Opposition Brief — Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Paynter

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@uUPREME COURT, Us wR 4 19

IN THE RR Ta

Supreme Court of the United States~

October Term, 1974

No 174-986

THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY,

Petitioner,

EARLE G. PAYNTER, JR.,

Respondent,

\

\

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

\ TO \

\ PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Willard J. Moody, Esq.

Raymond H. Strople, Esq.

Moody, McMurran and Miller

P.O. Box 1138

Portsmouth, Virginia 23705

Counsel for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR

REVIEW 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2

ARGUMENTS

I. Paynter's Suit Was Timely

Commenced. 7

Il. There Was Sufficient Evidence

or Thepry [fo Pass On.

» ROR DE LEAT LL ALS

CONCLUSION 17

CERTIFICATE 17

APPENDIX 1A-6A

4 AT Oram ee ee ee ala <—e eee

ee ee

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Page

Federal Cases

Brennan v. Independent Lift Truck

uilders Union,

(7th Cir. 1973) 10

Johnson v. Flemming, 264 F 2d

322 (10th Cir. 1959) 10

Joint Council v. Delaware L.

Cir. 1946) 12

McCracken v. Richmond, Fredericks-

——“Hure and Potomac Rh. Co,,240 F 2d

484 oh Cir. 1957) 16

Miller v. Daybrook-Octtavia

Corporation, 291 F. supp. 896

(M.D. Ono 1968) 11

Pennsylvania Public Utilities

CAmmission vV. United states

Of America, 511 F. Supp. 1024 11

(M.D. Penn 1970)

Powell v. Kuel, 329 F. Supp. 193

(M.D. Penn 1971) 11

Rutledge v. Sinclair Refining Co. ,

T3 r R. D. 477 (1953) Y

OE ROTO TEE LE | RIV L ESS LEME SOLE LEP IGA Lt SDE ETE

so OLS EEL LA LLY A ly STOOL TE LLLP ACL BAR LBA EAL ALE 0 5 PID LAD

Sherwood Bros. v. District of

umpbia, ;

(T1940)

Simon v. Commissioner of

nternal Revenue,

T. 1949)

Smith v. Pasqualetto, 246 F 2d

Irst Circuit 1957)

United States v. Cia Luz

tearica, 5

inth Cir. 1950)

United States v. Petees, 220

ir. 1955)

Wilkes v. United States, 192

th Cir. 1951)

Wirtz v. Peninsula Shipbuilders

ssociation,

(ath Cir. 1967)

State

Asscciated Transport v. Pusey,

TId | aware )

Bowling v. Webb Gas Company,

Inc. of Lebanon, 5900 5. W.

2d 39 (Missouri 1974)

Bremby v. Armdir and Company,

05 NT W. 2d 449 (lowa 1900)

OP NLR EF EN EP TE EY Aa tl ak io esa cer

11

11

10

11

10

10

10

12

12

ae

DRT A APL DOI A te + aS M AIM ti EO AR NLT A POR a GE AA EB EAE LEAL LA ARE COTE

Page

Brown v. Porter, 163 N. W. 2d

ichigan 1968) 11, 12

Hardbarger v. Deal, 127 S.E.

2d rT (N.C. 1961) 12

Poetz v. Mix, 81 A 2d 741

(N.J. 1951) 12

Romaine v. State Farm Mutual

; Kutomobile Insurance Compan

485 P 2d 102 (Nevada 197 T) 12

Wooten a State Compensation

° “au 5 3

(Ww. Vx 1957) 12

Supreme Court Cases

Bailey v. Central Vermont R. Co.,

t. ,

87 L. Ed. 1445 (1943) 15

Burnett v. New york Central

allroad, , Bo

5. Ct. 1050, 13 L. Ed. "2d k

941 (1965) 10

Davis v. Virginia Railway, 361

U.S, 354, B05. Ct. 487, 4

L. Ed. 2d 366 (1960) 15

61 NELLA DELIA A ELEY S GMA IIE

Page

Gius v. Brooklyn Eastern

Terminal, 359 U.S. 231,

77S. Ct. 760, 3 L. Ed. 2d

770 (1959) 10

Herb v. Pitcarin, 325 U.S. 77,

; ae , 89 L. Ed.

1493 (1945) 10

Inman v. Baltimore and O. Ry.

Co. , 301 U.5. 136, B05. Ct.

242, 4L. Ed. 2d 198 (1959) 16

ones and Laughlin Steel Compan

V. orideron steel Seerer’

15 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1965) 9

Rogers v. Missouri-Pacific R.

Co. , 302 U.5. 900, 77 5. Ct.

43, 1 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1956) 14

Street v. United States, 133 U.S.

‘ >» ae _ aol. Be,

631 (1890) y

Tiller vy. Atlantic Coast Line R.

Co., 318 U.S. 94, 05 5. Ct.

444, 87 L. Ed. 610 (1943) 15

Union National Bank v. Lamb,

. 5. DO, ; Uae PER,

93 L. Ed. 1190 (1949) 8

Urie v. Pn ane 337 U.S.

018, 73

Le Ed. 1282 (1949)

Washington and G.R. Co. v.

chad T35 U.S. 904,

IOS. Ct. 1044, 34 L. Ed.

235 (1890)

Webb vy. Illinois Central

Railroad Company, 302

0.5. Siz, 773. tt. 451,

1 L. Ed. 2d 503 (1957)

Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336

U.5. 33, 09 5. CL. 413,

93 L. Ed. 497 (1949)

Other Authorities

45 U.S.C. Section 56

28 U.S.C. A. 2101 (c)

Rule 6a - Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure

Rule 19B of the Rules of the

Supreme Court of the

United States

Rule 51 - Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure

Page

16

15

16

2,8,9, 11

16

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 74-986

THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO

RAILWAY COMPANY,

Petitioner,

v.

EARLE G, PAYNTER, JR.,

Respondent.

Brief In Opposition To Petition For A Writ

Of Certiorari

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT!

This is a negligence case under the Federal

Employers’ Liability Act (FELA)*. It presents

lpetitioner, the Chesapeake and Ohio

Railway Company, will be referred to through-

out as the ''C&O". Respondent, Earle G.

Paynter, Jr. will be referred to throughout as

"Paynter". Reference will be made to the joint

appendix filed on appeal unless otherwise

designated.

45 U.S.C. 51 et seq

eter ll Ai PME DD A 6 OVA Napa OL BDV eh Os

no legal questions not previously resolved, nor

is there any dispute over the principles to be

applied. The only question is the application of

established principles and clearly defined rules

to the facts of this case. Paynter respectfully

submits that none of the reasons set forth in

Rule 19B apply to this case and this Honorable

Court should not grant a writ of certiorari.

II

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Should this Court review a well settled

principle that Rule 6a of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure will extend a federal statute

of limitation to a Monday when the statute of

limitation expires on a Saturday?

2. Should this Court review the sufficiency

of the evidence in a Federal Employers’

Liability Act case where the District Court and

the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals properly

concluded there was sufficient evidence of the

C&O's negligence for the jury to pass on? .

Ill

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Paynter, a railroad employee with the

C&O, filed a complaint in the United States

District Court for the Western District of

Virginia on Monday, March 22, 1971 against

the C&O alleging injuries sustained on March

19, 1968 as a result of the C&O's negligence.

Paynter's complaint was amended several times

2

FRO OY CL ROLDAN PEL ID” EL AMELIE SIE LEAL AIG EEE. ACL IS LL AEIGIO IE EAA irl ..

. . Gn ae ae Coe Re

one of which stated that Paynter did not have

knowledge of his injury until March 20, 1968.

The C&O filed an answer and a motion to dismiss

alleging that Paynter's cause of action was

barred by the FELA three year statute of

limitation, The District Court then held a

hearing on the motion to dismiss, and the C&O

offered no evidence at this hearing. Paynter

offered extensive evidence by way of depositions

and Paynter's evidence was uncontradicted.

The District Court held that Paynter's suit was

timely commenced as a matter of law. (See

entire written opinion of District Court Appendix

la - 6a which the C&O failed to include in its

petition for certiorari) The District Court

concluded from the uncontradicted facts and

evidence that the FELA three year statute of

limitation did not run until March 20, 1971, a

Saturday, and that since March 20th was a

Saturday and the Clerk's Office was closed,

that Paynter had until Monday, March 22, 1971,

the next day which is neither a Saturday or

Sunday to commence his action and that Paynter

did commence his action by March 22, 1971.

(See Appendix to this Brief, pages la-6a) The

District Court made a specific factual finding

that Paynter did not have knowledge of his

injury until March 20th, 1968. The case was

then set for a trial by jury.

The evidence showed that on March 19,

1968, Paynter was a yard conductor in charge

of a crew making up a train called 95 West in

the Smith Creek yard in Clifton Forge,

Virginia (120). Pullen was a brakeman (140),

McCoy, a brakeman (140), and Fisher was the

engineer (140). The crew was warking the

CRE La aie

" The es SS ae

PTTL EL KALTER EN Ke aed UN ee Ce NE

7:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. shift.

The crew had been kicking cars into the

number two track in order to make up the train

known as 95 West (119,120). The switcli known

as number one and two was lined up for che

number two track (157). There was no need for

Paynter’s crew to throw the number one and two

switch to the number one track (81,95).

However, there were several other crews

working in the yard (88). All testimony indi-

cated that switch number one and two had to be

lined up with track number two in order to

protect any train doubled over on track number

one (94,95, 131). When Paynter last noticed

switch number one and two before a break, it

was lined up with the track number two (157,

162). After a break, Pullen, the head brake-

man, cut a car off from the engine into the

number two track (144), Paynter was standing

about 50 feet away from switch number one and

two and saw that switch number one and two

was set wrong as it was aligned with track

number one (158). Paynter immediately went

over to the switch to change it from number

one to number two in order to prevent the car

cut by Pullen from running into the train on

track number one. Paynter had to jerk the

switch to get it up (159) and felt a "thing" hit

him in the back when he pushed the switch

down to line it with the number two track (159).

Evidence showed that Paynter did not know he

was injured at this time. (See Appendix to this

Brief, pages la-6a; see also 159, 163, 164, 177,

178, 182).

Paynter maintained that one of the members

ANS A SALLI CELE ASO OE ET Yo —

2 ore seis PPR ILL AAA MOM AD Ae AE CG OE

of the road crew that brought in a long coal

train pulled the wrong switch (157,188). All

members of Paynter’s crew denied throwing the

switch to the number one track.

Paynter stated that the switch didn't work

in the usual manner (159), that there was sand

and dirt in it (159) and that he had to jerk it to

operate it (160). Other railroad employees

agreed that if switch number one and two was

not clean it would not operate right (122, 142).

An accident report filed by Paynter the next

day on March 20, 1968 when he realized he was

injured indicated that the switch was defective

(179). R. A. Wilson, a railroad employee,

also indicated that switch number one and two

was not working oroperly on March 19th, 1968

(150). Switch number one and two was in an

improper working order at all times since the

switch had to be jerked in order to reverse the

movements of the switch points (137).

R. E. Johnson, a brakeman, who fre-

quently worked at the Smith Creek Yard indi-

cated that switch number one and two was un-

usual and the only switch of its kind in the

Clifton Forge yard (72). This switch had a

bar paralicl and just off the ground about two

and one-half feet long with a metal ball on the

end that weighed 12-15 pounds (72). All other

switches at Clifton Forge had a lever that

stood at a 45 degree angle with a latch that kept

the switch points from moving (126, 127).

Switch number one and two did not have a latch

and the switch points were kept from moving

by the weight of the metal ball (90). Johnson

was of the opinion that switch number one and

SOE VIAL aa

Ee a aa ae Se

le

two was harder to operate than the other

switches in the yard with a latch (77,84). Other

witnesses agreed that switch number one and

two was adjusted tighter than the latch switches

in order to keep the switch points from moving

and consequently was more difficult to throw

(91,95, 126, 149). In addition, the latch or

raccor switches when contrasted with switch

number one and two could be operated without

bending all the way over (76, 90, 126).

Evidence also showed that the switches

were only greased occasionally and then with a

heavy oil which made things worse when sand

got in it rather than being lubricated with

graphite (86,92,93). Sand would get in the

switches and the switches were not cleaned

daily (87). It took about twenty-twenty-five

minutes to clean a switch and the C&O had only

three men available to clean over 250 switches

in the yard,

The condition of switch number one and two

was not new to the C&O. Johnson had com -

plained about the condition of the switch to the

yardmaster and trainmaster (79). Bocock had

made complaints to the trainmaster about the

mechanical condition of switch number one and

two prior to March 19th, 1968 (93). Showalter,

a union representative, had made complaints

about the switch (128,129). Ray Wilson had

complained to his supervisors prior to March

19, 1968 that switch number one and two would

hang (150). Paynter had reported to the yard-

master Many times that the switch needed

cleaning (161).

: a

err: HARTA ONENESS TET NIE A PIN PRET NTR NTE RE Re ned PT Nn tr EEL T NT NTT TD

Pa AEE Tt i Tin CLL 0 tO AIEEE ON RIA PELE EVES AAS EOC EECA DEALT

The jury found for Paynter and awarded

him $125,540. 00 in damages for his disabling

injuries which injuries precluded Paynter from

any future employment with the C&O. The

court reduced the verdict of $125,540. 00 to

$100, 432. 00 which reduction was due to the jury

finding Paynter contributorily negligent in the

amount of twenty percent. The District Court

overruled the C&O's motion for judgment not-

withstanding the verdict and its motion for a

new trial (Appendix B, see pages 20 and 21,

petition for a writ of certiorari). The Fourth

Circuit Court of Appeals in a per curiam

opinion found no reversible error and found

sufficient evidence to take the case to the jury

(See Appendix B, page 19 of petition for a writ

of certiorari). The C&O then sought to have a

rehearing in banc which rehearing was denied

on December 6, 1974 (See Appendix B, page 18

petition for a writ of certiorari). The C&O's

petition for certiorari was filed in this Court

on February 7, 1975.

IV

ARGUMENT

Paynter's suit was timely commenced.

The District Court found that the three

year statute of limitation did not run until

Saturday, March 20, 1971, which finding is not

challenged by the C&O. The uncontradicted

evidence at the hearing on the motion to dis-

miss showed that Paynter did not know he was

injured until March 20th, 1968 and that Paynter’s

cause of action did not accrue until Paynter

discovered his injury. (See Appendix to this

brief 1A-6A); see also Urie v. Thompson, 337

U.S. 163, 69S. Ct. 1018, 73. Ed. T282 (1949).

The C&O argues that this Court should grant

certiorari because Rule 6a of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure cannot extend the FELA

three year statute of limitation to a Monday when

the last day of the statute runs out on a Saturday

or Sunday. Paynter respectfully submits that

this issue has been decided by all levels of state

and federal courts including this Court and is not

an issue that would warrant this Court granting

certiorari under Rule 19B of the Rules of the

Supreme Court of the United States.

In Union National Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S.

38, 69 5. Ct. SIT, SSL. Ed. TT90 (1949), the

Supreme Court of the United States held that

Rule 6a of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

would extend beyond 90 days, the time for filing

a petition for writ of certiorari when the last

day fell on a Sunday. This Court held that the

petition for certiorari was timely commenced

by filing the petition on the 91st day because

the language of Rule 6a provided that where the

last day for performance of an act falls on a

Sunday or a legal holiday, performance on the

next day which is not a Sunday or legal holiday

is timely commenced. (Note Rule 6a now

covers Saturdays). The Court then discussed

the purpose of Rule 6a and stated

"that rule provides the method for

computation of time prescribed or

allowed not only by the rules or by

order of court but by "any applicable

statute” (Italics ours). Since the rule

PELINAR PLL PIE ILOY T0 ASNET OCLE IEE LG FOLGE LOM NEI WP BREN F LI LOP EVI

had the concurrence of Congress,

and since no contrary policy is

expressed in the statute governing

tnis review, we think that the con-

sideration of liberality and leniency

which find expression in Rule 6 (a) are

equally applicable to 28 U.S.C. A. 2101

(c)". See Lamb, supra, 40, 41.

It is to be noted that Rule 6a was initially

adopted by Congress in 1934 and was in affect

when the FELA three year statute of limitation

found in 45 U.S.C. Section 56 was adopted in

1939. Congress has expressed no contrary

policy in 45 U.S.C. Section 56 which would

preclude the application of Rule 6a of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. See 45 U.S.C. Section

56; See Lamb, supra; See Jones and Laughlin

Steel Company v. Grideron Steel Company, 382

U.S. 32 OES Ct. loz, lo L. Ed. Ta-26 11965)

where this court held in a per curiam decision

that a notice of appeal was timely filed on 32nd

day when 30th day fell on a Saturday. See also

Street v. United States, 133 U.S. 299, 10S. Ct.

; > oe 90). In Rutledge v.

Sinclair Refining Co. , 13 F.R.D. ), a

District Court held that Rule 6a is applicable

to 45 U.S.C. Section 56 and held that a suit

commenced oi Mouday was timely commenced

when the statute of limitation expired on a

Sunday. (Rule 6a did not cover Saturdays at

that time). Of course, any other interpretation

would reduce the limitation period to a period

of less than three years which limitation would

be contrary to 45 U.S.C. 56 and to the decisions

of this court interpreting the humanitarian

purposes of the Federal Employers’ Liability

Act. See Burnett v. New york Cenrral Railroad,

380 U. S.

(1965). See Glus v. ta ’ Bastern Terminal,

359 U.S. 235, 79°:

(1959); See Herb v. olin ad 325 U. S. 77, 65

S. Ct. 954, BTL ES. T4935 11945).

There is no conflict among the Circuit

Courts on this issue. In Wilkes v. United Statcs,

192 F 2d 128 (5th Cir. 1951), a federal statute

required a suit to be instituted within two years

for a tax refund. The two year period expired

on a holiday and suit was filed on Monday. The

Fifth Circuit in Wilkes, supra, held that Rule 6a

applicd to tt any applicable statute and extended

the two year ‘statute of limitation to Monday.

The Fourth Circuit iz Wirtz v. Peninsula Ship-

builders Association, SAE REAERETGLETGl

1967) held that a suit was timely commenced

under the Labor Management Reporting and

Disclosure Act where a suit had been filed on a

Monday, one day after the 60 day statute of

limitation period had run on a Sunday. The

Seventh Circuit reached the same result in

Brennan v. STH Lift Truck Builders

on, re

Tenth Circuit held in a v. Flemming,

264 F 2d 322 (10th Cir. i Rule

would extend the 60 day statute of limitation

period which a social security applicant has to

commence a suit in Federal Court. (See also

United States v. Petees, 220 F 2d 554 (10th Cir.

e Kule 1 control any statute of

limitation unless the statute of limitation

provides otherwise). The First Circuit in

Smith v. Pasqualetto, 246 F 2d 705 (First

CRIETOST) Held That a negligence case was

» ang PA AO LS OnE Rtn RDAs Oem oie

timely commenced when the statute of limitation

ran on a Sunday or legal holiday and the suit was

commenced on a Monday. The Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia in Sherwood Bros.

v. District of Columbia, 113 F 2d i

held that under common law and Rule 6a a suit

was timely brought on a Monday when the statute

of limitation ran on a Sunday. See also Simon v.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 176 F2q

730 (2nd Cir. 1949); see United States v. Cia

Luz Stearica, 181 F 2d 695(Ninth Cir. 1950).

District Courts have ruled the same way.

See Powell v. Kuel, 329 F. Supp. 193 (M. D.

Penn 1971) where a District Court held that a

suit commenced on a Monday was timely

commenced under the one year statute of

limitation act provided by the Food, Drug and

Cosmetic Act where the statute of limitation

ran on a Sunday. See Pennsylvania Public

Utilities Commission Vv. United States of America,

. Supp. .D. Penn where t

District Court interpreted any applicable

statute of Rule 6a to mean the time period in

any statute that will be applied in an action in a

District Court. See Miller v. Daybrook -

Octtavia Corporation, . Supp. (M.D.

Ohio 1968) where the court held that Rule 6a is

applicable to statute of limitation.

State Courts which have a similar statute

or rule to Rule 6a of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure have concluded that if the

statute of limitation expires on a Saturday,

Sunday or a holiday, a suit will be timely

commenced if instituted on the next business

day. See Brown v. Porter, 163 N. W. 2d 709

ae

(Michigan 1968); See Romaine v. State Farm

Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 455 P

2d 102 (Nevada 1971), See ae v. Webb Gas

Company, Inc. of Lebanon, °

ssourl ; Hardbarger v. Deal, 127 S.E.

2d 771 (N.C. 1961); Wooten v. State Compen-

sation Comm. , 95 S. Seek Aa On UEYO ED

Tremby v. Armdir and Company, 95 N. W. 2d

owa ; Associat Transport v. Pusey,

118 A 24 362 (Delaware TOSS) Poste v—-Mix, —

81 A 2d 741(N.J. 1951).

The case of Joint Council v. Delaware L.

& W. R. Co., iS F 2d 417 (2nd Cir. 1946)

Cited by the C&O is not authority for saying that

Rule 6a of the Federal Rules has no application

to a statute of limitation because the Second

Circuit concluded that the suit was timely

commenced and did not hold that Rule 6a did not

apply to a statute of limitation. The cases cited

in the footnote of Lamb, supra, which the C&O

uses to support its position were all decided

before the adoption of Rule 6a and have been

overruled or repudiated. Therefore, it is well

settled through decisions of State Courts,

District Courts, Circuit Courts and this Court

that Rule 6a of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure would extend a statute of limitation

to a Monday if the last day expires on a

Saturday or Sunday.

Il. There was sufficient evidence for the jury

to pass on.

The C&O has not accurately reported the

facts and has failed to state the evidence and

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable

to Paynter, the verdict winner. Switch number

12

2 ee ae ears ak se Re ene re a

one and two was the only one of its kind in the

Clifton Forge yard where there were over 250

switches (72,92). Switch number one and two

was a ball type switch while all other switches

in the yard were a raccor switch which could be

handled in an upright position (126), Paynter

testified that he had to jerk switch number one

and two several times to get it up (159, 160),

that the switch did not work in the usual manner

(159), that the switch worked hard (159), and

that there was sand in the switch (159, 160).

Q. Now, you say you had to jerk it. Did

the switch operate in the usual manner or

did it not operate -

A. No sir, it did not. It was sand in it

and it worked hard, and I had to jerk it to

get it up, and you had to get your feet on it

to shut it down (159).

Q. Now, did the switch come up or not

when you pulled up on it?

A. It come up but I had to jerk it up.

It had sand and dirt in it (160).

Q. Did it come all the way up or not?

A. It come about half way up (160) --

A number of railroad employees confirmed

the fact that switch number one and two would

not work properly when there was sand in it

(122,142). Other testimony showed that the

switch was in improper working order at all

times because the switch had to be jerked to

13

ME EOP AERIAL DCSE CL ELA EY IIRL RG

A OP EO AIO SE eal EDL OD ls OES IED oe RDS

reverse the switch points (137). R. A. Wilson,

an employee of the C&O, stated that switch

number one and two had a hang in it which

prevented it from working properly (150). Evi-

dence also indicated that switch number one and

two was adjusted tighter than other switches

and was difficult to throw (91, 126,149). Other

switches in the Clifton Forge yard were kept

from moving by a latch rather than a tight

adjustment (126).

Evidence also showed that switch number

one and two was not maintained properly.

Switch number one and two was lubricated with

a heavy oil instead of graphite (86, 92,93).

Testimony also showed that the switch had to be

cleaned every day because sand got in it, that

the C&O did not have sufficient men to keep the

switches cleaned (92, 127, 128, 129) and there

was sand in the switch at the time of Paynter's

injury (159, 160).

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence

of a Federal Employers’ Liability case, the

United States Supreme Court, in the landmark

case of Rogers v. Missouri-Pacific R. Co.,

352 U. S- 900, 77S. Ct. 443, TL. Ed. 2d 493

(1956) held

"Under this statute the test of a jury

case is simply whether the proots justif

with reason the conclusion that employer

Tigence played any part, even the

STehrest Tn peoductog The Tayury OF

CHI TSE WHEN UaMages GTC SOUR. It

Goes tot Mater that, from the evidence,

the jury may also with reason, on

grounds of probability, attribute

the result to other causes, including

the employee's contributory negligence.

Judicial appraisal of the proofs to

determine SRSTher a jury case is

Presented Te narrowly Minted To y Miniter 9 the

oer = ether, with reason,

Ct conciusion ma rawn tnat

egligence Of the employer played an

part ata the injury Or death.

dges are to fix their sights to make

at appraisal and, if that test is met,

SES SORT STMT S CaS TOP or

ig Wade whether Or WOt Te SVIGERCE

allowed the jury a Choice of other

crobabiliies “The Statute expressly

imposes Mability on the wg cata =

pay damages for injury or death "

whole or in part’ due to its vee nt -

See Rogers, supra, at 506, 507.

(Emphasis added)

A reading of the evidence and reasonable

inferences thercfrom shows there was

sufficient evidence of the C&O's negligence to

submit to the jury. See Webb v. Illinois

Central Railroad Company, 352.5. Dl2, 77

S—CrIST- TT Ed-2a 303 (1957): See Davis

v. Virginia Railway, 361 U.S. 354, 80S" Ctr.

307, 4 - Ed. 2d sa (1960). Reasonable or

fair minded men could have concluded from the

evidence that the C&O failed to provide ga

with a reasonably safe place to work. Til

v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. , 318 U.S. 54,

635. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ea. 10 (1943); See

Bailey v. Central Vermont R. Co., 319 U.S.

SITS Ct. 1062, 87T.. Ed. 1445 (1943);

See Washington and G. R. Co. v. McDade, 135

U.S. 354, 10S, Ct. 1044, 347.. Ed. 235 (1890);

See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 69

S. Ct. 413, SSL. Ed. 79711949),

The C&O also argues that it was denied due

process because of a number of prejudicial

errors. Each of these errors were briefed and

argued before the Fourth Circuit. In passing,

it is to be noted that the C&O made no objection

to the statements of Paynter's counsel! in closing

argument. The C&O made no objeciion to the

charge of the court other than the charge was

heavi'y weighted in favor of Paynter. Of course,

this objection does not meet the requirements

of Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, Paynter, in making a case to the

jury, had to prove that the C& O knew or should

have known of the condition of switch number

one atid two (59-59). The Court charged the

jury that the only issue before it was whether

aynter had a reasonably safe place to work at

the time of his injury and that Paynter had to

prove tsat switch number one and two was ina

defective condition at the time he was injured

and not some other time either prior to or

subsequent to his injury. (See Charge 49-65),

Evidence of previous complaints about the

switch and the length of time the switch was

in an unsafe condition was relevant to the C&O's

knowledge. See Inman v. Baltimore and O. Ry.

Co. 261 US, LET ROSE Ca

TOK (1959): McCracken v. Richmond, Fredericks -

burg and Potomac RK. Co., 240 F ca “Se4 THN CIF,

T9357).

CONCLUSION

The case was fully and fairly tried. There

is no issue of national importance which would

warrant this Court granting a writ of certiorari.

The decision of the Fourth Circuit is consistent

with the decisions of this Court and of other

Federal Courts. This Court has long recognized

that ina F ELA case the jury is the tribunal to

decide issues of fact where fair minded men

could reach different conclusions. This Court

should deny the C&O's petition for a writ of

certiorari,

Respectfully submitted,

iNdit

iond H. opl

Willard J. Moody, Esq.

Raymond H. Strople, Esq.

Moody, McMurran and Miller

P.O. Box 1138

Portsmouth, Virginia 23705

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that three copies of the foregoing

Brief were mailed to Aubrey K. Bowles, Jr.

and Aubrey R. Bowles, III, 900 Mutual Building,

Richmond, Virginia 23219, counsel for

Petitioner, on the 3rd day of March, 1975.

Raymond H. Strople

- . — ons PANNA AEP AEE EE SS A Mth meta

anata oo YD ON ert Line we rare a «

APPENDIX

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

CHARLOTTESVILLE DIVISION

EARLE G, PAYNTER, JR.,

Plaintiff,

vs. CIVIL ACTION 71-C-6-C

THE CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO

RAILWAY COMPANY,

Defendant.

PPE EL AIOE ECO IE LL SN ah OE A ts Oe i wm

OWS OL ie le EE

Ruling On Motion To Dismiss

Plaintiff was injured on March 19, 1968.

Plaintiff filed his suit on March 22, 1971. The

time limit allowed under FELA is three years

as required by 45 U.S.C.A. § 56. Rule 6 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

as follows:

(52) In computing any period of time

prescribed or allowed by these rules, by

local rules of any district court, by order

of court, or by any applicable statute, the

day of the act, event, or default from

which the designated period of time ns

to run shall as counted. The —

Of the period so computed shall be come

unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a

legal holiday, in which event the period

runs sanil the end of the next da , which is

nary Samrdaya Sunday, ora I

ay. m s

Under Rule 6, the designated periodof time

did not begin to run until the date following

the accident, March 20, 1968. Three yars

from that date, March 20, 1971 fell ona

Saturday, and the fuiiowing day was Sunday.

Therefore, the court finds that plaintiff's suit,

filed on Monday, March 22, 1971, falls

within the statutory three-year period.

It has been held that Rule 6 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable to

pleadings and statutes of limitations and that

in computing time the first day should be

excluded and the last day included. Miller v.

w— REP OIA BO a © Sta YO

f PabteGiGen ain d

Daybrook-Ottawa Corp. , 291 F. Supp. 896

(1965).

In Rutledge v. Sinclair Refining Co., 13

F.R. aicemes D. N.Y. 1953), = Court said

at 478 that “the basic issue is whether Rule

6 (a) is applicable to a Federal statute of

limitation when the last day of the period

prescribed by it falls on a Sunday. (Rule 6

at that time did not include Saturdays). The

court specifically held that the statute of

limitations under FELA was controlled by the

provisions of Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

The court also notes that plaintiff testified

that although he was injured on March 19,

1968, he had no knowledge of his injury until

March 20. Under FELA, a cause of action

only accrues when the plaintiff has reason to

know he is injured. The Supreme Court in

Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 69S. Ct.

SILER aecoen ene (1949) stated that

statutes of limitations only require the

assertion of claims within a specified period

after notice of invasion of legal rights. This

has been interpreted by the Fourth Circuit

Court of Appeals as follows:

The Urie case unquestionably demon-

strates the Court's view that when the

nature of the injury is such that it does

not manifest itself immediately, the

determination of when the cause of action

accrued does not depend on when the

injury was inflicted. To the contrary,

(53) the cause of action accrues only when

the plaintilt has reason to know he fas

ve tbe aed Den

add ee

DO ADP CRO SLOT Be A a me

tats Base

|

i

been injured. (Emphasis added) young

v. a, Railroad Co, , 288 FY 2d

, r.

The court notes that until the plaintiff

knew that he was injured, he was legally

ignorant of the existence of his alleged cause

of action, Therefore, it may be said that the

cause of action accrued on March 20, 1968,

when the plaintiff first discovered his injury.

The defendant seeks dismissal because

the claim arose more than three years prior

to the filing of the amended complaint. The

amended complaint was filed on July 24, 1972

and the injury was discovered on March 20,

1968. The Supreme Court has held that where

an amendment merely expands or amplifies

the cause of action already asserted, it

relates back to the commencement of the

action and is not affected by the intervening

lapse of time. Seaboard Airline v. Renn.,

241 U.S. 290, 3035. Ct. 567, 60 L. Ed. 1006

(1916). This court notes that the amended

complaint filed on July 24, 1972 merely

expanded and amplified the original complaint

of March 22, 1971 and therefore relates back

to the commencement of the action.

The court notes that the FELA statute of

limitations is not totally inflexible, but may

be extended beyond three years. Burnett v.

New york Central R.R., 380 U.S. 427, 85

S.Ct. 1050, 1ST. Ed. 2d

a a 941 (1965);

Mum er v. Southern Railway Company,

a. ne

of the well recognized exceptions which will

toll the FELA statute of limitations is the

oe

eS Om

~<a

Prrserenercen

rae

SRE A EOIN A Rs

doctrine of estoppel. Glus v. Brookl

Eastern District Terminal, 1, 79

S- Ct. 700, 3 L.Ed. 2d 770 (1959). “The

general law is stated in 24 A L.R. 2d 1413,

1435:

Actual fraud in the technical sense,

bad faith, or an intent to mislead or

deceive is not essential to create an

estoppel against setting up the statute

of limitations, it being sufficient for

this purpose that the (defendant) made

misrepresentations which misled the

(plaintiff), who acted upon them in good

faith, to the extent that he failed to

commence action within the statutory

period.

The facts appear in this case to indicate

that the plainciff was given assurances by

three C&O doctors, Dr. Woodhouse, Dr.

Edmonds and Dr. Vermilya that his injury

was minor that he could return to work.

In (54) addition, a claims agent advised the

plaintiff in June 1968 that he had three years

within which to file his action.

The court feels that there remain factual

questions as to the representations made to

the plaintiff and to the issue of negligence,

all of which may be submitted to the jury at

the time of tria

Accordingly, for the above-stated reasons,

it is hereby ordered and adjudged that

defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground

of statute of limitations is overruled and

denied.

The court is of the opinion that this

decision and order entered herein involve a

controlling question of law as to which there

is a substantial ground for difference of

opinion, and that an immediate appeal from

the decision and order may materially

advance the ultimate determination of this

litigation, pursuant to the provisions of Title

28, U.S.C. sec. 1292 (b). An appeal is

granted.

The clerk is directed to send a certified

copy of this opinion to counsel of record.

Enter:

/s/ Ted Dalton

U.S. Chief District Judge

June 12, 1973

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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