Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — CIRRAMI V. UNITED STATES (No. 74-1066)

Supreme Court brief1974

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

SUPREME COURT, U. & Supreme

i

IN THE '

Supreme Cowt of the Uniten States

Ocroser Term, 1974

No. 74-1066

SALVATORE CIRAMI, and JAMES CIRAMI,

Petitioners,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Wacman, Cannon & Musorr, P.C.

136 East 57th Street

New York, N. Y. 10022

and

Luioyp A. Hate

36 West 44th Street

New York, N. Y. 10036

(212) 972-0170

Cownsel for Petitioners

Adame Press Corp. 139 Cedar Street, N. ¥-—Beakman 3-1050-51

[x

TORRENT aE EI

es

SLATE AY ig EEO REP ELE A PERE SOE SE.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Orrnion BeLow

JURISDICTION

Questions PRESENTED

ConsTITUTIONAL Provisions INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Reasons ror GRANTING THE Writ

1. Defendants may not be convicted on charges

not brought by the Grand Jury

2. The alleged false statements were not crim-

inal, the prosecution was arbitrary and threat-

ens all other innocent taxpayers and filers ....

ConcLusiIon

APPENDIX:

A—Opinion of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Second Circuit

B—Order of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Cireuit, Affirming Judgment

C—Order of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, Denying Motion for

Extension of Time

Cases Cited

Benderoff v. United States, 398 F. 2d 132 (8th Cir.

1968)

Chilhowee Mills, Ine. v. C.LR., 152 F. 2d 137 (D. C.

Cir. 1945)

12

12a

l4a

13

13

FTN cine Mat ga

rte Ye

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Genevieve B. Walker, 4 T.C. 630 (1966) 13

Germantown Trust Co. v. C.LR., 309 U. S. 304 (1940) 18

Paritem Singh Poonian v. United States, 294 F, 2d

74 (9th Cir. 1961) 11,12

Russel v. United States, 369 U. S. 749 (1964)... 5)

Rutkin v. United States, 343 U. S. 130 (195°). 14

Sansone v. United States, 380 U. S. 350 (1965)... 8

Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492 (19438)... 12,14

Stirone v. United States, 361 U. S. 212 (1960)_........ 8,10

Stockstrom v. C.I.R., 190 F. 2d 283 (D. C. Cir. 1951) 13

United States v. Barash, 365 F. 2d 395 (2d Cir. 1966) 14

United States v. Casale Car Leasing Inc., 385 F. 2d

707 (2d Cir. 1967) 14

United States v. Fischetti, 450 F. 2d 34 (5th Cir.

1971), cert. den. 405 U. S. 1016 12

United States v. Wilkins, 385 F. 2d 465 (4th Cir.

1967) 8

United States v. Williams, 412 F. 2d 625 (3rd Cir.

1969) 12

Venus v. United States, 368 U. S. 345 (1961)_..... 13

Ward v. United States, 344 U. S. 924 (1953) 0... 13

United States Constitution Cited

Fifth Amendment 2, 3,11

Statutes Cited

18 U.S.C.:

See. 1001 12

; TABLE OF CONTENTS iii

| PAGE

26 U.S.C.:

See. 7201 1, 3, 14

See. -7206(2) 1, 2, 5, 12, 14

28 US.C.:

See. 1254(1) 2

Regulation Cited

Treasury Regulations:

See. 31.6011(a)-5

14

EWI LD IRONS

“pepe

COE Be 28 mabe

\

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1974

No.

\

SALVATORE CIRAMI, and JAMES CIRAMI,

Petitioners,

Us.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

ee

\ i.

—>—

\

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Petitioners, Salvatore and James Cirami, hereby peti-

tion this Honorable Court for a writ of certiorari to

review the judgment of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Second Circuit, affirming, January 24, 1975,

petitioners’ conviction under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7206(2) in

the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-

trict of New York. <A timely petition to enlarge the time

for filing a petition for rehearing and a hearing en banc

seven days to allow new (present) counsel to point out

the errors in the opinion below, a review of which is here

sought, was denied on February 19, 1975.

cf

g

?

j

Opinion Below

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, not yet officially

reported, is reproduced in Appendix A of this petition.

Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of this Court is involved under See-

tion 1254(1), Title 28, United States Code, to review on

writ of certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals

entered January 24, 1975, timely petition to enlarge the

time for filing a petition for rehearing and hearing en

banc denied, February 19, 1975.

Questions Presented

1. Is it a fatal variance under an indictment alleging

that the petitioners personally owed withholding and

F.I.C.A. taxes to allow the prosecution to offer proof that

such taxes were actually owed by a corporation?

2. Was it a violation of the petitioners’ rights under

the Fifth Amendment to be held to answer for a felony

only on a grand jury indictment for the trial court to

strike as “surplusage”, the allegation that petitioners per-

sonally owed withholding and payroll taxes which they .

were charged with evading and allow the prosecution to

prove that such taxes were actually owed by a corpora-

tion, a charge nowhere contained in the indictment?

3. Should petitioners have been convicted of submit-

ting false forms 1099 under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) when

those forms disclosed payments to truck drivers which

would have been the same. disclosure made on form W-2

which the prosecution contended should have been filed?

3

4, Apart from the immediately foregoing question,

should petitioners be awarded a new trial on the last two

counts of the indictment because of the erroneous sub-

mission of the first seventeen counts to the jury or should

these counts be dismissed?

Constitutional Provisions Involved

Unirep States Constitution, Firrn AMENDMENT

“No person shall be held to answer for a capital

or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-

ment or indictment of a Grand Jury... .”

Statement of the Case

Petitioners Salvatore and James Cirami are father and

son. They were indicted in 73 Cr. 413 for attempted

evasion of withholding and payroll taxes, in violation of

26 U.S.C. 7201 in the following language:

“That during the period from January 1, 1967 to

July 31, 1971, inclusive in the Eastern District of

New York, the defendants Salvatore Cirami and

James Cirami who were the President and Treas-

urer and Vice President and Secretary respectively

of Air Package Distribution Service Ltd., a cor-

poration, with its principal place of business in

Queens County, New York, did wilfully attempt

to evade and defeat a large part of the federal

income taxes withheld from wages and Federal In-

surance Contributions Act taxes due and owing to

the United States cf America for the quarter end-

ing March 31, 1967, by preparing and causing to

be prepared and thereafter filing and causing to

be filed with the Internal Revenue Service Center,

RAMEN tue =

4

Andover, Massachusetts, a false and fraudulent em-

ployer’s quarterly tax return, wherein it was stated

that the total taxable wages paid employees for

the said quarter was the sum of $13,320.82 and

that the total amount of tax withheld and Fed-

eral Insurance Contributions Act taxes due there-

on was the sum of $1,172.23, whereas, as the de-

fendants then and there well knew, the total tax-

able wages paid employees for said quarter was

the sum of $39,401.82 wpon which wages the de-

fendants owed to the United States of America fed-

eral income taxes withheld from wages and Fed-

eral Insurance Contributions Act taxes due in the

total amount of $3,467.36.

In violation of Section 7201, Internal Revenue

Code; 26 United States Code, Section 7201; 18

United States Code, Section 2.” (emphasis added)

(A. 3a)*

The same language in italics was common to the first

seventeen counts of the indictment. As the Court of Ap-

peals opinion recognizes, that allegation was wrong—char-

acterized in the opinion below as “a mistake”—since the

only proof offered in support of the indictment was

that a corporation, Air Package Distribution Service,

Ltd., owed the taxes in question, not petitioners (A. 40a-

41a). An objection was made to the petitioners being

tried on a charge not made in the indietment—which the

trial court well undersfood (A. 102a-09a). However the

trial court allowed theSprosecution to rescue its ease by

granting its motion to strike the allegation common to

the first seventeen counts (italics, supra) that it was the

petitioners who owed the taxes, not the corporation (A.

* References in the form A. — a are to the appendix on appeal.

In the form T. —, references are to the trial transcript.

ee

5

(109a-17a). Tn the course of granting the motion to strike,

the trial court observed:

“Tt goes without saying that there is no ques-

tion that it is not the defendants that owe the

money to the Federal Government.” (A. 112a).

“The Grand Jury had no right to charge them

with the owing of a corporate tax. ... That will

be surplussage [sic] They cannot be charged with

that since they couldn’t possibly owe it, it eouldn’t

be in violation of law.” (A. 1138a)

Nonetheless, the courts below allowed the conviction to

be sustained and sentenced petitioners as follows:

Salvatore Cirami on Counts 1-15, a fine of $300.00 each,

and a fine of $100.00 each on Counts 17-19, for a total of

$4,800.00 (A. 151a).

James Cirami on Counts 1-14 a fine of $100.00 each

and on 17-19 of $150.00 each for a total of $2,000.00; with

two years probation for both (Aldla-2a).

The final two counts (18 and 19) alleged that petitioners

violated 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) by submitting forms 1099

covering remuneration to truckdrivers instead of forms

W-2, beeause the prosecution contended the drivers were

employees rather than independent contractors (A. 6a).

Reasons for Granting the Writ

1. Defendants may not be convicted on charges not

brought by the Grand Jury.

This Court has held in language, ignored, below that a

defendant may not be convicted on charges not brought

by the Grand Jury in Russel v. United States, 369 U.S.

749, 765-768 (1964):

REET mk SIE Se TA Se Pn orb

6

“Tt is an elementary principle of criminal plead-

ing, that where the definition of an offense, whether

it be at common law or by statute, ‘includes generic

terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment shall

charge the offense in the same generic terms as

in the definition; but it must state the species,—

it must descend to particulars.’” United States v.

Cruikshank, 92 US 542, 558, 23 L ed 588, 593.

An indictment not framed to apprise the defend-

ant “with reasonable certainty, of the nature of

the accusation against him .. . is defective, al-

though it may follow the language of the statute.”

United States v Simmons, 96 US 360, 362, 24 L

ed 819, 820. “In an indictment upon a statute,

it is not sufficient to set forth the offence in the

words of the statute, unless those words of them-

selves fully, directly, and expressly, without any

uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements

necessary to constitute the offenes intended to be

punished; . . .” United States v. Carll, 105 US

611, 612, 26 L ed 1135. “Undoubtedly the lan-

guage of the statute may be us. @ in the general

description of an offence, but it must be accom-

panied with such a statement of the facts and cir-

cumstances as will inform the accused of the spe-

cific offence, coming under the general description,

with which he is charged.” United States v. Hess,

124 US 483, 487, 31 L ed. 516, 518, 8 S Ct 571.

See also Pettibone v. United States, 148 US 197,

202-204, 37 L ed 419, 422, 423, 13 S Ct 542; Blitz

v. United States, 153 US 308, 315, 38 L ed 725,

727, 14 S Ct 924; Keck v. United States, 172 US

434, 437, 48 L ed 505, 507, 19 S Ct 254; Morissette

v. United States, 342 US 246, 270, note 30, 96 L

ed 288, 304, 72 S Ct 240. Cf. United States v.

HS

7

Petrillo, 332 US 1, 10, 11, 91 L ed 1877, 1884,

1885, 67 S Ct 1538. That these basic principles

of fundamental fairness retain their full vitality

under modern concepts of pleading, and specifically

under Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, is illustrated by many recent federal

decisions.

The vice which inheres in the failure of an in-

dictment under 2 USC 46192 to identify the sub-

ject under inquiry is thus the violation of the basic

principle “that the accused must be apprised by

the indictment, with reasonable certainty, of the

nature of the accusation against him, .. .” United

States v. Simmons, supra (96 US at 362). A eryp-

tic form of indictment in cases of this kind re-

quires the defendant to go to trial with the chief

issue undefined. It enables his conviction to rest

on one point and the afiirmance of the conviction

to rest on another. It gives the prosecution free

hand on appeal to fill in the gaps of proof by

surmise or conjecture. The Court has had ocea-

sion before now to condemn just such a practice

in quite different factual setting. Cole v. Arkansas,

333 US 196, 201, 202, 92 L ed 644, 647, 648, 68

S Ct 514. And the unfairness and uncertainty

which have characteristically infected criminal pro-

ceedings under this statute which were based upon

indictments which failed to specify the subjeet un-

der inquiry are illustrated by the cases in this

Court we have already discussed. The same un-

certainty and unfairness are underscored by the

records of the cases new before us.” 369 U.S. at

766.

The same forbidden result occurred in the present case.

The grand jury returned an indictment alleging that the

Sa

Se Se eee Oe

PE DAD WO Ae OF,

8

Ceramis owed withholding and other employment taxes.

The prosecution not only abandoned that approach but

successfully moved to have stricken that essential alle-

gation. Thus the Court of Appeals, the trial court and

the prosecution were able to sustain charges which were

not only not returned by the grand jury they were con-

trary to the charges returned by that screening body.

“As has been held by this Court, the elements

of § 7201 are willfulness; the existence of a tax de-

ficiency, Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 39, 361, 78

S. Ct. 311, 323, 2 L.£d.2d 321; Spies v. United States,

supra, 317 U.S. at 496, 63 S.Ct. at 366; and an

affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted

evasion of the tax, Spies v. United States, supra.”

Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 350, 351 (1965).

But it was precisely the element of a tax deficiency and

by which taxpayer(s) owed that was stricken from the in-

dictment in this case, thus allowing the courts and the

prosecution to present any substitution for the judgment of

the grand jury guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

Cf. United States v. Wilkins, 385 F.2d 465 (4th Cir.

1967), holding, as has this Court, that a deficiency due

and owing by a particular taxpayer is an element of the

offense of tax evasion, even though the statute does not

specifically so provide. Thus a direct conflict has arisen

between the decisions of this Court and those of other

Circuits on the elements of the offense of tax evasion

and the need to charge them in the indictment.

There is no way in which the decision below can be

squared with this Court’s decision in Stirone v. United

States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960), where this Court held:

“Ever since Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 7 S. Ct.

781, 30 L.Ed. 849, was decided in 1887, it has been

9

the rule that after an indictment has been returned

its charges may not be broadened through amend-

ment except by the grand jury itself. In that case,

the court ordered that some specific and relevant

allegations the grand jury had charged be stricken

from the indictment so that Bain might be con-

vieted without proof of those particular allegations.

In holding that this could not be done, Mr. Justice

Miller, speaking for the Court, said:

‘Tf it lies within the province of a court to

change the charging part of an indictment to suit

its own notions of what it ought to have been,

or what the grand jury would probably have

made it if their attention had been called to

suggested changes, the great importance which

the common law attaches to an indictment by a

grand jury, as a prerequisite to a prisoner’s trial

for a crime, and without which the constitution

says “no person shall be held to answer,” may

be frittered away until its value is almost de-

stroyed.’ 121 U.S. 1, 10, 7 S.Ct. 781, 786.

The Court went on to hold in Bain:

‘that after the indictment was changed it was

no longer the indictment of the grand jury who

presented it. Any other doctrine would place the

rights of the citizen, which were intended to be

protected by the constitutional provision, at the

merey or control of the court or prosecuting at-

torney * * *” 121 US. 1, 13, 7 S.Ct. 781, 787.

The Bain case, which has never been disapproved,

stands for the rule that a court cannot permit a

defendant to be tried on charges that are not made

in the indictment against him. See also United

10

States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619, 622, 50 S.Ct. 424,

425, 74 L.Ed. 1076; Cf. Clyatt v. United States,

197 U.S. 207, 219, 220, 25 S.Ct. 429, 431, 432, 49

L.Ed. 726. Yet the court did permit that in this

ease.” 361 U.S. at 215-17.

In Stirone, the indictment charged that the defendant

had obstructed interstate commerce in connection with

the mixing and manufacture of concrete, 361 U.S. at 213-

14. The trial court allowed proof that Stirone’s extortion-

ary activities could have affected either interstate ship-

ments of steel or sand. 361 U.S. at 214. In reversing

Stirone’s conviction this Court held:

“The very purpose of the requirement that a

man be indicted by grand jury is to limit his jeop-

ardy to offenses charged by a group of his fellow

citizens acting independently of either prosecuting

attorney or judge.* Thus the basie protection the

grand jury was designed to afford is defeated by a

device or method which subjects the defendant to

prosecution for interference with interstate com-

merece which the grand jury did not charge.” 361

US. at 218.

In the light of such a decision, can the result below be

allowed to stand where the indictment returned by the

grand jury charged petitioners with the evasion of taxes

which admittedly they did not owe?

Is there any bound to the sorts of convictions which can

be justified nunc pro tunc on the justification that the

prosecutor was “merely mistaken” when he drafted an

indictment?

Must the defendants be required to show that the

Grand Jury would not have indicted them if it had been

given proper proof or a correctly drafted indictment?

11

The Fifth Amendment guaranty that no citizen shall

be held to answer except on the Grand Jury’s indictment

would seem to place the burden the other way around and.

require dimissal in this case.

The decision below is in direct conflict with that of the

Ninth Cireuit in Parilcin Singh Poonian v. United States,

204 F. 2d 74 (9th Cir. 1961). In that case the defendant

was indicted (as were petitioners) with evading taxes

and making false statements as to them, when in fact

the taxes were the obligation of another (Poonian’s

mother). The Ninth Circuit held:

“Here, the indictment charged that the appellant

had understated ‘his’ income and sales. Was the

personal pronoun mere surplusage? We think not,

for it was an allegation crucial to any inference

that appellant’s allegedly false statements were

material.

[3] In support of our conclusion, we note that

the income tax return filed by appellant only re-

quired that he report ‘his’ income. It did not re-

quire that he report the amounts which constituted

income to any other person. Appellant was in

much the same position as a nominee of a stock

brokerage account. Ile is not required to report

as his own, income in which he has no beneficial

interest. It is beside the point that appellant may

have been the ‘owner’ of the income in the general

sense. The fact is that we are dealing with a trans-

action that can only be understood properly if we

bear in mind the laws and distinetions peculiar to

income tax law. Since, then, appellant only was

required to report his own income, and since he

only purported to do that, appellant’s statement of

‘his’ income is the only matter in which, as to him,

pC POEL OC IL PL INE ES HA

12

the Internal Revenue Service had a legitimate in-

terest.

a e

The evidence did not prove the charges set forth

in the indictment. There was under a iaw, a fatal

variance between the pleading and the proof, and

therefore the judgment of conviction must be re-

versed.” 294 F. 2d at 75-6.

Poonian, like the instant case, involved a prosecution

for evasion and false statements (the latter there, under

18 U.S.C. §1001, here, under 26 U.S.C. §7206(2)). The

Ninth Circuit’s opinion approves acquittal on the evasion

charges and directs reversal on the false statement

charges. A similar result should follow here. At the

very least, this Court should grant the writ to resolve the

conflict between the circuits in an area that this Court

has described as the “capstone” of federal tax felonies.

Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492 (1943).

Also in conflict are United States v. Williams, 412 F. 2d

625, 627-8 (3rd Cir. 1969), where the indictment was dis-

missed for just such an amendment as occurred below,

even though the defendant consented, and United States

v. Fischetti, 450 F. 2d 34, 39 (Sth Cir. 1971), cert. den.

405 U. S. 1016, where, as here after the trial court granted

the motion to strike, the indictment omitted an essential

element.

2. The alleged false statements were not criminal, the

prosecution was arbitrary and threatens all other in-

nocent taxpayers and filers.

The affirmance below of the convictions on Counts 18

and 19 alleging as false the reporting of the total annual

tei Lal

13

payments to truck drivers on form: 1099 (on the theory

that they were independent contractors) instead of on

forms W-2 (on the prosecution’s theory that the drivers

were employees) is also in conflict with decisions of this

Court and those in other circuits. See Germantown Trust

Co. v. C.LR., 309 U. S. 304, 308 (1940); Venus v. United

States, 368 U. S. 345 (1961); Ward v. United States, 344

U. S. 924 (1953); Stockstrom v. C.1.R., 190 F. 2d 283,

989 (D. C. Cir. 1951); Chilhowee Mills, Inc. v. C.L.R.,

152 F. 2d 137 (D. C. Cir. 1945); Benderoff v. United

States, 398 F. 2d 132 (Sth Cir. 1968) ; Genevieve B. Walk-

er, 4 T.C. 630, 639 (1966). Those cases stand for the

proposition that where a citizen has supplied the Internal

Revenue Service or other government agency with the

required information (e.g., payments to the truckdrivers)

no matter how irregularly, no penalty, even of a civil

nature attaches even though the government contends

that the items complained of should have been reported

in another way, on another form.

Since millions of such forms as 1099 and W-2 are re-

quired and are routinely filed every year, the conflicts

should now be resolved by this Court so that the In-

ternal Revenue Service may not arbitrarily and without

notice convert a required form into a weapon for prose-

cution of those it regards as recalcitrant taxpayers. Here,

through a prior audit of the corporate taxpayer, the

Service was aware from the corporate books and the

filed forms 1099 (admittedly correct as to the amounts paid

the drivers), that the drivers were being treated as inde-

pendent contractors, not as employees, and no withholding

or payroll taxes were being collected or paid over (A40a-

48a, 5la-57a). Yet instead of notifying the corporation

that, in the opinion of the Internal Revenue Service with-

holding and the filing of payroll tax returns (to which

forms W-2 relate) were required, as is specifically pro-

ine ee |

14

vided by Section 31.6011(a)-5 of the Treasury Regula-

tions, Internal Revenue initiated this prosecution. To

prevent this from happening to other taxpayers, it would

seem imperative that this Court now declare, that the

principle stated in Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492,

496 (1943) as to what is now 26 U.S.C. §7201 also applies

to prosecutions under 26 U.S.C. §7206(2) :

“It is not the purpose of the law to penalize frank

difference of opinions or innocent errors made de-

spite the exercise of reasonable care. Such errors

are corrected by the assessment of the deficiency

of tax and its collection with interest for the delay.”

317 U.S. at 496.

There can be little question that had the Second Cir-

cuit found that petitioner should have been acquitted un-

der the first seventeen counts because of the constitutional

violations first discussed, under which counts the bulk of

the evidence was erroneously admitted, it would also have

reversed the convictions under the last two, which were in

any event invalid. See Rutkin v. United States, 343 U. S.

130, 133 n. 4 (195 ); United States v. Casale Car Leasing

Inc., 385 F. 2d 707 (2d Cir. 1967); see also United States

v. Barash, 365 F. 2d 395 (2d Cir. 1966).

FA Lindy PON EAGLE ALD LV BLO LL! CA LURE yy AE

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, it is respectfully prayed

that this petition be granted. \"

Respectfully submitted,

Wacman, Cannon & Musorr, P.C.

136 East 57th Street

; New York, N. Y. 10022

and

Lioyp A. Hate

36 West 44th Street

New York, N. Y. 10036

(212) 972-0170

Counsel for Petitioners

ee TORS

‘

, ‘

‘ .

‘

i

'

‘

‘

‘

a ‘

'

‘

‘

/

4 ,

’

' é

t

'

‘

’

‘ ‘

'

e ‘

'

i t

Poy

;

‘ ‘

, > 4 '

P t

‘

i

F i

i

i sf .

‘

s

FLARED NIIP LIN OTE VALI TL TF, PANG NETO ET EN CL OAD

/ i

A DPE BL ERIE NALA PD

; or |

APPENDIX A

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

Unirep States Court or APPEALS

For THE Seconp Circuit

No. 1179—September Term, 1973

Argued July 16, 1974—Decided January 24, 1975

Docket No. 74-1492

y™

~~

Unirep States oF AMERICA,

Appellee,

—against—

SatvaTore Cirami and James CrraM1,

Appellants.

?

Before:

Muuucan and Winter,®* Circuit Judges, and Newman,°*

District Judge.

* of the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, sitting

by designation.

** of the United States District Court, District of Connecticut,

sitting by designation.

[la]

WS et bP DTA SW ne

2a

Appendix A

Appeal by Salvatore and James Cirami from convic-

tion for attempted evasion of taxes and aiding in the prep-

aration of false information returns, after trial before a

jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York, Mark A. Constantino, District

Judge.

Affirmed.

Robert E. Scher, New York, New York (Raphacls,

Searles, Vischi, Scher, Glover & D’Elia, on the brief),

for Appellants.

Richard B. Buhrman, Attorney, Tax Division, U.S. De-

partment of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Scott P.

Crampton, Assistant Attorney General, Ernest J.

Brown, Crombie J.D. Garrett, Attorneys, Tax Divi-

sion, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.,

and Edward J. Boyd, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern

District of New York, on the brief), for Appellee.

Newman, District Judge:

Salvatore and James Cirami appeal from multi-count

convictions for revenue law violations. The appellants

are principal officers of Air Package Distribution Service

Ltd. (hereinafter “the corporation”), a trucking company

that provides pickup and delivery service to airlines. The

corporation sought to classify its truck drivers as inde-

pendent contractors, rather than employees, thereby at-

tempting to evade its obligation for paying taxes im-

posed by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (sevial

security) and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act.

3a

Appendix A

A nineteen-count indictment charged the Ciramis with

three sets of violations. Counts 1 through 14 alleged that

they attempted to evade social security taxes due for four-

teen calendar quarters in 1967 through 1970 by filing false

and fraudulent employer’s quarterly tax returns understat-

ing the amount of taxable wages paid, in violation of 26

U.S.C. § 7201 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Counts 15 through 17

alleged similar violations with respect to attempted eva-

sion of federal employment taxes for the years 1967, 1968,

and 1969. Counts 18 and 19 alleged that the appellants, in

violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), aided and assisted in

the preparation of false United States Information Re-

turns (forms 1099) for the years 1968 and 1969, which

stated that the recipients of payments from the corpo-

ration were independent contractors rather than em-

ployees. After a trial before Judge Mark A. Costantino

and a jury, appellants were convicted en eighteen of the

nineteen counts, Count 16 having been dismissed. Appel-

lants were sentenced to pay fines on each of the eighteen

counts resulting in conviction, and were also placed on

probation.

Appellants’ attack upon the sufficiency of the evidence is

without merit, and no useful purpose would be served

by detailing the circumstances from which the jury was

ebundantly justified in concluding, under unchallenged and

proper instructions, that the truck drivers were regular

employees of the corporation and that both appellants wil-

fully participated in the attempt to evade corporate taxes

by filing false returns that concealed the employee status

of the drivers.

The principal issue on appeal arises because of a mis-

take made by the Government in drafting for the Grand

Jury’s consideration the first seventeen counts of the in-

SRS OE ee oe

ODS tee PRIDE A EN SS

5

a

-

2

=

¥

4

4

.

'

4a

Appendix A

dictment. Count 1, set out in full in the margin,’ was

drafted in an effort to follow the standard form for al-

leging attempted evasion of corporate taxes by responsible

corporate officials. The manner of attempted evasion was

alleged to be the filing by the appellants of false employer's

quarterly returns. The falsity was alleged by comparing

the wages reported to have been paid some employees

and the tuxes due thereon with the higher amount of

wages actually paid to all employees and the correspond-

ing higher amount of taxes due thereon. The mistake

occurred when it was alleged that the higher amount of

taxes was owed by the appellants, rather than by the

“That during the period from January 1, 1967 to July 31,

1971, inclusive in the Eastern District of New York, the defend-

ants Salvatore Cirami and James Cirami who were the President

and Treasurer and Vice President and Secretary respectively of

Air Package Distribution Service Ltd., a corporation, with its

principal place of business in Queens County, New York, did

wilfully attempt to evade and defeat a large part of the federal

income taxes withheld from wages and Federal Insurance Con-

tributions Act taxes due and owing to the United States of

America for the quarter ending March 31, 1967, by preparing and

causing to be prepared and thereafter filing and causing to be

filed with the Internal Revenue Service Center, Andover, Massa-

chusetts, a false and fraudulent employer’s quarterly tax return,

wherein it was stated that the total taxable wages paid employees

for the said quarter was the sum of $13,320.82 and that the total

amount of tax withheld and Federal Insurance Contributions Act

taxes due thereon was the sum of $1,172.23, whereas, as the

defendants then and there well knew, the total taxable wages paid

employees for said quarter was the sum of $39,401.82 upon which

wages the defendants owed to the United States of America fed-

eral income taxes withheld from wages and Federal Insurance

Contributions Act taxes due in the total amount of $3,467.36.

In violation of Section 7201, Internal Revenue Code; 26 United

States Code, Section 7201; 18 United States Code, Section 2.”

LNCS

5a

Appendix A

corporation. After alleging the correct amount of wages

to be $39,401.82, Count 1 continued: “upon which wages

the defendants owed to the United States of America fed-

eral incomes taxes withheld from wages and Federal In-

surance Contributions Act taxes due in the total amount

of $3,467.36.” The deletion of the quoted words, and of

corresponding language from Counts 2 through 17, upon

motion by the Government after it had rested, is chal-

lenged by appellants as a denial of their Fifth Amend-

ment right to trial upon an indictment of a grand jury.

Ever since the Supreme Court announced in Ex parte

Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887), that an indictment cannot be

amended except by resubmission to a grand jury, the law

has been in a “confused state,” United States v. Edwards,

465 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1972), as to whether any al-

iteration is permissible and if so, how any appropriate

changes may properly be made. While a “no amendment”

rule has been stated, e.g., Dodge v. United States, 258 F.

300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 660 (1919), changes of

various sorts have in fact been approve, e.g., United

States v. Colasurdo, 453 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.

denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972). See cases collected in Heis-

ler v. United States, 394 F.2d 692, 695-96, nn. 2-6 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 986 (1968). The Supreme

Court has stated that a “useless averment” of an indict-

ment may be ignored, Ford vy. United States, 273 U.S.

993, 602 (1927), and courts have regularly permitted jur-

ies to disregard as surplusage language in an indictment

not essential to the allegations of the offense charged. See,

e.g., United States vy. Archer, 455 F.2d 193 (10th Cir.),

cert. denied, 409 U.S. 856 (1972); United States v. Cola-

surdo, supra.

RB I ERIE EET

6a

Appendix A

Despite this modern line of cases, uncertainty has per-

sisted as to the propriety of withdrawing indictment lan-

guage from a trial jury’s consideration because Bain,

which “has never been disapproved,” Stirone v. United

States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960), itself involved the with-

drawal from the jury's consideration of language not es-

sential to the offense charged. Bain, an officer of a bank-

ing association, was charged with making a false report

with intent to deceive the Coimptroller of the Currency

and the agent appointed to examine the affairs of the

association. The trial court eliminated the reference to

the Comptroller of the Currency. The Supreme Court re-

versed even though the balance of the indictment ade-

quately stated an offense. The Court was concerned that

the grand jury might have indicted only because the

Comptroller of the Currency had been deceived. 121 U.S.

at 10. Implicit in this holding is the view that the Fifth

Amendment protects a defendant from being tried on

minimally sufficient allegations of an offense unless a

grand jury has made the prior determination that it con-

siders those allegations sufficient to warrant the exercise

of its prosecuting discretion. See Gaither v. United

States, 413 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

This Court has viewed Bain as holding that some dele-

tions of unnecssary language may work an impermissible

“fundamental change” in the charge set forth in an in-

dictment, even though a legally sufficient allegation re-

mains. See United States v. Colasurdo, supra, 453 F.2d

at 590. That type of change, involving the disregard of

language that might well have had a significant bearing

on the grand jury’s decision to indict, may still violate

the Pain rule. Even this interpretation of Pain may have

been eroded by the Supreme Court's opinion in Stirone vy.

7a

Appendix A

United States, supra, which interpreted Bain as standing

for “the rule that a court cannot permit a defendant to

be tried on charges that are not made in the indictment

against him.” 361 U.S. at 217. This view appears to

express concern only with the addition of charging lan-

guage, rather than its deletion.

The disregarded portions of the indictment in this case

were plainly surplusage. The manner of an attempted

evasion of income taxes has been deemed not essential

to a valid indictment. Hayes vy. United States, 407 F.2d

189 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 395 U.S. 972 (1969);

Heasley v. United States, 218 F.2d 86 (8th Cir.), cert.

denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955). Here, the manner of at-

tempted evasion—filing false returns—was adequately

stated even after the deletion, the omitted words econ-

cerning only the correct amount of taxes due. Nor do

we think there is any substantial likelihood that the grand

jury would have failed to indict the appellants for their

actions in wilfully filing false returns even if the grand

jurors had understood that the taxes were due from the

corporation and not from the appellants.

Appellants further contend that the deletions that oc-

curred here caused them prejudice beeause of the man-

ner in which they chose to defend. At trial the LR.S.

special agent acknowledged, on cross-examination, that no

notice had been given the corporation of its obligation

to pay social security taxes for its employees, nor had

any assessment been made of taxes due. Of course, no

notice or assessment was necessary prior to a prosecu-

tion for attempted evasion. Ford vy. United States, 233

F.2d 56 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).

In any event neither the cross-examination of the spe-

ae

ee St pe eee

8a

Appendix A

cial agent, nor any other evidence developed at the trial,

sought to place the obligation to pay taxes upon the

appellants or to shift it to the corporation, where it be-

longed. The jury’s attention was simply never directed

to the question of who was liable for payment of taxes,

an issue of no relevance in this attempted evasion case.

This case is thus totally unlike United States vy. Wolfson,

437 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1970), where substantial evidence

was submitted to the jury in support of allegations sub-

sequently withdrawn from the jury’s consideration. The

deletion here caused no prejudice.*

? Appellants allege one particular respect in which they were

prejudiced by the deletion, or, more precisely, by the prosecutor’s

failure to respect the deletion. The summation includes the fol-

lowing :

“Evidence in this case, I submit, points very strongly to

that Mr. Cirami was a man of expediency. In this case, he

saved approximately $34,000 by this scheme.

Mr. Hollman: I object to that.

Mr. Myerson: That is the amount in the indictment.

The Court: No, sustained.

Mr. Myerson: I submit, ladies and gentlemen, if you

find Mr. Cirami did that, it will add up to the approximate

figure of $34,000.

Mr. Hollman: I object to that.

The Court: Sustained.

Mr. Myerson: You can add it up, ladies and gentlemen.”

Plainly, it was improper for the prosecutor to argue to the jury

the total amount of taxes saved, when there was no evidence to

support these figures, and when the allegations of the indictment,

upon which he sought to rely, had been stricken from the indict-

ment at his request. It is also inexcusable for him to have per-

sisted in this improper argument after objection to it had twice

béen sustained.

. (Footnote continued on following page)

9a

Appendix A

One further aspect of the alteration of the indictment

warrants additional comment, the manner of accomplish-

ing the deletion. The Ninth Circuit has pointed out the

anomaly of permitting trial judges to instruct juries to

disregard certain portions of an indictment, yet prohibit-

ing a physical correction of the indictment papers to

reflect the deletion. Heisler vy. United States, supra. Yet

convictions have been overturned where language, con-

ceded to be surplusage, had been crossed out on the face

of the indictment. See, e.g., Stewart v. United States,

12 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1926).°

In United States v. Wolfson, supra, this Court econ-

sidered deletion of indictment language accomplished by

covering the words to be omitted with opaque paper on

which was written, “This portion of indictment stricken

as a matter of law; it is not to be considered by the

jury.” 437 F.2d at 868. The decision did not question

this physical alteration of the indictment, though con-

victions were reversed because of the prejudicial effect

of the evidence admitted in support of the deleted alle-

gations.

(Footnote continucd from preceding page)

Under all the circumstances, however, no prejudice resulted.

The prosecutor was referring to Salvatore Cirami, president of

the corporation, who had acknowledged that the corporation was

“his own company.” It was proper to argue, as bearing on motive,

that the principal officer of his own corporation stood to gain

money by attempting to evade corporate taxes. The improper

reference to the amount of taxes does not warrant reversal.

3 The manner of altering the face of the indictment in Stewart

is explained in Stewart v. District Court, 16 F.2d 863 (9th Cir.

1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 755 (1927).

i

SOLEIL PAL IAL LL TEES Ee

10a

Appendix A

In the instant case, we are neither asked to decide,

nor do we express, any view as to whether the jury is

to inspect an indictment in any or all criminal prose-

cutions. But, if a jury is permitted to see the individual

indictment, and if any language of that indictment is

surplusage or other matter that a jury may properly be

instructed to disregard, we think the preferable course

is to prepare a retyped “clean” version of the indict-

ment, omitting the language to be disregarded without

any indication of its omission. If the language is not

to be considered by the jury, it is surely better to re-

move it from their scrutiny, rather than rely on instruc-

tions. Crossing out or covering the deleted words only

serves to arouse the jury’s curiosity and stimulate un-

warranted speculation as to the full scope of the original

allegations. Of course, in situations where the original

indictment has been read to the jury or where a dele-

tion leaves the remaining langiage awkward or unclear,

a trial judge may, especially if the defendant prefers,

permit the jury to see the original indictment and deal

with the deletion in the court’s instructions.

In this case, the deletion was accomplished by placing

brackets on the face of the indictment around the words

to be deleted. However, it appears that the indictment,

thus marked, was never submitted to the jury. Appar-

ently, it is not the routine practice in the Eastern Dis-

trict of New York to submit indictments to the trial jury,

and the jury in this case made no request to see the

indictment. In his charge, Judge Costantino simply read

to the jury Counts 1, 15, and 17, which were illustrative

of the three sets of offenses charged, and in doing so,

omitted the language that he had ordered stricken. Thus,

the jury received an entirely adequate statement of the

ene ae,

lla

Appendiz A

offenses alleged, and their attention was never directed

to the fact that the improper allegation concerning taxes

owed by the appellants had been originally included in

the indictment and thereafter deleted. Since the jury

never saw the indictment, the absence of a clean, retyped

indictment is of no consequence.

The judgments of conviction are affirmed.

j

Bren SN

12a

APPENDIX B

Order of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, Affirming Judgment

74-1492

Unitep Srates Court or APPEALS

For tHe Seconp Circuit

At a stated Term of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at

the United States Courthouse in the City of

New York, on the twenty-fourth day of Jan-

uary, one thousand nine hundred and sev-

enty-five.

Present:

Hion. Harrison L. WintTER

Hon. Wituiam H. Mvtuican

Circuit Judges

Hon. Jon O. NewMan

District Judge

Unirep Srates or AMERICA,

Plaintiff-A ppellee,

Vv.

Satvatore Cram & James Crrami,

Defendants-Appellants.

a

t " eee. |

13a

Appendix B

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of New York

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of

record from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of New York, and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered,

adjudged, and decreed that the judgments of said Dis-

‘ trict Court be and they hereby are affirmed in accordance

with the opinion of this court with costs to be taxed

against the appellants.

A. Dante Fvsaro,

Clerk

By Vincent A. Carin,

Chief Deputy Clerk

A true copy

A. Danret Fusaro

Clerk

by: Vincent A. Cariin

Vincent A. Carlin,

Chief Deputy Clerk

lia

_ APPENDIX C

Order of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, Denying Motion

for Extension of Time

74-1492

: A 22 .

‘ | Unitep States Court oF APPEALS

| For THE Seconp’ Circuir

4 ‘ '

2 At a stated Term of. the United States Court

4 of Appeals, in and for the Second Cireuit,

j held at the United States Courthouse in the

zs City of New York, on the 19th day of Feb-

4 ruary, one thousand nine hundred and sevy-

; enty-five.

i ‘

i Unitep States or AMERICA,

j Plaintiff-Appellee,

g | Vv.

| | Sarvatore Crami & James Cram,

; Defendants-A ppellants.

It is hereby ordered that the motion made herein by

_ counsel for the appellant by notice of motion dated Feb-

ane’ agh eR”

lia

Appendix C

ruary 7, 1975 to extend the time to file a petition for

rehearing and rehearing en banc to and including seven

days after the grant of this motion or for a stay of man-

date pending application to the Supreme Court of the

United States for a writ of certiorari pursuant to Rule

41(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure be

and it hereby is denied.

Harrison L. Winter (MDD)

Harrison L. Winter

Writui1m H. Mvuiuican

William H. Mulligan

Jon O. Newman (MDD)

Jon O. Newman

Circuit Judges

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.