Appendix — Procter & Gamble Co. v. Chicago (No. 74-1109)

Supreme Court brief1974

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APPENDIX A

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOx THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 73-1650

Tue Procrer Anp GamB_Le Company, and FMC Corporation,

Plaintiff s-A ppellees,

v.

Tue Crry or CuHIcaco,

Defendant-Appellant.

Decipep January 15, 1975

Before Swycert, Chief Judge, Farrcutp and CummMtnes,

Circuit Judges.

Swycert, Chief Judge. This appeal presents the ques-

tion of whether an ordinance of the City of Chicago that

bans the use of detergents containing phosphates is un-

constitutional on the ground that it results in an imper-

missible interference with interstate commerce. This dis-

trict court decided that the ordinance is unconstitutional.’

We disagree.

The ordinance was adopted by the City Council after

its Committee on Environmental Control had held public

meetings for three days. The measure provided that the

* Soap and Detergent Ass’n v. Chicago, 357 F.Supp. 44 (N.D.

Ill. 1973).

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sale of detergents containing any phosphorous after

June 30, 1972 constituted a criminal offense.* Most de-

tergents sold in this country contain phosphates which

are compounds containing the element phosphorous.

The present action was brought seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief. Plaintiff-appellee Procter and Gamble

Company is a manufacturer of phosphate detergents.

Plaintiff-appellee FMC Corporation processes and manu-

factures sodium tripolyphosphate and other phosphate

products for use in detergents. Three other plaintiffs were

dismissed for failure to prove the jurisdictional amount

and have not appealed. The second amended complaint

alleged only a violation of the Commerce Clause of the

Constitution (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3) and the case

was tried on that issue.

A substantial amount of evidence, including exhaustive

expert scientific and technical testimony by many wit-

nesses, was presented both in court and by depositions.

As the district court observed, this evidence is much too

extensive to be set out in any detail. We think we need

present only a broad outline of the more relevant evidence.

The plaintiffs unquestionably showed that the ordinance

has had an adverse effect upon their businesses which

admittedly are national in scope. Procter and Gamble was

unable to sell any detergents in the Chicago area for five

months after June 30, 1972 and lost $4,700,000 in sales

as a result. FMC lost $500,000 worth of sales of phos-

2 Chicago, Ill., Code ech. 17, art. VII, §17-73(b) (1973) pro-

vides:

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to

sell, offer or expose for sale, give or furnish any synthetic

detergent or detergent containing any phosphorus, expressed

as elemental phosphorus, including synthetie detergents or de-

tergents manufactured for machine dishwashers, dairy equip-

ment, beverage equipment, food processing equipment and in-

dustrial cleaning equipment, within the City of Chicago from

and after June 30, 1972.

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phates as a result of the ordinance. Further, whereas be-

fore the ordinance Procter’s Chicago plant was able to

supply over 96 percent of the requirements for the six-

state ‘‘Chicago Plant Area,’’ after the ordinance became

effective the plant could supply only 51 percent, which

necessitated shipments to this area from other Procter

plants in Louisiana, Missouri, and Kansas. The result

was the establishment of a different and, from the com-

pany’s viewpoint, a less efficient interstate system of dis-

tribution of its products.

Evidence was also introduced concerning the warehovs-

ing practices of the retail grocery chains serving Chicago

and the surrounding area. These chains, which include

chains of independents, warehouse their products on an

area-wide basis as opposed to a city-wide basis. Goods

are purchased from the manufacturer and stored in ware-

houses for eventual distribution to the individual retail

stores. In the Chicago area, the same warehouses also

service stores in northern Illinois, northern Indiana,

southern Wisconsin, and Michigan. At the warehouses,

each product is stored in its own particular area called

a slot. There was testimony that these warehouses will not

‘double slot’’ a product and thus refused to carry both

phosphate and non-phosphate versions of the same prod-

uct. The explanation is that there is not sufficient space

in the warehouses and there would be the possibility of a

violation of the ordinance if phosphate formulas were

accidently shipped to Chicago stores. Of the seventeen

major Chicago area customers of Procter and Gamble,

fifteen chose to carry only non-phosphate detergents. The

result has been that consumers in areas of Illinois or the

other adjacent states where the sale of phosphate deter-

gents is legal can purchase only non-phosphate formulas

of the major detergents from stores which are part of

these fifteen chains. Thus, the Chicago ordinance affected

Procter and Gamble’s ability to sell its phosphate deter-

gents in other states.

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The bulk of the evidence dealt with the nature and effect

of phosphates and particularly their effect on the water

moving in the Illinois Waterway. Phosphates are not a

problem in and of themselves. They are not harmful to

most humans and are even added to water by some com-

munities for the purpose of softening. The aspect of

phosphates that causes concern is their nutritive contri-

bution to the eutrophication of rivers or lakes. Eutrophi-

eation is a process of aging, whereby a body of water

becomes over-nourished in nutrient elements such that

there occurs an extensive growth of green plants or nui-

sance algae. Nuisance algae can result in an unpleasant

ordor and a bad taste in drinking water. It is the elimi-

nation and prevention of these algae that is desirable.

Some controversy exists, however, concerning the rela-

tionship of phosphorous and eutrophication. An abundance

of phosphorous does not always result in increased eutro-

phication. It is a more complex process and its exact

nature is somewhat in dispute. Other nutrients including

nitrogen and carbon are needed for eutrophication. So

far as the nutrient aspect of eutrophication is concerned

the important inquiry centers on the idea of the ‘‘limiting

nutrient”’ or ‘‘limiting factor.’’ The ‘‘limiting nutrient’’

is that nutrient that is in the shortest supply relative to

the need for it for plant growth. It is the factor which

limits any further aquatic growth. The district court found

that phosphorous can be a ‘‘limiting factor’’ for nuisance

algae only at .02 milligrams per liter or less. There is some

evidence, however, that phosphorous is the nutrient that

is most easily controlled.

The ordinance’s most direct effect is on the Illinois

Waterway because the City’s sewage effluent flows into

it. This Waterway, which includes the Illinois River, is a

water source for some communities, but, not for Chicago.

The Waterway has a very high percentage of phosphorous.

The district court determined that before the passage of

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the ordinance the amount of phosphorous present in this

Waterway was at least twenty-five times as much as is

necessary to sustain nuisance algae. Still, there is a ques-

tion of whether there is any nuisance algae problem in

the Illinois River. Although the City introduced photo-

graphs showing the presence of such algae, the district

court concluded ‘‘that there was no significant amount

of nuisance algae in the Illinois River.’ Explanations

offered for this lack of growth included the excessive

turbidity of the river which prevents needed sunlight,

periodic flushing, and possibly some undefined trace ele-

ments which inhibit such growth. Also, the district court

found that the elimination of Chicago phosphates alone

would not result in reaching the ‘‘limiting factor’’ level,

though a 66 percent reduction did result in at least part

of the Waterway after the ordinance had been in effect.

Finally, there is the evidence concerning Lake Michigan

which is the source of Chicago’s water supply. The danger

of nuisance algae is more pronounced with regard to Lake

Michigan because it does not have the flushing quality of

a river. Moreover, the phosphorous concentration is at

about the ‘‘limiting factor’’ of .02 milligrams per liter.

But unlike some of the other communities along the lake,

Chicago’s sewage does not normally flow into the lake;

only during excessively heavy rainstorms is one of two

rivers reversed so that sewage flows into Lake Michigan.

The district court determined that such reversals occurred

only four times within a ten year period, though there

was also testimony that the frequency of such reversals is

increasing. As to the amount of phosphates entering the

lake during a year in which a back-flow resulted, the con-

clusion of the district court was that detergents contrib-

uted only 250 tons or about three percent of the total

entering the lake each year.

3357 F.Supp. at 49.

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Based on this evidence the trial court determined that

the phosphate ban was unconstitutional. It decided that

the ordinance resulted in increased costs of manufacture

and distribution and burdened interstate commerce. Once

the plaintiffs had proven this much the court held that

the City was then required to justify the ordinance by

showing some need to protect the public health, safety, or

welfare. Though it found that the ‘‘ordinance was enacted

in good faith and for laudatory objectives,’ the justifi-

cations offered for the ordinance were not sufficient to

outweigh its interference with interstate commerce. The

court held that the City did have the power to protect the

water quality for persons living downstream, but the ordi-

nance by itself would not have any beneficial effect on

the Illinois Waterway. The actual effect on Lake Michigan

was apparently considered too minimal to support the

legislation; the theory that the City could enact the ordi-

nance in order to influence other communities to stop

discharging phosphates into Lake Michigan was rejected.

Though the court conceded that such an ordinance might

be sustained in some other jurisdiction where the water

supply situation is different, it concluded that Chicago

could only enact the ordinance on a standby basis to be-

come effective only when other controls have brought the

phosphorous content of the Illinois Waterway down to

the ‘‘limiting level.’’

I

It is difficult to discern the precise test that should be

used to determine when a state or local legislative enact-

ment’s effect on an area of interstate commerce that has

not been preempted by Congressional legislation is viola-

tive of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. It is clear

that we must first decide whether there is such an effect

and what it is, for if we find no effect our inquiry need not

* 357 F.Supp. at 51.

/

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progress. However, if some effect is found then we must

proceed to consider whether the legislative body ‘‘has

acted within its province, and whether the means of regu-'

lation chosen are reasonably adapted to the end sought.’”

The more difficult question is whether our analysis should

encompass an additional step if the legislation is found

to be'a reasonable means of achieving a legitimate end.

The predominant test utilized by the Supreme Court ap-

pears to require that the burden imposed on interstate

commerce be balanced against the local benefit in order to

determine the ultimate question of constitutionality. See

Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959),

and Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).

The Court’s most recent formulation is that contained in

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970):

Where the statute regulates evenhandedly ‘to effectu-

ate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects

on interstate commerce are, only incidental, it will be

upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce

ad orvaiag excessive in relation to the putative local

nefits.

There is some support, though, for the proposition that

once it is determined that the legislation is a reasonable

means of achieving a nondiscriminatory, legitimate goal

it should be deemed constitutional and any further weigh-

ing process: need not occur. One commentator has sug-

gested that this ‘‘third stage’’ balancing process is un-

desirable because it can lead to the usurpation of the

legislative role.’ Moreover, it is argued that in fact the |

°S. C.. Highway Dep’t'v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190

(1938).

* Obviously, there is some degree’ of balancing involved in the

initial determination of whether the end sought is a legitimate local

concern.

7D. ENGpAHL, ConsTITUTIONAL Power: FEDERAL AND STATE IN

A NutsHe.. (1974). Engdahl’s theory is discussed in Note, Use of

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Supreme Court has perhaps eliminated this final balanc-

ing step by its opinion in Brotherhood of Locomotive

Firemen ¢ Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific

, Railroad Co., 393 U.S. 129 (1968). Brotherhood involved

the validity of the Arkansas ‘‘full-crew’’ laws for rail-

roads. The district court had analyzed conflicting evidence

,concerning the safety value of such laws and determined

that at best they provided for a small increment in safety

not worth the cost. This was found not to ontweigh the

burden on interstate commerce. In reversing, the Supreme

Court indicated that the analysis endorsed by the lower

court was incorrect:

We think it plain that in striking down the full-

, crew laws on this basis, the District Court indulged

in a legislative judgment wholly beyond its limited

authority to review state legislation under the Com-

merce Clause.’ . '

The matter was one properly left for the legislature be-

cause the evidence: ‘‘leaves little room for doubt that

the question of safety in the circumstances of this case

is essentially a matter of public policy, and public policy

can, under our consitutional system, be fixed only by the

people acting through their elected representatives.’”

The Brotherhood case has been relied upon in cases

similar to the one at bar. In discussing the Commerce

Clause implications of an environmental statute a state

court commented :

The language of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., supra,

does not mechanically compel a weighing process in

every case. The language is instructive in appropriate

‘eases rather than mandatory in ali cases... . The

the Commerce Clause to Invalidate Anti-Phosphate Legislation;

Will it Work?, 45 U. Coro. L. Rev. 487 (1974).

* 393 U.S. at 136.

* 353 US. at 138.

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United States Supreme Court recognized the inappro-

priateness of a weighing process in cases of non-

comparable benefit and injury ... in Firemen v. Chi-

cago, R.I. & P. R. Co... .”

Indeed, one court confronted with a challenge to the same

type of legislation before us adopted the Brotherhood

opinion as the controlling case."

Our case, we believe, has elements that require a com-

promise between Brotherhood and Pike. Like Brotherhood

there is conflicting evidence concerning the value of this

legislation. Here the conflict relates more to the question

of whether the ordinance will result in preventing nuisance

algae, as opposed to the question of how much benefit

there is from the removal or prevention of such algae.

The latter is the type of ‘‘public policy’’ question that is

directly addressed in Brotherhood. The district court did

not and should not have evaluated the benefits te be de-

rived from the improved water quality associated with

the elimination of nuisance algae. It was proper, however,

for the court to consider the ‘‘factual’’ question of whether

the ordinance has any relationship to the elimination of

nuisance algae. The question that we are faced with is

how much weight, if any, should be accorded the legis-

lative body’s determination that the means are reasonably

related to achieving the end. In the present case we think

that it is at this point that the Pike balancing stage occurs.

The district court addressed this issue as if it was an

ordinary factual dispute over a technical matter that should

be decided without the benefit of a presumption. It is our

view, however, that if the burden on interstate commerce

is slight, and the area of legislation is one that is prop-

erly of local concern, the means chosen to accomplish

*° American Can Co. v. Ore. Liquor Control Comm’n, 517 P.2d

691, 697 (Ore. App. 1974).

Soap and Detergent Ass’n y. Clark, 330 F.Supp. 1218 (S.D.

Fla. 1971).

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this end should be deemed reasonably effective unless the

party attacking the legislation demonstrates the contrary

by clear and convincing proof.’* If it is determined that

this presumption should be applied, no further balancing

need be undertaken. The end has already been deemed

legitimate and the burden on interstate commerce slight.

If the legislation is a reasonable means to that end it is

constitutional.

II

Having in mind the framework of our analysis, we begin

by considering what, if any, burden was imposed on inter-

state commerce by this ordinance. The first major argu-

ment raised by the plaintiffs, and apparently accepted

by the district court, is that the ordinance burdened inter-

state commerce by impairing the normal operation of

companies having interstate sales and requiring these

companies to create new, and less direct, shipping routes.

The argument is based on the fact that Procter and Gam-

ble’s plant in the Chicago area could not adequately supply

its six-state area with detergents because the plant had

to manufacture two lines of detergent products and thus

reduce its capacity. The result was that products had to

be shipped to some of these states from plants which

happened to be at different, and often further, locations.

The principal cases relied on to support this theory in-

volve interstate carriers whose ability to efficiently trans-

port other’s goods through particular states was perma-

nently impaired.** With our case, we are not confronted

with a situation in which legislation has reduced the effec-

tiveness of a means of transportation itself. In this con-

text the ordinance is not a burden on interstate commerce,

12 See also the suggestion for a somewhat different presumption

in Note, supra, n .7, at 493.

13 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) ;

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).

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but is merely a ‘‘burden”’ on a company which happens

to have interstate distribution facilities. The effect of

the ordinance is that the particular interstate systems

of distribution used by Procter and Gamble and other

detergent companies before the passage of the ordinance

can no longer be used. This is because of the freely chosen

geographical locations of their various plants, not because

of the requirements of this ordinance. There is no im-

pairment of the ultimate ability to transport in interstate

commerce in the most efficient and economical manner

possible. While this factor might necessitate a change in

certain production facilities, it does not rise to the level

of an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.”

Plaintiffs also argue that the ordinance is a burden on

interstate commerce because there is a ‘*potential for

conflicting legislation.’’ Other jurisdictions, including some

within the Chicago marketing area, have enacted phos-

phate detergent legislation, and it is urged that such

local legislation might conflict with each other so as to

inhibit the uniformity necessary for the national manu-

facture and distribution of detergents. It is claimed that

Milwaukee has an ordinance that not only restricts phos-

phates, but also prohibits highly alkaline detergents which

have been used as substitutes for phosphate detergents.

But there is no evidence in the record to prove that any

phosphate substitutes used by the appellees in Chicago

violate Milwaukee’s ordinance. The Supreme Court has

indicated that in a case involving environmental legisla-

tion it is actual conflict, not potential conflict, that is rele-

* A similar conelusion was reached in the analogous case of

Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Erie County, 327 N.Y.S8.2d 488, 491 (Sup.

C(t, 1971):

The primary burden which is placed upon the petitioner

Colgate involves nothing more than the changing of produc-

tion facilities at the point of origin, There is no interference

mandated by the County Law with transit across the state

lines, ...

Bitte enerencensmenenmnmnnen

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vant.* Moreover, once again the plaintiffs have drawn

the main support for their argument from the cases in-

volving interstate carriers. The importance of uniformity

‘3 not as great in the present type of case in terms of

interstate commerce. As Judge Stevens of this circuit

has stated:

[Wle think it certainly is true where you have a

carrier who necessarily goes from state to state carry-

ing the goods of third parties there is a higher inter-

est in uniformity throughout the nation, but with

respect to a commercial enterprise such as a manu-

facturer of detergents there is not the same national

interest in uniformity throughout the country.”

No burden has been shown based on this theory.

Another argument presented by plaintiffs is that the

ordinance burdens interstate commerce because it amounts

to an embargo on a safe, useful, and unique product of

commerce without any corresponding local benefit. We

find no merit to this argument. In essence, it is not a

Commerce Clause argument but one based on substantive

due process, an issue not before us. The only Commerce

Clause cases cited for this proposition involve situations

in which a state has attempted to achieve a local purpose

by discriminating against out-of-state producers or manu-

facturers.” There is no discrimination in this case. The

ordinance does not require that detergents be manufac-

tured in Chicago or Illinois and does not benefit manu-

facturers who are located there.

1° Turon Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448

(1960).

*® Soap and Detergent Ass’n v. Offutt, 3 ERC 1117, 1119 (S.D.

Ind. 1971).

17 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); West v.

Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) ; Minnesota v. Barber,

136 U.S. 313 (1890).

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There is one theory of plaintiffs, however, in which we

find some merit. This ordinance does have an extraterri-

torial effect because of the four-state warehouse market-

ing system employed by the major wholesale purchasers

of detergents. Since a substantial number of the retail

grocery stores within a 150 mile radius of Chicago are

supplied from seventeen grocery warehouses in or near

Chicago, the refusal of these warehouses to ‘‘double slot?’

detergents means that many people outside Chicago can-

not buy phosphate detergents even though they wish to

use them. Potential purchasers in other states are pre-

vented from obtaining a detergent formula that manu-

facturers may legally sell in those states. Though the ordi-

nance may not directly dictate such a result, one effect

is that the free flow in commerce of a particular product

is disrupted. Such a disruption must be deemed a burden

on interstate commerce.

Still, there is the question of how substantial is this

burden. It is important to realize that this burden is one

that was not intended by the City Council, even though

that factor is not determinative. The effect is an incidental

one due to the nature of the grocery warehouse system

over which the City Council has no control.

Moreover, all the potential purchasers of phosphate

detergents in this area outside Chicago are not affected

by the ordinance. Other jurisdictions in the Chicago mar-

keting zone also have limitations on phosphate detergents.

Purchasers in these areas are restricted by their own

local legislation. And in the areas without such legislation

phosphate detergents assumedly will be available at those

stores which are not part of these chains. Two of the

seventeen chains chose to carry phosphate formula deter-

gents, so such products will also be available at those

stores. While there might be people who cannot buy phos-

phate detergents in their own towns, the foregoing factors

tend to lessen the burden. Indeed, there is the possibility

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that manufacturers might be able to ‘‘drop-ship”’ directly

from the plant to stores in some areas. Although this

might not be the customary or most economical procedure,

Procter and Gamble distributes its products in this man-

ner for about one percent of its total business.

We are troubled by the contention that these large ware-

houses absolutely refuse to stock two formulas of the

same detergent. Procter and Gamble and the other two

large detergent manufacturers are huge companies that

could exert at least some ‘‘leverage’’ on these warehouses.

Admittedly, there is testimony that Procter and Gamble

has tried to convince them to handle both and has had

very limited success. But we wonder whether such lever-

age would not increase when this lawsuit is not a con-

sideration. One would think that the grocery chains would

have an incentive to carry both types of detergents in

order to compete with those stores selling what Procter

and Gamble claims is the ‘‘superior’’ detergent formula.

We are not totally persuaded by the grocery chains’

explanation of why only one type of detergent can be

stocked. The major reason presented is lack of space.

But it would seem that the total number of boxes of de-

tergents sold would be about the same whether two formu-

lations or only one are offered. The aggregate supply of

cartons kept in the warehouse would not increase unless

it is necessary to maintain the same amount of product

in stock even though less of it is being sold. It is not

clear from the record why more actual space in the ware-

house would be necessary if the same number of cartons

is separated into two types rather than one. Possibly,

the explanation is due to the limited availability of ware-

house slots which, in at least some warehouses, are metal

racks. But again the record does not show why the slots

that are used for detergents cannot be split into two

smaller slots that could accommodate the stock necessary

for each type of detergent, assuming the total number of

boxes in stock has not changed.

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Nor can we unquestionably accept the contention that

carrying both types of detergents would result in a great

risk of accidental shipments to and sale of phosphate

detergents by stores within Chicago in violation of the

ordinance. If this were the only concern we are sure that

some procedure could be arranged to minimize this possi-

bility. For instance, the cartons that contain boxes of

phosphate could be made a different color so they would

be easily distinguishable. Certainiy under such a proce-

dure the employees of the individual stores could recog-

nize a mistake and not sell the illegal detergent.

We recognize that the Chicago ordinance combined with

the grocery warehousing practice can result in interfering

with the full distribution of phosphate detergents to areas

outside of Chicago. But many of these consumers would

probably have access to such products either at other

stores or at chain stores that might receive drop-shipments.

Our analysis has indicated that if there was sufficient

demand it might even be possible that all the large ware-

houses would carry phosphate detergents. Overall, we con-

clude that the ordinance’s effect on full access to certain

products by consumers in parts of other states can only

be classified as a slight burden on interstate commerce.

II

Having determined that the ordinance does impose some

burden on interstate commerce, we are required to con-

sider whether the interest sought to be served by the

legislation is a legitimate local concern. As with most

cases of this type, the goal of this legislation can be stated

in its ultimate terms—protection of health and welfare.

For purposes of our analysis, we believe that it would

be more useful to express the objective simply as the pre-

vention and elimination of nuisance algae. This is an en-

vironmental objective toward which local legislation may

probably be aimed. In broad terms this legislation is part

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of the overall attack on the problem of water pollution.

Though there is federal intervention in this general area,

this does not prevent local attempts to deal with one

of our most immediate and difficult problems." As the

Supreme Court has said in regard to a city’s power to

enact legislation designed to curb pollution:

In the exercise of that power, the states and their

instrumentalities may act, in many areas of inter-

state commerce and maritime activities, concurrently

with the federal government.”

Indeed, Congress appears to have specifically encouraged

such local legislation.” The Federal Water Pollution Con-

trol Amendments of 1972 provide:

Except as expressly provided in this chapter, noth-

ing in this chapter shall (1) preclude or deny the

right of any State or political subdivision thereof or

interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any stand-

ard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants,

or (B) any requirements respecting control or abate-

ment of pollution.”

Moreover, as noted earlier, there are no discriminatory

aspects associated with this purpose that might invalidate

it. The objective is legitimately local and non-discrimina-

tory which means that it may properly be the end toward

which local legislation is addressed.

Finally, we see no problem in the fact that the ordi-

nance is aimed, at least in part, toward nuisance algae

18 There is no contention in this case that this particular area of

legislation has been preempted by Congressional action.

1° Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442

(1960).

2°The relevance of such Congressional encouragement has been

recognized in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 367-68 (1943).

21 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp. II, 1973).

A-17

downstream from Chicago. We agree with the conclusion

of the district court that the City can be legitimately

concerned with preventing any damage to its neighbors

caused by Chicago’s actions.

IV

We are now at the stage where we must determine

whether the ordinance is a reasonable means of reaching

the end desired. We have previously concluded that the

burden on interstate commerce that results from this ordi-

nance is slight and the objective of this legislation is

legitimate. We hold that the burden is so slight compared

to the important and properly local objective that the

presumption we discussed earlier should apply. We will

accept the City Council’s determination that this phos-

phate ban is a reasonable means of achieving the elimi-

nation and prevention of nuisance algae unless we find

that the plaintiffs have presented clear and convincing

proof to the contrary.”

We discuss first the Illinois Waterway because this is

the heart of the factual controversy. An initial consider-

ation is whether there is presently a nuisance algae prob-

lem in the Illinois River. The City did introduce some

testimony and photographs indicating the existence of

excessive algae blooms in the Illinois River. But the plain-

tiffs presented credible evidence to the effect that pres-

ently there is no nuisance algae growth in the Waterway.

The district court concluded that there was no ** signifi-

cant’’ growth. We can at least assume that there is some

*2 We note that even if it is a relevant consideration at this point,

there is not a reasonable and less burdensome alternative way to

eliminate phosphates from the sewage effluent. Elimination of phos-

phates by means of sewage treatment is too costly and requires too

great a waste of chemicals to be deemed a constitutionally mandated

alternative. See generally Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S.

349 (1951).

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nuisance algae and the possibility of more in the future,

since there was no convincing proof that such an increase

will not occur. The testimony that the excessive turbidity

and flushing quality of the river prevent algae blooms is

far from conclusive. Indeed there are apparently some

nuisance algae at present. The inhibitory factor might be

a nutrient other than phosphorous that will greatly in-

crease in concentration. The prospect for the future is

unknown.

The crux of the matter is actually the question of

whether the phosphorous level in the Waterway will ever

be relevant to the control or removal of nuisance algae.

We do not believe that the plaintiffs have met their burden

of showing convincingly that limiting the quantity of phos-

phorous can never be the key to the problem. Admittedly,

the evidence seems clear that phosphorous is not the

‘‘limiting factor’’ in the Waterway at this time. Moreover,

even with the elimination of detergent phosphates from

the Chicago sewage effluent, the phosphorous level would

not reach the limiting point. The Chicago ordinance, by

itself, would have no immediate effect on the Waterway.

This does not indicate, however, that the ordinance is

not a means of dealing with nuisance algae. The plaintiffs

introduced evidence to show that the amount of phosphor-

ous in the Illinois River could greatly increase without

increasing nuisance algae. Even if this is true, it only

proves that phosphorous is presently not the ‘‘limiting

nutrient.’’ It does not prove that phosphorous might not

be the ‘‘limiting nutrient’’ at some point in time. Indeed,

Chicago’s ordinance appears to be a significant first step

toward that goal. We do not agree with the district court

that it can only be enacted on a stand-by basis. If this

were the law, all programs aimed at eliminating phosphor-

ous from the Waterway would have to be enacted at the

same time. We can assume that other communities might

follow Chicago’s lead and prevent phosphate detergents.

Nor do we think that there was clear evidence that if all

A-19

phosphorous from detergents were eliminated there would

still be other uncontrollable sources that would keep the

level above the limiting point. There was testimony that

indicated that agricultural run-off of phosphorous can be

controlled. For Commerce Clause purposes the City Coun-

cil was justified in believing that eventually its phosphate

ban, in conjunction with other actions, would result in

eliminating and preventing nuisance algae in the Illinois

Waterway.

The effectiveness of the legislation is also shown, to

some extent, by the evidence concerning Lake Michigan.”

There is. no question that both eutrophication and phos-

phorous are serious problems in regard to Lake Michigan.

Though Chicago might contribute relatively little phos-

phorous to the lake, the phosphorous level is at such a

precarious point that even this minimal amount takes on

added importance. Further, contrary to the district courts

view, we find that Chicago has a legitimate interest in

banning phosphate detergents as an example for other

communities presently releasing their sewage into Lake

Michigan. Chicago is attempting to convince these com:

munities to control their phosphate discharge into the lake.

Chicago could reasonably decide that t would be aided in

this endeavor if it could show these other jurisdictions

that Chicago is willing to endure whatever hardships may

be associated with the loss of phosphate detergents. Given

the other aspects of the legislation that support its pre-

sumption of effectiveness, we need not reach the question

of whether this hortatory element by itself could support

* The City has argued in its brief that the ordinance also helps

Lake Michigan because it has the result of preventing other areas

from receiving phosphate detergents too, and thus these areas are

forced to control their discharge of phosphorous into the Lake. We

totally reject the contention that the effectiveness of the ordinance

ean be supported on the basis of this extraterritorial coercion. We

do not believe that the City Council considered this possibility and

we in no way rest our decision on this argument.

A-20

the conclusion that the ordinance provides a means suffi-

ciently effective to be declared constitutional. Based on all

the evidence the presumption afforded the City Council’s

judgment has not been overcome.

This case has presented a very difficult iilibleiiSiitas

problem. On the basis of the above analysis we have re-

solved the question in favor of the constitutionality of the

ordinance. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court

is reversed. .

B-1

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DISTRICT

Tue Soar ann Derercent Association, THe Procrer anp

GamsLe Company, FMC Corporation, Monsanto

Company, and Amway ‘Corporation, Plaintiff s,,

v.

| Tue Crry or Curcago, Defendant.

DECISION and ORDER

This case came on for trial on a declaratory action

brought by an association and four of its members en-

gaged in manufacturing detergents and phosphates. Plain-

tiffs seek to set aside an ordinance of the City of Chicago

which since June 30, 1972 has made it a criminal offense

to sell detergents containing phosphorus within the City.

Phosphorus is the element from which phosphates are

made and phosphates are a principal ingredient of most

detergents. Hence detergent products sold in Chicago must

now be made with substitutes for phosphates.

Plaintiffs Soap and Detergent Association, Monsanto

Company and Amway Corporation have failed to prove

the jurisdictional amount required by 28 U.S.C. § 1351,

and their complaints will be dismissed. The remaining

plaintiffs, The Procter and Gamble Company, a detergent

manufacturer, and FMC Corporation, a phosphate manu-

facturer, have proved that well in excess of $10,000 is

involved in their cases, and diversity is not contested.

/

B-2

The ordinance in question was adopted by the City

Council on October 14, 1970 upon the recommendation of

its Committee on Environmental Control which had held

public hearings on the matter for three days. The Com-

mittee did not make a written report and the City Council

made no findings or declarations of policy; so the specific

bases for the ordinance became known only in the course

of this litigation. The court ruled at the close of the plain-

tiffs’ case that ii had produced sufficient evidence to re-

quire the City to justify the ordinance.

We now find and conclude thgt the City failed to sustain

this burden, under the particular facts and circumstances

of this case, and that the two remaining plaintiffs are en-

titled to the declaratory and injunctive relief prayed for.

The evidence is largely technical and too voluminous to

_ summarize in detail, but the court finds the following con-

trolling facts have been proved.

' The ordinance provides in pertinent part as follows:

§17-7.3(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, firm,

or corporation to sell, offer or expose for sale, give

or furnish any synthetic detergent or detergent con-

taining any phosphorus, expressed as elemental phos-

phorus, including synthetic detergents or detergents

manufactured for machine dishwashers, dairy equip-

ment, beverage equipment, food processing equipment

and industrial cleaning equipment,, within the City

of Chicago from and after June 30, 1972.

§17-7.4 Penalties. Any person found guilty of vio-

lating, disobeying, omitting, neglecting, or refusing

to comply with, or resisting or opposing the enforce-

ment of any of the provisions of ‘this Article VII, ...

‘upon conviction thereof’ shall be punished by a fine

of not less than one hundred dollars ($100.) nor more

than $300.00 for the first offense, and not less than

$300.00 nor more than $500.00 for the second and each

subsequent offense, in any 180-day period, or shall be

punishable as a misdemeanor by incarceration in the

county jail for a term not to exceed six months under

procedures set forth in Section 1-2-1.1 of the Illinois

/

B-3

Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, par. nn ggy

as amended, or by both fine and imprisonment.

separate and distinct offense shall be regarded ag

committed each day on which such person shall con-

tinue or permit any such violation, or failure to com-

ply is permitted to exist after notification thereof.

Similar ordinances have been adopted by various juris-

dictions, state and local, in widely separated areas of the

United States. As of September 1972, four small munici-

palities neighboring Chicago, and-also the unincorporated

area of Lake County, Illinois prohibit the sale of deter-

gents containing any phosphorous. Other neighboring

jurisdictions, including the states of Indiana and Michi-

gan, limit the phosphorus content to 8.7 %o. Several mu-

nicipalities have repealed or delayed the effective date of

their ordinances, and most of the other municipalities sur-

rounding Chicago have no restrictions on the sale or use

of phosphate detergents.

Nationwide, a patchwork pattern of ordinances and laws

has grown up over the past three years ranging from com-

plete prohibition of phosphate detergents in Dade County,

Florida, Erie County (Buffalo), New York, and two addi-

tional states outside of the Mid-West, an 8.7% limitation

in many other localities, and no controls elsewhere. These

laws and ordinances have become too numerous and diverse

to summarize beyond the date of the stipulation of the

parties dated September 26, 1972. The task of complying

with and contesting this rash of legislation has required

considerable attention of the industry, one corporate offi-

cial testifying that he spends a day a week on the problem.

Members of the industry or its association have spent

several millions of dollars to develop a substitute for

phosphate in detergents, but none of these efforts have

yet been successful. Consequently, in many areas plaintiffs

have replaced all or most of the phosphorus content of

detergents with soda ash, a less effective and cheaper

component.

B-4

Plaintiffs contend that detergents containing phosphorus

are a useful and harmless product and that the City’s

ordinance unreasonably and unjustifiably interferes with

their normal distribution and sale of these products in

interstate commerce. The original complaints also alleged

unconstitutional discrimination and a violation of the

plaintiffs’ right to due process, among other things, but

on October 30, 1972 they filed a Second Amended Com-

plaint which was limited to an alleged violation of the

Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States

(Article I, Section 8, Clause 3). Plaintiffs seek a declara-

tion that the ordinance is unconstitutional and to enjoin

its enforcement.

The City contends that the ordinance is justified to pro-

tect the Illinois Waterway into which the Metropolitan

Sanitary District discharges the City’s sewage effluent

and also to protect the City’s water supply which comes

from Lake Michigan. It contends that phosphates unduly

accelerate the natural eutrophication of both of these

bodies of water and would be unreasonably expensive to

remove by sewage treatment. Since detergents contribute

approximately 50% of the phosphates in Chicago’s sewage

effluent, it asserts that it has the power and the right to

prohibit the introduction of this element into the system,

despite any interference that this may have on interstate

commerce. In short the City argues that the benefits result-

ing from the ordinance outweigh any disadvantage to the

plaintiffs or their customers, including housewives and

businesses using detergents. It is worth noting that none

of these groups nor any of the communities which depend

on the two bodies of water have sought to intervene in

this case.

The City does not contend that it has the right to pro-

hibit the sale of safe and useful products within its con-

fines, and plaintiffs do not contend that they have the

right to distribute and sell a product in interstate com-

B-5

merce which damages the public’s water. The principal

issues therefore are whether the ordinance does interfere

with the free flow of interstate commerce and, if so, whether

this is justified by the benefits realized by the ordinance.

The parties have offered their evidence in a commendably

thorough and forthright manner, so that the court has

been greatly assisted in deciding this case on a much

more complete record than was presented to the Commit-

tee on Environmental Control of the Chicago City Council.

There can be no doubt that local governments have the

right to enact laws for the protection of the public, even

to the extent of regulating or excluding certain undesir-

able activities from interstate commerce. For example, the

State of Florida can forbid the interstate shipment of

inedible or immature citrus fruit. in order to protect its

industry’s reputation. Sligh v. Kirkwood, Sheriff of Orange

County, Florida, 237 U.S. 52 (1915). Trucks over a certain

size and weight were held to be properly excluded by one

state in order to protect its highways. South Carolina

Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers, 303 U.S. 177

(1939). A smoke ordinance of the City of Detroit was

justified as a health measure even though it burdened

interstate navigation. Huron Portland Cement Company v.

City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). In these and similar

cases the local interests protected by the laws in question

were found to justify the reasonable exercise of local police

powers.

On the other hand, the State of Illinois cannot require

interstate trucks to use specially designed mudguards when

this is not reasonably necessary for the protection of its

citizens. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).

Arizona cannot require its melons to be packaged within

the state if this is primarily for the purpose of creating

a local enterprise. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137

(1970). And the State of New York, in order to protect

local economic interests, cannot refuse to issue a permit

B-6

for a plant to produce milk in New York to be shipped to

Boston. H. P. Hood é Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).

In all of the foregoing cases, the state and local laws were

held to be an impermissible interference with interstate

commerce because they were not shown to be sufficiently

necessary for the health, safety or welfare of the local

citizenry.

Modern-day detergents were developed and patented

after World War II by chemists who discovered that phos-

phates when combined with other materials would clean

better than soap, particularly in hard water. Detergents

contributed to the development of the automatic washing

machines and dishwashers, and the two complementary

lines of products flourished. Detergents soon outstripped

soap in volume and now contribute gross sales exceeding

$2,000,000,000 a year to the economy.

The evidence is clear that a detergent made with phos-

phate is a more effective cleaning agent than non-phosphate

detergents when used with Chicago’s water and is not at

all harmful to the persons using it or wearing clothes or

eating from utensils washed in it. In the form of phos-

phates, phosphorus constituted 12.3% of Procter and

Gamble’s leading detergent, Tide, and up to 25% of some

phosphate detergents, before the ordinance required a

reformulation. Phosphorus is a natural and benign element

appearing to a greater or lesser extent in all living or-

ganisms, including the human body.

Besides establishing beyond question that phosphate de-

tergents are not only safe but also beneficial to the users,

plaintiffs also proved that the prohibition of the sale of

these products in the City of Chicago seriously disrupted

the flow of interstate commerce. The normal distribution

system which developed for detergents is area-wide, not

city-wide. They are manufactured in plants located in

various cities in the Mid-West and then sold to major chain

stores and similar distributors. In the Chicago area these

B-7

purchasers store their products in warehouses and dis-

tribute them when needed to retail stores throughout

Northern Illinois and Indiana, and Southern Wisconsin

and Michigan. The proprietors of these warehouses, who

are customers of the plaintiff manufacturer, have ada-

mantly refused to carry two or three formulations for each

of the 275 varieties of detergents because this would double

or triple the number of ‘slots’? which would be required.

Furthermore they refuse to incur the risk of becoming

exposed to heavy fines by mistakenly delivering detergents

with phosphates to stores in Chicago. The undisputed evi-

dence is that 15 of the 17 major customers of Procter and

Gamble servicing Chicago and environs chose to carry only

non-phosphate detergents after June 30, 1972 and the two

which carry two formulations sell and distribute primarily

outside of the City.

The result is that the plaintiffs’ normal manufacturing

and distribution processes had to be drastically revised

because of the Chicago ordinance, Some of the plants which

had manufactured only one detergent formulation now

must be scheduled to manufacture two; other plants have

been devoted to manufacturing non-phosphate detergents

which had previously manufactured for a much larger area.

This requires obtaining raw materials from different

sources, shutting down the plants more frequently for

cleaning and change-over operations, changing shipping

patterns to accommodate the Chicago market, and many

other uneconomical makeshifts. The plaintiff Procter and

Gamble Company estimates that its shipping costs for raw

materials and finished products have been increased

$2,500,000 a year due to the changed production arrange-

ments required for the Chicago area. It did not sell any

detergents in the Chicago area for five months after

June 30, 1972 because it did not make a satisfactory non-

phosphate detergent, thereby losing approximately $4,-

700,000 in sales. It has completely withdrawn a tablet

detergent from the Chicago market because of inability

BS

to formulate it effectively without phosphate. Plaintiff

FMC Corporation has lost sales of phosphates amounting

to about $500,000 a year to its customers selling in the

Chicago area.

The court does not consider relevant whether it is more

profitable to manufacture the non-phosphate detergents;

the question is whether the plaintiffs have the right to

sell and ship a harmless product in interstate commerce.

The evidence of increased costs of manufacture and dis-

tribution, however, is relevant to show a burden on inter-

state commerce. It then becomes the task of the defendant

City to justify its ordinance by showing at least some

need to protect the public health, safety or welfare. This

need is not measurable in dollars and cents but can be

weighed equitably against the plaintiffs’ right to free trade.

E.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, supra.

The City’s justifications for the ordinance were of an

indirect nature, to the effect that excessive phosphates in

sewage cause undesirable changes in the Illinois Waterway

and in Lake Michigan. All of Chicago’s sewage is collected

and treated by the Metropolitan Sanitary District, an in-

dependent governmental entity. Most of this effluent is

then channelled into the Sanitary and Ship Canal which

enters the Des Plaines River at Lockport and then becomes

the Illinois River. Only a very small amount of phosphates

are removed by the Metropolitan Sanitary District and

none is removed intentionally except at one plant. Another

plant is under construction which will remove phosphate

from effluent discharged into the Fox River and thence

into the Illinois. Phosphates will be removed by that plant

in order to comply with the proposed regulation of the

Illinois Pollution Control Board, but the Metropolitan

Sanitary District has officially opposed any requirement

that it remove phosphates from sewage. Nor is there any

limit set by the Illinois Pollution Control Board on the

amount of phosphate which can be discharged into the

Illinois River.

B-9

Phosphate in water is not itself a pollutant. Some com-

munities add it to water in the purification process for

the purpose of softening. Excessive phosphates in the

sewage effluent, however, can cause nuisance algae to

flourish, resulting in a deterioration of the fish species,

an unpleasant odor from decaying algae, and a bad taste

in the water when used for drinking. The long-range effect

of nuisance algae is to accelerate natural eutrophication

and, by over-abundance; to ultimately destroy the value

of a body of water. This has happened in parts of Lake

Erie.

The weight of the evidence showed that there was no

significant amount of nuisance algae in the Illinois River

before the ordinance was passed and consequently that

the ordinance was not required for this objective. Neither

the State of Illinois nor the Federal government nor any

municipality or person along these rivers requested this

ordinance or testified in its support before the City Coun-

cil’s Committee or in this court. In fact scientists of the

State of Illinois and Missouri testified in the case at bar

that nuisance algae was no problem in the Illinois and

Mississippi Rivers, and no evidence was offered of algae

in the waterways above the Illinois River.

The reason for the lack of nuisance algae in the Illinois

and Mississippi Rivers is apparently attributable to such

causes as excessive turbidity, the periodic flushing of the

river by high water, and the presence of some undefined

trace elements which inhibit the growth of algae. More

to the point, however, is the fact that the Illinois and

Mississippi Rivers are so overloaded with phosphates that

the removal of phosphates from detergents can have no

effect on their plant or fish life. These rivers carry a

higher percentage of phosphates than any other river in

the United States, contributed by leaves and other natural

sources, agricultural fertilizers, industrial effluent, human

wastes and detergents. As a result the Illinois River at

B-10

Peoria contains at least 25 times as much phosphate as is

necessary to sustain nuisance algae, of which the Chicago

detergents contributed approximately 25%. The maximum

or ‘‘limiting’’ amount of phosphate which nuisance algae

can use is about .02 milligrams per liter; any amount above

this is surplus, having no effect on the growth of algae.

According to intensive samplings made by the Illinois

State Water Survey, the Illinois River at Peoria before

the Chicago ordinance became effective contained a mini-

mum of .5 milligrams of phosphate per liter and averaged

1.5 milligrams. After the ordinance went into effect, the

lowest phosphate count was .025 milligrams per liter and

the average was .5, still far above the limiting factor for

nuisance algae. Although these measurements were taken

some miles downstream from Lockport, the witness ex-

pressed the scientific opinion that 75 to 80% of Chicago’s

phosphates continue in the stream down to Peoria and

that the loss is more than regained by contributions added

by industry, sewage and other factors below Lockport.

Nonetheless he testified that there was no nuisance algae

in the Illinois River and that phosphates did not damage

or threaten its water. Even the defendant’s witnesses ad-

mitted that phosphates are not a limiting factor for nui-

sance algae at any place down to and including the Gulf

of Mexico, before or after the ordinance.

After the ordinance had been in effect for four months,

one of the plaintiffs’ witnesses took a quantity of water

from the Illinois River at two spots downstream from

Lockport and grew algae in it under laboratory conditions.

He found that the re-introduction of phosphates had no

discernible effect on the growth of algae in this particular

water but that the addition of nitrogen did. He concluded

that the elimination of phosphates from detergents had had

no effect on the growth of algae and was not justified for

this objective.

B-11

By the time of trial, the Chicago ordinance had been in

effect for almost six months, and an earlier provision of

the ordinance, reducing phosphorus in many detergents to

8.7%, had been in effect since February 1, 1971. The plain-

February 1, 1971, but it offered no evidence of anv change

nance had no effect.

The City of Chicago introduced a series of aerial photo-

graphs into evidence which purported to show algae growth

River where tributaries containing nuisance algae flowed

into the Illinois. The photographs therefore were not of

sufficient weight to establish a justification for the ordi-

nance.

the obligation, to prevent its activities from damaging its

neighbors. Cf. Sligh v. Kirkwood, Sheriff of Orange County,

Florida, 237 U.S. 52 at p. 60 (1915). Just as Chicago is

not privileged to dump raw sewage into the Illinois River,

so likewise it cannot lawfully dump other pollutants into

B-12

the waterways or air. This is not a jurisdictional problem,

it is a question of controlling nuisances, and the City un-

doubtedly has the power to do this.

On the other hand, the City cannot interfere with inter-

state commerce merely for hortatory purposes, to influence

other cities to refrain from discharging phosphates into

Lake Michigan. The concentration of phosphates in the

Lake is far lower than in the Illinois River, approximately

at the limiting amount of .02 milligrams per liter, and the

danger of nuisance algae is therefore much more real. The

Lake does not have the turbidity or flushiug antidotes

found in the rivers, and the excessive discharge of phos-

phates into the Lake can actually cause the bad results

which the City contends have occurred in the Illinois

Waterway.

The City has not shown that any appreciable amount of

sewage from Chicago gets into Lake Michigan, however.

The only places where Chicago sewage is known to enter

the Lake on occasion is from the Chicago River and the

Calumet River. Both of these rivers now flow away from

the Lake, and their reversal into the Lake is controlled by

locks. During excessively heavy rainstorms these two

rivers can be allowed to flow into the Lake as a safety

valve to relieve over-loading of the Metropolitan Sanitary

District facilities. However, this has only occurred from

the Chicago River on two occasions in the last ten years

and on two other occasions from the Calumet River during

the same decade. The amount of discharge into the Lake

is not accurately measured, but it has been relatively min-

imal, usually much less than 200,000,000 cubic feet on each

oceasion. The back-flow contains only about 45% of raw

sewage and a proportionately smaller amount of phos-

phate. The amount of phosphate actually discharged into

the Lake by these occasional back-flows is not contained

in any measurements made by the City or by the Metro-

politan Sanitary District, but we conclude from the evi-

B-13

dence that in the years of serious back-flows, detergents

contribute not more than 250 tons of the 15,000,000 pounds

of phosphates dumped into the Lake each year, approxi-

mately 3%. Thus this secondary justification for the or-

dinance is found to be insufficient.

We believe that the Chicago detergent ordinance was

enacted in good faith and for laudatory objectives, and

that a legislative enactment should not be interfered with

by the courts unless clearly required. Nevertheless we find

and conclude that Section 17-7.3(b) of the Chicago ordi-

nance, prohibiting the sale of detergents containing any

phosphorus, constitutes an unjustified interference with

interstate commerce and therefore violates Article I, See-

tion 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution. This

does not necessarily mean that similar ordinances in other

jurisdictions cannot be sustained, where the effects of dis-

charging phosphates into the public water supply may

outweigh the interference with interstate commerce. It is

also possible that area-wide legislation or regulation may

reduce the phosphate contributions into the Illinois Water-

way to a ievel where detergents should be controlled simi-

larly with other sources of phosphates, but this is not con-

templated even under the Federal Water Pollution Con-

trol Act until July 1, 1977 at the earliest. (P.L. 92-500,

Section 301(b)). Until plenary jurisdictions take action to

control all phosphates down to the limiting level so that

phosphates from detergents then might have some effect

on the Illinois Waterway, the City of Chicago should adopt

no more than a stand-by ordinance, to become effective

if and when this level is approached,

If Section 17-7.3(b) of the Municipal Code prohibiting

the sale of detergents containing any phosphorus is strick-

en, then Section 17-7.3(a) which limits sales of detergents

to those containing less than 8.7% phosphorus would

remain, theoretically. However, it is apparent that even

this lesser restriction has insufficient legal justification and

B-14

would have substantially the same effect on interstate

commerce as does the total ban. Furthermore the intent

of the City Council seems to have been to supersede the

8.7% requirement by the total ban, thus terminating the

former requirement by June 30, 1972. Thus Section 17-

7.3(a) also fails, both as a matter of statutory construction

and as a matter of constitutional law, and with these two

sections void, the entire ordinance, including the labelling °

and enforcement provisions, are of no effect.

The court reserved ruling on some of the documents

offered during trial and in depositions. The objections to

plaintiffs’ exhibits 13 and 14 are sustained. The objections

to defendant’s exhibits 6, 39, 42, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54 and 55

are sustained. The objections to defendant’s exhibits 26,

27, 28 and 29 are overruled. 28 U.S.C. § 1733.

Plaintiffs are ordered to submit a final judgment order,

agreed to in form, in accordance with the foregoing find-

ings and conclusions to be presented in open court on

March 9, 1973 at 10 a.m. At that time the parties may

bring up any other matters which they consider necessary

for the final disposition of this case.

C-1

APPENDIX C

STATUTES INVOLVED |

City of Chicago Gude 17-7.1—7.4 (1973)

Section 17-7.1. Definitions. (a) The term ‘*synthetic de-

tergent’’ or “‘detergent’’ means any cleaning compound

which is available for household use, laundry use, other

personal uses or industrial use, which is composed of or-

ganic and inorganic compounds, including soaps, water

softeners, surface active agents, dispersing agents, foam-

ing agents, buffering agents, builders, fillers, dyes, en-

zymes and fabric softeners, whether in the form of crystals,

powders, flakes, bars, liquids, sprays, or any other form.

(b) The term ‘polyphosphate builder’? or « phos-

‘phorus’ means a water softening and soil suspending agent

made from condensed phosphates, including pyrophos-

phates, triphosphates, tripolyphosphates, metaphosphates

and glassy phosphates, used as a detergent ingredient, but

shall not include “‘polyphosphate builders’’ or ‘*phos-

phorus’’ which is essential for medical, scientific or special

engineering use under such conditions and regulations as

may be prescribed, after hearing, by the Commissioner of

Environmental Control.

(c) The term “‘recommended use level?’ means the

amount of synthetic detergent or detérgent which the man-

ufacturer thereof recommends for use per wash load, at

which level said synthetic detergent or detergent will ef-

fectively perform its intended function.

(d) The term ‘‘machine dishwasher’’ means equipment

manufactured for the purpose of cleaning dishes, glass-

ware and other utensils involved in food preparation, con-

sumption or use, using a combination of water agitation

and high temperatures,

(e) The terms ‘dairy equipment,’’ “beverage equip-

ment’’ and ‘‘food processing equipment’? mean that equip-

C2

ment used in the production of milk and dairy products,

foods and beverages, including the processing, prepara-

tion or packaging thereof for consumption.

_ (f) The term ‘¢industrial cleaning equipment’’ means

machinery and cther tools used in cleaning processes dur-

ing the course’ of industrial manufacturing, production and

assembly.

Section 17-7.2. Labeling. It shall be unlawful for any

person, firm or corporation to sell, offer or expose for sale,

give’ or furnish any synthetic detergent or detergent,

whether in the form of crystals, powders, flakes, bars,

liquid, sprays, or any other form, in the City of Chicago

from and after February 1, 1971, unless the container,

wrapper or other packaging thereof shall be clearly labeled

with respect to its polyphosphate builder or phosphorus

ingredient content clearly and legibly set forth thereon in

terms of percentage of phosphorus by weight, expressed

as elemental phosphorus per container, wrapper or other

packaging thereof, as well as grams of phosphorus, ex-

pressed as elemental phosphorus, per recommended use

level.

Section 17-7.3. Limitations. (a) It shall be unlawful for

any person, firm or corporation to sell, offer or expose for

sale, give or furnish any synthetic detergent or detergent

containing more than eight and seven/tenths percent

(8.7%) of phosphorus by weight, expressed as elemental

phosphorus, within the City of Chicago from and after

February 1, 1971. It shall also be unlawful for any person,

: firm ‘or corporation to sell, offer or expose for sale, give or

furnish any synthetic detergent or detergent which requires

a recommended use level of said synthetic detergent or de-

tergent which contains more than seven grams (7 gms.) of

phosphoras by weight éxpressed as elemental phosphorus,

within the City of Chicago from and after February 1,

1971. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this

C-3

Section 17-7.3(a), synthetic detergents or detergents man-

ufactured for use in machine dishwashers, dairy equip-

ment, beverage equipment, food processing equipment and

industrial cleaning equipment shall not be subject to the

limitations herein set forth, but are hereby made expressly

subject to the provisions of Section 17-7.3(b).

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corpo-

ration to sell, offer or expose for sale, give or furnish any

synthetic detergent or detergent containing any phos-

phorus, expressed as elemental phosphorus, including syn-

thetic detergents or ietergents manufactured for machine

dishwashers, dairy equipment, beverage equipment, food

processing equipment and industrial cleaning equipment,

within the City of Chicago from and after June 30, 1972.

(c) The concentration of phosphorus by weight, ex-

pressed as elemental phosphorus in any synthetic deter-

gent or detergent shall be determined by the current ap-

plicable method prescribed by the American Society for

Testing and Materials (A.S.T.M.).

Section 17-7.4. Penalties. Any person found guilty of

violating, disobeying, omitting, neglecting, or refusing to

comply with, or resisting or opposing the enforcement of

any of the provisions of this Article VII, except when

otherwise specifically provided, upon conviction thereof

shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred

dollars ($100.) nor more than $300.00 for the first offense,

and not less than $300.00 nor more than $500.00 for the

second and each subsequent offense, in any 180-day period,

or shall be punishable as a misdemeanor by incarceration

in the county jail for a term not to exceed six months

under procedures set forth in Section 1-2-1.1 of the Illinois

Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, par. 1-2-1.1)

as amended, or by both fine and imprisonment. A separate

and distinct offense shall be regarded as committed each

day on which such person shall continue or permit any

C4

such violation, or failure to comply is permitted to exist

after notification thereof.

Article L section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States.

Section 8. The Congress shall have Power

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and

among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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