clause Was Adopted To En-

RS ch tkdo cvs deabvke bee ctedoudecus subesaes 2

PN oo 5s acon eek kbedaaenes atin ivowsie take 15

INDEX OF CITATIONS

CasEs:

Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. 359 U.S. 520

SICAS A daa WES SckS CEDARS abe Ta bce tuhbe oes «p00 9,10

Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) ....... 16

Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394

NE aiins ca suvechoundnedss eaobs nee 12

Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946). .2, 3, 7,9, 11, 14, 15

Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) ....4,6,9,15

Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 448

ESOT aU heise sdviettoons aes Codlyotese 10, 11

Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dis-

a OB FE pS a eee 13

Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1937) .. 5,7

Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) .............. 4

Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890) ............ 14

Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) ............ 3,9

National Bellas Hess Inc. v. Department of Revenue,

Se Pt ED Fa aw sdases eben ncadess 9,10, 11

Pike v. Bruch Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) ....3, 4,6

Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898) .. 4

Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915) .............. 4

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)

9, 10, 11

U.S. Constrrvtion :

Cea SS ae 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 15, 16

MISCELLANEOUS:

Chafee, Progress of the Law—Equitable Relief Against

, Torts, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 388 (1921) .............

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroper TERM, 1974

No. 74-1109

THE ProcrerR AND GAMBLE CoMPANY AND

FMC Corporation, Petitioners,

v.

THe Ciry or Cuicaco, Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE FOR THE

SOAP AND DETERGENT ASSOCIATION

This brief amicus curiae is filed by the Soap and

Detergent Association (SDA) with the consent of the

parties, as provided for in Rule 42 of the Rules of this

Court.

INTEREST OF THE SOAP AND DETERGENT

ASSOCIATION

The Soap and Detergent Association is a national

trade organization representing the manufacturers of

SBE ee

over 90 percent of the soap and detergents pro-

duced in the United States each year and their sup-

pliers of raw material. Its more than 120 wembers

include both the large and small factors in the

industry.

It is these companies, most of which either utilize

or produce phosphates, which are the targets of the

ordinance challenged herein and it is these companies

whose operations in interstate commerce are shackled

by the patchwork pattern of regulation found by the

trial court and described at p. 8, n.5, infra. Petitioner

Procter & Gamble has demonstrated the constitution-

ally significant costs imposed on it by the Chicago or-

dinance. SDA files this brief amicus curiae in order

to put before the Court the additional insights avail-

able to it as the representative of both large companies

such as Procter and the smaller detergent manufac-

turers who are even less able to adapt their production

and transportation patterns, and even more financially

vulnerzble to restrictive legislation.

The Decision Below Sanctions Local Regulations Which Uncon-

stitutionally Burden That “Free Access to Every Market in

the Nation” Which the Commerce Clause Was Adopted To

Ensure.

The Petition for OCertiorari demonstrates that the

“‘eompromise’’ between this Court’s precedents which

the Court of Appeals fashioned herein compromises

away the essential safeguards which the Commerce

Clause erected against any state or local ‘‘action which

may fairly be“deemed to have the effect of impeding

the free flow of trade between States.”’ Freeman v.

Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252. Although we agree with, we

eee ee ee ee ees oe a

2 te da SO >

a SEs ee ee

shall not echo that analysis. Rather, we shall concen-

trate on the details of the Court of Appeals’ treatment

of the burden issue, for this will reveal at each step a

dilution of the very concept of ‘“‘burden on commerce’’,

If that Court’s approach to the Commerce Clause is

accepted, approval of not only the Chicago anti-phos-

phate ordinance, but of any restrictive local regulation

is inevitable, and it matters not whether the rubric

articulated is that the burden is only “‘slight’”’ (ef. Pet.

A-10, A-15),’ or is “‘indirect”’, or is overbalanced by

the importance of local interest involved (cf. Pike v.

Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142).

1. We begin with the most obvious point. The

Chicago ordinance absolutely forbids the sale of de-

tergent products that contain phosphates. A more

substantial interference with or burden on commerce

than its total prohibition is logically inconceivable;

yet the court below found ‘‘no merit’’ in the argument

that this embargo burdens interstate commerce, be-

cause the “‘ordinance does not require that detergents

be manufactured in Chicago or Illinois and does not

benefit manufacturers who are located there’’ (Pet.

A-12). But the view that the Commerce Clause pro-

tects interstate commerce only against discrimination

in favor of local interests is untenable. As Mr. Justice

Frankfurter explained in Freeman v. Hewit, supra:

“This limitation on State power, as the Morgan

cease [Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373] so well

illustrates, does not merely forbid a State to single

1**Pet.”’ refers to the Petition for Certiorari herein. The

opinions of the Court of Appeals and the District Court will be

referred to as Pet. A-1 et seq. and Pet. B-1 et seq., as reprinted

in the Petition.

It is immaterial that local commerce is subjected

to a similar encumbrance.’’ 329 U.S. at 252.

When this Court struck. down embargoes on liquor

and oleomargarine in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 and

Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, there was

not even a whisper about discrimination in the

‘ opinions.” ,To be sure, these are old cases, but this

reflects not a diminution of their authority, but the

common understanding that legislation of this char-

acter could not survive constitutional challenge. By

holding that a law which excludes from a state legiti-

mate articles of commerce* ‘raises only an issue of

substantive due process (Pet. A-12), the decision below

invites renowed local experimentation in restricting

that ‘‘free access to every market in the Nation’’ which

the Commerce Clause was adopted to ensure. Hood

v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539.

2. The court below disapproved the District Court’s

holding ‘‘that the ordinance burdened interstate

commerce by impairing the normal operation of com-

panies having interstate sales and requiring these com-

panies to create new, and less direct, shipping routes”’

* While two of the cases cited at Pet. A-12, n. 17 did involve dis-

crimination against outsiders, the most recent of those cases, Pike

v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, did not, and militates strongly

against the result reached below, see Pet. 15-16.

* Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, sustained a law which forbad

export to other States of ‘‘impure f. unfit for use’’, which were

for that reason ‘‘not the legitimate subject of trade or commerce

nor within the protection of the Commerce Clause of the Consti-

tution’’ (id. at 59-60).

(Pet. A-10). The Cou:t acknowledged ‘‘the fact that

Procter and Gamble’s plant in the Chicago area could

not adequately supply its six-state area with detergents

because the plant had to manufacture two lines of

detergent products and thus reduce its capacity

[so that] products had to be shipped to some of these

states from plants which happened to Le at dif-

ferent, and often further, locations” (id.). The

precedents which establish that commerce was thereby

burdened, were dismissed out of hand on the ground

that this case does not ‘‘involve interstate carriers’’

(id.). The petition for certiorari conclusively demon-

strates that the distinction between ‘‘a burden on inter-

state commerce”’ and “‘a ‘burden’ on a company which

happens to have interstate distribution facilities’ (id.

A-10-11), while verbally facile, is constitutionally un-

tenable. But for the opinion below it would never have

occurred to us that such a demonstration would ever

again be necessary, since this Court established in

Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1, 41-42,

that “‘{w]hen industries organize themselves on a

national seale, making their relation to interstate com-

merce the dominant factor in their activities,’’ they are

subject to regulation under the commerce power pre-

cisely to prevent ‘‘interferences with that eommerce’’.

before the passage of the ordinance can no longer be

used’? (Pet. A-11), this is not an unconstitutiozal

burden because it results from “the freely chosen

geographical locations of their various plants’’ rather

I eeeeneennnneiasssensSamnneeeemees eel

than from ‘‘the requirements of this ordinance’’ (id.).

While this reasoning successfully limits to its facts

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, it appears

tv run afoul even on its own factual assumptions of

Hood v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539-540, where a

similar argument was made by the State and rejected

by this Court. And the ‘‘freely chosen’’ argument is

utterly unrealistic: It assumes that if Procter and the

Soap and Detergent Association’s other members had

possessed sufficient foresight, detergent plants could

have been erected in a location in which the enactment

of the Chicago antiphosphate ordinance would not

have created substantial additional costs. Since that

assumption is totally unwarranted,‘ the court’s reason-

*The additional production and transportation costs shown on

this record arise of necessity if a plant is in a marketing area

surrounded by some jurisdictions which allow, and others which

forbid the use of phosphates. The variety of permissible detergent

formulations that existing laws prescribe only compounds these

problems. See Point 3, infra.

The record shows that the decison where to manufacture a

particular product depends on a variety of factors, only one

of which is the cost of transportation. On cross-examination

Procter’s Sales Manager was asked why a particular heavy-duty

laundry detergent, Dash, is made in Cincinnati. He explained

(R. 481):

‘‘In order to manufacture a particular product, it re-

quires that you buy, install and run a certain amount of

machinery, that you buy and store raw materials, that you

employ the use of a high—in some cases of a high produc-

tion detergent tower.

Now, these detergent production facilities have optimum

production rates; and when you turn them on, sometimes

they produce a rather large volume of whatever it is you

are making.

To turn them off immediately, when you have made a

small amount is a costly proposition.

So, when you have a tower, in this instance in Cincinnati,

in the Ivorydale plant, which can produce Dash in such

quantities that it is more economic to make it in Cincinnati

Sh tRNA IIRL SIR A IIE TASER OEE

7

ing must be rejected: ‘The commerce clause does not

involve an exercise in the logic of empty categories.”

Freeman v. Hewit, supra, 329 U.S. at 254. And even

if such a Shangri-La had been found, the companies’

exercise of that ‘free choice’? would inevitably have

resulted in additional costs if other jurisdictions en-

acted restrictive legislation.

But we need not belabor the point, for there clearly

is no merit in the court’s constitutional theory that as

long as there ‘‘is no impairment of the ultimate ability

to transport in interstate commerce in the most efficient

and economical manner possible” an ordinance which

‘‘might necessitate a change in certain production

facilities, * * * does not rise to the level of an un-

constitutional burden on interstate commerce”’ (Pet.

A-11). As Mr. Chief Justice Hughes wrote in Jones

& Laughlin, supra, 301 U.S. at 42:

‘And of what avail is it to protect the facility of

transportation, if interstate commerce is throttled

with respect to the commodities to be trans-

ported!”’

3. The court below reasoned that an unconstitutional

burden results only from actual, not potential, conflict

of legislation in different jurisdictions (Pet. A-11-12),

and further that the ‘“‘importance of uniformity is not

as great in the present type of case in terms of inter-

state commerce’? as it is in ‘‘cases involving interstate

carriers” (id. A-12). It was on these grounds that the

and have the trans-shipment costs to Chicago than it would

be to buy another expensive piece of equipment and dupli-

cate the Ivorydale facilty in Chicago, and run them both at

shorter intervals.

These complex factors change from brand to brand and

geography to geography, but essentially that is the reason.’

The loss of economies of scale is, of course, even more serious for

the smaller producers.

court below rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the

‘*rival, conflicting and angry regulations’’ of phos-

phates in detergents create an unconstitutional burden

on interstate commerce.’ While the immediate result

raises practical problems of the utmost gravity to the

Soap and Detergent Association and its members, the

adverse impact of the court’s holding is not limited to

the industry which happens to be the target of the or-

dinance at issue in this case.

We address ourselves first to the court’s statement

that conflicting laws affecting production and mer-

chandising are constitutionally more tolerable than con-

flicting regulations of transportation. This view

5 As the trial court found (Pet. B-3) :

‘*Similar ordinances have been adopted by various jurisdic-

tions, state and local, in widely separated areas of the United

States. As of September 1972, four small municipalities

neighboring Chicago, and also the unincorporated area of

Lake County, Illinois prohibit the sale of detergents con-

taining any phosphorous. Other neighboring jurisdictions,

including the states of Indiana and Michigan, limit the phos-

phorus content to 8.7%. Several municipalities have repealed

or delayed the effective date of their ordinances, and most of

the other municipalities surrounding Chicago have no restric-

tions on the sale or use of phosphate detergents.

Nationwide, a patchwork pattern of ordinances and laws has

grown up over the past three years ranging from complete pro-

hibition of phosphate detergents in Dade County, Florida, Erie

County (Buffalo), New York, and two additional states outside

of the Mid-West, and 8.7% limitation in many other localities,

and no controls elsewhere. These laws and ordinances have be-

come too numerous and diverse to summarize beyond the date

of the stipulation of the parties dated September 26, 1972.’’

This situation is constantly changing as States and their subordi-

nate jurisdictions consider varying forms of anti-phosphate regu-

lation. Bills which would forbid or limit the use of phosphate de-

tergents are presently pending in the legislatures of approximately

nine states and many subordinate jurisdictions.

ignores National Bellas Hess v. Department of

Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759-760, as well as Free-

man v. Hewit, supra, 329 U.S. at 256. And

insofar as it confines the holdings of Southern Pacific

vy. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S.

373, and Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520

to the transportation industry, the court suecumbed to

‘the danger in our system of law which has grown up

from concrete cases rather than from abstract reason-

ing, of using precedents as principles per se and not

as illustrations of principle.”’ Chafee, Progress of

the Law—Equitable Relief Against Torts, 34 Harv.

L. Rev. 388, 391 (1921). Here, the governing ‘‘prin-

ciple [is] that our economic unit is the Nation, which

alone has the gamut of powers necessary to control of

the economy, * * * [and] has as its corollary that the

states are not separable economic units.’’ Hood v.

DuMond, supra, 336 U.S. at 537-538. That ‘“‘uni-

formity”’ is as essential to prevent serious impedi-

ments to the free flow of commerce’? (Southern

Pacific, supra, 325 U.S. at 775) in the marketing of

products as it is in the operation of railroads and

trucks, would seem to be sufficiently obvious to

deserve judicial notice. In any event, this record

amply demonstrates that in the detergent industry laws

already enacted have diminished the economies of

seale afforded by an unobstructed national market,

since they require the production of chemically and

physically different formulations for each of several

kinds of cleaning products and the disruption of

established distribution patterns.

In support of the view that-only ‘‘actual conflict”’

is “‘relevant’’ the court below cited Huron Portland

10

Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448 (see Pet. a

n. 15). This Court there said:

|

re ‘And while the appellant argues that other local i

: governments might impose differing requirements ?

as to air pollution, it has pointed to none. The j

record contains nothing to suggest the existence ;

of any such competing or conflicting local regula- 4

tions.’” (emphasis added) |

_ For purposes of the present case, it is sufficient that the ;

. challenge laid down in the Detroit case has been met

- on this record. And in broader terms, the Court of

Appeals has sanctioned burdens on commerce which

have previously been deemed intolerable, for it dis-

.~ regarded the Detroit opinion’s reference to ‘‘com-

peting’’ regulations, and treated as a ‘‘conflict’’ only

the situation where obedience to one law would require

~ “violation’’ of another (see Pet. A-11):

=~ ‘*Tt is claimed that Milwaukee has an ordinance

that not only restricts phosphates, but also pro-

~ hibits highly alkaline detergents which have been

_ used as substitutes for phosphate detergents. But

~ there is no evidence in the record to prove that any

phosphate substitutes used by the appellees in

Chicago violate Milwaukee’s ordinance.’’

Yet, in Bibb, adherence to the mud-flap regulations

of different states was not legally forbidden, but rather :

occasioned serious ‘‘delay and inconvenience’’ (359

U.S. at 529); in Southern Pacific trains which satis-

fied Arizona’s size limits could lawfully have operated

in California and New Mexico, for those States did not

require minimum train sizes; and it was sufficient in

ational Bellas Hess that States other than Illinois

might subject business in a ‘‘virtual welter of compli-

cated _obligations’’ (386 U.S. 760).

[oot et er Peet

~

11

Additionally, the court’s reading of Detroit, that

‘potential’ disparity in legislation may be disregarded

in determining whether commerce is unconstitutionally

burdened is inconsistent with prior decisions,° as well

as the more recent National Bellas Hess case where, as

in Detroit, Mr. Justice Stewart wrote for this Court.’

4, The only burden theory in which the court below

found ‘‘some merit’’ (Pet. A-13) was that the Chicago

ordinance has an extraterritorial effect because ware-

houses which service retail grocery chains in Chicago

and its environs refused to stock both phosphate and

non-phosphate detergents of the same manufacturer.

This reduced Procter’s sales and of course withdrew

from potential purchasers outside Chicago a detergent

formula that may legally be sold and bought there.* The

® See e.g., Southern Pacific Arizona, supra, 325 U.S. at 775: (‘‘If

one state may regulate train lengths, so may all the others, and they

need not prescribe the same maximum limitation’’); Freeman v.

Hewit, supra, 329 U.S. at 256: (‘‘The immunities implicit in the

Commerce Clause and the potential taxing power of a State can

hardly be made to depend, in the world of practical affairs, on the

shifting incidence of the varying tax laws of the various States at a

particular moment.’’)

7 “<TT}f Illinois can impose such burdens, so can every other State,

and so, indeed, can every municipality, every school district, and

every other political subdivision throughout the Nation with power

to impose sales and use taxes. The many variations in rates of tax,

in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and recordkeeping

requirements could entangle National’s interstate business in a vir-

tual welter of complicated obiigations to local jurisdictions. . . .’’

386 U.S. at 759-760, emphasis added.

8 The District Court found:

‘*Modern-day detergents were developed and patented after

World War II by chemists who discovered that phosphates

when combined with other materials would clean better than

soap, particularly in hard water. Detergents contributed to

the development of the automatic washing machines and dish -

12

Court admitted that thereby ‘‘the free flow in commerce

of a particular product is disrupted,’’ which ‘‘must be

deemed a burden on interstate commerce’’ (id.). The

Court determined, however, that this burden is only

“‘slight’’ (id. A-15), the critical conclusion under its

‘‘ecompromise’’, see id. A-9.

The major prop of the Court’s discussion of the

extraterritoriality problem is its elaborate speculation

that warehousemen might ultimately choose to change

their present practice and to undertake to distribute

both phosphate and non-phosphate detergents of the

same manufacturer (Pet. A-14-15). It is even sug-

gested that petitioner Procter ‘‘and the other two large

detergent manufacturers are huge companies that could

exert at least some ‘leverage’ on these warehouses’’

(id. A-14). Even if these companies could lawfully

exercise in this manner the economic power thus casu-

ally attributed to them (but cf. Fortner Enterprises v.

United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502-504), the

washers, and the two complementary lines of products flour-

ished. * * *

The evidence is clear that a detergent made with phosphate

is a more effective cleaning agent than non-phosphate deter-

gents when used with Chicago’s water and is not at all harm-

ful to the persons using it or wearing clothes or eating from

utensils washed in it.’’ (Pet. B-6)

The Court of Appeals did not disturb these findings.

The industry has spent large sums to develop non-phosphate sub-

stitutes which will match the cleaning efficiency of phosphates.

The most promising substitute material is Nitrilotricetate (NTA)

(see R. 825). It was stipulated that: ‘‘Use of NTA has been held

up pursuant to the urging of the Surgeon General of the United

States, pending further investigation of its safety. Recently a

government commission has reiterated the request to withhold

NTA from the market pending further investigation.’’ (R. 197)

At the present time the Department of Health, Education and

Welfare is still studying NTA and has not given the industry

clearance to use it.

— eT ee

———

13

ordinance would still make it impossible for those

among their smaller competitors who can manage to

produce both phosphate and non-phosphate detergents

to market them in the Chicago area.’ We need not

pursue this point, however, for this Court long ago

held, in a unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes,

that the substantiality or insubstantiality of a burden

on enmmerce does not depend on the actions of third

persons over which the regulated party has no control:

‘These judgments must be taken as they read

upon their face. They are not conditional orders

to raise the bridge if the defendants can obtain the

consent of parties not before the court, and of one

authority, at least, not subject to its control. They

cannot be qualified by speculation as to what is

likely to happen in fact.” Kansas City Southern

Railway Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage District of

Wyandotte County, Kansas, 233 US. 75, 78.

Since the burden which the Chicago ordinance

imposes on interstate commerce in detergents cannot

be measured by wishing away the practices of the

grocery warehouse industry, the Court’s other endea-

vors to belittle the ordinance’s extraterritorial impact

ean be dealt with summarily. Two of those arguments

appear to be inconsistent with the Court’s general

approach to the burden issue. First, the Court relied

on the circumstance that there are “‘[o]ther jurisdic-

tions in the Chicago marketing zone [which] have

———

® We do not regard it as mere happenstance that the Court’s rea-

soning led it in a direction fraught with danger to competition in

the market for detergents. While it is inappropriate to do so in

a brief supporting a petition for certiorari, we propose to demon-

strate, if we have the opportunity to present a brief on the merits,

that local regulations restricting the sale of nativnally marketed

products have an inevitably adverse effect on competition far be-

yond the immediate locale of regulation.

14

limitations on phosphate detergents’”’ (Pet. A-13) ; yet,

the Court elsewhere said that uniformity of legislation

is of lesser importance with respect to production and

merchandising than with respect to transportation (id.

A-11-12, see pp. 8-9, supra). ‘Second, the Court pointed

to ‘‘the possibility that manufacturers might be able to

‘dropship’ directly from the plant to stores in some

areas [, although] this might not be the customary or

most economical procedure * * *’’ (id. A-13-14). What

now of the Court’s assurance that ‘‘[t]here is no im-

pairment of the ultimate ability to transport in inter-

state commerce in the most efficient and economical

manner possible’”’ (id. A-11) ?

The Court also. deemed it to be ‘‘important’’, albeit

‘not eterminative’’, that the burden of extraterritori-

ality ‘‘is one that was not intended by the City Coun-

cil’? (Pet. A-13).”° Whether and how much a law bur-

dens interstate commerce is an objective fact, ‘‘in the

world of practical affairs’? (Freeman v. Hewit, 329

U.S. at 256). This Court should make clear that

consideration of that issue is not to be confused by

injecting the foreign element of subjective intent.”

% This did not inhibit the City from attempting to support the

ordinance in the Court of Appeals ‘‘on the basis of this extra-

territorial coercion’’ (Pet. A-19, n. 23), an argument which the

Court properly rejected (id.). '

™In Freeman this Court struck down a tax imposed by a seller

State because ‘‘potential taxation by consumer States’”’ (id. at 257)

created an unconstitutional burden on commerce. No inquiry was

made whether the seller State intended that such multiple taxation

would result; presumably the seller State was either indifferent to

the consumer State’s policy or, more likely, preferred that the

consumer State impose no tax.

1 For the sake of clarity ‘we emphasize that the purpose of that

law—that is, the local policy it is enacted to promote—may, of

course, be considered in deciding whether that burden is unconstitu-

tional, though it cannot be decisive, e.g., Minnesota v. Barber, 136

U.S. 313, 319.

ae

CONCLUSION

The last innate has seen growing public concern

over the environmental effects of the public consump-

tion of otherwise wholly beneficial products, and legis-

lative bodies at every state and local level have re-

sponded. It is symptomatic of the force of this move-

ment, and might have bemused Carl Sandburg, that it

is the great city of Chicago which has here endeavored

‘to encourage a pastoral instead of an industrial

society.’ Freeman v. Hewit, supra, 329 US. at 252.

But this development, though wholesome and overdue,

is not without countervailing costs, and insofar as local

environmental regulations affect nationally produced

aiid marketed products, it inevitably jeopardizes the

‘material success that has come to inhabitants of the

states which make up this federal free trade unit” and

which ‘“‘has been the most impressive in the history of

commerce.’’ Hood v. DuMond, supra, 336 U.S. at 538.

Of course, Congress has power to reconcile these

' tensions between the national economy and local or

regional environmental interests. Unless and until

Congress acts, however, it is, as it historically has been,

the responsibility of the'courts and most particularly

this Court, to safeguard the values which the Commerce

Clause was adopted to promote. Because of the in-

creasing importance of the problem which this case

typifies, state and local legislative bodies require guid-

~ ance so that they may confine their environmental enact-

ments within constitutional bounds. And the lower

courts, too, need enlightenment ‘in dealing with what

was acknowledged below to be “‘a very difficult constitu-

tional problem” (Pet. A+20). The opinion below,

though conscientious, does not provide a constitution-

ally tenable answer, because, as we have sought to show

/

16

herein, in elaboration of the Petition, it departed from

this Court’s precedents in evaluating the burden which

the Chicago ordinance imposes on interstate commerce

in detergents. Above all, we submit that only constitu-

tional chaos can result if regulation and adjudication

are to proceed from the assumption that the production

and sale of goods in interstate commerce is less worthy

of protection from interference than transportation

(Pet. A-10; A-12)— a reading of the Commerce Clause

which last prevailed here in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,

298 U.S. 238.

For the reasons stated in the Petition and herein, the

Petition for Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ALAN 8S. Wanp

Baker, Hostetler, Frost

& Towers

1425 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

March, 1975 ;

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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