Amicus Curiae Brief — Procter & Gamble Co. v. Chicago (No. 74-1109)
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INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE ........20ceeceecee8 2
GCumeENes PRMGRNTED 2. occas ccsesssiscvccacsccsoves 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..........2ccccccccccccccccs 3
Reason For GRANTING THE WRIT
Contrary to the Decisions of This Court, the Court
of Appeals Has Incorrectly Held That the Inter-
state Distribution of a Commodity Is Not Entitled
to the Same Degree of Protection From Local Leg-
islative Impediments to Its Free Flow as That Ac-
corded Interstate Carriers and Instrumentalities
ME ED niin boc bond cadiovusastsavanedabin sys 4
COMCEAIMIINT on ccc c ccc nseccccccnsasescescecoces pl
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, — U.S. —, 42 L.Ed.
Pi BRS co ickc wiuncb au tavns xidbabateear’ 4, 5,6
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) = 5
Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association v.
Clark, 482 F.2d 325 (Sth Cir. 1973) ............. 3
Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association v.
Lowery, 452 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1971) ............ 3
Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282,
TENOR ee TS ee ee LETT COTTE EEEEE 5
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824) ...........-.... 4
Hood € Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) ........ 6
Lemke v. Farmers Grain Company, 258 U.S. 50 (1922) 5
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,
Se BS SO AOE ode cbavintsedss téshvedee
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) ...... 5
Procter and Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, No. 73-1650
To A WO EE ROOT dp imac ipnbnias bonsbees 3,4
Procter and Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, No. 74=1109
Cae, eee same G, TRIO) avin coc vescavccescrts 4
Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1924) .... 5
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) .. 5
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OctosEeR TERM, 1974
No. 74-1109
THe PROCTER AND GAMBLE ComPANy and FMC
CorporATIon, Petitioners,
v.
Tue Crry or Cxicaco, Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE CHEMICAL
SPECIALTIES MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
=
On March 6, 1975, The Procter and Gamble Com-
pany and FMC Corporation petitioned this Court for a
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the above-captioned
ease. Also on March 6, 1975, the Chemical Specialties
2
Manufacturers Association received from respondent
City of Chicago its express consent to file this brief
as an amicus curiae pursuant to Rule 42 of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of the United States. Further, this
brief is lodged with the express consent of petitioners.
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association
(hereinafter ‘‘CSMA”’) is a nonprofit membership cor-
poration composed of approximately four hundred
manufacturers, suppliers, packagers, distributors and
marketers of chemical specialty products for house-
hold use. OSMA includes various divisions delineated
according to product groups, including the aerosol,
disinfectant, insecticide, waxes and polishes, detergent,
and transportation products divisions.
The instant proceeding is of particular concern to
CSMA’s member companies, as well as to all manu-
facturers and distributors of consumer and agricultural
commodities whose products are marketed in interstate
commerce. The free flow of consumer products in
interstate commerce is assured by the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution.’ However, in this case the decision
of the Court of Appeals incorrectly restricts the appli-
cation of the Commerce Clause to the means of trans-
port, leaving consumer products subject to such burdens
on movement as a state, county, or city may impose.
The increasing and disparate local regulation of prod-
uets and so-called pollutants has resulted in a patch-
work of inconsistent distribution and marketing re-
quirements for industry and businesses operating in
interstate commerce. No federal court has construed
1U.8. Consr. art. I, § 8.
3:
the Commerce Clause so narrowly as has the court
below. See, Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Asso-
ciation v. Lowery, 452 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1971) ; Chem-
ical Specialties Manufacturers Association v. Clark,
, 482 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1973). See also, National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753,
759 (1967). It is in pursuit of these concerns that
CSMA lodges this amicus brief in fe of the Peti-
tion for a Writ for Certiorari.
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Commerce Clause protects the inter-
state distribution of a common commodity from unrea-
sonable local restraints.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In overturning a district court injunction, the appel-
late court has held that the City of Chicago’s ordinance
barring the sale of phosphate detergents does not
impose an undue burden on interstate commerce and
that therefore the local ordinance is not constitutionally
_ proscribed. The district court, after hearing, foimd that
the ordinance unduly burdened interstate commerce by
interfering with the normal operation of ‘companies
selling consumer products in interstate commerce. The
appellate court simply disagreed, and incorrectly
limited the Commerce Clause protections to interstate
carriers and instrumentalities of transport. Slip Opin-
ion at 10, Procter and Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago,
No. 73-1650 (7th Cir., Jan..15, 1975). The Court of
Appeals did not disturb any of the findings of the dis-
trict court, nor did it find a lack of support in the ree-
ord for any findings. Rather, it fashioned a novel con-
clusion which strips the Commerce Clause of its vitality
/
4
and renders the interstate distribution of consumer pro-
ducts subject to the whimsical interference of every
government instrumentality in the United States. The
appellate court’s conclusion is flatly inconsistent with
the long series of decisions by this Court extending from
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824) through Allen-
berg Cotton Co. v: Pittman, — - US. —, 42 L.Ed. 2d
195 (1974).
REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
Contrary to the Decisions of This Court, the Court of Ap-
peals Has Incorrectly Held that the Interstate Distribution
of'a Commodity Is Not Entitled to the Same Degree of
Protection from ‘Local Legislative Impediments to Its
Free Flow as that Accorded Interstate Carriers and In-
' strumentalities of Trenspett.
The crux of the appellate court’s ruling is:
. we are not confronted with a situation in which
legislation has reduced the effectiveness of a means
of transportation itself. In this context the ordi-
nance is not a burden on interstate commerce, ‘but is
merely a ‘‘burden’’ on a company which happens
to have interstate distribution facilities.
* * *
There i is no impairment in the tiltimate ability to
transport in interstate commerce in the most
efficient and économical manner possible. [Slip
' Opinion at 10, Procter and Gamble Co. v. City of
Chicago, supra. }?
By holding that because an ekraraabillity of trans-
_ port is not involved, a burden on a company’s inter-
state distribution facilities is‘ not a burden on inter-
state commerce, the appellate court’s opinion is flatly
‘2 Also cited in Petitioners’ Brief for Certiorari at A-10, A-11,
‘Procter and Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, No. 74-1109 in S., filed
_— 6, 1975).
5
inconsistent with this Court’s application of the Com-
mane Mlease Is lemke 1 Romer Grain Somay;
258 U.S. 50 (1922), a local regulation was attacked by
interstate distributors because it interfered with their
method of purchasing, shipment and sale of grain in
the usual course of business. The commodity was sub-
ject to an elaborate local system of grading and inspec-
tion. This Court held that the state legislation unduly
burdened interstate commerce in its effect on the com-
plainant’s business. Accord, Dahnke-Walker Milling
Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 290-91 (1921); Shafer
v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1924).
This Court has consistently applied Commerce Clause
protections to strike down burdensome local impedi-
ments to commodities moving in interstate commerce.
In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970),
this Court struck down local regulation which forced
a commercial farmer to alter its interstate scheme of
packaging and processing of farm produce. And very
recently this Court reiterated that the Commerce
Clause protection from local interference extends to
any course of dealing in a commodity which traverses
‘‘a long interstate pipeline.”’ Allenberg Cotton Co. v.
Pittman, — U.S. —, 42 L.Ed.2d 195, 201 (1974).
In support of the proposition that Chicago’s ban on
phosphate detergents is not a burden on interstate
commerce because it does not constitute legislation
which reduces the effectiveness of a means of trans-
portation itself, the Court of Appeals noted Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), and
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
Neither Bibb nor Southern Pacific stands for the prop-
osition that interstate carriers and instrumentalities
6
of transport are entitled to a greater degree of Com-
merce Clause protection from locally enforced impedi-
ments than are common commodities which are the
subject of interstate distribution and marketing.
The scope and purpose of the Commerce Clause was
described by this Court in Hood d& Sons v. DuMond,
336 U.S. 525 (1949), and that philosophy was reiter-
ated this Term in Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman,
supra, 42 L.Ed. 2d at 205:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause,
is that every farmer and every craftsman shall be
encouraged to produce by the certainty that he
will have free access to every market in the Na-
tion, that no home embargoes will withhold his
exports, and no foreign state will by custom duties
or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every con-
sumer may look to the free competition from every
producing area in the Nation to protect him
from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of
the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this
Court which has given it reality.
The decision below eannot be reconciled with this
Court’s consistent view of the Commerce Clause and
its application to goods in interstate commerce. The
policy of free trade fostered by the Commerce Clause
has been compromised by the appellate court’s unjusti-
fiable distinction between instrumentalities on the one
hand which aid interstate transportation, and dis-
tribution facilities on the other which aid*the inter-
state flow of goods and products. Contrary to this
Court’s decisions, the Court of Appeals has virtually
insulated from future Commerce Clause challenges the
operation of singular local legislation which impedes
the free flow of consumer products commonly distrib-
uted in interstate commerce.
7
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition of The Proc-
ter and Gamble Company and FMC Corporation for
the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Rosert L. ACKERLY _
Cuar.es A. O’Connor, III
Jor G. HoLLiIncsworTH
1625 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Attorneys for the Chemical
Specialties Manufacturers
Association
Of Counsel:
SELLERS, CONNER & CUNEO
1625 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006 ¥
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