Respondents Brief — Bibler v. Young
Supreme Court brief1974
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OCTOBER TERM, 1974
No. 74-17
ANN E. BIBLER, ADMX. OF THE ESTATE OF
RALPH BIBLER, DECEASED, ET AL.,
- Petitioners, .
vs.
BERRY H. YOUNG, JR., ET AL.,
and
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
BERRY H. YOUNG, JR., ET AL,
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DAVID L. DAY
and
COLLIS GUNDY LANE
LANE, ALTON & HORST
150 East Broad Street
Columbus, Ohio 43215
Counsel for Respondents
Berry H. Young, Jr.,
The Ohio Aviation Company and
Ohio Aviation Distributors, Inc.
INDEX
ADDITIONAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS
INVOLVED
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
OBJECTIONS TO GRANTING A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI
The decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals does not conflict with the decisions
of other Courts of Appeals
The interpretation of Title 14 C.F.R., Sec-
tion 91.87, adopted by the Court below is
correct and does not create any problems for
safe operation of air travel
The decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals does not conflict with decisions of
other Courts of Appeals as to the proper
interpretation and application of Title 14
C.F.R., Section 91.67
A Writ of Certiorari is not to be granted to
give the defeated party another hearing on
the facts
SE UP oes ewiwas sc acacey se
~
Is
CITATIONS
Cases:
Boehmer v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 252
U.S. 496 (1920), certiorari granted, 248 US.
554, affirming, 252 F. 553 (2d Cir. 1918)
Chambers v. McFerren, 168 Ohio St. 398, 155 N.E.
2d 917 (1959)
Chicago Junction Ry. Co. v. King, 222 U.S. 222
Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F. 2d 62
(D.C. Cir. 1955) aff'd. subnom
George v. American Airlines, Inc., 295 F. 2d 311
(7th Cir. 1961)
Gilly. United States, 429 F. 2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1970)
Hartz vy. United States, 387 F. 2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968)
Hood v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Rd. Co.,
166 Ohio St. 529, 144 N.E. 2d 104 (1957)
Indian Towing Company, Inc. v. United States, 350
US. 61 (1955)
Ingham v. United States, 373 F. 2d 227 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967)
Magnum Ce. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159 (1923)
New York Airways, Inc. vy. United States, 283 F. 2d
496 (2d Cir. 1960)
Ricks v. Jackson, 169 Ohio St. 254, 159 N.E. 2d
225 (1959)
Spaulding v. United States, 455 F. 2d 222 (9th Cir.
1972)
Stanley v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 973, 975
(N.D. Ohio E.D. 1965)
. 21-22
. oo
20
st)
‘Page
Swoboda v. Brown, 129 Ohio St. 512, 196 N.E. 274
(1935) ; 21
United Air Lines, Inc. vy. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 379
“piccolo rn ae 12
United States v. Furumizo, 381 F. 29d 965 (9th Cir.
1967) ate,
United States v. Miller, 30% F. 2d 703 (9th Cir.
1962) aoa Oe
United States vy. Union Trust Co., 350 US. 907
(1955) ee:
Statutes:
14 C.F-R., Section 60.14 . 19
14 C.F.R., S ~ion 91.67 (ec) and (f) . 6-7, 18, 19, 22
14 C.F.R., Sec. om 91.75 . 1, 20
14 C.F.R., Section 91.87 (b) 15, 16, 17, 22, 24
28 U.S.C., Section 1332 4
28 U.S.C., Section 1346 (b) ; 2, 3
In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ANN E. BIBLER, ADMX. OF THE ESTATE OF
KALPH BIBLER, DECEASED, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
vs.
BERRY H. YOUNG, JR., ET AL.,
and
IHE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
BERRY H. YOUNG, JR., ET AL.,
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
ae
ADDITIONAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS
INVOLVED
litle 14 C.F.R., Section 91.75 Compliance with ATC clear-
ances and instructions.
(a) When an ATC clearance has been obtained, no
pilot in command may deviate from that clearance. except
2
in an emergency, unless he obtains an amended clearance.
However, except in positive controlled airspace, this para-
graph does not prohibit him from cancelling an IFR flight
plan if he is operating in VFR weather conditions.
(b) Except in an emergency, no person may, in an area
in which air traffic control is exercised, operate an aircraft
contrary to an ATC instruction.
(c) Each pilot in command who deviates, in an emer-
gency, from an ATC clearance or instruction shall notify
ATC of that deviation as soon as possible.
(d) Each pilot in command who (though not deviating
from a rule of this subpart) is given priority by ATC in
wn emergency, shall, if requested by ATC, submit a detailed
report of that emergency within 48 hours to the chief of
that ATC facility.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter involves four (4) separate claims. ‘The
first is a wrongful death claim asserted in the case of
Ann E. Bibler, as Administratrix of the Estate of Ralph
D. Bihler vy. Berry H. Young, Jr., Ohio Aviation Company,
Ohio Aviation Distributors, Inc., The United States of
America and The Federal Aviation Administration, Case
No. 70-56, in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. Jurisdiction
in that case is based on diversity of citizenship, Title 28
U.S.C., Section 1332, and The Federal Tort Claims Act.
Tithe 28 U.S.C., Section 1346 (b). Cross-claims were made
by the United States of America against the three co-
defendants in that case.
The second claim is for property damage to a Piper
Cherokee airplane of which the decedent, Ralph D. Bibler,
was pilot-in-command and which airplane was owned by
Donald L. Sundin d/b/a Sundin Aviation Company. That
claim is the subject of the case of Donald L. Sundin d/b/a
3
Sundin Aviation Company y. United States of America
and the Federal Aviation Administration, Case No. 70-82,
in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Ohio, Eastern Division. Jurisdiction in that case
is based on The Federal Tort Claims Act, Title 28 U.S.C..
Section 1346(b). Third-party claims were made by the
United States of America against Berry H. Young, Jr.,
The Ohio Aviation Company and Ohio Aviation Distribu-
tors, Inc. in that case.
The third claim is for the same property damage to
the Piper Cherokee airplane and was originally asserted
in the case of Donald L. Sundin d/b/a Sundin Aviation
Company v. Ohio Aviation Company, Ohio Aviation Dis-
tributors, Inc. and Berry H. Young, Jr., Case No. 23991,
in the Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County, Ohio.
Ohio Aviation Distributors, Inc. was the owner of the
Beechcraft Bonanza 18N, and it counterclaimed against
said Donald L. Sundin in that case for damage to the
Beechcraft Bonanza. This is the fourth claim which is
a subject of this matter. There was no diversity of citizen-
ship or other basis for federal court jurisdiction of the
subject matter in that case.
The above Cases Nos. 70-56 and 70-82 were consolidated
for trial to the Court. The claims asserted in the Com-
mon Pleas Court were submitted to the District Court
on the Common Pleas Court pleadings by stipulation of
the parties for trial along with Cases Nos. 70 56 and 70-82.
Decedent Ralph D. Bibler was an employee of Donald
L. Sundin d/b/a Sundin Aviation Company. Berry H.
Young, Jr. was an employee of The Ohio Aviation Com-
pany but was neither an employee nor an agent of Ohio
Aviation Distributors, Inc.
The accident out of which these four (4) claims arose
occurred on April 10, 1968, at Port Columbus Interna-
, —e
“
tional Airport (hereafter called Port Columbus) within
the airport traffic area (five (5) mile radius). Port Colum-
bus had an F.A.A. air traffic control facility which provided
aircraft approach control services and tower services (local
and ground). The approach control radio frequency in
use was 119.0Hz. The tower local control radio frequency
in use was 120.5Hz. At the time of the accideat, the
weather conditions were such as to make the F.A.A. visual
flight rules applicable.
Prior to and at the time of the accident, decedent Ralph
Bibler was giving a student instrument flight instructions
in Cherokee 39] on the approach course to Port Columbus
Runway 28 Left. That runway lay in an easterly-westerly
direction. ‘The approach to Runway 28 Left was from
east to west. On the first simulated instrument approach.
Cherokee 39] was given compass directions by approach
control to guide it in alignment with the approach to
Runway 28 Left. Prior to the time Cherokee 39J passed
the outer marker (the point at which descent was to com-
mence), approach control told Cherokee 39J to contact
the tower at the outer marker. Cherokee 39] followed
those instructions and received clearance to continue his
descent towards Runway 28 Left. That first simulated
approach was terminated by Cherokee 39J just short of
the runway when the airplane began climbing to a higher
altitude and executing a right turn (missed approach) .
Cherokee 39J then re-contacted approach control as he
had previously been instructed to do. At the time of
the accident, Cherokee 39] was attempting a second sim-
ulated instrument approach. At no time did Cherokee
39] intend to land on Runway 28 Left.
At approximately 3:04 P.M., approach control informed
Cherokee 39] that he was on the localizer (radio direction-
al beam on approach course) a mile from the outer marker
4
5
and that he was spaced in reference to a Lake Central
Nord located about three (3) miles north of the airport.
The Nord would be landing on Runway 28 Left. Cher-
okee 39] acknowledged the approach control transmission.
However, approach control did not instruct Cherokee 39]
to contact the tower on frequency 120.5Hz at the outer
marker as approach control had done on the first simulated
approach. From that time (a mile from the outer marker)
until the time of the mid-air collision well inside the
outer marker and the five (5) mile airport traffic area,
Cherokee 39] made no transmission to either approach
control or to the tower local controller until the approx-
imate time of the collision. Neither did the approach
controller make any transmissions to Cherokee 39]. The
tower local controller could not. transmit to Cherokee
39J because at no time on the second approach did Chero-
kee 39] switch to the tower local controller's frequency.
At approximately 3:04 P.M., Mr. Young, piloting Bonan-
za 18N. called the tower local controller on frequency
120.5Hz and reported his position as two (2) miles south
of the outer marker (Charlie Mike). The tower local
controller instructed Bonanza I8N to plan Runway 28
Left as No. 2 aircraft, the aircraft following the Nord,
which was No. |. The only warning received concerning
any other traffic was that Bonanza I8N should watch for
traffic coming up on the outer marker making an instru-
ment landing system (ILS) low approach. Low approach
means without landing. After other transinissions, the
tower local controller asked Bonanza 18N if he had sighted
the Nord. After first responding “negative”. Bonanza
I8N reported identification of the Nord. A short while
later the tower local controller told Bonanza I8N_ that
he (the local controller) had the Bonanza in sight and
stated, “You're cleared to land 28 Left.” Bonanza 18N
—_
»
:
6
acknowledged receiving this transmission. After being
alerted to the fact that the two (2) airplanes were in
close proximity on the approach to Runway 28 Left, the
tower local controller attempted to call Cherokee 39]
then attempted to call Bonanza 18N. The transmission
to Bonanza 18N occurred a slight instant after the collision.
It appears that Cherokee 39] was below and in front of
Bonanza 18N and could not be seen by Mr. Young. Chero-
kee 39J crashed and Mr. Bibler and the student were
killed. Mr. Young safely executed a forced landing of
Bonanza 18N in a nearby field (A. 4-12).
After trial to the Court, the District Court implied
that the approach controller was negligent in failing to
warn Bibler or the tower controller of the converging
paths of Cherokee 39J and Bonanza 18N (A. 28) and
in failing to advise Cherokee 39] to contact the tower
local controller at the outer marker (A. 30). However,
the District Court further found that Mr. Bibler was
contributorily negligent in failing to maintain two-way
communications with the control tower and in failing to
contact the tower once he passed the outer marker (A.
34). Negligence on the part of the approach controller
was assumed (A. 28). Mr. Young was found not negligent
(A. 34).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's determination that Mr. Bibler was contributorily
negligent, doing so in part as a matter of law (A. 14)
and in part as a finding of fact supported by the weight of
the evidence (A. 15) and that such negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of the collision (A. 17-18). ‘The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals also assumed that the approach controller
was negligent (A. 18) and determined that Mr. Young
(Bonanza 18N) had the right of way under Title 14
7
C.F.R., Section 91.67 (f). By virtue of Mr. Bibler’s con-
tributory negligence, all plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed
as required by Ohio law (A. 15, 17-18).
OBJECTIONS TO GRANTING
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
1. THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT CONFLICT
WITH THE DECISION OF OTHER COURTS OF
APPEALS.
The District Court, in its opinion, made the following
statements concerning the approach controller:
“While it may be asserted that an agency of the defen-
dant United States was also negligent in failing to
instruct 39 Julict to contact the ‘Tower at the outer
marker, such negligence cannot obsclve the plaintiff.”
(A. 30)
- * *
“It is true that Approach Control was the only entity
that knew, at a time immediately prior to the accident,
of the relative positions of the two planes. Beginning
at 1503:47 it had precisely located 39 Juliet; at
1504:44 it had located 18 November. For a period
of between three and four minutes Approach Control
had the capability of noting that two planes were in
a collision course. Ironically, Bibler’s own contribu-
tory negligence in failing to contact Vower had the
effect of retaining him on Approach Control's fre-
quency. Approach Control could have instructed Bib-
ler to take evasive action or it could have advised
‘Tower to order Young to do the same.
Approach Control's failure to do this, however, does
not relieve Bibler from the effects of his contributory
negligence through the doctrine of last clear chance.
(A. 31-32)
, pay
. 4
8
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also recognized that
the approach controller at Pert Columbus had been negli-
gent by stating:
“He (the District Judge) also held that the approach
controller at the Port Columbus Airport was guilty
of negligence for failing to tell pilot Bibler to contact
local control. But he held that this negligence was
not the proximate cause of the accident.” (A.3)
The above quotations from the opinions of the District
Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals demonstrate
that both Courts judged the conduct of the approack. con-
troller by the same standard of care which has been ex-
plicitly stated in the cases cited by Petiticners. ‘he ap-
parent reason why the lower Courts did not further ex-
pound on that standard is the findings both as a matter
of fact and as a matter of law that Mr. Bibler was con-
tributorily negligent. This pivotal contributory negli-
gence issue also distinguishes this matter from most of the
cases cited by Petitioners and explains why there should
be no review of the judgments below. (A. 12, 15 and 33)
The case of Eastern Air Lines vy. Union Trust Co.,
221 F. 2d 62 (D. C. Cir. 1955). aff'd. subnom., United
States v. Union Trust Co., 350 US. 907 (1955). involved
a claim for the wrongful causing of the death of passengers
on an Eastern Airlines DC-4 who were killed as the result
of a collision between the DC-4 and a P-38 military air-
craft. There was no defense of contributory negligence
to the claim for the deaths of the passengers. The passen-
KETS WeTe passive participants in a tragic event. Both air-
craft had been cleared for the same runway at the same
time. The judgment against Eastern Airlines was reversed
and remanded for a new trial. The United States, how-
ever, was found negligent for the breach by the air traffic
qy
control personnel of their duty to warn each aircraft of
the other's presence. This duty is identical to that recog-
nized by the District Court and quoted above.
The case of Indian Towing Company, Inc. v. Urited
States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), states the same principle. This
Court held that the coast guard had the duty to us? due
care in operating a lighthouse, and, if the light became
extinguished, it had the duty to use due care to discover
that the light had been extinguished and to give a warning
of such to appropriate persons. Again, this is the same
standard recognized by the lower Courts as quoted above.
The case of Ingham vy. United States, 373 ¥. 2d 227 (2d
Cir. 1967) , cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967) , also involved
claims for the wrongful causing of the death and for in-
juries to passengers on a commercial airliner which crashed
at Idlewild International Airport. Suit was brought
against both Eastern Airlines aad the United States. Two
test cases were tried: one against Eastern Airlines and
one against the United States ‘The claim was that the
air traffic controllers had a duty to warn the pilots of the
airliner about a crucial change in weather conditions.
The trial court held that there was such a duty. The
Court of Appeals went further and specificially found that
such failure was a violation of the F.A.A.’s Air Traffic Con-
trol Procedure Manual which provided that the controller
should give advice as to weather conditions and subsequent
changes as necessary. Again there was no defense of con-
tributory negligence to the claims made in that case.
United States v. Furumizo, 381 F. 2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967),
involved a claim for the wrongful causing of the death of
a student pilot who died when the small plane in which
he was riding crashed after it had encountered wake tur-
bulence caused by the take-off of a large aircrait. The
Court of Appeals noted that the pilot in command had a
j 10
duty of avoiding the danger of wake turbulence and also
demonstrated that the instructor in command of the small
plane had been found negligent. The Court of Appeals
also affirmed the District Court's finding that the student
had not been negligent. Affirming the judgment against
the United States, the Court held that the controllers’ job
required that they act in the interest of safety and warn
a pilot whom they observe is taking off when it is apparent
to such controllers that the pilot will encounter a severe
hazard.
The case of Hartz y. United States, 387 F. 2d 870 (5th
Cir. 1968), involved claims for the wrongful causing of
the death of the pilot, Mr. Hartz, and the death of a
passenger, Mr. Roth, who were killed when their Beech-
craft Bonanza encountered wake turbulence created by
the take-off of a DC-7. One of the issues in the case was
the negligence of the pilot, Mr. Hartz. There was no
issue as to any negligence on the part of the passenger,
Mr. Roth. The District Court held that the controller
had no duty to do anything more than maintain separation
of aircraft to avoid a collision and that the negligence of
Mr. Hartz was the sole proximate cause of the crash. Such
holding prevented recovery by the passenger, Mr. Roth.
On review, the Court of Appeals held, at page 874 of the
opinion:
“We hold that the controller gave Hartz a warning
which was neither sufficient under the manual nor
adequate to caution Hartz of a possible danger which
was then known to the controller. The failure of
the controller to properly caution Hartz of the possible
danger of wing tip vortex imposed upon the con-
alee an additional duty to aes take-of clearance
for the Bonanza for such period as was reasonably
necessary to permit such turbulence from the DC.7
to dissipate. “Che controller's breach of duty clearly
was a proximate cause of the crash of the Bonanza... .”
Based on this holding, the Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
the opinion. The net result was that recovery could be
had against the United States at least for the death of
the passenger, Mr. Roth.
The case of Spaulding vy. United States, 455 F. 2d 299
(9th Cir. 1972), involved claims for the wrongful death
of Dorman D. Michelmore (pilot) , John B. Michelmore
(passenger and son of pilot) and Jack E. Spaulding
(passenger). Neither of the passengers were pilots. A
judgment was rendered in the trial court against all plain-
tiffs. Only the claims on behalf of the estates of the de-
cedent passengers were appealed. The appellate court
stated the duty of the air traffic controller as follows at
page 226 of the opinion:
“The air traffic controller is required to give all infor-
mation and warnings specified in his manuals, and in
certain situations he must give warnings beyond the
manuals. ‘This duty to warn is based on the simple
tort principle that once the government has assumed
a function or service, it is liable for negligent per-
formance.
The controller's duty to warn does not, however,
relieve the pilot of his primary duty and responsibility.
Again, as in most of the above cases, there was no defense
of contributory negligence to the claims for the deaths of
the passengers.
The case of Gill v. United States, 429 F. 2d 1072 (5th
Cir. 1970), also involved a claim for the wrongful death
of two passengers. Claims for the death of those passengers
-_—
i2
had previously been made against the estate of the decedent
pilot and were settled. Suit was brought against the
United States. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's finding that the radar approach controlier was
negligent in furnishing “in-flight weather information
which wes inexact, incomplete and in all reasonable proba-
bility misleading.” “Nhe Court remanded the case solely
for determination as to whether, as an issue of fact, the
pilot had been negligent, because, if so, under the law
of Texas, the United States was entitled to a reduction
of the judgment against it by one-half. In that case con-
‘ributory negligence of the pilot was a significant factor
cven though the air v athe controllers had a duty to warn
tie pilot.
Finally, the case of (/nited Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335
F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), involved claims for the wrongful
causing of the deaths of passengers of a commercial airliner
resulting from a collision between the airliner and an Air
Force jet fighter. “vere was no contributory negligence
defense to the claims for the deaths of the passengers.
‘The Court of Appeals held at pages 397-98 of the opin-
ion:
“A warning to others of dangerous tying activity being
conducted by the government would have been a pre-
caution dictated by the exercise of ordinary care. We
therefore affirm the District Court's holding that it
was negligence at the operational level of the govern-
ment to fail to inform United of the details of the
government’s hazardous activity involved in the
KRAM procedure prior io authorizing Flight 736 to
travel into the area where such activity was likely to
be encountered. . . .~
‘These Respondents respectfully submit that the opin-
ions of both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit Court
13
of Appeals in this matter show that those Courts did apply
the standard of care explicitly set forth in the cases re-
viewed above. What occurred in the District Court and
the Court of Appeals in this matter is almost-identicai to
what occurred in the District Court in United States v.
Furumizo, 381 F. 2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967). In that case
Baker Aircraft Sales, Inc. (Baker) was one of the appel-
lants. Baker argued that the District Court made no find-
ing that its pilot-employce, the instructor in the airplane,
was negligent. The Court of Appeals agreed that there
was no direct finding that Shima (the employee) was
negligent. However, the Court of Appeals made the fol-
lowing comments and reached the following conclusion
at page 969 of the opinion:
“The trial judge thought that he had made such a
finding. as is indicated by a colloquy between court
and counsel on motion tor a new trial. In that the
court was mistaken, and such a situation would nor-
mally require a remand for further indings on the
issuc. Here, however, it is apparent trom the record
that the court intended to make the finding: pre-
sumably it would do so on remand. We think that
such a remand is unnecessary here. All that Baker
secks, in relation to the first theory, is an opportunity
to convince the trial judge that Shima was in fact
fully informed about the danger of wake turbulence,
thus showing that Baker was not negligent in employ-
ing him as an instructor. But if Baker succeeded in
proving that. it would bring itself within the second
theory, the one on which the case was tried. As the
trial court said (paragraph 38) :
‘Had Shima been an adequately trained pilot. and
had he been adequately instructed and made fully
aware of the dangers of large plane wake turbu-
lence to small planes, the Court cannot believe
that he would have taken off at the time and
14
under the circumstances he did, the evidence in-
dicating that he was a careful and prudent person,
not one given to taking undue chances. A well-
trained pilot, adequately schooled in the actual
dangers to planes of the size of this Piper of
turbulence created by planes of the size of the
DC-8, would have done what the pilots of the
C-47 did — wait until a reasonable time had
elapsed to allow the most violent aspects of the
turbulence to dissipate before taking off, * * *’.
‘To have done anything else would certainly have been
negligent. In substance, then, the trial court's find-
ings do embody the second theory. Remand for a
more specific finding would be a triumph of form over
substance.”
Likewise, the lower Courts in this matter did not make
a specific finding that the duty to warn was breached by
the approach controller. It is apparent, however, that
both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the approach controller negligent in
failing to follow the procedure set forth in the controller's
manual and in failing to give appropriate warnings of the
impending collision of which the approach controller was
the only one in a position to know all the facts. Therefore,
these Respondents respectfully submit that the decision
of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals does not conflict
with the decisions of other Courts of Appeals as to the
standard of care required of government air traffic con-
trollers.
15
2. THE INTERPRETATION OF TITLE 14
C.F.R., SECTION 91.87, ADOPTED BY THE
COURT BELOW IS CORRECT AND DOES NOT
CREATE ANY PROBLEMS FOR SAFE OPER-
ATION OF AIR TRAVEL.
These Respondents respectfully submit that the inter-
pretation given by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to
the term “control tower” as used in Title 14 C.F.R., Sec-
tion 91.87 (b), is correct and in accordance with the gen-
eral usage and understanding of that term by both the
Federal Aviation Administracion and experienced pilots
through the useage of that term in the regulations and
the Airman’s Information Manual.
Title 14 C.F.R.. Section 91.87 (b), provides:
“No person may, within an airport traffic area, oper-
ate an aircraft to, from, or on an airport having a
control tower operated by the United States unless
two-way radio communications are maintained be-
tween that aircraft and the control tower.” (Emphasis
added.)
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 51, Airman’s Information Manual, p.
l-1, (R. 4), gives the following definition:
“AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SERVICE (CON.
TROL) — A service provided for the purpose of pro-
moting the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air
trafic, including airport, approach, and enroute ai
traffic control service.” (Emphasis added.)
Finally, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 51, Airman’s Information Man-
ual, p. 1-84, (R. 4), provides:
“LANDING — TOWER-CONTROLLED AIR-
PORTS — 1. When operating te an airport where
traffic control is being exercised by a control tower.
lb
pilots are required to maintain two-way radio contact
with the tower while operating within the airport
trathe area unless the tower authorized otherwise. In
itl call-up should be made about 13 miles trom the
airport. (sce “Decrease Frequency Congestion’ under
GOOD OPERATING PRACTICES)
2. When necessary, the tower controller will issue
clearances or other information for aircratt to general:
lv follow the desired Hight path (trathic patterns) when
ving in the airport traffic area/control zone, and the
proper taxi routes when operating on the ground... .”
(Emphasis added.)
The Airman’s Information Manual defines the term “Air
Trathe Control Service” (ATC) as including three tunc-
tions: airport traffic control service, approach traflic con-
trol service and enroute traflic control service. Further.
in reference to Section 91.87 (b) , the Airman’'s Information
Manual specifically interprets the term “control tower”
as being the “tower controller”. Consequently, the infor-
mation available to all pilots and the knowledge with
which pilots are charged clearly supports the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals’ determination that the term “control
tower” meant the “local controller”. See Stanley v. United
States, 239 F. Supp. 073. 975 (N.D. Ohio E.D. 1965).
In addition, these Respondents submit that simply hav-
ing one’s radio tuned to a particular frequency is not
“radio communications” within the tacaning of Title 14
C.F.R.. Section 91.87 (b). Petitioners repeatedly argue
that Mr. Bibler, by having his radio tuned to the approach
control frequency, was in “contact” with the “control tow-
er’. Section 91.87 (b) docs not simply require “contact”.
It requires “communications”. ‘The findings of fact of the
District Court as quoted in the Sixth Circuit of Appeals’
opinion clearly demonstrate that Mr. Bibler did not main-
-
li
tain “Communications. According to those tacts, a period
of approximately four Cl) munutes passed during which
Mr. Bibler spoke to no one. The District Court found:
TAM TS0G 1 oo Juliet was noted by approach control
as ‘on the localizer a amile trom the marker.” CAL 8.
a
* * *
“AL D507 45, SO Juliet knew he was inside the outer
marker since he advised approach control “a beam of
Wosters Blecrric. No conversation at any time im
this approach was had with local control.” CA. Te and
YN)
Anvone can sit by a silent radio and in a very technical
sense be in contact with the party at the other end. Such
Silent contact, however, should not be considered “com-
municauion in a circumstance where the very purpose
of the radio contact is for the communication of informa-
tion designed to protect all the parties concerned.
Respondents respecttully submit that the lower Courts
have properly interpreted Tithe 1 C.F.R., Section 91.87
(bh). as it existed at the time of the accident and that
the findings of fact, which petitioners do not dispute, show
a clear violation of that regulation. “Therefore, the de-
cision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals does not
create any problems which will affect the safe operation
of air travel.
18
3. THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT CONFLICT
WITH DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF
APPEALS AS TO THE PROPER INTERPRETA-
TION AND APPLICATION OF TITLE 14 C.F.R.,
SECTION 91.67.
The facts recited by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
and which are relevant to this objection are as follows:
“At the time and place concerned Young had a clear-
ance to land and was proceeding according to it. Bib-
ler did not have a clearance to land: he had only a
clearance to approach.” (A. 18)
“At 1503:47 he (Bibler) was advised that he was
on the localizer one mile from the outer marker and
spaced in reference to a Lake Central Nord three
miles north of the airport. “The term ‘spaced in ref-
erence to Lake Central Nord’ is not a clearance to
land nor is it a landing sequence.” (A. 11)
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 51, Airman’s Information Manual, p.
l-1, (R. 4) provides:
“Approach Sequence — the order in which aircraft
are positioned while awaiting approach clearance or
while on approach.”
There is no dispute as to the fact that Cherokee 39] (Bib-
ler) never did intend to land.on Runway 28 Left. At
no time was he on “final approach to land” or “landing”.
He was only sequenced behind the Nord (A. 11).
It appears that Petitioners completely missed the basis
upon which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded
that Mr. Young had the right of way over Mr. Bibler.
Paragraphs (e) and (f) of Title 14 C.F.R., Section 91.67,
contain three sentences (A. 1). Each of those sentences
19
apply to different situations. Paragraph (ec) is very gen-
cral providing that an aircraft which is being overtaken
has the right of way and that the overtaking aircraft shall
alter course to the right. By its very nature, this provision
indicates that it applics to enroute flight. It would not
be logical to suggest that the second of two aircraft ap-
proaching the same runway should pass to the right. It
would be more logical to provide for some other maneuver.
‘The first sentence of paragraph (f) specifically gives the
right of way to an aircraft “on final approach to land”
or “landing” (A. 1). ‘The second sentence of paragraph
(f) specifically provides for the situation where two (2)
or more aircraft are approaching an airport for the “pur-
pose of landing’. If Mr. Bibler, who had no intention
of landing at any time, is to be treated, as Petitioners
infer, as if he were on tinal approach to land, then there
is no reason for the distinction provided in the two sen-
tences contained in Title 14 C.F.R., Section 91.67 (f).
‘Thus it is apparent that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
based its decision that Mr. Young had the right of way
on the specific and clear provisions of the first: sentence
of paragraph (f) rather than the note to Title 14 CF.R.,
Section 60.14, as Petitioners claim. Further, the cases,
cited by Petitioners are distinguishable on the facts.
In United States v. Miller, 303 F. 2d 703 (9th Cir.
1962), Miller, who was piloting a Beechcraft had been
cleared by radio to enter the traffic pattern but had not
received a clearance for landing. ‘The other aircraft, a
Cessna, was doing touch and go landings. The Cessna
Was receiving instructions by means of light signals flashed
with a light from the tower. At the time of the collision,
it appears neither aircraft had been cleared. Consequently,
the Court applied the general right of way regulation con-
tained in paragraph (ce) of Title 14 C.F.R., Section 91.67.
10)
In New dork Airways, Inc. v. United States, 283 F. 2d
496 (2d Cir. 1960), the aircralt involved was a helicopter
which could sately stop its movement (hover) and make
any maneuver desirable in order for the pilot to be assured
that the spot on which he intended to land was free of
surface vehicles. No right of way regulation was involved
in that case. “.
In George v. American Airlines, Inc., 295 F. 2d 311 (7th
Cir. 1961), the two (2) aircraft were converging at ap-
proximately forty-five (45) degrees. ‘The pilot of the de-
fendant’s aircraft did not see the other military aircratt
until it was about “five seconds” away. In taking evasive
action to avoid a collision, the pilot put the defendant's air-
liner into a dive resulting in injury to the plainull. The
Court determined that the defendant was negligent because
of the pilot's failure to maintain a proper lookout. “Vhere
is no question of right of way nor is there any indication
that, had the United States been sued, the crew of the
military aircraft would not have been found negligent also.
Petitioners also argue that Mr. Young had an obligation
to see Mr. Bibler’s airplane. Respondents respecttully
submit that Mr. Bibler also had an obligation to see Mr.
Young's airplane. The facts as recited by the District
Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals show that
for a substantial period prior to the collision, the two (2)
aircralt were converging from a spread of tvo (2) miles
separation north to south at the approximate point of the
outer marker to the point of the collision a slight distance
short of the runway (A. 9-10).
Having been cleared to land, Mr. Young was obligated
by Title 14 C.F.R., Section 91.75, to proceed directly to
the runway and land. In fact, he was prohibited from
doing otherwise. ‘The significance of a clearance to land
is explained in Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221
2%
F. 2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), at page 65, in tootmote 3, as
follows:
“Phe Administrator of Civil Aeronautics was called
by the court as a witness on the meaning of the phrase
‘cleared to land.’ He testified that when a plane in
the trafic pattern of an airport is ‘cleared to land,’
the pilot of the plane is thereby authorized to com-
mence his landing approach operation immediately:
in other words. when a pilot receives that clearance.
wherever he may be in the traffic pattern, there is
no plane ahead of him and he may make his turn at
his discretion and consistently with the sale manage-
ment of his plane, and may come in and land at once
on the runway which has been designated by the
tower. “Phat this is the only meaning of the phrase
‘cleared to land’ was the unanimous testimony of all
the certified air traffic controllers who testified on the
subject. “The trial judge instructed the jury as a mat-
ter of law that such was the meaning of the phrase
‘cleared to land’.”’
Having received a clearance and in view of the obligation
Mr. Bibler had to maintain communications with the con-
trol tower, Mr. Young had the right to assume that the
aircraft “coming up on the marker.” would contact the
control tower and not be negligent. ‘This conclusion is
based on the rule set forth in Swoboda v. Brown, 129 Ohio
SM. 512, 196 N.E. 274 (1985). in the eighth paragraph of
the syllabus as follows:
“One may rightlully assume the observance of the law
and the exercise of ordinary care by others, and action
by him in accordance with such assumption ino the
absence of notice or knowledge to the contrary is not
negligence.”
See als» Hood vy. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Rd. Co.,
166 Ohio St. 529, 144 N.E. 2d 104 (1957): Chambers vy.
22
McFerren, 168 Ohio St. 398, 155 N.E. 2d 917 (1959) ;
Ricks v. jackson, 169 Ohio St. 254, 159 N.E. 2d 225
(1959) .
By virtue of Title 14 C.F.R.. Section 91.87 (b), both
Mr. Bibler and Mr. Young were required to maintain com-
munications with the control tower when within the airport
trafhc area. Mr. Young, even though being told of an
aircraft coming up on the marker, had a right to assume
that Mr. Bibler would establish and maintain communica-
tions with the control tower. Had Mr. Bibler done so,
Mr. Young would have heard the transmissions to and
from Cherokee 39J and could have done something to
avoid the collision. Mr. Young had no knowledge of the
entrance of Cherokee 39] into the airport traffic area which
would have permitted Mr. Young to take action to avoid
the collision. Consequently, Mr. Young was not negligent
for his failure to see Cherokee 39].
Respondents respectfully submit that the F.A.A. regu-
lations and the law of Ohio were correctly applied by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and that there is no conflict
between that decision and decisions of other Courts of
Appeals as to the proper interpretation of ‘Title 14 C.F.R.,
Section 91.67.
4. A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS NOT TO
BE GRANTED TO GIVE THE DEFEATED
PARTY ANOTHER HEARING ON THE FACTS.
Even if the writ of certiorari were granted in this matter,
Petitioners would gain no benefit unless this Court were
willing to review the evidence, the findings of fact and
the conclusions of law made by the District Court as to
23
Mr. Bibier’s contributory negligence. “Uhis Court has in-
dicated that a writ of certiorari will not be granted for that
purpose.
In Boehmer v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 252
U.S. 496, 40 S. Ct. 409, 64 L. Ed. 680 (1920), certiorari
granted, 248 U.S. 554, 39S. Ct. 10, 63 L. Ed. 419, affirming,
252 F. 553 (2d Cir. 1918), this Court held at page 4938,
40 S. Ct. at 409, 64 L. Ed. at 684:
. We accept the concurrent judgment of the lower
courts that the carrier was not negligent in failing to
give warning concerning the use of cars with hand-
holds only at two diagonal corners. Whether this con-
stituted negligence depended upon an appreciation of
the peculiar facts presented, and the rule is well settled
that in such circumstances where two courts have
agreed we will not enter upon a minute analysis of
the evidence. Chicago Junction Ry. Co. v. King, 222
U.S. 222.”
Then in Magnum Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 43 S. Ct. 531,
67 L. Ed. 922 (1923), this Court stated at page 163, 43
S. Ct. at 532, 67 L. Ed. at 924:
“The jurisdiction to bring up cases by certiorari from
the Circuit Courts of Appeal was given for two pur-
poses, first to secure uniformity of decision between
those courts in the nine circuits, and second, to bring
up cases involving questions of importance which it is
in the public interest to have decided by this Court
of last resort. The jurisdiction was not conferred
upon this Court merely to give the defeated party in
the Circuit Court of Appeals another hearing. Our
experience shows that cighty per cent of those who
petition for certiorari do not appreciate these limita-
tions upon our issue of the writ.”
These Respondents respectfully submit that the primary
purpose for which Petitioners seek a writ of certiorari in
of
this matter is to obtain another opportunity to argue the
facts and the law as they relate to Mr. Bibler’s contributory
negligence. This Court has already indicated by the above
cited cases that the writ of certiorari is not available for
that purpose. Therefore, Petitioners’ petition should be
denied.
CONCLUSION
These Respondents respectfully submit that the decision
of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals does not conflict with
any decision of any other Court of Appeals on any point
of law, that said Court's interpretation of ‘Vitle 14 C.F.R.,
Section 91.87, is correct and does not create any problems
for safe operation of air travel and that a writ of certiorari
is not to be granted for the purpose of giving the defeated
party another hearing.
Wherefore. these Respondents pray that the petition for
a writ of certiorari to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. DAY
COLLIS GUNDY LANE
150 East Broad Street
Columbus, Ohio 43215
Phone: 614/228-6885
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