Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — DELTA AIR LINES, INC. v. V. MCDONNELL (Nos. 74-1138, 74-1175)

Supreme Court brief1974

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Text

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF.CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES\COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT cccccccccscsssscssssscccccsescccscce

OPINIONS BELOW o.....ssso0e- en a nl ?

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 8 icccccsssccssccsccsrssnsccoonsoceees 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THIWRIT ooo 5

1. THE COURTS BELOW HAVE MISCONCEIVED THE

EFFECT OF UPHOLDING THE EXCULPATORY

CLAUSE UPON THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND IN

SO DOING HAVE UNDERMINED THE FEDERAL

REGULATION OF AIRCRAFT SAFETY ................ 5

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. THE COURTS BELOW INCORRECTLY REFUSED

TO FOLLOW THE LAW OF CALIFORNIA WHICH,

CONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL LAW, RE-

QUIRES A HOLDING THAT THES EXCULPATORY

CLAUSE IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY AND

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APPENDIX :

Statutory Provisions :

~~

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Section 601.

49 U.S.C. §1421

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Section 603,

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Order and Opinion of the United States District

Court dated October 30, 1972 oo...

Order of United States District Court dated

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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit dated October 31, 1974

Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit dated October 31, 1974

Order of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit Denying Rehearing dated

December 17, 1974

Letter of the Federal Aviation Administration

dated April 24, 1969

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955) .... 7,9

Buckner v. Azulai, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967)

Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft

Company, Inc., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47

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Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cont'd)

Page

Halliday v. Greene, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1966) ...0 11

Hanna v. Lederman, 36 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1963) 00.0... 10

Northwest Airlines, Inc. vy. Alaska Airlines,

RE 5 Pe eek BOO CHU Gils FED teiserasecticscnsveranseses 7,9

Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Calif.,

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STATUTES

California Civil Code 81668 (West 1972) oo... 3.6

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Section 601.

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Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Section 603.

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Federal Aviation Regulations §21.165,

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OTHER AUTHORITIES

Restatement of Contracts 9

POU eee ETO COCO OCC S COO T eee eee ee eee eee rere eee

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

No.

DELTA AIR LINES, INC..,

\ Petitioner,

v.

McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION,

Respondent.

- PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner, Delta Air Lines, Inc. (Delta), respectfully

requests that a writ of certiorari issue to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to review the opinion and

judgment entered in this case on October 31, 1974, rehearing of

which was denied on December 17, 1974. The case involves

important questions as to the effect of the violation of Federal

Aviation Regulations by manufacturers of large commercial

aircraft and calls for the application of this court’s supervisory

power to correct a grossly incorrect decision by the Fifth

Circuit. The decision of the Fifth Circuit constitutes a clear

failure to follow the applicable law and will result in the

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the manufacture of aircraft, contrary to principles recognized by

this Court and another Court of Appeals. Unless corrected by

this Court, the decision could lead to a decrease in the safety

standards of large aircraft manufacturers and a lower regard for

the safety regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA).

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, 503 F.2d 239 (Sth

Cir. 1974), is set out in the Appendix, as is the opinion of the

United States District Court for the Northern District of

Georgia, 350 F.Supp. 738 (USDC ND Ga. 1972).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

October 31, 1974, and a timely petition for rehearing was

denied on December 17, 1974. This petition for certiorari is

filed within ninety (90) days of that date. The jurisdiction of

this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether an exculpatory clause which relieves a federally

regulated manufacturer of aircraft from the consequences of

violating a federal regulation requiring the safe manufacture of

aircraft is void as being contrary to public policy.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. Sections 601 and 603 of the Federal Aviation Act of

1958, 49 U.S.C. § §1421, 1423 are set out in the Appendix.

2. Section 21.165 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, 14

CFR §21.165, provides as follows:

“21.165. Responsibility of holder.

The holder of a production certificate shall

(a) Maintain the quality control system with the data

and procedures approved for the production certificate; and,

(b) Determine that each aircraft submitted for air-

worthiness certification or approval conforms to the type

design and is in a condition for safe operation.”

2

provides as follows:

a

“§ 1668. Contracts contrary to policy of law

CERTAIN CONTRACTS UNLAWFUL. All contracts which

have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone

from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the

person or property of another, or violation of law, whether

willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises out of the collapse of the nose gear of a

new “stretched” DC-8 aircraft in January of 1969, some two

weeks after it had been delivered by McDonnell Douglas

Corporation (MDC) to Delta pursuant to a purchase agreement

between the parties. (At the time the stretched DC-8 was the

largest passenger-carrying aircraft in the world.) The collapse

occurred when a regularly scheduled passenger flight was

landing in Jacksonville, Florida. Fortunately, there were no

injuries to passengers or the crew, but the nose and nose gear

portions of the aircraft were substantially damaged.

After investigation Delta advised MDC that the collapse

had resulted from the negligence of MDC and later requested

MDC to reimburse it for damages sustained by Delta in the

amount of approximately $203,000. The FAA also concluded

that MDC had been at fault and that MDC had violated Section

21.165(b) of the Federal Aviation Regulations by failing to

determine that the aircraft was in a condition for safe

operation. (A copy of the FAA’s letter in this regard is included

in the appendix.)

MDC nevertheless refused to honor Delta’s request for

reimbursement and contended that it had no liability under the

exculpatory clause of the purchase agreement. That clause

provides that MDC’s liability is limited to its express warranty

obligations and that MDC is not responsible for any other

liabilities, even if occasioned from its own negligence.' MDC

further denied that it had any obligation under the express

warranty.

Subsequently, Delta initiated this action against MDC in

the United States District Court for the Northern District of

Georgia. Jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship

and amount in controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. MDC filed

a motion for summary judgment based upon the exculpatory

clause and the motion was overruled. The parties then agreed to

a limited non-jury trial upon the issue of the effect of the

exculpatory clause upon the various theories of recovery set out

in Delta - complaint.

Following this trial the District Court entered a judgment

dismissing Delta’s claim insofar as it was based upon negligence

and strict liability in tort on the basis that the exculpatory

clause was broad enough to cover both of these theories and

that the exculpatory clause did not violate public policy,

despite the fact that it relieved MDC of the consequences of

violating a federal aviation regulation; despite the California

statute which specifically declares that any contract relieving a

person from responsibility for a willful or negligent violation of

1 The entire clause reads as follows: “(G) The warranty provided in

this article and the obligations and liabilities of Seller thereunder are in

lieu of and Buyer hereby waives all other warranties, guarantees or

liabilities, express or implied arising by law or otherwise (including

without limitation any obligation of Seller with respect to consequential

damages) and whether or not occasioned by Seller’s negligence and shall

not be extended, altered or varied except by a written instrument signed

by Seller and Buyer, provided that in the event the provision relieving

Seller from liability for its negligence should for any reason be ineffective,

the remainder of this paragraph (G) shall remain in full force and effect.”

4

law is against public policy;' despite a clearly correct decision

by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reaching a contrary

result, and despite a clearly correct decision by the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals reaching a contrary result, and

despite a decision of this Court recognizing that one of the main

purposes of the rule preventing enforcement of release-from-

negligence contracts is to discourage negligence by making the

wreng-doer pay damagers. The District Court concluded,

however, that there was substantial ground for difference of

opinion and authorized an immediate appeal. Delta prosecuted

an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). The

Court of Appeals affirmed.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The Courts Below Have Misconceived the Effect of

Upholding the Exculpatory Clause Upon the Public In-

terest and in So Doing Have Undermined the Federal

Regulation of Aircraft Safety.

MDC has contended, and the courts below have agreed,

that the only thing involved in this case is whether two large

corporations may agree to allocate the economic risks associ-

ated with defects in manufacturing even though the defects

result from the manufacturer’s negligence and even though the

manufacturer violates federal safety regulations by its negli-

gence. It also has been maintained by MDC that Delta could

have paid more for the aircraft and secured the removal of the

exculpatory clause. Although Delta’s witnesses testified that it

was not possible to negotiate the clause out of the contract, this

is not the point raised by Delta’s contention that the clause

violates public policy and is void. The point is that federal

safety regulations are undermined by a private contract and that

this is contrary to the public interest in attaining the highest

possible degree of safety in the manufacture of aircraft which

transport millions of passengers each year.

'The parties had agreed that California law was applicable in

determining the validity of the exculpatory clause.

~> Wren tet

In Section 601 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49

U.S.C. §1421, Congress has authorized the FAA Administrator

to prescribe rules and regulations with respect to aircraft safety

and in Section 603, 49 U.S.C. §1423, the Administrator is

empowered to issue type and production certificates to manu-

facturers of aircraft under certain conditions and to issue

airworthiness certificates for aircraft. (See Appendix.) Pursuant

to this statutory authority the Administrator promulgated

Section 21.165 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, 14 CFR

§ 21.165, which requires the holder of a production certificate

(such as MDC held for the “stretched” DC-8) to:

“Determine that each aircraft submitted for air-

worthiness certification or approval conforms to

the type design and is in a condition for safe

operation.” (emphasis added)

In its letter of April 24, 1969, the FAA stated that its

investigation indicated that MDC had failed properly to

assemble the aircraft and that MDC had violated §21.165(b) by

failing to determine that the aircraft was in a condition for safe

operation. (See Appendix.) Notwithstanding the fact that

§ 1668 of the California Civil Code specifically declares as

against public policy any contract which relieves a party of

responsibility for a violation of law, the District Court and the

Fifth Circuit refused to invalidate the exculpatory clause, which

relieves MDC of responsibility for its own negligence even when

it results in a violation of law.

The courts below failed to deal squarely with the issue

raised by the California statute and the violation of the

regulation, but instead relied upon the reasoning of a California

court in an earlier case between Delta and MDC’s predecessor,

Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc., in which the issue had not

been decided. In that case the court had said, “The upholding

of the exculpatory clause will not adversely affect rights of

future passengers” because “[t]hey are not parties to the

contract and their rights would not be compromised.” Delta Air

Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc. , 238 Cal. App. 2d

95, 47 Cal. Reptr. 518 (1965). It is true that the rights of

injured passengers would not be directly compromised, but

6

undoubtedly the passengers would prefer not to be injured in

the first place. It is in order to discourage conduct which might

cause such injuries that the courts have refused to uphold

exculpatory clauses which affect the public interests and there

could hardly be a matter in which the public has a greater

interest than the safety of large commercial aircraft. The courts

below lost sight of this point in concluding that the only issue

was whether an allocation of risks should be upheld.

The principles involved were well-stated by the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska

Airlines, Inc., 351 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1965), in which that court

also demonstrated the views of, this Court, expressed in Bisso y.

Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955), as to the policy

reasons for refusing to uphold exculpatory clauses such as the

one involved here. Because of the pertinence of that case, which

involved the public interest in safe aircraft operations, and the

authority cited therein, it is quoted at length as follows:

“It is, or course, ordinarily desirable that competent

parties be protected in their rights to make and enforce

agreements between themselves. These rights are restricted by

the transcendent rule that denies enforceability to a private

contractual provision which would require an unlawful act or

which, given effect, would gravely violate paramount require-

ments of public interest. Especially significant here is the

decision of our own court in Air Transport Associates v.

United States, 221 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1955). There. the

Government, the owner and operator of an Alaskan airport,

had granted to an air carrier the right to employ the airport’s

facilities in exchange for valuable consideration and the

execution by the carrier of an agreement undertaking to

exculpate the Government for any loss arising from the

carrier's operations. Following a nighttime crash of one of the

carrier’s planes, alleged to have resulted from the Govern-

ment’s negligence in parking a ground vehicle upon an

unlighted runway, the carrier sued, under the Federal Tort

Claims Act, to recover for the damage to its aircraft. Jn

defense, the Government invoked the exculpatory provision of

the contract. We rejected the defense, holding that under the

law of both Washington, where the contract was executed, and

Alaska, where the contract was to be performed, the exculpa-

7

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tory provision was invalid. We held that its enforcement would

be opposed to the policy interests of the general public. That

decision rests upon the controlling fact that the airport was a

public service. In looking to Washington law, we cited Griffiths

v. Henry Broderick, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 901, 182 P.2d 18,175

A.L.R. 1 (1947), aud Broderson v. Rainier Nat. Park Co., 187

Wash. 399, 60 P.2d 234 (1936), and we wrote, 221 F.2d at

page 472,

‘In both of those cases, while the Washington Supreme

Court held valid exculpatory agreements, they recog-

nized the general law concerning this type of agreement,

and cited with approval the statement of that law found

in the American Law Institute, Restatement of Con-

tracts, Volume 2, Section 575(1) as follows:

*“A bargain for exemption from liability for the

consequences of a wilful breach of duty is illegal,

and a bargain for exemption from liability for the

consequences of negligence is illegal if * * *

(b) one of the parties is charged with a duty of

public service, and the bargain relates to negligence

in the performance of any part of its duty to the

public, for which it has received or been promised

compensation.’ ” [emphasis added ]

“In Bisso [Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp.], 349 U.S. at 91,

75 S.Ct. at 632, we see the Supreme Court’s views in the

language, ‘The two main reasons for the creation and

application of the rule [to prevent enforcement of release-

from-negligence contracts] have been (1) to discourage negli-

gence by making wrong-doers pay damages, * * *. The dangers

of modern machines make it all the more necessary that

negligence be discouraged.’ Can it be sincerely believed that

the public interest is better served by the discouraging of the

negligence of tugboat operators than by the discouraging of

negligence on the part of operators of public airports? We

think not.” [emphasis added]

Similarly, can it be believed that the public interest in

discouraging the negligent manufacture of aircraft is less

important than discouraging the negligence of airport op-

8

erators? Obviously, it is not and there is an overriding public

interest that aircraft be manufactured safely- as is evidenced by

the detailed federal regulation of aircraft manufacturers. Clear-

ly, public policy will not allow a manufacturer to insist upon a

contract exculpating it from the consequences of violating such

regulations. That this is true as a matter of federal law is

demonstrated by the Bisso case. That it is true as a matter of

general law is demonstrated by the Restatement of Contracts

quoted in the Northwest case. There is no divergence from the

federal or general law in California, as will be shown hereinafter.

But the Courts below have failed to recognize the principles

involved and this failure is quite important to the nation as

whole because so many aircraft manufacturers are located in

California and because of the effect of the decision upon the

federal scheme of regulating aircraft safety.

2. The Courts Below Incorrectly Refused To Follow the

Law of California Which, Consistent With the General

Law, Requires a Holding that the Exculpatory Clause Is

Against Public Policy and Void.

Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals

incorrectly relied upon Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft

Company, Inc., supra, in holding that the exculpatory clause

did not violate public policy, despite the fact that the question

of violation of a federal regulation had not been decided by the

Delta v. Douglas court. The Court of Appeals acknowledged

that under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), it was

obliged to follow the law of California and that in Delta vy.

Douglas the court had not decided the question of whether the

exculpatory clause would have been invalid if a_ federal

regulation (or any other law) had been violated. Nevertheless,

the court failed to take the next step required of it under the

Erie doctrine of looking to other California cases which had

ruled on the point. Instead of moving on to the applicable

California cases the Court used the “bootstrap” reasoning that

it had already concluded that the exculpatory clause was not

invalid:

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“The total comments in the [Delta v. Douglas] opinion

relating to this argument about Section 1668 leave no

inference whatsoever as io how the court would have handled

the argument had Douglas violated the regulations. See 47 Cal.

Rptr. at 525. With the Douglas case providing no guidance, we

feel our analysis of Delta’s first point applies equally to this

point, and Delta’s argument fails.”

Delta demonstrated, however, in its petition for rehearing,

that the Court’s analysis of the “first point” was incorrect and

was not based upon California law, but upon an irrelevant

principle of North Dakota law.' Moreover, nothing the court

said could change the fact that the question of the effect of a

violation of law was not ruled upon in Delta v. Douglas so that

the court’s clear duty was to apply the California cases which

had decided the point. The California cases which do apply are

discussed below.

In the case of Hanna v. Lederman, 36 Cal. Rptr. 150

(1963), the court had before it the exact legal issue presented in

this case. There plaintiffs were tenants who were suing their

landlord for damages resulting from a defective fire sprinkler

system, which defect was alleged to be in violation of a city

ordinance. The landlord maintained that the action was barred

by an exculpatory provision in the lease which provided that

“Lessee ... hereby waives all claims against lessor for damages

... from any cause arising at any time... .” (This is exactly the

same as McDonnell Douglas’ contention that Delta’s claim is

barred by the exculpatory clause.) After determining that the

city ordinance was applicable, the Court held:

1The court found, in regard to the so-called “first point,” that Delta

had confused “a negligence theory of action, under which violation of a

law or a regulation may be evidence of negligence [citation omitted] with

the liability that may be imposed by law.” Delta pointed out in its petition

for rehearing that the court had apparently misunderstood Delta’s

argument because the issue was not whether Delta could prove negligence

by showing a violation of law (the negligence per se doctrine), but whether

the exculpatory clause was valid if it relieved MDC of the consequences of

violating a law.

10

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“Each lease contained an exculpatory provision which

has been set forth hereinabove. The effect of that provision

must be determined in light of section 1668 of the Civil Code.

*** “-

“Since the claim for damages because of negligence embodied

in the first cause of action . . . was predicated upon an alleged

violation of [the city ordinance], the exculpatory provision

could not be a defense to that cause of action if the evidence

showed such violation to be a proximate cause of the tenant’s

loss.” (36 Cal. Rptr. 25 154) [emphasis added ] ~

Similarly, in this case Delta’s negligence count alleges that

MDC violated 14 C.F.R. §21.165 and that this violation was a

proximate cause of Delta’s damages. The cases are conceptually

identical. “a

In a later case which is very similar to the Hanna, the

California Fifth District Court of Appeals held in Halliday y.

Greene, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1966), that sublessees were covered

by a safety order issued pursuant to law, and that an

exculpatory clause in the lease was ineffective, saying:

“However, the defect here constituted a violation of a

safety order. If the safety order is applicable, the exculpatory

clause is ineffective because Civil Code Section 1668 provides:

[quotation omitted] ~

“Public policy as expressed in Section 1668, prohibits an

agreement to relieve one of the consequences of his violation

of the law, and this is whether the violation be willful or

negligent.”” (Stonehocher v. Casano, 154 Cal. App. 2d 732,

736, 316 P.2f 717.) (53 Cal. Rptr. at 272)

The principle was again reaffirmed in the case of Buckner

vy. Azulai, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967), where the court said “Any

attempted waiver of such a duty so imposed by law is invalid.”

(59 Cal. Rptr. at 808)

By ignoring the cases cited above, which are the only cases

cited to the Court on the validity of an exculpatory clause

which relieves a party from the civil liability resulting from a

violation of law, the Court violated its own conclusion as to the

requirement of the Erie doctrine:

Se, ee ee ee

\

“What may be more important in addressing the plaintiffs

contention is that under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, supra, we are

bound to follow state law, whether or not we agree with the

reasoning upon which it is based or the outcome which it

dictates. This is the ultimate significance of the Erie decision.

Delta has not cited us to any subsequent California decisions

criticizing, distinguishing, or modifying the Douglas case.

Therefore, Douglas remains the latest, most authoritative

expression of California law applicable to the facts of this case.

It is controlling for our purpose. See Ford Motor Co. v.

Mathis, 322 F.2d 267, 269 (Sth Cir. 1963).”

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Delta did not need to cite any such cases, however,

because even the Court of Appeals found that Delta v. Douglas

did not deal with the question at issue. Delta v. Douglas was

: irrelevant on this point and it was not necessary that it be

4 distinguished. Delta cited the California cases applicable to this

& question and neither the Court of Appeals nor MDC has or

could distinguish them. Moreover, the cases cited by Delta were

perfectly consistent with the leading California case of Tunkl v.

: Regents of Univ. of Calif., 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 391 P.2d 168

: (1963). In Tunkl it had been held that exculpatory clauses

4 affecting the public interest cannot be upheld and the court

discussed a number of factors to be considered in determining if

the public interest is involved,’ but there was no violation of

law involved in that case as there is here. Clearly, a violation of

law or regulation (dealing with aircraft safety in this case)

conclusively establishes a public interest, specifically recognized

in § 1668 of the California Civil Code, stronger than any of the

individual factors mentioned in Tunkl for determining the

public interest when a law or regulation is not violated.

CONCLUSION

In the Federal Aviation Act Congress established a

pervasive scheme for regulating all aspects of safety in air

transportation, including the manufacture of aircraft. In pur-

See ELS Sane

1Delta pointed out in its briefs below that the Delta v. Douglas court

had improperly distinguished Tunkl by concluding that public interest

factors were not involved in the manufacture of aircraft.

12

suance of that scheme the FAA, inter alia, has issued regula-

tions, which have the force of law, designed to insure the

highest degree of safety possible in the manufacture of aircraft.

That safety in the manufacture of aircraft is a matter of

overriding federal public interest cannot be doubted. If an

aircraft manufacturer may by contract relieve itself of any of

the consequences which normally flow from the violation of

these regulations then the federal regulatory scheme is seriously

undermined. As this Court said in the Bisso case, supra, one of

the two main reasons for the creation and application of the

rule preventing the enforcement of release-from-negligence

contracts is “to discourage negligence by making the wrongdoer

pay damages * * *.”

Consistent with the general law, California has declared

that contracts which relieve a party of responsibility for a

negligent or willful violation of law are void and its courts

consistently have stricken down such clauses when raised as a

defense in an action for damages.

If the decision of the Court of Appeals below is not

reversed so as to comport with federal policy and California

law, the public interest in the safe manufacture of aircraft will

be thwarted, the federal law will be undermined and a serious

error of decision will be allowed to stand. For these reasons,

Delta respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari be issued to the

Court of Appeals to review its decision in this case.

Of Counsel: Respectfully submitted,

Robert S. Harkey Frank F. Rox

Law Department Law Department

Delta Air Lines, Inc. Delta Air Lines, Inc.

Hartsfield Atlanta Int’l Hartsfield Atlanta Int'l Airport

Airport Atlanta, Georgia 30320

Atlanta, Georgia 30320

Robert Reed Gray

Hale Russell & Stentzel

1001 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

Attorneys for Petitioner

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Section 601, 49 U.S.C. §1421

§1421. Powers and duties of Administrator—Minimum stand-

ards; rules and regulations

(a) The Administrator is empowered and it shall be his

duty to promote safety of flight of, civil aircraft in air commerce

by prescribing and revising from time to time:

(1) Such minimum standards governing the design,

materials, workmanship, construction, and performance of

aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers as may be required

in the interest of safety;

(2) Such minimum standards governing appliances

as may be required in the interest of safety;

(3) Reasonable rules and regulations and minimum

standards governing; in the interest of safety, (A) the

inspection, servicing, and overhaul of aircraft, aircraft

engines, propellers, and appliances; (B) the equipment and

facilities for such inspection, servicing, and overhaul; and

(C) in the discretion of the Administrator, the periods for.

and the manner in, which such inspection, servicing, and

overhaul shall be made, including provision for examina-

tions and reports by properly qualified private persons

whose examinations or reports the Administrator may

accept in lieu of those made by its officers and employces;

(4) Reasonable rules and régulations governing the

reserve supply of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers,

appliances, and aircraft fuel and oil, required in the

interest of safety, including the reserve supply of aircraft

fuel and oil which shai: be carried in flight;

(5) Reasonable rules and regulations governing, in

the interest of safety, the maximum hours or periods of

service of airmen, and other employees, of air carriers; and

(6) Such reasonable rules and regulations, or mini-

/ mum standards, governing other practices, methods, and

A-l

DRE IO LID LAL NO

procedure, as the Administrator may find necessary to

provide adequately for national security and safety in air

commerce.

Consideration of needs of service; classification of standards,

rules, regulations, and certificates

(b) In prescribing standards, rules, and regulations, and in

issuing certificates under this subchapter, the Administrator

shall give full consideration to the duty resting upon air carriers

to perform their services with the highest possible degree of

safety in the public interest and to any differences between air

transportation and other air commerce; and he shall make

classifications of such standards, rules, regulations, and certifi-

cates appropriate to the differences between air transportation

and other air commerce. The Administrator may authorize any

aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance, for which an

aircraft certificate. authorizing use thereof in air transportation

has been issued, to be used in other air commerce without the

issuance of a further certificate. The Administrator shall

exercise and’ perform his powers and duties under this chapter

in such manner as will best tend to reduce or eliminate the

possibility of, or recurrence of, accidents in air transportation,

‘but shall not deem himself required to give preference to either

air transportation or other air commerce in the administration

and enforcement of this subchapter.

Exemptions

(c) The Administrator from time to time may grant

exemptions from the requirements of any rule or regulation

prescribed under this subchapter if he finds that such action

would be in the public interest. Pub.L. 85-726, Title VI, § 601,

Aug. 23, 1958, 72 Stat. 775.

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Section 603, 49 U.S.C. §1423 |

§1423. Aircraft certificates—Authorization to issue; applica-

tion; investigation; tests; issuance of type certificate °

(a) (1) The Administrator is empowered to issue type

A-2

certificates for aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers; to

specify in regulations the appliances for which the issuance of

type certificates is reasonably required in the interest of safety;

and to issue such certificates for appliances so specified.

(2) Any interested person may file with the Adminis-

trator an application for a type certificate for an aircraft,

aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance specified in regulations

under paragraph (1) of this subsection. Upon receipt of an

application, the Administrator shall make an_ investigation

thereof and may hold hearings thereon. The Administrator shall

make, or require the applicant to make, such tests during

manufacture and upon completion as the Administrator deems

reasonably necessary in the interest of safety, including flight

tests and tests of raw materials or any part or appurtenance of

such aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance. If the

Administrator finds that such aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller,

or appliance is of proper design, material, specification, con-

struction, and performance for safe operation, and meets the

minimum standards, rules, and regulations prescribed by the

Administrator, he shall issue a type certificate therefor. The

Administrator may prescribe in any such certificate the dura-

tion thereof and such other terms, conditions, and limitations as

are required in the interest of safety. The Administrator may

record upon any certificate issued for aircraft, aircraft engines,

or propellers, a numerical determination of all of the essential

factors relative to the performance of the aircraft, aircraft

engine, or propeller for which the certificate is issued.

Production certificates

(b) Upon application, and if it satisfactorily appears to

the Administrator that duplicates of any aircraft, aircraft

engine, propeller, or appliance for which a type certificate has

been issued will conform to such certificate, the Administrator

shall issue a production certificate authorizing the production

of duplicates of such aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or

appliances. The Administrator shall make such inspection and

may require such tests of any aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller.

or appliance manufactured under a production certificate as

may be necessary to assure manufacture of each unit in

A-3

Ce ee

conformity with the type certificate or any amendment or

inodification thereof. The Administrator may prescribe in any

such production certificate the duration thereof and such other

terms, conditions, and limitations as are required in the

interest of safety.

Airworthiness certificates

(c) The registered owner of any aircraft may file with the

Administrator an application for an airworthiness certificate for

such aircraft. If the Administrator finds that the aircraft

conforms to the type certificate therefor, and, after inspection,

that the aircraft is in condition for safe operation, he shall issue

an airworthiness certificate. The Administrator may prescribe in

such certificate the duration of such certificate, the type of

service for which the aircraft may be used, and such other

terms, conditions, and limitations, as are required in the interest

of safety. Each such certificate shall be registered by the

Administrator and shall set forth such information as the

Administrator may deem advisable. The certificate number, or

such other individual designation as may be required by the

Administrator, shall be displayed upon each aircraft in ac-

cordance with regulations prescribed by the Administrator.

Pub.L. 85-726, Title VI, §603, Aug. 23, 1958, 72 Stat. 776.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

Delta Air Lines, Inc.,

)

Plaintiff )

v. ) Civil Action No. 13768

McDonnell Douglas Corporation, )

Defendant )

ORDER

Findings cf Fact

1. This case involves the collapse of the nose landing’gear

assembly of a “stretched” or “super” DC-8 aircraft manufac-

A4

tured by defendant McDonnell Douglas Corporation (““MDC’’)

and operated by plaintiff Delta Air Lines, Inc. (“Delta”).

Federal court jurisdiction is founded upon diversity of citizen-

ship and an amount in controversy in excess of $10,000,

exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

2. At the July 10, 1972, nonjury trial the parties advised

the Court that the evidence and discovery developed to date

indicates that the cause of the nose gear collapse during the

landing roll of the aircraft was an incorrectly installed com-

ponent part of the nose landing gear assembly. Delta contends

that the component part was installed incorrectly by MDC

when MDC assembled the aircraft. MDC on the other hand

contends that the component part was correctly installed during

assembly and that the component part was removed and

re-installed incorrectly during post-delivery servicing of the

aircraft by Delta. In the alternative, MDC contends that if there

was a “defect in workmanship” (i.e., incorrect installation of a_

component part), Delta should and could have in the exercise

of ordinary care detected such defect in workmanship, and that

the alleged damages therefore arise from Delta’s own negligence.

3. Delta’s amended complaint seeks to impose liability on

four theories: Count One alleges negligence; Count Two alleges

breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for

a particular purpose; Count Three aticgzes breach of the express

warranty: and Count Four alleges strict liability in tort.

4. Asan additional and affirmative defense MDC asserts:

(a) the limitations of liability and exculpatory

clause contained in the Warranty Article of the Purchase

Agreement negotiated and agreed to by the parties bar Delta’s

claims based on negligence, breach of implied warranties and

Strict liability;

(b) MDC is not liable for breach of express warranty

because the Warranty Article specifically provides that liability

for breach of the express “workmanship” warranty is limited,

among other things, to the replacement of the improperly

installed part;

(c) Delta failed to follow the warranty claim pro-

cedures spelled out in the Warranty Article, which relieved MDC

of liability with respect to the claim based on breach of express

A-5

PASSA ee Se Tt

warranty; and

(d) in any event MDC is not liable for the type of

damages sought by Delta because such damages are specifically

excluded by the limitations of liability and exculpatory clause

contained in the Purchase Agreement Warranty Article.

5. MDC filed a motion for summary judgment (sup-

ported by evidence) based on the defenses outlined in the

preceding paragraph. Delta submitted opposing affidavits and

contended, among other things:

(a) as a matter of economic necessity Delta was

required to p-‘rchase MDC’s “stretched” DC-8 aircraft;

(b) the limitations of liability and exculpatory clause

in the Purchase Agreement Warranty Article were forced upon

Delta by MDC;

(c) Delta did not voluntarily agree to such provi-

sions;

(d) Delta was unable to negotiate a deletion of such

provisions from the Purchase Agreement;

(e) the Purchase Agreement is a contract of adhe-

sion in this respect;

(f) the limitations of liability and exculpatory

clause are unconscionable, violate public policy and are un-

enforceable; and

(g) the provisions of the Warranty Article therefore

do not bar Delta’s claims for relief.

6. The Court denied MDC’s motion for summary judg-

ment because there appeared to be material issues of fact in

dispute. At the request of the parties, based upon a limited

waiver of jury trial, the Court held a nonjury trial on July 10,

1972, to decide the validity of the “defense based upon the

Warranty Article and exculpatory clause contained in the

contract documents” (Limited Waiver of Jury Trial, filed June

15, 1972).

7. The Purchase Agreement in question was signed at

Long Beach, California, on November 18, 1964, and originally

related only to the so-called “short’’ DC-8 aircraft, or Series 51

DC-8 aircraft. On August 13, 1966, at Long Beach, California,

the parties executed Amendment No. 5 to the Purchase

Agreement. The amendment provided that additional DC-8

A-6

aircraft, of the Series 61 or “stretched” variety, would be

delivered to Delta under the terms and provisions of the

November 18, 1964, Purchase Agreement. The accident aircraft

was one of the aircraft covered in Amendment No. 5.

8. Article 4 of the Purchase Agreement stated the

aircraft would be manufactured and delivered in California, and

Article 17 provided: “This agreement shall be construed and

performance thereof shall be determined according to the laws

of the State of California, U.S.A.” The Purchase Agreement also

contained clauses which limited the agreements between the

parties to the exact written terms of the contract.

9. At the time of the accident in question, Delta was

operating the aircraft under a lease agreement with McDonnell

Douglas Finance Corporation, but the lease was contemplated

by the parties and they agreed that the lease agreement would

not abrogate or modify the provision of the Purchase Agree-

ment.

10. The Warranty Article in the Purchase Agreement

provided:

“12. WARRANTY.

“(A) Subject to the limitations and conditions herein-

after set forth, seller warrants that the aircraft, accessories,

equipment and parts supplied hereunder which have been

manufactured by seller, and by other manufacturers if made to

detailed design and detailed specifications originated by seller,

shall at the time of delivery by seller be free from:

(1) Defects ir material and workmanship fur-

nished by seller and used in the fabrication thereof;

(2) Defects arising from the selection of material

or process of marufacture;

(3) Defects inherent in the design thereof in

view of the state of the art as of the date of such design;

(4) Defects arising from failure to conform to

the detailed specifications of this purchase agreement

except as to such portions thereof, if any, as are

expressly stated to be not guaranteed.

“(B) Defects in material and workmanship. defects

arising from the selection of material or process of manufac-

A-7

ture and defects arising from failure to conform to the detailed

specifications, must become apparent in the aircraft, acces-

sory, equipment or part within one (1) year or two thousand

(2,000) flying hours, whichever shall first expire, but not less

than eight (8) months after delivery of said aircraft.

“The extent of seller’s liability under this warranty as to

defects in material or workmanship, defects arising from the

selection of material or the process of manufacture, and

defects arising from failure to conform to the detailed

specifications, is limited to the repair at its expense of such

defects in the aircraft or to the repair or replacement at its

expense (with a similar item free from the defect in question)

of any accessory, equipment or part which is defective in any

of such respects.

“(C) The extent of seller's liablity under this warranty

as to defects inherent in design is limited to the correction at

its expense of all such defects becoming apparent in the

aircraft, accessory, equipment or part purchased hereunder

within one (1) year or two thousand (2,000) flying hours,

whichever shall first expire, but not less than eight (8) months

after delivery of said airciaft.

“(D) Seller shall :nake the foregoing repairs, replace-

ments and corrections with reasonable care and dispatch in

order that the aircrait, system, accessory, equipment or part

involved may pot be kept out of service longer than necessary.

Disassembly of the aircraft to correct the defect, removal of

the defective or faulty structure, system, accessory, equip-

ment, or new part and installation of the corrected or new

structure, system, accessory, equipment or new part and

re-assembly of the aircraft shall be at buyer's expense, unless

such work is performed by seller at its factory at Long Beach,

California, or unless buyer offers to return the aircraft,

accessory, equipment or part and buyer and seller thereafter

mutually agree that buyer will perform the work and that

seller will pay buyer in whole or in part for removal,

installation and re-assembly of the aircraft. Cost of temporary

or interim repairs, replacements and corrections accomplished

by buyer, as well as any consequential cost related thereto,

shall likewise be at buyer's expense, except when seller, in

advance, approves in writing such temporary or interim

repairs, replacements and corrections and the cost thereof,

which cost seller may agree to pay in whole or in part.

A-8

“(E) Seller shall, as to each defect, be relieved of all

obligations and liability under this warranty if:

(1) The aircraft is operated with any accessory,

equipment or part not specifically approved by seller

and not manufactured by seller or to seller’s design and

specification unless buyer furnishes reasonable evidence

that such installation was not a cause of the defect;

provided that this provision shall not apply to any

accessory, equipment or part, the use of which does not

affect the safety of the aircraft:

(2) The aircraft shall not have been operated or

maintained in accordance with seller’s instructions fur-

nished under this agreement, unless buyer furnishes

reasonable evidence that such operation or maintenance,

as the case may be, was not a cause of the defect;

(3) The aircraft shall not have been operated

under normal airline use, unless buyer furnishes reason-

able evidence that such operation was not a cause of the

defect;

(4) The aircraft shall not have been repaired,

altered or modified without seller’s approval or if the

aircraft shall have been operated subsequent to its

involvement in an accident, unless buyer furnishes

reasonable evidence that such repair, alteration, modifi-

cation, operation or accident was not a cause of the

defect, provided, however, that this limitation insofar as

it relates to repairs and accident shall not be applicable

to routine repairs or replacements or minor accidents

which normally occur in the operation of aircraft if such

repairs or replacements are made within suitable material

and according to standard practice and engineering;

(S) Buyer does not (i) report the defect in

writing or by telegram to seller’s warranty administrator

at its factory in Long Beach, California, within sixty

(60) days following such defect becoming apparent to

buyer as provided in paragraphs (B) and (C) above, and

(ii) return the defective or faulty aircraft, accessory,

equipment or part to said factory (or, if return to seller’s

factory is not feasible and seller so agrees in advance in

writing, which agreement shall not unreasonably be

withheld, to buyer’s base repair shop or other appropri-

A-9

ate facility in the United States) within sixty (60) days

following the end of the applicable period of time

specified in paragraphs (B) and (C) above, or within

sixty (60) days following such defect becoming ap-

parent, whichever is earlier, and further provided that if,

for reasons beyond buyer’s control, return of the items

to seller’s factory is not possible within said sixty (60)

day period, and if buyer so notifies seller in writing and

seller so agrees in writing, which agreement shall not

unreasonably be withheld, the said sixty (60) day period

will be waived, but buyer must return the item to

seller’s said factory if, as and when said return does

become feasible. Buyer also must submit reasonable

proof to seller, within sixty (60) days after the defect

becomes apparent (except when such period is waived)

that the defect is due to a matter embraced within the

seller’s warranty hereunder. Seller shall approve or

disapprove buer’s substantiated warranty claim in

writing within’ sixty (60) days of receipt thereof. All

such transportation, including return to buyer of the

repaired, replaced or corrected aircraft, accessory, equip-

ment or part shall be at buyer’s expense.

“With respect to matters made the subject of seller’s

approval under sub-paragraphs (1), (4) and seller’s approval or

disapproval of buyer’s warranty claim under (5) of this

paragraph (E), seller’s approval or disapproval thereof shall be

made in writing to buyer within sixty (60) days after buyer's

written notice requesting approval is received by seller. In the

event of disapproval, seller shall set forth the reasons therefor

in its statement of disapproval. Seller’s failure to deliver to

buyer a written statement of approval or disapproval within

such sixty (60) day period shall irrevocably and conclusively

constitute approval by seller of the subject matter of the

particular request involved.

“(F) Normal wear and tear and the need for regular

overhauls shall not constitute a defect or failure under this

warranty. Buyer acknowledges that some of the accessories,

equipment and parts warranted hereunder have a normal life

expectancy that is less than the time period specified under

paragraph (B) and (C) above. 4

“(G) The warranty provided in this article and the

obligations and liabilities of seller thereunder are in lieu of and

A-10

buyer hereby waives all other warranties, guarantees or

liabilities, express or implied arising by law or otherwise

(including without limitation any obligation of seller with

respect to consequential damages) and whether or not occa-

sioned by seller’s negligence and shall not be extended, altered

or varied except by a written instrument signed by seller and

buyer; provided that in the event the provision relieving seller

from liability for its negligence should for any reason be

ineffective, the remainder of this paragraph (G) shall remain in

full force and effect.”

11. The aircraft Purchase Agreement incorporated the

terms of a prior agreement, including the Warranty Clause,

which were the subject of intensive negotiation. There was no

substantial imbalance in the bargaining position of the parties

and the Warranty Clause was not dictated by MDC on a “take it

~ or leave it” basis. Due to the California Court of Appeals

decision in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas, 230 Cal. App.2d 95

(Nov. 9, 1965), entered several months before the parties

entered into the agreement in the instant case, Delta was aware

that MDC would, under certain circumstances, agree to modifi-

cation or elimination of the exculpatory clause, albeit for a

price which Delta apparently did not wish to pay (see. 230 Cal.

App.2d at 103, n.5).

Conclusions of Law

When ruling on substantive matters of law, federal courts

must follow the laws of the State in which it sits [Erie R.R. v. |

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)] including its Conflicts of Laws

rules [Klaxon Co. vy. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487

(1941)]. The Georgia conflicts of law rule concerning the

validity and interpretation of contracts made in another state

provides the law of the state where the contract was made and

performed will govern except when the result is contrary to the

public policy of the State of Georgia. Cox vr. Adams, 2 Ga. 158,

165 (1847); Tillman v. Gibson, 44 Ga. App. 440, 442, 161 S.E.

630, (1931). The Georgia state courts would apply

California law in this case not only because the contract was

made and performed in California, but also because the parties

specifically agreed in the contract that California law would

A-11

9} hd NSO AREA AGEL Dr SAS

watt

control.

12. The contract before the Court is in all material

respects identical to the contract ruled on by the Califomia

Court of Appeals in Delta v. Douglas, supra. That case, which

Delta unsuccessfully sought to have reviewed by the California

Supreme Court, is the law of California so far as the matters at

issue here are concerned. Accordingly, this Court must uphold

the validity of the exculpatory clause contained in the Warranty

Article of the contract before the Court.

Thus, Delta’s causes of action sounding in “negligence”

and “strict liability in tort” are DISMISSED. Delta’s causes of

action based on the validity of the Warranty Clause, which is

hereby upheld as a matter of law, and recovery thereunder, are

reserved for determination by jury trial pursuant to the limited

waiver of jury trial referred to above.

SO ORDERED, this 30 day of October, 1972.

/s;CHARLES A. MOYE, JR.

United States District Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

Delta Air Lines, Inc.,

)

Plaintiff )

v. ) Civil Action No. 13768

McDonnell Douglas Corporation, )

Defendant )

ORDER

On October 30, 1972, this Court dismissed Delta’s claims

based on negligence and strict liability in tort but did not rule

on its claims based on implied and express warranty. The

Court’s order was based on its nonjury consideration of certain

issues following a limited waiver by the parties of trial by jury.

Defendant, McDonnell Douglas, has moved the Coyrt to

amend that order so as to also dismiss the implied warranty

claim and to exclude “consequential damages” from the express

A-12

warranty claim. In response, Delta contends that this additional

relief sought by defendant is improper because it would force

the court to consider issues on which Delta did not waive trial

by jury. Accordingly, the Court is unwilling to go beyond an

interpretation of the nonjury issues and consequently denies

defendant’s motion.

In an attempt to obtain the right to an immediate appeal

of this Court’s order of October 30, 1972, Delta has moved the

Court to amend that order in one of the following ways:

(1) to include a determination “that there is no just

reason for delay” and to direct the entry of a final

judgment in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or

(2) to permit an interlocutory appeal of a controlling

question of law.

Although that order used the phrase “‘cause of action” with

respect to Delta’s claims which were dismissed, it probably

would be more appropriate to say that Delta has a single cause

of action against the defendant for the damage to its aircraft,

and that its complaint sets forth several different legal theories

supporting that cause of action. Consequently, the Court is

doubtful that a finding pursuant to Rule 54(b) would be

appropriate, but the Court is of the opinion that its order of

October 30, 1972, involves a controlling question of law as to

which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion

and that an immediate appeal from that order may materially

advance the ultimate determination of the litigation [28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b)]. Accordingly, the Court’s order of October 30,

1972, is so amended.

This 22 day of November, 1972.

/s;CHARLES A. MOYE, JR.

United States District Judge

A-13

OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DATED OCTOBER 31, 1974

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Georgia.

Before BROWN, Chief Judge, and RONEY and GEE, Cir-

cuit Judges.

RONEY, Circuit Judge:

An aircraft purchased by Delta Air Lines, Inc. from McDon-

nell Douglas Corporation, the manufacturer, suffered dam-

ages when its nose gear collapsed during a landing in Jackson-

_ ville, Florida, because a component part was incorrectly in-

stalled. There were no personal injuries. Delta seeks to

+ recover from McDonnell the expenses incurred in repair on

; four theories of liability: (1) negligence; (2) breach of implied

» warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular

; purpose; (3) breach of express warranty; and, (4) strict

liability in tort. The District Court dismissed the two counts

sounding in negligence and strict liability on the ground that

_ an exculpatory clause in the contract limited McDonnell’s

liability to contractual warranty provisions. Delta, in this

interlocutory appeal, seeks review of the correctness of the

Court’s ruling in this regard. We affirm.

{1] By cross-appeal McDonnell seeks review of the District

Court’s refusal to dismiss the counts based on express and

implied warranties. The District Court reserved decision as to

these two counts pending trial. Accordingly, there is no

decision on the attempted cross-appeal for us to review at this

time. Assuming without deciding that the allowance of an

interlocutory appeal was not improvident under these cireum-

stances, we will review the validity and effect of the exculpa-

tory clause only insofar as it presents a defense against the

A-14

Sri gp an BRD enlist RANK Gola OE

counts for negligence and strict liability, the is issues previously

decided by the trial court. |

The Purchase Agreement in question was signed at Long

Beach, California, on November 18, 1964, and originally relat-

ed only to the so-called “short” DC-8 aircraft, or Series 51

DC-8 aircraft. On August 13, 1966, at Long Beach, Califor-

nia, the parties executed Amendment No. 5 to the Purchase

Agreement, which amendment provided that additional DC-8

aircraft, of the Series 61 or “stretched” variety, would be

delivered to Delta under the terms and _ provisions of the

November 18, 1964, Purchase Agreement. The accident air-

craft was one of the aircraft covered by Amendment No, 5.

Article 4 of the Purchase Agreement stated the aircraft

would be manufactured and delivered in California, and Arti-

cle 17 provided: “This agreement shall be construed and

performance thereof shall be determined according to the laws

of the State of California, U.S.A.” The Purchase Agreement

also contained clauses which limited the agreements between

the parties to the exact written terms of the contract.

At the time of the accident in question, Delta was operating

the aircraft under a lease agreement with McDonnell Douglas

Finance Corporation, but the lease was contemplated by the

parties and they had agreed that the lease agreement would

not abrogate or modify the provisions of the Purchase Agree-

ment.

The Warranty Article in the Purchase Agreement, set forth

in full in the margin,’ contained the following exculpatory

clause:

(G) The warranty provided in this article and the obliga-

tions and liabilities of seller thereunder are in lieu of and

1. 12. WARRANTY.

(A) Subject to the limitations and conditions hereinafter set forth,

seller warrants that the aircraft, accessories, equipment and parts

supplied hereunder which have been manufactured by seller, and by

other manufacturers if made to detailed design and detailed specifi-

A-15

DES MD NE neitibs Re 3s

_buyer’ hereby waives all other warranties, guarantees or

liabilities, éxpress or implied arising by law or otherwise

(including without limitation any obligation of seller with

cations originated by seller, shall at the time of delivery by seller be

free from:

(1) Defects in material and workmanship furnished by seller

and used in the fabrication thereof;

(2) Defects arising from the selection of material or process of

manufacture;

(3) Defects inherent in the design thereof in view of the state of

‘the art as of the date of such design;

(4) Defects arising from failure to conform to the detailed

specifications of this purchase agreement except as to such

portions thereof, if any, as are expressly stated to be not guaran-

teed.

(B) Defects in material and workmanship, defects arising from

the selection of material or process of manufacture and defects

arising from failure to conform to the detailed specifications, must

become apparent in the aircraft. accessory, equipment or part within

one (1) year or two thousand (2,000) flying hours, whichever shall

first expire, but not less than eight (8) months after delivery of said

aircraft.

The extent of seller’s liability under this warranty as to defects in

. material or workmanship, defects arising from the selection of

material or the process of manufacture, and defects arising from

failure to conform to the detailed specifications, is limited to the

repair at its expense of such defects in the aircraft or to the repair

or replacement at its expense (with a similar item free from the

defect in question) of any accessory, equipment or part which is

defective in any of such respects.

(C) The extent of seller’s liability under this warranty as to

defects inherent in design is limited to the correction at its expense

of all such defects becoming apparent in the aircraft, accessory,

equipment or part purchased hereunder within one (1) year or two

thousand (2,000) flying hours, whichever shall first expire, but not

less than eight (8) months after delivery of said aircraft.

(D) Seller shall make the foregoing repairs, replacements and

corrections with reasonable care and dispatch in order that the

aircraft, system, accessory, equipment or part involved may not be

kept out of service longer than necessary. Disassembly of ‘the

aircraft to correct the defect, removal of the defective or faulty

structure, system, accessory, equipment, or new part and installa-

tion of the corrected or new structure, system, accessory, equipment

or new part and re-assembly of the aircraft shall be at buyer's

expense, unless such work is performed by seller at its factory at

Long Beach, California, or unless buyer offers to return the aircraft,

accessory, equipment or part and buyer and seller thereafter matual-

ly agree that buyer will perform the work and that seller will pay

buyer ‘in whole or in part for removal, installation and re-assembly

A-16

respect to consequential damages) and whether or not occa-

sioned by seller’s negligence and shall not be extended,

altered or varied except by a written instrument signed by

of the aircraft. Cost of temporary or interim repairs, replacements

and corrections accomplished by buyer, as well as any consequential

cost related thereto, shall likewise be at buyer’s expense, except

when seller, in advance, approves in writing such temporary or

interim repairs, replacements and corrections and the cost thereof,

which cost seller may agree to pay in whole or in part.

(E) Seller shall, as to each defect, be relieved of all obligations

and liability under this warranty if:

(1) The aircraft is operated with any accessory, equipment or

part not specifically approved by seller and not manufactured by

seller or to seller’s design and specification unless buyer furnishes

reasonable evidence that such installation was not a cause of the

defect; provided that this provision shall not apply to any acces-

sory, equipment or part, the use of which does not affect the

safety of the aircraft;

(2) The aircraft shall not have been operated or maintained in

accordance with selier’s instructions furnished under this agree-

ment, unless buyer furnishes reasonable evidence that such opera-

tion or maintenance, as the case may be, was not a cause of the

defect;

(3) The aircraft shall not have been operated under normal

airline use, unless buyer furnishes reasonable evidence that such

operation was not a cause of the defect;

(4) The aircraft shall have been repaired, altered or modified

without seller’s approval or if the aircraft shall have been operat-

ed subsequent to its involvement in an accident, unless buyer

furnishes reasonable evidence that such repair, alteration, modifi-

cation, operation or accident was not a cause of the defect,

provided, however, that this limitation insofs- as it relates to

repairs and accident shall not be applicable to routine repairs or

replacements or minor accidents which normally occur in the

operation of aircraft if such repairs or replacements are made

within suitable material and according to standard practice and

engineering;

(5) Buyer does not (i) report the defect in writing or by

telegram to seller's warranty administrator at its factory in Long

Beach, California, within sixty (60) days following such defect

becoming apparent to buyer as provided in paragrapi.. (B) and

(C) above, and (ii) return the defective or faulty aircraft, accesso-

ry, equipment or part to said factory (or, if return to seller's

factory is not feasible and seller so agrees in advance in writing,

which agreement shall not unreasonably be withheld, to buyer's

base repair shop or other appropriate facility in the United States)

within sixty (60) days following the end of the applicable period of

time specified in paragraphs (B) and (C) above, or within sixty

(60) days following such defect becoming apparent, whichever is

A-17

seller and buyer; provided that in the event the provision

relieving seller from liability for its negligence should for

any reason be ineffective, the remainder of this paragraph

(G) shall remain in full force and effect.

Amendment 5 incorporated the terms of the 1964 agree-

ment, including the Warranty Clause, which terms were the

subject of intensive negotiation. There was no substantial

earlier, and further provided that if, for reasons beyond buyer’s

control, return of the items to seller's factory is not possible

within said sixty (60) day period, and if buyer so notifies seller in

writing and seller so agrees in writing, which agreement shall not

unreasonably be withheld, the said sixty (60) day period will be

waived, but buyer must return the item to seller’s said factory if,

as and when said return does become feasible. Buyer also must

submit reasonable proof to seller, within sixty (60) days after the

defect becomes apparent (except when such period is waived)

that the defect is due to a matter embraced within the seller's

warranty hereunder. Seller shall approve or disapprove buyer’s

substantiated warranty claim in writing within sixty (60) days of

receipt thereof. All such transportation, including return to buyer

of the repaired, replaced or corrected aircraft, accessory, equip-

ment or part shall be at buyer’s expense.

With respect to matters made the subject of seller's approval

under sub-paragraphs (1), (4) and seller’s approval or disapproval of

buyer’s warranty claim under (5) of this paragraph (E), seller’s

approval or disapproval thereof shall be made in writing to buyer

within sixty (60) days after buyer’s written notice requesting ap-

proval is received by seller. In the event of disapproval, seller shall

set forth the reasons therefor in its statement of disapproval.

Seller’s failure to deliver to buyer a written statement of approval or

disapproval within such sixty (60) day period shall irrevocably and

conclusively constitute approval by seller of the subject matter of

the particular request involved.

(F) Normal wear and tear and the need for regu!ar overhauls shall

not constitute a defect or failure under this warranty. Buyer

acknowledges that some of the accessories, equipment and parts

warranted hereunder have a normal life expectancy that is less than

the time period specified under paragraph (B) and (C) above.

(G) The warranty provided in this article and the obligations and

liabilities of seller thereunder are in lieu of and buyer hereby waives

all other warranties, guarantees or liabilities, express or implied

arising by law or otherwise (including without limitation any obliga-

tion of seller with respect to consequential damages) and whether or

not occasioned by seller’s negligence and shall not be extended,

altered or varied except by a written instrument signed by seller and

buyer; provided that in the event the provision relieving seller from

liability for its negligence should for any reason be ineffective, the

remainder of this paragraph (G) shall remain in full force and effect.

A-18

imbalance in the bargaining positions of the parties and the

Warranty Clause was not dictated by McDonnell on a “take

it-or leave it” basis. Due to the California Court of Appeal

decision in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc.,

238 Cal.App.2d 95, 47 Cal.Rptr. 518 (1965), rendered several

months before the parties entered into the agreement in the

instant case, Delta was aware that McDonnell would, under

certain circumstances, agree to modification or elimination of

the exculpatory clause, albeit for a price which Delta appar-

ently did not wish to pay. See 238 Cal.App.2d at 103 n. 5, 47

Cal.Rptr. at 523 n. 5.

[2-4] The parties agree with the proposition that in this

diversity case, we must follow state law, including state

conflict of law rules, and that the Georgia conflicts rule

provides that the law of the state where a contract is made

and performed will govern the validity and interpretation of

the contract except when the result is contrary to the public

policy of the State of Georgia.’ The Georgia state courts

would apply California law in this case not only because the

contract was made and performed in California, but also

because the parties specifically agreed in the contract that

California law would control.’

The chief point of disagreement between the parties that

we are called upon to settle concerns what a California court

would do with this case. This disagreement centers around

the precedent established by Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas

Aircraft Co., Inc., 238 Cal.App.2d 95, 47 Cal.Rptr. 518 (1965),

in the light of an earlier California Supreme Court case, Tunkl

v. Regents of University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal.

2. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188

(1938).

3. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020,

85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941).

4. Cox v. Adams, 2 Ga. 158, 165 (1847); Goodman v. Nadler, 113

Ga.App. 493, 148 S.E.2d 480, 483 (1966).

5. See Barzda v. Quality Courts Motel, Inc., 386 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.

1967).

Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963), and a California statute dealing

with exculpatory clauses, Cal.Civ.Code § 1668 (West 1972).

Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., supra,

involved the validity, as between the same airline and the

same manufacturer as the case at bar, of virtually identical

warranty provisions in connection with an airplane accident

also caused by a malfunctioning nose landing gear. The

intermediate California Court of Appeal upheld the exculpato-

ry clause in the contract as precluding a negligence suit

brought by the airline against the manufacturer.

Faced with this strong indication of how a California court

would decide this case, Delta makes essentially five arguments

against that result, which we find unpersuasive. We address

the arguments seriatim as presented in Delta’s brief.

Sur doe boaieaaarie ve aaa

co Retr of a KO:

[5,6] First, Delta contends that the exculpatory clause is

in clear violation of the public policy of California as specifi-

cally set out in the statutes of that state because it would

relieve McDonnell of responsibility for the violation of § 21.-

165 of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations

requiring it to determine that the aircraft was in a condition

for safe operation. California Civil Code § 1668 makes it

against the policy of the law for a contract to exempt anyone

from responsibility for violation of the law.’ Delta asserts

_ that by delivering the plane with the nose gear part incorrect-

j ly installed, McDonnell violated the FAA regulation found at

- 14 C.F.R. § 21.165 (1974), which provides in effect that an

airplane manufacturer must determine that any airplane pro-

' posed for certification is in a condition for safe operation.’

wh eA eA tet dr oe A ae ee,

6. Cal.Civ.Code § 1668 provides:

All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly,

; to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful

injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law,

whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.

7. Section 21.165 reads:

The holder of a production certificate shall—

(a) Maintain the quality control system in conformity with the

data and procedures approved for the production certificate; and

4 A-20

a

Delta, however, confuses a negligence theory of action,

under which violation of a law or a regulation may be evi-

dence of negligence, see Steel v. Downs, 438 F.2d 310, 316 (8th

Cir. 1971), with the liability that may be imposed by law.

McDonnell is still answerable to the FAA and third parties for

any responsibility established by the regulation, and any stat-

utory right of action that might be given to Delta by FAA

regulations has not been abrogated. But none of these causes

of action are involved in an action based on common law

negligence. We are unable to agree that the contract be-

tween two industrial giants fixing the dollar responsibility for

McDonnell’s alleged negligence would be void under Califor-

nia law, any more than would be an insurance contract which

might be written for the same purpose.

Second, and along the same lines as the first argument,

Delta contends that this case is distinguishable from Delta Air

Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., because in that case

the court did not consider the issue raised here with respect to

the violation of § 21.165. The Douglas court, however, did

reject an argument similar to the one asserted first by Delta,

by finding that Douglas had not violated the regulations there

in question. Delta argues that the clear inference from the

case is that had such a violation been proved, the California

Court would have held the exculpatory clause void under

Section 1668. Since this case is at the pleading stage, Delta

contends that it ought to be permitted to prove what it did

not prove in the state case.

Although Delta is correct in contending that Douglas did

not consider the issue raised here as to a FAA regulation

violation, it is incorrect in asserting that the California Court

conceded that if a violation of such a regulation had been

shown the exculpatory clause would have been invalid under

(b) Determine that each completed product submitted for air-

worthiness certification or approval conforms to the type design

and is in a condition for safe operation.

A-2]

Dee ee

_ California law. The total comments in the opinion relating to

_ this argument about Section 1668 leave no inference whatso-

_ ever as to how the court would have handled the argument

_ had Douglas violated the regulations. See 47 Cal.Rptr. at 525.

- With the Douglas case providing no guidance, we feel our

_ analysis of Delta’s first point applies equally to this point, and

_ Delta’s argument fails.

_ Third, Delta argues that even if Delta Air Lines, Inc, v.

_ Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. were not distinguishable, the court

_ in that case did not correctly apply the law of California as set

- out in the leading cases of that state. Instead, Delta asserts,

_ that court misinterpreted and incorrectly applied the law,

_ while the duty of the court below in this case was to apply the

_ law of California correctly, and not just to follow the Douglas

_ ease. And since that case was not a correct interpretation of

_ the law, the District Court was bound to follow the law set

_ out in the statutes and other decisions of California.

In this argument, Delta stresses the case of Tunkl v. Re-

- gents of University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33,

- 383 P.2d 441 (1963). In Tunkl, the Supreme Court of Califor-

_ nia held that release from liability for future negligence

_ imposed as a condition for admission to a charitable research

_ hospital was invalid on the ground that the agreement affect-

ed the public interest. The court reviewed a variety of

_ exculpatory clause cases and concluded that an exculpatory

_ provision can only be valid if it does not affect the “public

interest.” The Douglas court dealt specifically with Tunkl

and its analysis of California law, and concluded in a very

thorough discussion, that the contract between the airline and

_ the manufacturer was not clothed with the kind of public

interest that surfaced in a contract between a patient and a

hospital. Based on the reasoning in the Douglas opinion, we

are convinced that California law was correctly applied there.

What may be more important in addressing the plaintiff's

contention is that under Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, supra, we are

bound to follow state law, whether or not we agree with the

A-22

reasoning upon which it is based or the outcome which it

dictates. This is the ultimate significance of the Erie decision.

Delta has not cited us to any subsequent California decisions

criticizing, distinguishing, or modifying the Douglas case.

Therefore, Douglas remains the latest, most authoritative

expression of California law applicable to the facts of this

case. It is controlling for our purposes. See Ford Motor Co.

v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267, 269 (5th Cir. 1963).

Fourth, Delta contends that even if the court below correct-

ly determined that the exculpatory clause is valid under the

law of California, the clause violates the public policy of

Georgia and should not be enforceable as a defense to Delta’s

complaint by a federal court sitting in Georgia.

To support this argument, Delta cites only a Georgia statute

similar to Cal.Civ.Code § 1668." The argument fails to carry

the point for the same reasons that made the position untena-

ble as a matter of California public policy.

[7] Finally, as to the dismissal of the strict liability count

only, Delta makes this argument: The count based upon strict

liability in tort is not barred by the exculpatory clause (even if

valid) because one of the basic reasons for the development of

the theory of strict liability is to transcend technical bases for

denying liability where the product involved is unreasonably

dangerous to the public. Contractual attempts to restrict

liability are therefore immaterial in strict liability cases.

Although McDonnell argues in response to this that strict

liability does not apply to factual cireumstances such as these,

we do not have to rule on this argument because we agree

with MeDonnell’s contention that the exculpatory clause is

broad enough to include the concept of strict liability in tort.

8. Ga.Code Ann. § 20 504 provides:

A contract which is against the policy of the law cannot be

enforced; such are contracts tending to corrupt legislation or the

judiciary, contracts in general restraint of trade, contracts to

evade or oppose the revenue laws of another country, wagering

contracts, contracts of maintenance or champerty.

A-23

|

ed

j

i

i

i

Although the California Court of Appeal did not expressly

mention strict liability in the earlier Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.

Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. case, the holding by that Court is

broad enough to encompass strict liability. In reaching its

decision, the California Court cited and discussed Greenman v.

Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377

P.2d 897 (1963), the landmark California case dealing with the

concept of strict liability in tort, and expressly held: “Even

though disclaimer clauses are to be strictly construed, still we

find that this clause covers not only contractua] warranty

liability but also tort liability.” 2388 Cal.App.2d at 101, 47

Cal.Rptr. at 522. The doctrine of strict liability is a tort

concept, and the statement by the California Court that the

exculpatory clause is broad enough to encompass “tort liabili-

ty” as well as other forms of liability clearly indicates that

strict tort liability has been disclaimed. Any other conclusion

would emasculate the basic purpose of the Warranty Article

and exclupatory clause.

Finding no persuasive arguments that militate against fol-

lowing this remarkably similar California case, we affirm the

dismissal of the two counts in negligence and strict liability as

being barred by the exculpatory clause in the contract under

the authority of Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,

Inc., supra.

Affirmed.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 73-1799

D. C. Docket No. CA 13768

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Appellee,

versus

McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION,

Defendant-A ppellee-Cross Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Georgia

Before BROWN, Chief Judge, and RONEY and GEE, Circuit

Judges.

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the

record from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Georgia, and was argued by counsel:

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here ordered

and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said

District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed;

It is further ordered that plaintiff-appellant-cross appellee

pay to defendant-appellee-cross appellant, the costs on appeal

to be taxed by the Clerk of this Court.

October 31, 1974

Issued as Mandate: December 26, 1974

tates Ls

6) Sat

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 73-1799

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Apellee,

versus

McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION,

Defendant-A ppellee-Cross Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Georgia

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

(December 17, 1974)

Before BROWN, Chief Judge, RONEY and GEE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing filed in

the above entitled and numbered cause be and the same is

hereby denied.

A-26

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

2815 East Spring Street

Long Beach, California 90806

CERTIFIED MAIL — RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

April 24, 1969

McDonnell Douglas Corporation

Douglas Aircraft Company

3855 Lakewood Boulevard

Long Beach, California 90801

Attention: Mr. W. F. Stryker, Director Reliability and

Quality Assurance

Gentlemen:

On January 31, 1969, Delta Air Lines DC-8-61 aircraft,

Registration No. N1I302L. Serial No. 46029, experienced

collapse of its nose landing gear while landing at Jacksonville,

Florida. Subsequent investigation indicated that taper bolts,

P/N 4716811-SO1, had been installed by Douglas Aircraft

Company in the upper cross tube assembly only, and not

through the cross tube bearings, P/N 4771383-SO1A. McDon-

nell Douglas Corporation, Douglas Aircraft Company. took

immediate corrective action by reinspecting all production

aircraft before delivery to the airlines and, in addition, revised

DC-8 and DC-9 Assembly Outlines. The DC-8 Assembly Outline

310M7100-210, Edition 24, and DC-9 Assembly Outline

474-4325-2, Edition 19, were issued with the addition of

applicable reference drawings, and a special attention note to

the drawing view showing proper installation of the taper bolts

through bearings.

The circumstances indicate that McDonnell Douglas Corpora-

tion, Douglas Aircraft Company, holder of Production Certifi-

cate No. 27, were in violation of Federal Aviation Regulations

21.165 (b) in that they failed to determine that each completed

A-27

;

;

3

j

3

2

4

‘

#

4

co Sk

raha er ONY

ib NINE ME DA Ge ci NO RTO Re AT te Ti a Re A r

product submitted for airworthiness certification conforms to

the type design and is in a condition for safe operation.

After our subsequent discussions with you concerming this

discrepancy, and the action taken by your company to preclude

any future occurrence of this nature, we have concluded that no

further enforcement action is necessary as a result of this

incident. In lieu thereof, we are issuing this official reprimand

which will be made a matter of record. You may consider this

matter closed.

Sincerely,

/s/ JOHN B. BARNARD

JOHN B. BARNARD

Supervising Inspector

WE-AEDO-48

RECEIVED BY DIRECT MAIL.

CERTIFIED # 425534

Note: Incident previously reported by FAA Miami Itr dtd

24-69.

A-28

So ata

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SRT. I °

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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