Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Modern Air Transport, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, District No. 145

Supreme Court brief1974

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

MODERN AIR TRANSPORT, INC.,

Petitioner,

Ve

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,

DISTRICT NO. 145,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

JOHN BACHELLER, JR.

Counsel of Record

WILLIAM F. KASPERS

First National Bank

Tower

Atlanta, Georvia 30303

Attorneys for

Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Gramaome BIA 2 2 sc te wt et eee 2

GUMAMEEGEOUN 6 © ee he te eee 2

QUESTION PRESENTED ....e«e.e 2

Damawnm Seay 6 2 6 bs eb ee 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ....e. 5

I. The Factual Background

and the Arbitrator's

Award, — o . — oe oe oe - oO oe 5

II. The Decision »f the

mameeaee Court « « 2 ss 9

III. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals ..... 10

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT. . ll

I, THE DECISION HEREIN INVOLVES

AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FED-

ERAL LAW WHICH HAS NOT BEEN

SPECIFICALLY CONSIDERED AND

SETTLED BY THIS COURT. MORE-

OVER, THE DECISION HEREIN IS

IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE

DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF

APPEALS WHICH HAVE ADDRESSED

eis QUESTION. . . 2. wer ll

II

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

Il. THE DECISION HEREIN IS

OF IMPERATIVE PUBLIC

IMPORTANCE TO THE EFFEC-

TIVE OPERATION OF THE

RAILWAY LABOR ACT ... - 25

6 ONC LUS ION ss * * 7 _ . = — J > 2 7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. « « e« « 29

APPENDICES:

A. Decision of the United

States Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit . .. - 1-A

Order of the United States

District Court for the

Southern District of

Florida ..«.e«.ee+«e-ee e 14-A

Final Judgment of the

United States District

Court for the Southern

District of Florida ... 25-A

Decision and Award of the

Arbitrator e e e e e a e e Zz 7-A

|| &

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES:

Cases

Amanda Bent Bolt Co. v. UAW,

451 F.2d 1277 (6th Cir. 1971)

American Machine and Foundry

Company v. Auto, Aerospace and

Agr. Implement Workers,

329 F.2d 147 (2nd Cir. 1964).

Dallas Typographical Union,

No. 173 v. A. H. Belo Corp.,

372 F.Zd 577 (5th Cir. 1967)-

H. K. Porter, Inc. v. United

Saw Workers, 333 F.2d 596

(3rd Cir. 1964) oe ee ee -_ 8 . .

International Brotherhood of

Pulp, Sulfite and Paper Mill

Workers Local Union No. 874

v. St. Regis Paper Company,

362 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1966).

Local 342, UAW v. T.R.W.,

402 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1968).

Local 7-644 Oil. Chemical &

Atomic Workers International

Union v. Mobil Oil Company,

350 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1965).

21

18

17

22

18

20,21

17

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES:

Cases

Socony Vacuum Tanker Men's

Assoc. v. Socony Mobil Oil Co.,

369 F.2d 480 (2nd Cir. 1966). .

Textile Workers Union of

America v. American Thread

Company, 291 F.2d 894

a oe, BOORt GS sk ee et

Textron, Inc. v. Auto Workers

Local 516, 86 LRRM 3240

jaeo Car, July 26, i974). « » e

Timken Co, v. Steelworkers

Local 1123, 432 F.2d 1012

Cea Gas: SOtal & « © © «© & 6 6

Torrington v. Metal Products

Workers, 362 F.2d 677

(2nd cir. 1966 ) ° ° e. . e ° ° e

Truck Drivers and Helpers

Union Local 784 v. Ulry-

Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562

eee acute 29RO) s sc bk te

United Steelworkers of America v.

Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.,

363 Use 593 . * * o . e es - oO

Page

18

18

24

24

ee oe

18,22

12,13

16,17

21,23

25,26

V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES:

Cases

Western Iowa Pork Company v.

National Brotherhood Packing

“House and Dairy Workers,

366 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1966)... 19

Statutes

Railway Labor Act, as

amended (45 U.S.C. § 151,

et. seq.)

Section 204 (45 U.S.C. § 184). . 3

28 Uessecs § 1254 (1) e . ° e a 2

Miscellaneous

Black's Law Dictionary

(Rev. 4th Ed. 1968) .... 14,15

IN THE

SUMPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1974

NO.

MODERN AIR TRANSPORT, INC.,

Petitioner,

Ve

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,

DISTRICT NO. 145,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Modern Air Transport, Inc.,

Petitioner herein, by and through its

undersigned counsel, petitions this Court

for a Writ of Certiorari to review the

Decision of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, rendered

and entered in this case on June 20, 1974,

reversing the findings of fact and con-

clusions of law rendered by the United

States District Court for the Southern

District of Florida on November 13, 1974,

but nevertheless affirming the order of

the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida entered on

2

November 30, 197%, said order granting

enforcement of an arbitrator's award

rendered on March 29, i972,

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision and judgment of the Court

of Appeals (App.A, infra, pp.1-A - 13-A)?+

is reported at 495 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir.1974).

The decision and order of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of

Florida (App.B, infra, pp.14-A - 24-A) is

to date unreported. The final judgment of

the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida (App.c, infra,

pp. 25-A - 26-A) is also unreported, as is

the decision and award of the arhitrator

(App.D, infra, pp. 27-A - 54-A).

JURISDICTION

The decision and judgment of the Court

Of Appeals was rendered and entered on June

20, 1974 (App.A, infra, pp. 1-A - 13-A).

On September 16, 1974, this Court rendered

an Order extending the time for filing a

petition for Writ of Certiorari to and

including October 18, 1974. The jurisdiction

of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §

1254(1) and the provisions of the Railway

Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §151, et seq.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether an arbitrator's rewriting of

the language of a collective bar-

1/ All references to "App." are references

to the Apperdix hereto designated by the

reference,

3

gaining agreement is within the arvitra-

tor's authority to interpret the acree-

ment and thus cutsice the scope of judi-

cial review.

STATUTE INVOLVED

The Railway Labor Act, as amended,

45 U.S.C. § 151, et seg., insofar as is

here pertinent, provides:

Section 204: The disputes between

an employee or group of employees

end a carrier Or carriers by air

growing out of grievances, or out

of the interpretation or applica-

tion of agreements concerning

rates of pay, rules, or working

conditions, including cases pend-

ing and unadjusted on the date

of approval of this Act before

the National Labor Relations Board,

shall be handled in the usual

manner up tc and including the

chief operating officer of the

carrier designated to handle such

disputes; but, failing te reach

an adjustment in this manner, the

disputes may be referred by

petition of the parties or by

either party to an appropriate

adjustment board, as hereinafter

rcoovided, with a fu2l statement

of the facts and supporting data

bearing upon the disputes.

4

It shall be the duty of every

carrier and of its employees,

acting through their representa-

tives, selected in accordance

with the provisions of this title,

to establish a board of adjustment

of jurisdiction not exceeding the

jurisdiction which may be lawfully

exercised by system, group, or

regional boards of adjustment,

under the authority of Section 3,

Title I, of this Act.

Such boards of adjustment may be

established by agreement between

employees and carriers either on

any individual carrier, or system,

Or group of carriers by air and

any class or classes of its or

their employees; or pending the

establishment of a permanent

National Board of Adjustment as

hereinafter provided, Nothing

in this Act shall prevent said

carriers by air, or any class or

classes of their employees, both

acting through their represent a-

tives selected in accordance with

provisions of this title, from

mutually agreeing to the establish-

ment of a national board of adjust-

ment of temporary duration and of

similarly limited jurisdiction.

45 U.S.C. 5184.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. The Factual Background and

the Arbitrator's Award

Petitioner, Modern Air Transport,

Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the

Company), and Respondent, International

Association of Machinists and Aerospace

Workers, District No. 145 (hereinafter

referred to as the Union), are parties

to a collective bargaining agreement

dated December 28, 1°70.

In July, 1971, the Company sent

several jet engines to American Air-

motive Corporation, an FAA approved

jet engine repair agency, for repair.

The Union contended that this action

violated Section 24 of the collective

bargaining agreement, and, pursuant to

the grievance and arbitration procedure

of the collective bargaining agreement,

the case was duly submitted to a System

Board of Adjustment, Laurence E. Seibel

presiding as impartial arbitrator.

Section 29 of the agreement specifi-

cally limited the authority of the System

Board of Adjustment and the impartial

arbitrator, by providing:

D. The Board shall have juris-

diction over disputes »etween

any employee covered izy the...

6

agreement and the company,

growing out of grievances

or out of interpretation or

application of any of the

terms of the .. . agreement.

The jurisdiction of the Board

shall not extend to proposed

changes in hours of employ-

ment, rates of compensation,

or working conditions covered

by existing agreements be-

tween the parties hereto.

The agreement further provided, in

Section 24(a) with respect to contracting

Out, in part as follows:

The parties agree that the

company may:

1. Continue to contract out

work heretofore customarily

contracted out.

2. Return equipment, parts

or assemplies to the manu-

.acturer or to an approved

ayency for repair or replace-

ment.

3. Purchase necessary parts,

eculpment or facilities.

“&. Contract out work when the

compan''s facilities are not

7

sufficient or available, or

wnere employees available do

not have the experience and

ability to satisfactorily

perform the work required,

provided that the above does

not result in a reduction in

force of the employees covered

by this agreement. In which

case representatives of the

company and the union will meet

without delay and negotiate

the proper provisions for the

protection of employees’

seniority and other property

rights.

Notwithstanding the above provisions

of the collective »argaining agreement,

the arbitrator in this case substituted

the word "exclusively" for the word

"customarily" in Section 24(a)l, stating:

- - . There would appear to be

and [sic] implication in the use

of the words [sic] “customarily”

in suv-paracraph 1 suo-section

(a) that the authority specified

therein relates to work that has

ween exclusively contracted out."

(App. B, infra, p. 47-A, emphasis

in original).

Based upon such a re-writing of the

language of the agreement, the ar, itrator

8

held that the Company's sending of jet

engine repair work to the FAA approved

repair agency, American Airmotive Corp-

oration, violated Section 24 of the con-

tract, stating:

- «. .The fact remains that

some "initial" modification

work has been performed by

bargaining unit employees

and it cannot be thus con-

cluded that such work has

been "exclusively" contracted

out. This is equally true

for engine repair work. (App.

D, infra, p. 47-A, emphasis

in original).

Moreover, the specific factual findings

set forth in the arbitrator's decision

clearly reveal that the underlying basis

of the arbitrator's holding was his sub-

stitution of the word "exclusively" for

the word “customarily” in the languwge

of Section 24(a) of the agreement. For

the arbitrator specifically found that

the bulk of the engine repair work in

question had been contracted out prior

to the effective date of the contract

(App. D, infra, pp. 33-A - 34-A; pp. 47-

A - 48-A); that American Airmotive Corp-

oration, the Company to which the engines

in question were sent, was ". .. an ap-

proved agency for the repair cof the en-

gine in question" (App. D, infra, p. 33-

A); that the parties clearly intended to

9

provide considerable flexibility to the

company with respect to the contracting

out of work (App. D, infra, p. 46-A) ;

and that the parties had set forth in

Section 24(a), sub-paragraphs 1-4 of the

agreement, the four distinct circumstances

under which the company could contract out

work (App. D, infra, p. 46-A).

II. The Decision of the District Court

‘he Union petitioned the United

States District Court for the Southern

District of Florida for enforcement of

the arbitrator's award. The company re-

sisted, contending that the arbitrator's

opinion manifested an utter infidelity

to his contractual obligation to confine

himself to interpretation and application

of the collective bargaining agreement,

and that the award was therefore unen-

forceable.

The District Court found that the

arbitrator's substitution of the word

“axclusively" for the word “customarily"

as the underlying »asis of the award was

". , . completely improper .. . sO

clearly improper as to not really deserve

much more comment" (App. B, infra, p. 15-

A).

The lower court nevertheless en-

forced the arbitrator's award “for reasons

completely different from those" stated

10

by the arbitrator (App. B, infra, p. 18-

A).

In the lower court's opinion, the ar-

bitrator could have arrived at the result

that he reached, even if he had not ex-

ceeded his authority by changing the ex-

press language of Section 24(a)1l of the

agreement (App. B, infra, p. 18-A). The

District Court therefore saw no reason to

refuse enforcement and send the case back

to the arbitrator (App. B, infra, p.19-A).

Til, The Decision of the Court

of Appeals

The Company appealed the District

Court's decision to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,

insisting that, once the lower court had

concluded that the arbitrator's substitu-

tion of "exclusively" for “customarily”

in Section 24(a)1 of the agreement as the

underlying basis for the award was "com-

pletely improper", it had no authority to

proceed further but instead should have

Simply denied enforcement of the award.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the

Company's position, holding thats

The proper course for the

District Court would have

been to deny enforcement upon

the finding that the arbitra-

tor manifested an “infidelity

11

to his obligation." App.

A, infra,p. 11-A - 12-A.

However, the Court of Appeals went on to

hold that the arbitrator's substitution

of the word “exclusively” for "“customar-

ily" in Section 24(a)1 of the agreement

was within his fundamental authority to

interpret the contract, and the District

Court's conclusion that such a substitu-

tion was "completely improper" was there-

fore itself improper. The Court of Ap-

peals therefore affirmed the District

Court's result, enforcing the arbitrator's

award, while at the same time reversing

the method by which the lower court

arrived at such a result.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE DECISION HEREIN INVOLVES AN

IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW

WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY

CONSIDERED AND SETTLED BY THIS

COURT. MOREOVER, THE DECISION HERE-

IN IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE

DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF AP-

PEALS WHICH HAVE ADDRESSED THIS

QUESTION.

As the portions of the arbitrator's

@erision cited in the Statement of the

Case indicate (pp. 5-9, supra), it is un-

disputed that the arbitrator substituted

his own word, “exclusively” for the con-

tractual term, “customarily”, in Section

12

24(a)l of the agreement. It is also

undisputed that such a substitution was

the underlying basis of the arbitrator's

award.

The question at issue in this case,

therefore, is whether such a substitution

was within the fundamental authority of

the arbitrator to interpret the agreement,

whether such a substitution could be used

as the underlying basis of the award, and

whether the arbitrator's decision is thus

outside the scope of judicial review. As

mentioned, supra, the District Court,

after a full and complete evidentiary

hearing, held such a substitution to be

“completely improper." On the other hand,

the Court of Appeals held such a substitu-

tion to be within the fundamental authori-

ty of the arbitrator to interpret the

agreement.

The only decision of this Court which

has addressed the general question of the

scope of judicial review of an arbitra-

tor’s award in a case involving a dispute

arising out of a collective bargaining

agreement is United Steelworkers of

America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp.,

363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d

_ 1424 (1960). In that case, this Court

held that it was not a proper function of

a federal court to review an arbitrator's

decision which is to some extent ambigu-

ous. In arriving at such a result, this

Court stated:

13

A mere ambiguity in the opinion

accompanying an award, which permits

the inference that the arbitrator

may have exceeded his authority, is

not a reason for refusing to enforce

the award. 363 U.S. at 597.

Seat e paod ae

While thus limiting the scope of judicial

review of an arbitrator's award, this

Court went on to state in its Enterprise

Wheel decision:

Nevertheless, an arbitrator is con-

fined to interpretation and appli-

cation of the collective bargaining

agreement; he does not sit to dis-

pense his own brand of industrial

justice .. . his award is legiti-

mate only so long as it draws its

essence from the collective bargain-

ing agreement. When the arbitrator's

words manifest an infidelity to this

obligation, the courts have no choice

but to refuse enforcement of the

award. 363 U.S. at 597.

The instant arbitration award is

clearly distinguishable from the arbitra-

tion award in issue in Enterprise Wheel.

Unlike the award in Enterprise Wheel,

there is no ambiguity in the instant

award. Rather, the award clearly and

unambiguously substituted the arbitrator's

term "exclusively," for the Parties' term

"customarily," in Section 24(a)(1) of the

g Pees

14

Agreement. Such a substiti:tion does not

simply contain an “inference that the

arbitrator may have exceeded his authority"

by substituting his own language for the

language of the agreement, but instead

ciearly indicates that the arbitrator

did in fact exceed his authority.

The instant arbitrator's obligation

was to take the facts as he found them

and determine, as Section 24(a)(1) of the

Agreement required, whether those facts

established that the work contracted out

was "heretofore customarily contracted

out." Consistent with this obligation,

the arbitrator was not authorized under

the guise of interpretation, to change

the relevant provision of the agreement

by substituting the .word "exclusively"

for the word "customarily," as that word

is used in Section 24(a)l. For, the two

words. are inherently contradictory.

The dictionary definitions of the

two words clearly demonstrate their non-

substitutability:

"Customarily . .. usually, habitu-

ally, according to the customs,

general practice or usual order of

things." Black's Law Dictionary

462 (Rev. 4th Ed. 1968),

"Exclusively . . . apart from all

others .'. . oily . ss purely ...

15

solely .. . substantially all or

for the greater part .. . to the

exclusion of all others; without

admission of others to participate;

in a manner to exclude.” Id. at 674,

675.

Moreover, 1¢ should be noted that the most

restrictive synonym for the word "“custo-

marily," “habituallv." is itself defined

as follows:

"Customarily; by frequent practice

or use." It does not mean entirely

or exclusively. Black's Law

Dicticnary 840 (Rev. 4th Ed. 1968)

(Emphasis supplied).

The above definitions clearly indi-

cate that the arbitrator's substitution

of the word "exclusively" for the word

“customarily” in the instant case was

neither reasonable nor rational. Accord-

ingly, as the District Court below recog-

nized, such a substitution could in no

way be construed to be within the arbi-

trator's traditional authority of inter-

pretation. To thus apply the facts of

the case to a standard concocted by the

arbitrator (i.e., whether the work in

question had been heretofore “exclusive-

ly" contracted out) rather than the

standard agreed upon the the Parties (i.e,

whether the work in question had been

"heretofore customarily contracted out")

16

clearly manifests an infidelity on the

part of the arbitrator to his fundamental

obligation to interpret and apply the

terms of the collective bargaining ‘agree-

ment, rather than his own terms, to the

facts in issue,

fhe Fifth Circuit's decision herein

that the arbitrator's award was "well

founded in the ‘essence! of, and more

than ‘rationally inferable' from the

letter and purpose of, the collective

bargaining agreement" (see App. A, infra,

pb. 12-4), thus represents the extent to

which this Court's Enterprise Wheel

decision has been misinterpreted and

misapplied by the lower courts. The

Court Of Appeals' decision herein illus-

trates the necessity of a clarification

by this Court of the difference between

a federal court's substitution of its

Own judgment for that of an arbitrator

and a federal court's complete abandon-

ment of its role as a reviewer of arbi-

tration awards with a "you get what you

bargained for" attitude, even where the

arbitration award in issue manifests a

clear infidelity to the essence of the

collective bargaining agreement. It is

unquestionably desirable that arbitration

be "final and binding" and not subject to

"judicial interpretation," but not at a

price of Surrendering the express and

unambiguous terms of a collective bar-

gaining agreement.

17

While some Circuit Courts have recog-

nized the proper scope of judicial review

as set forth by this Court in its Enter-

prise Wheel decision, other Circuit

courts have not. Indeed, the Courts of

Appeal have completely failed to trans-

late this Court's Enterprise Wheel

decision into a consistent and workable

pronouncement of the appropriate extent

or limitation of judicial review of an

arbitration award. Instead, the courts

have fashioned a different standard of

judicial review for each case.

Among the various standards employed

by the Courts of Appeal have been:

1) The reviewing court should not

disturb the award so long as the inter-

pretation of the arbitrator was not

arbitrary (Local 7-644 Oil, Chemical &

Atomic Workers International Union v.

Mobil Oil Company, 350 F.2d 708, 712

[7th Cir. 1965]).

2) The reviewing court should not

disturb the award merely because it be-

lieves that sound legal principles were

not applied by the arbitrator (Dallas

Typographical Union, No. 173 v. A. H.

Belo Corp., 372 F.2d 577, 581 [5th Cir.

1967])).

18

3) The reviewing court should inter-

fere “where the arbitrator clearly went

beyond the scope of the submission"

(Textile Workers Union of America v.

American Thread Company, 291 F.2d 894,

897-898 [4th Cir. 196]1]).

4) The reviewing court should inter-

fere where “the authority to make ...

the award cannot be bound or legally

assumed from the terms of the arbitration

agreement" (Truckdrivers and Helpers

Union Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert Company,

330 F.2d 562, 563 [8th Cir. 1964]).

5) The reviewing court should inter-

fere if the arbitrator made a determina-

tion not required for the resolution of

the dispute (Socony Vacuum Tanker Men's

Assoc. v. Socony Mobil Oil Company, 369

F.2d 480 [2nd Cir. 1966]).

6) Construction and interpretation

is not for the reviewing court (Inter-

national Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulfite

and Paper Mill Workers Local Union No.

874 v. St. Regis Paper Company, 362

F.2d 711, 714 [5th Cir. 1966]).

7) There should be no review of the

merits at all (American Machine and

Foundry Company v. Auto, Aerospace and

Agr. tmplement Workers, 329 F.2d 147

{2nd Cir. 1964]).

19

8) Review is confined to the question

of whether the union agreed to arbitrate

or give the arbitrator the power to make

the award (Western lowa Pork Company v.

National Brotherhood Packing House and

Dairy Workers, 366 F.2d 275, 277 [8th

Cir. 1966]).

Not unexpectedly, these various and

conflicting standards of judicial review

of arbitration awards adopted by the

Circuit Courts have resulted in various

and conflicting decisions. Nowhere is

this more evident than in the instant

case. The Court of Appeals' decision

herein is in direct conflict with the

decisions of other Courts of Appeals in

cases involving similar, indeed almost

identical, facts as those involved in the

case at bar. In a number of cases, cited

infra, Circuit Courts have set aside

awards of arbitrators which, by adding or

ignoring terms of a collective bargaining

agreement, manifested an infidelity to

the arbitrator's obligation to confine

himself to interpretation and application

of the agreement before him. There is

clearly no substantive distinction between

cases which involve an arbitrator's award

arrived at by adding or ignoring express

terms of a collective bargaining agreement,

and the case at bar, which involves an

arbitrator's award arrived at by substi-

tuting the arbitrator's own terms for the

express terms of the agreement.

20

In Local 342, U.A.W. v. T.R.W., Inc.,

402 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1968), the Circuit

Court refused to enforce an arbitrator's

award in which the arbitrator added a

provision to the contract. The court

noted that the pertinent language of the

collective bargaining agreement in issue

was not, under any reasonable interpre-

tation, ambiguous. The court went on to

hold that, inasmuch as no language in the

agreement made the exercise of the rights

expressly enumerated therein subject to

the ultimate approval of an arbitrator

Or a court:

The conduct of the arbitrator, thus

approved by the District Court, in

reality constituted the addition of

terms to a negotiated contract that

was neither unclear or incomplete.

402 F.2d at 30.

The Court noted, in language particularly

apposite to the instant case:

It can be assumed that ... the

Company gave some quid pro quo to

get [the contract provision in

issue] . . . an arbitrator should

not be permitted to nullify it.

Id. at 731.

21

The court then concluded that, in

obedience with the dictum stated by this

Court in Enterprise Wheel, the District

Court should have denied enforcement of

the arbitrator's award. Accordingly,

the decision of the District Court was

reversed, with the direction to enter

judgment dismissing the complaint seeking

enforcement of the award.

As in T.R.W., the arbitrator in the

instant case attempted to engraft upon

the collective bargaining agreement terms

which were not there. Indeed, the instant

arbitrator went even further than the

arbitrator in T.R.W., by excising an

express term of the agreement ("custo-

marily"), before adding his own term

("exclusively"). As in T.R.W., the

wortion of the collective bargaining

agreement in issue was the product of

bargaining and the company gave some quid

pro quo to get it. Accordingly, the

instant arbitrator should not have been

permitted to nullify the pertinent con-

tractual language by rewriting it, and

the Appellant Court should therefore have

refused to enforce the arbitrator's award.

In Amanda Bent Bolt Company v. U.A.W.,

451 F.2d 1277 (6th Cir. 1971), the Sixth

Circuit, citing language from this Court's

decision in Enterprise Wheel, concluded

22

that the arbitrator's act of ignoring and

in effect excising express portions of the

collective bargaining agreement went beyond

the scope of the arbitrator's authority,

and that his award was therefore unenforce-

able. In the instant case, the arbitrator's

act of ignoring and in effect excising an

express term of the collective bargaining

agreement also went beyond the scope of

the arbitrator's authority, and his award

should therefore also have been held

unenforceable.

Similarly, other circuit courts have

not hesitated to set aside awards which

were arrived at by adding to or excising

express portions of the collective bar-

gaining agreement. In Truck Drivers and

Helpers Union Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert

Company, supra, the Eighth Circuit set

aside an arbitrator's award which ignored

the express portion of the collective

bargaining agreement which gave the com-

pany the discretion to take the action in

issue,

~

in H. K. Porter v. United Saw Workers,

333 F.2d 596 (3rd Cir. 1964), the Circuit

Court refused to enforce a portion of an

arbitrator's award which, withcut any

reason, ignored an express provision of

the collective bargaining agreement which

the arbitrator was commissioned to inter-

pret.

23

Likewise, in Torrington v. Metal Pro-

duct Workers, 362 F.2d 677 (2nd Cir. 1966),

the Circuit Court refused to enforce an

award which added a requirement based on

past practice to the express provisions of

the collective bargaining agreement. In

its Torrington decision, the Second Cir-

cuit stated:

the mandate that the arbitrator should

stay within the confines of the

collective bargaining agreement ...

requires a reviewing court to pass

upon whether the agreement authorizes

the arbitrator to expand its express

terms on the basis of the parties'

prior practice . .. the arbitrator's

decision . . . should not be accepted

where the reviewing court can clearly

preceive that he has derived that

authority from sources outside the

collective bargaining agreement at

issue. 362 F.2d at 680.

The inconsistency with which the Cir-

cuit Courts have interpreted the "essence"

and "fidelity" dictum set forth in this

Court's Enterprise Wheel decision, in

cases involving judicial review of an

arbitration award, is clearly demonstrated

by the fact that said dictum was cited by

both the majority and dissenting opinions

of the Second Circuit in the Torrington

case. 362 F.2d at 680, 682.

24

in a recent decision, the Sixth

Circuit reiterated its intention not

to enforce arbitration awards which

clearlv manifest the arbitrator's infi-

delity to his contractual obligation.

See Timken Company v. Steelworkers,

Local 1123, 482 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1973).

In Timken, the Circuit Court held that

an arbitrator's award based upon an un-

reasonably restrictive interpretation of

a term of the collective bargaining

agreement could not be enforced, absent

evidence indicating that the parties to

the agreement intended such an unreason-

ably restrictive interpretation of the

contractual term in issue. The Sixth

Circuit held that the arbitrator was fore-

closed "from substituting his discretion

for the company and from modifying the

language of the agreement." 482 F.2d at

1015. This decision is in clear and di-

rect conflict with the Court of Appeals

decision herein.

Finally, in a very recent case,

Textron, Inc. v. Auto Workers Local 516,

86 LRRM 3240 (2nd Cir. 1974), the Court

of Appeals held that where an arbitra-

tor's award is on its face contradictory,

the court should deny enforcement of the

award and resubmit the case for further

arbitration. As discussed above, the

instant case is also on its face clearly

contradictory, since the words "customar-

ily" and "exclusively" can in no way

25

reasonably be considered to be synony-

mous.

Thus, there are a number of Circuit

Court decisions in cases directly

analogous to the ase at bar, which have

held, contrary to the Court of Appeals'

decision herein, that an arbitrator can-

not add or ignore terms of a collective

bargaining agreement and thereby rewrite

the provisions which the parties to such

agreement have collectively bargained

for. These decisions are therefore in

direct conflict with the Court of Appeals

decision herein. Clarification of the

proper role of a court in reviewing an

arbitration award is thus necessary, if

the dictum set forth in this Court's

Enterprise Wheel decision is to be

followed without inherent conflict, and

if the parties to a collective bargain-

ing agreement are to be afforded a pre-

dictable forum for protecting their

contractual interests.

Ii. THE DECISION HEREIN IS OF

IMPERATIVE PUBLIC IMPORTANCE TO

THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF THE

RAILWAY LABOR ACT.

\

2 UE PRR OI fk RL RY ond

Sea bases WATS Ys

26

The Court of Appeals‘ decision here-

in holds, in effect, that a Federal Court

is not authorized to review the award of

an impartial arbitrator and System Board

of Adjustment, even where the award is on

its face contradictory and is based on

terms concocted by the arbitrator rather

than terms agreed upon by the Parties

through collective bargaining. Such a

decision, if permitted to stand, would do

substantial and irreparable damage to the

integrity and effectiveness of the System

Board of Adjustment process under the

Railway Labor Act. For, such a decision

amounts to a total abdication of the

Court's function as a reviewing body over

awards rendered by System Boardsof Adjust-

ment.

In its Enterprise Wheel decision,

this Court noted that it would be unde-

sirable to require arbitration awards

free of ambiguity, for such a requirement

“may lead arbitrators to play it safe by

writing no supporting opinions," and "a

well-reasoned opinion tends to engender

confidence in the integrity of the process

and aids in clarifying the underlying

agreement." 363 U.S. at 597. Similarly,

to hold that a court may not review an

arbitrator's award which is not only

poorly reusoned, but is in fact based on

the arbitrator's own terms and views of

industrial justice, rather than the terms

of the collective bargaining agreement,

would invariably tend to destroy confidence

27

in the integrity of the process and

impair the ability of the statutory

system to clarify collective bargaining

agreements covered by the Act.

As the Second Circuit noted in its

Torrington decision:

Far from having the disruptive

effect upon the finality of labor

arbitration which results when

courts review the ‘merits’ of a

particular remedy, devised by an

arbitrator, we think that the

limited review exercised here

will stimulate voluntary resort

to labor arbitration and thereby

strengthen this important aspect

of labor-management relations by

guaranteeing to the Parties to a

collective bargaining agreement

that they will find in the arbi-

trator not a ‘philosopher king'

but one who will resolve their

disputes within the framework of

the agreement which they negoti-

ated. 362 F.2d at 682.

CONC LUS ION

For the foregoing reasons, it is

respectfully submitted that this

a

a

28

Petition for Certiorari be granted.

JOHN BACHELLER, JR.

Counsel of Record

WILLIAM F., KASPERS

3500 First National

Bank Tower

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attorneys for

Petitioner

29

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that ” have this

15th day of October, 1974, caused the

foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT to be served upon the

following individuals as counsel for

parties to the case by causing three

copies thereof for each such party to be

deposited in the U. S. Mail, postage

prepaid:

Harold Mendelow, Esquire

Manners and Amoon, P. A.

123 Northwest 12th Avenue

Miami, Florida 33128

Erwin N. Griswold, Esquire

Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

JOHN BACHELLER, JR.

Counsel of Record for

Petitioner

ee

L Oe OE EIT Te Ray OabORT eet oes

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eres DORN LNA I LI ELOY Ew

1-A

APPENDIX A

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,

DISTRICT NO. 145,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Ve

MODERN AIR TRANSPORT, INC.,

Defendant -Appellant.

No. 73-1345

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,

FIFTH CIRCUIT.

June 20, 1974

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Southern District

of Florida,

Before WISDOM, AINSWORTH and GEE,

Circuit Judges.

GEE, Circuit Judge:

‘lodern Air appeals from the district

court's enforcement of an arbitrator's

award in favor of the Union. Concluding

that the court reached the right result,

SSE LER E

‘Cee

omxees

SPS SOT FRITS ST OE

2-A

although through the wrong process, we

affirm.

In 1971 Modern Air contracted out

some modification and repair work to an

outside agency rather than assigning the

work to its own facilities. The Union

contended that the contracting-out vio-

lated the collective bargaining agree-

ment. They sought reinstatement and back

pay for laid-off mechanics. Modern Air

and the Union duly submitted the griev-

ance to arbitration under the procedure

provided in the collective bargaining

agreement. The arbitrator found that

Modern Air had breached the contracting-

Out provision of the agreement, and he

Ordered back pay and reinstatement for

those employees improperly laid off.

In respect to contracting-out, the

agreement provided:

(a) All work normally performed in

the Company's Maintenance Shops and

facilities and airport stations by

the employees covered by this Agree-

ment is recognized as coming within

the jurisdiction of the Internation-

al Brotherhood of Teamsters and is

covered by this Agreement. When

aircraft is placed in the active

service of the Company, the periodic

maintenance on such aircraft shall

be within the scope of this Agree-

ment *

3-A

The parties agree that the Company

may :

1. Continue to contract out work

heretofore customarily contracted

out ./1/

Initial modification of newly ac-

quired airplanes and jet engine repair

work were the subjects of the Union's

grievances, On the evidence submitted to

him, the arbitrator found that Modern Air

had contracted out the bulk of the initial

modification work but that the bargaining

unit employees had performed some of that

1. It further provided:

2. Return equipment, parts or assem-

blies to the manufacturer or to an

approved agency for repair or replace-

ment.

3. Purchase necessary parts, equipment

or facilities.

4. Contract out any work when the Com-

pany's facilities or personnel are not

sufficient or available, or where em-

ployees available do not have the ex-

perience and ability to satisfactorily

perform the work required, provided

that the above does not result in a

reduction in force of the employees

covered by this Agreement. In which

case representatives of the Company

and Union will meet without delay and

negotiate the proper provisions for the

protection of employees’ seniority and

other property rights.

RMIT TIS, LS TS e

VWENPHVEE BTN ©

4-A

work. As to the jet engine repair, he

found that the amount of contracting-out

had varied over the years according to

Modern Air's facilities and other contin-

gencies but, although it had contracted

out much of the engine repair, it also

had performed a significant amount of the

work in its own facilities.

This appeal focuses on the arbitra-

tor's and the district court's interpre-

tation of the term "customarily" in sub-

paragraph 1. The arbitrator reasoned that:

- « « I do not share the Company's

apparent view that so long as there

was substantial contracting out of

certain work it may “continue to con-

tract out [such] work" because of

subparagraph 1 of subsection (a). To

my mind, in the light of the basic

thrust of subsection (a) to place

“work normally performed" in the bar-

gaining unit and in view of the limi-

tations specified in subparagraph 4

of subsection (a) with regard to con-

tract out "any work," there would

appear to be and [sic] implication

in the use of the words "customariiy”

in subparagraph 1 of subsection (a)

that the authority specified therein

relates to work that has been exclu-

sively contracted out. Stated differ-

ently, it is my view that subparagraph

5-A

1 does not refer to work which has been

both contracted out as well as performed

by the bargaining unit./2/

2. The arbitrator's reasoning proceeded:

In the instant case, while I am not at

all convinced that bargaining unit em-

ployees have performed "initial" modi-

fication work to the extent that the

Union here claims and, indeed, while

I am equally convinced that the bulk

of the “initial modification work has

not been performed by bargaining unit

employees, although tasks performed in

connection with such work may well

have been performed by bargaining unit

employees from time to time after air-

craft have been placed in a revenue

status, the fact remains that some

"initial" modification work has been

performed by bargaining unit employees

and it cannot thus be concluded that

such work has been “exclusively” con-

tracted out. This is equally true for

engine repair work involving hot sec-

tion overhauls, as is plainly evident

from the detailed recital above of what

was done by whom with respect to vari-

ous engine repair work, Accordingly,

I do not regard subparagraph 1 of sub-

section (a) as determinative of the

issue presented herein.

I find subparagraphs 2 and 3 of sub-

section (a) of Section 24 equally in-

applicable in the instant situation.

These provisions appear to have been

~6-A

The district judge decided to “en-

force the award for reasons completely

different from those in the arbitrator's

report: [W]Jhere the arbitrator substitu-

included to make crystal clear the

Company's right to resort, where neces-

sary, to a manufacturer or to an

approved agency for repairs or replace-

ment of parts or assemblies, etc. but

to conclude that in the instant situ-

ation the Company was authorized to

contract out the work simply because

"an approved agency” was involved

would prove too much, in my opinion,

since virtually all contracting out

could then be authorized so long as

“an approved agency” was involved and

there would thus be little, if any,

need to include subparagraphs 1 and 4

of subsection (a) of Section 24,

Essentially, authorization for the

Company's contracting out for the work

here being grieved must be found in

subparagraph 4. As I read that pro-

vision the Parties intended to provide

substantial flexibility to the Company

to obtain the performance of all work

required to keep its equipment opera-

tive. However, the Parties equally

and plainly intended that the Company's

right to contract out “any work” would

be circumscribed to the extent that if

a reduction in force of bargaining

unit employees would occur then the

Company and Union would meet and pro-

7-A

ted the word ‘exclusively' for the word

‘customarily,’ as it is used in subpara-

graph (a)l .. ., it is completely im-

proper.” But the court went on to exam-

ine the facts in light of its own inter-

pretaion of the agreement and concluded

that the arbitrator would have reached

the same result using "customarily."

tect employees' seniority and other

property rights. Thus, the Company

could contract out work where its fa-

cilities or personnel are not suffi-

cient Or available or where employees

able to perform the required work are

not sufficiently experienced or skilled

to perform the required work, so long

as the Compan.’ and Union meet to pro-

tect employees in the event a reduc-

tion of force then occurs.

TO my mind, the limitations specified

in subparagraph 4 on the Company's

right to contract out “any work" places

a burden not upon the Union, as the

Company here argues, but rather on the

Company itself to demonstrate that its

facilities or personnel are not suffi-

cient Or available etc. Stated differ-

ently, the Company has the right to

contract Out under given circumstances

and it thus behooves the Company to

demonstrate the existence of such

circumstances when it seeks to exer-

cise its right.

8-A

On appeal, Modern Air contends that,

when the district court said tne arbitra-

tor could not interpret “customarily” to

mean "exclusively," the cour: had found

that the arbitrator exceeded his authori-

ty. Modern Air goes on to insist that,

when the court reached that conclusion,

then it should have proceeded no further

but should have simply denied enforcement.

(nm the other hand, the Union con-

tends that the court did not substitute

its judgment for that of the arbitrator;

rather, the court made the proper inquiry

and determined by examining the entire

clause that the arbitrator acted properly

and within the scope of the agreement ./3/

At this point, we insert the law,

The genesis, of course, was the trilogy.

/4/. The Court there delineated the limi-

tations on the arbitrator:

3. The parties do not dispute that the

grievance was properly arbitrable.

4. United Steelworkers of America v.

American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80

S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960);

United Steelworkers of America v.

Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574,

80 S- Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960);

United Steelworkers of America v. Enter-

prise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,

80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960).

9-A

- - « {A]Jn arbitrator is confined to

interpretation and application of the

collective bargaining agreement; he

does not sit to dispense his own brand

of industrial justice. He may of

course look for guidance from many

sources, yet his award is legitimate

only so long as it draws its essence

from the collective bargaining agree-

ment. When the arbitrator's words

manifest an infidelity to this obli-

gation, courts have no choice but to

refuse enforcement of the award,

United Steelworkers of America v.

Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363

U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361,

4 L.Ed.2d 1424, 1428 (1960).

We have expressed the limitation in terms

of “foundation in reason or fact":

In the arbitration context, an award

“without foundation in reason or fact"

is equated with an award that exceeds

the authority or jurisdiction on the

arbitrating body. To merit judicial

enforcement, an award must have a ba-

sis that is at least rationally in-

ferable, if not obviously drawn, from

the letter or puxpose of the collec-

tive bargaining agreement. The arbi-

trator's role is to carry out the

aims of the agreement, and his role

defines the scope of his authority.

When he is no longer carrying out the

agreement Or when his position cannot

SANE AC GAREY ENTER TAL PLE NENTET §

OTA Wer PREY

Se ea tak Rc

10-A

be considered in any way rational, he

has exceeded his jurisdiction. The

requirement that the result of arbi-

tration have “foundation in reason or

fact” means that the award must, in

some logical way, be derived from the

wording or purpose of the contract.

Brotherhood of RR Trainmen v. Central

of Georgia Ry. Co., 415 F.2d 403, 411-

412 (5th Cir. 1969).

Additionally, in Safeway Stores v. Ameri-

can Bakery Workers Union Local 111, 5 Cir,,

390 F.2d 79, 81-82, we said:

"{I]f the award is arbitrary, capri-

cious or not adequately grounded in

the basic collective bargaining con-

tract, it will not be enforced by the

courts.” . . . On its face the award

should ordinarily reveal that it finds

its source in the contract and those

circumstances out of which comes the

“common law of the shop."

See, Dallas Typographical Union v, A. H.

Belo Corp., 372 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1967).

A concomitant narrow standard re-

stricts judicial review of the arbitra-

tor's broad authority:

« « « the question of interpretation

of the collective bargaining agreement

is a question for the arbitrator. It

is the arbitrator's construction which

was bargained for; and so far as the

11-A

arbitrator's decision concerns con--

struction of the contract, the courts

have no business overruling him be-

cause their interpretation of the con-

tract is different from his. Enter-

prise, supra, 363 U.S. at 599, 80 S.ct.

at 1362, 4 L.Ed.2d at 1429,

As we said in Safeway Stores, supra at 8l:

- « « [W]e must be vigilant that we are

not slipping off into that habit, easy

for Judges, of “deciding the merits in

the guise of adjudicating the court-

reserved issue of the scope . .. of

the agreement to arbitrate."

The court must not “[resume] its tradi-

tional role of assaying the judicial

acceptability of the award had it been a

court judgment." Safeway Stores, supra

at 83.

{1] Although the district court's

action here was ambiguous, we conclude

that, by finding that the arbitrator

could not interpret “customarily” to mean

"exclusively," the court found that the

arbitrator had exceeded his authority.

Then, when the district court went on to

interpret the contract, the court itself

improperly “[resumed] its traditional

role of assaying the judicial accept a-

bility of the award." The proper course

for the district court would have been to

deny enforcement upon the finding that

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12-A

the arbitrator manifested an “infidelity

to his obligation.” Enterprise, supra.

[2] That conclusion, however, does

not end our inquiry. The district court,

in deciding that the arbitrator could not

equate “customarily” with “exclusively, "

mistook fundamental authority for con-

tract interpretation--the arbitrator's

proper function,

Analyzing the arbitrator's reason-

ing, he performed the traditional function

of one delegated to resolve contractual

disputes. He interpreted and gave mean-

ing ‘exclusively) to an ambiguous (custo-

marily) contract term in light of the

other provisions and purposes of the con-

tract. His award was well founded in the

“essence” of, and more than “rationally

inferable" from the letter and purpose

of, the collective barjyaining agreement.

United Steelworkers v. United States

Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1974);

Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 540 v,

Neuhoff Bros, Packers, Inc., 481 F.2d 817

(Sth Cir. 1973). Neither the district

court nor we have any “business overrul-

‘ing him because [our] interpretation of

the contract is different from his,"

Enterprise, supra.

We find ourselves thus in agreement

with the district court's result but in

disagreement with his method. In effect,

we are directly approving the arbitrator's

ee ae ae POAC MIN AY A OOP RIS LT AERO NE AE eD aiaht B el TN AR io mrtg cd enna

fa

13-A

award, As this is not unprecedented,

when it fully resolves the issue between

the parties in a protracted dispute, San

Antonio Newspaper Guild, Local 25 v. San i

Antonio Light Division, 481 F.2d 821 f

(Sth Cir. 1973),/5/, we affirm the dis- b

trict court's order.

Affirmed.

ATLL TT EAT SIT ee RN IN ILE! ETS NN AE

ean ne’~

5. Additionally, our action does not

contravene Judge Godbold'‘s dissent in

that case because here the arbitrator

has reached and decided the merits of

an issue undisputedly within his

authority.

REALATRS ROY

PRATER WAKER ESS t

a ;

14-A

APPENDIX B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

No. 72-791-Civ-PF

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,

DISTRICT NO. 145,

Plaintiff,

Ve

MODERN AIR TRANSPORT, INC.,

Defendant.

North Courtroom

U.S. Post Office Building

Miami, Florida

Monday, 5:30 p.m,

November 13, 1972

The above-entitled case came on for

trial before the Honorable PETER T. FAY,

United States District Judge, pursuant

to notice.

FINDINGS OF FACT

15-A

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

Well, gentlemen, I am constantly

amazed at the opinions that District

Court judges are called upon to render

and would be the first to profess my

limited contact with a case such as this.

It is about the same experience I have

with running public schools.

Not unlike what other courts have

done, I am going to grant the petition.

I am going to enforce the award for rea-

sons completely different from those in

the arbitrator's report, and I suppose

really a littie different from what you

all have argued.

I want the record to show very clear-

ly why I am doing what I am doing so that,

if I am wrong, someone else can correct

that.

Let me start at the beginning.

I think first if we deal with, and

we talk about areas--if we deal with the

area where the arbitrator substituted the

word “exclusively” for the word "custo-

marily,” as it is used in Subparagraph

A-1 of Section 24, it is completely im-

proper. I think it is so clearly improper

as to not really deserve much more com-

ment.

ote ete

POOR RETIREE AN

PEAY PRS EIE

rere ery

16-A

There is no way he can do that, in

my Opinion,

Now, the problem I have, as you have

probably gathered from my questions, is I

do not think that ends the matter, because

I think that the arbitrator broke this

into two phases, and that in reviewing

the entire situation in the two phases, I

think his decision, his ultimate decision,

is quite proper, using the provisions of

Section 24 as it is written.

I say that for these reasons: I

think that the initial modification work

was customarily contracted out. He goes

to great lengths to point out factually,

I think, in his report that that is the

situation and that the only initial modi-

fication work that was done was done on

a piecemeal basis and along with routine

maintenance that any substantial initial

modification was customarily contracted

out.

Now, then, going to the area where

Modern Air Transport does complain--and I

never remember the language because I am

just not that familiar with it, but it

would be in the engine work. When we get

into the area of the engine work, I frank-

ly agree completely with the arbitrator's

interpretation of Subparagraph 2 of

Section 24, I just don't think you can

read it any other way. Any other inter-

pretation would just completely eliminate

17-A

the necessity for Paragraphs 1, 3 and 4,

They just wouldn't have any meaning, and

I do not think they were put there just

as surplusage,.

I think a reasonable interpretation

of Subparagraph 2, really Subparagraph

A-2 of Section 24, has to have some

reasonable limitations, and I think that

is what the arbitrator felt.

So, I find his interpretation of

Subparagraph A-2 to be completely reason-

able and consistent and certainly within

his authority.

Then, taking that within his author-

ity, I think of necessity he had to go to

Subsection A-4 of Section 24, and I can-

not find that his ruling is improper be-

cause, as I say, from my question I think

he did two things. I think he would have

arrived at the same result had he used

the word “customary” as he should have.

In other words, as the word “custom-

arily” is used in Subparagraph A-l, I

think his conclusion would have been that

you then have to look at the factual cir-

cumstances, and although I think he could

have found, I think any reasonable arbi-

trator could have found that the jet en-

gine work was customarily contracted out.

He would also look to the facts that

Modern Air set up the engine facilities,

PERT OT RT TE ee ee

ete: AR NE TREY ene

FE RS

Bo Pies. comers sero te

18-A

they trained their men in jet engine

work; that this customarily contracting

cut had changed, and I think the facts

show very clearly that it had changed to

the point where they were contracting it

out when their employees and their shop

could not handle it.

I think that of necéssity that

immediately took him to Subparagraph A-4

under Section 24 in this instance, when

there was, in fact, a layoff.

I believe again we get to the months

of September and October of 1971.

So I think what he did was correct.

I do not think it was correct for the

reasons he used because, as I said, I

think he was completely improper in sub-

stituting the word “exclusive” for “cus-

tomarily."

I think the result would have been

exactly the same and was completely

proper using the language of the contract.

I think that is what he did, I think that

is what he had to do,

As I say, I guess I am enforcing it

for reasons completely different from

those he stated, and really a little bit

different from what you all argued,

Maybe I should not do that, but I

want the record to show very clearly that

19-A

is what I am doing and why I am doing it,

because if I cannot do that, then I

suppose I either have to set it aside or

send it back to him. However, I see no

reason to send it back to him because I

think for the reasons he has already

stated very clearly in the record, he

would have to arrive, of necessity, if

he used the same facts that he uses, with

the same result.

I see no reason to send it back to

him and say, "Do it again and don't sub-

stitute the word ‘exclusive,' " because

I think he would end up, of necessity,

using the word “customarily” in A-l and

then finding factually that the circum-

stances had changed and thereby going to

A-4, where you get into the situation of

well, what's happening; when they are con-

tracting it out, are the facilities and

the personnel sufficient; and, if not,

did they sit down with the union and try

to work it out to avoid a layoff?

I think this is completely consis-

tent with the provisions of the contract.

I do this as a rank amateur in this field.

Now, if you want anything more for-

mal than this, I will ask the prevailing

party to draw it up or the court reporter

cantype this up and I will be glad to

sign it as the order granting the petition

and enforcing the arbitrator's report and

Order.

20-A ‘

However you all want to handle it.

MR. RHOADS: Your Honor, if I may,

we have one problem.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. MENDELOW: We may have.

MR. RHOADS: We may have.

MR. MENDELOW: We may have several

problems,

MR. RHOADS: We have several problems

Or may have several problems directed at

compliance with this, assuming that we

do not take an appeal.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. RHOADS: Modern Air shut down its

entire base, maintenance base, in Decem-

ber of last year, the last day of Decem-

ber, and has not employed mechanics since

that time,

The arbitrator was aware that this

was going to happen. The parties told

the arbitrator to ignore it insofar as

his---

THE COURT: I was going to say, he

mentions it, but he says it has not

happened, hasn't he, in his report ?

21-A

MR. MENDELOW: At the time. It hap-

pened approximately in January of 1972,

MR. RHOADS: The last day worked was

the last day of December, 1971.

THE COURT: I don't mean to jump over

any problems or preclude argument.

You can probably tell from my opin-

ion that I wonld take those facts into

consideration. If they did not have a

shop, I think you can guess what my

rulings are going to be, because mine are

based upon just what I told you.

MR. MENUELOW: There are additional

facts. 7

American Aeromotive, as you know, is

a subsidiary or a sister company to

Modern Air under the GAC corporate struc-

ture. Right now they are, from what I

understand, flying airplanes or jets into

New York and shipping down engines to

American Aeromotive to do the hot section

overhaul. They are Operating very

successfully, from what I understand,

over in Berlin, Germany, with these same

aircraft that they have flown over there

now,

THE COURT: Or would it go back to the

arbitrator first?

22-A

MR. MENDELOW: No, I believe under

Gunther, this Court could make the

decision,

First of all, I think in our relief

in this court we asked the Court to re-

quire the company to meet with us to see

if we can sit down and settle this thing

amicably. That has been our only demand

of the company up until the time we had

to come to court, Your Honor.

As an alternative for this Court, if

this Court feels it ought to order that

at least and we cannot come to any agree-

ment with regard to this, I would ask the

Court to appoint someone to determine

damages in lieu thereof.

THE COURT: I would always encourage

the parties to try to resolve it first,

because I think you all can both see

pretty clearly where I am going and what

I am going to do,

As I say, mine is based on the

changing circumstances and if they had

the shop and they operate, so be it.

That is what I would think the purview

would be. If they had not had the shop,

if they did not have the mechanics,

there is no question in my mind what my

eventual ruling would probably be.

23-A

As I say, I say that without pre-

cluding anybody from arguing and present-

ing whatever evidence they want to.

MR. MENDELOW: Would the Court make

that part of his order, that we do sit

down?

THE COURT: Certainly. Sure would.

MR. MENDELOW: We are ready, willing

and able to sit down with them at any

time,

THE COURT: Oh, yes.

MR. MENDELOW: And discuss this thing

amicably, I'm sure.

THE COURT: Sure, yes.

MR. RHOADS: Could we have the tran-

script of your order?

I would be agreeable to that in an

order,

Would you, Mr. Mendelow?:

MR. MENDELOW: Yes, I would, too.

THE COURT: Certainly.

MR. MENDELOW: With that addition to

it, that the Court required the parties

to sit down,

” TELM GORI T I

POV Ee! BF Oh

ca ie a a

ITV AY

24-A

THE COURT: Yes. The Court would

specifically request that the parties

sit down and discuss the announced

ruling of the Court in an attempt to re-

sOlve all of the administrative matters

that have to be taken care of and handle3

to implement it.

What I would do is enter this by way

of a final order. I would probably close

the case administratively, but I would

retain jurisdiction.

MR. MENDELOW: That is what we want

the Court to do,

THE COURT: For any proceedings neces-

sary to enforce the judgment in accord-

ance with the announced final order.

MR. MENDELOW: Thank you.

MR. RHOADS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much,

It is an interesting proposition.

As I say, I am delighted to be educated.

If you appeal it, so be it. Maybe the

appellate court can aid me in my educa-

tion.

MR. RHOADS: Just something to chew

on for a little bit.

(Thereupon the hearing was concluded.)

25-A

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

;

No. 72-791-civ-pF |

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF .

MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS,

DISTRICT NO. 145,

Plaintiff,

Nea EME ees ROWE aE

Ve

MODERN AIR TRANSPORT, INC.,

Defendant,

FINAL JUDGMENT

ALT IG PLAINS TEE OT PY LY SIR OS

THIS MATTER came on for trial before

the Court without a jury and pursuant to

the findings of fact and conclusions of

law entered upon the record on November

Poe gee ae

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that judgment

is hereby entered in favor of the plain- 6

tiff and against the defendant and the

award of the arbitrator shall be en- :

forced. :

26-A

DONE AND ORDERED at Miami, Florida

this 30th day of November, 1972,

s/ Peter Fay

United States District

Judge

27-A

APPENDIX D

In the Matter of Arbitration

MODERN AIR TRANSPORT, INC .,

and

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION Or

MACHINISTS, DISTRICT LODGE

NO. 145

Grievances Involving Alleged

Violation of Section 24 --

Scope of The Agreement --

By Contracting Out of Work

BEFORE: Laurence E. Seibel,

Impartial Arbitrator

Appearances:

For the Company

James B. Rhoads, Esq.

Claude T. Sullivan, Jr.,Esq.

Fisher & Phillips

Atlanta, Georgia

Por the Union

Joseph P. Manners, Esq.

Manners and Amoon

Miami, Florida

; . . 38 PES REPAIRED PEA IRT cor |

LNT NTE MO RY POLL SM PET ERE I FT TT FE TN - .

——— =

8 RENNES PASTE NITY RIE EI NS a

28-A

Statement of the Case,

The Union filed a number of griev-

ances alleging that the contracting out

of the modification or conversion of

certain CV-990s violated the Agreement

executed in July 1967 and that the con-

tracting out of minor engine repairs and

hot section overhaul repairs violated

the Agreement executed in December 1970.

It seeks an award compensating employees

in the Company's maintenance shops, facil-

ities and airport stations covered by the

Agreement for the work lost as a conse-

quence of the contracting out of such

work.

Specifically, the Union filed griev-

ances dated November 23, 1970, November

30, 1970 and March 1, 1971 concerning the

“farming out” of modification and conver-

sion of four CV-990s, namely, aircraft

numbered 601, 614, 623 and 625; a griev-

ance dated July 15, 1971 concerning the

contracting out of engine repair work on

engines with serial numbers 151, 181 and

202; a grievance dated September 13, 1971

concerning the contracting out of engine

repair and sheet metal work which caused

the layoff of five mechanics, and the

Union requested cessation of the subcon-

tracting and the cancellation of the lay-

off notices; a grievance dated October 20,

1971 concerning the contracting out of

engine and sheet metal work which caused

the layoffs of five additional employees,

29-A

and the Union requested reinstatement of

such employees with back pay; and a

grievance dated October 31, 1971 con-

cerning another contracting out violation

resulting in layoffs of three additional

employees and the Union requested their

reinstatement with back pay.

As is evident from the foregoing,

the grievances essentially fall into two

groups: One relating to modification and

conversion of aircraft and the other re-

lating to engine repair work.

1. Modification and Conversion of

Aircraft. The grievances filed on Novem-

ber 23, 1970, November 30, 1970 and March

1, 1971 relate to the modification of

four aircraft from the configuration of

the seller to the configuration desired

by the purchaser, Generally speaking, a

company acquiring aircraft specifies the

configuration in which it will Operate

the aircraft and then appropriate modifi-

cation must be made subject to Federal

Aviation Agency requirements. The work

involved in modifying an aircraft to the

acquiring company's configuration and in

accomplishing hitherto unperformed FAA

modifications is, according to the Com-

pany, termed “initial modification."

Subsequent modification, once the air-

craft is in service, is undertaken from

time to time to meet Operational require-

ments or tO meet new FAA regulations or

to satisfy FAA requirements which

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30-A

periodic inspections indicate are not

being met. Such subsequent modification

is undertaken on an “as required” or “as

necessary” basis in 4 manner, where ever

possible, to minimize “down” time.

From April 1967 to the beginning of

1971 the Company acquired ten Convair 990

jet aircraft. The Parties are only in

agreement that the work here being grieved

with respect to aircraft numbered 601,

614, 623 and 625 was work performed by an

outside company, namely, American Air-

motive Corporation, and that all subse-

quent modification was performed by

Company mechanics, including the rein-

forcement of the main landing gear beams

(spar modification) on aircraft 603 and

615. However, with respect to the first

six aircraft acquired by the Company,

while the Company asserts that “the

record is uncontroverted that no initial

modification work was performed by unit

employees on the first CV-990 aircraft

acquired by the Company” and that "all

initial modification work was performed

by American Airlines or their designee,”

it is the Union's assertion that the

first aircraft (#605) acquired was

initially leased to Air France but upon

its return conversion was performed "to

conform it to numbers 607 and 609," two

aircraft which had previously been ac-

quired by the Company and converted by

bargaining unit employees. Concededly,

some of the conversion work on aircraft

Bae a

f Aew tae’ LOLI RAD EPEAT REL A ORAL DLL

31-A

605 was performed by Air France. With

respect to aircraft numbered 607, the

Union asserts that conversion to the

Company's configuration was not done all

at once but rather "a little at a time.”

The Union further asserts that aircraft

numbered 603, 615 and 617 were also con-

verted to Company configuration by bar-

gaining unit employees.

The Company concedes that aircraft

numbered 603 was one on which the com-

plete initial modification was performed

by bargaining unit employees, and, also,

that with respect to aircraft numbered

615 the plane was delivered without seats

and bargaining unit employees installed

seats in the 134 configuration, In

connection with such work, the Company

asserts, approximately 30 additional

mechanics were temporarily hired to

handle the increased work load since

modification had to be undertaken while

the active fleet had to be maintained;

these temporary employees were terminated

after completion of the modification work.

With respect to aircraft numbered

605, 607, 609 and 617 the Company asserts

that the initial modification work was

accomplished by American Airlines or its

designee. Such modification included

converting each aircraft from 110 seats

set up in two classes, four galleys and

four lavatories to the Company's configu-

ration of 134 seats set up in one class,

a

Me OA a eS aero

SAVED OATES

TATE PELE LIE NS OEE

RRNA RET UMN?

32-A

two galleys and four lavatories,

2. Engine Repairs. Prior to 1967,

the Company had an engine shop perform-

ing repair work on piston engines but as

the utilization of jet aircraft increased

the engine shop was phased out and finally

it was closed. However, in the latter

part of 1968, the Company posted bids for

mechanics for the engine shop which was

reactivated for jet engine repair early

in 1969, For the following year or so

the repair work performed was minor in

nature with major engine work being

farmed out. Early in 1970, the Company

had several members of the engine shop

trained by Delta Airlines in Atlanta in

hot section overhauls and starting in

June 1970, Company mechanics performed

hot section repair work,

The “hot section" of a jet engine is

the area in which the combustion of fuel

Occurs and the areas to the rear thereof,

including the turbines and the fan. Over-

haul of such section is required by FAA

regulations after the engine has flown a

certain number of hours; also, when other

repair on the engine requires its dis-

mantling and the engine has flown almost

the number of hours specified in the FAA

regulation, a hot section overhaul may be

deemed economically advisable in addition

to the other repair work that must be done.

Such hot section overhaul has been per-

formed by the engine manufacturer, (Gene-

33-A

ral Electric), American Airmctive (which

is an approved agency for the repair of

the engine in question) and the Company's

own engine shop under the authority of

its operating certificate; both American

Airmotive and the Company's own engine

shop have sent out parts needing repair

tc General Electric. The Company's

engine shop performed hot section over-

hauls on eight engines from June 1970

through June 1971, with six of the eight

having been completed prior to the arbi-

tration hearing. Actually, the work here

being grieved relates to various engines

having “hot section” overhauls made in

connection with other repair which the

Union regards as “minor” but which the

Company asserts involved either foreign

object damage or high exhaust gas temper-

ature or high vibrations or high oil con-

sumption or shipping damage.

Prior to December 28, 1970, hot

section overhauls had been performed or

begua on eighteen engines, fourteen of

which were subcontracted to General

Electric; eight were removed strictly for

hot section overhaul and of these eight

four were performed by bargaining unit

employees. Subsequent to December 28,

1970 nine engines received hot section

overhauls, of which six were contracted

out to American Airmotive (all of which

were grieved) and three were begun by,

Or waiting for, bargaining unit employees;

one of the three was completed in Septem-

PLOY PR Fe eh ee Merk

— OSPREY

POU EW ESET TLE

Ry ETN

34-A

ber 1971, another had begun in July 1971

and was not complete by the arbitration

hearing date and the third had not been

begun at the time of the hearing.

Prior to December 28, 1970, some

engines experiencing foreign object

damage were repaired by an outside con-

tractor and some by bargaining unit

employees, During the same period seven

engines were repaired for excessively

high vibrations, six by an outside con-

tractor and one by bargaining unit em-

ployees. Also, during the same period,

the one engine repaired for high exhaust

gas temperature was done by an outside

contractor and of the eight engines re-

paired for high oil consumption, six were

subcontracted and two were repaired by

bargaining unit employees. Three other

engines were repaired for minor oil leaks

by bargaining unit employees.

Section 24, the “scope clause” of

the Agreement executed December 28, 1970

reads as follows:

SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT

s ION 24

"(a) All work normally performed in

the Company's Maintenance Shops and

facilities and airport stations by the

employees covered by this Agreement is

recognized as coming within the

35-A

jurisdiction of the International

Brotherhood of Teamsters and is covered

by this Agreement. When aircraft is

placed in the active service of the

Company, the periodic maintenance on

such aircraft shall be within the scope

of this Agreement,

"The parties ayree that the Ccmpany

may :

“1. Continue to contract out work

heretofore customarily contracted

out,

"2. Return equipment, parts or assem-

blies to the manufacturer Or to

an approved agency for repair or

replacement.

> Purchase necessary parts, equip-

ment Or facilities,

"4. Contract out any work when the

Company's facilities or personnel

are not sufficient or available,

or where employees available do

not have the experience and

ability to satisfactorily perform

the work required, provided that

the above does not result in a

reduction in force of the employ-

ees covered by this Agreement.

In which case representatives of

the Company and Union will meet

without delay and negotiate the

36-A

proper provisions for the pro-

tection of employees' seniority

and other property rights.”

Section 24 in the Agreement of

December 28, 1970 is identical with the

“scope clause” of the preceding Agreement

except for the final sentence in sub-

paragraph (a) which was added in 1970.

Contentions of the Parties.

1. Modification and Conversion, The

Union contends that all modification of

ali aircraft in service was done by bar-

gaining unit employees.

In essence, the Union argues that

the modification work done on aircraft

numbered 601, 614, 623 and 625 is work

coming within the contractual restrictions

concerning the contracting out of work.

Such modification cannot be considered

“work heretofore customarily contracted

out" since the history of jet planes used

by the Company is too recent to conclude

that any modification work was "customar-

ily" contracted out. Indeed, modification

to conform new aircraft to the Company ‘s

configuration was customarily not con-

tracted out but was performed by bargain-

ing unit employees as early as April 1967,

which was three months before the Agree-

ment went into effect. Aircraft numbered

603, for example, was different from

American Airlines CV-990s and had to be

— ee ee eee eT A aT LGR e eh Rhee aay

er, al o's -

ye ee

37-A

aes

completely modified by bargaining unit

employees, Moreover, other CV-990s had :

to have spar modification and repair,

which was work that was never before con-

tracted out and, indeed was an integral .

part of maintaining the fleet. With re- _

spect to the reason given by the Company

that it did not have the capacity to per-

form the modification work on aircraft

601 and 614, the Union points out chat

bargaining unit employees modified six

other aircraft and that the Company and

American Airmotive share the same hangar.

And, the Union notes, the Company received

aircraft numbered 623 and 625 during a

slow period when bargaining unit emp loy-

ees were performing certain work at

American Airmotive ramps, which space was

available, the Union asser::s, to the

Company.

aS ee

The Union maintains that the Company

has the equipment +o perform the modifi-

cation work, the unit has the skill to per-

form the work and the Company has the

facilities and capacity to perform all

conversion and modification of aircraft

to its configuration, Indeed, the con-~

version of certain aircraft Was accom-

plished a little at atime as part of the

bargaining unit's normal and customary

work. The Union also maintains that there

has existed no emergency which would

Support or necessitate the contracting out

of work which was usually and customarily ~

performed by bargaining unit employees

Steal PA HF He NP Te

Pewee ea we Heer

POEPLOMTE KELL RI SNE RTS TRIN aT me

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|

38-A

and, further, that such contracting out

resulted in the reduction of the units

work force in the fall of 1970 as com-

pared with the size of the unit in Novem-

ber 1969,

Pinally, the Union contends that the

Company violated subsection 24(a)(4) since

it unilaterally assigned four aircraft to

American Airmotive for modification with-

out engaging in negotiations designed to

protect the property rights of laid off

employees. It further charges that the

Company had an interest in American Air-

motive and wanted to keep that Company's

work force busy.

The Company contends that “initial”

modification work was performed on air-

craft numbered 605, 607, 609 and 617 by

American Airlines or its designee, that

initial modification on aircraft number

615 was also performed by American Air-

lines except that bargaining unit employ-

ees installed the seats in the 134 con-

figuration and that initial modification

on aircraft number 603 was performed by

bargaining unit employees with the help

of additional personnel temporarily hired.

With respect to aircraft numbered 601,

614, 623 and 625, it is the Company's

position that its facilities were inade-

quate to modify these aircraft and at the

same time service the Company's active

fleet; moreover, on aircraft numbered 623

and 625 spar modification was authorized

&

4

:

FX RETINAL RO PETE

39-A

as part of the "initial" modification

when inspection revealed cracks in the

main landing gear beams which were close

to the tolerable limit. The Company con-

cedes that subsequent modification was

performed by Company mechanics including

spar modification,

The Company contends that while its

employees had at one time or another per-

formed each of the modification tasks

required in an “initial” modification,

nevertheless, with one exception, such

employees only performed this work as

part of the periodic maintenance of such

aircraft after the aircraft Was placed in

the Company's revenue producing service.

Stated differently, the Company maintains

that subsequent modification was the work

normally performed by its employees but

such work is not the subject of the in-

stant grievances, Moreover, the Company

points out that when the bargaining unit

performed its only “initial” modification

on aircraft number 603, thirty temporary

employees had to be hired, and it can thus

hardly be said that "initial" modification

was “work normally performed" in the Com-

pany's facility,

In any event, the Company contends,

Section 24 provides four separate and

distinct exceptions, one of which permits

the Company to contract Out work hereto-

fore customarily contracted out. Initial

modification, the Company maintains, has

REFN SL FF ON Ue

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POET PALE POP STN

40-A

always been customarily contracted out,

as is evident from the fact that air-

craft numbered 607 and 609, the only air-

craft acquired before July 1967 (the

effective date of the previous Agreement)

were initially modified by American Air-

lines, and, as of October 1970, of the six

aircraft acquired up until that time, the

“initial” modification on all but one had

been contracted out. In this connection,

the Company further contends that the

words "heretofore customarily contracted

out” should refer to July 14, 1967 con-

cerning the first two grievances and to

December 1970 for the 1971 grievances.

Finally, with respect to the modi-

fication grievances, the Company argues

that the Union has not demonstrated that

the Company's facilities or personnel were

sufficient or available. The Company

points out that at the time of the sub-

contracting being grieved no unit employ-

ees were on layoff status. Moreover, no

evidence was submitted to show that the

Company's facilities or personnel were

sufficient to perform both the work here

being grieved and the maintenance of the

Company's active fleet. On the contrary,

in the one instance when the Company per-

formed “initial” modification it became

necessary to hire temporary employees.

The Company points out that the Company's

Vice President for Technical Services

testified that ramp space was inadequate

to perform “initial” modification on four

TP I ne LU OE A Re ne BAO a

aircraft over a six month period and also

to maintain the active fleet, test imony

|

;

that was neither rebutted or contradicted. ?

2. Engine Repair Grievances. The

Union maintains that engines numbered 151

and 202 were sent to American Airmotive

for minor repairs normally performed by

bargaining unit employees and upon their

return it was discovered that a hot sec-

tion overhaul had also been performed,

It also maintains that engine number 110

was sent to American Airmotive for minor

repairs traditionally performed by bar-

gaining unit employees on September 10,

1971 after the Company had announced lay-

offs of five employees, Similarly, on

September 28, 1971 at the time that the

first layoffs were effected and the second

layoff of eight members of the bargaining

unit were announced, engine number 132 was

sent to American Airmotive for a hot sec-

tion overhaul, It is also asserted that

in October 1970 engines numbered 160 and

170 were sent to American Airmotive for

engine repair either traditionally per-

formed by the bargaining unit or which

might have been given to the unit. More-

Over, it is further contended by the

Union that engine number 221 which had

been awaiting a hot section overhaul was

sent to American Airmotives on September

13, 1971, after the layoffs had been

announced; this engine had been Waiting

for repair for some time because, the

Union alleges, the Company cross utilized

RETR ON

AO EMNIED STERN

RTC ER

42-A

the unit's mechanics on line maintenance

and, as°a consequence, the unit also

lost all of the other sheet metal, elec-

trical, welding and minor repairs that

were involved.

The Union concedes that during the

period in which the Company's engine shop

was not functioning engines were sent out

for cold section overhauls and toreign

object damage repair, that in the case of

engines numbered 151 and 202 the bargain-

ing unit did remove certain parts and

repair them fer use in other aircraft and

that time extension evaluations to deter-

mine whether hot section overhauls were

needed were sent to General Electric be-

cause the Company was not equipped to

do the layout.

The Union argues that the intent of

the Company in reopening its engine shop

was to perform more minor repair work and

eventually to perform hot section over-

hauls and that to accomplish this purpose

the Company acquired additional hangar

space, purchased parts and equipment and

had members of the unit trained in hot

section overhauls. Accordingly, in June

1970 bargaining unit employees were per-

forming the work which the Company in-

tended them to be performing and such work

was performed for approximately one year

without complaint. However, the Union

charges, the Company began cross utilizing

engine shop employees by requiring them to

43-A

work on maintenance of the fleet and

eventually as a consequence of the con-

tracting out of work some 13 members of

the unit were laid off in September and

October 1971. This contracting out of

work, undertaken unilaterally by the

Company without negotiation as required

by the Agreement, and without an emergen-

cy situation existing, resulted in the

layoffs and was violative of the Agree-

ment.

The Company contends that the Union's

basic premise is that once bargaining

unit employees are capable of performing

certain repairs and have performed those

repairs then the Company may no longer

contract out the work. This basic prem-

ise, it argues, is not only contrary to

the language of the "scope clause" but

contrary to its intent, namely to provide

flexibility to the Company to contract out

maintenance work. In this connection, the

ieee Se Soe Ak SU

ARIA Py LRP GE TO? Oe

Company points out that during negotiations —

the Union proposed to amend the "scope

clause" so that it would have the right to

the work which Union employees were capa-

ble of performing but this proposal was

rejected by the Company and the flexibil-

ity was retained, Thus, the Company con-

cludes, the Union is here seeking to

accomplish by arbitration what it failed

to obtain by negotiation.

The Company contends that somet imes

engine repair work of the type here in

STN

I er ei wet oe reins ° Ce os SU nena PON OY eid os aE

44-A

question was performed by unit employees

and sometimes Ly an outside contractor

and, indeed, initially when the Company

Operated without an engine shop such

repair work was accomplished solely by

contracting out. This contracting out

continued even after the opening of the

engine shop and it thus cannot be con-

cluded that such work is “normally” per-

formed by bargaining unit employees and

thus subject to Section (a) of the

“scope clause."

Moreover, under subsection 1 of

Section (a) the Company may “continue to

contract work heretofore customarily con-

tracted out” and prior to December 28,

1970 the type of engine work here under

consideration had been consistently con-

tracted out. Furthermore, the Company

maintains, the Union failed to demonstrate

that the subcontracting was not permitted

as the return of equipment, parts and

assemblies to an approved agency for re-

pair. American Airmotive is an “approved

agency," namely, One approved by the FAA

to repair the GE engine here in question

up to and including full overhaul,

Finally, the Company argues that the

Union has failed to establish that layoffs

were caused by the subcontracting or that

such layoffs adversely affected the Com-

pany’s right to subcontract the work in

question under subsection (a)l & 2 of

Section 24 of the “scope clause.“ In this

OPA OPEL IR, ES Ain 8 EIS OOOO ls LLIB AT I

45-A

connection, the Company points out that

subsections 1 to 4 of subsection (a) set

forth separate and distinct exceptions

which permit Company contracting out of

work, but only in subsection 4 are lay-

o-fs mentioned, Accordingly, the Company

ccncludes, the layoff proviso in subsec-

tion 4 only applies to the conditions

enimerated in subsection 4, and had the

Paities iniended such proviso to apply

to subsections 1 to 3 they could have

reajily done so by drafting the proviso

as part of subsection (a) itself, It is

therefore the Company's position that it

may contract out under subsections 1 to

3 of subsection (a) regardless of whether

Siich contracting out causes layoffs since

the proviso does not apply to such sub-

sections and the Company is not relying

on subsection 4 to justify the contract-

ing out here involved, Moreover, the

Company maintains, it has not been shown

that the layoffs were directly caused by

the contracting out. What has been shown

is simply that layoffs occurred while the

contracting out occurred. Admittedly,

several engines were awaiting work in the

Company's engine shop during this period

of time and while the Union seeks to ex-

plain this by asserting cross utilization

of employees precluded --he performance of

work on such engines, no testimony was

offered to that effect by the Union. on

the other hand, a Company official testi-

fied that cross utilization has always

been necessary to keep the Airline running

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46-A

and a mechanic is required to perform

"any and all work generally recognized

as mechanical” rather than only a par-

ticular class of work, such as “sheet

metal,” “engine,” etc.

Discussion and Opinion.

Careful consideration of all portions

of Section 24, the “scope clause", makes

it clear that while the Parties provided

that “all work normally performed" comes

“within the juris@iction of the [Union]

* « ©”, nevertheless the Parties clearly

intended to provide considerable flexi-

bility to the Company with respect to the

contracting out of work.

The different circumstances under

which such contracting out of work may be

effected are set forth above, not only in

the recital of the provisions of Section

24 but also in the detailed "Contentions

of the Parties" and particularly the Com-

pany’s contentions. While I am in agree-

ment with the Company's view that the

language in subparagraph 1 of subsection

(a) concerning “work heretofore customari-

ly contracted out” refers to the practice

existing prior to the effective date of

the Agreement (as held in Arbitrator

Greene's decision), I do not share the

Company's apparent view that so long as

there was substantial contracting out of

certain work it may “continue” to contract

/ out [such] work" because of subparagraph 1

Ponte fF

47-A

of subsection (a). To my mind, in the

light of the basic thrust of subsection

(a) to place “work normally performed"

in the bargaining unit and in view of the

limitations specified in subparagraph 4

of subsection (a) with regard to con-

tracting out “any work,” there would

appear to be an implication in the use

of the words “customarily” in subparagraph

1 of subsection (a) that t e authority

specified therein relates to work that

has been exclusively contracted out.

Stated differently, it is my view that

subparagraph 1 does not refer to work

which has been both contracted out as

well as performed by the bargaining unit.

In the instant case, while I am not at

all convineed that bargaining unit em-

ployees have performed “initial” modifi-

cation work to the extent that the Union

here claims and, indeed, while I am

equally convinced that the bulk of the

“initial” modification work has not been

performed by bargaining unit employees,

although tasks performed in connection

with such work may well have been per-

formed by bargaining unit employees from

time to time after aircraft have been

placed in a revenue status, the fact

remains that some “initial” modification

work has been performed by bargaining

unit employees and it cannot thus be con-

cluded that such work has been "exclusive-

ly” contracted out. This is equally true

for engine repair work involving hot

section overhauls, as is plainly evident

SE ETS OT ORD SR ITY IONE HEON T RC RPRRRGRNR NA

A ON al a i See

48-A

from the detailed recital above of what

was done by whom with respect to various

engine repair work. Accordingly, I do

not regard subparagraph 1 of subsection

(a) as determinative of the issue pre-

sented herein.

I find subparagraphs 2 and 3 of sub-

section (a) of Section 24 equally in-

applicable in the instant situation.

These provisions appear to have been in-

cluded to make crystal clear the Company's

right to resort, where necessary, to a

manufacturer or to an approved agency for

repairs or replacement of parts or assem-

blies, etc. but to conclude that in the

instant situation the Company was autho-

‘ rized to contract out the work simply

because “an approved agency” was involved

would prove too much, in my opinion, since

virtually all contracting out could then

.be authorized so long as "an approved

agency” was involved and there would thus

be little, if any, need to include sub-

paragraphs 1 and 4 of subsection (a) of

Section 24,

Essentially, authorization for the

Company‘s contracting out for the work

here being grieved must be found in sub-

paragraph 4, As I read that provision

the Parties intended to provide substan-

tial flexibility to the Company to obtain

the performance of all work required to

keep its equipment operative. However,

the Parties equally and plainly intended

49-A

that the Company's right to contract out

“any work” would be circumscribed to the

extent that if a reduction in force of

bargaining unit emplcyees would occur

then the Company and Union would meet and

protect employees' seniority and other

property rights. Thus, the Company could

contract out work where its facilities or

personnel are not sufficient or available

Or where employees able to perform the

required work are not sufficiently ex-

perienced or skilled to perform the

required work, so long as the Company and

Union meet to protect employees in the

event a reduction of force then occurs.

To my mind, the limitations specified

in subparagraph 4 on the Company's right

to contract out “any work" places a burden

not upon the Union, as the Company here

argues, but rather on the Company itself

to demonstrate that its facilities or

personnel are not sufficient or available

etc. Stated differently, the Company has

the right to contract out under given cir-

cumstances and it thus behooves the Com-

pany to demonstrate the existence of such

circumstances when it seeks to exercise

its right.

In the instant case, during a sub-

stantial period of time in which the con-

cerned contracting out was effected, there

was no reduction in force of bargaining

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50-A

unit employees and it could thus be

reasonably concluded that at such times

the Company's facilities and personnel

were not sufficient or available to per-

form all of the work (that was required

and it thus became necessary to resort to

the contracting out of work in order to

keep its operation or equipment function-

ing. The fact that bargaining unit

employees could have also performed the

contracted out work affords no basis for

the view that the Company was obligated

to “pile up” such work for the bargaining

unit employees for such time as other

work would slacken. And, the fact that

the Company has cross utilized, in the

Union's terms, bargaining unit employees

to perform flight maintenance work on

aircraft as well as modification and

engine repair work does not justify the

Union's view that the work should not

have been contracted out. Nothing in

this Agreement precludes the Company from

so utilizing bargaining unit employees

and there is no obligation on the Company's

part to hold over required work for ulti-

mate assignment to bargaining unit employ-

ees who are otherwise currently occupied

on other bargaining unit tasks.

As I see it, then, the problem here

becomes one of determining whether the

layoffs that occurred in September and

October 1971 were the result of contract-

ing out work when the Company's facilities

and skilled personnel were sufficient and

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51-A

available to perform the work required.

While it may not be entirely clear in any

given situation that the contracting out

of work at a time when all employees are

employed (for an example, in August )

caused a layoff which subsequent ly

occurred (for example, in September),

certainly a very serious question arises

“here the contracting out of work is

undertaken at a time when employees

actually are on layoff or have been noti-

fied that a layoff will shortly occur.

In this case, the Company contracted out

engine work on engine number 111 on

September 10, 1971,0n engine number 132

on September 28, 1971, on engine number

170 on October 1, 1971 and on engine

number 221 on September 13, 1971. All of

this contracting out occurred at a time

when layoffs were either imminent or had

Occurred; five men were laid off in

September 1971 and eight additional men

in October 1971,

That there were layoffs when work

was being contracted out is quite clear,

The crucial question then becomes one of

ascertaining whether the circumstances,

as specified in subparagraph 4 of sub-

section (a), existed, Essentially, the

Company appears to be justifying its

contracting out on the grounds that the

facility was inadequate for performing

the grieved work, but apart from the

assertion itself in that regard the record

is not at all clear that such inadequacy

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52-A

existed. The responsible Company offi-

cial testified that he “laid off from

various sections trying to maintain a

steady level of mechanics in the engine

build-up section,” that he and other

Company officials were engaged in “grind-

ing the entire airline down,” that in

July, August and September 1971 the shop

was fully occupied in turning out what it

had as well as keeping aircraft flying

and he did not want to add additional men

(instead of contracting out the work)

because he doesn't "believe in the Union's -

concept of bringing people in off the

street” and that he “laid off as the

flight loads diminished.” In the light

of this testimony it does not appear that

the adequacy of the facility was the

basis for contracting out the work. In

any event, the record is insufficient,

in my Opinion, to demonstrate precisely

how the facility was inadequate or per-

sonnel unavailable; the Company has not

met its burden of demonstrating the

inadequacy of the facility or the unavail-

ability of properly trained and exper-

ienced personnel. Stated differently,

under a subparagraph 4 situation, if

employees are on layoff or are about to

be laid off, and the Company contracts

out work which has been performed by bar-

gaining unit employees in the past, such

layoffs must be considered, prima facie,

as having been the “result,” within the

meaning of subparagraph 4, of such con-

tracting out; the burden then shifts to

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53-A

the Company to demonstrate the inadequacy

of the facility available or the unavail- 4

ability of properly trained and exper- 4

ienced personnel (either laid off or still

on the payroll) to perform the work

required, and, in my opinion, this burden

has not been met by the Company. Under

these circumstances I am constrained to

conclude that the contracting out of

engine repair work in September and Octo- :

ber 1971 when mechanics were either on f

layoff or when layoffs of mechanics had r

been announced was violative of Section

24(a)(4) of the Agreement.

Since the Union has commented upon

the fact that Modern Air and American

Airmotive are both owned by a parent

company, it may not be amiss to state

that, in my opinion, for the purposes of

Section 24 of this Agreement, mere common

ownership does not affect the right of

Modern Air to contract out to American

Airmotive as it, Modern Air, may do to

any appropriate FAA approved agency. The

adequacy of the Modern Air facilities

must be evaluated on the basis of its own

leasing arrangements.

SP RA BT IS ET

While on this record it does not

appear that the work contracted out was,

Or was not, sufficient to utilize fully,

Or for what period, tlie services of all

mechanics laid off in September and

October of 1971, the Submission Agreement

dated October 30, 1972 provides:

SNA LET

54-A

"4, That if the arbitrator finds the

subcontracting in question to be in

violation of the current collective

bargaining agreement between the

parties, and if he further finds the

employees have been laid off as a

direct result of the subcontracting

found to be in violation of said

collective bargaining agreement,

MODERN shall not oppose the reinstate-

ment of such employees with no loss

in pay."

Accordingly, I am constrained to so

order,

Award.

The Company is directed to reinstate

with full seniority those employees who

were laid off in September and October

1971 when the contracting out of engine

repair work was effected in violation of

Section 24 (a)(4) of the Agreement, and

the Company shall reimburse all such

employees for all loss of pay.

/s/ Laurence E. Seibel

Laurence E. Seibel,

Arbitrator

March 29, 1972

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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