Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — CIRRAMI V. UNITED STATES (No. 74-1066)
Supreme Court brief1974
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
SUPREME COURT, U. & Supreme
i
IN THE '
Supreme Cowt of the Uniten States
Ocroser Term, 1974
No. 74-1066
SALVATORE CIRAMI, and JAMES CIRAMI,
Petitioners,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Wacman, Cannon & Musorr, P.C.
136 East 57th Street
New York, N. Y. 10022
and
Luioyp A. Hate
36 West 44th Street
New York, N. Y. 10036
(212) 972-0170
Cownsel for Petitioners
Adame Press Corp. 139 Cedar Street, N. ¥-—Beakman 3-1050-51
[x
TORRENT aE EI
es
SLATE AY ig EEO REP ELE A PERE SOE SE.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Orrnion BeLow
JURISDICTION
Questions PRESENTED
ConsTITUTIONAL Provisions INVOLVED
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Reasons ror GRANTING THE Writ
1. Defendants may not be convicted on charges
not brought by the Grand Jury
2. The alleged false statements were not crim-
inal, the prosecution was arbitrary and threat-
ens all other innocent taxpayers and filers ....
ConcLusiIon
APPENDIX:
A—Opinion of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit
B—Order of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Cireuit, Affirming Judgment
C—Order of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, Denying Motion for
Extension of Time
Cases Cited
Benderoff v. United States, 398 F. 2d 132 (8th Cir.
1968)
Chilhowee Mills, Ine. v. C.LR., 152 F. 2d 137 (D. C.
Cir. 1945)
12
12a
l4a
13
13
FTN cine Mat ga
rte Ye
ii TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Genevieve B. Walker, 4 T.C. 630 (1966) 13
Germantown Trust Co. v. C.LR., 309 U. S. 304 (1940) 18
Paritem Singh Poonian v. United States, 294 F, 2d
74 (9th Cir. 1961) 11,12
Russel v. United States, 369 U. S. 749 (1964)... 5)
Rutkin v. United States, 343 U. S. 130 (195°). 14
Sansone v. United States, 380 U. S. 350 (1965)... 8
Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492 (19438)... 12,14
Stirone v. United States, 361 U. S. 212 (1960)_........ 8,10
Stockstrom v. C.I.R., 190 F. 2d 283 (D. C. Cir. 1951) 13
United States v. Barash, 365 F. 2d 395 (2d Cir. 1966) 14
United States v. Casale Car Leasing Inc., 385 F. 2d
707 (2d Cir. 1967) 14
United States v. Fischetti, 450 F. 2d 34 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. den. 405 U. S. 1016 12
United States v. Wilkins, 385 F. 2d 465 (4th Cir.
1967) 8
United States v. Williams, 412 F. 2d 625 (3rd Cir.
1969) 12
Venus v. United States, 368 U. S. 345 (1961)_..... 13
Ward v. United States, 344 U. S. 924 (1953) 0... 13
United States Constitution Cited
Fifth Amendment 2, 3,11
Statutes Cited
18 U.S.C.:
See. 1001 12
; TABLE OF CONTENTS iii
| PAGE
26 U.S.C.:
See. 7201 1, 3, 14
See. -7206(2) 1, 2, 5, 12, 14
28 US.C.:
See. 1254(1) 2
Regulation Cited
Treasury Regulations:
See. 31.6011(a)-5
14
EWI LD IRONS
“pepe
COE Be 28 mabe
\
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Ocroser Term, 1974
No.
\
SALVATORE CIRAMI, and JAMES CIRAMI,
Petitioners,
Us.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
ee
\ i.
—>—
\
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Petitioners, Salvatore and James Cirami, hereby peti-
tion this Honorable Court for a writ of certiorari to
review the judgment of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, affirming, January 24, 1975,
petitioners’ conviction under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7206(2) in
the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York. <A timely petition to enlarge the time
for filing a petition for rehearing and a hearing en banc
seven days to allow new (present) counsel to point out
the errors in the opinion below, a review of which is here
sought, was denied on February 19, 1975.
cf
g
?
j
Opinion Below
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, not yet officially
reported, is reproduced in Appendix A of this petition.
Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of this Court is involved under See-
tion 1254(1), Title 28, United States Code, to review on
writ of certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals
entered January 24, 1975, timely petition to enlarge the
time for filing a petition for rehearing and hearing en
banc denied, February 19, 1975.
Questions Presented
1. Is it a fatal variance under an indictment alleging
that the petitioners personally owed withholding and
F.I.C.A. taxes to allow the prosecution to offer proof that
such taxes were actually owed by a corporation?
2. Was it a violation of the petitioners’ rights under
the Fifth Amendment to be held to answer for a felony
only on a grand jury indictment for the trial court to
strike as “surplusage”, the allegation that petitioners per-
sonally owed withholding and payroll taxes which they .
were charged with evading and allow the prosecution to
prove that such taxes were actually owed by a corpora-
tion, a charge nowhere contained in the indictment?
3. Should petitioners have been convicted of submit-
ting false forms 1099 under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) when
those forms disclosed payments to truck drivers which
would have been the same. disclosure made on form W-2
which the prosecution contended should have been filed?
3
4, Apart from the immediately foregoing question,
should petitioners be awarded a new trial on the last two
counts of the indictment because of the erroneous sub-
mission of the first seventeen counts to the jury or should
these counts be dismissed?
Constitutional Provisions Involved
Unirep States Constitution, Firrn AMENDMENT
“No person shall be held to answer for a capital
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a Grand Jury... .”
Statement of the Case
Petitioners Salvatore and James Cirami are father and
son. They were indicted in 73 Cr. 413 for attempted
evasion of withholding and payroll taxes, in violation of
26 U.S.C. 7201 in the following language:
“That during the period from January 1, 1967 to
July 31, 1971, inclusive in the Eastern District of
New York, the defendants Salvatore Cirami and
James Cirami who were the President and Treas-
urer and Vice President and Secretary respectively
of Air Package Distribution Service Ltd., a cor-
poration, with its principal place of business in
Queens County, New York, did wilfully attempt
to evade and defeat a large part of the federal
income taxes withheld from wages and Federal In-
surance Contributions Act taxes due and owing to
the United States cf America for the quarter end-
ing March 31, 1967, by preparing and causing to
be prepared and thereafter filing and causing to
be filed with the Internal Revenue Service Center,
RAMEN tue =
4
Andover, Massachusetts, a false and fraudulent em-
ployer’s quarterly tax return, wherein it was stated
that the total taxable wages paid employees for
the said quarter was the sum of $13,320.82 and
that the total amount of tax withheld and Fed-
eral Insurance Contributions Act taxes due there-
on was the sum of $1,172.23, whereas, as the de-
fendants then and there well knew, the total tax-
able wages paid employees for said quarter was
the sum of $39,401.82 wpon which wages the de-
fendants owed to the United States of America fed-
eral income taxes withheld from wages and Fed-
eral Insurance Contributions Act taxes due in the
total amount of $3,467.36.
In violation of Section 7201, Internal Revenue
Code; 26 United States Code, Section 7201; 18
United States Code, Section 2.” (emphasis added)
(A. 3a)*
The same language in italics was common to the first
seventeen counts of the indictment. As the Court of Ap-
peals opinion recognizes, that allegation was wrong—char-
acterized in the opinion below as “a mistake”—since the
only proof offered in support of the indictment was
that a corporation, Air Package Distribution Service,
Ltd., owed the taxes in question, not petitioners (A. 40a-
41a). An objection was made to the petitioners being
tried on a charge not made in the indietment—which the
trial court well undersfood (A. 102a-09a). However the
trial court allowed theSprosecution to rescue its ease by
granting its motion to strike the allegation common to
the first seventeen counts (italics, supra) that it was the
petitioners who owed the taxes, not the corporation (A.
* References in the form A. — a are to the appendix on appeal.
In the form T. —, references are to the trial transcript.
ee
5
(109a-17a). Tn the course of granting the motion to strike,
the trial court observed:
“Tt goes without saying that there is no ques-
tion that it is not the defendants that owe the
money to the Federal Government.” (A. 112a).
“The Grand Jury had no right to charge them
with the owing of a corporate tax. ... That will
be surplussage [sic] They cannot be charged with
that since they couldn’t possibly owe it, it eouldn’t
be in violation of law.” (A. 1138a)
Nonetheless, the courts below allowed the conviction to
be sustained and sentenced petitioners as follows:
Salvatore Cirami on Counts 1-15, a fine of $300.00 each,
and a fine of $100.00 each on Counts 17-19, for a total of
$4,800.00 (A. 151a).
James Cirami on Counts 1-14 a fine of $100.00 each
and on 17-19 of $150.00 each for a total of $2,000.00; with
two years probation for both (Aldla-2a).
The final two counts (18 and 19) alleged that petitioners
violated 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) by submitting forms 1099
covering remuneration to truckdrivers instead of forms
W-2, beeause the prosecution contended the drivers were
employees rather than independent contractors (A. 6a).
Reasons for Granting the Writ
1. Defendants may not be convicted on charges not
brought by the Grand Jury.
This Court has held in language, ignored, below that a
defendant may not be convicted on charges not brought
by the Grand Jury in Russel v. United States, 369 U.S.
749, 765-768 (1964):
REET mk SIE Se TA Se Pn orb
6
“Tt is an elementary principle of criminal plead-
ing, that where the definition of an offense, whether
it be at common law or by statute, ‘includes generic
terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment shall
charge the offense in the same generic terms as
in the definition; but it must state the species,—
it must descend to particulars.’” United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 US 542, 558, 23 L ed 588, 593.
An indictment not framed to apprise the defend-
ant “with reasonable certainty, of the nature of
the accusation against him .. . is defective, al-
though it may follow the language of the statute.”
United States v Simmons, 96 US 360, 362, 24 L
ed 819, 820. “In an indictment upon a statute,
it is not sufficient to set forth the offence in the
words of the statute, unless those words of them-
selves fully, directly, and expressly, without any
uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements
necessary to constitute the offenes intended to be
punished; . . .” United States v. Carll, 105 US
611, 612, 26 L ed 1135. “Undoubtedly the lan-
guage of the statute may be us. @ in the general
description of an offence, but it must be accom-
panied with such a statement of the facts and cir-
cumstances as will inform the accused of the spe-
cific offence, coming under the general description,
with which he is charged.” United States v. Hess,
124 US 483, 487, 31 L ed. 516, 518, 8 S Ct 571.
See also Pettibone v. United States, 148 US 197,
202-204, 37 L ed 419, 422, 423, 13 S Ct 542; Blitz
v. United States, 153 US 308, 315, 38 L ed 725,
727, 14 S Ct 924; Keck v. United States, 172 US
434, 437, 48 L ed 505, 507, 19 S Ct 254; Morissette
v. United States, 342 US 246, 270, note 30, 96 L
ed 288, 304, 72 S Ct 240. Cf. United States v.
HS
7
Petrillo, 332 US 1, 10, 11, 91 L ed 1877, 1884,
1885, 67 S Ct 1538. That these basic principles
of fundamental fairness retain their full vitality
under modern concepts of pleading, and specifically
under Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, is illustrated by many recent federal
decisions.
The vice which inheres in the failure of an in-
dictment under 2 USC 46192 to identify the sub-
ject under inquiry is thus the violation of the basic
principle “that the accused must be apprised by
the indictment, with reasonable certainty, of the
nature of the accusation against him, .. .” United
States v. Simmons, supra (96 US at 362). A eryp-
tic form of indictment in cases of this kind re-
quires the defendant to go to trial with the chief
issue undefined. It enables his conviction to rest
on one point and the afiirmance of the conviction
to rest on another. It gives the prosecution free
hand on appeal to fill in the gaps of proof by
surmise or conjecture. The Court has had ocea-
sion before now to condemn just such a practice
in quite different factual setting. Cole v. Arkansas,
333 US 196, 201, 202, 92 L ed 644, 647, 648, 68
S Ct 514. And the unfairness and uncertainty
which have characteristically infected criminal pro-
ceedings under this statute which were based upon
indictments which failed to specify the subjeet un-
der inquiry are illustrated by the cases in this
Court we have already discussed. The same un-
certainty and unfairness are underscored by the
records of the cases new before us.” 369 U.S. at
766.
The same forbidden result occurred in the present case.
The grand jury returned an indictment alleging that the
Sa
Se Se eee Oe
PE DAD WO Ae OF,
8
Ceramis owed withholding and other employment taxes.
The prosecution not only abandoned that approach but
successfully moved to have stricken that essential alle-
gation. Thus the Court of Appeals, the trial court and
the prosecution were able to sustain charges which were
not only not returned by the grand jury they were con-
trary to the charges returned by that screening body.
“As has been held by this Court, the elements
of § 7201 are willfulness; the existence of a tax de-
ficiency, Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 39, 361, 78
S. Ct. 311, 323, 2 L.£d.2d 321; Spies v. United States,
supra, 317 U.S. at 496, 63 S.Ct. at 366; and an
affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted
evasion of the tax, Spies v. United States, supra.”
Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 350, 351 (1965).
But it was precisely the element of a tax deficiency and
by which taxpayer(s) owed that was stricken from the in-
dictment in this case, thus allowing the courts and the
prosecution to present any substitution for the judgment of
the grand jury guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
Cf. United States v. Wilkins, 385 F.2d 465 (4th Cir.
1967), holding, as has this Court, that a deficiency due
and owing by a particular taxpayer is an element of the
offense of tax evasion, even though the statute does not
specifically so provide. Thus a direct conflict has arisen
between the decisions of this Court and those of other
Circuits on the elements of the offense of tax evasion
and the need to charge them in the indictment.
There is no way in which the decision below can be
squared with this Court’s decision in Stirone v. United
States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960), where this Court held:
“Ever since Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 7 S. Ct.
781, 30 L.Ed. 849, was decided in 1887, it has been
9
the rule that after an indictment has been returned
its charges may not be broadened through amend-
ment except by the grand jury itself. In that case,
the court ordered that some specific and relevant
allegations the grand jury had charged be stricken
from the indictment so that Bain might be con-
vieted without proof of those particular allegations.
In holding that this could not be done, Mr. Justice
Miller, speaking for the Court, said:
‘Tf it lies within the province of a court to
change the charging part of an indictment to suit
its own notions of what it ought to have been,
or what the grand jury would probably have
made it if their attention had been called to
suggested changes, the great importance which
the common law attaches to an indictment by a
grand jury, as a prerequisite to a prisoner’s trial
for a crime, and without which the constitution
says “no person shall be held to answer,” may
be frittered away until its value is almost de-
stroyed.’ 121 U.S. 1, 10, 7 S.Ct. 781, 786.
The Court went on to hold in Bain:
‘that after the indictment was changed it was
no longer the indictment of the grand jury who
presented it. Any other doctrine would place the
rights of the citizen, which were intended to be
protected by the constitutional provision, at the
merey or control of the court or prosecuting at-
torney * * *” 121 US. 1, 13, 7 S.Ct. 781, 787.
The Bain case, which has never been disapproved,
stands for the rule that a court cannot permit a
defendant to be tried on charges that are not made
in the indictment against him. See also United
10
States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619, 622, 50 S.Ct. 424,
425, 74 L.Ed. 1076; Cf. Clyatt v. United States,
197 U.S. 207, 219, 220, 25 S.Ct. 429, 431, 432, 49
L.Ed. 726. Yet the court did permit that in this
ease.” 361 U.S. at 215-17.
In Stirone, the indictment charged that the defendant
had obstructed interstate commerce in connection with
the mixing and manufacture of concrete, 361 U.S. at 213-
14. The trial court allowed proof that Stirone’s extortion-
ary activities could have affected either interstate ship-
ments of steel or sand. 361 U.S. at 214. In reversing
Stirone’s conviction this Court held:
“The very purpose of the requirement that a
man be indicted by grand jury is to limit his jeop-
ardy to offenses charged by a group of his fellow
citizens acting independently of either prosecuting
attorney or judge.* Thus the basie protection the
grand jury was designed to afford is defeated by a
device or method which subjects the defendant to
prosecution for interference with interstate com-
merece which the grand jury did not charge.” 361
US. at 218.
In the light of such a decision, can the result below be
allowed to stand where the indictment returned by the
grand jury charged petitioners with the evasion of taxes
which admittedly they did not owe?
Is there any bound to the sorts of convictions which can
be justified nunc pro tunc on the justification that the
prosecutor was “merely mistaken” when he drafted an
indictment?
Must the defendants be required to show that the
Grand Jury would not have indicted them if it had been
given proper proof or a correctly drafted indictment?
11
The Fifth Amendment guaranty that no citizen shall
be held to answer except on the Grand Jury’s indictment
would seem to place the burden the other way around and.
require dimissal in this case.
The decision below is in direct conflict with that of the
Ninth Cireuit in Parilcin Singh Poonian v. United States,
204 F. 2d 74 (9th Cir. 1961). In that case the defendant
was indicted (as were petitioners) with evading taxes
and making false statements as to them, when in fact
the taxes were the obligation of another (Poonian’s
mother). The Ninth Circuit held:
“Here, the indictment charged that the appellant
had understated ‘his’ income and sales. Was the
personal pronoun mere surplusage? We think not,
for it was an allegation crucial to any inference
that appellant’s allegedly false statements were
material.
[3] In support of our conclusion, we note that
the income tax return filed by appellant only re-
quired that he report ‘his’ income. It did not re-
quire that he report the amounts which constituted
income to any other person. Appellant was in
much the same position as a nominee of a stock
brokerage account. Ile is not required to report
as his own, income in which he has no beneficial
interest. It is beside the point that appellant may
have been the ‘owner’ of the income in the general
sense. The fact is that we are dealing with a trans-
action that can only be understood properly if we
bear in mind the laws and distinetions peculiar to
income tax law. Since, then, appellant only was
required to report his own income, and since he
only purported to do that, appellant’s statement of
‘his’ income is the only matter in which, as to him,
pC POEL OC IL PL INE ES HA
12
the Internal Revenue Service had a legitimate in-
terest.
a e
The evidence did not prove the charges set forth
in the indictment. There was under a iaw, a fatal
variance between the pleading and the proof, and
therefore the judgment of conviction must be re-
versed.” 294 F. 2d at 75-6.
Poonian, like the instant case, involved a prosecution
for evasion and false statements (the latter there, under
18 U.S.C. §1001, here, under 26 U.S.C. §7206(2)). The
Ninth Circuit’s opinion approves acquittal on the evasion
charges and directs reversal on the false statement
charges. A similar result should follow here. At the
very least, this Court should grant the writ to resolve the
conflict between the circuits in an area that this Court
has described as the “capstone” of federal tax felonies.
Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492 (1943).
Also in conflict are United States v. Williams, 412 F. 2d
625, 627-8 (3rd Cir. 1969), where the indictment was dis-
missed for just such an amendment as occurred below,
even though the defendant consented, and United States
v. Fischetti, 450 F. 2d 34, 39 (Sth Cir. 1971), cert. den.
405 U. S. 1016, where, as here after the trial court granted
the motion to strike, the indictment omitted an essential
element.
2. The alleged false statements were not criminal, the
prosecution was arbitrary and threatens all other in-
nocent taxpayers and filers.
The affirmance below of the convictions on Counts 18
and 19 alleging as false the reporting of the total annual
tei Lal
13
payments to truck drivers on form: 1099 (on the theory
that they were independent contractors) instead of on
forms W-2 (on the prosecution’s theory that the drivers
were employees) is also in conflict with decisions of this
Court and those in other circuits. See Germantown Trust
Co. v. C.LR., 309 U. S. 304, 308 (1940); Venus v. United
States, 368 U. S. 345 (1961); Ward v. United States, 344
U. S. 924 (1953); Stockstrom v. C.1.R., 190 F. 2d 283,
989 (D. C. Cir. 1951); Chilhowee Mills, Inc. v. C.L.R.,
152 F. 2d 137 (D. C. Cir. 1945); Benderoff v. United
States, 398 F. 2d 132 (Sth Cir. 1968) ; Genevieve B. Walk-
er, 4 T.C. 630, 639 (1966). Those cases stand for the
proposition that where a citizen has supplied the Internal
Revenue Service or other government agency with the
required information (e.g., payments to the truckdrivers)
no matter how irregularly, no penalty, even of a civil
nature attaches even though the government contends
that the items complained of should have been reported
in another way, on another form.
Since millions of such forms as 1099 and W-2 are re-
quired and are routinely filed every year, the conflicts
should now be resolved by this Court so that the In-
ternal Revenue Service may not arbitrarily and without
notice convert a required form into a weapon for prose-
cution of those it regards as recalcitrant taxpayers. Here,
through a prior audit of the corporate taxpayer, the
Service was aware from the corporate books and the
filed forms 1099 (admittedly correct as to the amounts paid
the drivers), that the drivers were being treated as inde-
pendent contractors, not as employees, and no withholding
or payroll taxes were being collected or paid over (A40a-
48a, 5la-57a). Yet instead of notifying the corporation
that, in the opinion of the Internal Revenue Service with-
holding and the filing of payroll tax returns (to which
forms W-2 relate) were required, as is specifically pro-
ine ee |
14
vided by Section 31.6011(a)-5 of the Treasury Regula-
tions, Internal Revenue initiated this prosecution. To
prevent this from happening to other taxpayers, it would
seem imperative that this Court now declare, that the
principle stated in Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492,
496 (1943) as to what is now 26 U.S.C. §7201 also applies
to prosecutions under 26 U.S.C. §7206(2) :
“It is not the purpose of the law to penalize frank
difference of opinions or innocent errors made de-
spite the exercise of reasonable care. Such errors
are corrected by the assessment of the deficiency
of tax and its collection with interest for the delay.”
317 U.S. at 496.
There can be little question that had the Second Cir-
cuit found that petitioner should have been acquitted un-
der the first seventeen counts because of the constitutional
violations first discussed, under which counts the bulk of
the evidence was erroneously admitted, it would also have
reversed the convictions under the last two, which were in
any event invalid. See Rutkin v. United States, 343 U. S.
130, 133 n. 4 (195 ); United States v. Casale Car Leasing
Inc., 385 F. 2d 707 (2d Cir. 1967); see also United States
v. Barash, 365 F. 2d 395 (2d Cir. 1966).
FA Lindy PON EAGLE ALD LV BLO LL! CA LURE yy AE
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, it is respectfully prayed
that this petition be granted. \"
Respectfully submitted,
Wacman, Cannon & Musorr, P.C.
136 East 57th Street
; New York, N. Y. 10022
and
Lioyp A. Hate
36 West 44th Street
New York, N. Y. 10036
(212) 972-0170
Counsel for Petitioners
ee TORS
‘
, ‘
‘ .
‘
i
'
‘
‘
‘
a ‘
'
‘
‘
/
4 ,
’
' é
t
'
‘
’
‘ ‘
'
e ‘
'
i t
Poy
;
‘ ‘
, > 4 '
P t
‘
i
F i
i
i sf .
‘
s
FLARED NIIP LIN OTE VALI TL TF, PANG NETO ET EN CL OAD
/ i
A DPE BL ERIE NALA PD
; or |
APPENDIX A
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
Unirep States Court or APPEALS
For THE Seconp Circuit
No. 1179—September Term, 1973
Argued July 16, 1974—Decided January 24, 1975
Docket No. 74-1492
y™
~~
Unirep States oF AMERICA,
Appellee,
—against—
SatvaTore Cirami and James CrraM1,
Appellants.
?
Before:
Muuucan and Winter,®* Circuit Judges, and Newman,°*
District Judge.
* of the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, sitting
by designation.
** of the United States District Court, District of Connecticut,
sitting by designation.
[la]
WS et bP DTA SW ne
2a
Appendix A
Appeal by Salvatore and James Cirami from convic-
tion for attempted evasion of taxes and aiding in the prep-
aration of false information returns, after trial before a
jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, Mark A. Constantino, District
Judge.
Affirmed.
Robert E. Scher, New York, New York (Raphacls,
Searles, Vischi, Scher, Glover & D’Elia, on the brief),
for Appellants.
Richard B. Buhrman, Attorney, Tax Division, U.S. De-
partment of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Scott P.
Crampton, Assistant Attorney General, Ernest J.
Brown, Crombie J.D. Garrett, Attorneys, Tax Divi-
sion, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.,
and Edward J. Boyd, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern
District of New York, on the brief), for Appellee.
Newman, District Judge:
Salvatore and James Cirami appeal from multi-count
convictions for revenue law violations. The appellants
are principal officers of Air Package Distribution Service
Ltd. (hereinafter “the corporation”), a trucking company
that provides pickup and delivery service to airlines. The
corporation sought to classify its truck drivers as inde-
pendent contractors, rather than employees, thereby at-
tempting to evade its obligation for paying taxes im-
posed by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (sevial
security) and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act.
3a
Appendix A
A nineteen-count indictment charged the Ciramis with
three sets of violations. Counts 1 through 14 alleged that
they attempted to evade social security taxes due for four-
teen calendar quarters in 1967 through 1970 by filing false
and fraudulent employer’s quarterly tax returns understat-
ing the amount of taxable wages paid, in violation of 26
U.S.C. § 7201 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Counts 15 through 17
alleged similar violations with respect to attempted eva-
sion of federal employment taxes for the years 1967, 1968,
and 1969. Counts 18 and 19 alleged that the appellants, in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), aided and assisted in
the preparation of false United States Information Re-
turns (forms 1099) for the years 1968 and 1969, which
stated that the recipients of payments from the corpo-
ration were independent contractors rather than em-
ployees. After a trial before Judge Mark A. Costantino
and a jury, appellants were convicted en eighteen of the
nineteen counts, Count 16 having been dismissed. Appel-
lants were sentenced to pay fines on each of the eighteen
counts resulting in conviction, and were also placed on
probation.
Appellants’ attack upon the sufficiency of the evidence is
without merit, and no useful purpose would be served
by detailing the circumstances from which the jury was
ebundantly justified in concluding, under unchallenged and
proper instructions, that the truck drivers were regular
employees of the corporation and that both appellants wil-
fully participated in the attempt to evade corporate taxes
by filing false returns that concealed the employee status
of the drivers.
The principal issue on appeal arises because of a mis-
take made by the Government in drafting for the Grand
Jury’s consideration the first seventeen counts of the in-
SRS OE ee oe
ODS tee PRIDE A EN SS
5
a
-
2
=
¥
4
4
.
'
4a
Appendix A
dictment. Count 1, set out in full in the margin,’ was
drafted in an effort to follow the standard form for al-
leging attempted evasion of corporate taxes by responsible
corporate officials. The manner of attempted evasion was
alleged to be the filing by the appellants of false employer's
quarterly returns. The falsity was alleged by comparing
the wages reported to have been paid some employees
and the tuxes due thereon with the higher amount of
wages actually paid to all employees and the correspond-
ing higher amount of taxes due thereon. The mistake
occurred when it was alleged that the higher amount of
taxes was owed by the appellants, rather than by the
“That during the period from January 1, 1967 to July 31,
1971, inclusive in the Eastern District of New York, the defend-
ants Salvatore Cirami and James Cirami who were the President
and Treasurer and Vice President and Secretary respectively of
Air Package Distribution Service Ltd., a corporation, with its
principal place of business in Queens County, New York, did
wilfully attempt to evade and defeat a large part of the federal
income taxes withheld from wages and Federal Insurance Con-
tributions Act taxes due and owing to the United States of
America for the quarter ending March 31, 1967, by preparing and
causing to be prepared and thereafter filing and causing to be
filed with the Internal Revenue Service Center, Andover, Massa-
chusetts, a false and fraudulent employer’s quarterly tax return,
wherein it was stated that the total taxable wages paid employees
for the said quarter was the sum of $13,320.82 and that the total
amount of tax withheld and Federal Insurance Contributions Act
taxes due thereon was the sum of $1,172.23, whereas, as the
defendants then and there well knew, the total taxable wages paid
employees for said quarter was the sum of $39,401.82 upon which
wages the defendants owed to the United States of America fed-
eral income taxes withheld from wages and Federal Insurance
Contributions Act taxes due in the total amount of $3,467.36.
In violation of Section 7201, Internal Revenue Code; 26 United
States Code, Section 7201; 18 United States Code, Section 2.”
LNCS
5a
Appendix A
corporation. After alleging the correct amount of wages
to be $39,401.82, Count 1 continued: “upon which wages
the defendants owed to the United States of America fed-
eral incomes taxes withheld from wages and Federal In-
surance Contributions Act taxes due in the total amount
of $3,467.36.” The deletion of the quoted words, and of
corresponding language from Counts 2 through 17, upon
motion by the Government after it had rested, is chal-
lenged by appellants as a denial of their Fifth Amend-
ment right to trial upon an indictment of a grand jury.
Ever since the Supreme Court announced in Ex parte
Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887), that an indictment cannot be
amended except by resubmission to a grand jury, the law
has been in a “confused state,” United States v. Edwards,
465 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1972), as to whether any al-
iteration is permissible and if so, how any appropriate
changes may properly be made. While a “no amendment”
rule has been stated, e.g., Dodge v. United States, 258 F.
300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 660 (1919), changes of
various sorts have in fact been approve, e.g., United
States v. Colasurdo, 453 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972). See cases collected in Heis-
ler v. United States, 394 F.2d 692, 695-96, nn. 2-6 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 986 (1968). The Supreme
Court has stated that a “useless averment” of an indict-
ment may be ignored, Ford vy. United States, 273 U.S.
993, 602 (1927), and courts have regularly permitted jur-
ies to disregard as surplusage language in an indictment
not essential to the allegations of the offense charged. See,
e.g., United States vy. Archer, 455 F.2d 193 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 856 (1972); United States v. Cola-
surdo, supra.
RB I ERIE EET
6a
Appendix A
Despite this modern line of cases, uncertainty has per-
sisted as to the propriety of withdrawing indictment lan-
guage from a trial jury’s consideration because Bain,
which “has never been disapproved,” Stirone v. United
States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960), itself involved the with-
drawal from the jury's consideration of language not es-
sential to the offense charged. Bain, an officer of a bank-
ing association, was charged with making a false report
with intent to deceive the Coimptroller of the Currency
and the agent appointed to examine the affairs of the
association. The trial court eliminated the reference to
the Comptroller of the Currency. The Supreme Court re-
versed even though the balance of the indictment ade-
quately stated an offense. The Court was concerned that
the grand jury might have indicted only because the
Comptroller of the Currency had been deceived. 121 U.S.
at 10. Implicit in this holding is the view that the Fifth
Amendment protects a defendant from being tried on
minimally sufficient allegations of an offense unless a
grand jury has made the prior determination that it con-
siders those allegations sufficient to warrant the exercise
of its prosecuting discretion. See Gaither v. United
States, 413 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
This Court has viewed Bain as holding that some dele-
tions of unnecssary language may work an impermissible
“fundamental change” in the charge set forth in an in-
dictment, even though a legally sufficient allegation re-
mains. See United States v. Colasurdo, supra, 453 F.2d
at 590. That type of change, involving the disregard of
language that might well have had a significant bearing
on the grand jury’s decision to indict, may still violate
the Pain rule. Even this interpretation of Pain may have
been eroded by the Supreme Court's opinion in Stirone vy.
7a
Appendix A
United States, supra, which interpreted Bain as standing
for “the rule that a court cannot permit a defendant to
be tried on charges that are not made in the indictment
against him.” 361 U.S. at 217. This view appears to
express concern only with the addition of charging lan-
guage, rather than its deletion.
The disregarded portions of the indictment in this case
were plainly surplusage. The manner of an attempted
evasion of income taxes has been deemed not essential
to a valid indictment. Hayes vy. United States, 407 F.2d
189 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 395 U.S. 972 (1969);
Heasley v. United States, 218 F.2d 86 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955). Here, the manner of at-
tempted evasion—filing false returns—was adequately
stated even after the deletion, the omitted words econ-
cerning only the correct amount of taxes due. Nor do
we think there is any substantial likelihood that the grand
jury would have failed to indict the appellants for their
actions in wilfully filing false returns even if the grand
jurors had understood that the taxes were due from the
corporation and not from the appellants.
Appellants further contend that the deletions that oc-
curred here caused them prejudice beeause of the man-
ner in which they chose to defend. At trial the LR.S.
special agent acknowledged, on cross-examination, that no
notice had been given the corporation of its obligation
to pay social security taxes for its employees, nor had
any assessment been made of taxes due. Of course, no
notice or assessment was necessary prior to a prosecu-
tion for attempted evasion. Ford vy. United States, 233
F.2d 56 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
In any event neither the cross-examination of the spe-
ae
ee St pe eee
8a
Appendix A
cial agent, nor any other evidence developed at the trial,
sought to place the obligation to pay taxes upon the
appellants or to shift it to the corporation, where it be-
longed. The jury’s attention was simply never directed
to the question of who was liable for payment of taxes,
an issue of no relevance in this attempted evasion case.
This case is thus totally unlike United States vy. Wolfson,
437 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1970), where substantial evidence
was submitted to the jury in support of allegations sub-
sequently withdrawn from the jury’s consideration. The
deletion here caused no prejudice.*
? Appellants allege one particular respect in which they were
prejudiced by the deletion, or, more precisely, by the prosecutor’s
failure to respect the deletion. The summation includes the fol-
lowing :
“Evidence in this case, I submit, points very strongly to
that Mr. Cirami was a man of expediency. In this case, he
saved approximately $34,000 by this scheme.
Mr. Hollman: I object to that.
Mr. Myerson: That is the amount in the indictment.
The Court: No, sustained.
Mr. Myerson: I submit, ladies and gentlemen, if you
find Mr. Cirami did that, it will add up to the approximate
figure of $34,000.
Mr. Hollman: I object to that.
The Court: Sustained.
Mr. Myerson: You can add it up, ladies and gentlemen.”
Plainly, it was improper for the prosecutor to argue to the jury
the total amount of taxes saved, when there was no evidence to
support these figures, and when the allegations of the indictment,
upon which he sought to rely, had been stricken from the indict-
ment at his request. It is also inexcusable for him to have per-
sisted in this improper argument after objection to it had twice
béen sustained.
. (Footnote continued on following page)
9a
Appendix A
One further aspect of the alteration of the indictment
warrants additional comment, the manner of accomplish-
ing the deletion. The Ninth Circuit has pointed out the
anomaly of permitting trial judges to instruct juries to
disregard certain portions of an indictment, yet prohibit-
ing a physical correction of the indictment papers to
reflect the deletion. Heisler vy. United States, supra. Yet
convictions have been overturned where language, con-
ceded to be surplusage, had been crossed out on the face
of the indictment. See, e.g., Stewart v. United States,
12 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1926).°
In United States v. Wolfson, supra, this Court econ-
sidered deletion of indictment language accomplished by
covering the words to be omitted with opaque paper on
which was written, “This portion of indictment stricken
as a matter of law; it is not to be considered by the
jury.” 437 F.2d at 868. The decision did not question
this physical alteration of the indictment, though con-
victions were reversed because of the prejudicial effect
of the evidence admitted in support of the deleted alle-
gations.
(Footnote continucd from preceding page)
Under all the circumstances, however, no prejudice resulted.
The prosecutor was referring to Salvatore Cirami, president of
the corporation, who had acknowledged that the corporation was
“his own company.” It was proper to argue, as bearing on motive,
that the principal officer of his own corporation stood to gain
money by attempting to evade corporate taxes. The improper
reference to the amount of taxes does not warrant reversal.
3 The manner of altering the face of the indictment in Stewart
is explained in Stewart v. District Court, 16 F.2d 863 (9th Cir.
1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 755 (1927).
i
SOLEIL PAL IAL LL TEES Ee
10a
Appendix A
In the instant case, we are neither asked to decide,
nor do we express, any view as to whether the jury is
to inspect an indictment in any or all criminal prose-
cutions. But, if a jury is permitted to see the individual
indictment, and if any language of that indictment is
surplusage or other matter that a jury may properly be
instructed to disregard, we think the preferable course
is to prepare a retyped “clean” version of the indict-
ment, omitting the language to be disregarded without
any indication of its omission. If the language is not
to be considered by the jury, it is surely better to re-
move it from their scrutiny, rather than rely on instruc-
tions. Crossing out or covering the deleted words only
serves to arouse the jury’s curiosity and stimulate un-
warranted speculation as to the full scope of the original
allegations. Of course, in situations where the original
indictment has been read to the jury or where a dele-
tion leaves the remaining langiage awkward or unclear,
a trial judge may, especially if the defendant prefers,
permit the jury to see the original indictment and deal
with the deletion in the court’s instructions.
In this case, the deletion was accomplished by placing
brackets on the face of the indictment around the words
to be deleted. However, it appears that the indictment,
thus marked, was never submitted to the jury. Appar-
ently, it is not the routine practice in the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York to submit indictments to the trial jury,
and the jury in this case made no request to see the
indictment. In his charge, Judge Costantino simply read
to the jury Counts 1, 15, and 17, which were illustrative
of the three sets of offenses charged, and in doing so,
omitted the language that he had ordered stricken. Thus,
the jury received an entirely adequate statement of the
ene ae,
lla
Appendiz A
offenses alleged, and their attention was never directed
to the fact that the improper allegation concerning taxes
owed by the appellants had been originally included in
the indictment and thereafter deleted. Since the jury
never saw the indictment, the absence of a clean, retyped
indictment is of no consequence.
The judgments of conviction are affirmed.
j
Bren SN
12a
APPENDIX B
Order of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, Affirming Judgment
74-1492
Unitep Srates Court or APPEALS
For tHe Seconp Circuit
At a stated Term of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the United States Courthouse in the City of
New York, on the twenty-fourth day of Jan-
uary, one thousand nine hundred and sev-
enty-five.
Present:
Hion. Harrison L. WintTER
Hon. Wituiam H. Mvtuican
Circuit Judges
Hon. Jon O. NewMan
District Judge
Unirep Srates or AMERICA,
Plaintiff-A ppellee,
Vv.
Satvatore Cram & James Crrami,
Defendants-Appellants.
a
t " eee. |
13a
Appendix B
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of
record from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, and was argued by counsel.
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered,
adjudged, and decreed that the judgments of said Dis-
‘ trict Court be and they hereby are affirmed in accordance
with the opinion of this court with costs to be taxed
against the appellants.
A. Dante Fvsaro,
Clerk
By Vincent A. Carin,
Chief Deputy Clerk
A true copy
A. Danret Fusaro
Clerk
by: Vincent A. Cariin
Vincent A. Carlin,
Chief Deputy Clerk
lia
_ APPENDIX C
Order of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, Denying Motion
for Extension of Time
74-1492
: A 22 .
‘ | Unitep States Court oF APPEALS
| For THE Seconp’ Circuir
4 ‘ '
2 At a stated Term of. the United States Court
4 of Appeals, in and for the Second Cireuit,
j held at the United States Courthouse in the
zs City of New York, on the 19th day of Feb-
4 ruary, one thousand nine hundred and sevy-
; enty-five.
i ‘
i Unitep States or AMERICA,
j Plaintiff-Appellee,
g | Vv.
| | Sarvatore Crami & James Cram,
; Defendants-A ppellants.
It is hereby ordered that the motion made herein by
_ counsel for the appellant by notice of motion dated Feb-
ane’ agh eR”
lia
Appendix C
ruary 7, 1975 to extend the time to file a petition for
rehearing and rehearing en banc to and including seven
days after the grant of this motion or for a stay of man-
date pending application to the Supreme Court of the
United States for a writ of certiorari pursuant to Rule
41(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure be
and it hereby is denied.
Harrison L. Winter (MDD)
Harrison L. Winter
Writui1m H. Mvuiuican
William H. Mulligan
Jon O. Newman (MDD)
Jon O. Newman
Circuit Judges
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.