Opposition Brief — Chicago Board of Health v. Friendship Medical Center, Ltd.
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SUPREKWE o> URT, U. 6
No. 74-935 FEB 25 97
if p GRICHAEL RUUAK, M,C
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
Ocrozen Trem, 1974
THE CHICAGO BOARD OF HEALTH, and DR. ERIC OLD-
and T. R. M. HOWARD,
Respondents.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITZON FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
JULIAN B. WILKINS
ROBEP? L. GRAHAM
D. COLMAN
horas for Respondents
Of Counsel: ,
JENNER & BLOCK
One IBM Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60611
(312) 222-9350
soon scene He same
UNITED STATES LAW PRINTING CO., CHICAGO, ILLINCIS 60818 2312) 525-6581
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LAP IED GY NIG SII IEE RITE OS ETL: OEE ALISO AS eu ALE SM PERL EE SRST OAT YS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
PON a eeishureoansianemennnnsigneions 2
SII ios cera asus aaa acatebiaeeccapeeseiaigiensboniek 2
I oa seca pucudenatectcutansceminsin 2
2 aE SEL RO eT NOTE 3
I Or NN iis cc tnenecenecininwertnadaierereriane 3
Reason for Denying the Writ ..................::-:-cscccccssseeseeees 4
A
Because This Court Has Ruled That The State Has No
Compelling Interest In Regulating Abortions Per-
formed In The First Trimester Of Pregnancy, Peti-
tioners Present No New Questions Of Federal Law
And The Seventh Circuit’s Ruling Does Not Merit
PTI 2 sarssaceecchnsseeceacouiies ssbiaieanis maka tisatnc las actinatgstc iene inmeisiceacteo 4
II.
The Seventh Cireuit’s Finding That Respondents Had
Standing To Challenge The Abortion Regulations As
An Unconstitutional Interference With The Funda-
mental Right Of Privacy Was Based On The Holdings
Of This Court And Is Consistent With All Other Cir-
a re I ice ciree lnente 11
Conclusion. ...............-2---+ Teena Sacauethieaetics elevation nies: tabthesias 14
Appendices :
A. WONAAC v. D.C. City Council, No. 72-2010
IS A, WINES pntpest ore tint ciceerserretiacasnthahancmecane App. 1
il
PAGE
B. CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH SERVICE
ADMINISTRATOR, Memorandum on Con-
stitutionality of First Trimester Abortion
Regulations (March 30, 1973) 2-2... App. +
Cc. STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPART-
MENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTIiI SER-
VICES DIVISION, Memorandum on Amend-
ments to Abortion Regulations ...................... App. 8
CITATIONS
Cases
Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1971) vacated
on other grounds, 419 U.S. 951 (1973) | ..........-....---- 13
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). 95
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ............ 5)
Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F.Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973)
appeal dismissed, cert. denied per curiam, 417 U.S.
DTD COTE) inane nnn ean nesnnnnnnnesnecenensnencunsnnnsinnen ~
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) ....2. 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14
Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971) vacated
on other grounds, 410 U.S. 950 (1978) . .......---.----.----- 13
Kisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 488 (1972) ...........-..-...- 5, 12
Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. and T.R.M. Howard
vy. The Chicago Board of Health, et al., 500 F.2d 1141
(Tth Cir, 1974) n.-nececeeeceecesseseeesecseeseeseesensennennsnnssnceneneas 8, 12
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) .......... 5, 12
Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina Department of
Human Resources, 380 F.Supp. 1153 (H.D. N.C.
1974) eaeeecnscesecneescsesneensecesnssnceesnssssnsecsncntensnsnsnssnenesaeosesenenns 10, 13
Hodgson v. Spannus, 378 F.Supp. 1008 ( D.C. Minn.
1974), appeal dismissed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3415 (1974) ..10, 18
iil
PAGE
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621
CRO acesesnseiennsssissnensnssnasenntunetinnneserteneanioninssienniebantananerts 5)
Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 I. 2d 1342 (8th Cir.
1974) appeal dismissed, cert, denied, 43 US.L.W.
BODE CIOTE) cece vss cscs nese nrcenntsessnenvenenneon eremmmacnsamencntienh 13
People v. Dobbs Ferry Medical Pavilion, 33 N.Y. 2d
584, 301 N.E. 2d 4385 (1973) -..-----------e-eececeeceeeeeee oes 10
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) — -......-..--------------- 12
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ...... 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) ..n.nececceneenseeevssnreseronsnnsosnsenensenssorennennsnenssnsncncsnseenseneees 7
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 PID bcanncsscicsasstans 5
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) .............------.-- 5
WONAAC v. D.C. City Council, No. 72-2010 (D.C.
Ch, 1972) za eencnivenesieaenennecennennsseensnnensnsnnsnanenonnoomnsnaneananeneneets 9
Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974) -...... 9,13
Statute
Municipal Code of Chicago, Chapter 9 § 9 -........-.------ 12
Miscellanecus
Comment, 4A Proposed Statute for Implementing the
Abortion Decisions, 12 J.Fam.L. 332 (1973-1974) .... 19
Comment, Landmark Abortion Decisions: Justifiable
Determination or Miscarriage of Justice? — Pro-
posals for Legislative Response, 4 Pae.L.J. 821 (July
1973) cessecsssescesevsnsssseeessnsnsnssncensnssnssnesnseneenennsensensnssomsemenesscs 10
Recent Legislation, Constitutional Validity of the Ten-
nessee Abortion Statute, 4 Memphis St. U. L. Rev.
BOS (1974) ..n----n-sescecceceecoeseseeeescesecenseesnsensensnseneenenensnncensneses 10
Fe INO BIBS ot Abe. Serie tte tae
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SARE BESS Ses
Iu the
Supreme Court of the United States
Octoper Term, 1974
No. 74-935
THE CHICAGO BOARD OF HEALTH, and DR. ERIC OLD-
BERG, SAMUEL A. GOLDSMITH, WALTER MULLADY, DR.
MARY KELLY MULLANE, DR. ROBERT STEPTO, EDWARD
W. HUSSEY, and MICHAEL ROSENBERG, Individual Members
of the Chicago Board of Health,
an Petitioners,
vs.
FRIENDSHIP MEDICAL CENTER, LTD.
and T. R. M. HOWARD,
Respondents.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Respondents pray that the Petition for a Writ of Cer-
tiorari be denied.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit is reported at 505 F.2d 1141 (1974),
and appears in Appendix A of the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
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The Memorandum Opinion and Order of the District
Court are reported at 367 F.Supp. 504 (N.D. TL 1973)
and appears in Appendix B of the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari. ‘
JURISDICTION
The jurisdictional statement is adequately set forth in
the Petition.
to
:
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether this Court’s holding that a woman’s right
of privacy is broad enough to encompass her decision
to have an abortion renders unconstitutional Board
of Health regulations which single out abortion clinics
for specialized standards and procedures applicable
to all abortions, regardless of the trimester, and which
are not applied to other surgical procedures of similar
complexity and risk.
Whether this Court should reject its holding in Roe
v. Wade, that the state’s interest in the health and
safety of women undergoing abortions does not be-
come compelling until the end of the first trimester
of pregnancy.
Whether a physician who is closely involved in
the abortion decision-making process and who is sub-
ject to arrest and loss of his clinic's license for fail-
ure to comply with licensing Regulations has stand-
ing to chailenge those Regulations on the ground that
they interfere with the fundamental right to privacy
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
3
ORDINANCES INVOLVED
The Chicago Board of Health regulations for abortion
services appear in Appendix C to the Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari.
Petitioners have neglected to include one portion of the
Chicago Municipal Code that is relevant to this case. Sec-
tion 9-5 of the Code states:
The president of the board of health, the assistant
to the president of the board of heaith, the secretary
of the board of health, the commissioner of health,
and all physicians, employes or inspectors, who may
be designated by the board of health shall have full
police vowers and shall have the right to arrest or
cause to be arrested any person who violates any of
the health provisions of this code.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Statement of the Case is adequately presented in
the Petition. For greater detail, this Court may refer to
the Statement in Respondents’ Brief filed in the Seventh
Cireuit Court of Appeals below.
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REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
Introduction
The unanimous decision below by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is in total com-
pliance with Roe vy. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). This case tenders no issues
which have not already been resolved by this Court in its
well-considered opinions in those cases.
I
BECAUSE THIS COURT HAS RULED THAT THE
STATE HAS NO COMPELLING INTEREST IN REGU-
LATING ABORTIONS PERFORMED IN THE FIRST
TRIMESTER OF PREGNANCY, PETITIONERS PRE-
SENT NO NEW QUESTIONS OF FEDERAL LAW AND
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S RULING DOES NOT
MERIT REVIEW.
This Court’s decisions in Roe v. Wade, supra, and Doe
v. Bolton, supra, held that the right of personal privacy
guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment encompasses the right of a woman and her
physician to terminate the woman’s pregnancy. Roe v.
Wade, supra, at 154. In those cases this Court declared
that the fundamental right of privacy can be restricted
only by the demonstration of a compelling and necessary
state interest. Id., at 155.
Nevertheless, Petitioners maintain that because the
City’s police powers are being invoked to protect the
)
health and safety of women undergoing abortions,* a ra-
tional relationship need only be established between the
City ordinance and the end it seeks to promote. Petition-
ers’ Brief for Certiorari {hereinafter ‘‘Petition’’} at 12.
This hypothesis overlooks the fundamental nature of the
right to privacy, and ignores the judicial test mandated
by countless Supreme Court decisions.
Where certain ‘‘fundamental rights’? are involved, the
Court has held that regulation limiting these rights
may be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,”’
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621,
627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963),
and that legislative enactments must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interest at
stake. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485;
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508
(1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-
308 (1940): sce Lisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 460,
463-464 (White, J., concurring in result.)
Roe v. Wade, supra, at 155-156.
The Petitioners assert the right to regulate extensively
abortion clinics without regard for the stage of pregnancy.
However, this Court has already ruled that the state’s
interest in the health of the mother does not become com-
pelling until the end of the first trimester of pregnancy.
* At one point Petitioners’ claim this is the “sole” purpose behind
the regulations. Petition, at 3. The Regulations themselves belie
the falsity of this claim. Regulation XVI(e), for example, requires
that a woman wait at least twenty-four hours between the time of
her initial examination by the doctor and the termination of the
pregnancy “. . . to permit the reporting to and review of all labora-
tory tests by the examining physician and to permit and encourage
thorough consideration and a firm decision by the patient regarding
termination of pregnancy.” Petition, Appendix C, at 57a (Empha-
sis added). That such a requirement directly affects the decision to
have an abortion can hardly be doubted.
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Woth re speet lo the State *s important and legitimate
interest in the health of the mother, the **compelling”™
pout, in the light of pres ni medical knowl: da - is at
approximately the ond of the first trimester... It
follows that, from and after this point, a State may
regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the
regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and
protection of maternal health. Examptes of permissi
ble state regulation in this area are requirements as
to the qualifications of the person who is to perform
the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as
to the facility in which the proeedure is to be per-
formed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may
be a clinie or some other place of less-than-hospital
status; as fo licensing of the facility; and the like.
This means, on the other hand, that, for the period
of pregnancy prior to this **compelling’’ point, the
attending physician, in consultation with his patient,
is free to determine, without regulation by the State,
that in his medical judguent the patient’s pregnancy
should be terminated. If that, decision is reached, the
judgment may be ejfectuated by an abortion free of
interference by the State.
Roe v. Wade, supra, at 168. (Emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals below did not, as Petitioners
maintain, ‘‘seize’’ on this language in the Supreme Court's
opinion. Petition, at 9. Rather, the Court of Appeals
followed the Ree holding which was clearly enunciated by
this Court.
To summarize and to repeat: ...
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end
of the first trimester, fhe abortion dectsion and its
effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of
the pregnant woman’s attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the
end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its
interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses,
Bence Si
regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are rea-
sonably related to qmaternal health.
410 U.S. at 164 (Eimphasis added).
In ve v. Wade, this Court invalidated state statutes pre-
cisely because they attempted to regulate abortion without
regard to the stage of pregnancy. Similarly, in Doe v.
Bolton, the Court considered a hospital requirement fail-
ing to exclude the first trimester of pregnancy and con-
cluded:
We hold that the hespital requirement of the Georgia
law, because it fails to exclude the first trimester of
pregnaney ... Is also invalid.
410 U.S. at 190,
These holdings unequivocally prohibit state intervention
in the abortion decision-making process or in the manner
in which such a decision is effectuated during the first
trimester. Despite this faci, Petitioners assert a right to
regulate **where, how and by whom an abortion may be
performed” regardless of the stage of pregnancy. Petition,
at 9. This Court has clearly beld that such regulations
may be proper after the first trimester of pregnaney Int
only when they are reasonably related to the state's in-
terest. Roe v. Wade. supra, at 163.
This Court has held that during the early stages of preg-
nancy the abortion decision **in all its aspects is inherently
and primarily a medical decision, ..."" Roe v. Wade, supra,
at 166, (Emphasis added).”. The Seventh Cireuit aecknowl-
* Petitioners’ reliance on San Antonio School District v. Red-
rigues, 411 US. 1 (1973) is ill-founded. Rodrigues was concerned
with the constitutional relationship of disparate rights (education,
voting and freedom of speech). In this case we are concerned with
one distinct right—the right to make and effectuate the decision to
have an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy. The
decision to have an abortion is intricately related to the procedures
and expenses involved. During the first trimester, the standards of
the medical profession, not the state, must be looked to for necessary
guidance and direction.
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8
edged, as did this Court, that appropriate remedies are
available should any physician abuse the privileges of his
or her position. Roe v. Wade, supra at 166; Friendship
Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Board of Health, et al.,
505 F.2d 1141, 1152-53 (7th Cir. 1974). The Seventh Cir-
euit’s holding that the Abortion Regulations constituted
an unnecessary encroachment upon the physician’s right
to exercise his medieai judgment was mandated by this
Court’s 1973 abortion decisions. A contrary decision
would have discounted ‘*. . . the reality that the vast ma-
jority of physicians observe the standards of their profes-
sion, and act only on the basis of carefully deliberated
medical judgments relating to life and health.’? Doe v.
Bolton, supra, at 208 (Burger C.J., concurring).
We emphasize, as did the Court of Appeals, that this is
not a case where the City purports to regulate abortions
‘* . . as it does other surgical procedures ...’’ Roe v.
Wade, supra at 170-171 (Stewart, J., concurring.) Rather,
as Petitioners concede, the Board of Health has singled
out abortion procedures for regulations that do not apply
to other medical procedures of the same risk and complexi-
ty. The Seventh Cireuit determined that this regulatory
scheme violated the Equal Protection Ciazse of the Four-
teenth Amendment because it adversely affected the funda-
mental right of privacy enunciated in Roe v. Wade by
treating differently without a compeliing reason medical
procedures which are indistinguishable in terms of health
risks. Friendship Medical Center, supra, 505 F.2d at 1153.
Because of the sweeping overbreadth of the Abortion
Regulations, this Court need not decide what legal pre-
sumption should be given to health and safety ordinances
affecting second trimester abortions. We note however,
that in arguing for a presumption of statutory validity,
Petitioners once again ignore the fundamental nature of
the right to privacy. See supra at p. 5. This right
9
remains operative throughout a woman’s pregnancy. Roe
v. Wade, supra, at 159. Consequently, while the ruling
was unnecessary to its decision in this case, the Seventh
Cireuit was correct in concluding that the government must
demonstrate that regulations affecting second trimester
abortions are reasonably related to a valid state interest.
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion is not in conflict with any
other Court of Appeals’ decisions and is supported by the
overwhelming weight of judicial authority. When con-
fronted with regulations similar to those promulgated by
the Chicago Board of Health, the Eighth Circuit reached
a conclusion identical to that reached by the Seventh Cir-
cuit. Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (Sth Cir. 1974). The
Court noted therein that:
While we agree with appellee that the ordinance does
not proseribe abortions, we do not agree that that fact,
of itself, removes the ordinance from the constitutional
realin of Roc and Doe. The Doe decision clearly struck
down portions of the Georgia statute governing abor-
tion procedures. Dov at 192-200. We learn from Doe
that sweeping reguiaiion of the abortion procedure
without regard for the conflicting interests involved
will not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
495 F.2d at 1301.
Similarly, even before Rue v. Wade, supra, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia suspended en-
forcement of an abortion clinie regulation to prevent ‘‘ir-
reparable injury’’ in a case strikingly similar to the present
one. WONAAC v. D.C. City Council, No. 72-2010 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (not reported) (See, Appendix A, infra).
Other courts have also recognized that the regulation of
abortions by the state in the first trimester of pregnancy
is invalid. In Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695, 696 (S.D.
SITE LSU MORE PE &
10
Fla. 1973) (three judge panel), appeal dismissed, cert.
denied per curiam 417 U.S. 279 (1974), the government it-
self expressly abandoned its defense of Florida’s regula-
tions affecting first trimester abortions after the decisions
in Roe v. Wade and Doe y. Bc!ton were announced. A three
judge federal panel in Minnesota also concluded that state
regulation of abortion procedurc. could not be justified
during the first trimester. Hodgson v. Spannus, 378 ¥F.
Supp. 1008 (D.C. Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed, 43 USLW
3415 (1974).
The same result was reached in Hallmark Clinic v. De-
partment of Human Resources, 380 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D.
N.C. 1974), where a three judge panel held the state’s
requirement that an abortion clinic secure a_ written
transfer agreement with a local hospital infringed on the
woman’s right to a first trimester abortion free of state
interference.
In addition, the New York Court of Appeals invalidated
first trimester regulations in People v. Dobbs Ferry Medical
Pavilion, 33 N.Y.2d 584, 301 N.B.2d 485 (1975) (per
curiam). Moreover, officials in New York City and the
State of Washington have voluntarily withdrawn their first
trimester abortion clinie regulations acknowledging that
they were constitutionally invalid. See Appendix B and
Appendix C to this brief, infra.”
* The law review analyses of post-Roe abortion legislation agree
that the only legitimate qualification on first trimester abortion pro-
cedures is that a physician perform the operation. See. ¢.g., Com-
ment, A Proposed Statute for linplementing The Abortion Deci-
sions, 13 Journal Family Law 332, 334-336 (1973-1974) ; Comment,
Landmark Abortion Decisions: Justifiable Determination or Mis-
carriage of Justice?—Proposals for Legislative Response, 4 Pacific
LT. 821, 848-850 (Tuly 1973): Recent Legislation, Constitutional
Validity of the Tennessee Abortion Statute, 4 Memphis St. U. L.
Rev. 593, 594 (1974).
11
Against this overwhelming body of authority, Petitioners
can cite no instance in whieh any court has upheld regula-
tions affecting first trimester abortions after acknowledging
the fundamental nature of a woman’s decision to terminate
her pregnancy. No conflict exists among the various Cir-
cuits necessitating a ruling from this Court. Because this
Court has already ruled that the state’s interest in pro-
tecting a woman’s health becomes compelling only at the
end of the first trimester of pregnancy, the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s decision is correct and the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari should be denied.
II.
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S FINDING THAT RESPON-
DENTS HAD STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE ABOR-
TION REGULATIONS AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
INTERFERENCES WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
OF PRIVACY WAS FASED ON THE HOLDINGS OF
THIS COURT AND !S CONSISTENT WITH ALL
OTHER CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS.
In Doe vy. Bolton, supra, this Court concluded that li-
censed physicians consulted by pregnant women had stand-
ing to challenge Georgia’s anti-abortion statute. 410 U.S.
at 188. It was conceded that the doctor-plaintiffs in that
ease had not been prosecu‘ed or threatened with prosecu-
tion for violation of those statutes. Nevertheless, this
Court held that:
The physician is the one against whom these criminal
statutes directly operate in the event he procures an
abortion that does not meet the statutory exceptions
and gvonditions. The physician-apvellants, therefore,
assert a sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment.
They shoald not be required to await and undergo a
12
criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking re-
lief.
Id., at 188.
In its well-reasoned opinion, the Seventh Circuit per-
ceived what Petitioners have repeatedly failed to acknowl-
edge: namely, that the Abortion, Regulatious promulgated
by the Board of Health are directly supported by Municipa!
Code provisions that give the Board *‘full police powers’’
enforceable by the ‘‘right to arrest’’ violators of the health
provisions of the Code. Chicago Municipal Code § 9-5.
Moreover, the Abortion Regulations specifically provide
for the closing down of facilities deemed in non-compliance
with the Regulations. As the Court of Appeals aptly
noted:
It is precisely this continuing restrictive effect placed
on the plaintiffs by the regulations which is the basis
of this complaint.
Friendship Medical Center, supra, 505 F.2d at 1146.
Like the statute under attack in Doe vy. Bolton, supra, the
Abortion Regulations are ‘‘recent and not moribund.’’ 410
U.S. at 188. Consequently, Petitioners’ reliance on Poe v.
Uliman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), is misplaced. Given these
governmental sanctions, Respondents clearly alleged a suffi-
cient personal stake in the controversy to afford them
standing to challenge the Abortion Regulations.
Petitioners’ contention that the Respondents lackea
standing to chailenge the Abortion Regulations as an un-
reasonable interference with the fundamental right of
privacy protected by the Fourteentii Amendment is totally
without merit. The Seventh Circuit properly foiiowed this
Court’s holdings in Griswold v. Conneciicui, 381 U.S. 478.
481 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-446
(1972), and Doe v. Bolton, supra, 410 U.S. at 188-189.
13
The attending physician’s role in the abortion decision
is so intimate and central that it would be incongruous not
to allow him to challenge the Abortion Regulations on
privacy grounds.
... for the period of pregnancy prior to this ‘‘com-
pelling”’’ point, the attending physician, in consultation
with his paticnt, is free to determine, without regula-
tion by the State, that in his medical judgment the
patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.
Roe v. Wade, supra, at 163 (Kmphasis added).
The Abortion Regulations impermissibly infringe on the
fundamental right of a woman and her physician to decide
to terminate the woman’s pregnancy. Because of the
unique quality of the doctor-patient relationship in this
context, and for the other reasons amply delineated in the
Seventh Circuit’s opinion, the Court was correct in hold-
ing that Respondents had standing to attack the Abortion
Regulations as an interference with the right to privacy
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
There is no conflict among the various Circuits as to a
physician’s standing to raise the privacy challenge. In
Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121, 1125 (2d Cir. 1971), vacated
on other grounds, 410 U.S. 951 (1973), the Court held that
the physician-plaintiffs alleged a sufficient threat of per-
sonal harm to give them standing to challenge Connecti-
cut’s anti-abortion law on privacy grounds. The Eighth Cir-
cuit reached -a similar conclusion in Nyberg v. City of
Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974), appeal dismissed,
cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3224 (1974).* In a reference
* The standing of physicians to challenge abortion regulations on
privacy grounds was unquestioned in several other cases. Word v.
Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974); Hallmark Clinic v. De-
partinent of Human Resources, 380 F.Supp. 1153 (E.D.N.C. 1974) ;
Hodgson vy. Spannus, 378 F.Supp. 1008 (D.C. Minn. 1974). See
also, Doe v. Scott, 321 F.Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (three judge
court), vacated on other grounds, 410 U.S. 950 (1973).
14
to the Supreme Court’s discussion of the standing issues
in Doe vy. Bolion, the Eighth Circuit in Vyberg noted:
The impact of the Court’s discussion cannot be fairly
said to limit standing to sue in abortion cases to preg-
nant women... Clearly, the claims of medical doctors
to ‘freely practice medicine according to the highest
~ medical standards without, arbitrary outside re-
straints’ are inexplicably bound up with the privacy
rights of women who seek abortions.
495 F.2d at 1344.
The Seventh Circuit’s ruling that Doctor Howard and
the Friendship Medical Center had standing to challenge
the Abortion Regulations as an invasion of the right to
privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is con-
sistent with all other Court of Appeals’ decisions and with
prior opinions of this Court. Consequently, the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion does not merit review.
CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully pray that the Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Jvuuiax B. Witkixss
Rosert L. Granam
Jerrrey D. Cotman
Attorneys for Respondents
Of Counsel:
JENNER & BLOCK
One IBM Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60611
(312) 222-9350
—€
APPENDIX
Vv
App. 1 |
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For The District Of Columbia Circuit
September Term, 1972
No. 72-2010 Civil Action 1991-72
Wonaac, Laurel Clinic, Ine.
Dr. Milan M. Vuitch, et al.,
Appellants
v.
District of Columbia City
Council, et al.,
No. 72-2011 Civil Action 1993-72
Mathias J. Coleman, M.D.
Summit Medical Center, Inc.,
et al.,
Appellants
Vv.
Walter E. Washington, et al.,
No. 72-2012 Civil Action 2001-72
Pre-Birth, Ine.,
Appellants
Vv.
John A. Nevius,
et al.,
Before: Wright and Robinson, Circuit Judges
ORDER
On consideration of appellants’ motion for stay and
interlocutory injunction, it appearing to the Court that a
serious question regarding the validity of the Abortion
Pe Te = Sot Ce EN ee Chae Nor ht oe. Cok
App. 2
‘Control Regulation of the District of Columbia has been
raised; and it further appearing that enforcement of the
Regulation may result in irreparable injury to the parties
at whom the Regulation is directed, it is
Ordered that enforcement of the Regulation is stayed
pending further order of the District Court, following a
hearing afforded the parties with all possible speed on
appellants’ motions for a preliminary injunction. Sec
Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown
College, Inc., 118 U.S. App. D.C. 80, 331 F.2d 1000, cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d
226 (Sth Cireuit 1965).
Per Curiam
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
WONAAG, et al.,
Plaintiffs
Civil Action No. 1991-72 Vv.
D. C. CITY COUNCIL, et al.
Defendants
PRE-BIRTH, INC.
Plaintiffs
Civil Action No. 2001-72 Vv.
JOHN A. NEVIUS, et al.
Defendants
MATHAIS J. COLEMAN, M.D., et al.
Plaintiffs
Civil Action No. 1993-72 Vv.
WALTER E. WASHINGTON
Defendant
ce TE eA OR LT DLT ES RARE
App. 3
ORDER
This matter having come before the Court upon defen-
dants’ motior. to dismiss, together with memorandum of
points and authorities in support thereof, and it appear-
ing to the Court that the instant case is now moot, it is,
by the Court, this 9th day of February, 1973,
Ordered: That the complaint be, and the same is, here-
by dismissed as moot.
/s/ J. H. Pratt
Judge
Brawiaan, $e
App. 4
APPENDIX B
THE CITY OF NEW YORK
BRALTT SAAVICES SADARVMSTANTLOS
Date March 30, 1973
To—
Joseph Cimino, M.D., M.P.H.
Chairman, Board of Health
From—
Harold Stults, Counsel N.Y.
Subject— ;
Constitutionality of the Regulation of First Trimester
Abortions under Article 42 of the Health Code in light
of Roe v. Wade, ........ ie Sema (Wade), and Doe v.
Bolton, ........ io (Bolton)
You have asked for my opinion on the effect of the Su-
preme Court’s Wade and Bolton decisions on the N.Y.C.
Health Code provision (in.Article 42) affecting first tri-
mester abortions. This opinion is based upon an analysis
of the guiding principles the Court used in Wade and
Bolton, which I believe would guide the Court in deter-
mining the constitutionality of regulations like those
found in Article 42.
The Covrt concluded that for first trimester abortions
‘the abortion decision and its effectuation must be
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s
attending physician . . . free of interference by the
State.’’ (Wade, at 48, 49).
Only beginning with second trimester abortions may a
state
‘‘regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that
the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation
and protection of maternal health.’’ (Wade at 47, 48).
Although the rationale for this sharp distinction be-
tween first and second trimester abortions is not clear, it
App. 5
is primarily based upon the increase in the risk to a
woman’s health from an abortion that occurs after the
first trimester. The Court determined that maternal health
‘is allequatély protected ‘in first trimester abortions (as in
other surgical procedures), by State requirements for
the licensing of physicians, by license revocaticn or sus-
pension proceedings, and by malpractice lawsuits, and it
ruled that any regulations that have the effect of limiting
a woman’s right to have a first trimester are unconstitu-
tional, even though these regulations are directed at fur-
ther protecting maternal health. In other words, the test
that is to be applied in determining whether first trimester
abortion regulations are constitutional is not whether the
regulations are reasonable or necessary to protect ma-
ternal health. The sole test for first trimester abortion
regulations is whether the regulations permit the woman,
together with her physician, to terminate her pregnancy
without government interference.
Hence, Article 42 of the Health Code, as far as first
trimester abortions are concerned, must be amended to
eliminate any regulation which de facto would interfere
in any significant way with a mother’s ability to exercise
her right, together with her doctor, to terminate her preg-
nancy. No regulation may, therefore, limit a woman's
right to an abortion indirectly through restrictions on her
doctor that would, for example, require the doctor to work
in a specifie manner, with specific equipment and staff, or
in a specifie type of facility. Included in this first tri-
mester prohibition would be any prior registration or re-
porting requirements, which if not complied with, would
prevent a physician from performing first trimester
abortions.
The sections of the Health Code which require data
collection, termination of pregnancy certificates and other
incidental post-abortion clerical acts, however, in no sig-
App. 6
nificant way interfere with a woman’s right and ability,
together with her physician, to terminate her pregnancy
during the first trimester. Since they do not affect a
woman’s constitutional rights, they are permissible con-
trols on first trimester abortions. The needed changes in
Article 42 vis-a-vis first trimester abortions may be
brought about in two basic steps:
1. Sections 42.21(b) and 42.33(a) are the only sections
of Article 42 which deal only with first trimester abor-
tions, and permit outpatient procedures. Since under
Wade and Bolton we cannot require any particular mo-
dality or treatment for first trimester abortions, regula-
tions permitting a particular type of treatment now have
very little meaning. Therefore, both these sections should
be eliminated.
2. Almost all the remaining sections would significant-
iy limit a woman’s right to have her pregnancy termi-
nated by restricting her doctor’s manner of practice, use
of equipment and staff or work in a particular type of
facility or by requiring the doctor’s prior registration.
These sections should be redefined to omit reference to
first trimester abortions, although post-abortion clerical
requirements and the general enforcement provisions of
Article 42 (found in $$42.03({¢), 42.05, 42.07, 42.09, 42.34)
may be retained. These changes may be accomplished by
first amending section 42.01(a) to read as follows:
(a) Abortion service means a place or facility in
which abortions on patients with a gestation of more
than twelve weeks are performed (.) except that for
the purposes of $$ 42.03(c), 42.05, 42.07, 42.09, 42.34,
abortion service means any place or facility in which
abortions are performed.
and by amending the first sentence of $42.03(a) to read:
(a) No person shall maintain or operate or repre-
sent himself as maintaining or operating an abortion
App. 7
service in which abortions on patients with a gesta-
tion of more than twelve weeks are performed unless
he first registers such service with the Department.
By amending tliese two subsections in this way, all prior
restraints on a mother’s right to have her physician per-
form an abortion are eliminated.
The Board of Health may of course consider new regu-
lations applicable to first trimester abortions so long as
they are designed to comply with the Supreme Court’s
guidelines as discussed above. Such new regulations
would be permissible if, like the termination of pregnancy
certificate requirement and the post abortion data require-
ment, they would interfere in no significant way with a
woman’s right and ability to have her doctor terminate
her pregnancy during the first trimester. On the other
hand, they could not indirectly limit a woman’s rights by
restricting her doctor through, for example, requiring
specified types of treatments, type of facilities, equip-
ment or staffing. Other post-abortion clerical require-
ments, if not burdensome, would probably satisfy the Su-
preme Court’s guidelines in this area.
Non-binding standards of an advisory or informational
nature, even if officially sanctioned would also be per-
mitted since they do not interfere with a woman’s right,
together with lier physician, to terminate her pregnancy.
Such non-binding standards, and the evaluation of specific
physicians or abortion services in light of those standards
may be publicized.
There remain some unresolved questions concerning the
constitutionality of certain Article 42 provisions affecting
second trimester abortions. These questions relate pri-
marily te whether it can be shown that certain provisions
are important enough to the protection of maternal health
to mect constitutional standards. These questions will be
dealt with in a subsequent opinion.
see
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App. 8
APPENDIX C
STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH
SERVICES
HEALTH SERVICES DIVISION
MEMORANDUM
To:
Hospitals and Medical Facilities for the Termination
of Pregnancy
From:
Licensing and Certification Section
Offiice of Planning and Health Facilities
Subject:
Amendment To Abortion Regulations
The Washington State Board of Health took action at
its April 5, 1973, meeting to amend the Medical Facility
for Termination of Pregnancy Rules and Regulations,
WAC 248-140, to bring them into line with the recent
United States Supreme Court decisions on abortions. The
following regulations are in effect for 90 days beginning
April 9, 1973.
“WAC 248-140-150 HOSPITAL FACILITIES AP-
PROVED FOR TERMINATING PREGNANCY.
For the purpose of preserving and protecting ma-
ternal health, all abortions performed during the sec-
ond trimester of pregnancy shall be performed only
in hospitals licensed pursuant to chapter 70.41 RUW:
PROVIDED, That a termination of pregnancy dur-
ing the second trimester may he induced in a facility
other than a licensed hospital so long as final termi-
nation takes place in a licensed hospital: PROVIDED
App. 9
FURTHER, That abortions during the second tri-
mester may be performed outside licensed hospitals
when the physician has determined that termination
of the pregnancy was immediately necessary to meet
a medical emergency.
WAC 248-140-152 FINDING OF EMERGENCY.
The board of health finds that the immediate adeption
of these rules is necessary for the preservation of the
public health, safety and welfare.
The effect of this amendment is to repeal from WAC 248-
140 sections WAC 248-140-020 through WAC 248-140-130
and to add the above quoted sections to WAC 248-140-010,
the purpose statement of these rules and regulations.
The State will no longer regulate or issue certificates to
facilities performing a first trimester termination.
During the second trimester, hospitals licensed under
RCW 70.41 are the only medical facilities approved by the
Board of Health for termination of pregnancy (RCW
9.02.070). At this time, no approval is required for those
non-hospital facilities where a second trimester termina-
tion is induced. Where second trimester terminations are
induced in a non-hospital facility, the final termination
must take place in a licensed hospital. The Board of
Health will consider permanent adoption of amendments
to WAC 248-140 at a public hearing in Olympia on June
7, 1973.
TR :kh
EVR E ROE DAMES NE ate aR ERNE OSE
mapteegiantes
SSSA RN I oI eT
App. 10
(Letterhead of Washington State Hospital Association)
BULLETIN
June 8, 1973
No. 1756
To: Administrators
From: Curt Fortney, associate director
Re: Board of Health on Abortions and Nurseries
The Washington State Board of Health, meeting in
Olympia yesterday, took action in two areas of particular
interest to hospitals.
ABORTION
The Board approved new regulations which permit
abortion during the second trimester to be induced in a
facility other than a hospital provided that final termina-
tion takes place at a hospital. The board also approved
a regulation to allow abortions to be performed during
the second trimester outside licensed hospitals when a
physician has determined that termination of the preg-
nancy was immediately necessary to meet a medical emer-
gency.
In cases where an abortion is induced outside the hos-
pital and terminated inside the hospital the physician will
make a report on the first part of the procedure and the
hospital will report only upon the portion of the procedure
accomplished at the hospital. The State Division of Health
will provide new forms for this purpose in the near future.
HOSPITAL NURSERIES
The Board changed existing requirements that nurses
and other personnel regularly assignea to the nursery
‘¢shall wear short-sleeved scrub dresses or uniforms with
a clean gown and should wear masks.’’
App. 11
The new language reads: ‘‘Nurses and other personnel
regularly assigned to the nursery shall wear short-sleeved
serub dresses or uniforms covered with a clean, long-
sleeved gown.’? The requirement for masks has been
deleted.
A second change provides that all persons not regu-
larly assigned to the nursery shall wear a clean, long-
sleeved gown before handling infants or coming in contact
with clean equipment such as bassinets, incubators and
examining tables. The old requirement that caps and
masks be worn was deleted.
The third change concerns handwashing. Previously
the regulations stated that ‘‘strict handwashing techniques
shall be maintained by physicians and nurses.’’ The new
rule reads: ‘‘Prior to touching babies or clean equipment
such as bassinets, incubators, and examining tables, all
persons must wash their hands. Handwashing is required
before handling each baby. The handwashing procedure
shall be that approved by the infection control committee.’’
The new regulations will be effective thirty (30) days
after the regulations are published probably next week.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.