Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — DELTA AIR LINES, INC. v. V. MCDONNELL (Nos. 74-1138, 74-1175)
Supreme Court brief1974
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF.CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES\COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT cccccccccscsssscssssscccccsescccscce
OPINIONS BELOW o.....ssso0e- en a nl ?
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QUESTION PRESENTED ...c....Scssscssscsssscccccccsssesssssnsesccsees ?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 8 icccccsssccssccsccsrssnsccoonsoceees 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THIWRIT ooo 5
1. THE COURTS BELOW HAVE MISCONCEIVED THE
EFFECT OF UPHOLDING THE EXCULPATORY
CLAUSE UPON THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND IN
SO DOING HAVE UNDERMINED THE FEDERAL
REGULATION OF AIRCRAFT SAFETY ................ 5
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. THE COURTS BELOW INCORRECTLY REFUSED
TO FOLLOW THE LAW OF CALIFORNIA WHICH,
CONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL LAW, RE-
QUIRES A HOLDING THAT THES EXCULPATORY
CLAUSE IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY AND
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APPENDIX :
Statutory Provisions :
~~
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Section 601.
49 U.S.C. §1421
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Section 603,
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Order and Opinion of the United States District
Court dated October 30, 1972 oo...
Order of United States District Court dated
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Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit dated October 31, 1974
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit dated October 31, 1974
Order of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit Denying Rehearing dated
December 17, 1974
Letter of the Federal Aviation Administration
dated April 24, 1969
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955) .... 7,9
Buckner v. Azulai, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967)
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft
Company, Inc., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47
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Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
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simientadi 11
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cont'd)
Page
Halliday v. Greene, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1966) ...0 11
Hanna v. Lederman, 36 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1963) 00.0... 10
Northwest Airlines, Inc. vy. Alaska Airlines,
RE 5 Pe eek BOO CHU Gils FED teiserasecticscnsveranseses 7,9
Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Calif.,
22 CH. Tale. 33, FES F.20 GET (EGOS). cccericcsciersssoncs 12
STATUTES
California Civil Code 81668 (West 1972) oo... 3.6
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Section 601.
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Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Section 603.
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Federal Aviation Regulations §21.165,
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OTHER AUTHORITIES
Restatement of Contracts 9
POU eee ETO COCO OCC S COO T eee eee ee eee eee rere eee
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1974
No.
DELTA AIR LINES, INC..,
\ Petitioner,
v.
McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION,
Respondent.
- PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Petitioner, Delta Air Lines, Inc. (Delta), respectfully
requests that a writ of certiorari issue to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to review the opinion and
judgment entered in this case on October 31, 1974, rehearing of
which was denied on December 17, 1974. The case involves
important questions as to the effect of the violation of Federal
Aviation Regulations by manufacturers of large commercial
aircraft and calls for the application of this court’s supervisory
power to correct a grossly incorrect decision by the Fifth
Circuit. The decision of the Fifth Circuit constitutes a clear
failure to follow the applicable law and will result in the
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the manufacture of aircraft, contrary to principles recognized by
this Court and another Court of Appeals. Unless corrected by
this Court, the decision could lead to a decrease in the safety
standards of large aircraft manufacturers and a lower regard for
the safety regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA).
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, 503 F.2d 239 (Sth
Cir. 1974), is set out in the Appendix, as is the opinion of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia, 350 F.Supp. 738 (USDC ND Ga. 1972).
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
October 31, 1974, and a timely petition for rehearing was
denied on December 17, 1974. This petition for certiorari is
filed within ninety (90) days of that date. The jurisdiction of
this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether an exculpatory clause which relieves a federally
regulated manufacturer of aircraft from the consequences of
violating a federal regulation requiring the safe manufacture of
aircraft is void as being contrary to public policy.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
1. Sections 601 and 603 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, 49 U.S.C. § §1421, 1423 are set out in the Appendix.
2. Section 21.165 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, 14
CFR §21.165, provides as follows:
“21.165. Responsibility of holder.
The holder of a production certificate shall
(a) Maintain the quality control system with the data
and procedures approved for the production certificate; and,
(b) Determine that each aircraft submitted for air-
worthiness certification or approval conforms to the type
design and is in a condition for safe operation.”
2
provides as follows:
a
“§ 1668. Contracts contrary to policy of law
CERTAIN CONTRACTS UNLAWFUL. All contracts which
have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone
from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the
person or property of another, or violation of law, whether
willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises out of the collapse of the nose gear of a
new “stretched” DC-8 aircraft in January of 1969, some two
weeks after it had been delivered by McDonnell Douglas
Corporation (MDC) to Delta pursuant to a purchase agreement
between the parties. (At the time the stretched DC-8 was the
largest passenger-carrying aircraft in the world.) The collapse
occurred when a regularly scheduled passenger flight was
landing in Jacksonville, Florida. Fortunately, there were no
injuries to passengers or the crew, but the nose and nose gear
portions of the aircraft were substantially damaged.
After investigation Delta advised MDC that the collapse
had resulted from the negligence of MDC and later requested
MDC to reimburse it for damages sustained by Delta in the
amount of approximately $203,000. The FAA also concluded
that MDC had been at fault and that MDC had violated Section
21.165(b) of the Federal Aviation Regulations by failing to
determine that the aircraft was in a condition for safe
operation. (A copy of the FAA’s letter in this regard is included
in the appendix.)
MDC nevertheless refused to honor Delta’s request for
reimbursement and contended that it had no liability under the
exculpatory clause of the purchase agreement. That clause
provides that MDC’s liability is limited to its express warranty
obligations and that MDC is not responsible for any other
liabilities, even if occasioned from its own negligence.' MDC
further denied that it had any obligation under the express
warranty.
Subsequently, Delta initiated this action against MDC in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia. Jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship
and amount in controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. MDC filed
a motion for summary judgment based upon the exculpatory
clause and the motion was overruled. The parties then agreed to
a limited non-jury trial upon the issue of the effect of the
exculpatory clause upon the various theories of recovery set out
in Delta - complaint.
Following this trial the District Court entered a judgment
dismissing Delta’s claim insofar as it was based upon negligence
and strict liability in tort on the basis that the exculpatory
clause was broad enough to cover both of these theories and
that the exculpatory clause did not violate public policy,
despite the fact that it relieved MDC of the consequences of
violating a federal aviation regulation; despite the California
statute which specifically declares that any contract relieving a
person from responsibility for a willful or negligent violation of
1 The entire clause reads as follows: “(G) The warranty provided in
this article and the obligations and liabilities of Seller thereunder are in
lieu of and Buyer hereby waives all other warranties, guarantees or
liabilities, express or implied arising by law or otherwise (including
without limitation any obligation of Seller with respect to consequential
damages) and whether or not occasioned by Seller’s negligence and shall
not be extended, altered or varied except by a written instrument signed
by Seller and Buyer, provided that in the event the provision relieving
Seller from liability for its negligence should for any reason be ineffective,
the remainder of this paragraph (G) shall remain in full force and effect.”
4
law is against public policy;' despite a clearly correct decision
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reaching a contrary
result, and despite a clearly correct decision by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reaching a contrary result, and
despite a decision of this Court recognizing that one of the main
purposes of the rule preventing enforcement of release-from-
negligence contracts is to discourage negligence by making the
wreng-doer pay damagers. The District Court concluded,
however, that there was substantial ground for difference of
opinion and authorized an immediate appeal. Delta prosecuted
an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). The
Court of Appeals affirmed.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. The Courts Below Have Misconceived the Effect of
Upholding the Exculpatory Clause Upon the Public In-
terest and in So Doing Have Undermined the Federal
Regulation of Aircraft Safety.
MDC has contended, and the courts below have agreed,
that the only thing involved in this case is whether two large
corporations may agree to allocate the economic risks associ-
ated with defects in manufacturing even though the defects
result from the manufacturer’s negligence and even though the
manufacturer violates federal safety regulations by its negli-
gence. It also has been maintained by MDC that Delta could
have paid more for the aircraft and secured the removal of the
exculpatory clause. Although Delta’s witnesses testified that it
was not possible to negotiate the clause out of the contract, this
is not the point raised by Delta’s contention that the clause
violates public policy and is void. The point is that federal
safety regulations are undermined by a private contract and that
this is contrary to the public interest in attaining the highest
possible degree of safety in the manufacture of aircraft which
transport millions of passengers each year.
'The parties had agreed that California law was applicable in
determining the validity of the exculpatory clause.
~> Wren tet
In Section 601 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49
U.S.C. §1421, Congress has authorized the FAA Administrator
to prescribe rules and regulations with respect to aircraft safety
and in Section 603, 49 U.S.C. §1423, the Administrator is
empowered to issue type and production certificates to manu-
facturers of aircraft under certain conditions and to issue
airworthiness certificates for aircraft. (See Appendix.) Pursuant
to this statutory authority the Administrator promulgated
Section 21.165 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, 14 CFR
§ 21.165, which requires the holder of a production certificate
(such as MDC held for the “stretched” DC-8) to:
“Determine that each aircraft submitted for air-
worthiness certification or approval conforms to
the type design and is in a condition for safe
operation.” (emphasis added)
In its letter of April 24, 1969, the FAA stated that its
investigation indicated that MDC had failed properly to
assemble the aircraft and that MDC had violated §21.165(b) by
failing to determine that the aircraft was in a condition for safe
operation. (See Appendix.) Notwithstanding the fact that
§ 1668 of the California Civil Code specifically declares as
against public policy any contract which relieves a party of
responsibility for a violation of law, the District Court and the
Fifth Circuit refused to invalidate the exculpatory clause, which
relieves MDC of responsibility for its own negligence even when
it results in a violation of law.
The courts below failed to deal squarely with the issue
raised by the California statute and the violation of the
regulation, but instead relied upon the reasoning of a California
court in an earlier case between Delta and MDC’s predecessor,
Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc., in which the issue had not
been decided. In that case the court had said, “The upholding
of the exculpatory clause will not adversely affect rights of
future passengers” because “[t]hey are not parties to the
contract and their rights would not be compromised.” Delta Air
Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc. , 238 Cal. App. 2d
95, 47 Cal. Reptr. 518 (1965). It is true that the rights of
injured passengers would not be directly compromised, but
6
undoubtedly the passengers would prefer not to be injured in
the first place. It is in order to discourage conduct which might
cause such injuries that the courts have refused to uphold
exculpatory clauses which affect the public interests and there
could hardly be a matter in which the public has a greater
interest than the safety of large commercial aircraft. The courts
below lost sight of this point in concluding that the only issue
was whether an allocation of risks should be upheld.
The principles involved were well-stated by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska
Airlines, Inc., 351 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1965), in which that court
also demonstrated the views of, this Court, expressed in Bisso y.
Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955), as to the policy
reasons for refusing to uphold exculpatory clauses such as the
one involved here. Because of the pertinence of that case, which
involved the public interest in safe aircraft operations, and the
authority cited therein, it is quoted at length as follows:
“It is, or course, ordinarily desirable that competent
parties be protected in their rights to make and enforce
agreements between themselves. These rights are restricted by
the transcendent rule that denies enforceability to a private
contractual provision which would require an unlawful act or
which, given effect, would gravely violate paramount require-
ments of public interest. Especially significant here is the
decision of our own court in Air Transport Associates v.
United States, 221 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1955). There. the
Government, the owner and operator of an Alaskan airport,
had granted to an air carrier the right to employ the airport’s
facilities in exchange for valuable consideration and the
execution by the carrier of an agreement undertaking to
exculpate the Government for any loss arising from the
carrier's operations. Following a nighttime crash of one of the
carrier’s planes, alleged to have resulted from the Govern-
ment’s negligence in parking a ground vehicle upon an
unlighted runway, the carrier sued, under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, to recover for the damage to its aircraft. Jn
defense, the Government invoked the exculpatory provision of
the contract. We rejected the defense, holding that under the
law of both Washington, where the contract was executed, and
Alaska, where the contract was to be performed, the exculpa-
7
DEO SIRE
¥
ERA ON: OE SPE Th
tory provision was invalid. We held that its enforcement would
be opposed to the policy interests of the general public. That
decision rests upon the controlling fact that the airport was a
public service. In looking to Washington law, we cited Griffiths
v. Henry Broderick, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 901, 182 P.2d 18,175
A.L.R. 1 (1947), aud Broderson v. Rainier Nat. Park Co., 187
Wash. 399, 60 P.2d 234 (1936), and we wrote, 221 F.2d at
page 472,
‘In both of those cases, while the Washington Supreme
Court held valid exculpatory agreements, they recog-
nized the general law concerning this type of agreement,
and cited with approval the statement of that law found
in the American Law Institute, Restatement of Con-
tracts, Volume 2, Section 575(1) as follows:
*“A bargain for exemption from liability for the
consequences of a wilful breach of duty is illegal,
and a bargain for exemption from liability for the
consequences of negligence is illegal if * * *
(b) one of the parties is charged with a duty of
public service, and the bargain relates to negligence
in the performance of any part of its duty to the
public, for which it has received or been promised
compensation.’ ” [emphasis added ]
“In Bisso [Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp.], 349 U.S. at 91,
75 S.Ct. at 632, we see the Supreme Court’s views in the
language, ‘The two main reasons for the creation and
application of the rule [to prevent enforcement of release-
from-negligence contracts] have been (1) to discourage negli-
gence by making wrong-doers pay damages, * * *. The dangers
of modern machines make it all the more necessary that
negligence be discouraged.’ Can it be sincerely believed that
the public interest is better served by the discouraging of the
negligence of tugboat operators than by the discouraging of
negligence on the part of operators of public airports? We
think not.” [emphasis added]
Similarly, can it be believed that the public interest in
discouraging the negligent manufacture of aircraft is less
important than discouraging the negligence of airport op-
8
erators? Obviously, it is not and there is an overriding public
interest that aircraft be manufactured safely- as is evidenced by
the detailed federal regulation of aircraft manufacturers. Clear-
ly, public policy will not allow a manufacturer to insist upon a
contract exculpating it from the consequences of violating such
regulations. That this is true as a matter of federal law is
demonstrated by the Bisso case. That it is true as a matter of
general law is demonstrated by the Restatement of Contracts
quoted in the Northwest case. There is no divergence from the
federal or general law in California, as will be shown hereinafter.
But the Courts below have failed to recognize the principles
involved and this failure is quite important to the nation as
whole because so many aircraft manufacturers are located in
California and because of the effect of the decision upon the
federal scheme of regulating aircraft safety.
2. The Courts Below Incorrectly Refused To Follow the
Law of California Which, Consistent With the General
Law, Requires a Holding that the Exculpatory Clause Is
Against Public Policy and Void.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
incorrectly relied upon Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft
Company, Inc., supra, in holding that the exculpatory clause
did not violate public policy, despite the fact that the question
of violation of a federal regulation had not been decided by the
Delta v. Douglas court. The Court of Appeals acknowledged
that under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), it was
obliged to follow the law of California and that in Delta vy.
Douglas the court had not decided the question of whether the
exculpatory clause would have been invalid if a_ federal
regulation (or any other law) had been violated. Nevertheless,
the court failed to take the next step required of it under the
Erie doctrine of looking to other California cases which had
ruled on the point. Instead of moving on to the applicable
California cases the Court used the “bootstrap” reasoning that
it had already concluded that the exculpatory clause was not
invalid:
‘
:
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j
“The total comments in the [Delta v. Douglas] opinion
relating to this argument about Section 1668 leave no
inference whatsoever as io how the court would have handled
the argument had Douglas violated the regulations. See 47 Cal.
Rptr. at 525. With the Douglas case providing no guidance, we
feel our analysis of Delta’s first point applies equally to this
point, and Delta’s argument fails.”
Delta demonstrated, however, in its petition for rehearing,
that the Court’s analysis of the “first point” was incorrect and
was not based upon California law, but upon an irrelevant
principle of North Dakota law.' Moreover, nothing the court
said could change the fact that the question of the effect of a
violation of law was not ruled upon in Delta v. Douglas so that
the court’s clear duty was to apply the California cases which
had decided the point. The California cases which do apply are
discussed below.
In the case of Hanna v. Lederman, 36 Cal. Rptr. 150
(1963), the court had before it the exact legal issue presented in
this case. There plaintiffs were tenants who were suing their
landlord for damages resulting from a defective fire sprinkler
system, which defect was alleged to be in violation of a city
ordinance. The landlord maintained that the action was barred
by an exculpatory provision in the lease which provided that
“Lessee ... hereby waives all claims against lessor for damages
... from any cause arising at any time... .” (This is exactly the
same as McDonnell Douglas’ contention that Delta’s claim is
barred by the exculpatory clause.) After determining that the
city ordinance was applicable, the Court held:
1The court found, in regard to the so-called “first point,” that Delta
had confused “a negligence theory of action, under which violation of a
law or a regulation may be evidence of negligence [citation omitted] with
the liability that may be imposed by law.” Delta pointed out in its petition
for rehearing that the court had apparently misunderstood Delta’s
argument because the issue was not whether Delta could prove negligence
by showing a violation of law (the negligence per se doctrine), but whether
the exculpatory clause was valid if it relieved MDC of the consequences of
violating a law.
10
a |
“Each lease contained an exculpatory provision which
has been set forth hereinabove. The effect of that provision
must be determined in light of section 1668 of the Civil Code.
*** “-
“Since the claim for damages because of negligence embodied
in the first cause of action . . . was predicated upon an alleged
violation of [the city ordinance], the exculpatory provision
could not be a defense to that cause of action if the evidence
showed such violation to be a proximate cause of the tenant’s
loss.” (36 Cal. Rptr. 25 154) [emphasis added ] ~
Similarly, in this case Delta’s negligence count alleges that
MDC violated 14 C.F.R. §21.165 and that this violation was a
proximate cause of Delta’s damages. The cases are conceptually
identical. “a
In a later case which is very similar to the Hanna, the
California Fifth District Court of Appeals held in Halliday y.
Greene, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1966), that sublessees were covered
by a safety order issued pursuant to law, and that an
exculpatory clause in the lease was ineffective, saying:
“However, the defect here constituted a violation of a
safety order. If the safety order is applicable, the exculpatory
clause is ineffective because Civil Code Section 1668 provides:
[quotation omitted] ~
“Public policy as expressed in Section 1668, prohibits an
agreement to relieve one of the consequences of his violation
of the law, and this is whether the violation be willful or
negligent.”” (Stonehocher v. Casano, 154 Cal. App. 2d 732,
736, 316 P.2f 717.) (53 Cal. Rptr. at 272)
The principle was again reaffirmed in the case of Buckner
vy. Azulai, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967), where the court said “Any
attempted waiver of such a duty so imposed by law is invalid.”
(59 Cal. Rptr. at 808)
By ignoring the cases cited above, which are the only cases
cited to the Court on the validity of an exculpatory clause
which relieves a party from the civil liability resulting from a
violation of law, the Court violated its own conclusion as to the
requirement of the Erie doctrine:
Se, ee ee ee
\
“What may be more important in addressing the plaintiffs
contention is that under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, supra, we are
bound to follow state law, whether or not we agree with the
reasoning upon which it is based or the outcome which it
dictates. This is the ultimate significance of the Erie decision.
Delta has not cited us to any subsequent California decisions
criticizing, distinguishing, or modifying the Douglas case.
Therefore, Douglas remains the latest, most authoritative
expression of California law applicable to the facts of this case.
It is controlling for our purpose. See Ford Motor Co. v.
Mathis, 322 F.2d 267, 269 (Sth Cir. 1963).”
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Delta did not need to cite any such cases, however,
because even the Court of Appeals found that Delta v. Douglas
did not deal with the question at issue. Delta v. Douglas was
: irrelevant on this point and it was not necessary that it be
4 distinguished. Delta cited the California cases applicable to this
& question and neither the Court of Appeals nor MDC has or
could distinguish them. Moreover, the cases cited by Delta were
perfectly consistent with the leading California case of Tunkl v.
: Regents of Univ. of Calif., 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 391 P.2d 168
: (1963). In Tunkl it had been held that exculpatory clauses
4 affecting the public interest cannot be upheld and the court
discussed a number of factors to be considered in determining if
the public interest is involved,’ but there was no violation of
law involved in that case as there is here. Clearly, a violation of
law or regulation (dealing with aircraft safety in this case)
conclusively establishes a public interest, specifically recognized
in § 1668 of the California Civil Code, stronger than any of the
individual factors mentioned in Tunkl for determining the
public interest when a law or regulation is not violated.
CONCLUSION
In the Federal Aviation Act Congress established a
pervasive scheme for regulating all aspects of safety in air
transportation, including the manufacture of aircraft. In pur-
See ELS Sane
1Delta pointed out in its briefs below that the Delta v. Douglas court
had improperly distinguished Tunkl by concluding that public interest
factors were not involved in the manufacture of aircraft.
12
suance of that scheme the FAA, inter alia, has issued regula-
tions, which have the force of law, designed to insure the
highest degree of safety possible in the manufacture of aircraft.
That safety in the manufacture of aircraft is a matter of
overriding federal public interest cannot be doubted. If an
aircraft manufacturer may by contract relieve itself of any of
the consequences which normally flow from the violation of
these regulations then the federal regulatory scheme is seriously
undermined. As this Court said in the Bisso case, supra, one of
the two main reasons for the creation and application of the
rule preventing the enforcement of release-from-negligence
contracts is “to discourage negligence by making the wrongdoer
pay damages * * *.”
Consistent with the general law, California has declared
that contracts which relieve a party of responsibility for a
negligent or willful violation of law are void and its courts
consistently have stricken down such clauses when raised as a
defense in an action for damages.
If the decision of the Court of Appeals below is not
reversed so as to comport with federal policy and California
law, the public interest in the safe manufacture of aircraft will
be thwarted, the federal law will be undermined and a serious
error of decision will be allowed to stand. For these reasons,
Delta respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari be issued to the
Court of Appeals to review its decision in this case.
Of Counsel: Respectfully submitted,
Robert S. Harkey Frank F. Rox
Law Department Law Department
Delta Air Lines, Inc. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
Hartsfield Atlanta Int’l Hartsfield Atlanta Int'l Airport
Airport Atlanta, Georgia 30320
Atlanta, Georgia 30320
Robert Reed Gray
Hale Russell & Stentzel
1001 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Attorneys for Petitioner
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Section 601, 49 U.S.C. §1421
§1421. Powers and duties of Administrator—Minimum stand-
ards; rules and regulations
(a) The Administrator is empowered and it shall be his
duty to promote safety of flight of, civil aircraft in air commerce
by prescribing and revising from time to time:
(1) Such minimum standards governing the design,
materials, workmanship, construction, and performance of
aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers as may be required
in the interest of safety;
(2) Such minimum standards governing appliances
as may be required in the interest of safety;
(3) Reasonable rules and regulations and minimum
standards governing; in the interest of safety, (A) the
inspection, servicing, and overhaul of aircraft, aircraft
engines, propellers, and appliances; (B) the equipment and
facilities for such inspection, servicing, and overhaul; and
(C) in the discretion of the Administrator, the periods for.
and the manner in, which such inspection, servicing, and
overhaul shall be made, including provision for examina-
tions and reports by properly qualified private persons
whose examinations or reports the Administrator may
accept in lieu of those made by its officers and employces;
(4) Reasonable rules and régulations governing the
reserve supply of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers,
appliances, and aircraft fuel and oil, required in the
interest of safety, including the reserve supply of aircraft
fuel and oil which shai: be carried in flight;
(5) Reasonable rules and regulations governing, in
the interest of safety, the maximum hours or periods of
service of airmen, and other employees, of air carriers; and
(6) Such reasonable rules and regulations, or mini-
/ mum standards, governing other practices, methods, and
A-l
DRE IO LID LAL NO
procedure, as the Administrator may find necessary to
provide adequately for national security and safety in air
commerce.
Consideration of needs of service; classification of standards,
rules, regulations, and certificates
(b) In prescribing standards, rules, and regulations, and in
issuing certificates under this subchapter, the Administrator
shall give full consideration to the duty resting upon air carriers
to perform their services with the highest possible degree of
safety in the public interest and to any differences between air
transportation and other air commerce; and he shall make
classifications of such standards, rules, regulations, and certifi-
cates appropriate to the differences between air transportation
and other air commerce. The Administrator may authorize any
aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance, for which an
aircraft certificate. authorizing use thereof in air transportation
has been issued, to be used in other air commerce without the
issuance of a further certificate. The Administrator shall
exercise and’ perform his powers and duties under this chapter
in such manner as will best tend to reduce or eliminate the
possibility of, or recurrence of, accidents in air transportation,
‘but shall not deem himself required to give preference to either
air transportation or other air commerce in the administration
and enforcement of this subchapter.
Exemptions
(c) The Administrator from time to time may grant
exemptions from the requirements of any rule or regulation
prescribed under this subchapter if he finds that such action
would be in the public interest. Pub.L. 85-726, Title VI, § 601,
Aug. 23, 1958, 72 Stat. 775.
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Section 603, 49 U.S.C. §1423 |
§1423. Aircraft certificates—Authorization to issue; applica-
tion; investigation; tests; issuance of type certificate °
(a) (1) The Administrator is empowered to issue type
A-2
certificates for aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers; to
specify in regulations the appliances for which the issuance of
type certificates is reasonably required in the interest of safety;
and to issue such certificates for appliances so specified.
(2) Any interested person may file with the Adminis-
trator an application for a type certificate for an aircraft,
aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance specified in regulations
under paragraph (1) of this subsection. Upon receipt of an
application, the Administrator shall make an_ investigation
thereof and may hold hearings thereon. The Administrator shall
make, or require the applicant to make, such tests during
manufacture and upon completion as the Administrator deems
reasonably necessary in the interest of safety, including flight
tests and tests of raw materials or any part or appurtenance of
such aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance. If the
Administrator finds that such aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller,
or appliance is of proper design, material, specification, con-
struction, and performance for safe operation, and meets the
minimum standards, rules, and regulations prescribed by the
Administrator, he shall issue a type certificate therefor. The
Administrator may prescribe in any such certificate the dura-
tion thereof and such other terms, conditions, and limitations as
are required in the interest of safety. The Administrator may
record upon any certificate issued for aircraft, aircraft engines,
or propellers, a numerical determination of all of the essential
factors relative to the performance of the aircraft, aircraft
engine, or propeller for which the certificate is issued.
Production certificates
(b) Upon application, and if it satisfactorily appears to
the Administrator that duplicates of any aircraft, aircraft
engine, propeller, or appliance for which a type certificate has
been issued will conform to such certificate, the Administrator
shall issue a production certificate authorizing the production
of duplicates of such aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or
appliances. The Administrator shall make such inspection and
may require such tests of any aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller.
or appliance manufactured under a production certificate as
may be necessary to assure manufacture of each unit in
A-3
Ce ee
conformity with the type certificate or any amendment or
inodification thereof. The Administrator may prescribe in any
such production certificate the duration thereof and such other
terms, conditions, and limitations as are required in the
interest of safety.
Airworthiness certificates
(c) The registered owner of any aircraft may file with the
Administrator an application for an airworthiness certificate for
such aircraft. If the Administrator finds that the aircraft
conforms to the type certificate therefor, and, after inspection,
that the aircraft is in condition for safe operation, he shall issue
an airworthiness certificate. The Administrator may prescribe in
such certificate the duration of such certificate, the type of
service for which the aircraft may be used, and such other
terms, conditions, and limitations, as are required in the interest
of safety. Each such certificate shall be registered by the
Administrator and shall set forth such information as the
Administrator may deem advisable. The certificate number, or
such other individual designation as may be required by the
Administrator, shall be displayed upon each aircraft in ac-
cordance with regulations prescribed by the Administrator.
Pub.L. 85-726, Title VI, §603, Aug. 23, 1958, 72 Stat. 776.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
)
Plaintiff )
v. ) Civil Action No. 13768
McDonnell Douglas Corporation, )
Defendant )
ORDER
Findings cf Fact
1. This case involves the collapse of the nose landing’gear
assembly of a “stretched” or “super” DC-8 aircraft manufac-
A4
tured by defendant McDonnell Douglas Corporation (““MDC’’)
and operated by plaintiff Delta Air Lines, Inc. (“Delta”).
Federal court jurisdiction is founded upon diversity of citizen-
ship and an amount in controversy in excess of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
2. At the July 10, 1972, nonjury trial the parties advised
the Court that the evidence and discovery developed to date
indicates that the cause of the nose gear collapse during the
landing roll of the aircraft was an incorrectly installed com-
ponent part of the nose landing gear assembly. Delta contends
that the component part was installed incorrectly by MDC
when MDC assembled the aircraft. MDC on the other hand
contends that the component part was correctly installed during
assembly and that the component part was removed and
re-installed incorrectly during post-delivery servicing of the
aircraft by Delta. In the alternative, MDC contends that if there
was a “defect in workmanship” (i.e., incorrect installation of a_
component part), Delta should and could have in the exercise
of ordinary care detected such defect in workmanship, and that
the alleged damages therefore arise from Delta’s own negligence.
3. Delta’s amended complaint seeks to impose liability on
four theories: Count One alleges negligence; Count Two alleges
breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for
a particular purpose; Count Three aticgzes breach of the express
warranty: and Count Four alleges strict liability in tort.
4. Asan additional and affirmative defense MDC asserts:
(a) the limitations of liability and exculpatory
clause contained in the Warranty Article of the Purchase
Agreement negotiated and agreed to by the parties bar Delta’s
claims based on negligence, breach of implied warranties and
Strict liability;
(b) MDC is not liable for breach of express warranty
because the Warranty Article specifically provides that liability
for breach of the express “workmanship” warranty is limited,
among other things, to the replacement of the improperly
installed part;
(c) Delta failed to follow the warranty claim pro-
cedures spelled out in the Warranty Article, which relieved MDC
of liability with respect to the claim based on breach of express
A-5
PASSA ee Se Tt
warranty; and
(d) in any event MDC is not liable for the type of
damages sought by Delta because such damages are specifically
excluded by the limitations of liability and exculpatory clause
contained in the Purchase Agreement Warranty Article.
5. MDC filed a motion for summary judgment (sup-
ported by evidence) based on the defenses outlined in the
preceding paragraph. Delta submitted opposing affidavits and
contended, among other things:
(a) as a matter of economic necessity Delta was
required to p-‘rchase MDC’s “stretched” DC-8 aircraft;
(b) the limitations of liability and exculpatory clause
in the Purchase Agreement Warranty Article were forced upon
Delta by MDC;
(c) Delta did not voluntarily agree to such provi-
sions;
(d) Delta was unable to negotiate a deletion of such
provisions from the Purchase Agreement;
(e) the Purchase Agreement is a contract of adhe-
sion in this respect;
(f) the limitations of liability and exculpatory
clause are unconscionable, violate public policy and are un-
enforceable; and
(g) the provisions of the Warranty Article therefore
do not bar Delta’s claims for relief.
6. The Court denied MDC’s motion for summary judg-
ment because there appeared to be material issues of fact in
dispute. At the request of the parties, based upon a limited
waiver of jury trial, the Court held a nonjury trial on July 10,
1972, to decide the validity of the “defense based upon the
Warranty Article and exculpatory clause contained in the
contract documents” (Limited Waiver of Jury Trial, filed June
15, 1972).
7. The Purchase Agreement in question was signed at
Long Beach, California, on November 18, 1964, and originally
related only to the so-called “short’’ DC-8 aircraft, or Series 51
DC-8 aircraft. On August 13, 1966, at Long Beach, California,
the parties executed Amendment No. 5 to the Purchase
Agreement. The amendment provided that additional DC-8
A-6
aircraft, of the Series 61 or “stretched” variety, would be
delivered to Delta under the terms and provisions of the
November 18, 1964, Purchase Agreement. The accident aircraft
was one of the aircraft covered in Amendment No. 5.
8. Article 4 of the Purchase Agreement stated the
aircraft would be manufactured and delivered in California, and
Article 17 provided: “This agreement shall be construed and
performance thereof shall be determined according to the laws
of the State of California, U.S.A.” The Purchase Agreement also
contained clauses which limited the agreements between the
parties to the exact written terms of the contract.
9. At the time of the accident in question, Delta was
operating the aircraft under a lease agreement with McDonnell
Douglas Finance Corporation, but the lease was contemplated
by the parties and they agreed that the lease agreement would
not abrogate or modify the provision of the Purchase Agree-
ment.
10. The Warranty Article in the Purchase Agreement
provided:
“12. WARRANTY.
“(A) Subject to the limitations and conditions herein-
after set forth, seller warrants that the aircraft, accessories,
equipment and parts supplied hereunder which have been
manufactured by seller, and by other manufacturers if made to
detailed design and detailed specifications originated by seller,
shall at the time of delivery by seller be free from:
(1) Defects ir material and workmanship fur-
nished by seller and used in the fabrication thereof;
(2) Defects arising from the selection of material
or process of marufacture;
(3) Defects inherent in the design thereof in
view of the state of the art as of the date of such design;
(4) Defects arising from failure to conform to
the detailed specifications of this purchase agreement
except as to such portions thereof, if any, as are
expressly stated to be not guaranteed.
“(B) Defects in material and workmanship. defects
arising from the selection of material or process of manufac-
A-7
ture and defects arising from failure to conform to the detailed
specifications, must become apparent in the aircraft, acces-
sory, equipment or part within one (1) year or two thousand
(2,000) flying hours, whichever shall first expire, but not less
than eight (8) months after delivery of said aircraft.
“The extent of seller’s liability under this warranty as to
defects in material or workmanship, defects arising from the
selection of material or the process of manufacture, and
defects arising from failure to conform to the detailed
specifications, is limited to the repair at its expense of such
defects in the aircraft or to the repair or replacement at its
expense (with a similar item free from the defect in question)
of any accessory, equipment or part which is defective in any
of such respects.
“(C) The extent of seller's liablity under this warranty
as to defects inherent in design is limited to the correction at
its expense of all such defects becoming apparent in the
aircraft, accessory, equipment or part purchased hereunder
within one (1) year or two thousand (2,000) flying hours,
whichever shall first expire, but not less than eight (8) months
after delivery of said airciaft.
“(D) Seller shall :nake the foregoing repairs, replace-
ments and corrections with reasonable care and dispatch in
order that the aircrait, system, accessory, equipment or part
involved may pot be kept out of service longer than necessary.
Disassembly of the aircraft to correct the defect, removal of
the defective or faulty structure, system, accessory, equip-
ment, or new part and installation of the corrected or new
structure, system, accessory, equipment or new part and
re-assembly of the aircraft shall be at buyer's expense, unless
such work is performed by seller at its factory at Long Beach,
California, or unless buyer offers to return the aircraft,
accessory, equipment or part and buyer and seller thereafter
mutually agree that buyer will perform the work and that
seller will pay buyer in whole or in part for removal,
installation and re-assembly of the aircraft. Cost of temporary
or interim repairs, replacements and corrections accomplished
by buyer, as well as any consequential cost related thereto,
shall likewise be at buyer's expense, except when seller, in
advance, approves in writing such temporary or interim
repairs, replacements and corrections and the cost thereof,
which cost seller may agree to pay in whole or in part.
A-8
“(E) Seller shall, as to each defect, be relieved of all
obligations and liability under this warranty if:
(1) The aircraft is operated with any accessory,
equipment or part not specifically approved by seller
and not manufactured by seller or to seller’s design and
specification unless buyer furnishes reasonable evidence
that such installation was not a cause of the defect;
provided that this provision shall not apply to any
accessory, equipment or part, the use of which does not
affect the safety of the aircraft:
(2) The aircraft shall not have been operated or
maintained in accordance with seller’s instructions fur-
nished under this agreement, unless buyer furnishes
reasonable evidence that such operation or maintenance,
as the case may be, was not a cause of the defect;
(3) The aircraft shall not have been operated
under normal airline use, unless buyer furnishes reason-
able evidence that such operation was not a cause of the
defect;
(4) The aircraft shall not have been repaired,
altered or modified without seller’s approval or if the
aircraft shall have been operated subsequent to its
involvement in an accident, unless buyer furnishes
reasonable evidence that such repair, alteration, modifi-
cation, operation or accident was not a cause of the
defect, provided, however, that this limitation insofar as
it relates to repairs and accident shall not be applicable
to routine repairs or replacements or minor accidents
which normally occur in the operation of aircraft if such
repairs or replacements are made within suitable material
and according to standard practice and engineering;
(S) Buyer does not (i) report the defect in
writing or by telegram to seller’s warranty administrator
at its factory in Long Beach, California, within sixty
(60) days following such defect becoming apparent to
buyer as provided in paragraphs (B) and (C) above, and
(ii) return the defective or faulty aircraft, accessory,
equipment or part to said factory (or, if return to seller’s
factory is not feasible and seller so agrees in advance in
writing, which agreement shall not unreasonably be
withheld, to buyer’s base repair shop or other appropri-
A-9
ate facility in the United States) within sixty (60) days
following the end of the applicable period of time
specified in paragraphs (B) and (C) above, or within
sixty (60) days following such defect becoming ap-
parent, whichever is earlier, and further provided that if,
for reasons beyond buyer’s control, return of the items
to seller’s factory is not possible within said sixty (60)
day period, and if buyer so notifies seller in writing and
seller so agrees in writing, which agreement shall not
unreasonably be withheld, the said sixty (60) day period
will be waived, but buyer must return the item to
seller’s said factory if, as and when said return does
become feasible. Buyer also must submit reasonable
proof to seller, within sixty (60) days after the defect
becomes apparent (except when such period is waived)
that the defect is due to a matter embraced within the
seller’s warranty hereunder. Seller shall approve or
disapprove buer’s substantiated warranty claim in
writing within’ sixty (60) days of receipt thereof. All
such transportation, including return to buyer of the
repaired, replaced or corrected aircraft, accessory, equip-
ment or part shall be at buyer’s expense.
“With respect to matters made the subject of seller’s
approval under sub-paragraphs (1), (4) and seller’s approval or
disapproval of buyer’s warranty claim under (5) of this
paragraph (E), seller’s approval or disapproval thereof shall be
made in writing to buyer within sixty (60) days after buyer's
written notice requesting approval is received by seller. In the
event of disapproval, seller shall set forth the reasons therefor
in its statement of disapproval. Seller’s failure to deliver to
buyer a written statement of approval or disapproval within
such sixty (60) day period shall irrevocably and conclusively
constitute approval by seller of the subject matter of the
particular request involved.
“(F) Normal wear and tear and the need for regular
overhauls shall not constitute a defect or failure under this
warranty. Buyer acknowledges that some of the accessories,
equipment and parts warranted hereunder have a normal life
expectancy that is less than the time period specified under
paragraph (B) and (C) above. 4
“(G) The warranty provided in this article and the
obligations and liabilities of seller thereunder are in lieu of and
A-10
buyer hereby waives all other warranties, guarantees or
liabilities, express or implied arising by law or otherwise
(including without limitation any obligation of seller with
respect to consequential damages) and whether or not occa-
sioned by seller’s negligence and shall not be extended, altered
or varied except by a written instrument signed by seller and
buyer; provided that in the event the provision relieving seller
from liability for its negligence should for any reason be
ineffective, the remainder of this paragraph (G) shall remain in
full force and effect.”
11. The aircraft Purchase Agreement incorporated the
terms of a prior agreement, including the Warranty Clause,
which were the subject of intensive negotiation. There was no
substantial imbalance in the bargaining position of the parties
and the Warranty Clause was not dictated by MDC on a “take it
~ or leave it” basis. Due to the California Court of Appeals
decision in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas, 230 Cal. App.2d 95
(Nov. 9, 1965), entered several months before the parties
entered into the agreement in the instant case, Delta was aware
that MDC would, under certain circumstances, agree to modifi-
cation or elimination of the exculpatory clause, albeit for a
price which Delta apparently did not wish to pay (see. 230 Cal.
App.2d at 103, n.5).
Conclusions of Law
When ruling on substantive matters of law, federal courts
must follow the laws of the State in which it sits [Erie R.R. v. |
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)] including its Conflicts of Laws
rules [Klaxon Co. vy. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487
(1941)]. The Georgia conflicts of law rule concerning the
validity and interpretation of contracts made in another state
provides the law of the state where the contract was made and
performed will govern except when the result is contrary to the
public policy of the State of Georgia. Cox vr. Adams, 2 Ga. 158,
165 (1847); Tillman v. Gibson, 44 Ga. App. 440, 442, 161 S.E.
630, (1931). The Georgia state courts would apply
California law in this case not only because the contract was
made and performed in California, but also because the parties
specifically agreed in the contract that California law would
A-11
9} hd NSO AREA AGEL Dr SAS
watt
control.
12. The contract before the Court is in all material
respects identical to the contract ruled on by the Califomia
Court of Appeals in Delta v. Douglas, supra. That case, which
Delta unsuccessfully sought to have reviewed by the California
Supreme Court, is the law of California so far as the matters at
issue here are concerned. Accordingly, this Court must uphold
the validity of the exculpatory clause contained in the Warranty
Article of the contract before the Court.
Thus, Delta’s causes of action sounding in “negligence”
and “strict liability in tort” are DISMISSED. Delta’s causes of
action based on the validity of the Warranty Clause, which is
hereby upheld as a matter of law, and recovery thereunder, are
reserved for determination by jury trial pursuant to the limited
waiver of jury trial referred to above.
SO ORDERED, this 30 day of October, 1972.
/s;CHARLES A. MOYE, JR.
United States District Judge
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
)
Plaintiff )
v. ) Civil Action No. 13768
McDonnell Douglas Corporation, )
Defendant )
ORDER
On October 30, 1972, this Court dismissed Delta’s claims
based on negligence and strict liability in tort but did not rule
on its claims based on implied and express warranty. The
Court’s order was based on its nonjury consideration of certain
issues following a limited waiver by the parties of trial by jury.
Defendant, McDonnell Douglas, has moved the Coyrt to
amend that order so as to also dismiss the implied warranty
claim and to exclude “consequential damages” from the express
A-12
warranty claim. In response, Delta contends that this additional
relief sought by defendant is improper because it would force
the court to consider issues on which Delta did not waive trial
by jury. Accordingly, the Court is unwilling to go beyond an
interpretation of the nonjury issues and consequently denies
defendant’s motion.
In an attempt to obtain the right to an immediate appeal
of this Court’s order of October 30, 1972, Delta has moved the
Court to amend that order in one of the following ways:
(1) to include a determination “that there is no just
reason for delay” and to direct the entry of a final
judgment in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
(2) to permit an interlocutory appeal of a controlling
question of law.
Although that order used the phrase “‘cause of action” with
respect to Delta’s claims which were dismissed, it probably
would be more appropriate to say that Delta has a single cause
of action against the defendant for the damage to its aircraft,
and that its complaint sets forth several different legal theories
supporting that cause of action. Consequently, the Court is
doubtful that a finding pursuant to Rule 54(b) would be
appropriate, but the Court is of the opinion that its order of
October 30, 1972, involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from that order may materially
advance the ultimate determination of the litigation [28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b)]. Accordingly, the Court’s order of October 30,
1972, is so amended.
This 22 day of November, 1972.
/s;CHARLES A. MOYE, JR.
United States District Judge
A-13
OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT DATED OCTOBER 31, 1974
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia.
Before BROWN, Chief Judge, and RONEY and GEE, Cir-
cuit Judges.
RONEY, Circuit Judge:
An aircraft purchased by Delta Air Lines, Inc. from McDon-
nell Douglas Corporation, the manufacturer, suffered dam-
ages when its nose gear collapsed during a landing in Jackson-
_ ville, Florida, because a component part was incorrectly in-
stalled. There were no personal injuries. Delta seeks to
+ recover from McDonnell the expenses incurred in repair on
; four theories of liability: (1) negligence; (2) breach of implied
» warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
; purpose; (3) breach of express warranty; and, (4) strict
liability in tort. The District Court dismissed the two counts
sounding in negligence and strict liability on the ground that
_ an exculpatory clause in the contract limited McDonnell’s
liability to contractual warranty provisions. Delta, in this
interlocutory appeal, seeks review of the correctness of the
Court’s ruling in this regard. We affirm.
{1] By cross-appeal McDonnell seeks review of the District
Court’s refusal to dismiss the counts based on express and
implied warranties. The District Court reserved decision as to
these two counts pending trial. Accordingly, there is no
decision on the attempted cross-appeal for us to review at this
time. Assuming without deciding that the allowance of an
interlocutory appeal was not improvident under these cireum-
stances, we will review the validity and effect of the exculpa-
tory clause only insofar as it presents a defense against the
A-14
Sri gp an BRD enlist RANK Gola OE
counts for negligence and strict liability, the is issues previously
decided by the trial court. |
The Purchase Agreement in question was signed at Long
Beach, California, on November 18, 1964, and originally relat-
ed only to the so-called “short” DC-8 aircraft, or Series 51
DC-8 aircraft. On August 13, 1966, at Long Beach, Califor-
nia, the parties executed Amendment No. 5 to the Purchase
Agreement, which amendment provided that additional DC-8
aircraft, of the Series 61 or “stretched” variety, would be
delivered to Delta under the terms and _ provisions of the
November 18, 1964, Purchase Agreement. The accident air-
craft was one of the aircraft covered by Amendment No, 5.
Article 4 of the Purchase Agreement stated the aircraft
would be manufactured and delivered in California, and Arti-
cle 17 provided: “This agreement shall be construed and
performance thereof shall be determined according to the laws
of the State of California, U.S.A.” The Purchase Agreement
also contained clauses which limited the agreements between
the parties to the exact written terms of the contract.
At the time of the accident in question, Delta was operating
the aircraft under a lease agreement with McDonnell Douglas
Finance Corporation, but the lease was contemplated by the
parties and they had agreed that the lease agreement would
not abrogate or modify the provisions of the Purchase Agree-
ment.
The Warranty Article in the Purchase Agreement, set forth
in full in the margin,’ contained the following exculpatory
clause:
(G) The warranty provided in this article and the obliga-
tions and liabilities of seller thereunder are in lieu of and
1. 12. WARRANTY.
(A) Subject to the limitations and conditions hereinafter set forth,
seller warrants that the aircraft, accessories, equipment and parts
supplied hereunder which have been manufactured by seller, and by
other manufacturers if made to detailed design and detailed specifi-
A-15
DES MD NE neitibs Re 3s
_buyer’ hereby waives all other warranties, guarantees or
liabilities, éxpress or implied arising by law or otherwise
(including without limitation any obligation of seller with
cations originated by seller, shall at the time of delivery by seller be
free from:
(1) Defects in material and workmanship furnished by seller
and used in the fabrication thereof;
(2) Defects arising from the selection of material or process of
manufacture;
(3) Defects inherent in the design thereof in view of the state of
‘the art as of the date of such design;
(4) Defects arising from failure to conform to the detailed
specifications of this purchase agreement except as to such
portions thereof, if any, as are expressly stated to be not guaran-
teed.
(B) Defects in material and workmanship, defects arising from
the selection of material or process of manufacture and defects
arising from failure to conform to the detailed specifications, must
become apparent in the aircraft. accessory, equipment or part within
one (1) year or two thousand (2,000) flying hours, whichever shall
first expire, but not less than eight (8) months after delivery of said
aircraft.
The extent of seller’s liability under this warranty as to defects in
. material or workmanship, defects arising from the selection of
material or the process of manufacture, and defects arising from
failure to conform to the detailed specifications, is limited to the
repair at its expense of such defects in the aircraft or to the repair
or replacement at its expense (with a similar item free from the
defect in question) of any accessory, equipment or part which is
defective in any of such respects.
(C) The extent of seller’s liability under this warranty as to
defects inherent in design is limited to the correction at its expense
of all such defects becoming apparent in the aircraft, accessory,
equipment or part purchased hereunder within one (1) year or two
thousand (2,000) flying hours, whichever shall first expire, but not
less than eight (8) months after delivery of said aircraft.
(D) Seller shall make the foregoing repairs, replacements and
corrections with reasonable care and dispatch in order that the
aircraft, system, accessory, equipment or part involved may not be
kept out of service longer than necessary. Disassembly of ‘the
aircraft to correct the defect, removal of the defective or faulty
structure, system, accessory, equipment, or new part and installa-
tion of the corrected or new structure, system, accessory, equipment
or new part and re-assembly of the aircraft shall be at buyer's
expense, unless such work is performed by seller at its factory at
Long Beach, California, or unless buyer offers to return the aircraft,
accessory, equipment or part and buyer and seller thereafter matual-
ly agree that buyer will perform the work and that seller will pay
buyer ‘in whole or in part for removal, installation and re-assembly
A-16
respect to consequential damages) and whether or not occa-
sioned by seller’s negligence and shall not be extended,
altered or varied except by a written instrument signed by
of the aircraft. Cost of temporary or interim repairs, replacements
and corrections accomplished by buyer, as well as any consequential
cost related thereto, shall likewise be at buyer’s expense, except
when seller, in advance, approves in writing such temporary or
interim repairs, replacements and corrections and the cost thereof,
which cost seller may agree to pay in whole or in part.
(E) Seller shall, as to each defect, be relieved of all obligations
and liability under this warranty if:
(1) The aircraft is operated with any accessory, equipment or
part not specifically approved by seller and not manufactured by
seller or to seller’s design and specification unless buyer furnishes
reasonable evidence that such installation was not a cause of the
defect; provided that this provision shall not apply to any acces-
sory, equipment or part, the use of which does not affect the
safety of the aircraft;
(2) The aircraft shall not have been operated or maintained in
accordance with selier’s instructions furnished under this agree-
ment, unless buyer furnishes reasonable evidence that such opera-
tion or maintenance, as the case may be, was not a cause of the
defect;
(3) The aircraft shall not have been operated under normal
airline use, unless buyer furnishes reasonable evidence that such
operation was not a cause of the defect;
(4) The aircraft shall have been repaired, altered or modified
without seller’s approval or if the aircraft shall have been operat-
ed subsequent to its involvement in an accident, unless buyer
furnishes reasonable evidence that such repair, alteration, modifi-
cation, operation or accident was not a cause of the defect,
provided, however, that this limitation insofs- as it relates to
repairs and accident shall not be applicable to routine repairs or
replacements or minor accidents which normally occur in the
operation of aircraft if such repairs or replacements are made
within suitable material and according to standard practice and
engineering;
(5) Buyer does not (i) report the defect in writing or by
telegram to seller's warranty administrator at its factory in Long
Beach, California, within sixty (60) days following such defect
becoming apparent to buyer as provided in paragrapi.. (B) and
(C) above, and (ii) return the defective or faulty aircraft, accesso-
ry, equipment or part to said factory (or, if return to seller's
factory is not feasible and seller so agrees in advance in writing,
which agreement shall not unreasonably be withheld, to buyer's
base repair shop or other appropriate facility in the United States)
within sixty (60) days following the end of the applicable period of
time specified in paragraphs (B) and (C) above, or within sixty
(60) days following such defect becoming apparent, whichever is
A-17
seller and buyer; provided that in the event the provision
relieving seller from liability for its negligence should for
any reason be ineffective, the remainder of this paragraph
(G) shall remain in full force and effect.
Amendment 5 incorporated the terms of the 1964 agree-
ment, including the Warranty Clause, which terms were the
subject of intensive negotiation. There was no substantial
earlier, and further provided that if, for reasons beyond buyer’s
control, return of the items to seller's factory is not possible
within said sixty (60) day period, and if buyer so notifies seller in
writing and seller so agrees in writing, which agreement shall not
unreasonably be withheld, the said sixty (60) day period will be
waived, but buyer must return the item to seller’s said factory if,
as and when said return does become feasible. Buyer also must
submit reasonable proof to seller, within sixty (60) days after the
defect becomes apparent (except when such period is waived)
that the defect is due to a matter embraced within the seller's
warranty hereunder. Seller shall approve or disapprove buyer’s
substantiated warranty claim in writing within sixty (60) days of
receipt thereof. All such transportation, including return to buyer
of the repaired, replaced or corrected aircraft, accessory, equip-
ment or part shall be at buyer’s expense.
With respect to matters made the subject of seller's approval
under sub-paragraphs (1), (4) and seller’s approval or disapproval of
buyer’s warranty claim under (5) of this paragraph (E), seller’s
approval or disapproval thereof shall be made in writing to buyer
within sixty (60) days after buyer’s written notice requesting ap-
proval is received by seller. In the event of disapproval, seller shall
set forth the reasons therefor in its statement of disapproval.
Seller’s failure to deliver to buyer a written statement of approval or
disapproval within such sixty (60) day period shall irrevocably and
conclusively constitute approval by seller of the subject matter of
the particular request involved.
(F) Normal wear and tear and the need for regu!ar overhauls shall
not constitute a defect or failure under this warranty. Buyer
acknowledges that some of the accessories, equipment and parts
warranted hereunder have a normal life expectancy that is less than
the time period specified under paragraph (B) and (C) above.
(G) The warranty provided in this article and the obligations and
liabilities of seller thereunder are in lieu of and buyer hereby waives
all other warranties, guarantees or liabilities, express or implied
arising by law or otherwise (including without limitation any obliga-
tion of seller with respect to consequential damages) and whether or
not occasioned by seller’s negligence and shall not be extended,
altered or varied except by a written instrument signed by seller and
buyer; provided that in the event the provision relieving seller from
liability for its negligence should for any reason be ineffective, the
remainder of this paragraph (G) shall remain in full force and effect.
A-18
imbalance in the bargaining positions of the parties and the
Warranty Clause was not dictated by McDonnell on a “take
it-or leave it” basis. Due to the California Court of Appeal
decision in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc.,
238 Cal.App.2d 95, 47 Cal.Rptr. 518 (1965), rendered several
months before the parties entered into the agreement in the
instant case, Delta was aware that McDonnell would, under
certain circumstances, agree to modification or elimination of
the exculpatory clause, albeit for a price which Delta appar-
ently did not wish to pay. See 238 Cal.App.2d at 103 n. 5, 47
Cal.Rptr. at 523 n. 5.
[2-4] The parties agree with the proposition that in this
diversity case, we must follow state law, including state
conflict of law rules, and that the Georgia conflicts rule
provides that the law of the state where a contract is made
and performed will govern the validity and interpretation of
the contract except when the result is contrary to the public
policy of the State of Georgia.’ The Georgia state courts
would apply California law in this case not only because the
contract was made and performed in California, but also
because the parties specifically agreed in the contract that
California law would control.’
The chief point of disagreement between the parties that
we are called upon to settle concerns what a California court
would do with this case. This disagreement centers around
the precedent established by Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas
Aircraft Co., Inc., 238 Cal.App.2d 95, 47 Cal.Rptr. 518 (1965),
in the light of an earlier California Supreme Court case, Tunkl
v. Regents of University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal.
2. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188
(1938).
3. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020,
85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941).
4. Cox v. Adams, 2 Ga. 158, 165 (1847); Goodman v. Nadler, 113
Ga.App. 493, 148 S.E.2d 480, 483 (1966).
5. See Barzda v. Quality Courts Motel, Inc., 386 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.
1967).
Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963), and a California statute dealing
with exculpatory clauses, Cal.Civ.Code § 1668 (West 1972).
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., supra,
involved the validity, as between the same airline and the
same manufacturer as the case at bar, of virtually identical
warranty provisions in connection with an airplane accident
also caused by a malfunctioning nose landing gear. The
intermediate California Court of Appeal upheld the exculpato-
ry clause in the contract as precluding a negligence suit
brought by the airline against the manufacturer.
Faced with this strong indication of how a California court
would decide this case, Delta makes essentially five arguments
against that result, which we find unpersuasive. We address
the arguments seriatim as presented in Delta’s brief.
Sur doe boaieaaarie ve aaa
co Retr of a KO:
[5,6] First, Delta contends that the exculpatory clause is
in clear violation of the public policy of California as specifi-
cally set out in the statutes of that state because it would
relieve McDonnell of responsibility for the violation of § 21.-
165 of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations
requiring it to determine that the aircraft was in a condition
for safe operation. California Civil Code § 1668 makes it
against the policy of the law for a contract to exempt anyone
from responsibility for violation of the law.’ Delta asserts
_ that by delivering the plane with the nose gear part incorrect-
j ly installed, McDonnell violated the FAA regulation found at
- 14 C.F.R. § 21.165 (1974), which provides in effect that an
airplane manufacturer must determine that any airplane pro-
' posed for certification is in a condition for safe operation.’
wh eA eA tet dr oe A ae ee,
6. Cal.Civ.Code § 1668 provides:
All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly,
; to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful
injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law,
whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.
7. Section 21.165 reads:
The holder of a production certificate shall—
(a) Maintain the quality control system in conformity with the
data and procedures approved for the production certificate; and
4 A-20
a
Delta, however, confuses a negligence theory of action,
under which violation of a law or a regulation may be evi-
dence of negligence, see Steel v. Downs, 438 F.2d 310, 316 (8th
Cir. 1971), with the liability that may be imposed by law.
McDonnell is still answerable to the FAA and third parties for
any responsibility established by the regulation, and any stat-
utory right of action that might be given to Delta by FAA
regulations has not been abrogated. But none of these causes
of action are involved in an action based on common law
negligence. We are unable to agree that the contract be-
tween two industrial giants fixing the dollar responsibility for
McDonnell’s alleged negligence would be void under Califor-
nia law, any more than would be an insurance contract which
might be written for the same purpose.
Second, and along the same lines as the first argument,
Delta contends that this case is distinguishable from Delta Air
Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc., because in that case
the court did not consider the issue raised here with respect to
the violation of § 21.165. The Douglas court, however, did
reject an argument similar to the one asserted first by Delta,
by finding that Douglas had not violated the regulations there
in question. Delta argues that the clear inference from the
case is that had such a violation been proved, the California
Court would have held the exculpatory clause void under
Section 1668. Since this case is at the pleading stage, Delta
contends that it ought to be permitted to prove what it did
not prove in the state case.
Although Delta is correct in contending that Douglas did
not consider the issue raised here as to a FAA regulation
violation, it is incorrect in asserting that the California Court
conceded that if a violation of such a regulation had been
shown the exculpatory clause would have been invalid under
(b) Determine that each completed product submitted for air-
worthiness certification or approval conforms to the type design
and is in a condition for safe operation.
A-2]
Dee ee
_ California law. The total comments in the opinion relating to
_ this argument about Section 1668 leave no inference whatso-
_ ever as to how the court would have handled the argument
_ had Douglas violated the regulations. See 47 Cal.Rptr. at 525.
- With the Douglas case providing no guidance, we feel our
_ analysis of Delta’s first point applies equally to this point, and
_ Delta’s argument fails.
_ Third, Delta argues that even if Delta Air Lines, Inc, v.
_ Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. were not distinguishable, the court
_ in that case did not correctly apply the law of California as set
- out in the leading cases of that state. Instead, Delta asserts,
_ that court misinterpreted and incorrectly applied the law,
_ while the duty of the court below in this case was to apply the
_ law of California correctly, and not just to follow the Douglas
_ ease. And since that case was not a correct interpretation of
_ the law, the District Court was bound to follow the law set
_ out in the statutes and other decisions of California.
In this argument, Delta stresses the case of Tunkl v. Re-
- gents of University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33,
- 383 P.2d 441 (1963). In Tunkl, the Supreme Court of Califor-
_ nia held that release from liability for future negligence
_ imposed as a condition for admission to a charitable research
_ hospital was invalid on the ground that the agreement affect-
ed the public interest. The court reviewed a variety of
_ exculpatory clause cases and concluded that an exculpatory
_ provision can only be valid if it does not affect the “public
interest.” The Douglas court dealt specifically with Tunkl
and its analysis of California law, and concluded in a very
thorough discussion, that the contract between the airline and
_ the manufacturer was not clothed with the kind of public
interest that surfaced in a contract between a patient and a
hospital. Based on the reasoning in the Douglas opinion, we
are convinced that California law was correctly applied there.
What may be more important in addressing the plaintiff's
contention is that under Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, supra, we are
bound to follow state law, whether or not we agree with the
A-22
reasoning upon which it is based or the outcome which it
dictates. This is the ultimate significance of the Erie decision.
Delta has not cited us to any subsequent California decisions
criticizing, distinguishing, or modifying the Douglas case.
Therefore, Douglas remains the latest, most authoritative
expression of California law applicable to the facts of this
case. It is controlling for our purposes. See Ford Motor Co.
v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267, 269 (5th Cir. 1963).
Fourth, Delta contends that even if the court below correct-
ly determined that the exculpatory clause is valid under the
law of California, the clause violates the public policy of
Georgia and should not be enforceable as a defense to Delta’s
complaint by a federal court sitting in Georgia.
To support this argument, Delta cites only a Georgia statute
similar to Cal.Civ.Code § 1668." The argument fails to carry
the point for the same reasons that made the position untena-
ble as a matter of California public policy.
[7] Finally, as to the dismissal of the strict liability count
only, Delta makes this argument: The count based upon strict
liability in tort is not barred by the exculpatory clause (even if
valid) because one of the basic reasons for the development of
the theory of strict liability is to transcend technical bases for
denying liability where the product involved is unreasonably
dangerous to the public. Contractual attempts to restrict
liability are therefore immaterial in strict liability cases.
Although McDonnell argues in response to this that strict
liability does not apply to factual cireumstances such as these,
we do not have to rule on this argument because we agree
with MeDonnell’s contention that the exculpatory clause is
broad enough to include the concept of strict liability in tort.
8. Ga.Code Ann. § 20 504 provides:
A contract which is against the policy of the law cannot be
enforced; such are contracts tending to corrupt legislation or the
judiciary, contracts in general restraint of trade, contracts to
evade or oppose the revenue laws of another country, wagering
contracts, contracts of maintenance or champerty.
A-23
|
ed
j
i
i
i
Although the California Court of Appeal did not expressly
mention strict liability in the earlier Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. case, the holding by that Court is
broad enough to encompass strict liability. In reaching its
decision, the California Court cited and discussed Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377
P.2d 897 (1963), the landmark California case dealing with the
concept of strict liability in tort, and expressly held: “Even
though disclaimer clauses are to be strictly construed, still we
find that this clause covers not only contractua] warranty
liability but also tort liability.” 2388 Cal.App.2d at 101, 47
Cal.Rptr. at 522. The doctrine of strict liability is a tort
concept, and the statement by the California Court that the
exculpatory clause is broad enough to encompass “tort liabili-
ty” as well as other forms of liability clearly indicates that
strict tort liability has been disclaimed. Any other conclusion
would emasculate the basic purpose of the Warranty Article
and exclupatory clause.
Finding no persuasive arguments that militate against fol-
lowing this remarkably similar California case, we affirm the
dismissal of the two counts in negligence and strict liability as
being barred by the exculpatory clause in the contract under
the authority of Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,
Inc., supra.
Affirmed.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER TERM, 1973
No. 73-1799
D. C. Docket No. CA 13768
DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Appellee,
versus
McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION,
Defendant-A ppellee-Cross Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia
Before BROWN, Chief Judge, and RONEY and GEE, Circuit
Judges.
JUDGMENT
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the
record from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia, and was argued by counsel:
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here ordered
and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said
District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed;
It is further ordered that plaintiff-appellant-cross appellee
pay to defendant-appellee-cross appellant, the costs on appeal
to be taxed by the Clerk of this Court.
October 31, 1974
Issued as Mandate: December 26, 1974
tates Ls
6) Sat
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 73-1799
DELTA AIR LINES, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Apellee,
versus
McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION,
Defendant-A ppellee-Cross Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
(December 17, 1974)
Before BROWN, Chief Judge, RONEY and GEE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing filed in
the above entitled and numbered cause be and the same is
hereby denied.
A-26
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
2815 East Spring Street
Long Beach, California 90806
CERTIFIED MAIL — RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
April 24, 1969
McDonnell Douglas Corporation
Douglas Aircraft Company
3855 Lakewood Boulevard
Long Beach, California 90801
Attention: Mr. W. F. Stryker, Director Reliability and
Quality Assurance
Gentlemen:
On January 31, 1969, Delta Air Lines DC-8-61 aircraft,
Registration No. N1I302L. Serial No. 46029, experienced
collapse of its nose landing gear while landing at Jacksonville,
Florida. Subsequent investigation indicated that taper bolts,
P/N 4716811-SO1, had been installed by Douglas Aircraft
Company in the upper cross tube assembly only, and not
through the cross tube bearings, P/N 4771383-SO1A. McDon-
nell Douglas Corporation, Douglas Aircraft Company. took
immediate corrective action by reinspecting all production
aircraft before delivery to the airlines and, in addition, revised
DC-8 and DC-9 Assembly Outlines. The DC-8 Assembly Outline
310M7100-210, Edition 24, and DC-9 Assembly Outline
474-4325-2, Edition 19, were issued with the addition of
applicable reference drawings, and a special attention note to
the drawing view showing proper installation of the taper bolts
through bearings.
The circumstances indicate that McDonnell Douglas Corpora-
tion, Douglas Aircraft Company, holder of Production Certifi-
cate No. 27, were in violation of Federal Aviation Regulations
21.165 (b) in that they failed to determine that each completed
A-27
;
;
3
j
3
2
4
‘
#
4
co Sk
raha er ONY
ib NINE ME DA Ge ci NO RTO Re AT te Ti a Re A r
product submitted for airworthiness certification conforms to
the type design and is in a condition for safe operation.
After our subsequent discussions with you concerming this
discrepancy, and the action taken by your company to preclude
any future occurrence of this nature, we have concluded that no
further enforcement action is necessary as a result of this
incident. In lieu thereof, we are issuing this official reprimand
which will be made a matter of record. You may consider this
matter closed.
Sincerely,
/s/ JOHN B. BARNARD
JOHN B. BARNARD
Supervising Inspector
WE-AEDO-48
RECEIVED BY DIRECT MAIL.
CERTIFIED # 425534
Note: Incident previously reported by FAA Miami Itr dtd
24-69.
A-28
So ata
a
SRT. I °
FE
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.