Opposition Brief — Chicago Board of Health v. Friendship Medical Center, Ltd.

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SUPREKWE o> URT, U. 6

No. 74-935 FEB 25 97

if p GRICHAEL RUUAK, M,C

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocrozen Trem, 1974

THE CHICAGO BOARD OF HEALTH, and DR. ERIC OLD-

and T. R. M. HOWARD,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITZON FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JULIAN B. WILKINS

ROBEP? L. GRAHAM

D. COLMAN

horas for Respondents

Of Counsel: ,

JENNER & BLOCK

One IBM Plaza

Chicago, Illinois 60611

(312) 222-9350

soon scene He same

UNITED STATES LAW PRINTING CO., CHICAGO, ILLINCIS 60818 2312) 525-6581

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

PON a eeishureoansianemennnnsigneions 2

SII ios cera asus aaa acatebiaeeccapeeseiaigiensboniek 2

I oa seca pucudenatectcutansceminsin 2

2 aE SEL RO eT NOTE 3

I Or NN iis cc tnenecenecininwertnadaierereriane 3

Reason for Denying the Writ ..................::-:-cscccccssseeseeees 4

A

Because This Court Has Ruled That The State Has No

Compelling Interest In Regulating Abortions Per-

formed In The First Trimester Of Pregnancy, Peti-

tioners Present No New Questions Of Federal Law

And The Seventh Circuit’s Ruling Does Not Merit

PTI 2 sarssaceecchnsseeceacouiies ssbiaieanis maka tisatnc las actinatgstc iene inmeisiceacteo 4

II.

The Seventh Cireuit’s Finding That Respondents Had

Standing To Challenge The Abortion Regulations As

An Unconstitutional Interference With The Funda-

mental Right Of Privacy Was Based On The Holdings

Of This Court And Is Consistent With All Other Cir-

a re I ice ciree lnente 11

Conclusion. ...............-2---+ Teena Sacauethieaetics elevation nies: tabthesias 14

Appendices :

A. WONAAC v. D.C. City Council, No. 72-2010

IS A, WINES pntpest ore tint ciceerserretiacasnthahancmecane App. 1

il

PAGE

B. CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH SERVICE

ADMINISTRATOR, Memorandum on Con-

stitutionality of First Trimester Abortion

Regulations (March 30, 1973) 2-2... App. +

Cc. STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPART-

MENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTIiI SER-

VICES DIVISION, Memorandum on Amend-

ments to Abortion Regulations ...................... App. 8

CITATIONS

Cases

Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1971) vacated

on other grounds, 419 U.S. 951 (1973) | ..........-....---- 13

Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). 95

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ............ 5)

Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F.Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973)

appeal dismissed, cert. denied per curiam, 417 U.S.

DTD COTE) inane nnn ean nesnnnnnnnesnecenensnencunsnnnsinnen ~

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) ....2. 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14

Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971) vacated

on other grounds, 410 U.S. 950 (1978) . .......---.----.----- 13

Kisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 488 (1972) ...........-..-...- 5, 12

Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. and T.R.M. Howard

vy. The Chicago Board of Health, et al., 500 F.2d 1141

(Tth Cir, 1974) n.-nececeeeceecesseseeesecseeseeseesensennennsnnssnceneneas 8, 12

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) .......... 5, 12

Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina Department of

Human Resources, 380 F.Supp. 1153 (H.D. N.C.

1974) eaeeecnscesecneescsesneensecesnssnceesnssssnsecsncntensnsnsnssnenesaeosesenenns 10, 13

Hodgson v. Spannus, 378 F.Supp. 1008 ( D.C. Minn.

1974), appeal dismissed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3415 (1974) ..10, 18

iil

PAGE

Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621

CRO acesesnseiennsssissnensnssnasenntunetinnneserteneanioninssienniebantananerts 5)

Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 I. 2d 1342 (8th Cir.

1974) appeal dismissed, cert, denied, 43 US.L.W.

BODE CIOTE) cece vss cscs nese nrcenntsessnenvenenneon eremmmacnsamencntienh 13

People v. Dobbs Ferry Medical Pavilion, 33 N.Y. 2d

584, 301 N.E. 2d 4385 (1973) -..-----------e-eececeeceeeeeee oes 10

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) — -......-..--------------- 12

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ...... 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13

San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1

(1973) ..n.nececceneenseeevssnreseronsnnsosnsenensenssorennennsnenssnsncncsnseenseneees 7

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 PID bcanncsscicsasstans 5

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) .............------.-- 5

WONAAC v. D.C. City Council, No. 72-2010 (D.C.

Ch, 1972) za eencnivenesieaenennecennennsseensnnensnsnnsnanenonnoomnsnaneananeneneets 9

Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974) -...... 9,13

Statute

Municipal Code of Chicago, Chapter 9 § 9 -........-.------ 12

Miscellanecus

Comment, 4A Proposed Statute for Implementing the

Abortion Decisions, 12 J.Fam.L. 332 (1973-1974) .... 19

Comment, Landmark Abortion Decisions: Justifiable

Determination or Miscarriage of Justice? — Pro-

posals for Legislative Response, 4 Pae.L.J. 821 (July

1973) cessecsssescesevsnsssseeessnsnsnssncensnssnssnesnseneenennsensensnssomsemenesscs 10

Recent Legislation, Constitutional Validity of the Ten-

nessee Abortion Statute, 4 Memphis St. U. L. Rev.

BOS (1974) ..n----n-sescecceceecoeseseeeescesecenseesnsensensnseneenenensnncensneses 10

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Iu the

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoper Term, 1974

No. 74-935

THE CHICAGO BOARD OF HEALTH, and DR. ERIC OLD-

BERG, SAMUEL A. GOLDSMITH, WALTER MULLADY, DR.

MARY KELLY MULLANE, DR. ROBERT STEPTO, EDWARD

W. HUSSEY, and MICHAEL ROSENBERG, Individual Members

of the Chicago Board of Health,

an Petitioners,

vs.

FRIENDSHIP MEDICAL CENTER, LTD.

and T. R. M. HOWARD,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respondents pray that the Petition for a Writ of Cer-

tiorari be denied.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit is reported at 505 F.2d 1141 (1974),

and appears in Appendix A of the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari.

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The Memorandum Opinion and Order of the District

Court are reported at 367 F.Supp. 504 (N.D. TL 1973)

and appears in Appendix B of the Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari. ‘

JURISDICTION

The jurisdictional statement is adequately set forth in

the Petition.

to

:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether this Court’s holding that a woman’s right

of privacy is broad enough to encompass her decision

to have an abortion renders unconstitutional Board

of Health regulations which single out abortion clinics

for specialized standards and procedures applicable

to all abortions, regardless of the trimester, and which

are not applied to other surgical procedures of similar

complexity and risk.

Whether this Court should reject its holding in Roe

v. Wade, that the state’s interest in the health and

safety of women undergoing abortions does not be-

come compelling until the end of the first trimester

of pregnancy.

Whether a physician who is closely involved in

the abortion decision-making process and who is sub-

ject to arrest and loss of his clinic's license for fail-

ure to comply with licensing Regulations has stand-

ing to chailenge those Regulations on the ground that

they interfere with the fundamental right to privacy

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

3

ORDINANCES INVOLVED

The Chicago Board of Health regulations for abortion

services appear in Appendix C to the Petition for a Writ

of Certiorari.

Petitioners have neglected to include one portion of the

Chicago Municipal Code that is relevant to this case. Sec-

tion 9-5 of the Code states:

The president of the board of health, the assistant

to the president of the board of heaith, the secretary

of the board of health, the commissioner of health,

and all physicians, employes or inspectors, who may

be designated by the board of health shall have full

police vowers and shall have the right to arrest or

cause to be arrested any person who violates any of

the health provisions of this code.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Statement of the Case is adequately presented in

the Petition. For greater detail, this Court may refer to

the Statement in Respondents’ Brief filed in the Seventh

Cireuit Court of Appeals below.

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REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

Introduction

The unanimous decision below by the United States

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is in total com-

pliance with Roe vy. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v.

Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). This case tenders no issues

which have not already been resolved by this Court in its

well-considered opinions in those cases.

I

BECAUSE THIS COURT HAS RULED THAT THE

STATE HAS NO COMPELLING INTEREST IN REGU-

LATING ABORTIONS PERFORMED IN THE FIRST

TRIMESTER OF PREGNANCY, PETITIONERS PRE-

SENT NO NEW QUESTIONS OF FEDERAL LAW AND

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S RULING DOES NOT

MERIT REVIEW.

This Court’s decisions in Roe v. Wade, supra, and Doe

v. Bolton, supra, held that the right of personal privacy

guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment encompasses the right of a woman and her

physician to terminate the woman’s pregnancy. Roe v.

Wade, supra, at 154. In those cases this Court declared

that the fundamental right of privacy can be restricted

only by the demonstration of a compelling and necessary

state interest. Id., at 155.

Nevertheless, Petitioners maintain that because the

City’s police powers are being invoked to protect the

)

health and safety of women undergoing abortions,* a ra-

tional relationship need only be established between the

City ordinance and the end it seeks to promote. Petition-

ers’ Brief for Certiorari {hereinafter ‘‘Petition’’} at 12.

This hypothesis overlooks the fundamental nature of the

right to privacy, and ignores the judicial test mandated

by countless Supreme Court decisions.

Where certain ‘‘fundamental rights’? are involved, the

Court has held that regulation limiting these rights

may be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,”’

Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621,

627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634

(1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963),

and that legislative enactments must be narrowly

drawn to express only the legitimate state interest at

stake. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485;

Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508

(1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-

308 (1940): sce Lisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 460,

463-464 (White, J., concurring in result.)

Roe v. Wade, supra, at 155-156.

The Petitioners assert the right to regulate extensively

abortion clinics without regard for the stage of pregnancy.

However, this Court has already ruled that the state’s

interest in the health of the mother does not become com-

pelling until the end of the first trimester of pregnancy.

* At one point Petitioners’ claim this is the “sole” purpose behind

the regulations. Petition, at 3. The Regulations themselves belie

the falsity of this claim. Regulation XVI(e), for example, requires

that a woman wait at least twenty-four hours between the time of

her initial examination by the doctor and the termination of the

pregnancy “. . . to permit the reporting to and review of all labora-

tory tests by the examining physician and to permit and encourage

thorough consideration and a firm decision by the patient regarding

termination of pregnancy.” Petition, Appendix C, at 57a (Empha-

sis added). That such a requirement directly affects the decision to

have an abortion can hardly be doubted.

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Woth re speet lo the State *s important and legitimate

interest in the health of the mother, the **compelling”™

pout, in the light of pres ni medical knowl: da - is at

approximately the ond of the first trimester... It

follows that, from and after this point, a State may

regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the

regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and

protection of maternal health. Examptes of permissi

ble state regulation in this area are requirements as

to the qualifications of the person who is to perform

the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as

to the facility in which the proeedure is to be per-

formed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may

be a clinie or some other place of less-than-hospital

status; as fo licensing of the facility; and the like.

This means, on the other hand, that, for the period

of pregnancy prior to this **compelling’’ point, the

attending physician, in consultation with his patient,

is free to determine, without regulation by the State,

that in his medical judguent the patient’s pregnancy

should be terminated. If that, decision is reached, the

judgment may be ejfectuated by an abortion free of

interference by the State.

Roe v. Wade, supra, at 168. (Emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals below did not, as Petitioners

maintain, ‘‘seize’’ on this language in the Supreme Court's

opinion. Petition, at 9. Rather, the Court of Appeals

followed the Ree holding which was clearly enunciated by

this Court.

To summarize and to repeat: ...

(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end

of the first trimester, fhe abortion dectsion and its

effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of

the pregnant woman’s attending physician.

(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the

end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its

interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses,

Bence Si

regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are rea-

sonably related to qmaternal health.

410 U.S. at 164 (Eimphasis added).

In ve v. Wade, this Court invalidated state statutes pre-

cisely because they attempted to regulate abortion without

regard to the stage of pregnancy. Similarly, in Doe v.

Bolton, the Court considered a hospital requirement fail-

ing to exclude the first trimester of pregnancy and con-

cluded:

We hold that the hespital requirement of the Georgia

law, because it fails to exclude the first trimester of

pregnaney ... Is also invalid.

410 U.S. at 190,

These holdings unequivocally prohibit state intervention

in the abortion decision-making process or in the manner

in which such a decision is effectuated during the first

trimester. Despite this faci, Petitioners assert a right to

regulate **where, how and by whom an abortion may be

performed” regardless of the stage of pregnancy. Petition,

at 9. This Court has clearly beld that such regulations

may be proper after the first trimester of pregnaney Int

only when they are reasonably related to the state's in-

terest. Roe v. Wade. supra, at 163.

This Court has held that during the early stages of preg-

nancy the abortion decision **in all its aspects is inherently

and primarily a medical decision, ..."" Roe v. Wade, supra,

at 166, (Emphasis added).”. The Seventh Cireuit aecknowl-

* Petitioners’ reliance on San Antonio School District v. Red-

rigues, 411 US. 1 (1973) is ill-founded. Rodrigues was concerned

with the constitutional relationship of disparate rights (education,

voting and freedom of speech). In this case we are concerned with

one distinct right—the right to make and effectuate the decision to

have an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy. The

decision to have an abortion is intricately related to the procedures

and expenses involved. During the first trimester, the standards of

the medical profession, not the state, must be looked to for necessary

guidance and direction.

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edged, as did this Court, that appropriate remedies are

available should any physician abuse the privileges of his

or her position. Roe v. Wade, supra at 166; Friendship

Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Board of Health, et al.,

505 F.2d 1141, 1152-53 (7th Cir. 1974). The Seventh Cir-

euit’s holding that the Abortion Regulations constituted

an unnecessary encroachment upon the physician’s right

to exercise his medieai judgment was mandated by this

Court’s 1973 abortion decisions. A contrary decision

would have discounted ‘*. . . the reality that the vast ma-

jority of physicians observe the standards of their profes-

sion, and act only on the basis of carefully deliberated

medical judgments relating to life and health.’? Doe v.

Bolton, supra, at 208 (Burger C.J., concurring).

We emphasize, as did the Court of Appeals, that this is

not a case where the City purports to regulate abortions

‘* . . as it does other surgical procedures ...’’ Roe v.

Wade, supra at 170-171 (Stewart, J., concurring.) Rather,

as Petitioners concede, the Board of Health has singled

out abortion procedures for regulations that do not apply

to other medical procedures of the same risk and complexi-

ty. The Seventh Cireuit determined that this regulatory

scheme violated the Equal Protection Ciazse of the Four-

teenth Amendment because it adversely affected the funda-

mental right of privacy enunciated in Roe v. Wade by

treating differently without a compeliing reason medical

procedures which are indistinguishable in terms of health

risks. Friendship Medical Center, supra, 505 F.2d at 1153.

Because of the sweeping overbreadth of the Abortion

Regulations, this Court need not decide what legal pre-

sumption should be given to health and safety ordinances

affecting second trimester abortions. We note however,

that in arguing for a presumption of statutory validity,

Petitioners once again ignore the fundamental nature of

the right to privacy. See supra at p. 5. This right

9

remains operative throughout a woman’s pregnancy. Roe

v. Wade, supra, at 159. Consequently, while the ruling

was unnecessary to its decision in this case, the Seventh

Cireuit was correct in concluding that the government must

demonstrate that regulations affecting second trimester

abortions are reasonably related to a valid state interest.

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion is not in conflict with any

other Court of Appeals’ decisions and is supported by the

overwhelming weight of judicial authority. When con-

fronted with regulations similar to those promulgated by

the Chicago Board of Health, the Eighth Circuit reached

a conclusion identical to that reached by the Seventh Cir-

cuit. Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (Sth Cir. 1974). The

Court noted therein that:

While we agree with appellee that the ordinance does

not proseribe abortions, we do not agree that that fact,

of itself, removes the ordinance from the constitutional

realin of Roc and Doe. The Doe decision clearly struck

down portions of the Georgia statute governing abor-

tion procedures. Dov at 192-200. We learn from Doe

that sweeping reguiaiion of the abortion procedure

without regard for the conflicting interests involved

will not withstand constitutional scrutiny.

495 F.2d at 1301.

Similarly, even before Rue v. Wade, supra, the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia suspended en-

forcement of an abortion clinie regulation to prevent ‘‘ir-

reparable injury’’ in a case strikingly similar to the present

one. WONAAC v. D.C. City Council, No. 72-2010 (D.C.

Cir. 1972) (not reported) (See, Appendix A, infra).

Other courts have also recognized that the regulation of

abortions by the state in the first trimester of pregnancy

is invalid. In Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695, 696 (S.D.

SITE LSU MORE PE &

10

Fla. 1973) (three judge panel), appeal dismissed, cert.

denied per curiam 417 U.S. 279 (1974), the government it-

self expressly abandoned its defense of Florida’s regula-

tions affecting first trimester abortions after the decisions

in Roe v. Wade and Doe y. Bc!ton were announced. A three

judge federal panel in Minnesota also concluded that state

regulation of abortion procedurc. could not be justified

during the first trimester. Hodgson v. Spannus, 378 ¥F.

Supp. 1008 (D.C. Minn. 1974), appeal dismissed, 43 USLW

3415 (1974).

The same result was reached in Hallmark Clinic v. De-

partment of Human Resources, 380 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D.

N.C. 1974), where a three judge panel held the state’s

requirement that an abortion clinic secure a_ written

transfer agreement with a local hospital infringed on the

woman’s right to a first trimester abortion free of state

interference.

In addition, the New York Court of Appeals invalidated

first trimester regulations in People v. Dobbs Ferry Medical

Pavilion, 33 N.Y.2d 584, 301 N.B.2d 485 (1975) (per

curiam). Moreover, officials in New York City and the

State of Washington have voluntarily withdrawn their first

trimester abortion clinie regulations acknowledging that

they were constitutionally invalid. See Appendix B and

Appendix C to this brief, infra.”

* The law review analyses of post-Roe abortion legislation agree

that the only legitimate qualification on first trimester abortion pro-

cedures is that a physician perform the operation. See. ¢.g., Com-

ment, A Proposed Statute for linplementing The Abortion Deci-

sions, 13 Journal Family Law 332, 334-336 (1973-1974) ; Comment,

Landmark Abortion Decisions: Justifiable Determination or Mis-

carriage of Justice?—Proposals for Legislative Response, 4 Pacific

LT. 821, 848-850 (Tuly 1973): Recent Legislation, Constitutional

Validity of the Tennessee Abortion Statute, 4 Memphis St. U. L.

Rev. 593, 594 (1974).

11

Against this overwhelming body of authority, Petitioners

can cite no instance in whieh any court has upheld regula-

tions affecting first trimester abortions after acknowledging

the fundamental nature of a woman’s decision to terminate

her pregnancy. No conflict exists among the various Cir-

cuits necessitating a ruling from this Court. Because this

Court has already ruled that the state’s interest in pro-

tecting a woman’s health becomes compelling only at the

end of the first trimester of pregnancy, the Seventh Cir-

cuit’s decision is correct and the Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari should be denied.

II.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S FINDING THAT RESPON-

DENTS HAD STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE ABOR-

TION REGULATIONS AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL

INTERFERENCES WITH THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

OF PRIVACY WAS FASED ON THE HOLDINGS OF

THIS COURT AND !S CONSISTENT WITH ALL

OTHER CIRCUIT COURT OPINIONS.

In Doe vy. Bolton, supra, this Court concluded that li-

censed physicians consulted by pregnant women had stand-

ing to challenge Georgia’s anti-abortion statute. 410 U.S.

at 188. It was conceded that the doctor-plaintiffs in that

ease had not been prosecu‘ed or threatened with prosecu-

tion for violation of those statutes. Nevertheless, this

Court held that:

The physician is the one against whom these criminal

statutes directly operate in the event he procures an

abortion that does not meet the statutory exceptions

and gvonditions. The physician-apvellants, therefore,

assert a sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment.

They shoald not be required to await and undergo a

12

criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking re-

lief.

Id., at 188.

In its well-reasoned opinion, the Seventh Circuit per-

ceived what Petitioners have repeatedly failed to acknowl-

edge: namely, that the Abortion, Regulatious promulgated

by the Board of Health are directly supported by Municipa!

Code provisions that give the Board *‘full police powers’’

enforceable by the ‘‘right to arrest’’ violators of the health

provisions of the Code. Chicago Municipal Code § 9-5.

Moreover, the Abortion Regulations specifically provide

for the closing down of facilities deemed in non-compliance

with the Regulations. As the Court of Appeals aptly

noted:

It is precisely this continuing restrictive effect placed

on the plaintiffs by the regulations which is the basis

of this complaint.

Friendship Medical Center, supra, 505 F.2d at 1146.

Like the statute under attack in Doe vy. Bolton, supra, the

Abortion Regulations are ‘‘recent and not moribund.’’ 410

U.S. at 188. Consequently, Petitioners’ reliance on Poe v.

Uliman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), is misplaced. Given these

governmental sanctions, Respondents clearly alleged a suffi-

cient personal stake in the controversy to afford them

standing to challenge the Abortion Regulations.

Petitioners’ contention that the Respondents lackea

standing to chailenge the Abortion Regulations as an un-

reasonable interference with the fundamental right of

privacy protected by the Fourteentii Amendment is totally

without merit. The Seventh Circuit properly foiiowed this

Court’s holdings in Griswold v. Conneciicui, 381 U.S. 478.

481 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-446

(1972), and Doe v. Bolton, supra, 410 U.S. at 188-189.

13

The attending physician’s role in the abortion decision

is so intimate and central that it would be incongruous not

to allow him to challenge the Abortion Regulations on

privacy grounds.

... for the period of pregnancy prior to this ‘‘com-

pelling”’’ point, the attending physician, in consultation

with his paticnt, is free to determine, without regula-

tion by the State, that in his medical judgment the

patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.

Roe v. Wade, supra, at 163 (Kmphasis added).

The Abortion Regulations impermissibly infringe on the

fundamental right of a woman and her physician to decide

to terminate the woman’s pregnancy. Because of the

unique quality of the doctor-patient relationship in this

context, and for the other reasons amply delineated in the

Seventh Circuit’s opinion, the Court was correct in hold-

ing that Respondents had standing to attack the Abortion

Regulations as an interference with the right to privacy

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

There is no conflict among the various Circuits as to a

physician’s standing to raise the privacy challenge. In

Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121, 1125 (2d Cir. 1971), vacated

on other grounds, 410 U.S. 951 (1973), the Court held that

the physician-plaintiffs alleged a sufficient threat of per-

sonal harm to give them standing to challenge Connecti-

cut’s anti-abortion law on privacy grounds. The Eighth Cir-

cuit reached -a similar conclusion in Nyberg v. City of

Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974), appeal dismissed,

cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3224 (1974).* In a reference

* The standing of physicians to challenge abortion regulations on

privacy grounds was unquestioned in several other cases. Word v.

Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974); Hallmark Clinic v. De-

partinent of Human Resources, 380 F.Supp. 1153 (E.D.N.C. 1974) ;

Hodgson vy. Spannus, 378 F.Supp. 1008 (D.C. Minn. 1974). See

also, Doe v. Scott, 321 F.Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (three judge

court), vacated on other grounds, 410 U.S. 950 (1973).

14

to the Supreme Court’s discussion of the standing issues

in Doe vy. Bolion, the Eighth Circuit in Vyberg noted:

The impact of the Court’s discussion cannot be fairly

said to limit standing to sue in abortion cases to preg-

nant women... Clearly, the claims of medical doctors

to ‘freely practice medicine according to the highest

~ medical standards without, arbitrary outside re-

straints’ are inexplicably bound up with the privacy

rights of women who seek abortions.

495 F.2d at 1344.

The Seventh Circuit’s ruling that Doctor Howard and

the Friendship Medical Center had standing to challenge

the Abortion Regulations as an invasion of the right to

privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is con-

sistent with all other Court of Appeals’ decisions and with

prior opinions of this Court. Consequently, the Seventh

Circuit’s opinion does not merit review.

CONCLUSION

Respondents respectfully pray that the Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Jvuuiax B. Witkixss

Rosert L. Granam

Jerrrey D. Cotman

Attorneys for Respondents

Of Counsel:

JENNER & BLOCK

One IBM Plaza

Chicago, Illinois 60611

(312) 222-9350

—€

APPENDIX

Vv

App. 1 |

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For The District Of Columbia Circuit

September Term, 1972

No. 72-2010 Civil Action 1991-72

Wonaac, Laurel Clinic, Ine.

Dr. Milan M. Vuitch, et al.,

Appellants

v.

District of Columbia City

Council, et al.,

No. 72-2011 Civil Action 1993-72

Mathias J. Coleman, M.D.

Summit Medical Center, Inc.,

et al.,

Appellants

Vv.

Walter E. Washington, et al.,

No. 72-2012 Civil Action 2001-72

Pre-Birth, Ine.,

Appellants

Vv.

John A. Nevius,

et al.,

Before: Wright and Robinson, Circuit Judges

ORDER

On consideration of appellants’ motion for stay and

interlocutory injunction, it appearing to the Court that a

serious question regarding the validity of the Abortion

Pe Te = Sot Ce EN ee Chae Nor ht oe. Cok

App. 2

‘Control Regulation of the District of Columbia has been

raised; and it further appearing that enforcement of the

Regulation may result in irreparable injury to the parties

at whom the Regulation is directed, it is

Ordered that enforcement of the Regulation is stayed

pending further order of the District Court, following a

hearing afforded the parties with all possible speed on

appellants’ motions for a preliminary injunction. Sec

Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown

College, Inc., 118 U.S. App. D.C. 80, 331 F.2d 1000, cert.

denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d

226 (Sth Cireuit 1965).

Per Curiam

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WONAAG, et al.,

Plaintiffs

Civil Action No. 1991-72 Vv.

D. C. CITY COUNCIL, et al.

Defendants

PRE-BIRTH, INC.

Plaintiffs

Civil Action No. 2001-72 Vv.

JOHN A. NEVIUS, et al.

Defendants

MATHAIS J. COLEMAN, M.D., et al.

Plaintiffs

Civil Action No. 1993-72 Vv.

WALTER E. WASHINGTON

Defendant

ce TE eA OR LT DLT ES RARE

App. 3

ORDER

This matter having come before the Court upon defen-

dants’ motior. to dismiss, together with memorandum of

points and authorities in support thereof, and it appear-

ing to the Court that the instant case is now moot, it is,

by the Court, this 9th day of February, 1973,

Ordered: That the complaint be, and the same is, here-

by dismissed as moot.

/s/ J. H. Pratt

Judge

Brawiaan, $e

App. 4

APPENDIX B

THE CITY OF NEW YORK

BRALTT SAAVICES SADARVMSTANTLOS

Date March 30, 1973

To—

Joseph Cimino, M.D., M.P.H.

Chairman, Board of Health

From—

Harold Stults, Counsel N.Y.

Subject— ;

Constitutionality of the Regulation of First Trimester

Abortions under Article 42 of the Health Code in light

of Roe v. Wade, ........ ie Sema (Wade), and Doe v.

Bolton, ........ io (Bolton)

You have asked for my opinion on the effect of the Su-

preme Court’s Wade and Bolton decisions on the N.Y.C.

Health Code provision (in.Article 42) affecting first tri-

mester abortions. This opinion is based upon an analysis

of the guiding principles the Court used in Wade and

Bolton, which I believe would guide the Court in deter-

mining the constitutionality of regulations like those

found in Article 42.

The Covrt concluded that for first trimester abortions

‘the abortion decision and its effectuation must be

left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s

attending physician . . . free of interference by the

State.’’ (Wade, at 48, 49).

Only beginning with second trimester abortions may a

state

‘‘regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that

the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation

and protection of maternal health.’’ (Wade at 47, 48).

Although the rationale for this sharp distinction be-

tween first and second trimester abortions is not clear, it

App. 5

is primarily based upon the increase in the risk to a

woman’s health from an abortion that occurs after the

first trimester. The Court determined that maternal health

‘is allequatély protected ‘in first trimester abortions (as in

other surgical procedures), by State requirements for

the licensing of physicians, by license revocaticn or sus-

pension proceedings, and by malpractice lawsuits, and it

ruled that any regulations that have the effect of limiting

a woman’s right to have a first trimester are unconstitu-

tional, even though these regulations are directed at fur-

ther protecting maternal health. In other words, the test

that is to be applied in determining whether first trimester

abortion regulations are constitutional is not whether the

regulations are reasonable or necessary to protect ma-

ternal health. The sole test for first trimester abortion

regulations is whether the regulations permit the woman,

together with her physician, to terminate her pregnancy

without government interference.

Hence, Article 42 of the Health Code, as far as first

trimester abortions are concerned, must be amended to

eliminate any regulation which de facto would interfere

in any significant way with a mother’s ability to exercise

her right, together with her doctor, to terminate her preg-

nancy. No regulation may, therefore, limit a woman's

right to an abortion indirectly through restrictions on her

doctor that would, for example, require the doctor to work

in a specifie manner, with specific equipment and staff, or

in a specifie type of facility. Included in this first tri-

mester prohibition would be any prior registration or re-

porting requirements, which if not complied with, would

prevent a physician from performing first trimester

abortions.

The sections of the Health Code which require data

collection, termination of pregnancy certificates and other

incidental post-abortion clerical acts, however, in no sig-

App. 6

nificant way interfere with a woman’s right and ability,

together with her physician, to terminate her pregnancy

during the first trimester. Since they do not affect a

woman’s constitutional rights, they are permissible con-

trols on first trimester abortions. The needed changes in

Article 42 vis-a-vis first trimester abortions may be

brought about in two basic steps:

1. Sections 42.21(b) and 42.33(a) are the only sections

of Article 42 which deal only with first trimester abor-

tions, and permit outpatient procedures. Since under

Wade and Bolton we cannot require any particular mo-

dality or treatment for first trimester abortions, regula-

tions permitting a particular type of treatment now have

very little meaning. Therefore, both these sections should

be eliminated.

2. Almost all the remaining sections would significant-

iy limit a woman’s right to have her pregnancy termi-

nated by restricting her doctor’s manner of practice, use

of equipment and staff or work in a particular type of

facility or by requiring the doctor’s prior registration.

These sections should be redefined to omit reference to

first trimester abortions, although post-abortion clerical

requirements and the general enforcement provisions of

Article 42 (found in $$42.03({¢), 42.05, 42.07, 42.09, 42.34)

may be retained. These changes may be accomplished by

first amending section 42.01(a) to read as follows:

(a) Abortion service means a place or facility in

which abortions on patients with a gestation of more

than twelve weeks are performed (.) except that for

the purposes of $$ 42.03(c), 42.05, 42.07, 42.09, 42.34,

abortion service means any place or facility in which

abortions are performed.

and by amending the first sentence of $42.03(a) to read:

(a) No person shall maintain or operate or repre-

sent himself as maintaining or operating an abortion

App. 7

service in which abortions on patients with a gesta-

tion of more than twelve weeks are performed unless

he first registers such service with the Department.

By amending tliese two subsections in this way, all prior

restraints on a mother’s right to have her physician per-

form an abortion are eliminated.

The Board of Health may of course consider new regu-

lations applicable to first trimester abortions so long as

they are designed to comply with the Supreme Court’s

guidelines as discussed above. Such new regulations

would be permissible if, like the termination of pregnancy

certificate requirement and the post abortion data require-

ment, they would interfere in no significant way with a

woman’s right and ability to have her doctor terminate

her pregnancy during the first trimester. On the other

hand, they could not indirectly limit a woman’s rights by

restricting her doctor through, for example, requiring

specified types of treatments, type of facilities, equip-

ment or staffing. Other post-abortion clerical require-

ments, if not burdensome, would probably satisfy the Su-

preme Court’s guidelines in this area.

Non-binding standards of an advisory or informational

nature, even if officially sanctioned would also be per-

mitted since they do not interfere with a woman’s right,

together with lier physician, to terminate her pregnancy.

Such non-binding standards, and the evaluation of specific

physicians or abortion services in light of those standards

may be publicized.

There remain some unresolved questions concerning the

constitutionality of certain Article 42 provisions affecting

second trimester abortions. These questions relate pri-

marily te whether it can be shown that certain provisions

are important enough to the protection of maternal health

to mect constitutional standards. These questions will be

dealt with in a subsequent opinion.

see

tN DIS BOE NEY, AYR AEE SF SOONG EE

RRNA PH RI ALENT HEY

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wy

App. 8

APPENDIX C

STATE OF WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH

SERVICES

HEALTH SERVICES DIVISION

MEMORANDUM

To:

Hospitals and Medical Facilities for the Termination

of Pregnancy

From:

Licensing and Certification Section

Offiice of Planning and Health Facilities

Subject:

Amendment To Abortion Regulations

The Washington State Board of Health took action at

its April 5, 1973, meeting to amend the Medical Facility

for Termination of Pregnancy Rules and Regulations,

WAC 248-140, to bring them into line with the recent

United States Supreme Court decisions on abortions. The

following regulations are in effect for 90 days beginning

April 9, 1973.

“WAC 248-140-150 HOSPITAL FACILITIES AP-

PROVED FOR TERMINATING PREGNANCY.

For the purpose of preserving and protecting ma-

ternal health, all abortions performed during the sec-

ond trimester of pregnancy shall be performed only

in hospitals licensed pursuant to chapter 70.41 RUW:

PROVIDED, That a termination of pregnancy dur-

ing the second trimester may he induced in a facility

other than a licensed hospital so long as final termi-

nation takes place in a licensed hospital: PROVIDED

App. 9

FURTHER, That abortions during the second tri-

mester may be performed outside licensed hospitals

when the physician has determined that termination

of the pregnancy was immediately necessary to meet

a medical emergency.

WAC 248-140-152 FINDING OF EMERGENCY.

The board of health finds that the immediate adeption

of these rules is necessary for the preservation of the

public health, safety and welfare.

The effect of this amendment is to repeal from WAC 248-

140 sections WAC 248-140-020 through WAC 248-140-130

and to add the above quoted sections to WAC 248-140-010,

the purpose statement of these rules and regulations.

The State will no longer regulate or issue certificates to

facilities performing a first trimester termination.

During the second trimester, hospitals licensed under

RCW 70.41 are the only medical facilities approved by the

Board of Health for termination of pregnancy (RCW

9.02.070). At this time, no approval is required for those

non-hospital facilities where a second trimester termina-

tion is induced. Where second trimester terminations are

induced in a non-hospital facility, the final termination

must take place in a licensed hospital. The Board of

Health will consider permanent adoption of amendments

to WAC 248-140 at a public hearing in Olympia on June

7, 1973.

TR :kh

EVR E ROE DAMES NE ate aR ERNE OSE

mapteegiantes

SSSA RN I oI eT

App. 10

(Letterhead of Washington State Hospital Association)

BULLETIN

June 8, 1973

No. 1756

To: Administrators

From: Curt Fortney, associate director

Re: Board of Health on Abortions and Nurseries

The Washington State Board of Health, meeting in

Olympia yesterday, took action in two areas of particular

interest to hospitals.

ABORTION

The Board approved new regulations which permit

abortion during the second trimester to be induced in a

facility other than a hospital provided that final termina-

tion takes place at a hospital. The board also approved

a regulation to allow abortions to be performed during

the second trimester outside licensed hospitals when a

physician has determined that termination of the preg-

nancy was immediately necessary to meet a medical emer-

gency.

In cases where an abortion is induced outside the hos-

pital and terminated inside the hospital the physician will

make a report on the first part of the procedure and the

hospital will report only upon the portion of the procedure

accomplished at the hospital. The State Division of Health

will provide new forms for this purpose in the near future.

HOSPITAL NURSERIES

The Board changed existing requirements that nurses

and other personnel regularly assignea to the nursery

‘¢shall wear short-sleeved scrub dresses or uniforms with

a clean gown and should wear masks.’’

App. 11

The new language reads: ‘‘Nurses and other personnel

regularly assigned to the nursery shall wear short-sleeved

serub dresses or uniforms covered with a clean, long-

sleeved gown.’? The requirement for masks has been

deleted.

A second change provides that all persons not regu-

larly assigned to the nursery shall wear a clean, long-

sleeved gown before handling infants or coming in contact

with clean equipment such as bassinets, incubators and

examining tables. The old requirement that caps and

masks be worn was deleted.

The third change concerns handwashing. Previously

the regulations stated that ‘‘strict handwashing techniques

shall be maintained by physicians and nurses.’’ The new

rule reads: ‘‘Prior to touching babies or clean equipment

such as bassinets, incubators, and examining tables, all

persons must wash their hands. Handwashing is required

before handling each baby. The handwashing procedure

shall be that approved by the infection control committee.’’

The new regulations will be effective thirty (30) days

after the regulations are published probably next week.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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