Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Tillem v. New Jersey

| | MICHAEL RODAK, JR..CLeR

IN THE ne

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1974

No. 74-60 a

La

a

GERALD TILLEM,

Petitioner,

Vs.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Respondent.

¢?

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY,

APPELLATE DIVISION

Rosert A. Coocan,

Counsel for Petitioner,

Crystal Brook Professional Building,

State Highway 35,

Eatontown, New Jersey 07712

Adams Press Corp., 11 Commerce Street, Newark, N. J.—Market 3-8611-12

rs

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinion BELow

JURISDICTION

Qurstions PRESENTED

CoNSTITUTIONAL Provisions INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Reasons FoR GRANTING THE WRIT

ConcLusion

APPENDIX:

A—Order of Supreme Court of New Jersey Deny-

ing Petition for Certification

B—Opinion of the Appellate Division of the Su-

perior Court of New Jersey

Cases Cited

Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385

(1926)

Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399 (1966) ~...........

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939) —.W0....

State v. Smith, 46 N. J. 510 (1966)

United States Constitution Cited

Fourteenth Amendment ...

PAGE

Ny oo WwW WS WS WO F

lo, a; eo? ee 2

2,5

Ee tL

iakhralvScacall PASSA Dine nian ces

sets SS eedatial

3

3

2

4

=

é

$

4

2

:

’

;

li TABLE OF CONTENTS

Statutes Cited

Anti Gangster Law

N.J.S. 2A :119-1

N.J.S. 2A:119A-3

28 U.S.C., Section 1257 (3)

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Octroser Term, 1974

No.

ys

>

GERALD TILLEM,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Respondent.

*

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY,

APPELLATE DIVISION

Gerald Tillem, your Petitioner, prays that a Writ of

Certiorari issue to review the order of the Supreme Court

of New Jersey entered in the above-entitled cause on June

18, 1974.

Opinion Below

The order of the Supreme Court of New Jersey deny-

ing a Petition for Certification to the Appellate Division,

Superior Court of New Jersey was entered herein with-

out opinion on June 18, 1974. It has not yet been offi-

hat

cially reported and is reprinted at p. la of the Appendix

hereto.

The opinion of the Appellate Division, Superior Court

of New Jersey per the Honorable Joseph Halpern, P.J.

A.D., entered herein on March 29, 1974, is reported at 1

to 7 N. J. Super. 421, 317 A. 2d 738 (App. Div. 1974). It

is reprinted at p. 2a to 12a of the Appendix hereto.

Jurisdiction

1. The judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey

was entered on June 18, 1974 and is final by its terms.

2. No application for rehearing or for an extension of

time within which to petition for certiorari has been ap-

plied for, granted or denied.

3. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C., Section 1257 (3).

Questions Presented

1. Is N.J.S. 2A:119A-3, which makes any person who

engages in the business of making loans or forbearances

at a rate exceeding 50% per annum a criminal, repugnant

to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

by reason of its vagueness and uncertainty?

Constitutional Provisions Involved

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States: “... No State shall... deprive any person

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law

”

3

Statement of Case

This is an appeal in a criminal case from a judgment

of conviction on a single count of “being in the business

of making loans or forbearances in excess of 50% per

annum” contrary to the provisions of N.J.S. 2A :119A-3.

N.J.S. 2A:119A-3 reads as follows:

Any person who engages in the business of mak-

ing loans or forbearances prohibited by section 1 of

this act, or who conspires so to do, shall be guilty

of a high misdemeanor and shall be punished by a

fine of not more than $10,000.00, or by imprison-

ment for not more than 25 years, or both. N.J.S.

2A :119A-3.

Originally the defendant was charged in an eight count

New Jersey State Grand Jury indictment. The first

count charged him with willfully, knowingly and unlaw-

fully engaging in the business of making loans and for-

bearances at a rate of interest exceeding 50% per annum

between February of 1970 and July 12, 1972, in violation

of N.J.S. 2A:119A-3, as set forth in toto aforesaid. Counts

Two through Kight charged the defendant with seven sub-

stantive loans in excess of 50% per annum in violation of

N.J.S. 2A:119-1. N.J.S. 2A:119-1 reads as follows:

Any person who, not being authorized or per-

mitted by law so to do, charges, takes or receives

any money, property or other thing of value as in-

terest on the loan or forbearances of any money

or other property at a rate exceeding 50% per an-

num, or the equivalent rate for a longer or shorter

period, is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be

punished by a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or

by imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both.

N.J.S. 2A:119-1.

NT TUES SW

4

Prior to the commencement of the trial the defendant,

through his counsel, moved to dismiss the First Count

which charged him with being in the business of making

loans at a rate of interest exceeding 50% per annum on

the ground that the Statute was unconstituticnal because

of its vagueness (T 3, 17 through 23).* This motion was

denied by the trial judge (T 3, 24 to T 4,18). The case

then proceeded to trial and the defendant was convicted

on all counts. The defendant was sentenced on the “do-

ing business” count to a term in the New Jersey State

Prison of not less than ten nor more than fifteen years,

and on each of the seven substantive counts to a term in

the New Jersey State Prison of not less than two nor

more than three years. The sentence on the substantive

counts were to be consecutive to each other and conseecu-

tive to the sentence on the “doing business” count. De-

fendant appealed.

At the Appellate level the defendant again raised the

constitutionality of the “doing business” statute hecause

of its vagueness, but his challenge was rebuffed. How-

ever, the intermediate Appellate Court accepted the de-

fendant’s argument that the seven substantive counts

“merged” in the “doing business” count and reversed the

convictions for the seven substantive loans. Nevertheless,

the defendant was still exposed to a minimum of ten years

and a maximum of fifteen years on the “doing business”

count.

Defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of N.J.S.

2A :119A-3 was raised and argued at Point I in defend-

ant’s brief in the Appellate Division, Superior Court of

New Jersey, and was disposed of adversely as to defend-

* The reference “T” refers to the Transcript of the trial herein.

5

ant by that Court (5a). The issue was further raised as

Point I in the Petition for Certification filed by defend-

ant in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, which was de-

nied on June 18, 1974 (la). Therefore, defendant’s posi-

tion has been preserved throughout the appellate process

leading to this petition.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

1. Certiorari should be granted to permit this Court to

decide the issue of the constitutionality vel non of New

Jersey’s loan-sharking statute because of the extremely

severe penalty provisions attached to its trespass and the

genuine likelihood that it will be utilized more frequently

in future state court prosecutions.

N.J.S. 2A:119A-3 says:

Any person who engages in the business of making

loans or forbearances prohibited by section 1 of this

act (N.J.S. 2A:119A-1) shall be guilty of a high

misedemanor and shall be punished by a fine of not

more than $10,000.00, or by imprisonment for not

more than 25 years, or both.

In its applicable part, section 1 (N.J.S. 2A:119A-

1) reads as follows:

Any person who... receives any money as interest

on a loan or forbearance of any money .. . at a rate

exceeding 50% per annum, .. . is guilty of a mis-

demeanor...

It is and has been the defendant’s position that the

“being in the business of making usurious loans” statute

is so vague as to be constitutionally infirm under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is es-

(pene: Hie

tablished that a law fails to meet the requirements of the

Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that

it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it pro-

hibits. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399 (1966). Put

another way, no one may be required at peril of life, lib-

erty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal

statutes. A statute which either forbids or requires the

doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common

intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and

differ as to its application, violates the first essential of

due process of law. Connally v. General Construction Co.,

269 U.S. 385 (1926). This concept has been recognized

by the highest court of New Jersey. State v. Smith, 46

N. J. 510 (1966).

Exactly what does “engaging in the business of making

usurious loans” mean? The Act contains no definition of

“engaging in the business” nor does it set forth any stand-

ard by which it could be determined that one was engag-

ing in the business of making loans. Certainly one of the

basic purposes of the Due Process Clause has always been

to protect a person against having the Government im-

pose burdens upon him except in accordance with the valid

laws of the land. Implicit in this constitutional safeguard

is the premise that the law must be one that carries an

understandable meaning with legal standards that courts

must enforce. In the statute subject to attack at bar,

there is no attempt made by the legislature to define or

set standards on “engaging in the business of making

loans”. These words are subject to numerous and varied

interpretations. In Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451

(1939), another New Jersey statute—the Anti Gangster

Law—was challenged constitutionally on the grounds of

vagueness and was struck down by the United States Su-

preme Court. Concededly, no two statutes are alike as to

wording or purpose, but a close comparison of the New

7

Jersey “loansharking” act with the Anti-Gangster Law

shows that the former does not even contain either a defi-

nition or standards which the latter did and the latter

(even with some attempt at definition) was struck down.

The vice of N.J.S. 2A:119A-3 is that it leaves open the

widest possible inquiry as to meaning of terms, the scope

of which no one can foresee and the result of which no

one can foreshadow or adequately guard against.

By exercising jurisdiction herein, this Court cannot only

correct the injustice visited upon the defendant, but can

also alert law-enforcement personnel that whereas clearly

defined penal statutes will be upheld those statutes which

attempt to punish without precision will fall.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and based on the fore-

going authorities, Petitioner respectfully requests this

Court to grant the Petition for Certification to the

Appellate Division, Superior Court of New Jersey.

Respectfully submitted,

Rosert A. Coocan

Counsel for Petitioner

Crystal Brook Professional Building

State Highway 35

Eatontown, New Jersey 07724

Sattnc, Moore, O’Mara & Coocan

Attorneys for Petitioner

[Appenpices Fotitow]

APPENDIX A

Order of Supreme Court of New Jersey Denying

Petition for Certification

SupremME Court cor NEw JERSEY

C-666 SrepremBer Term 1973

La

_—

State or New Jersey,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Vs.

GeraLp TILLEM,

Defendant-Petitioner.

?

To Appellate Division, Superior Court:

A petition for certification having been submitted to

this Court, and the Court having considered the same,

It is hereupon Orperep that the petition for certification

is denied, with costs.

Wrrness, the Honorable Richard J. Hughes, Chief Jus-

tice, at Trenton, this 18th day of June, 1974.

Frorence R. PEsKoE

Clerk

Filed

Jun 18 1974

FLoreNcE R. PEsSKOE

Clerk

POF SI LE ED

2a

APPENDIX B

Opinion of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court

of New Jersey

Superior Court or New JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

A-2895-72

Strate oF New JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

GeraLD TILLEM,

Defendant-Appellant.

Argued February 20, 1974—Decided Mar 29 ’74

Before Judges Ha-trern, Marruews and BiscHorr.

On appeal from Monmouth County Court.

Mr. Robert A. Coogan argued the cause for appellant

(Messrs. Saling, Moore, O’Mara & Coogan, attorneys).

Mr. Michael A. Graham, Deputy Attorney General, ar-

gued the cause for respondent (Mr. William F. Hy-

land, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney;

Mr. George F. Kugler, Jr., former Attorney General

of New Jersey, and Michael A. Graham, of counsel

and on the brief).

3a

Appendix B

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Havpern, P.J.A.D.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of en-

gaging in the business of “loan sharking” in violation of

N.J.S.A. 2A: 119A-3. He was also convicted, at the same

trial, on seven counts of “loan sharking” representing

seven illegal loans made to four different individuals over

a two and one-half year period, wherein the annual rate of

interest charged was between 200 and 300%, in violation

of N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-1. He was sentenced on the latter

seven charges to consecutive 2-3 year State Prison terms,

and on the former charge to a State Prison term of 10-15

years, to be served consecutively to the sentences imposed

on the seven charges. In all, he was given State Prison

sentences totalling 24-36 years.

Before considering the issues raised on this appeal, we

pause to point out that defendant neither testified nor

called any witnesses in his defense; and we find the un-

contradicted proofs of the State amply supported the

convictions.

I

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-3

Defendant argues that N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-3 is unconsti-

tutional because of vagueness, in that “* * * it does not

spell out the degree or details of ‘engaging in the busi-

ness’ of making loans.” The statute provides:

94:119A-3. Busrxess oF Makinc Pronwisitep Loans

or ForEBEARANCES; PENALTY

Any person who engages in the business of mak-

ing loans or forebearances prohibited by section 1

4a

~ Appendix B

of this act, or who conspires so to do, shall be

guilty of a high misdemeanor and shall be pun-

-ished by a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or by

imprisonment for not more than 25 years, or both.

The contention is without merit. Reading, as we must,

N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-1 through 2A:119A-4 as a whole statu-

tory scheme to prevent and punish the crime of loan

sharking, we are satisfied that men of common intelli-

gence do not have to guess at the legislative meaning or

differ as*to the application of the term “engages in the

business of making [illegal] loans.” State v. Joas, 34

N. J. 179, 185 (1961). The four sections of the loan

sharking statutes must be considered as a homogeneous

and consistent whole giving effect to all their provisions.

State v. Green, 62 N. J. 547, 554-555 (1973). Giving the

statutory words their common, ordinary, common-sense

construction, they can be defined as meaning one who

carries on an enterprise, a business or a profession for

profit or improvement over a period of time, as distin-

guished from one who commits or occasionally partici-

pates in a single act or transaction. See Webster’s Third

New International Dictionary, 1969, p. 751; Black’s Law

Dictionary, (4 ed. 1951), p. 622; 58 C.I.S., Money Lend-

ers, §1, pp. 852-853 (1948); Fleckenstein Brothers’ Com-

pany v. Fleckenstein, 66 N. J. Hq. 252, 256-257 (Ch. 1904).

The trial judge in clear and plain language defined

the term to the jury thusly:

Now, what does the statute mean by someone

who engages in the business of making loans?

What do we mean by business? Well, business as

used in the statute pertains in a very broad sense

to all gainful activity. A business could be called

5a

Appendiz B

occupation or work of some sort in which a per-

son is engaged on a regular basis.

If a person engages in a certain type of transac-

tion once and that’s all, you certainly wouldn’t con-

sider that person to be in the business. If, how-

ever, that type of conduct is repeated to the ex-

tent that there is a certain regularity to that type

of conduct, then it could be inferred properly that

that person was in that business. It’s in that sense

that we use the term business that I have just read

to you.

We need hardly labor the point any further since we are

satisfied the statute informs those concerned what is pro-

scribed and, therefore, is not void for vagueness.

II

ScCIENTER AND CRIMINAL INTENT

Defendant contends the trial judge erred in refusing to

charge the jury that scienter and criminal intent were

essential elements of N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-1 and 3 which the

State had to prove in order to convict him. We disagree.

Whether a statute provides criminal sanctions for pro-

scribed conduct, without proving criminal intent, is a

matter of statutory construction. There are areas where

the evil or danger sought to be prevented is so great

that the Legislature may, as a matter of public policy, de-

clare an act unlawful without proof of a wrongful intent.

State v. Hatch, 64 N. J. 179 (1973); Morss v. Forbes, 24

N. J. 341, 358 (1957). We believe the Legislature felt

Joan sharking is of that invidious caliber. We would

have to be very naive to believe that one who loans

ad ey at

Tie ius edie del

et Lada,

Bis SABLA RE ECE

PDO GE Ma den

6a

Appendix B

money to individuals at annual interest rates in excess

of the lawful rates (here it was 200-300%) does not know

he is violating the law.

It

Prosecutor’s SUMMATION

Defendant argues the prosecutor’s comments in sum-

mation deprived him of a fair trial. The comments com-

plained of consisted of a reference to defendant, by way

of sarcasm, as a “giant angel”; likened defendant to

Shakespear’s Shylock in exacting a “pound of flesh”; and

in referring to a specific loan made by defendant, said

the borrower had “his guts torn out.” These were strong

comments, but in the light of the evidence, defense coun-

sel’s summation, and the nature of the charges and

proofs, they were justifiably made and can hardly b»

deemed sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a_reversai.

United States v. La Sorsa, 480 F. 2d 522, 526 (2 Cir.

1973), cert. den. 38 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1973); State v. Knight,

63 N. J. 187, 193-194 (1973); State v. Wilson, 57 N. J.

39, 50 (1970). In any event, the trial judge instructed

the jury that its verdict must be based on the evidence.

See United States v. Ramos, 268 F. 2d 878, 880 (2 Cir.

1959). If error existed, it was harmless beyond a rea-

sonable doubt in view of the overwhelming evidence of

defendant's guilt. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U. S. 371

(1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969);

Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), reh. den.

386 U. S. 987 (1967).

AL SEP PY MILI

: Fi

2

7a :

Appendix B

IV

MERGER

Defendant contends the seven individual charges for

loan sharking merged in the greater offense of engaging

in the business of loan sharking. We agree.

The legislative intent must be garnered from the loan

sharking statute considered in their context as a whole.

This is particularly true since they were passed at the

same time to effectuate a given result or to overcome a

certain evil. N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-1 proscribes the making

of loans in the amount of $1,000, or more, at a rate in

excess of the annual or equivalent legal rate of interest

but not in excess of 50% per year, and designates such

offenses as misdemeanors. It then provides that any

person who makes a loan at an annual or equivalent legal

rate of interest in excess of 50% per year, regardless

of the amount or duration of the loan, is guilty of a high

misdemeanor.*

N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-2 makes it a high misdemeanor, pun-

ishable by imprisonment for not more than 25 years, or

a fine not greater than $10,000, or both, for any person to

use or threaten to use force in connection with a loan

made in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-1. Here the Legis-

lature obviously intended to severely punish loan sharkers,

or their agents, who commit or threaten to commit vio-

lence upon borrowers of the proscribed illegal loans.

*It was under this latter provision that the seven counts were

premised since the annual or equivalent rate of interest allegedly

charged exceeded 50%.

8a

Appendix B

N.J.S.A. 2A :119A-3, as previously set forth herein, seeks

to reach those who engage in the business of loan shark-

ing, as distinguished from those involved in an isolated

transaction. And, here again, the Legislature considered

the business of loan sharking a menace and detriment to

the public welfare, and prescribed the severe penalties for

violators of imprisonment for not more than 25 years, or

a fine not greater than $10,000, or both.

N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-4, not applicable here, made it mis-

demanor punishable by a maximum of three years im-

prisonment, or a fine not greater than $25,000, or both, for

any person who knowingly possesses, maintains or has

control over anything used to record the proscribed loan

sharking transactions.

Viewing these statutes as indicated, we are satisfied that

one is not guilty of engaging in the business of loan

sharking unless it is shown that various loans are made

as part of a continuing criminal impulse, namely, to en-

gage in the business of loan sharking. Here, the proofs

were not controverted that defendant made at least seven

loans proscribed by N.J.S.A. 2A:119A-1 to four different

individuals over a period of two and one-half years. This

was the kind of illegal business the Legislature sought to

prevent. For an incisive discussion of the evils of loan

sharking, see “Syndicate Loan-Shark Activities and New

York’s Usury Statute”, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 167 (1966).

The seven separate illegal loans were constituent ele-

ments of the greater offense of engaging in the business

of loan sharking and, therefore, merged in the conviction

of the greater offense. They cannot be fractionalized ae-

cording to its component parts. State v. Riley, 28 N. J.

188, 195 (1958), appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 313 (1959);

State v. Mowser, 92 N. J. L. 474 (KE. & A. 1919); Note,

Twice In Jeopardy, 75 Yale L. J. 262, 318-319 (1965). See

also Final Report New Jersey Penal Code, §2C:1-6 and

Commentary.

~—>

PTY OES SS RRS olen ee

9a

Appendix B

In enacting N.J.S.A. 2A :119A-3 the Legislature intended

to punish a course of conduct (engaging in the business

of loan sharking), therefore, all violations that spring

from that singleness of thought and deed, are but one of-

fense. United States v. Universal C.1.T. Credit Corp., 344

U.S. 218 (1952). See also State v. Di Rienzo, 53 N. J. 360

(1969) ; State v. Mills, 51 N. J. 277, 289 (1968), cert. den.

393 U.S. 832 (1968). This principle was enunicated by

Otto Kirchheimer in “The Act, The Offense and Double

Jeopardy”, 58 Yale L. J. 518, 522 (1949):

The unifying element in the cases where ‘con-

sumption’ or ‘subsidiarity’ may be called into play

exists in the perpetrator’s own mind and in his ulti-

mate goal. Whatever appears to him as the princi-

pal object of his criminal endeavors becomes the

main object of the law’s protection. All other stages

or aspects of his action, be they antecedent, simul-

taneous, or posterior, would assume independent

significance only if their perpetration would en-

danger a different social interest; otherwise, they

merge in the offense category protecting the inter-

est towards which the main attention of the perpe-

trator is directed (emphasis added).

If the Legislature had intended to make individual loan

sharking acts separate offenses it would have so provided.

Having failed to do so, it is reasonably inferable that the

individual offenses merged in the greater offense because

without proof of the individual offenses the crime of en-

gaging in the business of loan sharking could not be

proven. The “rule of lenity” which has been often applied

in construing legislation should be utilized to prevent mul-

tiple convictions where none was intended. See Heflin v.

S| —_—

10a

Appendix B

United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); Ladner v. United

States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958); Bell v. United States, 349

U.S. 81 (1955); 8 Moore, Federal Practice, §8.07(2), 1973,

pp. 8-60 to 8-61. The philosophy behind the rule was ex-

pressed by Justice Frankfurter thusly:

It is not to be denied that argumentative skill,

as was shown at the Bar, could persuasively and

not unreasonably reach either of the conflicting con-

structions. About only one aspect of the problem

; can one be dogmatic. When Congress has the will

q it has no difficulty in expressing it—when it has the

will, that is, of defining what it desires to make the

unit of prosecution and, more particularly, to make

each stick in a faggot a single criminal unit. When

; Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imput-

5 ing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity

‘ should be resolved in favor of lenity. And this not

out of any sentimental consideration, or for want

of sympathy with the purpose of Congress in pro-

scribing evil or antisocial conduct. It may fairly

} be said to be a presupposition of our law to resolve

f doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against

3 the imposition of a harsher punishment. This in no

’ wise implies that language used in criminal statutes

should not be read with the saving grace of common

y sense with which other enactments, not east in tech-

y nical language, are to be read. Nor does it assume

; that offenders against the law carefully read the

penal code before they embark on crime. It merely

means that if Congress does not fix the punishment

for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity,

4 doubt will be resolved against turning a single trans-

a action into multiple offenses, when we have no more

lla

Appendix B

to go on than the present case furnishes. (Bell v.

United States, 349 U.S. supra, at 83-84).

In view of the nature of the crime here involved, we

find no abuse of the trial judge’s sentencing discretion on

the first count.

Having decided that the seven lesser included offenses

(counts 2-8 in the indictment) merged in the greater of-

fense (count 1 of the indictment), we ceverse the con-

victions on the seven individual counts for loan sharking,

and vacate the sentences imposed thereon. We affirm the

conviction for unlawfully engaging in the business of loan

sharking.

SRLS AS he