Appendix — Allied Pilots Ass'n v. Civil Aeronautics Board
Supreme Court brief1975
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xe 74-70 g
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL,
Petitioner,
v.
CIvIL AERONAUTICS BOARD,
Respondent,
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al.,
we #Y-710
Alk LINE DISPATCHERS’ ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
CIvIL AERONAUTICS BOARD,
Respondent,
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al.,
Intervenors.
APPENDIX TO PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
———————
ConHEN, Weiss AND SIMON
605 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10016
O'’Donocuvue & O'DONOGHUE _
1912 Sunderland Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Attorneys for Petitioner
Air Line Pilots Association,
International
Hicusaw & MAHONEY
1015 Eighteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Attorneys for Petitioners
6 1974
11 Dm ATRIA SOT ARNO POR
:
INDEX ;
4
Sei E
PAGE Fi
Opinion of the Court of Appeals ............ iv j
Six-Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, j
Order E-13899, 29 CAB 168 (1959) é
Opinion of the Board ................. 6a 3
#s
Opinion of Member Minetti, Dissenting .. 16a E
Six-Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, é
Supplemental Opinion and Order on Recon-
sideration, Order E-14563, 30 CAB 90 (1959)
ee 35a
Opinion of Member Minetti Dissenting .. 38a
Order Instituting Investigation,
Order E-15413, 31 CAB 977 (1960) ...... 4la
Mutual Aid Pact Investigation, #
Order E-21044, 40 CAB 559 (1964)
Opinion of the Board .................. 44a
Opinion of Vice Chairman Murphy, Con-
curring and Dissenting .............. 49a
Opinion of Member Minetti, Dissenting .. 49a
Initial Decision of Examiner S. Thomas
NS le MS Cia Ga ga ps 844 bow 2-6 53a
Mutual Aid Pact of 1958 ............... 53a
Mutual Aid Pact as Amended through De-
NE Es das 6 ack dae we ec dances 122a
Mutual Aid Pact Incorporating Supple-
mental Payments Amendment, dated De-
CO ly BE 6k oe ba ects eaaaeces 123a
ii
PAGE
F. Mutual Aid Agreement Between American and
Mohawk Airlines,
Order E-24213,—CAB 209 (1966)
Opinion of the Board ................. 130a
Opinion of Member Gillilland, Dissenting . 132a
G. Airlines Mutual Aid Agreement (Rerewal),
Order Instituting Investigation, Order E-
26000, November 17, 1967 .............. 134a
H. Airlines Mutual Aid Agreement (Renewal),
Order Denying Leave to Intervene and Defer-
ring Kequest to Remand, Order 70-1-100,
Sammary BO, TOTO ous cen ccscesssscccenss 138a
I. Airlines Mutual Aid Pact,
Order 70-7-114 (July 28, 1970)
Opinion of the Board .................. 148a
Opinion of Chairman Browne, Concurring 158a
Opinion of Members Minetti and Murphy,
RII nao s.c cas nsawsdcassnseees 159a
Ynitial Decision of Examiner Arthur S.
PU: CUD 444460 xe canevacdoens 162a
J. Airlines Mutual Aid Pact—Order Granting in
Part Petition for Reconsideration and Remand-
ing for Further Hearing,
Order 70-11-110 (November 23, 1970) .... 22la
K. Airlines Mutual Aid Agreement,
Order 73-2-110 (February 27, 1973)
Opinion of the Board .................. 226a
iii
PAGE
Opinion of Members Minetti and Murphy,
Concurring and Dissenting ........... 255a
Initial Decision of Examiner Arthur S.
Present (1972) ..... Pe ey ey ee ee 27la
Mutual Aid Pact of October 31, 1969 .... 314a
Mutual Aid Pact Amendment of December
a eee _ EERE ears 322a
L. Pertinent Sections of:
Railway Labor Act, as Amended, 45 U.S.C.
§ 152, First, Seventh, Ninth
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as Amended,
49 U.S.C. § 1302, § 1871, $ 1882, § 1384
Sherman Act, Sec. 1, 15 U.S.C. $1
Clayton Act, Sec. 6, 15 U.S.C. $17 ...... 33la
APPENDIX A
Decision of United States Court of Appeals
502 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir., August 8, 1974)
A hon etn tel bY
ae a
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 73-1214
AR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL,
PETITIONER
v.
CIvIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, RESPONDENT
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., ET AL
ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION & AIRCRAFT
MECHANICS FRATERNAL ASSOCIATION
FRONTIER AIRLINES, INC.
HUGHES AIR CORPORATION d/b/a HUGHES AIRWEST
NORTH CENTRAL AIRLINES, INC.
OZARK AIR LINES, INC.
PIEDMONT AVIATION, I}.
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES, INC.
. — Sin ss SNF HENRY IPT PR, CRT
ERNE EI PGE POAT LEO AE LUT EI ORT LEZEN NNT TN ELE I
IF A REIT IDD AE it LEB ELIT POR AL AV TOCA
Vv
No. 73-1229
Al LINE DISPATCHERS’ ASSOCIATION, ET AL,
PETITIONERS
Vv.
Civi. AERONAUTICS BOARD, RESPONDENT
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
BRANIFF AIRWAYS, INC.
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.
EASTERN AIR LINES, INC.
NATIONAL AIRLINES, INC.
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.
UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
WESTERN AIR LINES, INC.
ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION AND THE AIRCRAFT
MECHANICS FRATERNAL ASSOCIATION
FRONTIER AIRLINES, INC.
HuGnes AIR CORPORATION d/b,a HUGHES AIRWEST
NortTH CENTRAL AIRLINES, INC.
PIEDMONT AVIATION, INC.
“. TEXAS INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES, INC.
Petitions For Review of an Order of the
Civil Aeronautics Board
Decided August 8, 1974
Robert S. Savelson, of the bar of the Court of Ap-
peals of New York, pro hac vice, by special leave of
vi
court, with whom Donald J. Capuano was on the brief,
for petitioner in No. 73-1214. Patrick C. O’Donoghue
and Martin F. O’Donoghue, Jr., alse entered appearances
for petitioner in No. 78-1214.
William G. Mahoney, for petitioners in No. 73-1229.
Mariin C. Seham, of the bar of the Supreme Court of
the United States, pro hac vice, by special leave of court
for intervenor, Allied Piiots Association and Aircraft
Mechanies Benevolent Association. Richard Hibey and
James P. Davenport, entered appearances for intervenors
Allied Pilots Association and Aircraft Mechanics Benevo-
lent Association.
Glen M. Bendixsen, Attorney, Civil Aeronautics Board
for respondent. Richard Littell, General Counsel, Civil
Aeronautics Board, O. D. Ozment, Deputy General Coun-
sel, Robert L. Toomey, Acting Associate General Counsel,
Litigation and Research, Civil Aeronautics Board and
Robert B. Nicholson, Attorney, Department of Justice,
were on the brief, for respondent. R. Tenny Johnson,
General Counsel, Civil Aeronautics Board, at the time the
record was filed and Warren L. Sharfman, Associate
General Counsel, Civil Aeronautics Board, at the time
the record was filed, also entered appearances for re-
spondent. Howard E. Shapiro, Attorney, Department of
Justice also entered an appearance for respondent.
Charles A. Miller with whom Robert N. Saylor and
Eugene D. Guiland were on the brief, for i1.tervenors
trunkline carriers.
Raymond J. Rasenberger and James L. Devali were
on the brief for intervenors, Frontier Airlines. Inc., et al.
Before: BAZELON, Chief Judge and MACKINNON, Cir-
cuit Judge and CHRISTENSEN,” United Stotes
Semor District Judge for the District of Utah
* Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d).
Pin en
_ Co CRETE BIT OL LB Bate Se ee eee
OA IGS OA PPL LI III LL OOS CAS LP OVO Re J Lae Os ee a 2 were 2 “
vii
Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge BAZELON.
BAZELON, Chief Judge: Petitioners, who are various
groups of airline employees, challenge the CAB’s ap-
proval of the airlines’ Mutual Aid Pact, as amended.
They contend that the Pact, as approved, vielates the
national laber policy, the Railway Labor Act (RLA}
and the antitrust laws; and that there is no substantial
evidence to support the CAB'’s finding that the Pact is
not adverse to the public interest.
1.
Created in 1958 by six airlines, the Mutual Aid Pact
represented a joint effort to soften the impact of strikes
against individual companies. At its inception, the Pact
provided only for “windfall payments.” A strikebound
company received payments from other Pact members
equal to their inerease in revenues resulting from the
strike minus their added operating expenses in servicing
the new business. The Paci. was soon amended to pro-
vide for “supplemental payments.” This feature enabled
a carrier member to receive 25°. of its normal air trans-
port operating expenses for operations shut down by the
strike. A 1969 amendment to the Pact raised that figure
te 50°, during the first fourteen days of the strike.
dropping by stages to 35°) after a strike period of four
weeks or longer. The additional payments over windfall
to meet this allotment were to be contributed by each
member in the proportion which its air transport oper-
ating revenues bore to the total revenue for all members.
Individual earrier liability for supplemental payments
Was limited at first to one-half of one percent of the
carrier's intake for the prior year. That limitation was
upped in 1969 to one percent by agreement of the Pact
members.
Both the increase ip supplemental payments rates and
the higher ceiling on individual earrier liability were
Beer SDC a OU eg GT a
aad ee ee ee
AVANCE ON MI RR Ry SAIS LACM LEENA, LTO RR LOEEOE A AAD
viii
approved in the Board's 1973 order,’ which followed an
initial decision by the Administrative Law Judge refus-
ing to allow the escalations.: These elements of the
amended Pact are the primary focus of the unions’ at-
tack on the Board's action. Petitioners also contest the
CAB’s consent to a 1971 amendment to the Puct author-
izing the participation of local service carriers.
Il.
The Supreme Court has recognized the responsibility
of transportation agencies like the CAB to make deci-
sions consistent with national labor policy. Burlington
Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 173. This
responsibility was explicitly recognized in the Board's
opinion and is not a matter of dispute on appeal. What
is in dispute is the substance of national labor policy
relevant to this case.
The national labor policy rests on the principle that
parties should be free to marshall the economic resources
at their disposal in the resolution of a labor dispute,
consistent with the specific rights and prohibitions es-
tablished by the labor statutes. It is not generally given
to government agencies to “regulate what economic
weapons a party might summon to its aid.”* And this
principle, of course, underlies the RLA, which is made
applicable to air carriers by 45 U.S.C. §181 and by
section 401(k) (4) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
$1871(k) (4). That Act does establish certain proce-
dures that must be followed in the direct bargaining
‘CAR Order 73-2-110, Feb. 27, 1973, Joint App. 268a.
: Initial Decision of Examiner Arthur S. Present, Joint
App. 271a.
> NLRB v. Insurance Agents’ Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490
(1960).
a, ee
ENO TE OPM TOLL RIP ASABE LLP NIN ONE BE Te REELS BE AER 8
DREN “eT ART. Bey
Peer ea seeueree: PEF RAINE
ix
process, but once these procedures are exhausted with-
out a settlement, either side is free to resort to economic
self-help in an attempt to force a settlement most favor-
able to it.’
This is not to suggest that warfare between unions
and the airlines may rage uninhibited under the RLA.
Like other substantive labor legislation, the RLA_ im-
poses a duty on both employers and employees to bar-
vain in good faith, and it recogrizes the right of em-
vlovers to organize without employer interference. But
in this case the CAB specifically noted that “the record
is replete with evidence of the earnest and consistent
vood faith efforts of [the Mutual Aid Pact Members!
to find a resolution to their strikes throughout the course
of difficult labor negotiations.” ~ The Board also points
‘to evidence refuting any notion that the Pact functions
as an employer device to control the formation of bar-
raining units."
The permissibility of the Mutual Aid Pact under the
RLA is supported by Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319
Red 366 (2d Cir. cert. denied, 375 U.S. 8380 11963).
The case involved a union attack on a strike insurance
plan in the railroad industry. a device whose similarity
to the Mutual Aid Pact in the airlines industry was
‘See 4 ULS.C. $$ 154-68, 183-85.
Seco Brotherhood of RR. Trainmen v. Jaeksonville Termi-
nal Co, 394 US. 3869, 378-79.
om U.S.C. § 152 First.
f/., § 152 Fourth.
Opinion of the CAB, Feb. 27, 1973, Joint App. 240a-41a.
One instence of an alleged RLA violation by an airline is
noted, but it was not shown to have any connection to carrier
membership in the Pact. /d., Joint App. 241a.
“See ia., Joint App. 240a n.14.
Pe
x
specifically noted in the Second Circuit’s opinion. In up-
holding the plan, the court began with the principle set
out above and found further support for its result in
section 20 of the Clayton Act’ and section 4 of the
Norris-La Guardia Act,” which sanction the payment of
benefits to parties engaged in a labor dispute. Petition-
ers’ efforts to undermine the rationale of the Kennedy
decision are unconvincing.’ We find the Board’s ap-
proval of the Pact, us amended, fully consistent with the
national labor policy and the RLA.
1099 U.S.C. § 52.
1129 U.S.C. § 104.
is Petitioners’ argument is based in part on a later holding
of the Second Circuit, NLRB v. A. & P. Stores Tuc., 340 F.2d
690, that a lockout by employers who were not in the same
bargaining unit as the company being struck was violative
of the National Labor Relations Act. Petitioners urge that this
case implies that multiemployer aid is impermissible except
in the context of multiemployer bargaining units, which pres-
ently do not exist in the airlines industry. A. & P. is easily
distinguished from Kennedy in that the court’s result in
A. & P. turned on a finding that the lockout violated section
8(a) (1) of the NLRA as a device to force the unions to accept
multiemployer bargaining units. As we have noted, text ac-
companying note 9 supra, the Pact does not appear to have
such coercive tendencies.
The unions also resort to Brotherhood of Railway &
Steamship Clerks v. Florida East Coast R. Y., 384 U.S. 238
(1966), which held that during a strike period 2 railroad
could make some alterations in its contracts with the unions
without submitting these alterations to the lengthy negotia-
ions procedures required by the Act. The unions attempt
to read into this case a principle limiting the use of em-
ployer self-help whose effect is to prolong strikes. In fact, the
decision vindicates the right of self-help in the face of the
technical requirements of the Act by allowing the employer
to make adjustments necessary for continued operations dur-
ing the strike subject only to approval by the district court.
xi
III.
There is no indication either in the initial opinion of
the Administrative Law Judge or in the CAB’s opinion
that the unions presented their antitrust objections to
the Pact in the proceedings before the agency. As a
‘echnical matter, therefore, we are precluded from con-
sidering the antitrust attack absent any reasonable
grounds for failure to pursue that attack before the
CAB." As a practical matter, we cannot exercise an
appellate function in the review of administrative mat-
ters unless the problems have been fully aired and fo-
cused in the proceedings below. The Federal Aviation
Act (FAAs specifically exempts agreements approved
by the CAB from the operation of the antitrust laws."
The initial forum in which to raise antitrust objections
remains the ageney which is charged with the primary
determination of the public interest.’
IV.
In passing on agreements among air carriers under
49 U.S.C. $ 1382, the CAB is required to disapprove any
49 US.C. § 1486(e) provides:
No objection to an order of the Board .. . shall be con-
sidered by the court unless such objection shall have been
urged before the Board ... or if it was not so urged,
untoss there were reasonable grounds for failure to do so.
19 US.C. § 1384.
In prior rulings, the CAB has dealt with antitrust ob-
yeetions to the Puet. See. ¢.g., Opinion of the CAB, July 10,
M64, Joint App. 44a, 66a-67a. It concluded that the Pact
“has not operated in restraint of trade or lessened competition
between air carriers... .” However, we do not consider
these prior rulings, or the findings which they contain, to be
proper subjects of review at this juncture. See 49 USC.
“1I860a) Oprecliding appeals from orders of the CAB after
‘ days of decision except by leave of court on a showing of
soneonable grounds for failure to file in timely fashion).
xii
agreements which it finds to be “adverse to the public
interest.” The courts may not overturn the CAB’s find-
ings of fact unless they are unsupported by substantial
evidence on the record.” Nor may they upset the final
judgments of the CAB unless they fall outside a zone of
reasonableness.’” It is urged, however, that because the
CAB lacks expertise in labor matters, its decisions im-
pinging on the activities of unions in the airlines indus-
try are to be accorded less weight than these standards
imply, although petitioners fail even to articulate an al-
ternative standard.”
The CAB is not a labor board, of course, as it is first
to concede. Yet we have already concluded that its
decision in this case is consistent with national labor
policy, such as it may be discerned. Beyond that, a
proper evaluation of the Pact’s effect on the unions and
their members necessarily involves a firm grasp of in-
dustry practices under the agreement, and the CAB’s
grasp has reason to be firm. Against a background
k 1owledge of the industry’s economic structure, the CAB
has monitored the Pact since its inception sixteen years
ago and has the benefit of three full evidentiary hear-
ings conducted on the Pact in 1962, 1966 and 1970.**
16 49 U.S.C. § 1486(e): “The findings of fact by the Board
_.., if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”
17 See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 98 U.S. App.
D.C. 348, 354, 235 F.2d 845, 851 (1956).
‘‘ Brief for Petitioner Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’! at 8-9.
' Brief for Respondent CAB at 16.
2° Cf. National Aviation Trades Ass’n v. CAB, 136 US.
App. D.C. 367, 372, 420 F.2d 209, 214 (1969) (endorsing
CAB’s competence to make findings reievant to antitrust
factors despite its lack of expertise as such in the antitrust
field).
xiii
Despite the CAB’s experience with the Pact, we would
net affirm, of course, if issues of employee welfare had
been ignored or slighted. This court has previously
pointed out “the Board’s duty to consider the welfare of
carrier employees under the public interest standard
when it approves agreements under Section 412.”*' But
in a finding that the unions do not dispute, the Board
in this ease declared
that the employees retain substantial and effective
bargaining power regardless of the Mutual Aid
Agreement. Thus, the record shows that air carrier
wages ... are higher than, and. . . have increased
faster than, wages in other industries, including
other transportation industries.**
We do not think the Board need have gone further in
this respect.
In assessing the net impact of the Pact and its new
amendments, the CAB also took into account, inter alia:
the industry’s vulnerability to strikes; the tendency of
the Pact, as amended, to promote or prolong strikes;
and the impact which the agreement has on the viability
of marginal companies. Since the basis of the CAB’s
findings on each of these points is vigorously attacked
by the unions, we will review in some detail the evi-
dence on which the Board bases its findings.
The Board found that the air transport industry “suf-
fers a greater impact by strike than do other industries,
and is therefore more vulnerable to strike|s| .. . than
are other industries.” The unions claim that this finding
is based on a misreading of the testimony of Dr. Herbert
R. Northrup of the Wharton School of the University
“Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. CAB, 154 U.S. App. D.C.
316, BZ, ATS F.2d 900, 905 (1973).
Opinion of the CAR, Feb. 27, 1973, Joint App. Z34da-35a.
xiv
of Pennsylvania.*’ On our reading of the statement, Dr.
Northrup seems quite explicit that airlines—like other
service industries in which the ability to stockpile is
limited—are particularly vulnerable to strikes and fur-
thermore that they are more vulnerable to strikes than
other transportation industries with a higher percentage
of freight traffic, which can be stored pending settle-
ment.:* In defending the peculiar suitability of the Mu-
tual Aid Pact for the airlines industry, the Board did
not purport to find that air carriers were more sensi-
tive to work stoppages than all other transport industries;
nor was such a finding necessary.
The tyro remaining findings of the Board which come
under special fire are: (1) that the Pact, as amended.
is not likely to have a serious impact on the willing-
ness of companies to sustain or prolong strikes; (2) that
the payments required by the Act do not and are not
likely to affect the viability of small or economically
marginal airlines. These findings are defensive in na-
ture. They are central to the Board’s answer to al-
legations that the Pact poses risks to the stability and
smooth operation of the airlines system which out-
weigh the benefits on which we have touched. If either
finding were unsupported, we would have difficulty in
countenancing the Board’s decision. But we do not so
conclude.
Although the CAB followed the Administrative Law
Judge’s view that “the record does not establish that
any carrier has incurred or prolonged a strike because
of the increased level of mutual aid,” ** it differed from
his as-essment of a substantial danger that the amended
*’ Trunkline Carrier Exhibit No. 80.
‘Id. 11-42.
Initial Decision of Examiner Arthur S. Present, Joint
App. 301a.
REMPCERG NAT MENT LAE DIRIY EN OP RI eCSTIETEN
APE ATP OTR EA LIT BE FI
ear cia ine
Reaver RPE MAL AED
XV
Pact would result in significantly longer and more fre-
quent work stoppages. In concluding that this risk was
not substantial, the Board noted the relative infrequency
with whieh negotiations in the airlines industry have
erupted into strikes in recent years. The statistics cited
cover the period from 1968-1971, during at least part of
which the new amendments were actually in effect.”
The CAB’s finding on the prolongation issue is further
supported by the Board's determination that significant
financial pressures to settle remain on the airlines despite
their participation in the Pact. The unions point out
that in 1970 some airlines actually experienced operating
profits during periods of strike when supplemental pay-
nents under the Pact were taken into account. But the
Bourd reasonably believed that in assessing the dynamics
of the companies’ position during strikes, operating prof-
its should be compared to “normal profits” for a similar
period—profits which the company would have enjoyed
‘¢ it had not sustained a strike. Similarly, it included
in its model “post-strike losses.” These take in the cost
of resuming operations, losses attributable to the ab-
sence of advance bookings and “the long-term loss of
traffie attributable to the loss of carrier identity in the
9 27
market .... ”
Clearly “normal profits” and “nost-strike losses” are
based to some degree, as petitioners assert, on “specula-
tion and hypotheeation,” * but the absence of certainty
does not preclude the Board from making a considered
“}ronieally, the unions cite the same statistics in their
altempts to refute the CAN’s findings on the strike prolonga-
tion issue. Brief of Petitioner Air Line Dispatchers’ Ass’n at
10. This would seem to ignore that the Pact was in effect
during the entire period covered by the figures.
Opinion of the CAL, Feb. 27, 1973, Joint App. 236a.
-s Brief of Petitioner Air Line Dispatchers’ Ass'n at 30.
xvi
judgment on the best information available. One could
wish that the Board had addressed itself to the meth-
odological problems inherent in estimating these loss fac-
tors: it simply stated that it considered the companies’
figures to have been “reasonadly estimated’ and adopted
them as its own. Yet the unions do not point to evi-
dence that the companies reached their estimates by mis-
guided or meritricious methods. And the CAB did seek
to control the risk of error by limiting its approval of
the agreement to a period of five years. Thus, if the
CAB’s “hypotheeatiuns” prove wrong, they may be cor-
rected.
The Board also found that the Pact offers no significant
threat to the financial stability of its members. Although
the Administrative Law Judge reached a different as-
<essment of the risk involved, he believed the record did
not “demonstrate that the viability of any earrier has
been critieally threatened because of the higher level of
contributions required under the amended agreement.” ”
The CAB reinforced its own evaluation by reference to
the amounts paid out by various airlines as compared
with strike losses incurred.’ These statistics cover the
period from January 1970 to June 30, 1971, when the
new higher ceilings were in effect. The Board con-
cluded, not unreasonably, that the payments are not
out of proportion to the gains from the protection of-
fered. The balance of costs and benefits in favor of al-
lowing the agreement was found to be particularly true
for financially weak carriers, which stand to lose most
> These methodological problems do receive extensive treat-
ment by company experts cn the record. See Trunkline Car-
rier Exhibit Nos. 50-52. Presumably these discussions pro-
vided the basis of the CAB’s acceptance of the estimates.
“|nitin! Decision of Examiner Arthur S. Present, Joint
App. 301a.
‘ Opinion of the CAB, Feb. 27, 1973, Joint App. 243a-44a.
aaentes
Basses ee
xvii
from strikes or threats of strike.* This line of justi-
fication also supports the Board’s approval of the 1971
amendment allowing local service carriers to join the
act, for these carriers, as a group, are likely to be less
stable, and therefore more vulnerable to strikes than
trunkline carriers.
Of course, the ceiling imposed by the Pact provides
some safeguard against oppvessive payrhents. And al-
though liability for windfall payments may bring a car-
riers total obligation to more than one percent of its
operating revenues, the Board argues correctly that the
windfall paynients represent no added burden to the
company which must pay them, because they represent
only profits which the company could not have expected
to enjoy absent the strike suffered by its competitor.
We conclude that the findings on which the Board
rests its decision are adequately supported and that the
result reached is «a reasonable one.
V.
We have earefully considered the unions’ remaining
econtentions."' We believe that only one warrants dis-
cussion. The unions say the CAB erred in failing to
adopt a condition that would have precluded considera-
tion of amounts paid out under the Pact as expenses for
the purpose of establishing rates. As the CAB recog-
nized," the petitioners are seeking to pursue this issue
in the wrong procedural context. The authority of the
Board to review and prescribe air carrier rates is ex-
Id.. Joint App. 245a.
These include a claim of bias on the part of CAB, which
we deem without substantial foundation.
“The CAR refused to take evidence on this point. Brief
of Petitioner Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l at 72.
xviii
ercised in distinct proceedings under the FAA.’ Jf
the unions feel that the rates charged by the airlines
are unreasonable because they include allowances for pay-
ments under the Pact, they may institute proceedings
before the CAB under 42 U.S.C. § 1482(d). Petitioners
suggest that their objection would be “buried” in a rate-
making proceeding.” If this should happen, and if the
unions are so advised, they may seek judicial review.”
Affirmed.
33 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d).
‘’ See Brief of Petitioner Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l at 72.
* See 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a).
APPENDIX B
Six-Carrier Mutual Aid Pact
Order E-13899 (1959)
Opinion of the Board
Opinion of Member Minetti, dissenting
one ad BC Hr
Docket 9977
(E-18899)
SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT
Decided May 20, 1959
On the basis of the record before the Board and after giving due consideration
to the standards contained in the Federal Aviation Act and the Railway
Labor Act, basic agreement between American Airlines, Inc.. Capital Air-
lines, Inc., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
Trans World Airlines, Ine., and United Air Lines, Inc., relating to mutual
assistance in the event of strikes, not found to be adverse to the public in-
terest or in violation of the Act and, accordingly, approved subject to con-
ditions.
In the absence of an affirmative showing io the record. the Beard is unable to
conclude that the agreement violates the Railway Labor Act: that the acree-
men’, threatens, by an azzravation of labor disputes, to hinder promotion of
a eiable and efficient air transportation system ; that the agreement. modified
by deletion of the provision relating to reuting of trathe by a struck carrier,
will substantially lessen competition between carriers: thar the agreement is
too vague for approval or that the parties thereto have failed to comply with
the filing requirements imposed by the Beard’s orders: that subsidy mail-pay
considerations require disapproval of the agreement; or that the agreement
would inject the Board into the controversial area of labor relations and
impose such a complex administrative burden on the Lourd as to render ite
approval adverse to the public interest.
Where Congress has been silent on the matter of private efforts by employers
to induce acceptance by unions of recommendations of emergency boards
established by the I’resident of the United States under section 10 of the Rail-
way Labor Act, the Board will not usurp the congressional prerogative by
embroidering additional prohibitions on the fabric of that Act.
Provision in agreement, not essential to basic plan, which requires struck car-
rier to route traflic to other sicnatories, unduly restrains competition among
air carriers, docs not serve the interests of the traveling public, and must be
deleted as a condition to approval of the agreement.
Approval of agreement shall in the public interest be conditioned npon deiction
of objectionable clause relating to routing of traffic, preservation of richts
and obligations under Railway Labor Act, continuation of recnlar reports,
and reservation of question concerning reasonableness of financial provisions
of agreement for future ratemaking or other regulators purposes under the
Act.
AYPPRARANCTS ‘
Gun Farmer, Howard C, Westwood, David C. Acheson, and Jerome Ackerman
ou behalf of American Airlines, Inz., ct al.
Samuel E. Gates on behalf of American Airlines, Inc.
Charics H. Murchison, Robert B. Hankins, Macon M. Arthur, and James JT.
Bastian on behalf of Capital Airlines, Inc.
W. Glen Harlan, FE. Smuthe Gamorctt, William R. Howard, and William B.
Bell, Jr., on behalf of Kastern Air Lines, tne.
John C. Pirie on behalf of Pan American World Airways, Ine.
Carl S. Rowe and Arthur Wischart on behalf of Trans World Airlines, Inc.
H. Templcton Brown on behalf of United Air Lines, Inc.
168 Vol. 29, No. 14
PRN CEN NRA om LES Wis EL DE
SIX-CAPRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 169
Clarence M. Mulholland, Edward J. Hickey, Jr., James L. Highsaw, Jr., Plato
Papps, and [var I’cteraon on behalf of International Association of Machini-t-,
and the Brotherhood of Rallway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Mandler;, Ix-
press and Station Employees.
F. Harold Bennett and Wanriee WT. Schy on behal€ of Air Line Pilots Assocla-
tion, Internatlonal, and Air Line Ageuts Association, International.
John FF. O'Donnell ou behalf of Transport Workers Union of Amerien, AFL-
clo.
George R. Petty, Jr., on behalf of Flight Engineers International Association,
AFL-C10.
Orinion
By tur Boarp:
This proceeding involves an agreement between six certificated
carriers? for mutual assistance in the event of certain strikes.* The
carriers seek approval of the agreement under section 412 of the Act
On December 4, 1958, the Board ordered * oral argument on the
question of approval or disapproval of the agreement. AIL inter-
ested parties and government agencies were invited to participate in
the hearing. Statements of position have been filed by the carriers?
unions,’ six supplemental air carriers,’ and one municipal chamber
of commerce. Responses to Board inquiries have been reecived from
various government agencies.” The carriers and unions ' have fur-
ther expressed their views during oral argument, and the matter now
stands submitted for decision.
tAmeriean Alriines, Inc., Capita! Alrlines, Ine., Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Pan American
World Airways, Ine., Trans World Airlines, lne., and United Air Lines, Ine. These
carriers shall be referred to simply as “the carriers,” or by their commonly knows
abbreviatet names.
3A copy of the agreement is attached hereto as appendix A.
3 Federal Aviation Act sec, 412 provides:
“See. 412. (a) Every air carrier shail file with the Board a true copy, or. if oral,
a true and complete memorandum, of every contract or agreement (whether enforceable
by provisions for liquidated damages, pensities, bonds, or otherwise) affecting air trans-
portation and in force on the effective dite of this section or bereatter entered tnta,
or any meditieation or cancellation thereot, between such air carrier and any other air
earcier, foreigo air carrier, or other carrier for pooling or apportioning —-er losses,
trate, service, or equipment, of relating to the establishment of transportation rates,
fares, charges, or classilientions, or for preserving and improving safety, coenemns and
efficiency of operation, or tor controlling, regulating, preventing, or otherwise eliminating
Gestructise, oppressive, or wasteful competition. or for regulating stops, schedules, aud
ebaracter of service, or for uther ee working arrangements.
° ° ° ° ° °
“(b) The Board shall by order deaneneee any such contract or agreement, whether or
not previously approved by it. that it tinds to be adverse to the public interest. or in
violation of this Act. and shall by order approve ans suck contract of agreement. or
ans modification or cancellation thereof, that It does not tind to be adverse to the public
interest, or in violation of this Act: except that the Board may not approve any con-
tract or agreement hetween an ale carrier not directly engaged in the operation of air-
craft in nit transportation and a common carrier subject to the Interstate Commerce
Act, as amended. governing the compensation to be received by such common cartier
for transportation ne rviees performed by it.”
4Order BK baton. os eA tet
ovae carriers filed a joint brief, TWA and Capital also filed supplemental metmo-
randume.
6 Internattonal Associntion of Machinists, ond the Brotherhood of Railway and Steam-
abip Clerks, Freteht Ulandlers, Dxpress and Station Employees (jointly): Air Line
Agents Association, Internationa®: smd Air Line Pilots Association. International.
TAN American Airwaves, Ine., Air Corso Express, Ine. dba. Columbia Airlines, Seur-
dough Air Transport, Sontheorn Atr Trans cort, Ine. Standard Airways, and United States
Oversens Airlines, Ine. cjetotis arin di-approevald.
8 Louisville (Kyo) Chamber of Commerce Caurging appreval.
PS Department of Commerce. Depertment of Justices, Department of Labor, National
Labor Relations Beard. and Natvenal Sfecdiation Board. ‘The responses of these agencies
are eet forth In appendix Bo to this opr,
WM International As-octation of Machinists; Rrotherhood of Rallwas and Steamship
Clerks, Preticht ye Iixpress amt Station Limndoyeea: Ate Line Pilota Association,
International; Ale Line Agents Association, International: Transport Workers of Aimer-
ten, AFL CIOS and Plight Engineers’ International Assoctation, AFL-CIO, These unions
abail be referred to herein as “the unlons,”” or by their commonly known alphabetical
abbreviations.
29 C.A.B.—168
598690—62——--13
6a
4 r vee SO er AR a I PS 2 aE ES eet Oe LSP a, a EBON dA ei
x
170 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS
After careful scrutiny of the record before it. the Board has deter-
mined to approve the agreement since, subject to conditions," the
basic agreement cannot be found to be adverse to the public interest
or in violation of the Act. Certain conditions required by the public
interest will be included in the order of approval.
I
The agreement, which became etlective October 20, 1958, and is to
expire 1 year later, provides for mutual assistance in the event any
party’s flight operations are shut down by rexson of (1) a strike
called to enforce union demands in excess of or opposed to the recom-
mendations of a Presidential Emergency Board appointed under
section 10 of the Railway Labor Act; or (2) a strike called before
exhaustion of the pre-strike procedures of that Act: or (3) a strike
which is “otherwise unlawful.” The operating parties will pay to
the strike-bound signatory carrier their “increased revenues attrib-
utable to the strike * * *: Jess applicable added direct expenses.”
In return, the struck carrier “will make every reasonable effort * * *
to provide the public with information concerning all air services
rendered by the other parties, and to direct to them as much of the
traflie normally carried by the party sutlering such a strike as pos-
i olen
IT
In determining whether to approve the agreement. we are governed
by section [12 of the Act. which provides that we siiail approve any
agreement not found to be adverse to the public interest '* or in vio-
lation of the Act. Since both the Federal Aviation Aet and the
Railway Labor Act provide that every air carrier, and its emplovees,
must comply with the applicable provisions of the latter statute?3
our measurement of the agreement against the standards contained
in section 412 begins with the inquiry whether the agreement vio-
lates the Railway Labor Act.
11 As noted hereinafter, the conditions include deletion of clause 2 of the agreement,
@ severable provision which is not essential to adininiscration of the agreement but which
is objectionable to the interests of the public.
12 Qur purview of the “public interesc” is framed by sec. 102, which provides :
“See. 102. In the exercise and performance of its powers aud duties under this Act,
the Board shall consider the following, emeng other thines, as being in the public inter-
est, and in accerdance with the public convenience ated necessity :
(a) The enceuragement and development of ano arr-tranmspertition system properly
adapted to the present and future needs of the Loretza aivd elemestic conumerce of the
United States. of the Posial Service, and of the nationad defense :
(bp The rezulativa of air transportation te sueh iMmanner os te recognize and preserve
the inherent adsonteces ef ossuie the biche.t decree of safety ia. aml foster sound
economic conditions in, such tranmspertation, aud to improve the relations beiween, and
Coordingte transportation by. air carriers :
(c) ‘The promotion et adequate, economical, and efficient service by ale carriers at
reasonable charzes, witheut unjust diservninations, undue preferenees of advantages, or
unfair or destructive competitive practices ;
(d) Competition to the extent mecessary to assure the sound development of an air-
transportation system properly adapted te the needs ef the ferenzu and domestic com-
merce of the United States, of the Uostal Servier, and of the national defense ;
(e) The promotion of safery in nar eon
(f) The promotion. encouragement, and deve nr ef civil aeronautics *
3 Section JOLEKI C4) Of our Act makes comp swith tithe TL ef the Railway Labor
Act a condition upon the holdings of a eertitieate ot publie “Hence ad fteeessitv by
any air carrier, Section Lol of the Railway Laber Net exte s Visi
title To of that Aet (except see. 3) te “cover every commen earrier by sir engaged iv
Interstate or foreign commerce, and every earrier by air transperting mail for or under
contract with the United States Government, and every air pilet or other person who
performs any werk as an employee or subordinate oflicial of sueh earrier or carriers,
Rubject to its or their continuing authority to supervise and direct the manner of rendl-
tion of his service.”
29 C.A.B.—168
Ta
ot
Digrtione:
a ee i oa
IX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 171
The unions oppose approval of the agreement on the ground that
the agreement wil! violate the Railway Labor Act in several respects.
First, it is contended that “the agreement portends a repudiation of
the requirement that collective bargaining be in good faith.” We
cannot agree. Clearly, such a result is not dietated by the terms of
the agreement, which do vot impinge upon the carrier” responsibilt-
ties “to exert every reasonable effort te make * * * agreements — * *
and to settle all disputes.” Vhe sc:eement. although increasing
management's abilities to withstand the economic impact of strikes
in the same manner that union strike benefits cushion the econonie
effect on cmployees, does not purport to affect the carriers’ duties
under the Railway Labor Act to bargain in earnest. Nothing pre-
sented by the parties shows that the operation of the agreement wiih,
in fact, induce the carriers to cisregard the obligations imposed by
law. Neither matters of record nor fair inferences to be drawn
therefrom justify a finding that the agreement will constitute an
impedunent to lend fide collective bargaining.
Similarly. we cannot conelnde that the operation of the agreement
will interfere with Cie prompt sett'oment of disputes. Our view is
confirmed by the chrenicle Gf recent events. ‘Thus, although the
agreement was operative during a period of nvvor strikes, the reeord
is devoid of any showing that the duration of any dispute was pro-
longed as a result of the mutual aid provided thereunder. Indeed,
counsel for the wnious diseiaimed any evidence to this effect when
questioned at oral argument.
Moreover, experience derived from the recent strikes -neeests that
there will necessarily be present potent factors preciuding carrier
complacency around the bargaining table. Strikes compensable un-
der the agreement wil continue to eause stgnificant losses of rev-
enue!® For example, even after Capital received mivitial aid) pay-
ments of S2.247.972 for October and November 195% that ecarrter’s
net operating revenue for the 2 months in which the strike tock
place was S1587,979 less than the carrier would have earned by its
own forecast. And, as to expenses, it is noteworthy that payments
under the agreement do not reeoup a struck carrier's fixed costs, or
its extraordinary sirike expenses. We are satistied that the prospect
of major Josses of revenue and continning fixed expenses, with pes-
sible permanent diversion of traffic to competing carriers, will serve
aS a genuine carrier incentive to avoid strikes by bargaining in good
faith. Accordingly, we reject the wuon contention to the contrary.
MAmonz the bargaining duties of carriers are those set forth In sec. 2, first, of the
Rallwas Laber Act, whieh provides:
“Et shall be the duty of al) eorcters, their aleers, aventt, and employees to exert
every reasonable esert te teshe aod maintain oerectiaents coneertiung rates of pay. rules,
and working condit ons, ated te settle all disputes, whether aristag out of the opplieation
of euch agrecment. Or othe owl. an order te avoid any interruption to Commerce of to
the operation of any carrier growin: out of ans dispute between tie Cartier and the
employees thereof"
13 Kallway Labor Act, sec. 2, first. quoted nete Tt. supra.
Bee A ostdiewtatttat teeeileee OP the te cetene stitet hd tave been certvedd from fight
vperations by the struck carrier Weil mot be teenuped by operation of the agreement.
Fiest, net all tratlic let by the struct carrier wal be dovertesl to parttes te the agree
ment; Henelgnatory earriers, ex eourse, Wilh Dot pesos Cheat “exeess nese dee to the
atrike, This loss of revenne will be imerecsed by the condition attieled (oe oar order
which prohibits routtus of tratie by streeb eurrier te other sesnatery earriers.
Seeondly, the struck coctier cai expect mo reterm with fe peet to iocht« over segments
not serviced by any party to the agreement. Finally. it is possible that the grounding
of an airline will teedluce no portion of Its potential trite not to travel bs air, thos
depriving oll alr carriers, Including the struck carrier, of “excess income.”
29 C.A.B.—168
8a
172 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS
Second, the unions contend that “the agreement violates the duties
of air carriers under the Railway Labor Act by bringing into the
dispute carriers not parties thereto.” In this regard it is argued
that the financial * provisions of the agreement will nopert the
signatory carriers info the “shadowy background” of disputes, atd-
ing the actual parties to seek the bargain desired by the other car-
riers. We do not agree. Even assuming that the Railway Labor
Act precludes group bargaining without union consent, the agree-
ment would not violate that Aet unless it burdened the negotiating
carrier with representation of positions net its own!’ "Phis, how-
ever, the agreement does not do: The carrier involved in the dispute
may bargain without reference to the views or policies of other
parties to the agreement: if struck, it is entitled to financial aid with-
out regard to the popularity of its bargaining posture among the
other parties. It may well be, of course, that carriers have and
under the agreement increasingly will consult with each other con-
cerning labor questions of common concern, Such a practice, how-
ever, would not necessarily entail any sacrifice of each carrier's com-
plete and exclusive control over its collective bargaining.””
The third manner in which it is contended that the agreement
violates the Railway Labor Act relates to its coverage of strikes
which have been called “for reasons which incinde the enforcement
of demands in excess of or opposed to the recommendations of a
board established by the President of the United States under
section 10 of the Railway Labor Act.” The uniens urge that the
agreement is antipothetic to both the letter and spirit of thac Act
by attempting to force unions to accept emergeucy board recom-
mendations.
The union position is that the carriers may not by mutual eco-
nomic aid seek to induce acceptance of board recommendations,
which are not made mandatory by the Railway Labor Aet. Such
concerted carrier action is asserted to be opposed to the congressional
contemplation that emergency board recommendations be free of
compulsion. ‘To the contrary, the carriers urge that the refusal of
Congress te compel acceptance by governmental sanction did not
operate to prohibit private parties from attempting to induce com-
pliance by the ciash of comparative economic bargaining strength.
The Railway Labor Act is silent on the matter of private efforts
to compel acceptance by unions of the recommendations of emergency
boards. Nothing in the legisiative history called to our attention
indicates that Congress intended to forbid a mutual ail pact among
employers for that purpose. The Board will not neurp the co.-
gressional prerogative by embroidering additional prohibitions on
the fabric of the Railway Labor Act. As we have said before —*°
17The union Interpretation of the Railway Iabor Act te exclude from disputes car-
flers not parties thereto rests upon see. 2. sewond, of that Act, which provides:
“ALL disputes between a carrier or enrriers and its or their employers shall be con-
sidered, and, if possible, decided. with all expedition, in coaference between representa-
tives designated and authorized -o toe confer, respectively, by the carrier or carriers and
by the employees thereof interested in the dispute.”
ICS ANulines Negutistiey Cortese Se 1 ob C1947. where we allewed 1S car-
tiers to set up an orcanization te act as exclusive bargaining representative of each
carrier, althouch we did not purport to pass upon its propriety as a representative in
avy particular necotiation.
19 We express no view whether carrier consultation, which is not shown In the record,
would be a dv<irable or undesirable practice.
320 Jd. at 357. -
29 C.A.B.—168
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SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 173
In enacting the Railway Lubor Act and in requiring certificated air car-
riers to comply with Title II of that act Congress has spoken as to the
standards of public policy, or public interest, that should apply in the set-
tling of labor disputes between air carriers and their employees. We cannot
substitute our opinions for the considered judgment of the Congress * * *.
It follows that the agreement, even if au attempt to obtain union
acceptance of emergency board recommendations, will not be dis-
approved by the Board as in violation of the Railway Labor Act.?#
In sum, we must conclude that the unions have failed to prove
their contentions that the agreement violates the Railway Labor Act.
Nonetheless, to underscore our understanding of the agreement and
its pernissible application insofar as approved by the Board, we
shall impose an express proviso that our order shall not atfect the
rights and obligations of the parties, or of their employees, under
that Act. Should the carriers fulfill the union predictions and sub-
vert the agreement in violation of iaw, aggrieved parties remain
free to pursue the same letal remedies which were available prior to
our order. We are also aware that our order of approval is not
irrevocable, and does not exhaust our powers under the Act to tke
whatever steps may become necessary to protect the public interest .*4
III
We next turn to the question whether the agreement threatens,
by aggravation of labor disputes, to hinder achievement of the ob-
jectives sct forth in section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act. The
public interest which we must guard, though not broadly one of
employee welfare, includes attainment of a degree of stability and
efliciency m aii transportation that freedom from industrial ‘strife
will provide.
The range of our inquiry, however, is limited to a determination
of the effect of the agreement upon these statutory objectives. Mat-
ters of general policy as to labor disputes are not to be considered
by the Board in assessing whether the agreement is adverse to the
mublic inferesi.”74 It is the function of Congress, and not of the
toard, to weigh the wisdom of such agreements as a factor in the
furtherance of Jabor policies not directly related to the promotion
of a sound air transportation system.
Accordingly. we must disregard allegations concerning the relative
bargaining endurance of the parties. unless the asserted imbalance in
labor-management relations poses a threat to the development of a
stable and cilicient air transportation system. After exemining the
record, we cannot conclude that the industry has been or, with the
agreement, will be afilicted by such a disparity in economic power
21 The carriers contend that the agreement should not be Interpreted as an attempt
to compel compliance with bonrd recamiecodations, We note that, if such was the pur
ne, the carriers have nonetheless been singularly unsuccessful in achieving settlements
% conformity with the recommendations, Thus, before being struck by TAM, three
eatricrs-— Capital, Eastern, ond TWA—had all made offers in execss of the pattern recom.
mended bs the emoryea y beard, and the actual settlements of these strikes were ap
tertus substantially tore fevorcble te the anton than these recommended,
22 Aa part of our retention of jurisdiction over the agreement, we shall Perpetuate the
reporting requirements contained ino owe previous orders,
Kent vy. Civil Acrenaviies Board, 204 Fo 2a 26 eld Cir, 19523, cert. cemiod, 44
U.S R26: Western Air Lines vy. Civil Aeronautica Foard, 194 Bo 2d 211 (oth Cir, 195%).
Cf, F.C.C. ¥. KOA Communicationa, Inc, 346 U.S. 86 (1952) Cantitrust polices and
“public interest’): American Ovcracaa Airlines ¥. Civil Acronautica Board, 254 F. 2d
744 (D.C. Cir. 1958) Clubor policy aud mail pay “need’).
29 CLA. B,—168
10a
fee peat ds Bt
(palit 22 OPS Pont
174 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS
as to jeopardize the attainment of the statutory objectives.2> The
union arguments to the contrary have been carefully weighed and
found wanting. First, since the carriers’ duties to exert every rea-
sonable effort to achieve prompt and orderly settlement of disputes
reinains unaffected, we cannot agree that the agreement will destroy
effective collective bargaining under the Railway Labor Act. Sec-
ondly, we cannot accept the bare, unsupported contention that the
agreement will result in an expansion of the area of labor disputes
and industrywide strikes. The record before us does not support
the inference that the existence of the agreement would persuade
unions, as a matter of strategy or of retaliation,*® to strike against
carriers With whom they have no uncompromisable dispute. The
mere augury of industrywide strikes, incorrectly predicted under
similar circumstances once before,’ is insuflicient to warrant a con-
clusion that the agreement will destroy workable labor relations in
the industry.**
IV
In weighing the objections made to the traffic-routing provision of
the agreement, we must recognize that our order of approval would
grant immunity from the antitrust laws.2? We have therefore scru-
tinized the agreement to insure that the conduct thus legalized does
not inhibit competition to any significant extent or. if it does, that
the restraint is necessary to serve the purposes of the regulatory
statute.*°
After consideration of the contentions of the parties. we have
concluded that the clause relating to diversion of traflic by the
struck carrier! is adverse to the public interest. First. the von-
certed eifort to shuttle traflie among a restricted group of carriers
is repugnant to established antitrust principles and should not re-
ceive our approval unless required by a serions transportation need,
or in order to secure important public benetits.** Since the record
fails to show any sound public justification for the restrictive pro-
vision, we cannot allow it to stand. Secondly, we are convinced
25 Should subsequent events, including the operation of the agreement, lead to a dif-
ferent conclusion, we would act to preserve the minimum stability in air transportation
required by the public interest.
% Coun-el for JAM-EKC. at oral arzument, disavowed any intent on the part of his
clients to stave retaliatory strikes.
— IAM and ALDPA briefs in Airlines Negotiating Conference Agreements, docket
2 The petition of ALAA. dated Feb. 9, 1959, requests exemption of ALAA from the
application of the agreement on the grounds that the earrer allecations of imbalance
do not relate to ALAA. Viewing the petition as. in part, an anteipaters petition Lor
reconsideration and, in part. a repiy brief fer w hich request for leave to file was dermis ad
at oral arzument, we shall grant the carriers’ metions fo distarss, Order K-s22en,
Mar. 18, 1095S: rule 31 of the Rules of Dractier in Leonemie Proceedings. In adlditien,
we note thet the specitte findinzs and substantiating evidentiary hearing requested) by
ALAA are rendered unnecessary by the rationale of our decision, Sines we do net
approve the agreement tn order to redress an alleged preponderance of lober power, the
failure of ALAA to achieve cquivalent barzatning strength would not entitle it to an
exemetion from the application of the agrectnent.
7 Vederal Aviation Aet, sec. 414.
M Poderal Aviation Act. see. 102(d), See Local Cartage Aagrcement Case, Th CARB.
850 (in): Air Freight Tariff Aareement Case, 14 CLA.B. 42-4 (151): Air Cargo, Ine,
Agreement, Petitions, © CAT des cloasd.
3°2. The party suffering such a strike will make every reasonable effort, with its
emmoyees still on duty, to provide the pablie with information concerning ai) air sery-
fees rendered by the other parties. and to direet fo them as much of the tratie normally
carried by the party suffering such a strike as possible, all as the best interests of the
members of the public may require.”
92 Sve Local Cartage Agrecment Case, supra; North Atlontic Tourist Commission Caac,
16 C.A.B, 225 (1952).
29 C.A.R.—168
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SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 175
that the public interest is not served if the traveling public, unaware
of alternative air services which might be preferable, is advised
according to carrier obligation rather than passenger convenience.*?
Recognizing that the provision is not crucial to the purpose of the
agreement, we believe sound regulatory practice dictates conditioning
our order of approval upon the deletion of the provision from the
agreement3* We shall require the filing of an amendment to the
agreement to conform it to the requirements of the public interest.**
If the agreement is so moditied, the questions posed by the Depart-
ment of Justice concerning restraint of trade may be answered
favorably to the agreement. First, we are satisfied that the agree-
ment springs from business requirements and not from any intent
to monopolize. Secondly, we do not believe that the operation of
the modified agreement during the limited period of a strike would
seriously affect competition between air carrier parties to the agree-
ment nnd other carriers. The condition we have imposed will pre-
vent a lessening of competition between air carriers. while surface
carriers cannot be deprived of traffic which has already expressed
a preference for air service.
Similarly, we cannot conclude that the financial assistance provi-
sions of the agreement will substantially lessen competition within
the air transportation industry. The commercial advantages of
building goodwill and permanently capturing diverted traflic miti-
gate against any dampening of competition between operating
signatory carriers. y
The unions have urged disapproval on several grounds relating to
the completeness of the agrecnient and to the contracting parties’
responses to our orders. First, the unions contend that the agree-
° , » , ° van :
ment is too ambiguous for approval. We disagree. The carriers
were required to file the agreement under section 412(a), whether or
not it was legally enforceable“ Similarly, the Board is required by
section 412(b) to approve or to disapprove the agreement unless it
is so vague that the Board cannet intelligently determine whether
33 We are aware that several carriers have made the routing obligations more palatable
bs Saying special stress on the provi.o “all as the best interests of the members of the
poblic may require.” Copital, for example. “in ceneral” prefers signatories only where
schedules are “equally d:<irable’: American, only where “other factors” are “etna.”
The existence of such practices, however, cannet obviate the grounds fer objection to
the specific routing provisions of the clause Fiest, we note that the American and
Capital interpretations only underline the ambiguity of the cliuse, the specie Linguace
of which {6 susceptible to a cen-tenetion vielative of antitrust principles Needless to
aay it is net soflicient toe avoid such comblaet be. “in general.” aetins differentt!y. See-
Only, any attempt by the stench carrier to rescive the tactors of prodact competition
inclading fight times, routes. norher of stops. cand quality of equ oment---by a ovecune
ataudard of “equality” must be unsatisfactory to the subjective preterences ef the pub
He. In the last analvats, the deci<ion that the ponsicnatery enrriers ofer no advantaze
to the tras-ler must reet with the pousserger aod not with the struck carrier ¥
39 By this action, of course, the Board does not Intend to modify the oblization of the
carriers, o« common carriers sublect to the publie convenience and teeessity, to con-
tinue to advise the troveling public en a nondiscriminatery basis of all available air
errvice provided by ether cir carriers.
33.We have aMrmed our power under see. 412 to attach approprinte conditions to an
order of approval, in Hew of disapproval, in Pen American-Neticoal Agreements, 28
CLA TH teres cts red fer Ogee, fue. baresneet, Pettinns, WOON 8. tus ec tttse
The petition of ALTA, dated Feb. 2. 1959. questions eur power te so conditten our
order of opproval, The carriers bave filed well founded motions te strike the petitten
ae an anticipatory petition for reconsideration, and we shall accordingly dismiss the
ALVA petition. Order Tb 12208, Mar. 1S, 1058. In addition. we note that ener concin-
sion Alspases of the substantive question raised in the petition and that the issuance
of our» inion and order render moot the procedural questions faised therelp.
TWA -Delia, Equipment Interchunge, 8 C.A.B. 857 (1947).
2& C.A.B.—168
12a
spl ME CBCP aS DOO SB NEO PMD i NA AE VERE EEE RE PRIETO EGA EL 8 CELA
176 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS
the agreement is adverse to the public interest or in violation of the
Act. The agreement, although not definitive in every respect, is
still definite. As we have pointed out herein, the plan presented by
its terms is capable of measurement against the requirements of the
public interest and of the Act. Section 412 requires no greater
specificity.
The unions have also argued that the agreement should be dis-
approved for failure of the parties to file any subsidiary arrange-
ments implementing the agreement, as required by order J-15253,
dated December 4. 1958, 25 C.A.B. 964. By that order and by sup-
plemental order [5-13508, Dev. 22, 1958, 28 C.A.B. 966, the carriers
were required to file such arrangements, if any, or to state that there
were none. All carrier-psrties have responded to our orders by sub-
mitting statements that no subsidiary arrangenwnts have been con-
summated. Since the record contains no showing that the represen-
tations of the carriers are inaccurate, we cannot conclude that there
has been any failure to comply with our orders.
VI
The last point upon which we shall dwell relates to the effect of
the agreement on the subsidy mail-pay program under section 406
of the Act.**
The unions contend that, if subsidized carriers become parties to
the agreement. Federal subsidy funds may be used “to try and break
a lawful strike * * *." It is urged that payments by subsidized
carriers who do not have a subsidy case pending are not subject to
Board restrictions; and that payments by earriers haying a subsidy
case pending at the time of the payment will be diflicult to disallow
in subsidy computations.
In rebuttal, the carriers contend that the subsidy program will be
affected on!y to a limited extent. Their argument is that payments
by 2 carrier on a closed rate can have no effect: and that payments
by carriers on an open rate should properly be allowed as cedue-
tions from revenue for the purpose of determining subsidy “need ”
The carriers contend that such payments merely offset windfall rev-
enue and, by analo; y to the allowance of strike losses, shoula be
computed for subsidy purposes.
Upon consideration of the opposing contentions, the Board is un-
able to find that approval of the agreement will xdversely affect the
mail-pay pregram. First. we note that no subsidized carrier is now
a pcrty to the agreement. The payments decried by the unions are
thus at this juncture wholly conjectural, and may never oceur. See-
ondly, we do not believe that it is either necessary or desirable to
— ———
37 Sec. 400(b) of the Federal Aviation Act provides, in part:
“In fixing and determining fair and reasonable rates of compensation under this sec-
tion, the Board, considermmg the conditions peculiar to transpertation by aireraft and
to the particular air carrier or class ef air carriers, may fix diterent rates fer a ferent
gir carriers of classes of air carriers, ond diferent elas-es of service, In determining the
rate In each case, the Board shall take into consideration, amonz other factors, * © ©
(3) the need ef each such air earrier for compensation for the transpertatien of mail
sufticlent to insure the performance of such serviee. and, together with all other revenue
of the mir carrier, to enable such air carrier under honest econemical, and efficient
Maparcement, to maintain and continue the development of air transportation to the
extent and of the character and quality required for the commerce of the United States,
the oxtal Service, and the national defense.
29 C.A.B.—168
13a
SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 177
prejudge in this proceeding the precise treatment for mail-pay pur-
»yoses to be accorded payments under the agreement. The factors
aring: upon a carrier's “need” for subsidy are varied and complex,
and can be ascertained only after exhaustive examination of factual
data. The record before us contains no more than fleeting refer-
ences to the general problem. In the absence of any showing that
the agreement presents problems incapable of satisfactory resolution
in a subsidy case, we are unable to find that mail-pay considerations
uire disapproval of the agreement.
n keeping with our usual practice in approving agreements under
various sections of the Act other than 406, we will provide that the
approval granted herein shall not be deemed a determination of the
reasonableness of the financial provisions of the agreement for
future ratemak ng or other regulatory purposes under the Act.4*
Vil
After painsteking review of this matter, we have concluded that
the agreement inust be approved. Our decision is predicated upon
fhe standards contained in the Federal Aviation Act. and does not
attempt to prescribe the most desirable method of adjusting 'abor-
management problems. Congress has not invested the Board with
the task of selecting the most salutory approach to labor-manage-
ment relations: r-ther, section 412¢b) peremptorily commands that
“The Board * — * shall by order approve any * * * agreement * * *
that if does not tind to be adverse to the publie interest, or in viola-
tion of this Net: * *°S) In performing our statutory funetion, we
may dono more than measure the agreement against these standards
in order to ascertain whether its efleet weuld be so detrimental as
to endanger achrevement of the objectives laid down by section 102
of the Nets? Within this framework, the Board’s order foilows
from the Jack of any adirmative showing that the agreement is
adverse to the objectives specified by the Congress. ‘Thus our ap-
proval herein does not reflect any determination as to whether the
agreement is a wise or beneficial step in the promotion of maximum
harmony between labor and tianagement, generally. or im air trans-
portation in partientar.
Accordingly, in view of the foregoing and upon consideration of
the entire revord, we sine
1. That, except av indicated below, agreement CAB 12635 is not
adverse to the publie miterest. and should be approved:
2. That the approval referred te above should, in the publie inter-
est. be made subject to the foli wing conditions:
(a) The agreement should be atended by deleting clause 2 there-
of. relating to renting of trallic by a struck carrier party;
(b) The approval referred to above sixall not atfeet the rights and
obligations of the parties, or of their employees, under the Railway
Labor Act:
%8 We hove also reviewed the union contention that approral of the agreement wonld
inject the Board Into the controverstal aren of labor relations, and impo. such a com-
Piet administrative burden on the Bord as te remder approval ef the cgreements ad-
terse to the pablie forerest After slue consideration, we have coneluded that the burden
juape-rd fe tet sullicientiy onerous te comrel dlapproval of the agreement.
See. 412 ts queted tn full in note 4 supra.
Sec. 102 18 queted in full to note 12 aupra
29 C.A.B.—168
lé4a
a meatier oat sae ———
178 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS
(c) The approval granted herein shall not be deemed a determi-
nation of the reasonableness of the financial provisions of the agree-
ment for future ratemaking or other regulatory purposes under
the Act.
3. That each carrier-party to the agreement shall file with the
Board as amendments to the agreement any subsidiary agreements
or arrangements which set forth the act ual or contemplated methods
for (a) determining when employee demands are in excess of, or
opposed to, the recommendations of a board established under sec-
tion 10 of the Railway Labor Act, when a strike has been called
before exhanstion of the procedures of the Railway Labor Act, or
when # strike is otherwise unlawful, all as stated in clause 1 of the
agreement, and by whom such determinations may be made; or (b)
measurement of the increased revenues attributable to a strike and
applicable added direct expenses as siated| in clause ! of the agree-
ment; and that, if there are no such agreements or arrangements,
each of the carrier-parties shall individually so state. Said parties
shall also file a statement of any monies which have been “gees pur-
suant to the agreement indicating the amount paid by each carrier-
arty and to whom such payment has been made.
4. That any ecarrier-party which states that no such agreements
exist shall file with the Board a complete and detailed statement of
(1) any agreements which it may have made with any of the other
carrier-parties, individually or collectively. regarding any of the
matters specified in ordering paragraph 3. or a statement that there
are no such agreements: (2) 11s understanding of all its obligations
under the agreement: (5) its past, present, or contemplated frture
practices regarding the agreement;
5. That each carrier-party to the agreement shall file with the
Board a complete, detailed statement of the bases for each payment
made.
6. That each carrier-party which has been, or is in the future,
struck shall file with the Board for the duration of each strike a
‘statement containing the following information with respect to rev-
enues and expenses.
(a) An estimate of the dollar amount of operating revenues lost
due to cessation of operations;
(b) The dollar amount of payments received under the agree-
ment and, separately. any related tax accruals;
(c) An estimate of the dollar amount of normal operating ex-
wenses which would have been inenrred to earn the revenues which
it is estimated would have been received:
(d) The dollar amount of revenues and expenses of the period
as follows: (i) total operating \revenues; (11) total operating ex-
penses; (iii) nono erating income and expense—net: (iv) special
items: (v) Federal income taxes and tax credits; (vi) net income
after special items; *
= That each carrier shall continue to file monthly reports of all
the information required to be filed by ordering paragraphs 3
43 The data furnished pursuant to subparacraph (4) above shall be in accordance with
the accounting and reporting provisions of part 241 of the Economie Regulations and
exclusive of auy payments received under the terms of this agreement.
29 C.A.B.—168
15a
. ier aE
ae, 4, . SORE TE RE ie
ceuPntrd att aN AN EAL ETL OILED ELE DLA
et ree PS wise 2.
SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 179
through 6 of this order, until further order of the Board; that
negative reports shall be filed by each carrier as to each item for
which, during the reporting period, there has been no change from
the preceding reporting period; and that such continuing reports
shall. be filed not later than the 15th day of the month next fol-
lowing the month for which data are reported;
8. That the approval granted herein shall be conditioned upon
the filing, within 30 days of service of this epinion and accompany-
ing order, of an amendment to the agreement in conformance with
cis opinion and order;
9. That the petitions of Air Line Pilots Association, International,
and Air Line Agents Association, International, dated February 2
and 12, 1959. should be dismissed. .
An appropriate order will be entered.
Durfee, Chairman, Gurney, Vice Chairman, Denny and Hector,
Members of the Board, concurred in the above opinion. Minetti,
Member, filed the following dissenting opinion.
Mixerri. Memo r. dissenting:
1 cannot agree with the majority that this mutual aid agreement
is neither adverse to the public interest nor in violation of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1s,
Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the Act), this Board
cannot approve any agreement between carriers which offends the
tailway Labor Aet or the publie interest on which it is based, since
air corricr certiiieates, under the Aet, are conditioned on continued
compliance with the Railway Labor Act. Since this agreement
tends to make the collective bargaining process of the Railway Labor
Act impvetent, the agreement cannot be approved by this Board.
The Railway Labor Act envisages the mandatory practice and
procedure of collective bargaining as the only feasible method of
preventing work stoppages in essential transportation. In sharp
contrast, Deeause of the coercion it imposes on labor during and
subsequent to the statutory negotiating periods, this agreement rill
destroy ihe practice while retaining the procedure of collective bar-
gainirg. From the unfortunate opening declaration of hostilities,*
through the provisions for enforcing Presidential Emergency Board
reconnnendations. the agreement is premised on a_ proposition re-
pugnant to the Railway Labor Act; namely, that labor-management
disputes can only be resolved through the use of concerted economic
force.
The damage which this agreement does to the statutory processes
of the Railway Labor Act is clear from the agreement itself and
from the limited factual information available to us. Even if we
1°Woerras, the partles and other alrlines are facing or faced with the threat of
crtrome and unreasonatle demanda made by representatives of certain of the elasses and
eraft< of their employees. as exemplified by the current dispute between certain of the
parties and their tesietes cee ced Geceted emplovees, represented fer tee purpose of coallee-
tive barenining bs the Taterrattonal Ascoeiation ef Machinists. APL/CIO Chereinafter
eutled DAM. @ comtrovers in whtelh EAM bes reteeted and shown on utter disrezard for the
recommendations of the Dmereeney Beard 122 apuointed by the Presideut of the United
States te Investicate said di-pute amd hos struck Copital Afrlines and threatened to
strike other carrier for their insietence upan aubstontial compliance with the terme of
said recammendsicons whieh sction of the IAM tends to undermine the fntlnene., posf-
tion and integrit« of seh Board and tx destructive of the collective bargaining process ;
° © © [iaphaxi- added }
29 C A.B.—i8
16a
5 a
180 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS
assumne that our current information does not unequivocally estab-
jish the illegality of the agreement, an assumption which I cannot
make, the majority's failure to require an evidentiary hearing in
order to explore the critical issues raised by this agreement is totally
inconsistent with the Board’s statutory obligations and is equivalent
to an abuse of regulatory discretion.
The Raiiway Labor Act,? like related statutes which form the
basis for our national labor policy.’ is predicated on the faith which
Congress has placed in the ability of labor and management to
resolve their disputes through sincere efforts to reach an agreement.
It seeks to protect the public interest inherent in uninterrupted
common-carrier service by promoting a peaceful, friendly approach
to labor-management disputes.
Every feature of the Railway Labor Act is aimed either at cre-
ating favorable conditions for the conduct of collective bargaining
or at prohibiting obstacles to its successful accomplishment. Thus,
the Railway Labor Act guarantees to employees the right to organize
and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and provides, in the essential 1934 amendments,‘ the means for
conipelling compliance with its provisions.
Stated in another way. the Railway Labor Act promotes genuine
collective bargaining and, consequently, labor peace, by nullifying
the imbalance in bargaining power, between employer and employee,
which economic concentration had produced. Not only does the stat-
ute protect the employee's right to organize for bargaining purposes
but, in addition, it requires management to confer in good faith with
employee-elected representatives, a compulsion without which the
right to organize and bargain would be an empty one.
The necessity for this compulsion is clear. As the National Medi-
ation Board has stated, “there can be no effective right to organize
if it is to be enforced only with economic power.”*® For these and
—
2’The purposes of the Act are: (1) To avoid ang interruption to commerce or to the
qn of any earricr engaged therein; (2) to forbid anv limitation upon freedom
of association among emplosees or any denial, as a condition of employment or other-
wise, of the richt of employees te join a labor orzanization: (3) to provide for the
complete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter of self-orzanization to
carry ont the purposes of this Act; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settle-
nent of all disputes concerning rates of pay, roles, of working conditions: (5) to pro-
vide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing ont of crievances
or ont of the Interpretations or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions.”
8 National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C.A. § 151:
“Experience has proved that protection bs law of the right of employees te organize
aud bargain collcetively safecuards commerce from Injury. impairment, or interruption,
and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of indu-trial
atrife and unrest, by encouraging practiers fundamental to the friendly adiustment of
industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working con-
ditions, aod by restoring equality of barcaining power between employers aud empunsers,
- . *
“It Is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the eanses of eortain
substantial obstructions to the free flew of commerce and to mitigote ord eliminate
these obstructions when thes lave occurred by enconracing the practice sud preeedure
of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
askocintion, self-organization, and desizuation of representatives of their ewn choo-ing,
for the purpexe of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutnal aid or protection”
4 Act of June 21, 1924, 48 Stot. 1185. In the words of Federal Coordinator of Trane-
portation Hastman. a proponent of the legislation, the amendments were intended “to
‘"~ what has been done” in the Ratlway Labor Act of 1926. (Senate Hearings on
_ R266. Td Cong... 2d Sess. p. 10.)
meee of the Railway Labor Act dy the National Mediation Board, 1934-
vi, PL oo.
29 C.A.B.—168
17a
We NO LO PALA LL ANA LLII LOE IE
wren bo MN
we et InN TROT 7
manioanemmeal
SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 181
>
el
other reasons,® then, the Railway Labor Act is an employee-protec-
tion statute as well as an overall plan for labor peace. Since both
objectives are designed to be realized through genuine, good-faith
caiheative bargaining. ‘the emasculation of the bargaining process
inherent in this agreement is adverse to the objectives of the Rail-
way Labor Act.
To insure the attainment of its objectives, the Railway Labor Act
commands the parties to major disputes to take the following pre-
gnceieit kN ae AeA
‘ liminary steps, without which no agreement could be reached, and
: freezes the use of economic weapons during those steps? First, the
2 Railway Labor Act requires direct bargaining between the parties
4 in a good-faith effort to adjust their differences. Second. when
: bilateral efforts to reach agreement have failed, on request of
J either party or on proffer of services by the National Media-
a tion Board, the National Mediation Board will
act as mediator,
or counselor, to both parties to the dispuie. Third, in the
% event of continued failure by the parties to reach agreement
3, after mediation, the National “Mediation Board must make every
; effort to induce the parties to submit their controversies to tinal and
binding arbitration. Finally, where either of the parties declines to
arbitrate and the National Mediation Board is of the judgment that
an unadjusted dispute threatens “substantially to interrupt inter-
State conmierce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the
country of essential transportation service.” * the National Mediation
Board must notify the President, who in his discretion may create
in Emergency Board to investigate and report on the facts of the
dispute. .
hxamination of this agreement reveals it to be contrary to the
collective bargaining objectives of the Railway Labor Act in two
fundamental respects. One, it imposes compulsory multiemployer
bargaining without employee consent. Two, it substitutes reliance
4 on economic force for the good-faith bargining required by the
Railway Labor Act.
MULTIEMPLOYER BARGAINING
Whether the majerity considers multiemployer bargaining desir-
} able or undesirable, its review of this Agreement is circumscribed
: by the prohibition of the Railway Labor Act against the imposition
: of multiemployer bargaining on unwilling employees. This the Na-
tional Mediation Board has fonnd.! Moreover, the language of the
‘ statute permits no other reasonable construction and the statutory
| prohibition has been recognized by airline spokesmen.
@ While the Ratlway Taber Act prohibits unfair
Parable restraints are
‘
labor practices by employers, na com-
4 duttes in the Railway 1
Imposed on employee aetivicy The only stzniticant employee
ather Net apple eaaally to emplovers,
TFrom the time of the notice of intended change in agreements which acts the Rail-
way Labor Act’a machinery in motion, no chavge may be made in statue qo With respect
to rates of pas. rules, of Werking conditions for ¢1) 10 dige after negotiations hare
A collapsed and the serviers of the National Mediation Roard have not been utilized:
(2) for 20 daga after notification by the National Mediation Board. if ite services have
been utilired. that it« ineliatory efforts have fettea: of (3) im the event of establish-
ment of an Largrerecy Steard. for 30 days after the teport to the l’resident.
* Sec. 10. Ratlway bor Act. i
foeth Amnial Report. pre do
*Nothonal Mevibe tien Tecore
fe Ree statements of Mero Theron then Genetal Counsel for the Ale Transport Ax<cocia-
tion of America, In toforma! bearing OD agreement CAN 520, tranecript, pp. 56-63
29 (A I —168
Anat Sew
18a
——
182 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS
The wisdom of this prohibition is apparent. Any tendency to
hinge the entire operation of the Nation's airlines on the success of
single negotiation Increases the danger of a nationwide transpor-
tution paralysis, particularly where the expanded scape of negotia-
tion is involuntary. Certainly, where multiemployer hegotiations are
compulsory, the change in relative economic bargaining strength, as
well as the hardened attitudes which compulsion produces, can en-
tirely frustrate not only the machinery but the very purposes of the
Railway Labor Act. Ironically, 1 might add, where one carrier
negotiates for the industry, an industrywide work stoppage might
well occur, even though a threatened work stoppage on the routes
of that carrier alone would not justify the creation of an Emergency
Board."
Past experience with the Airlines’ Negotiating Committee, a bar-
gaining agency for the industry established in 1945, illustrates the
dangers of compulsory multiemployer bargaining. That committees
unquestionably prevented an early settlement of a wage dispute
between the Air Line Pilots Association on the one hand and Amer-
jean and TWA on the other. Although the Air Line Pilots Asso-
ciation had accepted a National Mediation Board proffer of arbitra-
tion, both carriers declined, demanding that negotiations be con-
ducted on an industrywide basis through the Airlines’ Negotiating
Committee. The result was both unfortunate and unnecessary. As
an Emergency Board noted :?
The Airlines’ Negotiating Committee agreement was approved by
the Civil Aeronautics Board under section 412 without an eviden-
tiary hearing. Such a hearing would have revealed that prier to
Board approval. the Committee attempted to force industry wide
bargaining on the pilots.
In spite of this earlier experience. and in the face of the available
facts which point to compulsory multiemployer bargaining. the ma-
jority has blindly approved the mutual aid agreement before us
without atiempting to explore or resolve the strong likelihood that
multiemployer payments to a negotiating carrier consti:ute the price
for multiemployer representation.
Certainly the ultimatum ' issued by Capital to the Internationa!
Association of Machinists (Machinists) on Octover 22, 1953, 2 days
43 Not all alr transperfat! on work stoppages affect essential traneportatica. Note, for
example, the 10S day Western Aiclines strike im 1958, where the Naties:) Medio tten
Ronard declined ta call fer tie creation of a Presidential Dmerceney Peard. Other eitna-
tions can be envisioned where. becarse of unatected competitive aeerttors OF the mitted
cerviee scope of the struck airline, a work stor page would not afect essenti.l trans
portation.
12 Emergency Board Report, July 7. 1946.
0 6 © the mediation aml arhitration polleies of the Railway Tabor Act did not have
@ fair chance to work out ther pee ‘ful and am “able reeulle beet at the controreryy
orer industruwide bargaining. Mad thie d «pate been handled promptly When 2 arose
in the -rormer of 1:45. if mice well have been settled before the question of jyint
Dargaining beeame acute © * &”
I' See Washington Post and Times Ilerald (Oct. 27. T1958)"
Negotiations to settle the Capital Airlines mechanics’ strike collapsed yesterday an
Doth <0) ~ in the dispute took on inercacing!y hestile attitude
“Hepes fer an esely cesuiep tion of opera vious by the Washincton-based airline faded
in the face of these development. °
“Capital scucd an ultomatum te the 2474 «triking membera of the International As-o-
elation of Machini.s and scaled down its offer of wage increases by one cent an hour
for exers dar tne strike continnes
“The wesom anaqrilu veyected the ultimatum and branded It as *‘insaltine.”
“Federol Mediator Francis A. Neill said the two sides had ‘agreed to disagree” and
the nexotiotions were stalled on “dead center.” He said there wa» Bo point in cont'ne-
fog the conference
29 C.A.B.—165
19a
| eters
ns Watont. Rv o> DER A i A ALR ELEA LO E
pen A PPA EPS Sen oo - ” “ - cow =
“es
SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 183
subsequent to the effective date of this agreement and prior to the
date on which it was filed with the Board, requires an examination.
From the context of statements made by the president of Capital to
us on October 21, 1958, it is reasonable to assume that the ultimatum
was issued on behalf of other airlines as well and in reliance on the
economic strength furnished by this agreement. If, because of
this agreement, the hostile attitude displayed by the parties at the
time of the Cepital ultimatum (:n attitude in sharp contrast to the
forebearance and absence of bitterness noted in Emergency Board
Report No, 122),)° will continue in the future, the purposes of the
Railway Labor Act will be entirely frustrated.
In the majority’s view there is no evidence whatsoever that any
work stoppage was prolonged because of this mutual aid agreement
or the attitudes engen? ved by it.2 The majority also points to
the ultimate settlement of the dispute between Capital and_ the
Machinists on terms favorable to the employees as evidence of the
innocuousness of the agreement and its inability to enable carriers
to hold out longer? The latter argument, of course, seems some-
what inconsistent with the former. But whether or not the agree-
ment prolonged the Capital strike, and it appears that it did, the
Railway Labor Act is concerned with prevention of work stoppages,
and not with the settlement of disputes on terms particularly favor-
able to either side. In fact, one of the basie difliculties with this
agreement, as with the earlier Airlines’ Negotiating Committee
acreement, is the tendency to make belligerents of negotiators. The
almost inevitable result of the hostile attitudes produced by such
agreements is the ultimate concession by one party, after a work
stoppage, to terms highly favorable to the other party.
The Railway Labor Act. in contrast, contemplates the complete
aveidence of work stoppages through mutual agreement. rather than
the ultimate surrender of one side to the other. It is noteworthy
that, while the carrier parties to the negotiations reported in Emer-
gency Board No, 122 were preparing for all-out contlict, the Ma-
chinists and United sat down, in an atmosphere of mutual contidence
and trust, and worked out an agreement satisfactory to both sides '
without a work roy mg and the consequent public inconvenience.
Similar preparation for peace might have avoided the Capital work
stoppage as well.
FFEFECT ON THE DUTY TO NEGOTIATE
On its face, it is evident that reliance by the carriers on their
combined economic power to enforce Emergency Board recommenda-
tions, instead of the good faith bargaining required by the Railway
Labor Act, will violate that statute.
As previously indicated, negotiations in good faith are essential
to the success of the statutory plan. In the language of a recent
_———
a Lrepertigs of Board conference with President Baker, Oct. 21, 1958, pp. 13, 14,
20.
15 Report No. 122, p. 178.
“ALijerity opinten, poov7d
Majortt,s opinion. po ti mete 21
18 Oral argument transcript, pp. 127-129.
29 C_A.R.—I168
15
20a
gaat tees
184 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS
decision,’ “Such compliance (with the mandatory bargaining pro-
visions of the Railway Labor Act) cannet be merely perfunctory.
‘Good faith exhaustion of the possibility of agreement is required to
fulfill it’” [Emphasis added; footnote omitted. ]
The National Mediation Board. in the past, has deplored the lack
of maturity in air transport employer-cmployee relations, as evi-
denced by the frequent failure of the parties to resolve issues in
good-faith negotiations prior to mediation.“ Yet, in the negotis-
tions current at the time of execution of the agreement before us, no
carrier2! with the exception of Eastern,?? made any counteroffer
until after the Emergency Board proceeding"? Despite the absence
of early good-faith bargaining. a fact which was noted with concern
by the Emergency Poard?* the carrier parties to this agreement
characterized all requests made by labor, as well as those yet to be
made, as “extreme and unreasonable.” Whether the earriers had
agreed to make no counteroffers, as was suggested in oral argument.?®
and whether any such pact laid the foundation for the instrument
now before the Board, is impossible to determine from the meager
information currently available to us. It is clear that any aggra-
yation of the present tendency to defer genuine collective bargaining
until a work stoppage is imminent wili seriously impair the col-
lective-bargaining process.
It is clear, too, that this agreement will produce that result. since
the incentives offered by the agreement do not become operative until
the preliminary steps required by the Railway Labor Act have been
exhausted, procedurally (though not substantively), and unti! an
Emergency Board has issued recommendations. The purpose of the
agreement is to provide the combined economic power to enforce
settlement of labor disputes on whatever terms an Emergency Board
may recommend. The agreement thus aims at perpetuation of the
tendency to defer bargaining until the issuance of an Temergency
Board report. since its only effect on present bargaining practices
is to make them more attractive.
This increased use of Emergency Board recommendations as a
earrier’s first counteroffer is an unequivocal violation of the bargain-
ing mandate of the Railway Labor Act, since the statute requires
good-faith bargaining before the creation of an Emergency Board.
No carrier can know, during the negotiating period which precedes
the establishment of an Emergency Board, what recommendations
an Emergency Board will make or even if the creation of an Emer-
eee a ne eee
ane ‘ican Airlinca, Inc. ¥. Air Line Pilota Aas sciation, 43 L.R.R.M. 2402 (Dec. 12,
? .
195770 na tration of the Raflway Labor Act by tbe National Mediation Board, 1934-
ahd, °
21 The negotin. ‘ons concerned involved 6 atrlines and the International Association of
Machinists. ‘Vheoe of the alrimes, Capital, Eastern, and TWA, are parties to the acree-
ment nuder discussion. Of the 6. only Capital suffered a work stoppage, Acreement
has now been reached by International Association of Machinists on the one h ind and
each of the G6 airlines on the other. The terms of the agreement are, of course, unknown
to thiy Bonrd. The reasons whe National, Northeast, and Northwest have declined to
become particw to this mutzct ald agreement have not been furnixbed to the Boar.
2) Eastern offered sulocaet. “ay dess than the amount recommended by the Emergency
Board: oral argument tron crip. p. 127.
23 Oral argument transcript, pp. 1206-127.
24Sce Emeigency Board Leport Ne. 122, p. 9: “We reeret and deplore the fact that
there was net more effective bargaining on wages prior to the creation of this Board.”
2 Oral argument transcript, pp. 126-127.
29 0.A.B.—168
2la
Brin cccmaan. aah et hata.
SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 185
gency Buard will be recommended. As a practical matter then, the
carrier cannot freely bargain in good faith if it intends to rely on
Emergency Board recommendations, since it would thereby risi
offering its employees more than the Emergency Board will ulti-
mately recommend. The absence ef good-faith bargaining during
this period, hewever, is in tlat violation of the Railway Labor Act.
The result is well described in language of the Netional Labor
Relations Board which has said: “Where negotiation is not entered
into in good faith, where there is no real give and take, there is no
collective bargaining.” 78
The majority argues that, since the mutual aid agreement does
not entirely insulace a struck carrier egainst loss, ample incentive
will remain for each carrier to bargain freely and earnestly during
the periods designed for that purpose. The reasoning wanld be
more impressive were it not for the fact that the carriers, heretofore.
have been reluctant to engage in genuine bargaining until the elev-
enth hour. Since contemplation of unrecompensed total loss, in the
event of shut down, did not deter the carriers from engaging in such
poor bargaining practices in the past, the financial security offered
by this mutual aid agreement can only reduce the incentive to
bargain.
To evaluate the full impact of this agreement on future collective
bargaining, it is imperative that we know all the circumstances
under which it will be eifective. Obviously, if the carriers ean
invoke this agrecement during any strike, the threat to the continued
existence of genuine collective bargaining in the air transport in-
dustry will be considerably heightened.
Looking at the precise terms of this agreement, we find it opera-
tive in the event of a strike: (1) called for reasons “which include
the enforcement of demands in excess of or opposed to the recom-
mendations of a board established by the President of the United
States under section 10 of the Railway Labor Act and applicable to
such party” [emphasis addea]; (2) “ealled before the employees on
strike shall have exhe isted the procedures of the Railway Labor
Act,” or (3) “which is otherwise unlawful.”
* The judicial remedies which the carriers gratuitously commend
fo the unions in the event that carrier practices exceed the scope of
this agreement are available also to the carriers in the event of
strikes called for reasons outlined in (2) and (3) above. We have
been furnished with no reason 47 for believing that these judicial
remedies, if adequate for the employees, will not be adequate to pro-
tect the carriers against unlawful employee activity. If the rem-
edies are inadequate, the cure lies in corrective legisiaiion and not
in the vigilante activity inherent in the agreement.
BWritten Trade Agreements in Collective Bargaining; N.L.RB. Bulletin No. 4.
November 1959, p. 12
77 Transcript, pp. 95, 96. One possible explanation appears in the uncompleted oral
argument discussion of the American strike and its relationship to thit agreement: a
perhaps unintended implication exists there that unlawful strikes are these which have
net been judielally dectared to be Liwful Anether explanation may le In the Possi-
bility that a determination of ith ealtty by an atrline of airlines. under this agreement,
docs not, Whe a judtletal determination, have for its purpose the presention of strikes
but the ultimate settlement of strikes on preconceived terms.
29 C.A.R.—168
698090—62——_14
22a
west, Hf af:
e an At SOREN Pi OO a POPS EE PELE LEAS tines
NS a EE LTT REE ——_——
ee . sremcars wait = :
186 — CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS
As urgently as the actual operation of provisions (2) and (3)
above need evidentiary explanation, the most objectionable is pro-
yision (1) which relates to Emergency Hoard recommendations.
For the effect of the word “jnclude” in (1) is to make the agreement
operative in any strike affecting any of the carricr parties. It may
be invoked 1n a.d of an employer whether or not (a) the employer
has exhausted the remedies of the Railway Labor Act; (b) an }mer-
gency Board has been established; or (c) the employer will himself
accept the Emergency Board recommendations. This mutual aid
agreement, then, in threatening economic warfare unless employees
accept any and all Emergency Board findings, amends the Railway
Labor Act’s statutory plan in a manner which, from an employers
oint of view, is just as effective as the elimination of the statute.
his agreement has from an employer viewpoint all of the advan-
tages of compulsor arbitration with none of its disadvantages;
while TDmergency Board recommendations will in contemplation
he economically binding on employees, the carriers under the terms
of the agreement will be under no compulsion to accept them.*®
While it might be argued, for example, that the absence of pay-
ments to American, for the period of its strike, proves that the
agreement will not be operative in any and all circumstances, this
argument in my © inion is unpersnasive. As hereinabove indicated,
under the Jetter of the agreement, the right to payments is not con-
fned to circumstances specifically enumerated. Moreover, it is
highly probable that if American is to continue a party to the agree-
ment, it will be paid subsequent to the issuance of this opinion. In
any event, since the threat of this agreement hung over the recent
negotiations between A merican and its employees, the agreement was
operative whether or not American will be paid.
The naked question presented then is whether this Board will
approve the agreement even if operative in any strike. no mafter
how it ig motivated, or whenever It occurs. The majority, in point-
ing to the legal remedies which were available to unions prior to
the entry of this order2® answers the question in the affirmative.
It is difficult to understand, however, how remedies which are in-
adequate for carrier purposes will suffice to safeguard the interest
of employees, let alone the public, in the event of carrier activities
which violate the Railway Taber Act. Aside from the differences
in the nature of judicial relief which must be obtained, employees
vis-a-vis employers. in the event of violation of the Railway Labor
Act the employees, because of the majority's approval of this
ee
28 Acceptance of all Fmereency Yoard recommendations would be the near equivalent
of arrecing to compulsory arbitration, a process to which the carriers as a whole do
not appcar to be attracted, See American Aviation, Feb. 23, 1959. Pp. Hy i
“Constructive dl-cuxsions, but littl: ehanee of aetion, seems te sam up Labor Secre-
tary Mitchell's recent alrline labor meeting. Management asked amendments to Railway
Labor Act—seeret ballot tn strike votes, ban on jnrisdictional strikes, time limit on
length of mediation, no eevondary boyeorts, Airline Jabor leaders want no chances.
Rome carriers favor commul-ors arbitration, bat materity oppese it, as de unions. Con-
gressional action on amendments je very unlikely thie secre. ‘Mrlines give bigher priority
io working out some form_of group bargaining with unions.”
24 Moteritw opmion. p. 172
3° The carriers’ remedy in the event of {allure to negotiate in cond faith ts infunetion.
(American Airlines, Ine. ¥. Air Line Vilote Asanciation, supra.) smplosees, on the other
hand, must obtain a decree compelling specific formance of the carriers’ statutory
obligations. (Virginian Ky. v. Federation, 400 U.S. 515 (1937).)
29 €.A.B.—168
23a
| Beare Teeter PAR
SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 187
agreement, may well be required to pursue their remedies with this
Board before judicial relief is granted? If so, at least some ques-
tion arises as to whether the majority’s action has immunized car-
rier activity under the agreement from immediate or ultimate redress
by the employees under the Railway Labor Act, prior to specific
Board disapproval.
Whatever the employees’ remedies may be, we cannot approve this
agreement as not in violation of the Federal Aviation Act. the
Railway Labor Act, or the public interest in either, if it permits,
encourages, or results in carrier activities which violate either stat-
ute. Under our authority, it is not enough to say that the employees
have ample remedies in the event of unlawful carrier activity. We
are without power to approve any agreement between carriers which
has resulted or will result in unlawful activity. In the absence of
information responsive to the many questions arising under this
egreement, we must disapprove it.
“SANCE FOR THE GOOSE”
Neither the carriers nor the majority concede that a transportation
necessity must be established before this agreement can be approved.
T, on the other hand, do not concede that there can be a transporta-
tion justification for an agreement which is so clearly repugnant
to the purposes of the Railway Labor Act.
This issue needn't be resolved in view of the antitrust law implica-
tions inherent in the agreement, implications which have always, in
this Board's view, required allirmative justification.2? Such questions
are always present where competitors agree to share excess earnings.
Sharing profits with a competitor, like playing marbles “for fun”
rather than “for keeps,” is entirely inconsistent with the concept
of vigorous competition between rivals. The carriers have beon cer-
tificated to compete with, not subsidize each other. Air carrier sub-
sidy. if necessary, will be granted by the Government as provide:
by Congress in section 406 of the Act.
In spite of the need for justification, no transportation necessity
has been established. The carriers assert that since unions provide
economic assistance to each other during strikes or lockouts, the
maxim “sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander” provides the
equity for comparable mutual aid among carriers. But we have no
evidence of assistance given by other unions to the Machinists in the
strike against which this agreement was first directed. The only
assistance to the Machinists in the Capital strike was the payment
of $10 per week out of their own strike fund.4? That assistance
neither furnishes the economic strength to prolong a strike nor jus-
tifies the et bags of huge sums to a struck carrier to enable it to
resist employee requests. ‘To state the proposition is to reject it.
oy
Si Cf. Krotherhood of Railway, ctc. v. Railroad Retire. Bd., 239 F. 24 37 (1956).
S27. Majeritv opinion, p. 145; see also Isbrandtern vy. United States, 211 FL 2d 51,
ST (D.C. Cir. 10%4):
“e © © the agency entrusted with the duty to protect the public Interest (must)
scrutinize the agre ment to moke sure that the conduct thus legalized does not invade
the probiblitions of the antitrust laws anv more than te necessary to serve the purposes
of the regulatory atatute.” (Emphasis supp licd.)
83 Oral argument tranecript, p. 142.
2? C.A.B.---108
24a
188 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS
“rE RECORD”
The majority blindly denies that the foregoing clear indications of
violation of the Railway Labor Act unequivocally establish the
agreement's illegality. Accordingly, the majority is forced to recon-
cile its grant of approval with discharge of its statutory investiga-
tive duties by a three-step reasoning process. First in its “pains-
taking review” 4 tie majority leans heavily on the failure of “the
record” to provide unequivocal evidence of illegality. Second, the
majority states that the Board must approve agreements under sec-
tion 412 of the Act. in the absence of facts which affirmatively and
unequivocally establish the agreement as in violation of the Act.
Third. in recognition of the factual deficiencies of “the record,” the
majority imposed various conditions to its approval of the
agreement.
Plainly, there is no “record” in this proceeding, nor can the tran-
script of oral argument be reasonably so designated. Oral argu-
ments neither resolve. nor are they designed to resolve. factual ques-
tions. Since the majority argues that this agreement musf be ap-
proved in the absence of facts which affirmatively and unequivocally
establish its illegality a refusal by the majority to provide an
opportunity for evidentiary development of those facts is inde-
fensible. Further, no one can argue that action on the agreement
could not await more precise administrative fact-finding processes
since section 412 agreements do not require approval prior to
effectuation.
To assert that we must immediately approve agreements between
carriers in the absence of affirmative facts clearly establishing ille-
gality not only rules out the evidentiary process for section 412
agreements, but conflict=, as well, with past attitudes toward the
review of those agreements. We have repeatedly asserted that
“Where an agreement has * * * elements which are plainly re-
pugnant to established antitrust principles. approval should not be
granted unless there is a clear showing that the agreement is required
by @ serious transportation need, or in order to secure important
public benefits.” 35 [Italie supplied.] I can see no reason for main-
taining that a clear showing of illegality must "2 made by opponents
of an agreement in one instance, and a clear showing of necessity
must he made by proponents in another. If the difference is the
immunization from the sanctions of other statutes which may be
given by our approval, it must be recoenized that Board approval here
grants antitrust Jaw immunity. It must be recognized, too, that
while we have no power to grant Railway Labor Act immunity. the
possibility that this Board may have exclusive primary jurisdiction
over future allegations of Railway Labor Act violations because of
this agreement may produce the same result.¢ Plainly, regardless
of the burden of proof. the fact of the matter is that we cannot
1s Malority opinion, p. 176-177.
3 Local Cartage Aarcement Caer, 15 CNT S50, 853 (1952).
% See Brotherhood of Railway, etc. v. Railroad Retire. Bd., supra.
29 C.A.B.—168
2 ERS OE Pree: ——
SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 189
~w
approve any agreement, unless we are completely satisfied with its
legality.
‘he majority's imposition of various conditions to its approval
in no way substitutes for that satisfaction. On the contrary, the
very necessity for imposition of conditions speaks cloquently for
the majority's dissatisfaction with the agreement as written and
with the majority's lack of knowledge of the carriers’ past and
future operat.on thereunder. Astonishingly, in one of its conditions,
the majority has stated that its approval shall not affect the rights
of management or labor under the Railway Labor Act. The major-
ity is required to decide, however, whether the agreement has oper-
ated or will operate in violation of the Railway Labor Act. If the
agreement jias had or will have that effect, it clearly affects the
rights of employees adversely under that statute. The majority,
then. has approved the agreement as not in violation of the Railway
Labor Act, while, at the same time. denying that past or future
violations of the Railway Labor Act have received or will receive
the majority's blessing. If this approach is correct, then any section
432 agreenient may be iaechanicaliy approved by substituting for
factual analysis an admonition net to break the law. 1 cannot be.
lieve that Congress intended that we employ any such mechanical
nto or that our concept of admini-trative machinery take such a
iteral turn.
An unwillingness to hear evidence before rendering a decision is
more consistent with Jaissez-fa‘re concepts than with regulatory
responsibility. As a regulatory body, it is our duty to be fully
informed before dediding matters so clothed with the public interest.
We cannot approve agreements such as the one before this Board
by pleading the absence of facts when the facts are available. Here.
in spite of a prima facie indication that the agreement is repugnant
to the purposes of the Railway Labor Act. the majority has granted
its approval. not on an insuflicient record. but in the total absence
of any evidentiary record. In addition, this deficiency is aggravated
by the fact that burean counsel. nermally the sole spokesman for the
public interest, has nether participated in oral argument nor filed
a statement of position.
From all of the foregoing, I conclude that this mutual aid agree-
ment must be disapproved as adverse to the public interest. The
agreement strikes at the heart of the poliey of the Railway Labor
Act. a statute which embodies the wisdom acquired through years of
trial and error in labor Jegislation. The public interest inherent in
unintermmpted air transportation is not served by permitting manage-
ment to pit itself openly and adamantly against good-faith bargain-
ines with its emplovees, Air transportation will continue to progress
only in an atmosphere of mutual management-labor respect and co-
operation. It will not do sa by permitting air carriers, in a private
agreement, to rewrite the Railway Labor Act by silencing the em-
ployee’s voice in the determination of his wages and conditions of
employment.
29 A B.--168
26a
na cree
ow vam
paps 2k = somcenamms ar ee
190 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS
Arrenpix A
Aonerment dated as of October 20, 1958 hetween Awerican Airlines, Inc.,
Capital Airlines, Inc, Fastern A‘r Lines, Inc., Pan American World Airways,
Ine., Trans World Airlines, Inc., aud United Air Lines, Inc.
Witn resets :
Whereas, the parties are common carriers holding certificates of public
convenience and necessity issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board (hereinafter
7 = providing for the transportation by air of persons, property and
mall; an
Witenras, the mutual interests of the parties call for the taking of all proper
apd lawful mensurea to bring about sound and rensonable economic conditions
that will be of benefit to the alr transport industry and to the public; and
Wrea&ras, the parties and other airlines are facing or faced with the threat
of extreme oud unreasonable demands made by representatives of certain of
the classes and croafis of their empioyees, as exemplified by the current dispute
between certain of the parties and their maintenance and related employees,
represented for the purpose of collective bargaining by the International Asso-
ciation of Machinists, AFL/CIO (hereinafter enlled 1AM), © controversy in
which TAM has rejected and shown an utter Afsregard for the recommenda-
tions of the Emergency Board 122 appointed by the President of the United
Hintes to investigute suid dispute and has struck Capital Airlines and threat-
--... eued to strike other carriers for their insistence upon substantial compliance
= eticrre-tosme of said recommendations, which action of the IAM tends to
undermine tlie infuance. position and Integrity of such Roard and is destructive
of the collective bargaining process; and
Wuerras, it is in the public interest and the interest of the parties hereto
that the recommendations of such Presidential Emerzeucy Bonrd crented under
the provistons of the Railway Labor Act be respected by the employers aad
employees whose dispute was heard by the Roard ;
Now, Trenton, the parties bereby agree:
1. In the event any party suffers a strike, resulting in the shutdown of its
flight operations, which has been enlled for reasons which include the enforce-
mont of demands in excese of or opposed to the reconmendations of a heard
established by the President of the United States under section 10 of the Rail-
way Labor Act and applicable to such party: or which has been called before
the employees on strike shall have exhausted the procedures of the Railway
Labor Act or Which {s otherwise unlawful; then, in such event. ench party
will poy over to the party snffering the strike an nmount equal to its incrensed
revenucs nttributable to the strike duriog the term thereof, less applicable
added Mirect expenses. T’ayinents shall be mate monthly within 10 days after
the close ef each enleidor month or at such more frequent intervals as may be
agreed to by the partics.
2 ‘The purty suffering such a strike will make every rensonable effort, with
ite employees still on duty, to provide the publie with information concerning
all alr services rendered by the other purties, and to direct to them as much
of the traMe normally carried by the party suffering such a strike ne possible,
all ax the best laterests of the members of the public may require.
3. Any other alr enrrier hoiding a certifiente of public convenience and neces-
sity fesued by the CAL may become a party to this agreement by signing
counterpart coples thereof, forwarding coples to each of the other parties and
te the CAB for Ming.
4. This agreement shall become effective Immediately and shall be filed with
the CAL. If thie agreement shall be disapproved by the CAB, it shnll terminate
forthwith to the extent disapproved, and payments made hereunder, to the ex-
tent that they are affected by the terms of such disapproval, shall become and
be treated as an obligation te and owing from the party suffering the strike to
the paving party. This agreement shall continue in effect for a period of one
year from the date hereof.
29 C.A.B.—168
27a
, . . ae ee ae
Aine ONG MP ty a it 7 . -
SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 191
In Wirness Wientor, the parties have signed this agreement as of the date
first above written.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
By /s/ C. BR. SMITI
President
CAPITAL AIRLINES, INC.
By /s/ David If. Baker
Drosident
EASTERN AIR LINES, INC.
By /s/ Eddie Rickenbacker
Chairman of the Board
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC.
By _/s/ wuan T. Trippe
resident
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC.
By /s/ Charles §. Thomas
President
UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
By /s/ C.F. McErlean
Vice-President—Assistant to
President
STATE OF VIRGINIA }
COUNTY OF ARLINGTON }
Haves Preven, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is Secretary of
Capital Airlines, Ine.: that he has read and is familiar with the contents of
the attached agreement dated as of October 20, 1958S, between American Air-
lines, Ine., Capital Airlines, Ine. Fastern Air Dines, Ine., Pan American World
Airways, Ine, Trans World Airlines, Ine., and United Air Lines, Ine. : and that
the attached agreement is a true and complete copy of the original agreement
executed by the parties
RS. ¢
/s/ Hayes Dever
(NOTARIZED)
Arrenpix B
DEPARTMENT or ComMERCT
Washington, D.C., January 14, 1959.
Ilon. Javrs Ro Dereer,
Chairman, Civil Acronautics Roard, Washington, D.C.
Dran Me. Citatesan: You asked our views in connection with the Board's
consideration of the agreement by six certificated air carriers for matual as-
sistance in the event of strike. Mach of these carriers has underisken, in the
event of a strike occurring under certain conditions, to pay to any participating
earricr forced te suspend ti ht operations, any net gain realized as a result of
such shuftdewn from operations over reutes over which it is competitive with
the struck carrier. These parments are to be made only if the strike was
called to enforce demands in ecoutliet with recommendations made by a Presi-
dential board appointed under Section 10 of the Railway Laber Act, or if the
strike was called before the procedures of the Railway Labor Act had been
exbausted, or if the strike is untaw ful.
Since the agreement afleets matters within the purview of Section 412(a)
of the Civil Aeronantics Net of 15s now the Federal Aviation Act ef 1958),
the Beourd has aeeepted it} for filinz and has commenced proceedings under
Section UHC) of the Net to determine if it shonkd be approved or disapproved.
Tn this respeet the Dourd must determine whether the agreement is adverse
te the public interest
We believe this acreement is consistent with the publie interest and that it
should be approved by the Civil Aeronamties Boure.
Pouring the past two deendes, air transportation has evolved from a mode of
transport utilized by the venturesome few into an economic necessity. More
fod mere, our Nation's commerce has come to depend upon and require the
Uniniorrnpted and ecomemie services of our air earriers. This depemlence
vee AH. 168
_——
192 CIVIL AERONAUTICS aie REPORTS
upon air transportation and the need, in the public interest, for adequate, safe
and continuous service has been recognized by Congress in the statutory scheme
which has been adopted for the regulation of this industry. Air carriers may
not operate routes unless authorized to do so by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
Once such authority has been granted, safe and \adequate service must be pro-
vided without interruption unless the carrier is agthorized by the Loard to sus-
pend such operations. Air carriers must comply Wwith the requirements of the
Railway Labor Act iu the conduct of their laboer\ relations, or face the possi-
bility of loss of their nuttwrity to operate. fn \addition to this, the added
costs which may be assumed by air carriers as 4 result of bargaining with
their employees cannot be automatically passed on to the public in the form of
higher rates. Under the law, the Civil Aeronautics Board has the final word
on the rates which air carriers may charge. In short, certificated air carriers
have very little choice- they must provide service, they must operate at fares
consistent with determinations of the Board and they must abide by the re-
quirements of the Railway Labor Act.
In contrast with this, the freedom of organizations representing air carrier.
employees to take action to enforce their demands is virtually unlimited. The
initiative in determining whether or not to use economic compulsion to enforce
demands and the extent and duration of such compulsion rests with the em-
ployees and their organizations and not with the air carriers. Neither Civil
Aeronautics Board nor the Nat‘onal Mediation Board nor any other agency of
the Government has authority to elreumscribe the freedom of action which
air carrier employees hove in dealing with their employers. It is in this
posture therefore that sur carriers and their employees sit down to bargain.
The carriers cannot curtail or suspend thelr operations as a means of enfore-
ing their demands, The carriers cannot refuse to follow the procedures pro-
vided by the Railway Labor Act. The carriers cannot act in any manner not
in aceord with requirements provided by law. Any action along these lines
could result in proceedings by the Civil Aeronautics Board to deprive the car-
rier of its right to operate in air transportation.
Carrier emplosees can suspend operations by striking. They can refuse to
follow the procedures provided by the Railway Labor Act. Their right to
strike Is specifically guaranteed by law and there is no legal penalty to consider
for their failure to follow procedures promulgated to assure peace and sta-
bility in labor-management relations.
The ultimate procedure provided by the Railway Labor Act is the appeint-
ment by the Vresident of, and consideration of the dispute by, a Board em-
powered to make recommendations. It is true that neither party is bond to
accept these recommendations. It does net follow from this, however, that ft
is to be expected that either party should freely disrezard these recommenda-
tions and seek to compel the other party to de likewise. The weapon which
the employees have to compel such disrezard is the strike. When this weapon
is used against one of a number of corapeting air carriers, a legical extension
is the fact that the operating carriers reap economic benetit from the struck
earricr’s enforced suspension of flicht operations.
In the agreement which is before the Board, the parties undertake not to
retain such benefit but ra.her te restore the net cain realized to the earrier
whose employees have struck. Is this adverse to the public interest? Consid-
ered in the licht of the conditions which must be met beford print nnuder
the agreement are to be made, we believe the answer to this question must be
no.
The purposes soucht to be served by the acreement—to disceurace rejection
of recommendations made by disiuterested Boards appointed br the Presijent
awl encourage compliance with procedures provided by Congress to effect neace
and stability in air carrier Libers+nanacement dealings—these objectives ecan-
not be held to be adverse to the public interest. Neither can reasonable steps
taken to further such objectives be ansthing but consistent with the public
Interest.
Certainly this agreement does not deny to the emploree organizations their
richt to strike. It dees seck to deny to them the involuntary aid of compet-
ing air eurriers in the furtherance of strike objectives which are contrary to
the spirit amd letter of statutes designed to protect the public interest in unin-
terrupted air transportation service.
The effect of the acreement is to strengthen the ability of the parties to insist
upon complinnee by the tnuion with lawful procedures and the acc*ptance of
29 C.A.B.—'‘6S
29a
ee eee
ee ee er
Brana SrA relia 88 a el WTI HET EB
nl
SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 193
recommendations of disinterested public boards convened pursuant to pro-
cedures provided by Congress. As matters now stand, a Union which refuses
to accept the recommendations of such a Board may strike to require acceptance
of its demands. The carrier has the choice of acceding to the union demand>
or having to shut down and see its business and its customers foreed to use
the services of @ competitor. The competitor has no choice but to coutinue to
operate with the usually predictable certainty that it will be next. Its con-
tinued operations, therefore, become part of a persuasive force to require ac-
ceptance of union demands in excess of impartial recommendations. The even-
tual cost of thix must necessarily fali upon the public. If a carrier should
choose nevertheless to hold out, we have a ionz drawn out shutdewn with the
public again having te bear the eventual burder both in terms of inconvenience
and fiuanetal cost. Thix is na regulated industry. The certificated carriers
must operate and they cannot continue to operate if they lose money. Losses
must be made up either in hizher fares or goverumeut subsidy. The thrust of
the agreement before the Benrd is net to enforce unrensonable demands which
manatgement might seek It is to give a hich decree of acceptability to reeom-
mendations and procedures provided by law on the part of both management
and labor, We think these objectives will serve the public interest in assuring
genuine collective barzaining and avoiding resorts to force’ as a means of
settling disputes.
None of the carriers party to this agreement are receiving subsidy aid from
the Government. Nevertheless, the question has been raised that the agree-
nent poses the possibility that the Government may have to underwrite costs
arixing as a result of this ondertahing. This. it is argued, would be adverse to
the publie interest. We think this issue to be irrelevant to the question of the
validity of this acreetsent. We eannct predict what will actually happen but
the following are sume of the possibilities. First, none of the parties may,
during the effective period of this agreement, require subsidy. Second, the
effect of the agreetnent could be to help a earrier, which micht otherwise
require subsidy oveid that need. Finally, even if a carrier should have to apply
for subsidy mail pay during the period of this agreement, that need more than
likely would rest upen factors other than the need to meet payments made
pursuant te this agreement. In any event the proper fime to determine the
extent te which these costs may be considered for subsidy mail pay purposes
would be in a mail rate proceeding-——1f such a proceeding should be required
fn the case of a party to this acreement.
In the present proceeding it is neither contemplated nor likely that the
payments made by any of the carriers will have to be underwritten by the
Govermecnt. What is mere important from the standpoint of public interest
Is thet if air carrier ermoleyces are free to pursue demands in excess of the
recommendations ef disinterested Presidential Boards and air carriers have no
choice but te accete te such demands, then the increased costs which wenld
result moy eventually have to be borne either by the users of air transperta-
thon in the form of bicher fares or by the publie at lnrge in bearing the eost
of inerensed subsidy aid) Here asain the weight of public interest is on the
side of permitting aetien taken for the purpose of encouraging acceptance of
recommendations and campliznce with procedures provided by law. This is the
purpose seucht by the air carrier's agreement.
We believe the acreeteent is consistent with the public interest. it will nat
interfere with effective and lawful eslective bargaining and it will help to
assure adequate, ecomemie and uninterrupted air service necessary to the
commerce of the United States,
Sincerely yours,
(S) F. H. Mueller,
FREDERICK H. MuUrryer,
Undcr Scerctarnu.
DEPARTMENT OF JI'STICE
Washington, December 80, 19358.
Hien. Jaurs R. Dierrer,
Chairman, Civil Acronautics Board, Washinoton 25, D.C.
My Dyan Me Cistesax: Your letter to the Attorney General, dated Decem-
ber 8, 1958, refers te “an agreement for mutual assistance in the event of a
strike’ which “<is certified air earriers have filed with the Civil Aeronautics
Heard for approval auder Section 412 of the Civil Aeronautics Act.” That
29 «AB. - 168
80a
poupsremcen~
194 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS
letter invites “both oral and written statements for the Board's considera-
tion” in order to “aid the Board in determining whether the agreement should
be approved or disapproved.” ‘
Considering this agreement, Section 2 of the Civil Aeronautics Act obliges the
Board to weigh, among other fuctors:
Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of
an air-transpertation system properly adapted to the needs of the for-
~ eign and domestic commerce of the United states, of the Postal Service,
and of the national defense 149 USC 402 (d)).
If the Board approves this agreement pursuant to $412. however, the parties
are relieved, insofar as may be necessary to enable them to carry out its
terms, from the operation of the antitrust laws ($414). Since the Board must
weigh competitive factors before approval is granted, and antitrust immunity
results, we here simply pose briefly possible competitive issues which the Board
may wish to consider in making its decision.
Helpful at the ontsct is seme sketch of the agreement's terms. Though only
six certified: carriers, are at present signatories, Section 3 provides that “any
other air carrier holding a vertitivate of public convenience and necessity issued
by the CAB may become 2 party to this agreement. . . ” No matter the num-
ber of signatories, however, Section 1 limits the agreement’s coverage to “a
strike, resulting in the shutdewn of . . . flight operations, which has been
enlled for reasons which include the enforcement of demands in excess of or
opposed to the recommnelations of a board established by the resident of the
United States... ; or which has been called before the employees on strike
shall have exhausted the procedures of the Railway Labor Act or which is
otherwise unlawful: ... .”. Ovly in such cases, Section 1 goes on, 1s “each
party” obliged to “pay over to the party suffering the strike an amount equal
to its incrensed revenues attributable to the ‘strike, during the term thereof,
less applicable added direct expenses.” Finally, in such instances, Section 2
obliges each signatery struck airline “to provide the public with information
concerning all air services rendered by the other parties, and to direct to
them as much of the traffic normatty carried by the party suffering such a
strike as possible.”
Initially relevant is the question “whether the action springs from business
requirements or purpose to monopolize.” U.S. v. Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. 594,
Gb. To resolve this question. the eard may wish to consider whether this
agreement is primarily, 9s would appear. essentially an outgrowth ef labor-
management problems in the air enarrier field, Assuming the Board finds that
the agreement's primary purpose is, not to affect competition among airlines,
but instend to improve the sisuatery airlines’ barzaining position vis-a-vis
unions, still relevant would be the ngreement’s effect on competition. :
Turning to the agreement's possible competitive consequences, two board
Issues seem relevant. First, how if at all does the agreement affect competition
between airlines and other carriers? And, second, what is the agreement's
likely impact on competition within the airtine industry?
As for competition between scheduled air earriers and other carriers, the
acreesnent does require strc k signatory virlines “te direct” to aon-struck
siznatory airlines “as much of the traflie nermally earried by the party suffering
auch strike as possible . . .” The extent to which this prevision’s result
might be te direct te other siznatory nirlines traffie which mizht otherwise 20
to buses, railroads or supplemental non-scheduled air carriers depends on a
variety of factors ‘The impact on other methods of transportation mizht well
vary with the duration ef the airline strike teyond that, we have no way
of knowing the extent te which, even a’went. this agreement. individual air-
lines as a matter, of practice refer excess passencers exelusively te other
xcheduled airlines Nor. “as<yming this provision does alter existing practice,
do we knew whether if< impact would vary substantially from, for example, a
permissible industry ‘ndvertising program. In any event, those competitive
copsiderations which Sectien 2 obliges the Reard to consider doe not clearly
embrace consequences affecting modes of transportation other than airlines.
With these factors in mind, in this area we cannot state that the acreement
promises significant competitive consequences,
Similarly ambicneus is the asreement’s likely impact on competition within
the airline industry. On the ene hand, during a lengthy strike the agreement
mizht well help an airline survive as an effective competitor. The agreement
might, on the other hand, make it advisable for other airlines to join so that
29 C.A.B.—168
8la
ee
ae
Se Te
*
it
beat
SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 195
they may more likely, under Section 2, obtain thelr “share” of the strike-
engendered business. And, once airlines have joined, the requirement that cer-
tain profits be turned ever to the struck airline might afect sicnatery non-
struck airlines’ incentive to compete with each other for strike-spurred traffic.
llowever, as @ practical mattes, the tendency to Join might well be offset by the
fact that, even absent reference of business by the struck line, competing meom-
signatorles would likely pick up strike trafle; and regarding such traffic, non-
signers would net be obliged te turn over any portion of proiit to the struck
carrier. Finally, even if the agreement encourages other lines to join, com-
mercial advantages of building good will, aud acquainting customers with a
particular line’s service, mitizate against that dampening of competition be-
tween signatory but non-striking airlines the profit turn-over provision might
provide.
1 trust these views will prove of some help to the Board in this matter.
Stacerely yuurs,
(S) Victor R. Hansen,
Victor R. Hansen,
Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Dirision.
U.S. DEPARTMENT oF Lanon
Office of the Secretary
Washington, December 20, 1958.
The lion. James KR. Dunerer,
Chairman, Civil Acronantics Board, Washington 25, D.C.
Dear Mr. Cuainsan: This is to acknowledge your letter of December 8th
inviting the submission of views to the Civil Aeronautics Board in connee-
tion with its consideration of the agreement between certain airlines for mutual
assistance in the event of a strike.
Your invitation is now being considered to determine if the Department will
be in @ position te present a written statement which will be helpful to your
covsideration of this matter, It is unlikely that the Department will wish to
present an oral statement.
Your thoughtful invitation is appreciated.
Sincerely yours,
(S) James P. Mitchell,
Scervtary of Labor.
NATIONAL Lanor Revations Voano
; Washington 25, D.C., December 16, 1958.
Hon. Javuers R. Denver,
Cheirman, Civil Acronantics Board, Washington 25, DC.
Dean Mi. Deuce: This will acknowledge your letter of December 8, 1958,
in whieh you duvite oral and written statements from our Beard in connection
with the ting of certain air carriers for approval by your Board of an agree-
ment for mutual assi-tam ec in the event of a strike.
1 folly appreciate the desire on the part of your Board for a full expression
of views and opinions by Government agencies and other sexmnent< of the
Interested public with respect te the matiers currently pending and under
consideration by yeu and described in your letter. Loam certain that you will
readily recegnive, bewever, that beeanse our Beard is quasi-judicial in ehar-
neter, it has cenerally, as ao matter of policy, refrained from reciting its
thews except in the eeutest of a case actually before us for determination.
This bos heen eur peliey in the area embraced by the Labor Management Re-
Lifions Net which i onder our administration. It would fellow that enr
reluetance to devart from this polices would be even greater in an area, such as
thet wmder couibteration by your Board which, as you knew, is embraced by
the Railwar tiabor Act amd administered by a sister agency.
Under the circumstances, while we are deeply conscious of the merit ef the
reasens that aetuated your invitation, we feel constrained to adhere to onr
existing poliey and refrain from an expression ef views and opinions as con-
templated by your reyuest.
Sincerely yours,
(8S) Bosd Teelom,
Rorp Lrerros,
Chairman,
29 C.AB.--168
196 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS
NaTIONaAL Meptation Boarp
Washington, December 31, 1958.
Hon. James R.
Dorree,
Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board, Washington 25, D.C.
Deas Ma. Dvunree: Further refercace is made to your letter of December 8.
1958 transmitting copy of Civn Aeronautics Bonrd Order So. F-12922. also
copy of agreement made by the various airlines for mutual assistance in the
event of a strike.
? The Members of the National Mediation Board have given careful considera-
tion to your invitation to preseut oral and written statements on this sub-
_ to your Board. In view ot its primary function as a mediators agency
ndling labor disputes between roil and air carricis and the various organi-
gations representing their employes, the National Mediation Board is not ina
position to express an opinion on & controversial question of this nature.
Very truly yours,
(8) Leverett Edwards,
Leverert Epwarps,
Chairman.
Orpen
There having been filed with the Board, pursuant to section 412(a)
of the Act, agreement CAB 12635, entered into by six carriers and
providing for certain mutual assistance upon specified conditions;
ant
The Roard having. after due consideration of said agreement and
after oral argument with respect thereto, issued its opinion contsin-
ing its findings, conclusions, and decision, which is attached hereto
and made a part hereof;
Ir 18 Orpenrn—
1. That, except as indicated below, agreement CAB 12633 is not
adverse to the public interest. and should be approved;
9, That the approval referred to above should in the public in-
terest be made subject to the following conditions :
(a) The agreement should be amended by deleting clause 2 thereof.
relating to routing of traffic by a struck carrier party;
(b) The approval referred to above shall not affect the rights and
obligations of the parties. or of their employees, under the Railway
Labor Act;
(c) The «approval eranted herein shall not be deemed a deter-
mination of the reasonableness of the financial provisions of the
— for future ratemaking or other regulatory purposes under
e Act;
4. That each carrier-party to the agreement shall file with the
Board as amendments to the agreement any subsidiary agreements
or arrangements which set forth the actual or contemplated methods
for (a) determining when employee demands are in exces< of. or
opposed to. the recominendations of a board established under see-
tion 10 of the Railway Laber Act, when strike has heen cailed
before exhaustion of the procedures of the Railway Labor Act. or
when a strike is otherwise unlawful, all a stated in clause 1 of the
agreement, and by whom such determinations may be made: or (b)
measurement of the increased revenues attributable to a strike and
applicable added «lirect expenses as stated in clause i of the agree-
ment: and that. if there are no such agreements or arrangemen:¢.
each of the carrier-parties shall individually so state. Said parties
shall also file a statement of any monies which have been paid pur-
29 C.A.B.—168
88a
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SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 197
suant to the agreement indicating the amount paid by each carrier-
party and to whom such payment has been made;
4. That any carrier-party which states that no such agreements
exist shall file with the Board « complete and detailed statement of
(1) any agreements which it way have made with any of the other
carrier-parties, individually o- collectively, regarding any of the
matters specified in ordering paragraph 3. or a statement that there
are no such agreements; (2) its understanding of all its obligations
under the agreement; (3) its past, present or contemplated future
practices regarding the agreement:
5. That each carrier-party to the agreement shall file with the
Board a complete, detailed statement of the bases for each payment
made.
6. That each carrier-party which has been, or is in the future,
struck shall file with the Board for the duration of each strike a
statement containing the following information with respect to reve-
nues and expenses:
(a) An estimate of the dollar amount of operating revenues Jost
due to cessation of operations:
(b) The dollar amount of payments received under the ugree-
ment and, separately, any related tax aceruals{
(c) An estimate of the dollar amount of normal operating ex-
penses which would have been incurred to earn the revenues which
it is esiimated would have been received;
(d) The dollar anount of revennes and expenses of the period
us follows: (i) total operating revenues; (ii) total operating ex-
peises; (Gj) nonoperating income and expense—net; (iv) special
items: (v) Federal ineome taxes and tax credits; (vi) net income
after special items;
7. That each carrier shall continue to file monthly reports of all
the information required to be filed by ordering paragraphs 3 through
6 of this order, until further order of the Board; that negative re-
ports shall be filed by each carrier as to each item for which. during
the reporting period, there has been no change from the preceding
reporting period: and that such continuing reports shall be filed not
later than the 15th day of the month next following the month
for which data are reported;
8. That the approval granted herein shall be conditioned upon the
filing, within 30 days of service of this order, of an amendment to
the agreement in conformance with this order,
®. That the petitions of Air Line Pilots Association, International.
and Air Line Agents Association, International, dated February 2
and 32. 1959, be and hereby are dismissed.
—
1The Asin faralshed pursuant to stbparagraph (4) above shall be ir accordance with
the accounting and reporting provisions of part 241 of the Beonomie Kegulatlons and
exclusive of any payments received undes the termes of this agreement.
20 C.A.B.--168
APPENDIX C
Six-Carrier Mutual Aid Pact
Supplemental Opinion and Order
on Reconsideration
Order E-14563 (1959)
Opinion of the Board
Opinion of Member Minetti, dissenting
Docket 9977
(B-14563)
SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT
Adopted October 19, 1959
SUPPLEMENTAL Orrnion axp Onper oN RECONSIDERATION
By THe Boao:
The Board in its decision of May 20, 1959 (order E-13899), 29
C.A.B. 168, conditionally ap roved under section 412 the financial
provisions of the above-sty agreement providing limited mutual
assistance in the event of certain strikes. A joint petition for re-
consideration of our opinion and order and other relief, and motion
for leave to file latc, have been filed by the Brotherhood of Railway
and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Em-
ployes, and the International Association of Machinists. Answers
opposition to the petition and motion have been filed by the six
air carrier parties to the agreement. ;
We have considered the contentions of the parties and conclude
that the matters set forth in the petition do not establish error in
the Board’s decision or otherwise estabiish that the relief requested
is warranted. . Se
1. We have chosen to consider the petition on its merits despite
—"a. failure to show cause for failure to make timely
ing. The petition was su mitted for filing 10 ~_ after the
e
procedural — on the date he submitted the petition; that
petitioners and counsel were neither given nor had actual notice of
or experience with the revision of rule 37; that officers of both peti-
tioners were engaged as witnesses in congressional hearings so that
the necessary authorization to file the petition was not received
by reason of the Ohio location of the headquarters of one petitioner;
and that consideration of the petition on its merits will not prejudice
any party to the pact.
As pointed out by the answering parties, these statements are not
the “showing of unusual and exceptional circumstances, constituting
1 Regulation PR-24, adopted Feb. 11 1950. effective Feb. 14, 1959, shortened the time
for Gling petitions for reconsideration from 30 to 20 days.
Vol. 30, No. 7
Oye aaa,”
teak SP aa Lt Race
ets § Ror ee ees
SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 91
ood cause for movant’s inability to meet the established procedural
ates” contemplated by rule 37(a) as a basis for the grant of a
motion for leave to file a petition after the time for the filing thereof
has expired. The publication of revised rule 37 in the Federal
Register? was sufficient to give notice to any person subject thereto
or affected thereby regardless of actual knowledge,’ and the failure
to obtain authorization while corporate oflicers were otherwise en-
gaged is not equivalent to an inability to do so.
© failure to lodge the petition within the four corners of our
Procedural Regulations would normally disqualify it from further
consideration by the Board. In this instance, however, we shall
exercise our discretion to relax our rales, based upon consideration
of the surrounding circumstances, the Jack of prejudice to any party,
and the public interest in a decision upon the merits. The pw
tions of the motion demonstrate the inadvertent nature of the failure
to comply with established procedural dates. The brief delay re-
sulting from the late filing will neither prejudice nor unduly impose
upon the air carrier parties, who remain legally free to operate
under the agreement as approved. Most importantly, a final disposi-
tion on technical procedural grounds of a matter so heavily weighted
with the public interest would be a disservice to all concerned, for
certain allegations contained in the petition strike at the core of the
basic fairness of our decisional process. ‘These considerations lead
us to entertain the petition.
2. On the merits, petitioners contend that it was the Board’s duty,
upon its own initiative, to order an evidentiary investigation of the
agreement. It is alleged that, by proceeding upon the basis of writ-
ten briefs and oral argument, the Board unfairly foreclosed presen-
tation of pertinent matters.
We disagree. Of course, we fully recognized that the substantial
impact of the agreement upon «air carriers, their employees, and the
public made some form of hearing appropriate despite the fact that
there is no statutory requirement for a hearing in respect to agree-
ments filed under section 412 of the Act. But we were also cog-
nizant that no person had requested a hearing, that the grounds of
objection to the agreement were alleged to be “clear,” “obvious,” or
“patent on its face,” and that various considerations, including peti-
tioners’ request for disapproval “as promptly as possible,” made
speedy action by the Bourd desirable. Balancing these considera-
tions, and having determined that the agreement was not prima facie
repugnant to law, we correctly corcluded that the matter of approval
or disapproval of the agreement should be set down for oral argu-
ment at an early date, with ample opportunity for submission of
pertinent matter in writing.‘
It is noteworthy that petitioners did not seek reconsideration of
the procedure of which they now complain cither at the time we
made our intentions plain or at any other time prior to the issuance
of our decision. Indeed, even at this late date, after many months
of experience with the operation of the agreement, petitioners have
wholly failed to spell out any specilic factual matters which they
expect to prove after evidentiary exploration and which might in-
224 Fed. Reg. 1152. Feb, 14, 1959.
344 USCA, wee, 207; Vederal Crop Ina, Corp. ¥. Merrill, 8332 U.S. 380 (1947).
Order 13233, Dee. 4, 1958, 26 C.A.B. 964.
30 CAL
62::974—62--—8 86a
55 AE ATP CL CLITORIS
me
area s a
92 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS
fluence the Board to reconsider its decision. These matters do not
lend merit to petitioners’ suggestion that the Board abused a discre-
‘tion which was invoked by no party. We are confident that our
procedures provided petitioner with a wholly fair igre yn to
gupport its objections, and that the Board took full and correct
account of all the considerations pertinent to the public interest
implications of the agreement.
3. Petitioners allege that the Board incorrectl construed section
412 as requiring only the negative finding that the agreement is not
adverse to the public interest and, therefore, improperly confined its
review of the agreement to a determination whether there were
in the record aflirmative facts clearly ng ig | it to be inconsistent
with that interest. It is contended that the Board erred in failing
to determine whether the agreement in fact effectuates the public
interest and the purposes of the Act.
We cannot ngree, for our decision was not predicated upon the
niceties of negative as opposed to aflirmative findings. Hy our pro-
cedure we allowed development of a full record concerning the
—s and effect of the agreemnt and, against this background
and without indulging in any presumptions, arrived at the conclu-
sion that the agreement accorded with the statutory criteria for ap-
proval. Our conclusion rested — an assessment of the agreement,
as amplified by the record, in ight of the public interest and the
objectives of the Act, and not, as petitioners assume, upon the failure
of any party to come forward with evidence. Although we were
mindful of the meagerness of the showing made by those objecting
to the agreement, we did not reach our conclusion until satisfied by
the record that the agreement would be unprejudicial to the public
interest. Our decision to approve the agreement was based upon a
conviction that, in light of all circumstances, the objections fully
unfolded upon an adequate record were lacking in merit. Accord-
ingly, we must reject petitioners’ argument insofar as it ettributes
our ayer subtle statutory phraseology or burden of proof.
4. The petition contains excerpts from the legislative history of
the Railway Labor Act in an attempt to show that the intent of
Congress was hostile to agreements such as the one before us. The
congressional history, however, only confirms our original view that.
in the Railway Labor Act. Congress restricted the ambit of its
proscription against compulsion to governmental action, and left
the parties free to engage in reciprocal tests of economic strength
within the framework of collective bargaining.
The remaining pvints advanced by the petition reiterate matters
previously raised and fully considered in the Board’s original
opinion, We find nothing presented which establishes error in our
determinations and. consequently, adhere to our decision in this
matter. Accordingly,
Ir 18 Orvrrre—
1. That the motion for leave to file petition for reconsideration
filed herein by the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks,
5 Nothing in Acquisition of Mavflower Air. by Northeast Air., 4 C..T. GSO (10944),
uoted by petitioners, ix inconsixtent with the views expressed herein. Indeed, that crise
volved transfer of a certificate under see. 401, o8 well as purchase of properties under
sec. 40%, and xec. 401 ix framed in terms of an affirmative Onding of consistency with
the public interest.
30 C.A.B.—90
87a
Qe eee
a edo ble ota ce adele eb ena Sl Koa eames WS
SIX-CARRIER MUTUAL AID PACT 93
Freight Handlers, _— and Station Employes, and the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists. be and it hereby is granted ;
2. That the petition for reconsideration and other relief so tiled be
and it hereby is denied.
Durfee, Chairman, Gurney, Vice Chairman, and Denny, Member
of the Board, concurred in the above opinion and order. Minetti,
Member, filed the following dissent.
Minettt, Member, dissenting:
I would grant the petition filed by the Brotherhood of Railway &
Steamship Clerks and the International Association of Machinists
(Machinists) for reconsideration of the Board opinion and order by
which this six-carrier mutual aid agreement was approved. As the
petition = points out, minimal justice cog poe that govern-
mental sanction be given only after all pertinent factual information
has been developed through the evidentiary hearing process. Al-
ternatively, and absent a satisfactory explanation of the preliminary
indications of the agreement’s illegality, the petition properly seeks
summary disapproval.
The majority's treatment of the Machinists’ petition is disappoint -
ing. After devoting several pages in debate over whether the peti-
tion should be entertained, the majority disposes of the petition with
three arguments:
First, the majority states, since no party requested an evidentiary
hearing, no probing of the facts underlying the mutual aid agree-
ment is required. Clearly, however, the absence of any such request
cannot excuse a failure to exercise this “oard’s statutory obligation
to explore the facts underlying this agreement. As [ indicated in
my earlier dissenting opinion. those facts of which we are currently
aware should themselves prod the Board into seeking evidentiary
explorations of the prima facie violations of the Railway Labor Act
which are apparent therein. But whatever the Board's duty may be
where no evidentiary hearing has been requested, the Air Line
Agents Association did request such a hearing —— to oral
argument in this proceeding. In these circumstances. the majority's
surprise at the Machinists’ current request is unimpressive.
Second, the majority states, without perceptible embarrassment,
that its approval “was not predicated upon the niceties of negative
as opposed to affirmative findings,” but on the “full record.”
In view of its earlier allusions to the necessity for an aflirmative
showing of illegality ' as a prerequisite to disapproval, the majority's
FO ea the following excerpts from Siz-Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, 29 C.A.B. 168
“e © © the Board has determined to approve the acreement since * * © the basic
agreement cannot be found to be adverec to the public interest or in riolation of the
Act.” (p. 170+) | [Eanplasi< added! ]
“@ © © we are governed by sertion 412 of the Act, which provides that we shall
approve any agreement not found to be adverse to the public interest!? or in violation
ofthe Act.” (tp. 170) [Pootnete omitted: empha-t< added. |
“@ © © the record Is devoid of anv showing that the duration of any dispute was
Prolonged ae a result of the mutual aid facreement} © © *° tp. Tete.
“@ © © we must conclude that the nnions have failed to prore their contentions that
the agreement Vielates the Kailway Later Net." (ge D758
“e © © After examining the record, we cannot conclude that the industry * © * will
be aMicted by such a disparity in economic power ax to jeopardize the attainment of
the statutory objectives" tp 05s Tae | amgelecasts acdebest |
“@ @ © the Roard’s ordcr follows from the lack of any affirmative showing that the
aaa in adlvetse te the objectives specitied by the Congress.” tp. 177) [Emphs<i«
30 CAB.
Sanaa ————
/
2
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94 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD REPORTS
present position is sur rising. It appears, moreover, to be destruc-
tive of any basis for Board action, for, if stripped of presumption,
all that remains of the majority order is “<ee-no-evil” oomnsbenry,
This desire for Governmental neutrality in management-labor
affairs constitutes the majority’s third argument in answer to the
ition for reconsideration. e Railway Labor Act, it urges, for-
ids Governmental compulsion or interference in management-labor
relations; the Railway Labor Act does not prohibit economic com-
<7 by either party, the majority states, but “leaves the parties
ree to engage in reciprocal tests of economic strength within the
framework of collective bargaining.” The majority fails to recog-
nize, however, that sincere collective bargaining is the substitute for,
rather than the companion of, economic compulsion. The majority
further fails to recognize that despite its earnest desire to remain
neutral, its summary grant of antitrust. and possibly Railway Labor
Act, immunity, has thrown the considerable weight of the U.S. Gov-
ernment on side of management in this dispute. Morcover, its
willin to permit the Bureau of Air yee to abstain from
participation in this proceeding has, to a large extent, shielded the
a t from examination for consistency with the public interest
and has added further partisan color to the Governmental action.
Since the filing of the petition for reconsideration, union plans
to counteract the mutual aid agreement with interunion assistance
have been publicly reported.? While this reported union reaction to
the six-carrier combination, if accurate, is neither unexpected nor
unreasonable, it emphasizes the variance between the purposes of
the Railway Labor Act and the aims and natural consequences of
the six-carrier mutual aid agreement. I can only hope that the
carrier parties to the agreement will bring about a cease fire in em-
loyer-employee hostilities by refusing to extend the mutual aid pact
beyond its October 20, 1959, termination date.
either the impact nor the significance of this agreement is con-
fined to the immediate carrier parties, on the one hand, and the
Machinists, on the other. On the contrary, the agreement threatens
to affect the future welfare of the entire industry at a time when
productivity and mutual Jabor-management respect and cooperation
are essential. To the extent that this agreement has increased the
possibility of future industrywide work stoppages, both the carriers
ZAviation Week, Sept.
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