Petition for Rehearing — Diamond v. Bland

Supreme Court brief1974

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— OFC 2 1974

Supreme Court of the Unite States

October Term, 1974

No. 74-97

ROGER JON DIAMOND; WILLIAM DUXLER;

and PEOPLE'S LOBBY, INC.,

Petitioners,

vs.

FRANK BLAND, Sheriff of San Bernardino

County; LOUIS J. FORTUNA, Chief of Police

of City of San Bernardino; LOWELL E.

LATHROP, District Attorney of San

Bernardino County; JAMES LAMBERT;

C.H. BARRET: AL C. BALLARD, Mayor

of City of San Bernardino; and

HOMART DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ of Certiorari To The

Supreme Court of the State of California

PETITION FOR REHEARING

ROGER JON DIAMOND

Attorney at Law

15415 Sunset Boulevard

Pacific Palisades

California 90272

(213) 454-1351

Attorney for Petitioners.

PEOPLE’S LOBBY PRESS. LOS ANGELES

ethhen

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1974

No. 74-97

ROGER JON DIAMOND; WILLIAM DUXLER;

and PEOPLE'S LOBBY, INC.,

Petitioners,

US.

FRANK BLAND, Sheriff of San Bernardino

County; LOUIS J. FORTUNA, Chief of Police

of City of San Bernardino; LOWELL E.

LATHROP, District Attorney of San

Bernardino County; JAMES LAMBERT;

C.H. BARRET: AL C. BALLARD, Mayor

of City of San Bernardino; and

HOMART DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Petitioners herein respectfully

move this Court for an order (1) vacat-

ing its order of October 15, 1974 deny-

ing the petition for writ of certiorari

in this case, Mr. Justice Douglas and

Mr. Justice Stewart being of the opinion

that the petition should be granted, and

(2) granting the petition. On October 3l,

2

1974 Mr. Justice Brennan extended the

time in which to file a petition for

rehearing to and including December 9,

1974.

Rehearing is sought because of the

following intervening circumstances:

1. Amendments to the California

Constitution effective November 6,

1974;

2. Amendments to the California

Government Code effective January 7,

1975;

3. Comments of Chief Justice Warren

Burger reported on October 15, 1974

If rehearing is granted and certiorari

is granted, this Court should resolve the

constitutional issues presented in the

petition for certiorari in light of the

enumerated intervening circumstances. At

a minimum, this Court should grant cer-

tiorari, summarily vacate the judgment

of the California Supreme Court, and

remand the case to that court for recon-

sideration of its four-to-three decision

in light of the substantial intervening

circumstances which have occurred at the

state level.

I. AMENDMENTS TO CALIFORNIA

CONSTITUTION

On November 5, 1974 the California

electorate voted to amend the California

Constitution, and the amendments became

effective on November 6, 1974. Article

I, Sections 9 and 10 (the free speech

and petition provisions of the California

Constitution, Pet.App. A., pp. A2-A3)

etm ccensne

were repealed.

Justice Mosk, writing for the three

dissenters on the California Supreme

Court, based his decision partly on

Article I, Section 9 of the California

Constitution (Pet.App. O, p. Al1l4).

Although Sections 9 and 10 were

repealed by the California electorate,

substantially similar provisions were

added to the California Constitution.

Article I, Section 2 now provides as

follows:

"Every person may freely speak,

write and publish his or her senti-

ments on all subjects, being respon-

sible for the abuse of this right.

A law may not restrain or abridge

liberty of speech or press."

Article I, Section 3 now provides as

follows:

"The people have the right to

instruct their representatives,

petition government for redress

of grievances, and assemble freely

to consult for the common good.”

It should be noted that the new "peti-

tion clause" is broader than the old

(Article I, Section 10) because the right

to petition has been extended from the

right to petition the "Legislature" to

the right to petition "government."

More important than the changes noted

above is the addition of Article I,

Section 24 to the California Constitution:

"Rights guaranteed by this

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Constitution are not dependent on

those guaranteed by the United

States Constitution.

This declaration of rights may

not be construed to impair or deny

others retained by the people."

The addition to the California Consti-

tution of this amendment is a significant

intervening circumstance. It goes to the

heart of the dispute between Justice

Burke's four-justice majority opinion

and Justice Mosk's three-justice dissent-

ing opinion. Justice Mosk concluded that

petitioners’ rights were protected by the

California Constitution, which afforded

petitioners greater rights than they

possessed under the federal constitution.

Justice Burke did state that the question

was being left open (Pet.App. O, p. 104)

because, in his view, Lloyd v. Tanner,

407 U.S. 551 (1972), is based on the

property right of the shopping center,

not the absence of a First Amendment

right in the leaflet distributor. As

noted in the petition for certiorari,

there is great uncertainty in the lower

courts and among the legal commentators

as to the precise meaning of Lloyd v.

Tanner. Pet. pp. 36-37.

This constitutional change alone

requires, at a minimum, this Court to

vacate summarily the judgment below and

remand with directions to the California

Supreme Court to reconsider its opinion

in light of the change. Parenthetically,

it should be noted that Justice Burke

retired from the California Supreme Court

on November 20, 1974, leaving a three-to-

three split on the issue. Perhaps the

5

vote of his replacement will make the

difference (just as the loss of the late

Justice Raymond E. Peters from the first

six-to-one Diamond v. Bland majority

apparently led to the second four-to-

three reversal (Justice Clark, Peters'

replacement, voted to overrule the prior

decision)). (Mr. Justice Marshall dis-

senting in Lloyd v. Tannexr, 407 U.S. 551,

584 (1972), recognized the effect of the

composition of a court upon the decision

it renders.) (It also perhaps should be

noted that Secretary of State Edmund G.

Brown, Jr., who filed an amicus curiae

brief in support of petitioners in the

California Supreme Court (Pet.App. M,

pp. A91-A98) was elected Governor of

California on November 5, 1974. Governor-

elect Brown, in view of the denial of

certiorari, cannot determine whether to

seek 2 statute specifically authorizing

the utilization of shopping centers for

the circulation of initiative petitions.

It is not clear whether such a statute

would be constitutional. The present

opinion of the California Supreme Court

indicates that in its view this Court

would strike it down. Yet this Court has

not spoken. The California Legislature

will not enact a law the California

Supreme Court believes would be invalid.

Petitioners cannot enact such a statute

by an initiative petition without access

to shopping centers.)

II. LIMITATION ON EXPENDITURES;

CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE

Another significant intervening circum-

stance is the addition of Sections 85200

and 85201 to the California Government

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Code regarding the limitation on expendi-

tures which may be incurred in the circu-

lation of statewide initiative petitions.

These sections will become effective on

January 7, 1975. They provide as

follows:

"85200. No person shall incur

any expenditure in furtherance of

a circulation or qualification of

a statewide petition without the

express or implied authorization

of the proponent. For purposes

of this article, 'expenditure' does

not include:

(a) Unreimbursed expenses incur-

red by a circulator incidental to

his circulation of the petition;

(b) Expenditures for advertis-

ing or speech regarding the measure

unless the advertising or speech is

directly incidental to circulation

of the petition.

"85201. Not more than twenty-

five cents ($0.25) multiplied by

the number of signatures required

for qualification, adjusted for

cost of living changes, shall be

spent in furtherance of the circu-

lation or qualification of a state-

wide petition."

Throughout the litigation in the

instant case there has been no limit on

the amount of money which could be spent

to circulate and qualify a statewide

initiative petition for the ballot. The

absence of any restriction on the expen-

diture of funds to collect signatures

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on petitions is inextricably related

to the major premise of the majority

a of the California Supreme Court,

-€., that there are effective, altern-

fites methods cf gathering signatures on

petitions. As Secretary of State Edmund

G. Brown, Jr., pointed out in his amicus

brief, many California initiative

petitions qualified for the ballot

because of the financial resources of the

proponents of the measures. If cost is

not a factor, promoters of initiative

petitions might be able to pay persons

to go door-to-door in the communities and

gather signatures in this time consuming

and expensive fashion. Thus, with no

financial limitation, effective, alter-

native means of circulating initiative

petitions may exist (which petitioners

do not concede). However, the limitation

on expenditures for qualifying initiative

petitions will force all proponents to

seek locations where numerous signatures

can be gathered with little expense, such

as shopping centers. Secretary of State

Brown noted in his amicus brief the

relationship between the availability of

alternatives and the cost of qualifying

initiative petitions. Indeed, he anti-

cipated the enactment of financial

limitations. Govehor-elect Brown stated

in his brief,

"Finally, proposals to limit

circulation expenditures or to

prohibit payment to circulators

are pending before the Legisla-

ture. If any of these proposals

are enacted and if the opinion of

the District Court of Appeals (sic)

is affirmed, the result could well

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be to make the qualification of

an initiative petition a practical

impossibility under any circum-

stances.” Pet.App. M, pp. A96-A97.

In view of the new financial restric-

tions on expenditures to qualify initia-

tive petitions for the ballot and the

significance to the majority of the

California Supreme Court of the avail-

ability of alternative (but obviously

more expensive) methods of petition

circulation, at a minimum this Court

should vacate the judgment of the

California Supreme Court and remand to

that court for the purpose of permitting

it to reconsider its opinion.

III. COMMENTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Statements made by the Chief Justice

were published in the Los Angeles Daily

Journal on October 15, 1974, the same

day certiorari was denied. The Chief

Justice announced his concern about the

increasing workload of the Court. A

copy of the article is included as an

appendix to this petition.

The action of the Court in denying

certiorari can only lead to an increase

in litigation, both state and federal,

with the resulting continued and in-

creased burden on this Court which the

Chief Justice apparently would like to

see lessened. By denying certiorari in

this case, which involves the right of

the initiative guaranteed by the consti-

tutions of twenty-one states, this Court

has necessarily made it much more diffi-

cult, indeed impossible in most cases,

for citizens of these states to partici-

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pate in that form of the legislative

precess known as the initiative. With-

out shopping center access, citizens

simply cannot gather enough signatures

in the time allotted to qualify a measure

for the ballot.

Often, the subject of a citizen

initiative drive is the same as a lawsuit.

The instant case is an excellent example.

It involves an attempt to enact anti-

pollution legislation by the initiative

process.

When the legislative system fails

(initiative or representation), persons

turn to the judiciary. Thus, the battle-

ground for clean air shifted to the

judiciary. See, e.g., In re Multidistrict

Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. ’

ve iu 3 City of Chicago

v. General Motors Corporation, 467 F.2d

1262 (7th Cir. 1972); Diamond v. General

Motors Corp., 20 Cal.App.3d 374, 97

Cal.Rptr. 639, 47 A.L.R. 3d 759, 3 E.R.C.

1227 (1971). Some air pollution cases

have reached this Court on appeal, e.g.,

City of New York v. United States, 397

U.S. 248 (1970), and some have been

brought as original proceedings, e.g.,

Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406

U.S. 109 (1972).

Numerous other social problems which

are brought to the judiciary could be

solved by the legislative process. By

limiting the legislative process, this

Court forces frustrated citizens to turn

to the courts for help. The Chief Justice

has previously stated his preference for

legislative solutions to social problems.

See United States v. Richardson, U.S.

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, 41 L.Ed 2d 678, 689-690 (1974) and

Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the

War, U.S. __, 41 L.Ed 2d 706, 716-

722 (1974).

A decision in favor of petitioners

would result in a reduction in the work-

load of this court, and the workload of

the judiciary in general. The more

Opportunities citizens have to partici-

pate in the legislative process, the less

will be the demands they place on the

judiciary. Obvious also is the fact that

the availability of the initiative pro-

cess reduces the likelihood that frus-

trated citizens will resort to socially

Se methods to accomplish their

goals.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, as

well as those contained °. the petition

for writ of certiorari, petitione:s pray

that this Court grant rehearing of the

order of denial, vacate that order, grant

the petition and either hear this case on

its merits or summarily vacate the judg-

ment below and remand to the California

Supreme Court for reconsideration of its

opinion in light of the intervening cir-

cumstances enumerated herein. On a

1. A statute adopted by the initia-

tive process may lead to judicial

action if it is unconstitutional. This

is true of any statute. An initiative

statute was declared violative of the

state and federal constitutions by the

California Supreme Court in Weaver v.

Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235 (1966).

AS Ee.

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previous occasion in this case the Chief

Justice and Justice Blackmun voted to

grant certiorari and also voted to grant

a rehearing, Homart Development Co. v.

Diamond, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); 405 U.S.

981 (1972). Now Justices Douglas and

een favor the granting of certiorari.

Petitioners respectfully urge this

Honorable Court to grant the rehearing

requested.

Respectfully submitted,

ye Cid

ROGER JON DIAMOND

15415 Sunset Boulevard

Pacific Palisades

California 90272

(213) 454-1351

Attorney for Petitioners.

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

As counsel for Petitioners, I hereby

certify that this petition for rehearing

is presented in good faith and not for

delay and is restricted to the grounds

specified in Rule 58(2) of this Court.

rege. Jn amend

ROGERGON DIAMOND

Counsel for Petitioners

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APPENDIX A

Los Angeles Daily Journal, Oct. 15, 1974

Burger Complains

Of High Caseload

Supreme Court to Begin Hearing

Record Number of Appeals Today

WASHINGTON (UPI)—The

Court its

of hearing orai in its

Warren E. Burger 5 the

“SB "i been wt

urger has frequently com-

plained about the number of cases

the court must consider and said iz

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decisions included such

issues as school %

obscenity rulings and cases

involving other forms of free

Douglas was, in the AJC’s

opinion, the most consistently

liberties positions in only 18 of the 76

poet ne mee es ay ee ey

TERR: BLE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Roger Jon Diamond, declare as

follows: I am an attorney at law duly

admitted to practice before the Supreme

Court of the United States, and I am

the attorney for petitioners.

On 1/279 Fé 1974, pursuant to

Rule 33 of the Supreme Court Rules, I

caused the within Petition for Rehearing

to be served on all respondents, the

California Supreme Court, the California

Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate

District, the San Bernardino County

Superior Court, and on California Secre-

tary of State Edmund G. Brown, Jr., amicus

curiae in the California Supreme Court,

and the American Civil Liberties Union

of Southern California, amicus curiae

in the California Supreme Court, by plac-

ing three copies thereof enclosed in a

sealed envelope with first class postage

thereon fully prepaid, in the United

States mail at Los Angeles, California,

addressed as follows:

Court of Appeal

Fourth Appellate District

640 State Building

303 West Third Street

San Bernardino, Calif. 92401

V. Dennis Wardle, Clerk

San Bernardino Superior Court

351 North Arrowhead Avenue

San Bernardino, Calif. 92401

Lonergan, Jordan, Gresham

& Varner

Allen B. Gresham, Esq.

398 West Fourth Street

San Bernardino, Calif. 92401

Lederer, Fox and Grove

Lawrence M. Cohen, Esq.

233 South Wacker, Suite 7916

Chicago, Illinois 60606

A. L. Wirin

Fred Okrand

John D. O'Loughlin

Jill Jakes

323 West Fifth Street

Los Angeles, California 90013

Ralph H. Prince, City Attorney

300 North "D" Street

San Bernardino, Calif. 92418

Paul A. Grube, Jr.

Deputy County Counsel

157 West Fifth Street

San Bernardino, Calif. 92401

Daniel H. Lowenstein, Esq.

111 Capitol Mall

Sacramento, Calif. 95814

California Supreme Court

350 McAllister Street

San Francisco, Calif. 94102

I further certify that all parties

required to be served have been served.

Kege, Ton Damad

Jon Diamond

15415 Sunset Boulevard

Pacific Palisades

California 90272

PF PONV INLET ONE AI Bi Pe

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