Respondents Brief — Bibler v. Young

Supreme Court brief1974

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OCTOBER TERM, 1974

No. 74-17

ANN E. BIBLER, ADMX. OF THE ESTATE OF

RALPH BIBLER, DECEASED, ET AL.,

- Petitioners, .

vs.

BERRY H. YOUNG, JR., ET AL.,

and

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and

THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

BERRY H. YOUNG, JR., ET AL,

IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

DAVID L. DAY

and

COLLIS GUNDY LANE

LANE, ALTON & HORST

150 East Broad Street

Columbus, Ohio 43215

Counsel for Respondents

Berry H. Young, Jr.,

The Ohio Aviation Company and

Ohio Aviation Distributors, Inc.

INDEX

ADDITIONAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

OBJECTIONS TO GRANTING A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

The decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals does not conflict with the decisions

of other Courts of Appeals

The interpretation of Title 14 C.F.R., Sec-

tion 91.87, adopted by the Court below is

correct and does not create any problems for

safe operation of air travel

The decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals does not conflict with decisions of

other Courts of Appeals as to the proper

interpretation and application of Title 14

C.F.R., Section 91.67

A Writ of Certiorari is not to be granted to

give the defeated party another hearing on

the facts

SE UP oes ewiwas sc acacey se

~

Is

CITATIONS

Cases:

Boehmer v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 252

U.S. 496 (1920), certiorari granted, 248 US.

554, affirming, 252 F. 553 (2d Cir. 1918)

Chambers v. McFerren, 168 Ohio St. 398, 155 N.E.

2d 917 (1959)

Chicago Junction Ry. Co. v. King, 222 U.S. 222

Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F. 2d 62

(D.C. Cir. 1955) aff'd. subnom

George v. American Airlines, Inc., 295 F. 2d 311

(7th Cir. 1961)

Gilly. United States, 429 F. 2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1970)

Hartz vy. United States, 387 F. 2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968)

Hood v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Rd. Co.,

166 Ohio St. 529, 144 N.E. 2d 104 (1957)

Indian Towing Company, Inc. v. United States, 350

US. 61 (1955)

Ingham v. United States, 373 F. 2d 227 (2d Cir.

1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967)

Magnum Ce. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159 (1923)

New York Airways, Inc. vy. United States, 283 F. 2d

496 (2d Cir. 1960)

Ricks v. Jackson, 169 Ohio St. 254, 159 N.E. 2d

225 (1959)

Spaulding v. United States, 455 F. 2d 222 (9th Cir.

1972)

Stanley v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 973, 975

(N.D. Ohio E.D. 1965)

. 21-22

. oo

20

st)

‘Page

Swoboda v. Brown, 129 Ohio St. 512, 196 N.E. 274

(1935) ; 21

United Air Lines, Inc. vy. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 379

“piccolo rn ae 12

United States v. Furumizo, 381 F. 29d 965 (9th Cir.

1967) ate,

United States v. Miller, 30% F. 2d 703 (9th Cir.

1962) aoa Oe

United States vy. Union Trust Co., 350 US. 907

(1955) ee:

Statutes:

14 C.F-R., Section 60.14 . 19

14 C.F.R., S ~ion 91.67 (ec) and (f) . 6-7, 18, 19, 22

14 C.F.R., Sec. om 91.75 . 1, 20

14 C.F.R., Section 91.87 (b) 15, 16, 17, 22, 24

28 U.S.C., Section 1332 4

28 U.S.C., Section 1346 (b) ; 2, 3

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ANN E. BIBLER, ADMX. OF THE ESTATE OF

KALPH BIBLER, DECEASED, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

vs.

BERRY H. YOUNG, JR., ET AL.,

and

IHE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and

THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

BERRY H. YOUNG, JR., ET AL.,

IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ae

ADDITIONAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

litle 14 C.F.R., Section 91.75 Compliance with ATC clear-

ances and instructions.

(a) When an ATC clearance has been obtained, no

pilot in command may deviate from that clearance. except

2

in an emergency, unless he obtains an amended clearance.

However, except in positive controlled airspace, this para-

graph does not prohibit him from cancelling an IFR flight

plan if he is operating in VFR weather conditions.

(b) Except in an emergency, no person may, in an area

in which air traffic control is exercised, operate an aircraft

contrary to an ATC instruction.

(c) Each pilot in command who deviates, in an emer-

gency, from an ATC clearance or instruction shall notify

ATC of that deviation as soon as possible.

(d) Each pilot in command who (though not deviating

from a rule of this subpart) is given priority by ATC in

wn emergency, shall, if requested by ATC, submit a detailed

report of that emergency within 48 hours to the chief of

that ATC facility.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter involves four (4) separate claims. ‘The

first is a wrongful death claim asserted in the case of

Ann E. Bibler, as Administratrix of the Estate of Ralph

D. Bihler vy. Berry H. Young, Jr., Ohio Aviation Company,

Ohio Aviation Distributors, Inc., The United States of

America and The Federal Aviation Administration, Case

No. 70-56, in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. Jurisdiction

in that case is based on diversity of citizenship, Title 28

U.S.C., Section 1332, and The Federal Tort Claims Act.

Tithe 28 U.S.C., Section 1346 (b). Cross-claims were made

by the United States of America against the three co-

defendants in that case.

The second claim is for property damage to a Piper

Cherokee airplane of which the decedent, Ralph D. Bibler,

was pilot-in-command and which airplane was owned by

Donald L. Sundin d/b/a Sundin Aviation Company. That

claim is the subject of the case of Donald L. Sundin d/b/a

3

Sundin Aviation Company y. United States of America

and the Federal Aviation Administration, Case No. 70-82,

in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-

trict of Ohio, Eastern Division. Jurisdiction in that case

is based on The Federal Tort Claims Act, Title 28 U.S.C..

Section 1346(b). Third-party claims were made by the

United States of America against Berry H. Young, Jr.,

The Ohio Aviation Company and Ohio Aviation Distribu-

tors, Inc. in that case.

The third claim is for the same property damage to

the Piper Cherokee airplane and was originally asserted

in the case of Donald L. Sundin d/b/a Sundin Aviation

Company v. Ohio Aviation Company, Ohio Aviation Dis-

tributors, Inc. and Berry H. Young, Jr., Case No. 23991,

in the Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County, Ohio.

Ohio Aviation Distributors, Inc. was the owner of the

Beechcraft Bonanza 18N, and it counterclaimed against

said Donald L. Sundin in that case for damage to the

Beechcraft Bonanza. This is the fourth claim which is

a subject of this matter. There was no diversity of citizen-

ship or other basis for federal court jurisdiction of the

subject matter in that case.

The above Cases Nos. 70-56 and 70-82 were consolidated

for trial to the Court. The claims asserted in the Com-

mon Pleas Court were submitted to the District Court

on the Common Pleas Court pleadings by stipulation of

the parties for trial along with Cases Nos. 70 56 and 70-82.

Decedent Ralph D. Bibler was an employee of Donald

L. Sundin d/b/a Sundin Aviation Company. Berry H.

Young, Jr. was an employee of The Ohio Aviation Com-

pany but was neither an employee nor an agent of Ohio

Aviation Distributors, Inc.

The accident out of which these four (4) claims arose

occurred on April 10, 1968, at Port Columbus Interna-

, —e

“

tional Airport (hereafter called Port Columbus) within

the airport traffic area (five (5) mile radius). Port Colum-

bus had an F.A.A. air traffic control facility which provided

aircraft approach control services and tower services (local

and ground). The approach control radio frequency in

use was 119.0Hz. The tower local control radio frequency

in use was 120.5Hz. At the time of the accideat, the

weather conditions were such as to make the F.A.A. visual

flight rules applicable.

Prior to and at the time of the accident, decedent Ralph

Bibler was giving a student instrument flight instructions

in Cherokee 39] on the approach course to Port Columbus

Runway 28 Left. That runway lay in an easterly-westerly

direction. ‘The approach to Runway 28 Left was from

east to west. On the first simulated instrument approach.

Cherokee 39] was given compass directions by approach

control to guide it in alignment with the approach to

Runway 28 Left. Prior to the time Cherokee 39J passed

the outer marker (the point at which descent was to com-

mence), approach control told Cherokee 39J to contact

the tower at the outer marker. Cherokee 39] followed

those instructions and received clearance to continue his

descent towards Runway 28 Left. That first simulated

approach was terminated by Cherokee 39J just short of

the runway when the airplane began climbing to a higher

altitude and executing a right turn (missed approach) .

Cherokee 39J then re-contacted approach control as he

had previously been instructed to do. At the time of

the accident, Cherokee 39] was attempting a second sim-

ulated instrument approach. At no time did Cherokee

39] intend to land on Runway 28 Left.

At approximately 3:04 P.M., approach control informed

Cherokee 39] that he was on the localizer (radio direction-

al beam on approach course) a mile from the outer marker

4

5

and that he was spaced in reference to a Lake Central

Nord located about three (3) miles north of the airport.

The Nord would be landing on Runway 28 Left. Cher-

okee 39] acknowledged the approach control transmission.

However, approach control did not instruct Cherokee 39]

to contact the tower on frequency 120.5Hz at the outer

marker as approach control had done on the first simulated

approach. From that time (a mile from the outer marker)

until the time of the mid-air collision well inside the

outer marker and the five (5) mile airport traffic area,

Cherokee 39] made no transmission to either approach

control or to the tower local controller until the approx-

imate time of the collision. Neither did the approach

controller make any transmissions to Cherokee 39]. The

tower local controller could not. transmit to Cherokee

39J because at no time on the second approach did Chero-

kee 39] switch to the tower local controller's frequency.

At approximately 3:04 P.M., Mr. Young, piloting Bonan-

za 18N. called the tower local controller on frequency

120.5Hz and reported his position as two (2) miles south

of the outer marker (Charlie Mike). The tower local

controller instructed Bonanza I8N to plan Runway 28

Left as No. 2 aircraft, the aircraft following the Nord,

which was No. |. The only warning received concerning

any other traffic was that Bonanza I8N should watch for

traffic coming up on the outer marker making an instru-

ment landing system (ILS) low approach. Low approach

means without landing. After other transinissions, the

tower local controller asked Bonanza 18N if he had sighted

the Nord. After first responding “negative”. Bonanza

I8N reported identification of the Nord. A short while

later the tower local controller told Bonanza I8N_ that

he (the local controller) had the Bonanza in sight and

stated, “You're cleared to land 28 Left.” Bonanza 18N

—_

»

:

6

acknowledged receiving this transmission. After being

alerted to the fact that the two (2) airplanes were in

close proximity on the approach to Runway 28 Left, the

tower local controller attempted to call Cherokee 39]

then attempted to call Bonanza 18N. The transmission

to Bonanza 18N occurred a slight instant after the collision.

It appears that Cherokee 39] was below and in front of

Bonanza 18N and could not be seen by Mr. Young. Chero-

kee 39J crashed and Mr. Bibler and the student were

killed. Mr. Young safely executed a forced landing of

Bonanza 18N in a nearby field (A. 4-12).

After trial to the Court, the District Court implied

that the approach controller was negligent in failing to

warn Bibler or the tower controller of the converging

paths of Cherokee 39J and Bonanza 18N (A. 28) and

in failing to advise Cherokee 39] to contact the tower

local controller at the outer marker (A. 30). However,

the District Court further found that Mr. Bibler was

contributorily negligent in failing to maintain two-way

communications with the control tower and in failing to

contact the tower once he passed the outer marker (A.

34). Negligence on the part of the approach controller

was assumed (A. 28). Mr. Young was found not negligent

(A. 34).

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District

Court's determination that Mr. Bibler was contributorily

negligent, doing so in part as a matter of law (A. 14)

and in part as a finding of fact supported by the weight of

the evidence (A. 15) and that such negligence was a proxi-

mate cause of the collision (A. 17-18). ‘The Sixth Circuit

Court of Appeals also assumed that the approach controller

was negligent (A. 18) and determined that Mr. Young

(Bonanza 18N) had the right of way under Title 14

7

C.F.R., Section 91.67 (f). By virtue of Mr. Bibler’s con-

tributory negligence, all plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed

as required by Ohio law (A. 15, 17-18).

OBJECTIONS TO GRANTING

A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

1. THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT CONFLICT

WITH THE DECISION OF OTHER COURTS OF

APPEALS.

The District Court, in its opinion, made the following

statements concerning the approach controller:

“While it may be asserted that an agency of the defen-

dant United States was also negligent in failing to

instruct 39 Julict to contact the ‘Tower at the outer

marker, such negligence cannot obsclve the plaintiff.”

(A. 30)

- * *

“It is true that Approach Control was the only entity

that knew, at a time immediately prior to the accident,

of the relative positions of the two planes. Beginning

at 1503:47 it had precisely located 39 Juliet; at

1504:44 it had located 18 November. For a period

of between three and four minutes Approach Control

had the capability of noting that two planes were in

a collision course. Ironically, Bibler’s own contribu-

tory negligence in failing to contact Vower had the

effect of retaining him on Approach Control's fre-

quency. Approach Control could have instructed Bib-

ler to take evasive action or it could have advised

‘Tower to order Young to do the same.

Approach Control's failure to do this, however, does

not relieve Bibler from the effects of his contributory

negligence through the doctrine of last clear chance.

(A. 31-32)

, pay

. 4

8

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also recognized that

the approach controller at Pert Columbus had been negli-

gent by stating:

“He (the District Judge) also held that the approach

controller at the Port Columbus Airport was guilty

of negligence for failing to tell pilot Bibler to contact

local control. But he held that this negligence was

not the proximate cause of the accident.” (A.3)

The above quotations from the opinions of the District

Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals demonstrate

that both Courts judged the conduct of the approack. con-

troller by the same standard of care which has been ex-

plicitly stated in the cases cited by Petiticners. ‘he ap-

parent reason why the lower Courts did not further ex-

pound on that standard is the findings both as a matter

of fact and as a matter of law that Mr. Bibler was con-

tributorily negligent. This pivotal contributory negli-

gence issue also distinguishes this matter from most of the

cases cited by Petitioners and explains why there should

be no review of the judgments below. (A. 12, 15 and 33)

The case of Eastern Air Lines vy. Union Trust Co.,

221 F. 2d 62 (D. C. Cir. 1955). aff'd. subnom., United

States v. Union Trust Co., 350 US. 907 (1955). involved

a claim for the wrongful causing of the death of passengers

on an Eastern Airlines DC-4 who were killed as the result

of a collision between the DC-4 and a P-38 military air-

craft. There was no defense of contributory negligence

to the claim for the deaths of the passengers. The passen-

KETS WeTe passive participants in a tragic event. Both air-

craft had been cleared for the same runway at the same

time. The judgment against Eastern Airlines was reversed

and remanded for a new trial. The United States, how-

ever, was found negligent for the breach by the air traffic

qy

control personnel of their duty to warn each aircraft of

the other's presence. This duty is identical to that recog-

nized by the District Court and quoted above.

The case of Indian Towing Company, Inc. v. Urited

States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), states the same principle. This

Court held that the coast guard had the duty to us? due

care in operating a lighthouse, and, if the light became

extinguished, it had the duty to use due care to discover

that the light had been extinguished and to give a warning

of such to appropriate persons. Again, this is the same

standard recognized by the lower Courts as quoted above.

The case of Ingham vy. United States, 373 ¥. 2d 227 (2d

Cir. 1967) , cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967) , also involved

claims for the wrongful causing of the death and for in-

juries to passengers on a commercial airliner which crashed

at Idlewild International Airport. Suit was brought

against both Eastern Airlines aad the United States. Two

test cases were tried: one against Eastern Airlines and

one against the United States ‘The claim was that the

air traffic controllers had a duty to warn the pilots of the

airliner about a crucial change in weather conditions.

The trial court held that there was such a duty. The

Court of Appeals went further and specificially found that

such failure was a violation of the F.A.A.’s Air Traffic Con-

trol Procedure Manual which provided that the controller

should give advice as to weather conditions and subsequent

changes as necessary. Again there was no defense of con-

tributory negligence to the claims made in that case.

United States v. Furumizo, 381 F. 2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967),

involved a claim for the wrongful causing of the death of

a student pilot who died when the small plane in which

he was riding crashed after it had encountered wake tur-

bulence caused by the take-off of a large aircrait. The

Court of Appeals noted that the pilot in command had a

j 10

duty of avoiding the danger of wake turbulence and also

demonstrated that the instructor in command of the small

plane had been found negligent. The Court of Appeals

also affirmed the District Court's finding that the student

had not been negligent. Affirming the judgment against

the United States, the Court held that the controllers’ job

required that they act in the interest of safety and warn

a pilot whom they observe is taking off when it is apparent

to such controllers that the pilot will encounter a severe

hazard.

The case of Hartz y. United States, 387 F. 2d 870 (5th

Cir. 1968), involved claims for the wrongful causing of

the death of the pilot, Mr. Hartz, and the death of a

passenger, Mr. Roth, who were killed when their Beech-

craft Bonanza encountered wake turbulence created by

the take-off of a DC-7. One of the issues in the case was

the negligence of the pilot, Mr. Hartz. There was no

issue as to any negligence on the part of the passenger,

Mr. Roth. The District Court held that the controller

had no duty to do anything more than maintain separation

of aircraft to avoid a collision and that the negligence of

Mr. Hartz was the sole proximate cause of the crash. Such

holding prevented recovery by the passenger, Mr. Roth.

On review, the Court of Appeals held, at page 874 of the

opinion:

“We hold that the controller gave Hartz a warning

which was neither sufficient under the manual nor

adequate to caution Hartz of a possible danger which

was then known to the controller. The failure of

the controller to properly caution Hartz of the possible

danger of wing tip vortex imposed upon the con-

alee an additional duty to aes take-of clearance

for the Bonanza for such period as was reasonably

necessary to permit such turbulence from the DC.7

to dissipate. “Che controller's breach of duty clearly

was a proximate cause of the crash of the Bonanza... .”

Based on this holding, the Court of Appeals reversed and

remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with

the opinion. The net result was that recovery could be

had against the United States at least for the death of

the passenger, Mr. Roth.

The case of Spaulding vy. United States, 455 F. 2d 299

(9th Cir. 1972), involved claims for the wrongful death

of Dorman D. Michelmore (pilot) , John B. Michelmore

(passenger and son of pilot) and Jack E. Spaulding

(passenger). Neither of the passengers were pilots. A

judgment was rendered in the trial court against all plain-

tiffs. Only the claims on behalf of the estates of the de-

cedent passengers were appealed. The appellate court

stated the duty of the air traffic controller as follows at

page 226 of the opinion:

“The air traffic controller is required to give all infor-

mation and warnings specified in his manuals, and in

certain situations he must give warnings beyond the

manuals. ‘This duty to warn is based on the simple

tort principle that once the government has assumed

a function or service, it is liable for negligent per-

formance.

The controller's duty to warn does not, however,

relieve the pilot of his primary duty and responsibility.

Again, as in most of the above cases, there was no defense

of contributory negligence to the claims for the deaths of

the passengers.

The case of Gill v. United States, 429 F. 2d 1072 (5th

Cir. 1970), also involved a claim for the wrongful death

of two passengers. Claims for the death of those passengers

-_—

i2

had previously been made against the estate of the decedent

pilot and were settled. Suit was brought against the

United States. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District

Court's finding that the radar approach controlier was

negligent in furnishing “in-flight weather information

which wes inexact, incomplete and in all reasonable proba-

bility misleading.” “Nhe Court remanded the case solely

for determination as to whether, as an issue of fact, the

pilot had been negligent, because, if so, under the law

of Texas, the United States was entitled to a reduction

of the judgment against it by one-half. In that case con-

‘ributory negligence of the pilot was a significant factor

cven though the air v athe controllers had a duty to warn

tie pilot.

Finally, the case of (/nited Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335

F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), involved claims for the wrongful

causing of the deaths of passengers of a commercial airliner

resulting from a collision between the airliner and an Air

Force jet fighter. “vere was no contributory negligence

defense to the claims for the deaths of the passengers.

‘The Court of Appeals held at pages 397-98 of the opin-

ion:

“A warning to others of dangerous tying activity being

conducted by the government would have been a pre-

caution dictated by the exercise of ordinary care. We

therefore affirm the District Court's holding that it

was negligence at the operational level of the govern-

ment to fail to inform United of the details of the

government’s hazardous activity involved in the

KRAM procedure prior io authorizing Flight 736 to

travel into the area where such activity was likely to

be encountered. . . .~

‘These Respondents respectfully submit that the opin-

ions of both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit Court

13

of Appeals in this matter show that those Courts did apply

the standard of care explicitly set forth in the cases re-

viewed above. What occurred in the District Court and

the Court of Appeals in this matter is almost-identicai to

what occurred in the District Court in United States v.

Furumizo, 381 F. 2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967). In that case

Baker Aircraft Sales, Inc. (Baker) was one of the appel-

lants. Baker argued that the District Court made no find-

ing that its pilot-employce, the instructor in the airplane,

was negligent. The Court of Appeals agreed that there

was no direct finding that Shima (the employee) was

negligent. However, the Court of Appeals made the fol-

lowing comments and reached the following conclusion

at page 969 of the opinion:

“The trial judge thought that he had made such a

finding. as is indicated by a colloquy between court

and counsel on motion tor a new trial. In that the

court was mistaken, and such a situation would nor-

mally require a remand for further indings on the

issuc. Here, however, it is apparent trom the record

that the court intended to make the finding: pre-

sumably it would do so on remand. We think that

such a remand is unnecessary here. All that Baker

secks, in relation to the first theory, is an opportunity

to convince the trial judge that Shima was in fact

fully informed about the danger of wake turbulence,

thus showing that Baker was not negligent in employ-

ing him as an instructor. But if Baker succeeded in

proving that. it would bring itself within the second

theory, the one on which the case was tried. As the

trial court said (paragraph 38) :

‘Had Shima been an adequately trained pilot. and

had he been adequately instructed and made fully

aware of the dangers of large plane wake turbu-

lence to small planes, the Court cannot believe

that he would have taken off at the time and

14

under the circumstances he did, the evidence in-

dicating that he was a careful and prudent person,

not one given to taking undue chances. A well-

trained pilot, adequately schooled in the actual

dangers to planes of the size of this Piper of

turbulence created by planes of the size of the

DC-8, would have done what the pilots of the

C-47 did — wait until a reasonable time had

elapsed to allow the most violent aspects of the

turbulence to dissipate before taking off, * * *’.

‘To have done anything else would certainly have been

negligent. In substance, then, the trial court's find-

ings do embody the second theory. Remand for a

more specific finding would be a triumph of form over

substance.”

Likewise, the lower Courts in this matter did not make

a specific finding that the duty to warn was breached by

the approach controller. It is apparent, however, that

both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals considered the approach controller negligent in

failing to follow the procedure set forth in the controller's

manual and in failing to give appropriate warnings of the

impending collision of which the approach controller was

the only one in a position to know all the facts. Therefore,

these Respondents respectfully submit that the decision

of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals does not conflict

with the decisions of other Courts of Appeals as to the

standard of care required of government air traffic con-

trollers.

15

2. THE INTERPRETATION OF TITLE 14

C.F.R., SECTION 91.87, ADOPTED BY THE

COURT BELOW IS CORRECT AND DOES NOT

CREATE ANY PROBLEMS FOR SAFE OPER-

ATION OF AIR TRAVEL.

These Respondents respectfully submit that the inter-

pretation given by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to

the term “control tower” as used in Title 14 C.F.R., Sec-

tion 91.87 (b), is correct and in accordance with the gen-

eral usage and understanding of that term by both the

Federal Aviation Administracion and experienced pilots

through the useage of that term in the regulations and

the Airman’s Information Manual.

Title 14 C.F.R.. Section 91.87 (b), provides:

“No person may, within an airport traffic area, oper-

ate an aircraft to, from, or on an airport having a

control tower operated by the United States unless

two-way radio communications are maintained be-

tween that aircraft and the control tower.” (Emphasis

added.)

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 51, Airman’s Information Manual, p.

l-1, (R. 4), gives the following definition:

“AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SERVICE (CON.

TROL) — A service provided for the purpose of pro-

moting the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air

trafic, including airport, approach, and enroute ai

traffic control service.” (Emphasis added.)

Finally, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 51, Airman’s Information Man-

ual, p. 1-84, (R. 4), provides:

“LANDING — TOWER-CONTROLLED AIR-

PORTS — 1. When operating te an airport where

traffic control is being exercised by a control tower.

lb

pilots are required to maintain two-way radio contact

with the tower while operating within the airport

trathe area unless the tower authorized otherwise. In

itl call-up should be made about 13 miles trom the

airport. (sce “Decrease Frequency Congestion’ under

GOOD OPERATING PRACTICES)

2. When necessary, the tower controller will issue

clearances or other information for aircratt to general:

lv follow the desired Hight path (trathic patterns) when

ving in the airport traffic area/control zone, and the

proper taxi routes when operating on the ground... .”

(Emphasis added.)

The Airman’s Information Manual defines the term “Air

Trathe Control Service” (ATC) as including three tunc-

tions: airport traffic control service, approach traflic con-

trol service and enroute traflic control service. Further.

in reference to Section 91.87 (b) , the Airman’'s Information

Manual specifically interprets the term “control tower”

as being the “tower controller”. Consequently, the infor-

mation available to all pilots and the knowledge with

which pilots are charged clearly supports the Sixth Circuit

Court of Appeals’ determination that the term “control

tower” meant the “local controller”. See Stanley v. United

States, 239 F. Supp. 073. 975 (N.D. Ohio E.D. 1965).

In addition, these Respondents submit that simply hav-

ing one’s radio tuned to a particular frequency is not

“radio communications” within the tacaning of Title 14

C.F.R.. Section 91.87 (b). Petitioners repeatedly argue

that Mr. Bibler, by having his radio tuned to the approach

control frequency, was in “contact” with the “control tow-

er’. Section 91.87 (b) docs not simply require “contact”.

It requires “communications”. ‘The findings of fact of the

District Court as quoted in the Sixth Circuit of Appeals’

opinion clearly demonstrate that Mr. Bibler did not main-

-

li

tain “Communications. According to those tacts, a period

of approximately four Cl) munutes passed during which

Mr. Bibler spoke to no one. The District Court found:

TAM TS0G 1 oo Juliet was noted by approach control

as ‘on the localizer a amile trom the marker.” CAL 8.

a

* * *

“AL D507 45, SO Juliet knew he was inside the outer

marker since he advised approach control “a beam of

Wosters Blecrric. No conversation at any time im

this approach was had with local control.” CA. Te and

YN)

Anvone can sit by a silent radio and in a very technical

sense be in contact with the party at the other end. Such

Silent contact, however, should not be considered “com-

municauion in a circumstance where the very purpose

of the radio contact is for the communication of informa-

tion designed to protect all the parties concerned.

Respondents respecttully submit that the lower Courts

have properly interpreted Tithe 1 C.F.R., Section 91.87

(bh). as it existed at the time of the accident and that

the findings of fact, which petitioners do not dispute, show

a clear violation of that regulation. “Therefore, the de-

cision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals does not

create any problems which will affect the safe operation

of air travel.

18

3. THE DECISION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT CONFLICT

WITH DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF

APPEALS AS TO THE PROPER INTERPRETA-

TION AND APPLICATION OF TITLE 14 C.F.R.,

SECTION 91.67.

The facts recited by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

and which are relevant to this objection are as follows:

“At the time and place concerned Young had a clear-

ance to land and was proceeding according to it. Bib-

ler did not have a clearance to land: he had only a

clearance to approach.” (A. 18)

“At 1503:47 he (Bibler) was advised that he was

on the localizer one mile from the outer marker and

spaced in reference to a Lake Central Nord three

miles north of the airport. “The term ‘spaced in ref-

erence to Lake Central Nord’ is not a clearance to

land nor is it a landing sequence.” (A. 11)

Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 51, Airman’s Information Manual, p.

l-1, (R. 4) provides:

“Approach Sequence — the order in which aircraft

are positioned while awaiting approach clearance or

while on approach.”

There is no dispute as to the fact that Cherokee 39] (Bib-

ler) never did intend to land.on Runway 28 Left. At

no time was he on “final approach to land” or “landing”.

He was only sequenced behind the Nord (A. 11).

It appears that Petitioners completely missed the basis

upon which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded

that Mr. Young had the right of way over Mr. Bibler.

Paragraphs (e) and (f) of Title 14 C.F.R., Section 91.67,

contain three sentences (A. 1). Each of those sentences

19

apply to different situations. Paragraph (ec) is very gen-

cral providing that an aircraft which is being overtaken

has the right of way and that the overtaking aircraft shall

alter course to the right. By its very nature, this provision

indicates that it applics to enroute flight. It would not

be logical to suggest that the second of two aircraft ap-

proaching the same runway should pass to the right. It

would be more logical to provide for some other maneuver.

‘The first sentence of paragraph (f) specifically gives the

right of way to an aircraft “on final approach to land”

or “landing” (A. 1). ‘The second sentence of paragraph

(f) specifically provides for the situation where two (2)

or more aircraft are approaching an airport for the “pur-

pose of landing’. If Mr. Bibler, who had no intention

of landing at any time, is to be treated, as Petitioners

infer, as if he were on tinal approach to land, then there

is no reason for the distinction provided in the two sen-

tences contained in Title 14 C.F.R., Section 91.67 (f).

‘Thus it is apparent that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

based its decision that Mr. Young had the right of way

on the specific and clear provisions of the first: sentence

of paragraph (f) rather than the note to Title 14 CF.R.,

Section 60.14, as Petitioners claim. Further, the cases,

cited by Petitioners are distinguishable on the facts.

In United States v. Miller, 303 F. 2d 703 (9th Cir.

1962), Miller, who was piloting a Beechcraft had been

cleared by radio to enter the traffic pattern but had not

received a clearance for landing. ‘The other aircraft, a

Cessna, was doing touch and go landings. The Cessna

Was receiving instructions by means of light signals flashed

with a light from the tower. At the time of the collision,

it appears neither aircraft had been cleared. Consequently,

the Court applied the general right of way regulation con-

tained in paragraph (ce) of Title 14 C.F.R., Section 91.67.

10)

In New dork Airways, Inc. v. United States, 283 F. 2d

496 (2d Cir. 1960), the aircralt involved was a helicopter

which could sately stop its movement (hover) and make

any maneuver desirable in order for the pilot to be assured

that the spot on which he intended to land was free of

surface vehicles. No right of way regulation was involved

in that case. “.

In George v. American Airlines, Inc., 295 F. 2d 311 (7th

Cir. 1961), the two (2) aircraft were converging at ap-

proximately forty-five (45) degrees. ‘The pilot of the de-

fendant’s aircraft did not see the other military aircratt

until it was about “five seconds” away. In taking evasive

action to avoid a collision, the pilot put the defendant's air-

liner into a dive resulting in injury to the plainull. The

Court determined that the defendant was negligent because

of the pilot's failure to maintain a proper lookout. “Vhere

is no question of right of way nor is there any indication

that, had the United States been sued, the crew of the

military aircraft would not have been found negligent also.

Petitioners also argue that Mr. Young had an obligation

to see Mr. Bibler’s airplane. Respondents respecttully

submit that Mr. Bibler also had an obligation to see Mr.

Young's airplane. The facts as recited by the District

Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals show that

for a substantial period prior to the collision, the two (2)

aircralt were converging from a spread of tvo (2) miles

separation north to south at the approximate point of the

outer marker to the point of the collision a slight distance

short of the runway (A. 9-10).

Having been cleared to land, Mr. Young was obligated

by Title 14 C.F.R., Section 91.75, to proceed directly to

the runway and land. In fact, he was prohibited from

doing otherwise. ‘The significance of a clearance to land

is explained in Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221

2%

F. 2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), at page 65, in tootmote 3, as

follows:

“Phe Administrator of Civil Aeronautics was called

by the court as a witness on the meaning of the phrase

‘cleared to land.’ He testified that when a plane in

the trafic pattern of an airport is ‘cleared to land,’

the pilot of the plane is thereby authorized to com-

mence his landing approach operation immediately:

in other words. when a pilot receives that clearance.

wherever he may be in the traffic pattern, there is

no plane ahead of him and he may make his turn at

his discretion and consistently with the sale manage-

ment of his plane, and may come in and land at once

on the runway which has been designated by the

tower. “Phat this is the only meaning of the phrase

‘cleared to land’ was the unanimous testimony of all

the certified air traffic controllers who testified on the

subject. “The trial judge instructed the jury as a mat-

ter of law that such was the meaning of the phrase

‘cleared to land’.”’

Having received a clearance and in view of the obligation

Mr. Bibler had to maintain communications with the con-

trol tower, Mr. Young had the right to assume that the

aircraft “coming up on the marker.” would contact the

control tower and not be negligent. ‘This conclusion is

based on the rule set forth in Swoboda v. Brown, 129 Ohio

SM. 512, 196 N.E. 274 (1985). in the eighth paragraph of

the syllabus as follows:

“One may rightlully assume the observance of the law

and the exercise of ordinary care by others, and action

by him in accordance with such assumption ino the

absence of notice or knowledge to the contrary is not

negligence.”

See als» Hood vy. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Rd. Co.,

166 Ohio St. 529, 144 N.E. 2d 104 (1957): Chambers vy.

22

McFerren, 168 Ohio St. 398, 155 N.E. 2d 917 (1959) ;

Ricks v. jackson, 169 Ohio St. 254, 159 N.E. 2d 225

(1959) .

By virtue of Title 14 C.F.R.. Section 91.87 (b), both

Mr. Bibler and Mr. Young were required to maintain com-

munications with the control tower when within the airport

trafhc area. Mr. Young, even though being told of an

aircraft coming up on the marker, had a right to assume

that Mr. Bibler would establish and maintain communica-

tions with the control tower. Had Mr. Bibler done so,

Mr. Young would have heard the transmissions to and

from Cherokee 39J and could have done something to

avoid the collision. Mr. Young had no knowledge of the

entrance of Cherokee 39] into the airport traffic area which

would have permitted Mr. Young to take action to avoid

the collision. Consequently, Mr. Young was not negligent

for his failure to see Cherokee 39].

Respondents respectfully submit that the F.A.A. regu-

lations and the law of Ohio were correctly applied by the

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and that there is no conflict

between that decision and decisions of other Courts of

Appeals as to the proper interpretation of ‘Title 14 C.F.R.,

Section 91.67.

4. A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS NOT TO

BE GRANTED TO GIVE THE DEFEATED

PARTY ANOTHER HEARING ON THE FACTS.

Even if the writ of certiorari were granted in this matter,

Petitioners would gain no benefit unless this Court were

willing to review the evidence, the findings of fact and

the conclusions of law made by the District Court as to

23

Mr. Bibier’s contributory negligence. “Uhis Court has in-

dicated that a writ of certiorari will not be granted for that

purpose.

In Boehmer v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 252

U.S. 496, 40 S. Ct. 409, 64 L. Ed. 680 (1920), certiorari

granted, 248 U.S. 554, 39S. Ct. 10, 63 L. Ed. 419, affirming,

252 F. 553 (2d Cir. 1918), this Court held at page 4938,

40 S. Ct. at 409, 64 L. Ed. at 684:

. We accept the concurrent judgment of the lower

courts that the carrier was not negligent in failing to

give warning concerning the use of cars with hand-

holds only at two diagonal corners. Whether this con-

stituted negligence depended upon an appreciation of

the peculiar facts presented, and the rule is well settled

that in such circumstances where two courts have

agreed we will not enter upon a minute analysis of

the evidence. Chicago Junction Ry. Co. v. King, 222

U.S. 222.”

Then in Magnum Co. v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 43 S. Ct. 531,

67 L. Ed. 922 (1923), this Court stated at page 163, 43

S. Ct. at 532, 67 L. Ed. at 924:

“The jurisdiction to bring up cases by certiorari from

the Circuit Courts of Appeal was given for two pur-

poses, first to secure uniformity of decision between

those courts in the nine circuits, and second, to bring

up cases involving questions of importance which it is

in the public interest to have decided by this Court

of last resort. The jurisdiction was not conferred

upon this Court merely to give the defeated party in

the Circuit Court of Appeals another hearing. Our

experience shows that cighty per cent of those who

petition for certiorari do not appreciate these limita-

tions upon our issue of the writ.”

These Respondents respectfully submit that the primary

purpose for which Petitioners seek a writ of certiorari in

of

this matter is to obtain another opportunity to argue the

facts and the law as they relate to Mr. Bibler’s contributory

negligence. This Court has already indicated by the above

cited cases that the writ of certiorari is not available for

that purpose. Therefore, Petitioners’ petition should be

denied.

CONCLUSION

These Respondents respectfully submit that the decision

of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals does not conflict with

any decision of any other Court of Appeals on any point

of law, that said Court's interpretation of ‘Vitle 14 C.F.R.,

Section 91.87, is correct and does not create any problems

for safe operation of air travel and that a writ of certiorari

is not to be granted for the purpose of giving the defeated

party another hearing.

Wherefore. these Respondents pray that the petition for

a writ of certiorari to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID L. DAY

COLLIS GUNDY LANE

150 East Broad Street

Columbus, Ohio 43215

Phone: 614/228-6885

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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