Opposition Brief — Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Paynter
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@uUPREME COURT, Us wR 4 19
IN THE RR Ta
Supreme Court of the United States~
October Term, 1974
No 174-986
THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY,
Petitioner,
EARLE G. PAYNTER, JR.,
Respondent,
\
\
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
\ TO \
\ PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Willard J. Moody, Esq.
Raymond H. Strople, Esq.
Moody, McMurran and Miller
P.O. Box 1138
Portsmouth, Virginia 23705
Counsel for Respondent
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR
REVIEW 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2
ARGUMENTS
I. Paynter's Suit Was Timely
Commenced. 7
Il. There Was Sufficient Evidence
or Thepry [fo Pass On.
» ROR DE LEAT LL ALS
CONCLUSION 17
CERTIFICATE 17
APPENDIX 1A-6A
4 AT Oram ee ee ee ala <—e eee
ee ee
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Page
Federal Cases
Brennan v. Independent Lift Truck
uilders Union,
(7th Cir. 1973) 10
Johnson v. Flemming, 264 F 2d
322 (10th Cir. 1959) 10
Joint Council v. Delaware L.
Cir. 1946) 12
McCracken v. Richmond, Fredericks-
——“Hure and Potomac Rh. Co,,240 F 2d
484 oh Cir. 1957) 16
Miller v. Daybrook-Octtavia
Corporation, 291 F. supp. 896
(M.D. Ono 1968) 11
Pennsylvania Public Utilities
CAmmission vV. United states
Of America, 511 F. Supp. 1024 11
(M.D. Penn 1970)
Powell v. Kuel, 329 F. Supp. 193
(M.D. Penn 1971) 11
Rutledge v. Sinclair Refining Co. ,
T3 r R. D. 477 (1953) Y
OE ROTO TEE LE | RIV L ESS LEME SOLE LEP IGA Lt SDE ETE
so OLS EEL LA LLY A ly STOOL TE LLLP ACL BAR LBA EAL ALE 0 5 PID LAD
Sherwood Bros. v. District of
umpbia, ;
(T1940)
Simon v. Commissioner of
nternal Revenue,
T. 1949)
Smith v. Pasqualetto, 246 F 2d
Irst Circuit 1957)
United States v. Cia Luz
tearica, 5
inth Cir. 1950)
United States v. Petees, 220
ir. 1955)
Wilkes v. United States, 192
th Cir. 1951)
Wirtz v. Peninsula Shipbuilders
ssociation,
(ath Cir. 1967)
State
Asscciated Transport v. Pusey,
TId | aware )
Bowling v. Webb Gas Company,
Inc. of Lebanon, 5900 5. W.
2d 39 (Missouri 1974)
Bremby v. Armdir and Company,
05 NT W. 2d 449 (lowa 1900)
OP NLR EF EN EP TE EY Aa tl ak io esa cer
11
11
10
11
10
10
10
12
12
ae
DRT A APL DOI A te + aS M AIM ti EO AR NLT A POR a GE AA EB EAE LEAL LA ARE COTE
Page
Brown v. Porter, 163 N. W. 2d
ichigan 1968) 11, 12
Hardbarger v. Deal, 127 S.E.
2d rT (N.C. 1961) 12
Poetz v. Mix, 81 A 2d 741
(N.J. 1951) 12
Romaine v. State Farm Mutual
; Kutomobile Insurance Compan
485 P 2d 102 (Nevada 197 T) 12
Wooten a State Compensation
° “au 5 3
(Ww. Vx 1957) 12
Supreme Court Cases
Bailey v. Central Vermont R. Co.,
t. ,
87 L. Ed. 1445 (1943) 15
Burnett v. New york Central
allroad, , Bo
5. Ct. 1050, 13 L. Ed. "2d k
941 (1965) 10
Davis v. Virginia Railway, 361
U.S, 354, B05. Ct. 487, 4
L. Ed. 2d 366 (1960) 15
61 NELLA DELIA A ELEY S GMA IIE
Page
Gius v. Brooklyn Eastern
Terminal, 359 U.S. 231,
77S. Ct. 760, 3 L. Ed. 2d
770 (1959) 10
Herb v. Pitcarin, 325 U.S. 77,
; ae , 89 L. Ed.
1493 (1945) 10
Inman v. Baltimore and O. Ry.
Co. , 301 U.5. 136, B05. Ct.
242, 4L. Ed. 2d 198 (1959) 16
ones and Laughlin Steel Compan
V. orideron steel Seerer’
15 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1965) 9
Rogers v. Missouri-Pacific R.
Co. , 302 U.5. 900, 77 5. Ct.
43, 1 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1956) 14
Street v. United States, 133 U.S.
‘ >» ae _ aol. Be,
631 (1890) y
Tiller vy. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., 318 U.S. 94, 05 5. Ct.
444, 87 L. Ed. 610 (1943) 15
Union National Bank v. Lamb,
. 5. DO, ; Uae PER,
93 L. Ed. 1190 (1949) 8
Urie v. Pn ane 337 U.S.
018, 73
Le Ed. 1282 (1949)
Washington and G.R. Co. v.
chad T35 U.S. 904,
IOS. Ct. 1044, 34 L. Ed.
235 (1890)
Webb vy. Illinois Central
Railroad Company, 302
0.5. Siz, 773. tt. 451,
1 L. Ed. 2d 503 (1957)
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336
U.5. 33, 09 5. CL. 413,
93 L. Ed. 497 (1949)
Other Authorities
45 U.S.C. Section 56
28 U.S.C. A. 2101 (c)
Rule 6a - Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure
Rule 19B of the Rules of the
Supreme Court of the
United States
Rule 51 - Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure
Page
16
15
16
2,8,9, 11
16
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 74-986
THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO
RAILWAY COMPANY,
Petitioner,
v.
EARLE G, PAYNTER, JR.,
Respondent.
Brief In Opposition To Petition For A Writ
Of Certiorari
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT!
This is a negligence case under the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act (FELA)*. It presents
lpetitioner, the Chesapeake and Ohio
Railway Company, will be referred to through-
out as the ''C&O". Respondent, Earle G.
Paynter, Jr. will be referred to throughout as
"Paynter". Reference will be made to the joint
appendix filed on appeal unless otherwise
designated.
45 U.S.C. 51 et seq
eter ll Ai PME DD A 6 OVA Napa OL BDV eh Os
no legal questions not previously resolved, nor
is there any dispute over the principles to be
applied. The only question is the application of
established principles and clearly defined rules
to the facts of this case. Paynter respectfully
submits that none of the reasons set forth in
Rule 19B apply to this case and this Honorable
Court should not grant a writ of certiorari.
II
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Should this Court review a well settled
principle that Rule 6a of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure will extend a federal statute
of limitation to a Monday when the statute of
limitation expires on a Saturday?
2. Should this Court review the sufficiency
of the evidence in a Federal Employers’
Liability Act case where the District Court and
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals properly
concluded there was sufficient evidence of the
C&O's negligence for the jury to pass on? .
Ill
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Paynter, a railroad employee with the
C&O, filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Western District of
Virginia on Monday, March 22, 1971 against
the C&O alleging injuries sustained on March
19, 1968 as a result of the C&O's negligence.
Paynter's complaint was amended several times
2
FRO OY CL ROLDAN PEL ID” EL AMELIE SIE LEAL AIG EEE. ACL IS LL AEIGIO IE EAA irl ..
. . Gn ae ae Coe Re
one of which stated that Paynter did not have
knowledge of his injury until March 20, 1968.
The C&O filed an answer and a motion to dismiss
alleging that Paynter's cause of action was
barred by the FELA three year statute of
limitation, The District Court then held a
hearing on the motion to dismiss, and the C&O
offered no evidence at this hearing. Paynter
offered extensive evidence by way of depositions
and Paynter's evidence was uncontradicted.
The District Court held that Paynter's suit was
timely commenced as a matter of law. (See
entire written opinion of District Court Appendix
la - 6a which the C&O failed to include in its
petition for certiorari) The District Court
concluded from the uncontradicted facts and
evidence that the FELA three year statute of
limitation did not run until March 20, 1971, a
Saturday, and that since March 20th was a
Saturday and the Clerk's Office was closed,
that Paynter had until Monday, March 22, 1971,
the next day which is neither a Saturday or
Sunday to commence his action and that Paynter
did commence his action by March 22, 1971.
(See Appendix to this Brief, pages la-6a) The
District Court made a specific factual finding
that Paynter did not have knowledge of his
injury until March 20th, 1968. The case was
then set for a trial by jury.
The evidence showed that on March 19,
1968, Paynter was a yard conductor in charge
of a crew making up a train called 95 West in
the Smith Creek yard in Clifton Forge,
Virginia (120). Pullen was a brakeman (140),
McCoy, a brakeman (140), and Fisher was the
engineer (140). The crew was warking the
CRE La aie
" The es SS ae
PTTL EL KALTER EN Ke aed UN ee Ce NE
7:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. shift.
The crew had been kicking cars into the
number two track in order to make up the train
known as 95 West (119,120). The switcli known
as number one and two was lined up for che
number two track (157). There was no need for
Paynter’s crew to throw the number one and two
switch to the number one track (81,95).
However, there were several other crews
working in the yard (88). All testimony indi-
cated that switch number one and two had to be
lined up with track number two in order to
protect any train doubled over on track number
one (94,95, 131). When Paynter last noticed
switch number one and two before a break, it
was lined up with the track number two (157,
162). After a break, Pullen, the head brake-
man, cut a car off from the engine into the
number two track (144), Paynter was standing
about 50 feet away from switch number one and
two and saw that switch number one and two
was set wrong as it was aligned with track
number one (158). Paynter immediately went
over to the switch to change it from number
one to number two in order to prevent the car
cut by Pullen from running into the train on
track number one. Paynter had to jerk the
switch to get it up (159) and felt a "thing" hit
him in the back when he pushed the switch
down to line it with the number two track (159).
Evidence showed that Paynter did not know he
was injured at this time. (See Appendix to this
Brief, pages la-6a; see also 159, 163, 164, 177,
178, 182).
Paynter maintained that one of the members
ANS A SALLI CELE ASO OE ET Yo —
2 ore seis PPR ILL AAA MOM AD Ae AE CG OE
of the road crew that brought in a long coal
train pulled the wrong switch (157,188). All
members of Paynter’s crew denied throwing the
switch to the number one track.
Paynter stated that the switch didn't work
in the usual manner (159), that there was sand
and dirt in it (159) and that he had to jerk it to
operate it (160). Other railroad employees
agreed that if switch number one and two was
not clean it would not operate right (122, 142).
An accident report filed by Paynter the next
day on March 20, 1968 when he realized he was
injured indicated that the switch was defective
(179). R. A. Wilson, a railroad employee,
also indicated that switch number one and two
was not working oroperly on March 19th, 1968
(150). Switch number one and two was in an
improper working order at all times since the
switch had to be jerked in order to reverse the
movements of the switch points (137).
R. E. Johnson, a brakeman, who fre-
quently worked at the Smith Creek Yard indi-
cated that switch number one and two was un-
usual and the only switch of its kind in the
Clifton Forge yard (72). This switch had a
bar paralicl and just off the ground about two
and one-half feet long with a metal ball on the
end that weighed 12-15 pounds (72). All other
switches at Clifton Forge had a lever that
stood at a 45 degree angle with a latch that kept
the switch points from moving (126, 127).
Switch number one and two did not have a latch
and the switch points were kept from moving
by the weight of the metal ball (90). Johnson
was of the opinion that switch number one and
SOE VIAL aa
Ee a aa ae Se
le
two was harder to operate than the other
switches in the yard with a latch (77,84). Other
witnesses agreed that switch number one and
two was adjusted tighter than the latch switches
in order to keep the switch points from moving
and consequently was more difficult to throw
(91,95, 126, 149). In addition, the latch or
raccor switches when contrasted with switch
number one and two could be operated without
bending all the way over (76, 90, 126).
Evidence also showed that the switches
were only greased occasionally and then with a
heavy oil which made things worse when sand
got in it rather than being lubricated with
graphite (86,92,93). Sand would get in the
switches and the switches were not cleaned
daily (87). It took about twenty-twenty-five
minutes to clean a switch and the C&O had only
three men available to clean over 250 switches
in the yard,
The condition of switch number one and two
was not new to the C&O. Johnson had com -
plained about the condition of the switch to the
yardmaster and trainmaster (79). Bocock had
made complaints to the trainmaster about the
mechanical condition of switch number one and
two prior to March 19th, 1968 (93). Showalter,
a union representative, had made complaints
about the switch (128,129). Ray Wilson had
complained to his supervisors prior to March
19, 1968 that switch number one and two would
hang (150). Paynter had reported to the yard-
master Many times that the switch needed
cleaning (161).
: a
err: HARTA ONENESS TET NIE A PIN PRET NTR NTE RE Re ned PT Nn tr EEL T NT NTT TD
Pa AEE Tt i Tin CLL 0 tO AIEEE ON RIA PELE EVES AAS EOC EECA DEALT
The jury found for Paynter and awarded
him $125,540. 00 in damages for his disabling
injuries which injuries precluded Paynter from
any future employment with the C&O. The
court reduced the verdict of $125,540. 00 to
$100, 432. 00 which reduction was due to the jury
finding Paynter contributorily negligent in the
amount of twenty percent. The District Court
overruled the C&O's motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict and its motion for a
new trial (Appendix B, see pages 20 and 21,
petition for a writ of certiorari). The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals in a per curiam
opinion found no reversible error and found
sufficient evidence to take the case to the jury
(See Appendix B, page 19 of petition for a writ
of certiorari). The C&O then sought to have a
rehearing in banc which rehearing was denied
on December 6, 1974 (See Appendix B, page 18
petition for a writ of certiorari). The C&O's
petition for certiorari was filed in this Court
on February 7, 1975.
IV
ARGUMENT
Paynter's suit was timely commenced.
The District Court found that the three
year statute of limitation did not run until
Saturday, March 20, 1971, which finding is not
challenged by the C&O. The uncontradicted
evidence at the hearing on the motion to dis-
miss showed that Paynter did not know he was
injured until March 20th, 1968 and that Paynter’s
cause of action did not accrue until Paynter
discovered his injury. (See Appendix to this
brief 1A-6A); see also Urie v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163, 69S. Ct. 1018, 73. Ed. T282 (1949).
The C&O argues that this Court should grant
certiorari because Rule 6a of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure cannot extend the FELA
three year statute of limitation to a Monday when
the last day of the statute runs out on a Saturday
or Sunday. Paynter respectfully submits that
this issue has been decided by all levels of state
and federal courts including this Court and is not
an issue that would warrant this Court granting
certiorari under Rule 19B of the Rules of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
In Union National Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S.
38, 69 5. Ct. SIT, SSL. Ed. TT90 (1949), the
Supreme Court of the United States held that
Rule 6a of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
would extend beyond 90 days, the time for filing
a petition for writ of certiorari when the last
day fell on a Sunday. This Court held that the
petition for certiorari was timely commenced
by filing the petition on the 91st day because
the language of Rule 6a provided that where the
last day for performance of an act falls on a
Sunday or a legal holiday, performance on the
next day which is not a Sunday or legal holiday
is timely commenced. (Note Rule 6a now
covers Saturdays). The Court then discussed
the purpose of Rule 6a and stated
"that rule provides the method for
computation of time prescribed or
allowed not only by the rules or by
order of court but by "any applicable
statute” (Italics ours). Since the rule
PELINAR PLL PIE ILOY T0 ASNET OCLE IEE LG FOLGE LOM NEI WP BREN F LI LOP EVI
had the concurrence of Congress,
and since no contrary policy is
expressed in the statute governing
tnis review, we think that the con-
sideration of liberality and leniency
which find expression in Rule 6 (a) are
equally applicable to 28 U.S.C. A. 2101
(c)". See Lamb, supra, 40, 41.
It is to be noted that Rule 6a was initially
adopted by Congress in 1934 and was in affect
when the FELA three year statute of limitation
found in 45 U.S.C. Section 56 was adopted in
1939. Congress has expressed no contrary
policy in 45 U.S.C. Section 56 which would
preclude the application of Rule 6a of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See 45 U.S.C. Section
56; See Lamb, supra; See Jones and Laughlin
Steel Company v. Grideron Steel Company, 382
U.S. 32 OES Ct. loz, lo L. Ed. Ta-26 11965)
where this court held in a per curiam decision
that a notice of appeal was timely filed on 32nd
day when 30th day fell on a Saturday. See also
Street v. United States, 133 U.S. 299, 10S. Ct.
; > oe 90). In Rutledge v.
Sinclair Refining Co. , 13 F.R.D. ), a
District Court held that Rule 6a is applicable
to 45 U.S.C. Section 56 and held that a suit
commenced oi Mouday was timely commenced
when the statute of limitation expired on a
Sunday. (Rule 6a did not cover Saturdays at
that time). Of course, any other interpretation
would reduce the limitation period to a period
of less than three years which limitation would
be contrary to 45 U.S.C. 56 and to the decisions
of this court interpreting the humanitarian
purposes of the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act. See Burnett v. New york Cenrral Railroad,
380 U. S.
(1965). See Glus v. ta ’ Bastern Terminal,
359 U.S. 235, 79°:
(1959); See Herb v. olin ad 325 U. S. 77, 65
S. Ct. 954, BTL ES. T4935 11945).
There is no conflict among the Circuit
Courts on this issue. In Wilkes v. United Statcs,
192 F 2d 128 (5th Cir. 1951), a federal statute
required a suit to be instituted within two years
for a tax refund. The two year period expired
on a holiday and suit was filed on Monday. The
Fifth Circuit in Wilkes, supra, held that Rule 6a
applicd to tt any applicable statute and extended
the two year ‘statute of limitation to Monday.
The Fourth Circuit iz Wirtz v. Peninsula Ship-
builders Association, SAE REAERETGLETGl
1967) held that a suit was timely commenced
under the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act where a suit had been filed on a
Monday, one day after the 60 day statute of
limitation period had run on a Sunday. The
Seventh Circuit reached the same result in
Brennan v. STH Lift Truck Builders
on, re
Tenth Circuit held in a v. Flemming,
264 F 2d 322 (10th Cir. i Rule
would extend the 60 day statute of limitation
period which a social security applicant has to
commence a suit in Federal Court. (See also
United States v. Petees, 220 F 2d 554 (10th Cir.
e Kule 1 control any statute of
limitation unless the statute of limitation
provides otherwise). The First Circuit in
Smith v. Pasqualetto, 246 F 2d 705 (First
CRIETOST) Held That a negligence case was
» ang PA AO LS OnE Rtn RDAs Oem oie
timely commenced when the statute of limitation
ran on a Sunday or legal holiday and the suit was
commenced on a Monday. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Sherwood Bros.
v. District of Columbia, 113 F 2d i
held that under common law and Rule 6a a suit
was timely brought on a Monday when the statute
of limitation ran on a Sunday. See also Simon v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 176 F2q
730 (2nd Cir. 1949); see United States v. Cia
Luz Stearica, 181 F 2d 695(Ninth Cir. 1950).
District Courts have ruled the same way.
See Powell v. Kuel, 329 F. Supp. 193 (M. D.
Penn 1971) where a District Court held that a
suit commenced on a Monday was timely
commenced under the one year statute of
limitation act provided by the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act where the statute of limitation
ran on a Sunday. See Pennsylvania Public
Utilities Commission Vv. United States of America,
. Supp. .D. Penn where t
District Court interpreted any applicable
statute of Rule 6a to mean the time period in
any statute that will be applied in an action in a
District Court. See Miller v. Daybrook -
Octtavia Corporation, . Supp. (M.D.
Ohio 1968) where the court held that Rule 6a is
applicable to statute of limitation.
State Courts which have a similar statute
or rule to Rule 6a of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have concluded that if the
statute of limitation expires on a Saturday,
Sunday or a holiday, a suit will be timely
commenced if instituted on the next business
day. See Brown v. Porter, 163 N. W. 2d 709
ae
(Michigan 1968); See Romaine v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 455 P
2d 102 (Nevada 1971), See ae v. Webb Gas
Company, Inc. of Lebanon, °
ssourl ; Hardbarger v. Deal, 127 S.E.
2d 771 (N.C. 1961); Wooten v. State Compen-
sation Comm. , 95 S. Seek Aa On UEYO ED
Tremby v. Armdir and Company, 95 N. W. 2d
owa ; Associat Transport v. Pusey,
118 A 24 362 (Delaware TOSS) Poste v—-Mix, —
81 A 2d 741(N.J. 1951).
The case of Joint Council v. Delaware L.
& W. R. Co., iS F 2d 417 (2nd Cir. 1946)
Cited by the C&O is not authority for saying that
Rule 6a of the Federal Rules has no application
to a statute of limitation because the Second
Circuit concluded that the suit was timely
commenced and did not hold that Rule 6a did not
apply to a statute of limitation. The cases cited
in the footnote of Lamb, supra, which the C&O
uses to support its position were all decided
before the adoption of Rule 6a and have been
overruled or repudiated. Therefore, it is well
settled through decisions of State Courts,
District Courts, Circuit Courts and this Court
that Rule 6a of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure would extend a statute of limitation
to a Monday if the last day expires on a
Saturday or Sunday.
Il. There was sufficient evidence for the jury
to pass on.
The C&O has not accurately reported the
facts and has failed to state the evidence and
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable
to Paynter, the verdict winner. Switch number
12
2 ee ae ears ak se Re ene re a
one and two was the only one of its kind in the
Clifton Forge yard where there were over 250
switches (72,92). Switch number one and two
was a ball type switch while all other switches
in the yard were a raccor switch which could be
handled in an upright position (126), Paynter
testified that he had to jerk switch number one
and two several times to get it up (159, 160),
that the switch did not work in the usual manner
(159), that the switch worked hard (159), and
that there was sand in the switch (159, 160).
Q. Now, you say you had to jerk it. Did
the switch operate in the usual manner or
did it not operate -
A. No sir, it did not. It was sand in it
and it worked hard, and I had to jerk it to
get it up, and you had to get your feet on it
to shut it down (159).
Q. Now, did the switch come up or not
when you pulled up on it?
A. It come up but I had to jerk it up.
It had sand and dirt in it (160).
Q. Did it come all the way up or not?
A. It come about half way up (160) --
A number of railroad employees confirmed
the fact that switch number one and two would
not work properly when there was sand in it
(122,142). Other testimony showed that the
switch was in improper working order at all
times because the switch had to be jerked to
13
ME EOP AERIAL DCSE CL ELA EY IIRL RG
A OP EO AIO SE eal EDL OD ls OES IED oe RDS
reverse the switch points (137). R. A. Wilson,
an employee of the C&O, stated that switch
number one and two had a hang in it which
prevented it from working properly (150). Evi-
dence also indicated that switch number one and
two was adjusted tighter than other switches
and was difficult to throw (91, 126,149). Other
switches in the Clifton Forge yard were kept
from moving by a latch rather than a tight
adjustment (126).
Evidence also showed that switch number
one and two was not maintained properly.
Switch number one and two was lubricated with
a heavy oil instead of graphite (86, 92,93).
Testimony also showed that the switch had to be
cleaned every day because sand got in it, that
the C&O did not have sufficient men to keep the
switches cleaned (92, 127, 128, 129) and there
was sand in the switch at the time of Paynter's
injury (159, 160).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
of a Federal Employers’ Liability case, the
United States Supreme Court, in the landmark
case of Rogers v. Missouri-Pacific R. Co.,
352 U. S- 900, 77S. Ct. 443, TL. Ed. 2d 493
(1956) held
"Under this statute the test of a jury
case is simply whether the proots justif
with reason the conclusion that employer
Tigence played any part, even the
STehrest Tn peoductog The Tayury OF
CHI TSE WHEN UaMages GTC SOUR. It
Goes tot Mater that, from the evidence,
the jury may also with reason, on
grounds of probability, attribute
the result to other causes, including
the employee's contributory negligence.
Judicial appraisal of the proofs to
determine SRSTher a jury case is
Presented Te narrowly Minted To y Miniter 9 the
oer = ether, with reason,
Ct conciusion ma rawn tnat
egligence Of the employer played an
part ata the injury Or death.
dges are to fix their sights to make
at appraisal and, if that test is met,
SES SORT STMT S CaS TOP or
ig Wade whether Or WOt Te SVIGERCE
allowed the jury a Choice of other
crobabiliies “The Statute expressly
imposes Mability on the wg cata =
pay damages for injury or death "
whole or in part’ due to its vee nt -
See Rogers, supra, at 506, 507.
(Emphasis added)
A reading of the evidence and reasonable
inferences thercfrom shows there was
sufficient evidence of the C&O's negligence to
submit to the jury. See Webb v. Illinois
Central Railroad Company, 352.5. Dl2, 77
S—CrIST- TT Ed-2a 303 (1957): See Davis
v. Virginia Railway, 361 U.S. 354, 80S" Ctr.
307, 4 - Ed. 2d sa (1960). Reasonable or
fair minded men could have concluded from the
evidence that the C&O failed to provide ga
with a reasonably safe place to work. Til
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. , 318 U.S. 54,
635. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ea. 10 (1943); See
Bailey v. Central Vermont R. Co., 319 U.S.
SITS Ct. 1062, 87T.. Ed. 1445 (1943);
See Washington and G. R. Co. v. McDade, 135
U.S. 354, 10S, Ct. 1044, 347.. Ed. 235 (1890);
See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 69
S. Ct. 413, SSL. Ed. 79711949),
The C&O also argues that it was denied due
process because of a number of prejudicial
errors. Each of these errors were briefed and
argued before the Fourth Circuit. In passing,
it is to be noted that the C&O made no objection
to the statements of Paynter's counsel! in closing
argument. The C&O made no objeciion to the
charge of the court other than the charge was
heavi'y weighted in favor of Paynter. Of course,
this objection does not meet the requirements
of Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Paynter, in making a case to the
jury, had to prove that the C& O knew or should
have known of the condition of switch number
one atid two (59-59). The Court charged the
jury that the only issue before it was whether
aynter had a reasonably safe place to work at
the time of his injury and that Paynter had to
prove tsat switch number one and two was ina
defective condition at the time he was injured
and not some other time either prior to or
subsequent to his injury. (See Charge 49-65),
Evidence of previous complaints about the
switch and the length of time the switch was
in an unsafe condition was relevant to the C&O's
knowledge. See Inman v. Baltimore and O. Ry.
Co. 261 US, LET ROSE Ca
TOK (1959): McCracken v. Richmond, Fredericks -
burg and Potomac RK. Co., 240 F ca “Se4 THN CIF,
T9357).
CONCLUSION
The case was fully and fairly tried. There
is no issue of national importance which would
warrant this Court granting a writ of certiorari.
The decision of the Fourth Circuit is consistent
with the decisions of this Court and of other
Federal Courts. This Court has long recognized
that ina F ELA case the jury is the tribunal to
decide issues of fact where fair minded men
could reach different conclusions. This Court
should deny the C&O's petition for a writ of
certiorari,
Respectfully submitted,
iNdit
iond H. opl
Willard J. Moody, Esq.
Raymond H. Strople, Esq.
Moody, McMurran and Miller
P.O. Box 1138
Portsmouth, Virginia 23705
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that three copies of the foregoing
Brief were mailed to Aubrey K. Bowles, Jr.
and Aubrey R. Bowles, III, 900 Mutual Building,
Richmond, Virginia 23219, counsel for
Petitioner, on the 3rd day of March, 1975.
Raymond H. Strople
- . — ons PANNA AEP AEE EE SS A Mth meta
anata oo YD ON ert Line we rare a «
APPENDIX
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
CHARLOTTESVILLE DIVISION
EARLE G, PAYNTER, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs. CIVIL ACTION 71-C-6-C
THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO
RAILWAY COMPANY,
Defendant.
PPE EL AIOE ECO IE LL SN ah OE A ts Oe i wm
OWS OL ie le EE
Ruling On Motion To Dismiss
Plaintiff was injured on March 19, 1968.
Plaintiff filed his suit on March 22, 1971. The
time limit allowed under FELA is three years
as required by 45 U.S.C.A. § 56. Rule 6 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
as follows:
(52) In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by these rules, by
local rules of any district court, by order
of court, or by any applicable statute, the
day of the act, event, or default from
which the designated period of time ns
to run shall as counted. The —
Of the period so computed shall be come
unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday, in which event the period
runs sanil the end of the next da , which is
nary Samrdaya Sunday, ora I
ay. m s
Under Rule 6, the designated periodof time
did not begin to run until the date following
the accident, March 20, 1968. Three yars
from that date, March 20, 1971 fell ona
Saturday, and the fuiiowing day was Sunday.
Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff's suit,
filed on Monday, March 22, 1971, falls
within the statutory three-year period.
It has been held that Rule 6 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable to
pleadings and statutes of limitations and that
in computing time the first day should be
excluded and the last day included. Miller v.
w— REP OIA BO a © Sta YO
f PabteGiGen ain d
Daybrook-Ottawa Corp. , 291 F. Supp. 896
(1965).
In Rutledge v. Sinclair Refining Co., 13
F.R. aicemes D. N.Y. 1953), = Court said
at 478 that “the basic issue is whether Rule
6 (a) is applicable to a Federal statute of
limitation when the last day of the period
prescribed by it falls on a Sunday. (Rule 6
at that time did not include Saturdays). The
court specifically held that the statute of
limitations under FELA was controlled by the
provisions of Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The court also notes that plaintiff testified
that although he was injured on March 19,
1968, he had no knowledge of his injury until
March 20. Under FELA, a cause of action
only accrues when the plaintiff has reason to
know he is injured. The Supreme Court in
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 69S. Ct.
SILER aecoen ene (1949) stated that
statutes of limitations only require the
assertion of claims within a specified period
after notice of invasion of legal rights. This
has been interpreted by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals as follows:
The Urie case unquestionably demon-
strates the Court's view that when the
nature of the injury is such that it does
not manifest itself immediately, the
determination of when the cause of action
accrued does not depend on when the
injury was inflicted. To the contrary,
(53) the cause of action accrues only when
the plaintilt has reason to know he fas
ve tbe aed Den
add ee
DO ADP CRO SLOT Be A a me
tats Base
|
i
been injured. (Emphasis added) young
v. a, Railroad Co, , 288 FY 2d
, r.
The court notes that until the plaintiff
knew that he was injured, he was legally
ignorant of the existence of his alleged cause
of action, Therefore, it may be said that the
cause of action accrued on March 20, 1968,
when the plaintiff first discovered his injury.
The defendant seeks dismissal because
the claim arose more than three years prior
to the filing of the amended complaint. The
amended complaint was filed on July 24, 1972
and the injury was discovered on March 20,
1968. The Supreme Court has held that where
an amendment merely expands or amplifies
the cause of action already asserted, it
relates back to the commencement of the
action and is not affected by the intervening
lapse of time. Seaboard Airline v. Renn.,
241 U.S. 290, 3035. Ct. 567, 60 L. Ed. 1006
(1916). This court notes that the amended
complaint filed on July 24, 1972 merely
expanded and amplified the original complaint
of March 22, 1971 and therefore relates back
to the commencement of the action.
The court notes that the FELA statute of
limitations is not totally inflexible, but may
be extended beyond three years. Burnett v.
New york Central R.R., 380 U.S. 427, 85
S.Ct. 1050, 1ST. Ed. 2d
a a 941 (1965);
Mum er v. Southern Railway Company,
a. ne
of the well recognized exceptions which will
toll the FELA statute of limitations is the
oe
eS Om
~<a
Prrserenercen
rae
SRE A EOIN A Rs
doctrine of estoppel. Glus v. Brookl
Eastern District Terminal, 1, 79
S- Ct. 700, 3 L.Ed. 2d 770 (1959). “The
general law is stated in 24 A L.R. 2d 1413,
1435:
Actual fraud in the technical sense,
bad faith, or an intent to mislead or
deceive is not essential to create an
estoppel against setting up the statute
of limitations, it being sufficient for
this purpose that the (defendant) made
misrepresentations which misled the
(plaintiff), who acted upon them in good
faith, to the extent that he failed to
commence action within the statutory
period.
The facts appear in this case to indicate
that the plainciff was given assurances by
three C&O doctors, Dr. Woodhouse, Dr.
Edmonds and Dr. Vermilya that his injury
was minor that he could return to work.
In (54) addition, a claims agent advised the
plaintiff in June 1968 that he had three years
within which to file his action.
The court feels that there remain factual
questions as to the representations made to
the plaintiff and to the issue of negligence,
all of which may be submitted to the jury at
the time of tria
Accordingly, for the above-stated reasons,
it is hereby ordered and adjudged that
defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground
of statute of limitations is overruled and
denied.
The court is of the opinion that this
decision and order entered herein involve a
controlling question of law as to which there
is a substantial ground for difference of
opinion, and that an immediate appeal from
the decision and order may materially
advance the ultimate determination of this
litigation, pursuant to the provisions of Title
28, U.S.C. sec. 1292 (b). An appeal is
granted.
The clerk is directed to send a certified
copy of this opinion to counsel of record.
Enter:
/s/ Ted Dalton
U.S. Chief District Judge
June 12, 1973
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.