Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Modern Air Transport, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, District No. 145
Supreme Court brief1974
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1974
MODERN AIR TRANSPORT, INC.,
Petitioner,
Ve
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,
DISTRICT NO. 145,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
JOHN BACHELLER, JR.
Counsel of Record
WILLIAM F. KASPERS
First National Bank
Tower
Atlanta, Georvia 30303
Attorneys for
Petitioner
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Gramaome BIA 2 2 sc te wt et eee 2
GUMAMEEGEOUN 6 © ee he te eee 2
QUESTION PRESENTED ....e«e.e 2
Damawnm Seay 6 2 6 bs eb ee 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ....e. 5
I. The Factual Background
and the Arbitrator's
Award, — o . — oe oe oe - oO oe 5
II. The Decision »f the
mameeaee Court « « 2 ss 9
III. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals ..... 10
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT. . ll
I, THE DECISION HEREIN INVOLVES
AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FED-
ERAL LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN
SPECIFICALLY CONSIDERED AND
SETTLED BY THIS COURT. MORE-
OVER, THE DECISION HEREIN IS
IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE
DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF
APPEALS WHICH HAVE ADDRESSED
eis QUESTION. . . 2. wer ll
II
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
Il. THE DECISION HEREIN IS
OF IMPERATIVE PUBLIC
IMPORTANCE TO THE EFFEC-
TIVE OPERATION OF THE
RAILWAY LABOR ACT ... - 25
6 ONC LUS ION ss * * 7 _ . = — J > 2 7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. « « e« « 29
APPENDICES:
A. Decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit . .. - 1-A
Order of the United States
District Court for the
Southern District of
Florida ..«.e«.ee+«e-ee e 14-A
Final Judgment of the
United States District
Court for the Southern
District of Florida ... 25-A
Decision and Award of the
Arbitrator e e e e e a e e Zz 7-A
|| &
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES:
Cases
Amanda Bent Bolt Co. v. UAW,
451 F.2d 1277 (6th Cir. 1971)
American Machine and Foundry
Company v. Auto, Aerospace and
Agr. Implement Workers,
329 F.2d 147 (2nd Cir. 1964).
Dallas Typographical Union,
No. 173 v. A. H. Belo Corp.,
372 F.Zd 577 (5th Cir. 1967)-
H. K. Porter, Inc. v. United
Saw Workers, 333 F.2d 596
(3rd Cir. 1964) oe ee ee -_ 8 . .
International Brotherhood of
Pulp, Sulfite and Paper Mill
Workers Local Union No. 874
v. St. Regis Paper Company,
362 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1966).
Local 342, UAW v. T.R.W.,
402 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1968).
Local 7-644 Oil. Chemical &
Atomic Workers International
Union v. Mobil Oil Company,
350 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1965).
21
18
17
22
18
20,21
17
IV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES:
Cases
Socony Vacuum Tanker Men's
Assoc. v. Socony Mobil Oil Co.,
369 F.2d 480 (2nd Cir. 1966). .
Textile Workers Union of
America v. American Thread
Company, 291 F.2d 894
a oe, BOORt GS sk ee et
Textron, Inc. v. Auto Workers
Local 516, 86 LRRM 3240
jaeo Car, July 26, i974). « » e
Timken Co, v. Steelworkers
Local 1123, 432 F.2d 1012
Cea Gas: SOtal & « © © «© & 6 6
Torrington v. Metal Products
Workers, 362 F.2d 677
(2nd cir. 1966 ) ° ° e. . e ° ° e
Truck Drivers and Helpers
Union Local 784 v. Ulry-
Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562
eee acute 29RO) s sc bk te
United Steelworkers of America v.
Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.,
363 Use 593 . * * o . e es - oO
Page
18
18
24
24
ee oe
18,22
12,13
16,17
21,23
25,26
V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES:
Cases
Western Iowa Pork Company v.
National Brotherhood Packing
“House and Dairy Workers,
366 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1966)... 19
Statutes
Railway Labor Act, as
amended (45 U.S.C. § 151,
et. seq.)
Section 204 (45 U.S.C. § 184). . 3
28 Uessecs § 1254 (1) e . ° e a 2
Miscellaneous
Black's Law Dictionary
(Rev. 4th Ed. 1968) .... 14,15
IN THE
SUMPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1974
NO.
MODERN AIR TRANSPORT, INC.,
Petitioner,
Ve
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,
DISTRICT NO. 145,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Modern Air Transport, Inc.,
Petitioner herein, by and through its
undersigned counsel, petitions this Court
for a Writ of Certiorari to review the
Decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, rendered
and entered in this case on June 20, 1974,
reversing the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law rendered by the United
States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida on November 13, 1974,
but nevertheless affirming the order of
the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida entered on
2
November 30, 197%, said order granting
enforcement of an arbitrator's award
rendered on March 29, i972,
OPINIONS BELOW
The decision and judgment of the Court
of Appeals (App.A, infra, pp.1-A - 13-A)?+
is reported at 495 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir.1974).
The decision and order of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of
Florida (App.B, infra, pp.14-A - 24-A) is
to date unreported. The final judgment of
the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida (App.c, infra,
pp. 25-A - 26-A) is also unreported, as is
the decision and award of the arhitrator
(App.D, infra, pp. 27-A - 54-A).
JURISDICTION
The decision and judgment of the Court
Of Appeals was rendered and entered on June
20, 1974 (App.A, infra, pp. 1-A - 13-A).
On September 16, 1974, this Court rendered
an Order extending the time for filing a
petition for Writ of Certiorari to and
including October 18, 1974. The jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §
1254(1) and the provisions of the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §151, et seq.
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether an arbitrator's rewriting of
the language of a collective bar-
1/ All references to "App." are references
to the Apperdix hereto designated by the
reference,
3
gaining agreement is within the arvitra-
tor's authority to interpret the acree-
ment and thus cutsice the scope of judi-
cial review.
STATUTE INVOLVED
The Railway Labor Act, as amended,
45 U.S.C. § 151, et seg., insofar as is
here pertinent, provides:
Section 204: The disputes between
an employee or group of employees
end a carrier Or carriers by air
growing out of grievances, or out
of the interpretation or applica-
tion of agreements concerning
rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions, including cases pend-
ing and unadjusted on the date
of approval of this Act before
the National Labor Relations Board,
shall be handled in the usual
manner up tc and including the
chief operating officer of the
carrier designated to handle such
disputes; but, failing te reach
an adjustment in this manner, the
disputes may be referred by
petition of the parties or by
either party to an appropriate
adjustment board, as hereinafter
rcoovided, with a fu2l statement
of the facts and supporting data
bearing upon the disputes.
4
It shall be the duty of every
carrier and of its employees,
acting through their representa-
tives, selected in accordance
with the provisions of this title,
to establish a board of adjustment
of jurisdiction not exceeding the
jurisdiction which may be lawfully
exercised by system, group, or
regional boards of adjustment,
under the authority of Section 3,
Title I, of this Act.
Such boards of adjustment may be
established by agreement between
employees and carriers either on
any individual carrier, or system,
Or group of carriers by air and
any class or classes of its or
their employees; or pending the
establishment of a permanent
National Board of Adjustment as
hereinafter provided, Nothing
in this Act shall prevent said
carriers by air, or any class or
classes of their employees, both
acting through their represent a-
tives selected in accordance with
provisions of this title, from
mutually agreeing to the establish-
ment of a national board of adjust-
ment of temporary duration and of
similarly limited jurisdiction.
45 U.S.C. 5184.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. The Factual Background and
the Arbitrator's Award
Petitioner, Modern Air Transport,
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the
Company), and Respondent, International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, District No. 145 (hereinafter
referred to as the Union), are parties
to a collective bargaining agreement
dated December 28, 1°70.
In July, 1971, the Company sent
several jet engines to American Air-
motive Corporation, an FAA approved
jet engine repair agency, for repair.
The Union contended that this action
violated Section 24 of the collective
bargaining agreement, and, pursuant to
the grievance and arbitration procedure
of the collective bargaining agreement,
the case was duly submitted to a System
Board of Adjustment, Laurence E. Seibel
presiding as impartial arbitrator.
Section 29 of the agreement specifi-
cally limited the authority of the System
Board of Adjustment and the impartial
arbitrator, by providing:
D. The Board shall have juris-
diction over disputes »etween
any employee covered izy the...
6
agreement and the company,
growing out of grievances
or out of interpretation or
application of any of the
terms of the .. . agreement.
The jurisdiction of the Board
shall not extend to proposed
changes in hours of employ-
ment, rates of compensation,
or working conditions covered
by existing agreements be-
tween the parties hereto.
The agreement further provided, in
Section 24(a) with respect to contracting
Out, in part as follows:
The parties agree that the
company may:
1. Continue to contract out
work heretofore customarily
contracted out.
2. Return equipment, parts
or assemplies to the manu-
.acturer or to an approved
ayency for repair or replace-
ment.
3. Purchase necessary parts,
eculpment or facilities.
“&. Contract out work when the
compan''s facilities are not
7
sufficient or available, or
wnere employees available do
not have the experience and
ability to satisfactorily
perform the work required,
provided that the above does
not result in a reduction in
force of the employees covered
by this agreement. In which
case representatives of the
company and the union will meet
without delay and negotiate
the proper provisions for the
protection of employees’
seniority and other property
rights.
Notwithstanding the above provisions
of the collective »argaining agreement,
the arbitrator in this case substituted
the word "exclusively" for the word
"customarily" in Section 24(a)l, stating:
- - . There would appear to be
and [sic] implication in the use
of the words [sic] “customarily”
in suv-paracraph 1 suo-section
(a) that the authority specified
therein relates to work that has
ween exclusively contracted out."
(App. B, infra, p. 47-A, emphasis
in original).
Based upon such a re-writing of the
language of the agreement, the ar, itrator
8
held that the Company's sending of jet
engine repair work to the FAA approved
repair agency, American Airmotive Corp-
oration, violated Section 24 of the con-
tract, stating:
- «. .The fact remains that
some "initial" modification
work has been performed by
bargaining unit employees
and it cannot be thus con-
cluded that such work has
been "exclusively" contracted
out. This is equally true
for engine repair work. (App.
D, infra, p. 47-A, emphasis
in original).
Moreover, the specific factual findings
set forth in the arbitrator's decision
clearly reveal that the underlying basis
of the arbitrator's holding was his sub-
stitution of the word "exclusively" for
the word “customarily” in the languwge
of Section 24(a) of the agreement. For
the arbitrator specifically found that
the bulk of the engine repair work in
question had been contracted out prior
to the effective date of the contract
(App. D, infra, pp. 33-A - 34-A; pp. 47-
A - 48-A); that American Airmotive Corp-
oration, the Company to which the engines
in question were sent, was ". .. an ap-
proved agency for the repair cof the en-
gine in question" (App. D, infra, p. 33-
A); that the parties clearly intended to
9
provide considerable flexibility to the
company with respect to the contracting
out of work (App. D, infra, p. 46-A) ;
and that the parties had set forth in
Section 24(a), sub-paragraphs 1-4 of the
agreement, the four distinct circumstances
under which the company could contract out
work (App. D, infra, p. 46-A).
II. The Decision of the District Court
‘he Union petitioned the United
States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida for enforcement of
the arbitrator's award. The company re-
sisted, contending that the arbitrator's
opinion manifested an utter infidelity
to his contractual obligation to confine
himself to interpretation and application
of the collective bargaining agreement,
and that the award was therefore unen-
forceable.
The District Court found that the
arbitrator's substitution of the word
“axclusively" for the word “customarily"
as the underlying »asis of the award was
". , . completely improper .. . sO
clearly improper as to not really deserve
much more comment" (App. B, infra, p. 15-
A).
The lower court nevertheless en-
forced the arbitrator's award “for reasons
completely different from those" stated
10
by the arbitrator (App. B, infra, p. 18-
A).
In the lower court's opinion, the ar-
bitrator could have arrived at the result
that he reached, even if he had not ex-
ceeded his authority by changing the ex-
press language of Section 24(a)1l of the
agreement (App. B, infra, p. 18-A). The
District Court therefore saw no reason to
refuse enforcement and send the case back
to the arbitrator (App. B, infra, p.19-A).
Til, The Decision of the Court
of Appeals
The Company appealed the District
Court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
insisting that, once the lower court had
concluded that the arbitrator's substitu-
tion of "exclusively" for “customarily”
in Section 24(a)1 of the agreement as the
underlying basis for the award was "com-
pletely improper", it had no authority to
proceed further but instead should have
Simply denied enforcement of the award.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the
Company's position, holding thats
The proper course for the
District Court would have
been to deny enforcement upon
the finding that the arbitra-
tor manifested an “infidelity
11
to his obligation." App.
A, infra,p. 11-A - 12-A.
However, the Court of Appeals went on to
hold that the arbitrator's substitution
of the word “exclusively” for "“customar-
ily" in Section 24(a)1 of the agreement
was within his fundamental authority to
interpret the contract, and the District
Court's conclusion that such a substitu-
tion was "completely improper" was there-
fore itself improper. The Court of Ap-
peals therefore affirmed the District
Court's result, enforcing the arbitrator's
award, while at the same time reversing
the method by which the lower court
arrived at such a result.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. THE DECISION HEREIN INVOLVES AN
IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW
WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY
CONSIDERED AND SETTLED BY THIS
COURT. MOREOVER, THE DECISION HERE-
IN IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE
DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF AP-
PEALS WHICH HAVE ADDRESSED THIS
QUESTION.
As the portions of the arbitrator's
@erision cited in the Statement of the
Case indicate (pp. 5-9, supra), it is un-
disputed that the arbitrator substituted
his own word, “exclusively” for the con-
tractual term, “customarily”, in Section
12
24(a)l of the agreement. It is also
undisputed that such a substitution was
the underlying basis of the arbitrator's
award.
The question at issue in this case,
therefore, is whether such a substitution
was within the fundamental authority of
the arbitrator to interpret the agreement,
whether such a substitution could be used
as the underlying basis of the award, and
whether the arbitrator's decision is thus
outside the scope of judicial review. As
mentioned, supra, the District Court,
after a full and complete evidentiary
hearing, held such a substitution to be
“completely improper." On the other hand,
the Court of Appeals held such a substitu-
tion to be within the fundamental authori-
ty of the arbitrator to interpret the
agreement.
The only decision of this Court which
has addressed the general question of the
scope of judicial review of an arbitra-
tor’s award in a case involving a dispute
arising out of a collective bargaining
agreement is United Steelworkers of
America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d
_ 1424 (1960). In that case, this Court
held that it was not a proper function of
a federal court to review an arbitrator's
decision which is to some extent ambigu-
ous. In arriving at such a result, this
Court stated:
13
A mere ambiguity in the opinion
accompanying an award, which permits
the inference that the arbitrator
may have exceeded his authority, is
not a reason for refusing to enforce
the award. 363 U.S. at 597.
Seat e paod ae
While thus limiting the scope of judicial
review of an arbitrator's award, this
Court went on to state in its Enterprise
Wheel decision:
Nevertheless, an arbitrator is con-
fined to interpretation and appli-
cation of the collective bargaining
agreement; he does not sit to dis-
pense his own brand of industrial
justice .. . his award is legiti-
mate only so long as it draws its
essence from the collective bargain-
ing agreement. When the arbitrator's
words manifest an infidelity to this
obligation, the courts have no choice
but to refuse enforcement of the
award. 363 U.S. at 597.
The instant arbitration award is
clearly distinguishable from the arbitra-
tion award in issue in Enterprise Wheel.
Unlike the award in Enterprise Wheel,
there is no ambiguity in the instant
award. Rather, the award clearly and
unambiguously substituted the arbitrator's
term "exclusively," for the Parties' term
"customarily," in Section 24(a)(1) of the
g Pees
14
Agreement. Such a substiti:tion does not
simply contain an “inference that the
arbitrator may have exceeded his authority"
by substituting his own language for the
language of the agreement, but instead
ciearly indicates that the arbitrator
did in fact exceed his authority.
The instant arbitrator's obligation
was to take the facts as he found them
and determine, as Section 24(a)(1) of the
Agreement required, whether those facts
established that the work contracted out
was "heretofore customarily contracted
out." Consistent with this obligation,
the arbitrator was not authorized under
the guise of interpretation, to change
the relevant provision of the agreement
by substituting the .word "exclusively"
for the word "customarily," as that word
is used in Section 24(a)l. For, the two
words. are inherently contradictory.
The dictionary definitions of the
two words clearly demonstrate their non-
substitutability:
"Customarily . .. usually, habitu-
ally, according to the customs,
general practice or usual order of
things." Black's Law Dictionary
462 (Rev. 4th Ed. 1968),
"Exclusively . . . apart from all
others .'. . oily . ss purely ...
15
solely .. . substantially all or
for the greater part .. . to the
exclusion of all others; without
admission of others to participate;
in a manner to exclude.” Id. at 674,
675.
Moreover, 1¢ should be noted that the most
restrictive synonym for the word "“custo-
marily," “habituallv." is itself defined
as follows:
"Customarily; by frequent practice
or use." It does not mean entirely
or exclusively. Black's Law
Dicticnary 840 (Rev. 4th Ed. 1968)
(Emphasis supplied).
The above definitions clearly indi-
cate that the arbitrator's substitution
of the word "exclusively" for the word
“customarily” in the instant case was
neither reasonable nor rational. Accord-
ingly, as the District Court below recog-
nized, such a substitution could in no
way be construed to be within the arbi-
trator's traditional authority of inter-
pretation. To thus apply the facts of
the case to a standard concocted by the
arbitrator (i.e., whether the work in
question had been heretofore “exclusive-
ly" contracted out) rather than the
standard agreed upon the the Parties (i.e,
whether the work in question had been
"heretofore customarily contracted out")
16
clearly manifests an infidelity on the
part of the arbitrator to his fundamental
obligation to interpret and apply the
terms of the collective bargaining ‘agree-
ment, rather than his own terms, to the
facts in issue,
fhe Fifth Circuit's decision herein
that the arbitrator's award was "well
founded in the ‘essence! of, and more
than ‘rationally inferable' from the
letter and purpose of, the collective
bargaining agreement" (see App. A, infra,
pb. 12-4), thus represents the extent to
which this Court's Enterprise Wheel
decision has been misinterpreted and
misapplied by the lower courts. The
Court Of Appeals' decision herein illus-
trates the necessity of a clarification
by this Court of the difference between
a federal court's substitution of its
Own judgment for that of an arbitrator
and a federal court's complete abandon-
ment of its role as a reviewer of arbi-
tration awards with a "you get what you
bargained for" attitude, even where the
arbitration award in issue manifests a
clear infidelity to the essence of the
collective bargaining agreement. It is
unquestionably desirable that arbitration
be "final and binding" and not subject to
"judicial interpretation," but not at a
price of Surrendering the express and
unambiguous terms of a collective bar-
gaining agreement.
17
While some Circuit Courts have recog-
nized the proper scope of judicial review
as set forth by this Court in its Enter-
prise Wheel decision, other Circuit
courts have not. Indeed, the Courts of
Appeal have completely failed to trans-
late this Court's Enterprise Wheel
decision into a consistent and workable
pronouncement of the appropriate extent
or limitation of judicial review of an
arbitration award. Instead, the courts
have fashioned a different standard of
judicial review for each case.
Among the various standards employed
by the Courts of Appeal have been:
1) The reviewing court should not
disturb the award so long as the inter-
pretation of the arbitrator was not
arbitrary (Local 7-644 Oil, Chemical &
Atomic Workers International Union v.
Mobil Oil Company, 350 F.2d 708, 712
[7th Cir. 1965]).
2) The reviewing court should not
disturb the award merely because it be-
lieves that sound legal principles were
not applied by the arbitrator (Dallas
Typographical Union, No. 173 v. A. H.
Belo Corp., 372 F.2d 577, 581 [5th Cir.
1967])).
18
3) The reviewing court should inter-
fere “where the arbitrator clearly went
beyond the scope of the submission"
(Textile Workers Union of America v.
American Thread Company, 291 F.2d 894,
897-898 [4th Cir. 196]1]).
4) The reviewing court should inter-
fere where “the authority to make ...
the award cannot be bound or legally
assumed from the terms of the arbitration
agreement" (Truckdrivers and Helpers
Union Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert Company,
330 F.2d 562, 563 [8th Cir. 1964]).
5) The reviewing court should inter-
fere if the arbitrator made a determina-
tion not required for the resolution of
the dispute (Socony Vacuum Tanker Men's
Assoc. v. Socony Mobil Oil Company, 369
F.2d 480 [2nd Cir. 1966]).
6) Construction and interpretation
is not for the reviewing court (Inter-
national Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulfite
and Paper Mill Workers Local Union No.
874 v. St. Regis Paper Company, 362
F.2d 711, 714 [5th Cir. 1966]).
7) There should be no review of the
merits at all (American Machine and
Foundry Company v. Auto, Aerospace and
Agr. tmplement Workers, 329 F.2d 147
{2nd Cir. 1964]).
19
8) Review is confined to the question
of whether the union agreed to arbitrate
or give the arbitrator the power to make
the award (Western lowa Pork Company v.
National Brotherhood Packing House and
Dairy Workers, 366 F.2d 275, 277 [8th
Cir. 1966]).
Not unexpectedly, these various and
conflicting standards of judicial review
of arbitration awards adopted by the
Circuit Courts have resulted in various
and conflicting decisions. Nowhere is
this more evident than in the instant
case. The Court of Appeals' decision
herein is in direct conflict with the
decisions of other Courts of Appeals in
cases involving similar, indeed almost
identical, facts as those involved in the
case at bar. In a number of cases, cited
infra, Circuit Courts have set aside
awards of arbitrators which, by adding or
ignoring terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, manifested an infidelity to
the arbitrator's obligation to confine
himself to interpretation and application
of the agreement before him. There is
clearly no substantive distinction between
cases which involve an arbitrator's award
arrived at by adding or ignoring express
terms of a collective bargaining agreement,
and the case at bar, which involves an
arbitrator's award arrived at by substi-
tuting the arbitrator's own terms for the
express terms of the agreement.
20
In Local 342, U.A.W. v. T.R.W., Inc.,
402 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1968), the Circuit
Court refused to enforce an arbitrator's
award in which the arbitrator added a
provision to the contract. The court
noted that the pertinent language of the
collective bargaining agreement in issue
was not, under any reasonable interpre-
tation, ambiguous. The court went on to
hold that, inasmuch as no language in the
agreement made the exercise of the rights
expressly enumerated therein subject to
the ultimate approval of an arbitrator
Or a court:
The conduct of the arbitrator, thus
approved by the District Court, in
reality constituted the addition of
terms to a negotiated contract that
was neither unclear or incomplete.
402 F.2d at 30.
The Court noted, in language particularly
apposite to the instant case:
It can be assumed that ... the
Company gave some quid pro quo to
get [the contract provision in
issue] . . . an arbitrator should
not be permitted to nullify it.
Id. at 731.
21
The court then concluded that, in
obedience with the dictum stated by this
Court in Enterprise Wheel, the District
Court should have denied enforcement of
the arbitrator's award. Accordingly,
the decision of the District Court was
reversed, with the direction to enter
judgment dismissing the complaint seeking
enforcement of the award.
As in T.R.W., the arbitrator in the
instant case attempted to engraft upon
the collective bargaining agreement terms
which were not there. Indeed, the instant
arbitrator went even further than the
arbitrator in T.R.W., by excising an
express term of the agreement ("custo-
marily"), before adding his own term
("exclusively"). As in T.R.W., the
wortion of the collective bargaining
agreement in issue was the product of
bargaining and the company gave some quid
pro quo to get it. Accordingly, the
instant arbitrator should not have been
permitted to nullify the pertinent con-
tractual language by rewriting it, and
the Appellant Court should therefore have
refused to enforce the arbitrator's award.
In Amanda Bent Bolt Company v. U.A.W.,
451 F.2d 1277 (6th Cir. 1971), the Sixth
Circuit, citing language from this Court's
decision in Enterprise Wheel, concluded
22
that the arbitrator's act of ignoring and
in effect excising express portions of the
collective bargaining agreement went beyond
the scope of the arbitrator's authority,
and that his award was therefore unenforce-
able. In the instant case, the arbitrator's
act of ignoring and in effect excising an
express term of the collective bargaining
agreement also went beyond the scope of
the arbitrator's authority, and his award
should therefore also have been held
unenforceable.
Similarly, other circuit courts have
not hesitated to set aside awards which
were arrived at by adding to or excising
express portions of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. In Truck Drivers and
Helpers Union Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert
Company, supra, the Eighth Circuit set
aside an arbitrator's award which ignored
the express portion of the collective
bargaining agreement which gave the com-
pany the discretion to take the action in
issue,
~
in H. K. Porter v. United Saw Workers,
333 F.2d 596 (3rd Cir. 1964), the Circuit
Court refused to enforce a portion of an
arbitrator's award which, withcut any
reason, ignored an express provision of
the collective bargaining agreement which
the arbitrator was commissioned to inter-
pret.
23
Likewise, in Torrington v. Metal Pro-
duct Workers, 362 F.2d 677 (2nd Cir. 1966),
the Circuit Court refused to enforce an
award which added a requirement based on
past practice to the express provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement. In
its Torrington decision, the Second Cir-
cuit stated:
the mandate that the arbitrator should
stay within the confines of the
collective bargaining agreement ...
requires a reviewing court to pass
upon whether the agreement authorizes
the arbitrator to expand its express
terms on the basis of the parties'
prior practice . .. the arbitrator's
decision . . . should not be accepted
where the reviewing court can clearly
preceive that he has derived that
authority from sources outside the
collective bargaining agreement at
issue. 362 F.2d at 680.
The inconsistency with which the Cir-
cuit Courts have interpreted the "essence"
and "fidelity" dictum set forth in this
Court's Enterprise Wheel decision, in
cases involving judicial review of an
arbitration award, is clearly demonstrated
by the fact that said dictum was cited by
both the majority and dissenting opinions
of the Second Circuit in the Torrington
case. 362 F.2d at 680, 682.
24
in a recent decision, the Sixth
Circuit reiterated its intention not
to enforce arbitration awards which
clearlv manifest the arbitrator's infi-
delity to his contractual obligation.
See Timken Company v. Steelworkers,
Local 1123, 482 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1973).
In Timken, the Circuit Court held that
an arbitrator's award based upon an un-
reasonably restrictive interpretation of
a term of the collective bargaining
agreement could not be enforced, absent
evidence indicating that the parties to
the agreement intended such an unreason-
ably restrictive interpretation of the
contractual term in issue. The Sixth
Circuit held that the arbitrator was fore-
closed "from substituting his discretion
for the company and from modifying the
language of the agreement." 482 F.2d at
1015. This decision is in clear and di-
rect conflict with the Court of Appeals
decision herein.
Finally, in a very recent case,
Textron, Inc. v. Auto Workers Local 516,
86 LRRM 3240 (2nd Cir. 1974), the Court
of Appeals held that where an arbitra-
tor's award is on its face contradictory,
the court should deny enforcement of the
award and resubmit the case for further
arbitration. As discussed above, the
instant case is also on its face clearly
contradictory, since the words "customar-
ily" and "exclusively" can in no way
25
reasonably be considered to be synony-
mous.
Thus, there are a number of Circuit
Court decisions in cases directly
analogous to the ase at bar, which have
held, contrary to the Court of Appeals'
decision herein, that an arbitrator can-
not add or ignore terms of a collective
bargaining agreement and thereby rewrite
the provisions which the parties to such
agreement have collectively bargained
for. These decisions are therefore in
direct conflict with the Court of Appeals
decision herein. Clarification of the
proper role of a court in reviewing an
arbitration award is thus necessary, if
the dictum set forth in this Court's
Enterprise Wheel decision is to be
followed without inherent conflict, and
if the parties to a collective bargain-
ing agreement are to be afforded a pre-
dictable forum for protecting their
contractual interests.
Ii. THE DECISION HEREIN IS OF
IMPERATIVE PUBLIC IMPORTANCE TO
THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF THE
RAILWAY LABOR ACT.
\
2 UE PRR OI fk RL RY ond
Sea bases WATS Ys
26
The Court of Appeals‘ decision here-
in holds, in effect, that a Federal Court
is not authorized to review the award of
an impartial arbitrator and System Board
of Adjustment, even where the award is on
its face contradictory and is based on
terms concocted by the arbitrator rather
than terms agreed upon by the Parties
through collective bargaining. Such a
decision, if permitted to stand, would do
substantial and irreparable damage to the
integrity and effectiveness of the System
Board of Adjustment process under the
Railway Labor Act. For, such a decision
amounts to a total abdication of the
Court's function as a reviewing body over
awards rendered by System Boardsof Adjust-
ment.
In its Enterprise Wheel decision,
this Court noted that it would be unde-
sirable to require arbitration awards
free of ambiguity, for such a requirement
“may lead arbitrators to play it safe by
writing no supporting opinions," and "a
well-reasoned opinion tends to engender
confidence in the integrity of the process
and aids in clarifying the underlying
agreement." 363 U.S. at 597. Similarly,
to hold that a court may not review an
arbitrator's award which is not only
poorly reusoned, but is in fact based on
the arbitrator's own terms and views of
industrial justice, rather than the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement,
would invariably tend to destroy confidence
27
in the integrity of the process and
impair the ability of the statutory
system to clarify collective bargaining
agreements covered by the Act.
As the Second Circuit noted in its
Torrington decision:
Far from having the disruptive
effect upon the finality of labor
arbitration which results when
courts review the ‘merits’ of a
particular remedy, devised by an
arbitrator, we think that the
limited review exercised here
will stimulate voluntary resort
to labor arbitration and thereby
strengthen this important aspect
of labor-management relations by
guaranteeing to the Parties to a
collective bargaining agreement
that they will find in the arbi-
trator not a ‘philosopher king'
but one who will resolve their
disputes within the framework of
the agreement which they negoti-
ated. 362 F.2d at 682.
CONC LUS ION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
respectfully submitted that this
a
a
28
Petition for Certiorari be granted.
JOHN BACHELLER, JR.
Counsel of Record
WILLIAM F., KASPERS
3500 First National
Bank Tower
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Attorneys for
Petitioner
29
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that ” have this
15th day of October, 1974, caused the
foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT to be served upon the
following individuals as counsel for
parties to the case by causing three
copies thereof for each such party to be
deposited in the U. S. Mail, postage
prepaid:
Harold Mendelow, Esquire
Manners and Amoon, P. A.
123 Northwest 12th Avenue
Miami, Florida 33128
Erwin N. Griswold, Esquire
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530
JOHN BACHELLER, JR.
Counsel of Record for
Petitioner
ee
L Oe OE EIT Te Ray OabORT eet oes
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eres DORN LNA I LI ELOY Ew
1-A
APPENDIX A
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,
DISTRICT NO. 145,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Ve
MODERN AIR TRANSPORT, INC.,
Defendant -Appellant.
No. 73-1345
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,
FIFTH CIRCUIT.
June 20, 1974
Appeal from the United States
District Court for the Southern District
of Florida,
Before WISDOM, AINSWORTH and GEE,
Circuit Judges.
GEE, Circuit Judge:
‘lodern Air appeals from the district
court's enforcement of an arbitrator's
award in favor of the Union. Concluding
that the court reached the right result,
SSE LER E
‘Cee
omxees
SPS SOT FRITS ST OE
2-A
although through the wrong process, we
affirm.
In 1971 Modern Air contracted out
some modification and repair work to an
outside agency rather than assigning the
work to its own facilities. The Union
contended that the contracting-out vio-
lated the collective bargaining agree-
ment. They sought reinstatement and back
pay for laid-off mechanics. Modern Air
and the Union duly submitted the griev-
ance to arbitration under the procedure
provided in the collective bargaining
agreement. The arbitrator found that
Modern Air had breached the contracting-
Out provision of the agreement, and he
Ordered back pay and reinstatement for
those employees improperly laid off.
In respect to contracting-out, the
agreement provided:
(a) All work normally performed in
the Company's Maintenance Shops and
facilities and airport stations by
the employees covered by this Agree-
ment is recognized as coming within
the jurisdiction of the Internation-
al Brotherhood of Teamsters and is
covered by this Agreement. When
aircraft is placed in the active
service of the Company, the periodic
maintenance on such aircraft shall
be within the scope of this Agree-
ment *
3-A
The parties agree that the Company
may :
1. Continue to contract out work
heretofore customarily contracted
out ./1/
Initial modification of newly ac-
quired airplanes and jet engine repair
work were the subjects of the Union's
grievances, On the evidence submitted to
him, the arbitrator found that Modern Air
had contracted out the bulk of the initial
modification work but that the bargaining
unit employees had performed some of that
1. It further provided:
2. Return equipment, parts or assem-
blies to the manufacturer or to an
approved agency for repair or replace-
ment.
3. Purchase necessary parts, equipment
or facilities.
4. Contract out any work when the Com-
pany's facilities or personnel are not
sufficient or available, or where em-
ployees available do not have the ex-
perience and ability to satisfactorily
perform the work required, provided
that the above does not result in a
reduction in force of the employees
covered by this Agreement. In which
case representatives of the Company
and Union will meet without delay and
negotiate the proper provisions for the
protection of employees’ seniority and
other property rights.
RMIT TIS, LS TS e
VWENPHVEE BTN ©
4-A
work. As to the jet engine repair, he
found that the amount of contracting-out
had varied over the years according to
Modern Air's facilities and other contin-
gencies but, although it had contracted
out much of the engine repair, it also
had performed a significant amount of the
work in its own facilities.
This appeal focuses on the arbitra-
tor's and the district court's interpre-
tation of the term "customarily" in sub-
paragraph 1. The arbitrator reasoned that:
- « « I do not share the Company's
apparent view that so long as there
was substantial contracting out of
certain work it may “continue to con-
tract out [such] work" because of
subparagraph 1 of subsection (a). To
my mind, in the light of the basic
thrust of subsection (a) to place
“work normally performed" in the bar-
gaining unit and in view of the limi-
tations specified in subparagraph 4
of subsection (a) with regard to con-
tract out "any work," there would
appear to be and [sic] implication
in the use of the words "customariiy”
in subparagraph 1 of subsection (a)
that the authority specified therein
relates to work that has been exclu-
sively contracted out. Stated differ-
ently, it is my view that subparagraph
5-A
1 does not refer to work which has been
both contracted out as well as performed
by the bargaining unit./2/
2. The arbitrator's reasoning proceeded:
In the instant case, while I am not at
all convinced that bargaining unit em-
ployees have performed "initial" modi-
fication work to the extent that the
Union here claims and, indeed, while
I am equally convinced that the bulk
of the “initial modification work has
not been performed by bargaining unit
employees, although tasks performed in
connection with such work may well
have been performed by bargaining unit
employees from time to time after air-
craft have been placed in a revenue
status, the fact remains that some
"initial" modification work has been
performed by bargaining unit employees
and it cannot thus be concluded that
such work has been “exclusively” con-
tracted out. This is equally true for
engine repair work involving hot sec-
tion overhauls, as is plainly evident
from the detailed recital above of what
was done by whom with respect to vari-
ous engine repair work, Accordingly,
I do not regard subparagraph 1 of sub-
section (a) as determinative of the
issue presented herein.
I find subparagraphs 2 and 3 of sub-
section (a) of Section 24 equally in-
applicable in the instant situation.
These provisions appear to have been
~6-A
The district judge decided to “en-
force the award for reasons completely
different from those in the arbitrator's
report: [W]Jhere the arbitrator substitu-
included to make crystal clear the
Company's right to resort, where neces-
sary, to a manufacturer or to an
approved agency for repairs or replace-
ment of parts or assemblies, etc. but
to conclude that in the instant situ-
ation the Company was authorized to
contract out the work simply because
"an approved agency” was involved
would prove too much, in my opinion,
since virtually all contracting out
could then be authorized so long as
“an approved agency” was involved and
there would thus be little, if any,
need to include subparagraphs 1 and 4
of subsection (a) of Section 24,
Essentially, authorization for the
Company's contracting out for the work
here being grieved must be found in
subparagraph 4. As I read that pro-
vision the Parties intended to provide
substantial flexibility to the Company
to obtain the performance of all work
required to keep its equipment opera-
tive. However, the Parties equally
and plainly intended that the Company's
right to contract out “any work” would
be circumscribed to the extent that if
a reduction in force of bargaining
unit employees would occur then the
Company and Union would meet and pro-
7-A
ted the word ‘exclusively' for the word
‘customarily,’ as it is used in subpara-
graph (a)l .. ., it is completely im-
proper.” But the court went on to exam-
ine the facts in light of its own inter-
pretaion of the agreement and concluded
that the arbitrator would have reached
the same result using "customarily."
tect employees' seniority and other
property rights. Thus, the Company
could contract out work where its fa-
cilities or personnel are not suffi-
cient Or available or where employees
able to perform the required work are
not sufficiently experienced or skilled
to perform the required work, so long
as the Compan.’ and Union meet to pro-
tect employees in the event a reduc-
tion of force then occurs.
TO my mind, the limitations specified
in subparagraph 4 on the Company's
right to contract out “any work" places
a burden not upon the Union, as the
Company here argues, but rather on the
Company itself to demonstrate that its
facilities or personnel are not suffi-
cient Or available etc. Stated differ-
ently, the Company has the right to
contract Out under given circumstances
and it thus behooves the Company to
demonstrate the existence of such
circumstances when it seeks to exer-
cise its right.
8-A
On appeal, Modern Air contends that,
when the district court said tne arbitra-
tor could not interpret “customarily” to
mean "exclusively," the cour: had found
that the arbitrator exceeded his authori-
ty. Modern Air goes on to insist that,
when the court reached that conclusion,
then it should have proceeded no further
but should have simply denied enforcement.
(nm the other hand, the Union con-
tends that the court did not substitute
its judgment for that of the arbitrator;
rather, the court made the proper inquiry
and determined by examining the entire
clause that the arbitrator acted properly
and within the scope of the agreement ./3/
At this point, we insert the law,
The genesis, of course, was the trilogy.
/4/. The Court there delineated the limi-
tations on the arbitrator:
3. The parties do not dispute that the
grievance was properly arbitrable.
4. United Steelworkers of America v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80
S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
80 S- Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960).
9-A
- - « {A]Jn arbitrator is confined to
interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he
does not sit to dispense his own brand
of industrial justice. He may of
course look for guidance from many
sources, yet his award is legitimate
only so long as it draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agree-
ment. When the arbitrator's words
manifest an infidelity to this obli-
gation, courts have no choice but to
refuse enforcement of the award,
United Steelworkers of America v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361,
4 L.Ed.2d 1424, 1428 (1960).
We have expressed the limitation in terms
of “foundation in reason or fact":
In the arbitration context, an award
“without foundation in reason or fact"
is equated with an award that exceeds
the authority or jurisdiction on the
arbitrating body. To merit judicial
enforcement, an award must have a ba-
sis that is at least rationally in-
ferable, if not obviously drawn, from
the letter or puxpose of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. The arbi-
trator's role is to carry out the
aims of the agreement, and his role
defines the scope of his authority.
When he is no longer carrying out the
agreement Or when his position cannot
SANE AC GAREY ENTER TAL PLE NENTET §
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Se ea tak Rc
10-A
be considered in any way rational, he
has exceeded his jurisdiction. The
requirement that the result of arbi-
tration have “foundation in reason or
fact” means that the award must, in
some logical way, be derived from the
wording or purpose of the contract.
Brotherhood of RR Trainmen v. Central
of Georgia Ry. Co., 415 F.2d 403, 411-
412 (5th Cir. 1969).
Additionally, in Safeway Stores v. Ameri-
can Bakery Workers Union Local 111, 5 Cir,,
390 F.2d 79, 81-82, we said:
"{I]f the award is arbitrary, capri-
cious or not adequately grounded in
the basic collective bargaining con-
tract, it will not be enforced by the
courts.” . . . On its face the award
should ordinarily reveal that it finds
its source in the contract and those
circumstances out of which comes the
“common law of the shop."
See, Dallas Typographical Union v, A. H.
Belo Corp., 372 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1967).
A concomitant narrow standard re-
stricts judicial review of the arbitra-
tor's broad authority:
« « « the question of interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement
is a question for the arbitrator. It
is the arbitrator's construction which
was bargained for; and so far as the
11-A
arbitrator's decision concerns con--
struction of the contract, the courts
have no business overruling him be-
cause their interpretation of the con-
tract is different from his. Enter-
prise, supra, 363 U.S. at 599, 80 S.ct.
at 1362, 4 L.Ed.2d at 1429,
As we said in Safeway Stores, supra at 8l:
- « « [W]e must be vigilant that we are
not slipping off into that habit, easy
for Judges, of “deciding the merits in
the guise of adjudicating the court-
reserved issue of the scope . .. of
the agreement to arbitrate."
The court must not “[resume] its tradi-
tional role of assaying the judicial
acceptability of the award had it been a
court judgment." Safeway Stores, supra
at 83.
{1] Although the district court's
action here was ambiguous, we conclude
that, by finding that the arbitrator
could not interpret “customarily” to mean
"exclusively," the court found that the
arbitrator had exceeded his authority.
Then, when the district court went on to
interpret the contract, the court itself
improperly “[resumed] its traditional
role of assaying the judicial accept a-
bility of the award." The proper course
for the district court would have been to
deny enforcement upon the finding that
— eee
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12-A
the arbitrator manifested an “infidelity
to his obligation.” Enterprise, supra.
[2] That conclusion, however, does
not end our inquiry. The district court,
in deciding that the arbitrator could not
equate “customarily” with “exclusively, "
mistook fundamental authority for con-
tract interpretation--the arbitrator's
proper function,
Analyzing the arbitrator's reason-
ing, he performed the traditional function
of one delegated to resolve contractual
disputes. He interpreted and gave mean-
ing ‘exclusively) to an ambiguous (custo-
marily) contract term in light of the
other provisions and purposes of the con-
tract. His award was well founded in the
“essence” of, and more than “rationally
inferable" from the letter and purpose
of, the collective barjyaining agreement.
United Steelworkers v. United States
Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1974);
Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 540 v,
Neuhoff Bros, Packers, Inc., 481 F.2d 817
(Sth Cir. 1973). Neither the district
court nor we have any “business overrul-
‘ing him because [our] interpretation of
the contract is different from his,"
Enterprise, supra.
We find ourselves thus in agreement
with the district court's result but in
disagreement with his method. In effect,
we are directly approving the arbitrator's
ee ae ae POAC MIN AY A OOP RIS LT AERO NE AE eD aiaht B el TN AR io mrtg cd enna
fa
13-A
award, As this is not unprecedented,
when it fully resolves the issue between
the parties in a protracted dispute, San
Antonio Newspaper Guild, Local 25 v. San i
Antonio Light Division, 481 F.2d 821 f
(Sth Cir. 1973),/5/, we affirm the dis- b
trict court's order.
Affirmed.
ATLL TT EAT SIT ee RN IN ILE! ETS NN AE
ean ne’~
5. Additionally, our action does not
contravene Judge Godbold'‘s dissent in
that case because here the arbitrator
has reached and decided the merits of
an issue undisputedly within his
authority.
REALATRS ROY
PRATER WAKER ESS t
a ;
14-A
APPENDIX B
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
No. 72-791-Civ-PF
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,
DISTRICT NO. 145,
Plaintiff,
Ve
MODERN AIR TRANSPORT, INC.,
Defendant.
North Courtroom
U.S. Post Office Building
Miami, Florida
Monday, 5:30 p.m,
November 13, 1972
The above-entitled case came on for
trial before the Honorable PETER T. FAY,
United States District Judge, pursuant
to notice.
FINDINGS OF FACT
15-A
THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
Well, gentlemen, I am constantly
amazed at the opinions that District
Court judges are called upon to render
and would be the first to profess my
limited contact with a case such as this.
It is about the same experience I have
with running public schools.
Not unlike what other courts have
done, I am going to grant the petition.
I am going to enforce the award for rea-
sons completely different from those in
the arbitrator's report, and I suppose
really a littie different from what you
all have argued.
I want the record to show very clear-
ly why I am doing what I am doing so that,
if I am wrong, someone else can correct
that.
Let me start at the beginning.
I think first if we deal with, and
we talk about areas--if we deal with the
area where the arbitrator substituted the
word “exclusively” for the word "custo-
marily,” as it is used in Subparagraph
A-1 of Section 24, it is completely im-
proper. I think it is so clearly improper
as to not really deserve much more com-
ment.
ote ete
POOR RETIREE AN
PEAY PRS EIE
rere ery
16-A
There is no way he can do that, in
my Opinion,
Now, the problem I have, as you have
probably gathered from my questions, is I
do not think that ends the matter, because
I think that the arbitrator broke this
into two phases, and that in reviewing
the entire situation in the two phases, I
think his decision, his ultimate decision,
is quite proper, using the provisions of
Section 24 as it is written.
I say that for these reasons: I
think that the initial modification work
was customarily contracted out. He goes
to great lengths to point out factually,
I think, in his report that that is the
situation and that the only initial modi-
fication work that was done was done on
a piecemeal basis and along with routine
maintenance that any substantial initial
modification was customarily contracted
out.
Now, then, going to the area where
Modern Air Transport does complain--and I
never remember the language because I am
just not that familiar with it, but it
would be in the engine work. When we get
into the area of the engine work, I frank-
ly agree completely with the arbitrator's
interpretation of Subparagraph 2 of
Section 24, I just don't think you can
read it any other way. Any other inter-
pretation would just completely eliminate
17-A
the necessity for Paragraphs 1, 3 and 4,
They just wouldn't have any meaning, and
I do not think they were put there just
as surplusage,.
I think a reasonable interpretation
of Subparagraph 2, really Subparagraph
A-2 of Section 24, has to have some
reasonable limitations, and I think that
is what the arbitrator felt.
So, I find his interpretation of
Subparagraph A-2 to be completely reason-
able and consistent and certainly within
his authority.
Then, taking that within his author-
ity, I think of necessity he had to go to
Subsection A-4 of Section 24, and I can-
not find that his ruling is improper be-
cause, as I say, from my question I think
he did two things. I think he would have
arrived at the same result had he used
the word “customary” as he should have.
In other words, as the word “custom-
arily” is used in Subparagraph A-l, I
think his conclusion would have been that
you then have to look at the factual cir-
cumstances, and although I think he could
have found, I think any reasonable arbi-
trator could have found that the jet en-
gine work was customarily contracted out.
He would also look to the facts that
Modern Air set up the engine facilities,
PERT OT RT TE ee ee
ete: AR NE TREY ene
FE RS
Bo Pies. comers sero te
18-A
they trained their men in jet engine
work; that this customarily contracting
cut had changed, and I think the facts
show very clearly that it had changed to
the point where they were contracting it
out when their employees and their shop
could not handle it.
I think that of necéssity that
immediately took him to Subparagraph A-4
under Section 24 in this instance, when
there was, in fact, a layoff.
I believe again we get to the months
of September and October of 1971.
So I think what he did was correct.
I do not think it was correct for the
reasons he used because, as I said, I
think he was completely improper in sub-
stituting the word “exclusive” for “cus-
tomarily."
I think the result would have been
exactly the same and was completely
proper using the language of the contract.
I think that is what he did, I think that
is what he had to do,
As I say, I guess I am enforcing it
for reasons completely different from
those he stated, and really a little bit
different from what you all argued,
Maybe I should not do that, but I
want the record to show very clearly that
19-A
is what I am doing and why I am doing it,
because if I cannot do that, then I
suppose I either have to set it aside or
send it back to him. However, I see no
reason to send it back to him because I
think for the reasons he has already
stated very clearly in the record, he
would have to arrive, of necessity, if
he used the same facts that he uses, with
the same result.
I see no reason to send it back to
him and say, "Do it again and don't sub-
stitute the word ‘exclusive,' " because
I think he would end up, of necessity,
using the word “customarily” in A-l and
then finding factually that the circum-
stances had changed and thereby going to
A-4, where you get into the situation of
well, what's happening; when they are con-
tracting it out, are the facilities and
the personnel sufficient; and, if not,
did they sit down with the union and try
to work it out to avoid a layoff?
I think this is completely consis-
tent with the provisions of the contract.
I do this as a rank amateur in this field.
Now, if you want anything more for-
mal than this, I will ask the prevailing
party to draw it up or the court reporter
cantype this up and I will be glad to
sign it as the order granting the petition
and enforcing the arbitrator's report and
Order.
20-A ‘
However you all want to handle it.
MR. RHOADS: Your Honor, if I may,
we have one problem.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. MENDELOW: We may have.
MR. RHOADS: We may have.
MR. MENDELOW: We may have several
problems,
MR. RHOADS: We have several problems
Or may have several problems directed at
compliance with this, assuming that we
do not take an appeal.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. RHOADS: Modern Air shut down its
entire base, maintenance base, in Decem-
ber of last year, the last day of Decem-
ber, and has not employed mechanics since
that time,
The arbitrator was aware that this
was going to happen. The parties told
the arbitrator to ignore it insofar as
his---
THE COURT: I was going to say, he
mentions it, but he says it has not
happened, hasn't he, in his report ?
21-A
MR. MENDELOW: At the time. It hap-
pened approximately in January of 1972,
MR. RHOADS: The last day worked was
the last day of December, 1971.
THE COURT: I don't mean to jump over
any problems or preclude argument.
You can probably tell from my opin-
ion that I wonld take those facts into
consideration. If they did not have a
shop, I think you can guess what my
rulings are going to be, because mine are
based upon just what I told you.
MR. MENUELOW: There are additional
facts. 7
American Aeromotive, as you know, is
a subsidiary or a sister company to
Modern Air under the GAC corporate struc-
ture. Right now they are, from what I
understand, flying airplanes or jets into
New York and shipping down engines to
American Aeromotive to do the hot section
overhaul. They are Operating very
successfully, from what I understand,
over in Berlin, Germany, with these same
aircraft that they have flown over there
now,
THE COURT: Or would it go back to the
arbitrator first?
22-A
MR. MENDELOW: No, I believe under
Gunther, this Court could make the
decision,
First of all, I think in our relief
in this court we asked the Court to re-
quire the company to meet with us to see
if we can sit down and settle this thing
amicably. That has been our only demand
of the company up until the time we had
to come to court, Your Honor.
As an alternative for this Court, if
this Court feels it ought to order that
at least and we cannot come to any agree-
ment with regard to this, I would ask the
Court to appoint someone to determine
damages in lieu thereof.
THE COURT: I would always encourage
the parties to try to resolve it first,
because I think you all can both see
pretty clearly where I am going and what
I am going to do,
As I say, mine is based on the
changing circumstances and if they had
the shop and they operate, so be it.
That is what I would think the purview
would be. If they had not had the shop,
if they did not have the mechanics,
there is no question in my mind what my
eventual ruling would probably be.
23-A
As I say, I say that without pre-
cluding anybody from arguing and present-
ing whatever evidence they want to.
MR. MENDELOW: Would the Court make
that part of his order, that we do sit
down?
THE COURT: Certainly. Sure would.
MR. MENDELOW: We are ready, willing
and able to sit down with them at any
time,
THE COURT: Oh, yes.
MR. MENDELOW: And discuss this thing
amicably, I'm sure.
THE COURT: Sure, yes.
MR. RHOADS: Could we have the tran-
script of your order?
I would be agreeable to that in an
order,
Would you, Mr. Mendelow?:
MR. MENDELOW: Yes, I would, too.
THE COURT: Certainly.
MR. MENDELOW: With that addition to
it, that the Court required the parties
to sit down,
” TELM GORI T I
POV Ee! BF Oh
ca ie a a
ITV AY
24-A
THE COURT: Yes. The Court would
specifically request that the parties
sit down and discuss the announced
ruling of the Court in an attempt to re-
sOlve all of the administrative matters
that have to be taken care of and handle3
to implement it.
What I would do is enter this by way
of a final order. I would probably close
the case administratively, but I would
retain jurisdiction.
MR. MENDELOW: That is what we want
the Court to do,
THE COURT: For any proceedings neces-
sary to enforce the judgment in accord-
ance with the announced final order.
MR. MENDELOW: Thank you.
MR. RHOADS: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you very much,
It is an interesting proposition.
As I say, I am delighted to be educated.
If you appeal it, so be it. Maybe the
appellate court can aid me in my educa-
tion.
MR. RHOADS: Just something to chew
on for a little bit.
(Thereupon the hearing was concluded.)
25-A
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
;
No. 72-791-civ-pF |
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF .
MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,
DISTRICT NO. 145,
Plaintiff,
Nea EME ees ROWE aE
Ve
MODERN AIR TRANSPORT, INC.,
Defendant,
FINAL JUDGMENT
ALT IG PLAINS TEE OT PY LY SIR OS
THIS MATTER came on for trial before
the Court without a jury and pursuant to
the findings of fact and conclusions of
law entered upon the record on November
Poe gee ae
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment
is hereby entered in favor of the plain- 6
tiff and against the defendant and the
award of the arbitrator shall be en- :
forced. :
26-A
DONE AND ORDERED at Miami, Florida
this 30th day of November, 1972,
s/ Peter Fay
United States District
Judge
27-A
APPENDIX D
In the Matter of Arbitration
MODERN AIR TRANSPORT, INC .,
and
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION Or
MACHINISTS, DISTRICT LODGE
NO. 145
Grievances Involving Alleged
Violation of Section 24 --
Scope of The Agreement --
By Contracting Out of Work
BEFORE: Laurence E. Seibel,
Impartial Arbitrator
Appearances:
For the Company
James B. Rhoads, Esq.
Claude T. Sullivan, Jr.,Esq.
Fisher & Phillips
Atlanta, Georgia
Por the Union
Joseph P. Manners, Esq.
Manners and Amoon
Miami, Florida
; . . 38 PES REPAIRED PEA IRT cor |
LNT NTE MO RY POLL SM PET ERE I FT TT FE TN - .
——— =
8 RENNES PASTE NITY RIE EI NS a
28-A
Statement of the Case,
The Union filed a number of griev-
ances alleging that the contracting out
of the modification or conversion of
certain CV-990s violated the Agreement
executed in July 1967 and that the con-
tracting out of minor engine repairs and
hot section overhaul repairs violated
the Agreement executed in December 1970.
It seeks an award compensating employees
in the Company's maintenance shops, facil-
ities and airport stations covered by the
Agreement for the work lost as a conse-
quence of the contracting out of such
work.
Specifically, the Union filed griev-
ances dated November 23, 1970, November
30, 1970 and March 1, 1971 concerning the
“farming out” of modification and conver-
sion of four CV-990s, namely, aircraft
numbered 601, 614, 623 and 625; a griev-
ance dated July 15, 1971 concerning the
contracting out of engine repair work on
engines with serial numbers 151, 181 and
202; a grievance dated September 13, 1971
concerning the contracting out of engine
repair and sheet metal work which caused
the layoff of five mechanics, and the
Union requested cessation of the subcon-
tracting and the cancellation of the lay-
off notices; a grievance dated October 20,
1971 concerning the contracting out of
engine and sheet metal work which caused
the layoffs of five additional employees,
29-A
and the Union requested reinstatement of
such employees with back pay; and a
grievance dated October 31, 1971 con-
cerning another contracting out violation
resulting in layoffs of three additional
employees and the Union requested their
reinstatement with back pay.
As is evident from the foregoing,
the grievances essentially fall into two
groups: One relating to modification and
conversion of aircraft and the other re-
lating to engine repair work.
1. Modification and Conversion of
Aircraft. The grievances filed on Novem-
ber 23, 1970, November 30, 1970 and March
1, 1971 relate to the modification of
four aircraft from the configuration of
the seller to the configuration desired
by the purchaser, Generally speaking, a
company acquiring aircraft specifies the
configuration in which it will Operate
the aircraft and then appropriate modifi-
cation must be made subject to Federal
Aviation Agency requirements. The work
involved in modifying an aircraft to the
acquiring company's configuration and in
accomplishing hitherto unperformed FAA
modifications is, according to the Com-
pany, termed “initial modification."
Subsequent modification, once the air-
craft is in service, is undertaken from
time to time to meet Operational require-
ments or tO meet new FAA regulations or
to satisfy FAA requirements which
PPLE FM ee rR
RS ELIT LP IN,
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BP crrencrercne ter aR REP ENE TF ae ,
30-A
periodic inspections indicate are not
being met. Such subsequent modification
is undertaken on an “as required” or “as
necessary” basis in 4 manner, where ever
possible, to minimize “down” time.
From April 1967 to the beginning of
1971 the Company acquired ten Convair 990
jet aircraft. The Parties are only in
agreement that the work here being grieved
with respect to aircraft numbered 601,
614, 623 and 625 was work performed by an
outside company, namely, American Air-
motive Corporation, and that all subse-
quent modification was performed by
Company mechanics, including the rein-
forcement of the main landing gear beams
(spar modification) on aircraft 603 and
615. However, with respect to the first
six aircraft acquired by the Company,
while the Company asserts that “the
record is uncontroverted that no initial
modification work was performed by unit
employees on the first CV-990 aircraft
acquired by the Company” and that "all
initial modification work was performed
by American Airlines or their designee,”
it is the Union's assertion that the
first aircraft (#605) acquired was
initially leased to Air France but upon
its return conversion was performed "to
conform it to numbers 607 and 609," two
aircraft which had previously been ac-
quired by the Company and converted by
bargaining unit employees. Concededly,
some of the conversion work on aircraft
Bae a
f Aew tae’ LOLI RAD EPEAT REL A ORAL DLL
31-A
605 was performed by Air France. With
respect to aircraft numbered 607, the
Union asserts that conversion to the
Company's configuration was not done all
at once but rather "a little at a time.”
The Union further asserts that aircraft
numbered 603, 615 and 617 were also con-
verted to Company configuration by bar-
gaining unit employees.
The Company concedes that aircraft
numbered 603 was one on which the com-
plete initial modification was performed
by bargaining unit employees, and, also,
that with respect to aircraft numbered
615 the plane was delivered without seats
and bargaining unit employees installed
seats in the 134 configuration, In
connection with such work, the Company
asserts, approximately 30 additional
mechanics were temporarily hired to
handle the increased work load since
modification had to be undertaken while
the active fleet had to be maintained;
these temporary employees were terminated
after completion of the modification work.
With respect to aircraft numbered
605, 607, 609 and 617 the Company asserts
that the initial modification work was
accomplished by American Airlines or its
designee. Such modification included
converting each aircraft from 110 seats
set up in two classes, four galleys and
four lavatories to the Company's configu-
ration of 134 seats set up in one class,
a
Me OA a eS aero
SAVED OATES
TATE PELE LIE NS OEE
RRNA RET UMN?
32-A
two galleys and four lavatories,
2. Engine Repairs. Prior to 1967,
the Company had an engine shop perform-
ing repair work on piston engines but as
the utilization of jet aircraft increased
the engine shop was phased out and finally
it was closed. However, in the latter
part of 1968, the Company posted bids for
mechanics for the engine shop which was
reactivated for jet engine repair early
in 1969, For the following year or so
the repair work performed was minor in
nature with major engine work being
farmed out. Early in 1970, the Company
had several members of the engine shop
trained by Delta Airlines in Atlanta in
hot section overhauls and starting in
June 1970, Company mechanics performed
hot section repair work,
The “hot section" of a jet engine is
the area in which the combustion of fuel
Occurs and the areas to the rear thereof,
including the turbines and the fan. Over-
haul of such section is required by FAA
regulations after the engine has flown a
certain number of hours; also, when other
repair on the engine requires its dis-
mantling and the engine has flown almost
the number of hours specified in the FAA
regulation, a hot section overhaul may be
deemed economically advisable in addition
to the other repair work that must be done.
Such hot section overhaul has been per-
formed by the engine manufacturer, (Gene-
33-A
ral Electric), American Airmctive (which
is an approved agency for the repair of
the engine in question) and the Company's
own engine shop under the authority of
its operating certificate; both American
Airmotive and the Company's own engine
shop have sent out parts needing repair
tc General Electric. The Company's
engine shop performed hot section over-
hauls on eight engines from June 1970
through June 1971, with six of the eight
having been completed prior to the arbi-
tration hearing. Actually, the work here
being grieved relates to various engines
having “hot section” overhauls made in
connection with other repair which the
Union regards as “minor” but which the
Company asserts involved either foreign
object damage or high exhaust gas temper-
ature or high vibrations or high oil con-
sumption or shipping damage.
Prior to December 28, 1970, hot
section overhauls had been performed or
begua on eighteen engines, fourteen of
which were subcontracted to General
Electric; eight were removed strictly for
hot section overhaul and of these eight
four were performed by bargaining unit
employees. Subsequent to December 28,
1970 nine engines received hot section
overhauls, of which six were contracted
out to American Airmotive (all of which
were grieved) and three were begun by,
Or waiting for, bargaining unit employees;
one of the three was completed in Septem-
PLOY PR Fe eh ee Merk
— OSPREY
POU EW ESET TLE
Ry ETN
34-A
ber 1971, another had begun in July 1971
and was not complete by the arbitration
hearing date and the third had not been
begun at the time of the hearing.
Prior to December 28, 1970, some
engines experiencing foreign object
damage were repaired by an outside con-
tractor and some by bargaining unit
employees, During the same period seven
engines were repaired for excessively
high vibrations, six by an outside con-
tractor and one by bargaining unit em-
ployees. Also, during the same period,
the one engine repaired for high exhaust
gas temperature was done by an outside
contractor and of the eight engines re-
paired for high oil consumption, six were
subcontracted and two were repaired by
bargaining unit employees. Three other
engines were repaired for minor oil leaks
by bargaining unit employees.
Section 24, the “scope clause” of
the Agreement executed December 28, 1970
reads as follows:
SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT
s ION 24
"(a) All work normally performed in
the Company's Maintenance Shops and
facilities and airport stations by the
employees covered by this Agreement is
recognized as coming within the
35-A
jurisdiction of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters and is covered
by this Agreement. When aircraft is
placed in the active service of the
Company, the periodic maintenance on
such aircraft shall be within the scope
of this Agreement,
"The parties ayree that the Ccmpany
may :
“1. Continue to contract out work
heretofore customarily contracted
out,
"2. Return equipment, parts or assem-
blies to the manufacturer Or to
an approved agency for repair or
replacement.
> Purchase necessary parts, equip-
ment Or facilities,
"4. Contract out any work when the
Company's facilities or personnel
are not sufficient or available,
or where employees available do
not have the experience and
ability to satisfactorily perform
the work required, provided that
the above does not result in a
reduction in force of the employ-
ees covered by this Agreement.
In which case representatives of
the Company and Union will meet
without delay and negotiate the
36-A
proper provisions for the pro-
tection of employees' seniority
and other property rights.”
Section 24 in the Agreement of
December 28, 1970 is identical with the
“scope clause” of the preceding Agreement
except for the final sentence in sub-
paragraph (a) which was added in 1970.
Contentions of the Parties.
1. Modification and Conversion, The
Union contends that all modification of
ali aircraft in service was done by bar-
gaining unit employees.
In essence, the Union argues that
the modification work done on aircraft
numbered 601, 614, 623 and 625 is work
coming within the contractual restrictions
concerning the contracting out of work.
Such modification cannot be considered
“work heretofore customarily contracted
out" since the history of jet planes used
by the Company is too recent to conclude
that any modification work was "customar-
ily" contracted out. Indeed, modification
to conform new aircraft to the Company ‘s
configuration was customarily not con-
tracted out but was performed by bargain-
ing unit employees as early as April 1967,
which was three months before the Agree-
ment went into effect. Aircraft numbered
603, for example, was different from
American Airlines CV-990s and had to be
— ee ee eee eT A aT LGR e eh Rhee aay
er, al o's -
ye ee
37-A
aes
completely modified by bargaining unit
employees, Moreover, other CV-990s had :
to have spar modification and repair,
which was work that was never before con-
tracted out and, indeed was an integral .
part of maintaining the fleet. With re- _
spect to the reason given by the Company
that it did not have the capacity to per-
form the modification work on aircraft
601 and 614, the Union points out chat
bargaining unit employees modified six
other aircraft and that the Company and
American Airmotive share the same hangar.
And, the Union notes, the Company received
aircraft numbered 623 and 625 during a
slow period when bargaining unit emp loy-
ees were performing certain work at
American Airmotive ramps, which space was
available, the Union asser::s, to the
Company.
aS ee
The Union maintains that the Company
has the equipment +o perform the modifi-
cation work, the unit has the skill to per-
form the work and the Company has the
facilities and capacity to perform all
conversion and modification of aircraft
to its configuration, Indeed, the con-~
version of certain aircraft Was accom-
plished a little at atime as part of the
bargaining unit's normal and customary
work. The Union also maintains that there
has existed no emergency which would
Support or necessitate the contracting out
of work which was usually and customarily ~
performed by bargaining unit employees
Steal PA HF He NP Te
Pewee ea we Heer
POEPLOMTE KELL RI SNE RTS TRIN aT me
>
|
38-A
and, further, that such contracting out
resulted in the reduction of the units
work force in the fall of 1970 as com-
pared with the size of the unit in Novem-
ber 1969,
Pinally, the Union contends that the
Company violated subsection 24(a)(4) since
it unilaterally assigned four aircraft to
American Airmotive for modification with-
out engaging in negotiations designed to
protect the property rights of laid off
employees. It further charges that the
Company had an interest in American Air-
motive and wanted to keep that Company's
work force busy.
The Company contends that “initial”
modification work was performed on air-
craft numbered 605, 607, 609 and 617 by
American Airlines or its designee, that
initial modification on aircraft number
615 was also performed by American Air-
lines except that bargaining unit employ-
ees installed the seats in the 134 con-
figuration and that initial modification
on aircraft number 603 was performed by
bargaining unit employees with the help
of additional personnel temporarily hired.
With respect to aircraft numbered 601,
614, 623 and 625, it is the Company's
position that its facilities were inade-
quate to modify these aircraft and at the
same time service the Company's active
fleet; moreover, on aircraft numbered 623
and 625 spar modification was authorized
&
4
:
FX RETINAL RO PETE
39-A
as part of the "initial" modification
when inspection revealed cracks in the
main landing gear beams which were close
to the tolerable limit. The Company con-
cedes that subsequent modification was
performed by Company mechanics including
spar modification,
The Company contends that while its
employees had at one time or another per-
formed each of the modification tasks
required in an “initial” modification,
nevertheless, with one exception, such
employees only performed this work as
part of the periodic maintenance of such
aircraft after the aircraft Was placed in
the Company's revenue producing service.
Stated differently, the Company maintains
that subsequent modification was the work
normally performed by its employees but
such work is not the subject of the in-
stant grievances, Moreover, the Company
points out that when the bargaining unit
performed its only “initial” modification
on aircraft number 603, thirty temporary
employees had to be hired, and it can thus
hardly be said that "initial" modification
was “work normally performed" in the Com-
pany's facility,
In any event, the Company contends,
Section 24 provides four separate and
distinct exceptions, one of which permits
the Company to contract Out work hereto-
fore customarily contracted out. Initial
modification, the Company maintains, has
REFN SL FF ON Ue
—
<TR Ne IIIT SF
a tach 4 ooh eae
agrees < PEO EID
POET PALE POP STN
40-A
always been customarily contracted out,
as is evident from the fact that air-
craft numbered 607 and 609, the only air-
craft acquired before July 1967 (the
effective date of the previous Agreement)
were initially modified by American Air-
lines, and, as of October 1970, of the six
aircraft acquired up until that time, the
“initial” modification on all but one had
been contracted out. In this connection,
the Company further contends that the
words "heretofore customarily contracted
out” should refer to July 14, 1967 con-
cerning the first two grievances and to
December 1970 for the 1971 grievances.
Finally, with respect to the modi-
fication grievances, the Company argues
that the Union has not demonstrated that
the Company's facilities or personnel were
sufficient or available. The Company
points out that at the time of the sub-
contracting being grieved no unit employ-
ees were on layoff status. Moreover, no
evidence was submitted to show that the
Company's facilities or personnel were
sufficient to perform both the work here
being grieved and the maintenance of the
Company's active fleet. On the contrary,
in the one instance when the Company per-
formed “initial” modification it became
necessary to hire temporary employees.
The Company points out that the Company's
Vice President for Technical Services
testified that ramp space was inadequate
to perform “initial” modification on four
TP I ne LU OE A Re ne BAO a
aircraft over a six month period and also
to maintain the active fleet, test imony
|
;
that was neither rebutted or contradicted. ?
2. Engine Repair Grievances. The
Union maintains that engines numbered 151
and 202 were sent to American Airmotive
for minor repairs normally performed by
bargaining unit employees and upon their
return it was discovered that a hot sec-
tion overhaul had also been performed,
It also maintains that engine number 110
was sent to American Airmotive for minor
repairs traditionally performed by bar-
gaining unit employees on September 10,
1971 after the Company had announced lay-
offs of five employees, Similarly, on
September 28, 1971 at the time that the
first layoffs were effected and the second
layoff of eight members of the bargaining
unit were announced, engine number 132 was
sent to American Airmotive for a hot sec-
tion overhaul, It is also asserted that
in October 1970 engines numbered 160 and
170 were sent to American Airmotive for
engine repair either traditionally per-
formed by the bargaining unit or which
might have been given to the unit. More-
Over, it is further contended by the
Union that engine number 221 which had
been awaiting a hot section overhaul was
sent to American Airmotives on September
13, 1971, after the layoffs had been
announced; this engine had been Waiting
for repair for some time because, the
Union alleges, the Company cross utilized
RETR ON
AO EMNIED STERN
RTC ER
42-A
the unit's mechanics on line maintenance
and, as°a consequence, the unit also
lost all of the other sheet metal, elec-
trical, welding and minor repairs that
were involved.
The Union concedes that during the
period in which the Company's engine shop
was not functioning engines were sent out
for cold section overhauls and toreign
object damage repair, that in the case of
engines numbered 151 and 202 the bargain-
ing unit did remove certain parts and
repair them fer use in other aircraft and
that time extension evaluations to deter-
mine whether hot section overhauls were
needed were sent to General Electric be-
cause the Company was not equipped to
do the layout.
The Union argues that the intent of
the Company in reopening its engine shop
was to perform more minor repair work and
eventually to perform hot section over-
hauls and that to accomplish this purpose
the Company acquired additional hangar
space, purchased parts and equipment and
had members of the unit trained in hot
section overhauls. Accordingly, in June
1970 bargaining unit employees were per-
forming the work which the Company in-
tended them to be performing and such work
was performed for approximately one year
without complaint. However, the Union
charges, the Company began cross utilizing
engine shop employees by requiring them to
43-A
work on maintenance of the fleet and
eventually as a consequence of the con-
tracting out of work some 13 members of
the unit were laid off in September and
October 1971. This contracting out of
work, undertaken unilaterally by the
Company without negotiation as required
by the Agreement, and without an emergen-
cy situation existing, resulted in the
layoffs and was violative of the Agree-
ment.
The Company contends that the Union's
basic premise is that once bargaining
unit employees are capable of performing
certain repairs and have performed those
repairs then the Company may no longer
contract out the work. This basic prem-
ise, it argues, is not only contrary to
the language of the "scope clause" but
contrary to its intent, namely to provide
flexibility to the Company to contract out
maintenance work. In this connection, the
ieee Se Soe Ak SU
ARIA Py LRP GE TO? Oe
Company points out that during negotiations —
the Union proposed to amend the "scope
clause" so that it would have the right to
the work which Union employees were capa-
ble of performing but this proposal was
rejected by the Company and the flexibil-
ity was retained, Thus, the Company con-
cludes, the Union is here seeking to
accomplish by arbitration what it failed
to obtain by negotiation.
The Company contends that somet imes
engine repair work of the type here in
STN
I er ei wet oe reins ° Ce os SU nena PON OY eid os aE
44-A
question was performed by unit employees
and sometimes Ly an outside contractor
and, indeed, initially when the Company
Operated without an engine shop such
repair work was accomplished solely by
contracting out. This contracting out
continued even after the opening of the
engine shop and it thus cannot be con-
cluded that such work is “normally” per-
formed by bargaining unit employees and
thus subject to Section (a) of the
“scope clause."
Moreover, under subsection 1 of
Section (a) the Company may “continue to
contract work heretofore customarily con-
tracted out” and prior to December 28,
1970 the type of engine work here under
consideration had been consistently con-
tracted out. Furthermore, the Company
maintains, the Union failed to demonstrate
that the subcontracting was not permitted
as the return of equipment, parts and
assemblies to an approved agency for re-
pair. American Airmotive is an “approved
agency," namely, One approved by the FAA
to repair the GE engine here in question
up to and including full overhaul,
Finally, the Company argues that the
Union has failed to establish that layoffs
were caused by the subcontracting or that
such layoffs adversely affected the Com-
pany’s right to subcontract the work in
question under subsection (a)l & 2 of
Section 24 of the “scope clause.“ In this
OPA OPEL IR, ES Ain 8 EIS OOOO ls LLIB AT I
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connection, the Company points out that
subsections 1 to 4 of subsection (a) set
forth separate and distinct exceptions
which permit Company contracting out of
work, but only in subsection 4 are lay-
o-fs mentioned, Accordingly, the Company
ccncludes, the layoff proviso in subsec-
tion 4 only applies to the conditions
enimerated in subsection 4, and had the
Paities iniended such proviso to apply
to subsections 1 to 3 they could have
reajily done so by drafting the proviso
as part of subsection (a) itself, It is
therefore the Company's position that it
may contract out under subsections 1 to
3 of subsection (a) regardless of whether
Siich contracting out causes layoffs since
the proviso does not apply to such sub-
sections and the Company is not relying
on subsection 4 to justify the contract-
ing out here involved, Moreover, the
Company maintains, it has not been shown
that the layoffs were directly caused by
the contracting out. What has been shown
is simply that layoffs occurred while the
contracting out occurred. Admittedly,
several engines were awaiting work in the
Company's engine shop during this period
of time and while the Union seeks to ex-
plain this by asserting cross utilization
of employees precluded --he performance of
work on such engines, no testimony was
offered to that effect by the Union. on
the other hand, a Company official testi-
fied that cross utilization has always
been necessary to keep the Airline running
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and a mechanic is required to perform
"any and all work generally recognized
as mechanical” rather than only a par-
ticular class of work, such as “sheet
metal,” “engine,” etc.
Discussion and Opinion.
Careful consideration of all portions
of Section 24, the “scope clause", makes
it clear that while the Parties provided
that “all work normally performed" comes
“within the juris@iction of the [Union]
* « ©”, nevertheless the Parties clearly
intended to provide considerable flexi-
bility to the Company with respect to the
contracting out of work.
The different circumstances under
which such contracting out of work may be
effected are set forth above, not only in
the recital of the provisions of Section
24 but also in the detailed "Contentions
of the Parties" and particularly the Com-
pany’s contentions. While I am in agree-
ment with the Company's view that the
language in subparagraph 1 of subsection
(a) concerning “work heretofore customari-
ly contracted out” refers to the practice
existing prior to the effective date of
the Agreement (as held in Arbitrator
Greene's decision), I do not share the
Company's apparent view that so long as
there was substantial contracting out of
certain work it may “continue” to contract
/ out [such] work" because of subparagraph 1
Ponte fF
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of subsection (a). To my mind, in the
light of the basic thrust of subsection
(a) to place “work normally performed"
in the bargaining unit and in view of the
limitations specified in subparagraph 4
of subsection (a) with regard to con-
tracting out “any work,” there would
appear to be an implication in the use
of the words “customarily” in subparagraph
1 of subsection (a) that t e authority
specified therein relates to work that
has been exclusively contracted out.
Stated differently, it is my view that
subparagraph 1 does not refer to work
which has been both contracted out as
well as performed by the bargaining unit.
In the instant case, while I am not at
all convineed that bargaining unit em-
ployees have performed “initial” modifi-
cation work to the extent that the Union
here claims and, indeed, while I am
equally convinced that the bulk of the
“initial” modification work has not been
performed by bargaining unit employees,
although tasks performed in connection
with such work may well have been per-
formed by bargaining unit employees from
time to time after aircraft have been
placed in a revenue status, the fact
remains that some “initial” modification
work has been performed by bargaining
unit employees and it cannot thus be con-
cluded that such work has been "exclusive-
ly” contracted out. This is equally true
for engine repair work involving hot
section overhauls, as is plainly evident
SE ETS OT ORD SR ITY IONE HEON T RC RPRRRGRNR NA
A ON al a i See
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from the detailed recital above of what
was done by whom with respect to various
engine repair work. Accordingly, I do
not regard subparagraph 1 of subsection
(a) as determinative of the issue pre-
sented herein.
I find subparagraphs 2 and 3 of sub-
section (a) of Section 24 equally in-
applicable in the instant situation.
These provisions appear to have been in-
cluded to make crystal clear the Company's
right to resort, where necessary, to a
manufacturer or to an approved agency for
repairs or replacement of parts or assem-
blies, etc. but to conclude that in the
instant situation the Company was autho-
‘ rized to contract out the work simply
because “an approved agency” was involved
would prove too much, in my opinion, since
virtually all contracting out could then
.be authorized so long as "an approved
agency” was involved and there would thus
be little, if any, need to include sub-
paragraphs 1 and 4 of subsection (a) of
Section 24,
Essentially, authorization for the
Company‘s contracting out for the work
here being grieved must be found in sub-
paragraph 4, As I read that provision
the Parties intended to provide substan-
tial flexibility to the Company to obtain
the performance of all work required to
keep its equipment operative. However,
the Parties equally and plainly intended
49-A
that the Company's right to contract out
“any work” would be circumscribed to the
extent that if a reduction in force of
bargaining unit emplcyees would occur
then the Company and Union would meet and
protect employees' seniority and other
property rights. Thus, the Company could
contract out work where its facilities or
personnel are not sufficient or available
Or where employees able to perform the
required work are not sufficiently ex-
perienced or skilled to perform the
required work, so long as the Company and
Union meet to protect employees in the
event a reduction of force then occurs.
To my mind, the limitations specified
in subparagraph 4 on the Company's right
to contract out “any work" places a burden
not upon the Union, as the Company here
argues, but rather on the Company itself
to demonstrate that its facilities or
personnel are not sufficient or available
etc. Stated differently, the Company has
the right to contract out under given cir-
cumstances and it thus behooves the Com-
pany to demonstrate the existence of such
circumstances when it seeks to exercise
its right.
In the instant case, during a sub-
stantial period of time in which the con-
cerned contracting out was effected, there
was no reduction in force of bargaining
ERNE NATTY RE WE RIPE END IG ERO FH oH TN I
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hover rere erreur RRR HE TINT
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unit employees and it could thus be
reasonably concluded that at such times
the Company's facilities and personnel
were not sufficient or available to per-
form all of the work (that was required
and it thus became necessary to resort to
the contracting out of work in order to
keep its operation or equipment function-
ing. The fact that bargaining unit
employees could have also performed the
contracted out work affords no basis for
the view that the Company was obligated
to “pile up” such work for the bargaining
unit employees for such time as other
work would slacken. And, the fact that
the Company has cross utilized, in the
Union's terms, bargaining unit employees
to perform flight maintenance work on
aircraft as well as modification and
engine repair work does not justify the
Union's view that the work should not
have been contracted out. Nothing in
this Agreement precludes the Company from
so utilizing bargaining unit employees
and there is no obligation on the Company's
part to hold over required work for ulti-
mate assignment to bargaining unit employ-
ees who are otherwise currently occupied
on other bargaining unit tasks.
As I see it, then, the problem here
becomes one of determining whether the
layoffs that occurred in September and
October 1971 were the result of contract-
ing out work when the Company's facilities
and skilled personnel were sufficient and
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51-A
available to perform the work required.
While it may not be entirely clear in any
given situation that the contracting out
of work at a time when all employees are
employed (for an example, in August )
caused a layoff which subsequent ly
occurred (for example, in September),
certainly a very serious question arises
“here the contracting out of work is
undertaken at a time when employees
actually are on layoff or have been noti-
fied that a layoff will shortly occur.
In this case, the Company contracted out
engine work on engine number 111 on
September 10, 1971,0n engine number 132
on September 28, 1971, on engine number
170 on October 1, 1971 and on engine
number 221 on September 13, 1971. All of
this contracting out occurred at a time
when layoffs were either imminent or had
Occurred; five men were laid off in
September 1971 and eight additional men
in October 1971,
That there were layoffs when work
was being contracted out is quite clear,
The crucial question then becomes one of
ascertaining whether the circumstances,
as specified in subparagraph 4 of sub-
section (a), existed, Essentially, the
Company appears to be justifying its
contracting out on the grounds that the
facility was inadequate for performing
the grieved work, but apart from the
assertion itself in that regard the record
is not at all clear that such inadequacy
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52-A
existed. The responsible Company offi-
cial testified that he “laid off from
various sections trying to maintain a
steady level of mechanics in the engine
build-up section,” that he and other
Company officials were engaged in “grind-
ing the entire airline down,” that in
July, August and September 1971 the shop
was fully occupied in turning out what it
had as well as keeping aircraft flying
and he did not want to add additional men
(instead of contracting out the work)
because he doesn't "believe in the Union's -
concept of bringing people in off the
street” and that he “laid off as the
flight loads diminished.” In the light
of this testimony it does not appear that
the adequacy of the facility was the
basis for contracting out the work. In
any event, the record is insufficient,
in my Opinion, to demonstrate precisely
how the facility was inadequate or per-
sonnel unavailable; the Company has not
met its burden of demonstrating the
inadequacy of the facility or the unavail-
ability of properly trained and exper-
ienced personnel. Stated differently,
under a subparagraph 4 situation, if
employees are on layoff or are about to
be laid off, and the Company contracts
out work which has been performed by bar-
gaining unit employees in the past, such
layoffs must be considered, prima facie,
as having been the “result,” within the
meaning of subparagraph 4, of such con-
tracting out; the burden then shifts to
CDA Ueceeaten
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the Company to demonstrate the inadequacy
of the facility available or the unavail- 4
ability of properly trained and exper- 4
ienced personnel (either laid off or still
on the payroll) to perform the work
required, and, in my opinion, this burden
has not been met by the Company. Under
these circumstances I am constrained to
conclude that the contracting out of
engine repair work in September and Octo- :
ber 1971 when mechanics were either on f
layoff or when layoffs of mechanics had r
been announced was violative of Section
24(a)(4) of the Agreement.
Since the Union has commented upon
the fact that Modern Air and American
Airmotive are both owned by a parent
company, it may not be amiss to state
that, in my opinion, for the purposes of
Section 24 of this Agreement, mere common
ownership does not affect the right of
Modern Air to contract out to American
Airmotive as it, Modern Air, may do to
any appropriate FAA approved agency. The
adequacy of the Modern Air facilities
must be evaluated on the basis of its own
leasing arrangements.
SP RA BT IS ET
While on this record it does not
appear that the work contracted out was,
Or was not, sufficient to utilize fully,
Or for what period, tlie services of all
mechanics laid off in September and
October of 1971, the Submission Agreement
dated October 30, 1972 provides:
SNA LET
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"4, That if the arbitrator finds the
subcontracting in question to be in
violation of the current collective
bargaining agreement between the
parties, and if he further finds the
employees have been laid off as a
direct result of the subcontracting
found to be in violation of said
collective bargaining agreement,
MODERN shall not oppose the reinstate-
ment of such employees with no loss
in pay."
Accordingly, I am constrained to so
order,
Award.
The Company is directed to reinstate
with full seniority those employees who
were laid off in September and October
1971 when the contracting out of engine
repair work was effected in violation of
Section 24 (a)(4) of the Agreement, and
the Company shall reimburse all such
employees for all loss of pay.
/s/ Laurence E. Seibel
Laurence E. Seibel,
Arbitrator
March 29, 1972
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.