Brief Amicus Curiae — Procter & Gamble Co. v. Chicago (No. 74-1109)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Interest of the Soap and Detergent Association ...... 1
Argument—The Decision Below Sanctions Local Reg-
ulations Which Unconstitutionally Burden that
‘*Free Access to Every Market in the Nation’’
Which the Commerce Clause Was Adopted To En-
RS ch tkdo cvs deabvke bee ctedoudecus subesaes 2
PN oo 5s acon eek kbedaaenes atin ivowsie take 15
INDEX OF CITATIONS
CasEs:
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. 359 U.S. 520
SICAS A daa WES SckS CEDARS abe Ta bce tuhbe oes «p00 9,10
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) ....... 16
Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394
NE aiins ca suvechoundnedss eaobs nee 12
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946). .2, 3, 7,9, 11, 14, 15
Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) ....4,6,9,15
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 448
ESOT aU heise sdviettoons aes Codlyotese 10, 11
Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dis-
a OB FE pS a eee 13
Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1937) .. 5,7
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) .............. 4
Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890) ............ 14
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) ............ 3,9
National Bellas Hess Inc. v. Department of Revenue,
Se Pt ED Fa aw sdases eben ncadess 9,10, 11
Pike v. Bruch Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) ....3, 4,6
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898) .. 4
Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915) .............. 4
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)
9, 10, 11
U.S. Constrrvtion :
Cea SS ae 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 15, 16
MISCELLANEOUS:
Chafee, Progress of the Law—Equitable Relief Against
, Torts, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 388 (1921) .............
ee tee ote
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Ocroper TERM, 1974
No. 74-1109
THE ProcrerR AND GAMBLE CoMPANY AND
FMC Corporation, Petitioners,
v.
THe Ciry or Cuicaco, Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE FOR THE
SOAP AND DETERGENT ASSOCIATION
This brief amicus curiae is filed by the Soap and
Detergent Association (SDA) with the consent of the
parties, as provided for in Rule 42 of the Rules of this
Court.
INTEREST OF THE SOAP AND DETERGENT
ASSOCIATION
The Soap and Detergent Association is a national
trade organization representing the manufacturers of
SBE ee
over 90 percent of the soap and detergents pro-
duced in the United States each year and their sup-
pliers of raw material. Its more than 120 wembers
include both the large and small factors in the
industry.
It is these companies, most of which either utilize
or produce phosphates, which are the targets of the
ordinance challenged herein and it is these companies
whose operations in interstate commerce are shackled
by the patchwork pattern of regulation found by the
trial court and described at p. 8, n.5, infra. Petitioner
Procter & Gamble has demonstrated the constitution-
ally significant costs imposed on it by the Chicago or-
dinance. SDA files this brief amicus curiae in order
to put before the Court the additional insights avail-
able to it as the representative of both large companies
such as Procter and the smaller detergent manufac-
turers who are even less able to adapt their production
and transportation patterns, and even more financially
vulnerzble to restrictive legislation.
The Decision Below Sanctions Local Regulations Which Uncon-
stitutionally Burden That “Free Access to Every Market in
the Nation” Which the Commerce Clause Was Adopted To
Ensure.
The Petition for OCertiorari demonstrates that the
“‘eompromise’’ between this Court’s precedents which
the Court of Appeals fashioned herein compromises
away the essential safeguards which the Commerce
Clause erected against any state or local ‘‘action which
may fairly be“deemed to have the effect of impeding
the free flow of trade between States.”’ Freeman v.
Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252. Although we agree with, we
eee ee ee ee ees oe a
2 te da SO >
a SEs ee ee
shall not echo that analysis. Rather, we shall concen-
trate on the details of the Court of Appeals’ treatment
of the burden issue, for this will reveal at each step a
dilution of the very concept of ‘“‘burden on commerce’’,
If that Court’s approach to the Commerce Clause is
accepted, approval of not only the Chicago anti-phos-
phate ordinance, but of any restrictive local regulation
is inevitable, and it matters not whether the rubric
articulated is that the burden is only “‘slight’”’ (ef. Pet.
A-10, A-15),’ or is “‘indirect”’, or is overbalanced by
the importance of local interest involved (cf. Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142).
1. We begin with the most obvious point. The
Chicago ordinance absolutely forbids the sale of de-
tergent products that contain phosphates. A more
substantial interference with or burden on commerce
than its total prohibition is logically inconceivable;
yet the court below found ‘‘no merit’’ in the argument
that this embargo burdens interstate commerce, be-
cause the “‘ordinance does not require that detergents
be manufactured in Chicago or Illinois and does not
benefit manufacturers who are located there’’ (Pet.
A-12). But the view that the Commerce Clause pro-
tects interstate commerce only against discrimination
in favor of local interests is untenable. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter explained in Freeman v. Hewit, supra:
“This limitation on State power, as the Morgan
cease [Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373] so well
illustrates, does not merely forbid a State to single
1**Pet.”’ refers to the Petition for Certiorari herein. The
opinions of the Court of Appeals and the District Court will be
referred to as Pet. A-1 et seq. and Pet. B-1 et seq., as reprinted
in the Petition.
It is immaterial that local commerce is subjected
to a similar encumbrance.’’ 329 U.S. at 252.
When this Court struck. down embargoes on liquor
and oleomargarine in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 and
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, there was
not even a whisper about discrimination in the
‘ opinions.” ,To be sure, these are old cases, but this
reflects not a diminution of their authority, but the
common understanding that legislation of this char-
acter could not survive constitutional challenge. By
holding that a law which excludes from a state legiti-
mate articles of commerce* ‘raises only an issue of
substantive due process (Pet. A-12), the decision below
invites renowed local experimentation in restricting
that ‘‘free access to every market in the Nation’’ which
the Commerce Clause was adopted to ensure. Hood
v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539.
2. The court below disapproved the District Court’s
holding ‘‘that the ordinance burdened interstate
commerce by impairing the normal operation of com-
panies having interstate sales and requiring these com-
panies to create new, and less direct, shipping routes”’
* While two of the cases cited at Pet. A-12, n. 17 did involve dis-
crimination against outsiders, the most recent of those cases, Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, did not, and militates strongly
against the result reached below, see Pet. 15-16.
* Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, sustained a law which forbad
export to other States of ‘‘impure f. unfit for use’’, which were
for that reason ‘‘not the legitimate subject of trade or commerce
nor within the protection of the Commerce Clause of the Consti-
tution’’ (id. at 59-60).
(Pet. A-10). The Cou:t acknowledged ‘‘the fact that
Procter and Gamble’s plant in the Chicago area could
not adequately supply its six-state area with detergents
because the plant had to manufacture two lines of
detergent products and thus reduce its capacity
[so that] products had to be shipped to some of these
states from plants which happened to Le at dif-
ferent, and often further, locations” (id.). The
precedents which establish that commerce was thereby
burdened, were dismissed out of hand on the ground
that this case does not ‘‘involve interstate carriers’’
(id.). The petition for certiorari conclusively demon-
strates that the distinction between ‘‘a burden on inter-
state commerce”’ and “‘a ‘burden’ on a company which
happens to have interstate distribution facilities’ (id.
A-10-11), while verbally facile, is constitutionally un-
tenable. But for the opinion below it would never have
occurred to us that such a demonstration would ever
again be necessary, since this Court established in
Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1, 41-42,
that “‘{w]hen industries organize themselves on a
national seale, making their relation to interstate com-
merce the dominant factor in their activities,’’ they are
subject to regulation under the commerce power pre-
cisely to prevent ‘‘interferences with that eommerce’’.
before the passage of the ordinance can no longer be
used’? (Pet. A-11), this is not an unconstitutiozal
burden because it results from “the freely chosen
geographical locations of their various plants’’ rather
I eeeeneennnneiasssensSamnneeeemees eel
than from ‘‘the requirements of this ordinance’’ (id.).
While this reasoning successfully limits to its facts
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, it appears
tv run afoul even on its own factual assumptions of
Hood v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539-540, where a
similar argument was made by the State and rejected
by this Court. And the ‘‘freely chosen’’ argument is
utterly unrealistic: It assumes that if Procter and the
Soap and Detergent Association’s other members had
possessed sufficient foresight, detergent plants could
have been erected in a location in which the enactment
of the Chicago antiphosphate ordinance would not
have created substantial additional costs. Since that
assumption is totally unwarranted,‘ the court’s reason-
*The additional production and transportation costs shown on
this record arise of necessity if a plant is in a marketing area
surrounded by some jurisdictions which allow, and others which
forbid the use of phosphates. The variety of permissible detergent
formulations that existing laws prescribe only compounds these
problems. See Point 3, infra.
The record shows that the decison where to manufacture a
particular product depends on a variety of factors, only one
of which is the cost of transportation. On cross-examination
Procter’s Sales Manager was asked why a particular heavy-duty
laundry detergent, Dash, is made in Cincinnati. He explained
(R. 481):
‘‘In order to manufacture a particular product, it re-
quires that you buy, install and run a certain amount of
machinery, that you buy and store raw materials, that you
employ the use of a high—in some cases of a high produc-
tion detergent tower.
Now, these detergent production facilities have optimum
production rates; and when you turn them on, sometimes
they produce a rather large volume of whatever it is you
are making.
To turn them off immediately, when you have made a
small amount is a costly proposition.
So, when you have a tower, in this instance in Cincinnati,
in the Ivorydale plant, which can produce Dash in such
quantities that it is more economic to make it in Cincinnati
Sh tRNA IIRL SIR A IIE TASER OEE
7
ing must be rejected: ‘The commerce clause does not
involve an exercise in the logic of empty categories.”
Freeman v. Hewit, supra, 329 U.S. at 254. And even
if such a Shangri-La had been found, the companies’
exercise of that ‘free choice’? would inevitably have
resulted in additional costs if other jurisdictions en-
acted restrictive legislation.
But we need not belabor the point, for there clearly
is no merit in the court’s constitutional theory that as
long as there ‘‘is no impairment of the ultimate ability
to transport in interstate commerce in the most efficient
and economical manner possible” an ordinance which
‘‘might necessitate a change in certain production
facilities, * * * does not rise to the level of an un-
constitutional burden on interstate commerce”’ (Pet.
A-11). As Mr. Chief Justice Hughes wrote in Jones
& Laughlin, supra, 301 U.S. at 42:
‘And of what avail is it to protect the facility of
transportation, if interstate commerce is throttled
with respect to the commodities to be trans-
ported!”’
3. The court below reasoned that an unconstitutional
burden results only from actual, not potential, conflict
of legislation in different jurisdictions (Pet. A-11-12),
and further that the ‘“‘importance of uniformity is not
as great in the present type of case in terms of inter-
state commerce’? as it is in ‘‘cases involving interstate
carriers” (id. A-12). It was on these grounds that the
and have the trans-shipment costs to Chicago than it would
be to buy another expensive piece of equipment and dupli-
cate the Ivorydale facilty in Chicago, and run them both at
shorter intervals.
These complex factors change from brand to brand and
geography to geography, but essentially that is the reason.’
The loss of economies of scale is, of course, even more serious for
the smaller producers.
court below rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the
‘*rival, conflicting and angry regulations’’ of phos-
phates in detergents create an unconstitutional burden
on interstate commerce.’ While the immediate result
raises practical problems of the utmost gravity to the
Soap and Detergent Association and its members, the
adverse impact of the court’s holding is not limited to
the industry which happens to be the target of the or-
dinance at issue in this case.
We address ourselves first to the court’s statement
that conflicting laws affecting production and mer-
chandising are constitutionally more tolerable than con-
flicting regulations of transportation. This view
5 As the trial court found (Pet. B-3) :
‘*Similar ordinances have been adopted by various jurisdic-
tions, state and local, in widely separated areas of the United
States. As of September 1972, four small municipalities
neighboring Chicago, and also the unincorporated area of
Lake County, Illinois prohibit the sale of detergents con-
taining any phosphorous. Other neighboring jurisdictions,
including the states of Indiana and Michigan, limit the phos-
phorus content to 8.7%. Several municipalities have repealed
or delayed the effective date of their ordinances, and most of
the other municipalities surrounding Chicago have no restric-
tions on the sale or use of phosphate detergents.
Nationwide, a patchwork pattern of ordinances and laws has
grown up over the past three years ranging from complete pro-
hibition of phosphate detergents in Dade County, Florida, Erie
County (Buffalo), New York, and two additional states outside
of the Mid-West, and 8.7% limitation in many other localities,
and no controls elsewhere. These laws and ordinances have be-
come too numerous and diverse to summarize beyond the date
of the stipulation of the parties dated September 26, 1972.’’
This situation is constantly changing as States and their subordi-
nate jurisdictions consider varying forms of anti-phosphate regu-
lation. Bills which would forbid or limit the use of phosphate de-
tergents are presently pending in the legislatures of approximately
nine states and many subordinate jurisdictions.
ignores National Bellas Hess v. Department of
Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759-760, as well as Free-
man v. Hewit, supra, 329 U.S. at 256. And
insofar as it confines the holdings of Southern Pacific
vy. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S.
373, and Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520
to the transportation industry, the court suecumbed to
‘the danger in our system of law which has grown up
from concrete cases rather than from abstract reason-
ing, of using precedents as principles per se and not
as illustrations of principle.”’ Chafee, Progress of
the Law—Equitable Relief Against Torts, 34 Harv.
L. Rev. 388, 391 (1921). Here, the governing ‘‘prin-
ciple [is] that our economic unit is the Nation, which
alone has the gamut of powers necessary to control of
the economy, * * * [and] has as its corollary that the
states are not separable economic units.’’ Hood v.
DuMond, supra, 336 U.S. at 537-538. That ‘“‘uni-
formity”’ is as essential to prevent serious impedi-
ments to the free flow of commerce’? (Southern
Pacific, supra, 325 U.S. at 775) in the marketing of
products as it is in the operation of railroads and
trucks, would seem to be sufficiently obvious to
deserve judicial notice. In any event, this record
amply demonstrates that in the detergent industry laws
already enacted have diminished the economies of
seale afforded by an unobstructed national market,
since they require the production of chemically and
physically different formulations for each of several
kinds of cleaning products and the disruption of
established distribution patterns.
In support of the view that-only ‘‘actual conflict”’
is “‘relevant’’ the court below cited Huron Portland
10
Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448 (see Pet. a
n. 15). This Court there said:
|
re ‘And while the appellant argues that other local i
: governments might impose differing requirements ?
as to air pollution, it has pointed to none. The j
record contains nothing to suggest the existence ;
of any such competing or conflicting local regula- 4
tions.’” (emphasis added) |
_ For purposes of the present case, it is sufficient that the ;
. challenge laid down in the Detroit case has been met
- on this record. And in broader terms, the Court of
Appeals has sanctioned burdens on commerce which
have previously been deemed intolerable, for it dis-
.~ regarded the Detroit opinion’s reference to ‘‘com-
peting’’ regulations, and treated as a ‘‘conflict’’ only
the situation where obedience to one law would require
~ “violation’’ of another (see Pet. A-11):
=~ ‘*Tt is claimed that Milwaukee has an ordinance
that not only restricts phosphates, but also pro-
~ hibits highly alkaline detergents which have been
_ used as substitutes for phosphate detergents. But
~ there is no evidence in the record to prove that any
phosphate substitutes used by the appellees in
Chicago violate Milwaukee’s ordinance.’’
Yet, in Bibb, adherence to the mud-flap regulations
of different states was not legally forbidden, but rather :
occasioned serious ‘‘delay and inconvenience’’ (359
U.S. at 529); in Southern Pacific trains which satis-
fied Arizona’s size limits could lawfully have operated
in California and New Mexico, for those States did not
require minimum train sizes; and it was sufficient in
ational Bellas Hess that States other than Illinois
might subject business in a ‘‘virtual welter of compli-
cated _obligations’’ (386 U.S. 760).
[oot et er Peet
~
11
Additionally, the court’s reading of Detroit, that
‘potential’ disparity in legislation may be disregarded
in determining whether commerce is unconstitutionally
burdened is inconsistent with prior decisions,° as well
as the more recent National Bellas Hess case where, as
in Detroit, Mr. Justice Stewart wrote for this Court.’
4, The only burden theory in which the court below
found ‘‘some merit’’ (Pet. A-13) was that the Chicago
ordinance has an extraterritorial effect because ware-
houses which service retail grocery chains in Chicago
and its environs refused to stock both phosphate and
non-phosphate detergents of the same manufacturer.
This reduced Procter’s sales and of course withdrew
from potential purchasers outside Chicago a detergent
formula that may legally be sold and bought there.* The
® See e.g., Southern Pacific Arizona, supra, 325 U.S. at 775: (‘‘If
one state may regulate train lengths, so may all the others, and they
need not prescribe the same maximum limitation’’); Freeman v.
Hewit, supra, 329 U.S. at 256: (‘‘The immunities implicit in the
Commerce Clause and the potential taxing power of a State can
hardly be made to depend, in the world of practical affairs, on the
shifting incidence of the varying tax laws of the various States at a
particular moment.’’)
7 “<TT}f Illinois can impose such burdens, so can every other State,
and so, indeed, can every municipality, every school district, and
every other political subdivision throughout the Nation with power
to impose sales and use taxes. The many variations in rates of tax,
in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and recordkeeping
requirements could entangle National’s interstate business in a vir-
tual welter of complicated obiigations to local jurisdictions. . . .’’
386 U.S. at 759-760, emphasis added.
8 The District Court found:
‘*Modern-day detergents were developed and patented after
World War II by chemists who discovered that phosphates
when combined with other materials would clean better than
soap, particularly in hard water. Detergents contributed to
the development of the automatic washing machines and dish -
12
Court admitted that thereby ‘‘the free flow in commerce
of a particular product is disrupted,’’ which ‘‘must be
deemed a burden on interstate commerce’’ (id.). The
Court determined, however, that this burden is only
“‘slight’’ (id. A-15), the critical conclusion under its
‘‘ecompromise’’, see id. A-9.
The major prop of the Court’s discussion of the
extraterritoriality problem is its elaborate speculation
that warehousemen might ultimately choose to change
their present practice and to undertake to distribute
both phosphate and non-phosphate detergents of the
same manufacturer (Pet. A-14-15). It is even sug-
gested that petitioner Procter ‘‘and the other two large
detergent manufacturers are huge companies that could
exert at least some ‘leverage’ on these warehouses’’
(id. A-14). Even if these companies could lawfully
exercise in this manner the economic power thus casu-
ally attributed to them (but cf. Fortner Enterprises v.
United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502-504), the
washers, and the two complementary lines of products flour-
ished. * * *
The evidence is clear that a detergent made with phosphate
is a more effective cleaning agent than non-phosphate deter-
gents when used with Chicago’s water and is not at all harm-
ful to the persons using it or wearing clothes or eating from
utensils washed in it.’’ (Pet. B-6)
The Court of Appeals did not disturb these findings.
The industry has spent large sums to develop non-phosphate sub-
stitutes which will match the cleaning efficiency of phosphates.
The most promising substitute material is Nitrilotricetate (NTA)
(see R. 825). It was stipulated that: ‘‘Use of NTA has been held
up pursuant to the urging of the Surgeon General of the United
States, pending further investigation of its safety. Recently a
government commission has reiterated the request to withhold
NTA from the market pending further investigation.’’ (R. 197)
At the present time the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare is still studying NTA and has not given the industry
clearance to use it.
— eT ee
———
13
ordinance would still make it impossible for those
among their smaller competitors who can manage to
produce both phosphate and non-phosphate detergents
to market them in the Chicago area.’ We need not
pursue this point, however, for this Court long ago
held, in a unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes,
that the substantiality or insubstantiality of a burden
on enmmerce does not depend on the actions of third
persons over which the regulated party has no control:
‘These judgments must be taken as they read
upon their face. They are not conditional orders
to raise the bridge if the defendants can obtain the
consent of parties not before the court, and of one
authority, at least, not subject to its control. They
cannot be qualified by speculation as to what is
likely to happen in fact.” Kansas City Southern
Railway Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage District of
Wyandotte County, Kansas, 233 US. 75, 78.
Since the burden which the Chicago ordinance
imposes on interstate commerce in detergents cannot
be measured by wishing away the practices of the
grocery warehouse industry, the Court’s other endea-
vors to belittle the ordinance’s extraterritorial impact
ean be dealt with summarily. Two of those arguments
appear to be inconsistent with the Court’s general
approach to the burden issue. First, the Court relied
on the circumstance that there are “‘[o]ther jurisdic-
tions in the Chicago marketing zone [which] have
———
® We do not regard it as mere happenstance that the Court’s rea-
soning led it in a direction fraught with danger to competition in
the market for detergents. While it is inappropriate to do so in
a brief supporting a petition for certiorari, we propose to demon-
strate, if we have the opportunity to present a brief on the merits,
that local regulations restricting the sale of nativnally marketed
products have an inevitably adverse effect on competition far be-
yond the immediate locale of regulation.
14
limitations on phosphate detergents’”’ (Pet. A-13) ; yet,
the Court elsewhere said that uniformity of legislation
is of lesser importance with respect to production and
merchandising than with respect to transportation (id.
A-11-12, see pp. 8-9, supra). ‘Second, the Court pointed
to ‘‘the possibility that manufacturers might be able to
‘dropship’ directly from the plant to stores in some
areas [, although] this might not be the customary or
most economical procedure * * *’’ (id. A-13-14). What
now of the Court’s assurance that ‘‘[t]here is no im-
pairment of the ultimate ability to transport in inter-
state commerce in the most efficient and economical
manner possible’”’ (id. A-11) ?
The Court also. deemed it to be ‘‘important’’, albeit
‘not eterminative’’, that the burden of extraterritori-
ality ‘‘is one that was not intended by the City Coun-
cil’? (Pet. A-13).”° Whether and how much a law bur-
dens interstate commerce is an objective fact, ‘‘in the
world of practical affairs’? (Freeman v. Hewit, 329
U.S. at 256). This Court should make clear that
consideration of that issue is not to be confused by
injecting the foreign element of subjective intent.”
% This did not inhibit the City from attempting to support the
ordinance in the Court of Appeals ‘‘on the basis of this extra-
territorial coercion’’ (Pet. A-19, n. 23), an argument which the
Court properly rejected (id.). '
™In Freeman this Court struck down a tax imposed by a seller
State because ‘‘potential taxation by consumer States’”’ (id. at 257)
created an unconstitutional burden on commerce. No inquiry was
made whether the seller State intended that such multiple taxation
would result; presumably the seller State was either indifferent to
the consumer State’s policy or, more likely, preferred that the
consumer State impose no tax.
1 For the sake of clarity ‘we emphasize that the purpose of that
law—that is, the local policy it is enacted to promote—may, of
course, be considered in deciding whether that burden is unconstitu-
tional, though it cannot be decisive, e.g., Minnesota v. Barber, 136
U.S. 313, 319.
ae
CONCLUSION
The last innate has seen growing public concern
over the environmental effects of the public consump-
tion of otherwise wholly beneficial products, and legis-
lative bodies at every state and local level have re-
sponded. It is symptomatic of the force of this move-
ment, and might have bemused Carl Sandburg, that it
is the great city of Chicago which has here endeavored
‘to encourage a pastoral instead of an industrial
society.’ Freeman v. Hewit, supra, 329 US. at 252.
But this development, though wholesome and overdue,
is not without countervailing costs, and insofar as local
environmental regulations affect nationally produced
aiid marketed products, it inevitably jeopardizes the
‘material success that has come to inhabitants of the
states which make up this federal free trade unit” and
which ‘“‘has been the most impressive in the history of
commerce.’’ Hood v. DuMond, supra, 336 U.S. at 538.
Of course, Congress has power to reconcile these
' tensions between the national economy and local or
regional environmental interests. Unless and until
Congress acts, however, it is, as it historically has been,
the responsibility of the'courts and most particularly
this Court, to safeguard the values which the Commerce
Clause was adopted to promote. Because of the in-
creasing importance of the problem which this case
typifies, state and local legislative bodies require guid-
~ ance so that they may confine their environmental enact-
ments within constitutional bounds. And the lower
courts, too, need enlightenment ‘in dealing with what
was acknowledged below to be “‘a very difficult constitu-
tional problem” (Pet. A+20). The opinion below,
though conscientious, does not provide a constitution-
ally tenable answer, because, as we have sought to show
/
16
herein, in elaboration of the Petition, it departed from
this Court’s precedents in evaluating the burden which
the Chicago ordinance imposes on interstate commerce
in detergents. Above all, we submit that only constitu-
tional chaos can result if regulation and adjudication
are to proceed from the assumption that the production
and sale of goods in interstate commerce is less worthy
of protection from interference than transportation
(Pet. A-10; A-12)— a reading of the Commerce Clause
which last prevailed here in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238.
For the reasons stated in the Petition and herein, the
Petition for Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
ALAN 8S. Wanp
Baker, Hostetler, Frost
& Towers
1425 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
March, 1975 ;
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