Respondents Brief — Farver v. City of Westlake

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Supreme Court of the United States

sy October Term, 1974

No. 74-747

y BETTY S. FARVER,

Petitioner,

vs.

CITY OF WESTLAKE,

A Respondent.

On PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To THE SUPREME CouRT OF OHIO

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT CITY OF WESTLAKE

IN OPPOSITION

- Patrick A. GAREAU

21330 Center Ridge Road

Rocky River, Ohio 44116

Telephone: (216) 333-3100

Counsel for Respondent City of

Westlake

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

*

Opinions Below

Jurisdiction ...........

Questions Presented ......

Constitutional Provision Involved

Statutes Involved

Statement of the Case

Reasons for Denying Certiorari

NIP WNW WYN

I. There has been no unconstitutional deprivation

of property without due process of law; in that

the single-family residentia! zoning of the peti-

tioner’s property, under the facts and circum-

stances presented, bears a reasonable relation-

ship to the general health, welfare and safety of

the public and is a legitimate exercise of the

police power ... 7

II. This court lacks jurisdiction to consider the

second question presented by the petitioner ........ 14

III. This court lacks jurisdiction to consider the third

question presented by the petitioner 16

Conclusion 21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed.

27 (1954) i

Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 89 S. Ct. 1162, 22

L. Ed. 2d 398 (1969) 16

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038,

35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973) 19

Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad Company v. City of

Cleveland, Ohio, 235 U.S. 50, 35 S. Ct. 21, 59 L. Ed.

127 (1914) - 16

Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Rocky River, 38 Ohio St. 2d

23, 309 N.E.2d 900 (1974) .......... GRADE IRS athe hs 10

Monks v. New Jersey, 398 U.S. 71, 90 S. Ct. 1563, 26

a Sy ED OED caneaicansracecinsseonisemnicedtincmnpsovucenadsenceoss 16

Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925) 9

Tacon v. Arizona, 410 US. 351, 93 S. Ct. 998, 35 L. Md.

I ch ee 15, 16, 19

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, ........ if Ae , 94

iy RI I I apc a 2 we ae 2 10, 11

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S.

365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303 (1926) ................ 8, 10, 12

Constitution and Statutes

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment ....

See ewe oa os maasbonamaniaonebbaananalabinasion 2, 14,17

Be ein SI I ED goons ntaesnebeenniins ee aos 2, 3, 14, 18

Ohio Revised Code, Chapter 2506 ......0.00020.00.0:cceee 3, 6, 20

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1974

No. 74-747

BETTY S. FARVER,

Petitioner,

vs.

CITY OF WESTLAKE,

Respondent.

On PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To THE SuPREME CourRT oF OHIO

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT CITY OF WESTLAKE

IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The Court of Common Pleas in and for Cuyahoga

County rendered a memorandum opinion. The Court of

Appeals for Cuyahoga County rendered an unreported

decision. The Supreme Court of Ohio ¢ nied the peti-

tioner’s motion to assume jurisdiction. All three opinions

are properly reproduced in the petitioner’s brief in support

of her petition for*e writ of certiorai 2.4 will not be

reproduced herein.

JURISDICTION

Separate judgments of the Supreme Court of Ohio

were entered on September 20, 1974. Petitioner alleges

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1257 (3).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the zoning of the petitioner’s property

bears a reasonable relation to the public health, safety,

and welfare and is a legitimate exercise of the police

power. |

2. Whether the petitioner may raise the issue of pro-

cedural due process before this court when she failed to

raise the issue in any of the proceedings in the state

courts below.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

Fourteenth Amendment Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States,

and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the

United States and of the State wherein they reside. No

State shall make or enforce any law which shall! abridge

the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United

States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection

of the laws.

-_— = & OB &

STATUTES INVOLVED

28 United States Code Section 1257 (3)

Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest

court of a State in which a decision could be had, inay

be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: ...

(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of

a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn

in question or where the validity of a State statute

is drawn in question on the ground of its being re-

pugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the

United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or

immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Con-

stitution, treaties, or statutes of, or commission held

or authority exercised under, the United States.

Ohio Revised Code, Chapter 2506, Section 2506.01.

Appeal from decisions of any agency of any pulitical

subdivision.

Every final order, adjudication, or decision of any

officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, de-

partment or other division of any political subdivision

of the state may be reviewed by the common pleas court

of the county in which the principal office of the political

subdivision is located, as provided in sections 2505.01 to

2505.45, inclusive, of the Revised Code, and as such pro-

cedure is modified by sections 2506.01 to 2506.04, inclusive,

of the Revised Code.

The appeal provided in sections 2506.01 to 2506.04,

inclusive, of the Revised Code is in addition to any other

remedy of appeal provided by law.

A “final order, adjudication, or decision” does not

include any order from which an appeal is granted by

ruie, ordinance, or statute to a higher administrative au-

thority and a right to a hearing on such appeal is provided;

any order which doves not constitute a determination of

the rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships

of a specifiea person; nor any order issued preliminary

to or as a result of a criminal proceeding.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Since the facts of this case are such an integral part

of the petitioner’s complaint before this court, we feel it

is necessary to set them out more fully than the summary

treatment contained in the petitioner’s statement of the

case.

On May 2, 1968, John A. Thomson, a realtor, on behalf

of Mrs. Betty S. Farver (hereinafte: referred to as the

petitioner). submitted to the Council of the City of West-

lake a letter requesting that the subject property be re-

zoned from single-family to multi-family use. On May

16, 1968, the Council referred this request to the Planning

Commission for recommendation. No action was taken

on this request at the time because during that period

the Planning Commission and the Council were devising

a new Comprehensive Zoning Code and Zoning Map. On

January 6, 1970, a second request was made on behalf

of the petitioner to rezone the property. On January

15, 1970, the Council referred the matter to the Planning

and Zoning Committee of Council. Thereafter, Ordinance

No. 1970-56 was drafted and piaced on the Council agenda.

The Planning and Zoning Committee recommended that

the ordinance be further considered by Council, and the

ordinance was placed on Council’s agenda for its regular

meeting of October 1, 1970. A public hearing was ad-

vertised and held as provided by the Charter of the

City of Westlake, and was conducted on the evening of

February 4, 1971. The Ordinance, No. 1970-56, was voted

on that night by Council and unanimously defeated.

Thereafter, the petitioner appealed this decision of

the Council to the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court,

Case No. 891890. The case was heard on May 24, 1972.

The Court granted the City of Westlake’s motion for an

order dismissing the appeal for want of jurisdiction. The

petitioner then appealed this decision to the Cuyahoga

County Court of Appeals, Case No. 32029. On March

8, 1973, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming

the decision of the Court of Common Pleas.

While the action appealing the Council’s refusal to

rezone was being heard, the petitioner filed another action

for a declaratory judgment. The answer of the respondent

City of Westlake alleged that the petitioner failed to ex-

haust her administrative remedies. Therefore, on August

8, 1972, the petitioner requested that the Westlake Director

of Inspections issue a building permit to her for the con-

struction of multi-family buildings. The Director denied

the application since the property was not zoned for her

proposed use. The petitioner then appealed the Director’s

refusal to the Zoning Bosra of Appeals of the City of

Westlake. The matter was heard before the Zoning Board

of Appeals afier advertisir g for a public hearing on the

request on August 29, 1972. After presentation of all

the testimony and the exhibits, the Zoning Board of Ap-

peals denied the petitioner’s request.

After the decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals

was sent to the petitioner, an appeal was perfected to

the Common Pleas Court under the Administrative Appel-

late Act, Chapter 2506 of the Ohio Revised Code. A com-

plete record of the testimeny and exhibits taken by the

Zoning Board of Appeals was submitted to the Court of

Common Pleas pursuant to law. Counsel for the petitioner

submitted the following Assignments of Error as the basis

of her appeal to the Common Pleas Court:

1. The decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals is

arbitrary, capricious, unconstitutional, and void.

2. The decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals is

contrary to law.

3. The decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals is

contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

After reviewing the record of the Zoning Board of Appeals

and the additional testimony introduced at trial, the court

found in favor of the respondent City and denied the

petitioner’s request.

After this appeal from the Board of Zoning Appeals

was concluded by the trial court, the action for the declara-

tory judgment was then heard by the same court (Case

No. 907,277). The same and sole issue was again tried;

namely, that the zoning on the part of the City was un-

reasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and a denial of the peti-

tioner’s constitutional rights. All of the testimony and

exhibits presented to the Board of Zoning Appeals was

again admitted into evidence by stipulation of the parties.

At the request of the court, the parties agreed to proffer

to the court, by written instrument, the testimony of any

additional witnesses to be called in the declaratory judg-

ment action.

This case came on for final hearing on February 22,

1973. T'pon consideration, the court again found against

the petitioner.

~]

The petitioner then apnealed this decision to the Court

of Appeals, Case No. 32695, as well as the decision of

the Common Pleas Court involving the appeal from the

Zoning Board of Appeals, Appellate Case No. 32694. The

motion by petitioner to consolidate the appeals was over-

ruled. The cases were heard and argued together. The

Court of Appeals reviewed an extensive record encom-

passing all the testimony and exhibits presented before

the Zoning Board and Common Pleas Court.

The Appellate Court succinctly summed up the testi-

mony in its journal entry, set out ‘n Appendix B of the

petitioner’s request for a writ of certiorari and does not

demand repetition here. In both cases the court affirmed

the decision of the Common Pleas Court and denied the

petitioner her requested relief.

The petitioner then moved the Supreme Court of Ohio

to assume jurisdiction over both cases. Both motions were

denied on September 20, 1974.

REASONS FOR DENYING CERTIORARI

I. THERE HAS BEEN NO UNCONSTITUTIONAL

DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE

PROCESS OF LAW; IN THAT THE SINGLE-

FAMILY RESIDENTIAL ZONING OF THE PE-

TITIONER’S PROPERTY, UNDER THE FACTS

AND CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENTED, BEARS

A REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TO THE GEN.

ERAL HEALTH, WELFARE, AND SAFETY OF

THE PUBLIC AND IS A LEGITIMATE EXER.

_CISE OF THE POLICE POWER.

A starting point for a discussion of the legal principles

for the creation and challenge of zoning ordinances is

this court’s landrnark decision in the Village of Euclid

v. Ambler Realty Compony, 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114,

71 L. Ed. 303 (1926). With this decision the concept of

comprehensive zoning legislation for a community achieved

permanent acceptance throughout our country. This court

established the general guideline or test by which a court

may review the validiiy of a zoning ordinance:

“The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws

and regulations, must find their justification in some

aspect of the police power, asserted for the public

welfare. The line which in this field separates the

legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of power

is not capable of precise delimitation. It varies with

circumstances and conditions. A regulatory zoning

ordinance, which would be clearly valid as applied

to the great cities, might be clearly invalid as applied

to rural communities. In solving doubts, the maximum

sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which lies at

the foundation of so much of the common law of

nuisances, ordinarily will furnish a fairly helpful clew.

And the law of nuisances, likewise, may be consulted,

not for the purpose of controlling, but for the helpful

aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the

scope of the power. Thus the question whether the

power exists to forbid the erection of a building of

a particular kind or for a particular use, like the

question whether a particular thing is a nuisance, is

to be determined not by an abstract consideration

of the building or of the thing considered apart, but

by considering it in connection with the circumstances

and the locality. Sturgis v. Bridgeman, L.R. 11 Ch.

852, 865. A nuisance may be merely a right thing

in the wrong place—like a pig in the parlor instead

of the barnyard. If the validity of the legislative

classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable.

the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.

Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294. (Emphasis

added) 272 U.S. 365, 387.

The Supreme Court of the State of Ohio preceded

this court by one vear in promulgating the same guideline

for Ohio courts in Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149

N.E. 30 (1925). In this case the court held:

“Laws enacted in the proper exercise of the police

power which are reasonably necessary for the preser-

vation of the public health, safety and morals, even

though they result in the impairment of the full use

of property by the owner thereof, do not constitute

a ‘taking of private property’ within the meaning of

the constitutional requirements as to making compen-

sation for the taking of property for public use and

as to the deprivation of property without due process

of law.” 112 Ohio St. 628

The court amplified this principle of law beginning at

page 638:

“As a preface to our discussion of this question we

must remind ourselves that the test is not whether

this court sitt® g as a city council, would have enacted

the ordinance challenged. The members of this court

may or may not conceive that such an ordinance is

wisely calculated to preserve the public health, morals

or safety. If the ordinance discloses no purpose to

prevent some public evil or to fill some public need,

and has no real or substantial relation to public health,

morals, and safety, it must be held void. When, how-

ever, legislation does have a real and substantial rela-

tion to the prevention of conditions detrimental to

the public health, morals, or safety, no matter how

10

unwise the measure itself seems to individual judges,

it is not for the judicial tribunals to nullify it upon

constitutional grounds. (Citations Omitted). The

courts in such cases have no right to determine

whether the measures questioned are wise or the best

that might have been adopted. The courts cannot

hold such laws invalid upon the mere ground of in-

expediency. In other words, the question of the rea-

sonableness of this ordinance is one, in the first in-

stance, for the determination of the council which

enacted it.” ( Emphasis added).

This “reasonable relation” standard stiil remains the

test applied by the courts of the State of Ohio. Cf., Mobil

Oil Corp. v. City of Rocky River, 38 Ohio St. 2d 23, 309

N.E.2d 900 (1974).

This court, itself, was recently faced with a set of

circumstances similar to the case at bar. The case of

the Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974),

involved a zoning ordinance restricting the respondent's

land use to one-family dweiiings thereby excluding the

proposed multi-family use. This court sustained the valid-

ity of the ordinance holding that it was an example of

economic and social legislation with respect to which the

legislature has drawn lines in the exercise of its discretion.

The decision reaffirmed the tesi originally established by

this court in the Euclid case: that is, whether the ordinance

is reasonable, not arbitrary and bears a rational relation-

ship to a state objective. In its opinion discussing the

reasonableness of a zoning ordinance, this court quoted

its earlier decision in Bermen v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75

S. Ct. 98, 99 L. Ed. 27 (1954):

“We do not sit to determine whether a particular hous-

ing project is or is not desirable. The concept of

the public welfare is broad and inclusive . . . The values

1]

it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic

as well as monetary. It is within the power of the

legislature to determine that the community should

be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as

clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”

94S. Ct. 1536, 1539.

Specifically considering the zoning ordinance before

the court, namely, an ordinance excluding multiple dwell-

ings, this court stated:

“The regimes of boarding houses, fraternity houses and

the like present urban problems. More people occupy

a given space; more cars rather continuously pass by;

more cars are parked; noise travels with crowds.

A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and

motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in

a land use project addressed to family iieeds. This

goal is a permissible one within Berman v. Parker,

supra. The police power is no‘ confined to elimination

of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample

to lay out zones where family values, youth values,

and the blessings of quiet seclusion, and clear air

make the area a sanctuary for people.” 94 S. Ct.

1536, 1541.

The case at bar involves the petitioner’s proposed use

of multi-family dwellings in a single-family use district

thereby creating all the same problems of noise, cars, and

overcrowding which this court referred to in Belle Terre,

supra. The evidence introduced into the record before

the trial court and later considered by the Court of Ap-

peals ¢-monstrated that the present single-family zoning

bears a reasonable relationship to the general health, wel-

fare, and safety of the community and is neither arbitrary

12

nor capricious. The expert testimony proved that it is

economically feasible to develop the petitioner’s property

under the present single-family zoning. Indeed, the record

showed that the best utilization of the petitioner’s property

—considering the Guide Plan and adjacent development—

is for single family use. In this regard it must be noted

that the petitioner’s property was zoned in conformity

with the comprehensive guide plan. In the Village of

Euclid v. Ambler Realty Cumpany, supra, this court ex-

pounded upon the merits of comprehensive zoning with

special emphasis on apartment development:

“The matter of zoning has received much attention

at the hands of commissions and experts, and the

results of their investigations have been set forth in

comprehensive reports. These reports, which bear

every evidence of painstaking consideraticn, concur

in the view that the segregation of residential, busi-

ness, and industrial buildings will make it easier to

provide fire apparatus suitable for the character and

intensity of the development in each section; that it

will increase the safety and security of home life;

greatly tend to prevent street accidents, especially to

children, by reducing the traffic and resulting con-

fusion in residential sections; decresse noise and other

conditions which produce or intensify nervous disor-

ders; preserve a more favorable environment in which

to rear children, etc. With particular reference to

apartment houses, it is pointed out that the develop-

ment of detached house sections is greatly retarded

by the coming of apartment houses, which has some-

times resulted in destroying the entire section for pri-

vate house purposes; that in such sections very often

the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed

in order to take advantage of the open spaces and

13

attractive surroundings created by the residential char-

acter of the district. Moreover, the coming of one

apartment house is followed by others, interfering by

their height and bulk with the free circulation of

air and monopolizing the rays of the sun which other-

wise would fall upon the smeller homes, and bringing

as their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing

noises incident to increased traffic and business, and

the occupation, by means of moving and parked auto-

mobiles, of larger portions of the streets, thus detract-

ing from their safety and depriving children of the

privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed

by those in more favored localities—until, finally, the

residential character of the neighborhood and its desir-

ability as a place of detached residences are utterly

destroyed. Under these circumstances apartment

houses, which in a different environment would be

not only entirely unobjectionable but highly desirable,

come very near to being nuisances.” 272 U.S. 365,

394.

An extensive amount of testimony was received and

considered in this case. The testimony proved to the satis-

faction of the Zoning Board of Appeals, the trial court,

and Appellate Court, and the Supreme Court of the State,

that the zoning of the petitioner’s property bears a reason-

able relationship to the general health, welfare, and safety

of the community. To allow the petitioner to increase

her financial gain by building apartments in a single-

family zone, under the facts and circumstances presented

in the record, would undermine the whole purpose of

comprehensive zoning and much worse, endanger the wel-

fare of the community as a whole.

14

II. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO CON-

SIDER THE SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED

BY THE PETITIONER.

The petitioner claims that this court has jurisdiction

to consider the questions she presents by virtue of Title

28, United States Code Section 1257 (3). This section

reads as follows:

“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest

court of a State in which a decision could be had,

may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:

(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of

a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn

in question or where the validity of a State statute

is drawn in question on the ground of its being repug-

nant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United

States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity

is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution,

treaties, or statutes of, or commission held or author-

ity exercised under, the United States.”

The second question presented to this court by the

petitioner reads as follows:

“Whether or not the guarantees of procedural due

process were afforded in the Petitions in the State

Court and whether or not in so doing it failed to

follow its own law.”

This question contains only one allegation of a fed-

erally-protected right; that is, whether or not the fail-

ure of the trial court to make findings of fact and con-

clusions of law denied the petitioner Due Process of law

as that term is used in the Fourteenth Amendment of

the Constitution of the United States.

15

In the case of Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 93 S.

Ct. 998, 35 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1973), this court construed Title

28, United States Code Section 1257 (3). The case in-

volved the constitutional limits on the authority of the

State of Arizona to try in absentia a person who volun-

tarily left the State and was unable to return, for fi-

nancial reasons. Upon reviewing the record it ap-

peared that the constitutional questions were not raised

by the petitioner below nor passed upon by the Arizona

Supren:e Court. This court held that it could not de-

cide issues raised for the first time at this level in the

judicial proceedings. More specifically this court held

that where an issue presented in a petition for cer-

tiorari was not raised below nor passed upoen by the

State’s highest court, and where the only issue actually

litigated does not alone justify exercise of certiorari juris-

diction, the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as im-

providently granted.

The record in the case at bar shows that the ques-

tion on this issue raised by the petitioner before the

Ohio State Supreme Court was as follows:

“Where, upon seasonal request, a court fails to enter its

findings of fact and conclusions of law, the error is

prejudicial and the offended party is entitled to a re-

versal as a matter of law.”

This proposition of law and the petitioner’s suppori-

ing argument in her memorandum in support of jurisdic-

tion before the Ohio State Supreme Court raises no claim

of any infringement of a federally-protected right. The

proposition of law presented to the State court questioned

whether the trial court properly complied with the State

law and local rules as to the making of findings of fact and

conclusions of law. The proposition of law is also ad-

dressed to the proper remedy if the Supreme Court found

16

that the trial court did not conform to the rules of the State.

It must be noted that the petitioner never raised the issue

of procedural due process or even intimated to the court

that such an issue existed. Since the issue of procedural

due process was never presented to the Ohio State Supreme

Court, the court never rendered a decision on it.

This court has explicitly stated on numerous occasions

that it will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction any petition for

a writ of certiorari if the federal question to be argued was

not raised, preserved, or passed on in the state court but

simply raised here for the first time on review of a state

court decision. Tacon v. Arizona, supra; Monks v. New

Jersey, 398 U.S. 71, 90 S. Ct. 1568, 26 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1970);

Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 89 S. Ct. 1162, 22 L.

Ed. 2d 398 (1969).

The petitioner in the case at bar did not raise, nor did

the Ohio State Supreme Court nor any of the lower state

courts adjudicate, such an alleged constitutional infringe-

ment. In order to bring the case at bar into this court,

the petitioner is attempting to enlarge upon the conten-

tions made and passed upon by the state courts by adding

a new assignment of error. This court has made it clear

that such attempts will not be tolerated. Cleveland and

Pittsburgh Railroad Company v. City of Cleveland, Ohio,

235 U.S. 50, 35S. Ct. 21, 59 L. Ed. 127 (1914).

Ilr. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO CON-

SIDER THE THIRD QUESTION PRESENTED

BY THE PETITIONER.

The third question presented in this petition for a writ

of certiorari is as follows:

“Whether or not a municipality in a zoning matter,

wherein a property owner is compelled to exhaust her

17

administrative remedy, may refuse to act from May

2, 1968 till February 4, 1971 wherein three (3) times

during that period its Planning Commission has rec-

ommended action favorably to the Petitioner.”

This question fails to set out the federally-protected

right of which the petitioner feels she is being denied. By

the way her question is presented, we are led to believe

that her complaint is addressed to the time lag between

May 2, 1868 and February 4, 1971. Since the petitioner

cites only the Fourteenth Amendment in her petition, it

seems that sne is alleging that this time lag sormehow de-

nied her due process of law.

“is she did in question two, the petitioner is again

attempting to raise an issue here which she did not present

to the state courts. An analysis of the petitioner’s prop-

ositions of law before the Ohic State Supreme Court shows

that the petitioner raised the issue of substantive due pro-

cess but never presented any question as to procedural due

process. The proposition of law raised by the petitioner

before the Ohio State Supreme Court reads as follows:

“Where a property owner requests rezoning on May 2,

1968 with no final action by the Council until February

4, 1971; Where the Planning Commission of that Coun-

cil on three separate occasions recommends that the

premises be re-zoned as requested; where within that

period, land immediately adjacent to the subject prem-

ises is re-zoned for multi-family use up to, but not be-

yond, the irregular property line of the owner, with

no street, highway or other natural boundary excluding

the exact houndary of the owner's property; where

the subject premises are in part covered by a fireline

easement from a United States Government nike site:

where the premises are surrounded by commercial

propertv apartments, greenhouses and nursery prop-

18

erty, a church and parking area, a convent and, in

particular, a trailer park for mobile homes; where

there have been no new housing starts of even mod-

estly priced residential property in over fifteen years;

where the plan proposed by the City for single family

residential use would leave 28% of the land unavailable

for that use: where at a cost of $75,000 per residence,

the single family property is priced out of the market;

where for multi-family use it would have a value of

$620,000 and where there is no evidence presented to

show that multi-family use would in any way offend

against the public health, safety, welfare or morals,

the reft.sal of the City Council to re-zone and or grant

a bui'ding permit is arbitrary, capricious, unconstitu-

tion] and void.”

If not made clear by this pioposition of law that the

petit.oner presented only the issue of substantive due pro-

cess to the court, it is made clear by the argument of the

petiticner in her memorandum in support of jurisdiction

before the Ohio State Supreme Court. The petitioner

stated in her memorandum that:

“The sole and only issue before the Court in regulating

the use of land is a constitutional issue. Control rests

upon the police power of the State. Otherwise, the

deprivation is confiscation with compensation. With-

out justification on the grounds of public health, wel-

fare, safety and morals, control cannot be justified or

sustained. Any violation is contrary to the Vth and

XIVth Amendments to the Constitution of the United

States of America and of Article 1, Section 19 of tne

Constitution of the State of Ohio.” (Emphasis added).

Again, the petitioner never raised the question of pro-

cedural due process before the Supreme Court of the State

of Ohio. The question cannot now be raised for the first

19

time on a writ of certiorari before this court. Tacon v.

Arizona, 410 U.S. 351, 93 S. Ct. 998, 35 L. Ed. 2d 346

(1973).

Even assuming that the question of procedural due

process had been properly raised before the state court,

the petitioner's allegations of a denial of due process have

no basis in fact. This court has held that the concept

of procedural due process can only be judged on the par-

ticular facts of each case. Cf.. Chambers v. Mississippi,

410 US. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973).

The facts in the case at bar show that on May 2, 1968,

John A. Thomson, a realtor, on behalf of the petitioner,

submitted to the Council of the City of Westlake a letter

requesting that the subject property be rezoned from

single-family to multi-family use. On May 16, 1968, the

Council referred this request to the Planning Commission

for recommendation. No action was taken on this request

at the time because during this period, the Planning Com-

mission and the Council were devising a new compre-

hensive zoning code and zoning map encompassing the

entire city. On January 6, 1970, a second request was

made on behalf of the petitioner to rezone the property.

On January 15, 1970, the Council referred the matter to

the Planning and Zoning Committee of Council. There-

after, Ordinance No. 1970-56 was drafted and placed on

the Council agenda. The Planning and Zoning Committee

recommended that the ordinance be further considered

by Council, and the ordinance was placed on Council's

agenda for its regular meeting of October 1, 1970. A

public hearing was advertised and held as provided by

the Charter of the Citv of Westlake, and was conducted

on the evening of February 4, 1971. The ordinance was

voted on that night by Council and inanimously defeated.

If there was any delay in the consideration of the peti-

tioner’s request for rezoning, it was caused by the fact

20

that at that time the City was revamping the entire zoning

scheme of the municipality, and the Council thought it

more expedient to consider the petitioner’s property in

the context of the entire plan rather than as an isolated

parcel.

In the petition for a writ of certiorari before this

court, the petitioner complains that she was “locked in”

and denied the right to proceed under the requirement

that she first exhaust her administrative remedies. This

is simply not true. The facts show that the petitioner

was not “'ocked in” to any administrative system but

rather locke herself in by pursuing a single remedy where

alternative semedies were available. The petitioner was

content with requesting Council to rezcae her property

and then waiting for Council’s decision which would be

made along with the revamping of the entire zoning scheme

of the City. The petitioner knew that the consideration

by Council of the zoning for the entire City would not

be an overnight affair, but rather would take much study

and painstaking deliberation. If the petitioner felt that

the delay in time would cause her some type of hardship,

she could have sought an immediate adjudication of her

rights as to this property. The zoning ordinances of the

City of Westlake provided for a hearing before the Zoning

Board of Appeals for any property owner who felt that

the present zoning of his parcel caused some type of un-

usual hardship. Codified Ordinances of Westlake, Chapter

1215. The State Code, Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506,

then provided for a court review of any order meade by

this administrative body. In fact, the petitioner did take

advantage of this remedy but not until August 8, 1972.

There was also another remedy available to the petitioner.

She could have brought a declaratory judgment action

directly before the Common Pleas Court as early as May

2, 1968.

21

The fact is that the petitioner was quite content to

await the decision of Council when it considered her re-

quest for a rezoning along with its study of the zoning

scheme for the entire city. The petitioner cannot now

assert a denial of due process because of a delay which

was self-imposed.

CONCLUSION

The respondent believes, as to the first question raised

by the petitioner in her petition for a writ of certiorari,

that there is no substance in fact to her allegations of

a deprivation of propert,, without due process of law.

The evidence introduced before ‘ne Zoning Board of Ap-

peals of the City of Westlake, the trial court, and con-

sidered by the Court of Appeuls and the Supreme Court

of Ohio, proved to the satisfaction of all four bodies that

the zoning of the petitioner's property was reasonably

related to the public healtl:, safety, and welfare and within

the police powers of the respondent-City. The respondent

believes that the secead and third questions presented

by the petitioner ars improperly before this court since

they were never raised in the courts below. For this

reason, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider them here

for the first time.

For all the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully

requests that the petition for writ of certiorari be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Patrick A. GAREAU

21330 Center Ridge Road

Rocky River, Ohio 44116

Telephone: (216) 333-3100

Counsel for Respondent City of

Westlake

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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