Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Gables by Sea, Inc. v. Lee

Supreme Court brief1975

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Text

in the

Supreme Cours

Cniten ‘States

No. 74> 2! 28%

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.,

a Florida corporation,

Petitioner,

v8.

EMMETT C. LEE, JR., Colonel, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF

ENGINEERS, DISTRICT ENGINEER, DEPART-

MENT OF THE ARMY, JACKSONVILLE, FLOR-

IDA DISTRICT, ROBERT F. FROEHLKE, SECRE-

TARY OF THE ARMY, and UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MARION E. SIBLEY

and

ALLAN M. GLASER

of the law firm of

SIBLEY, GIBLIN, LEVENSON & WARD

Attorneys for Petitioners

P.O. Box 390360

Miami Beach, Florida 33139

MIAMI REVIEW — 371-4853 — 377-3721

PEL EO ELIE TL OILS EL OE RE ER

4s

ee ee

INDEX

Page

DECISIONS

I. Federal Decisions _. 2

II. State of Florida Decisions ......... 3

JURISDICTION ws 4

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 4

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND ~~?

RULE PROVISIONS INVOLVED .......... 5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE = = 5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ......... 8

CONCLUSION oe 14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . 15

li

CITATIONS

Case Page

Board of Regents of State College v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972) 12

Chrysler Corporation v. Department of

Transportation,

472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972) 10

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,

401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814 (1971) cece sen ee 10, 11

Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v.

Seaborg,

463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ... 11

Fuentes v. Shevin,

407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (1972) 12, 13

Morgan v. United States,

298 U.S. 48, 56 S.Ct. 906 (1926) 12, 13

Morgan v. United States,

AUS. Lease Te (ies) —_...... 12

Perry v. Sindermann,

408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694 (1972) 12

STATUTES

Ee FE ie 4

National Environmental Protection Act, Title 42,

U.S.C. $4322, et seq. nm i Aree

III

CITATIONS (cont.)

Page

Water Quality Act, Title 33, U.S.C. §1171, et seq. ..... 4,5

Water Pollution Control Act, Title 33, U.S.C. $1341,

00S tie 4,5

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Fourteenth Amendment ....... : : e 4,5

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Code of Federal Regulations,

Section 209.120(g) (1) (2) ......

Local Rule 10 of the Federal District Court for the

Southern District of Florida

Local Rule 18 of the Court of Appeals for Fifth

Circuit

Rule 19(b) of Supreme Court of United States

in the

Supreme Court

of the

Gnited States

NO.

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.,

a Florida corporation, Petitioner,

v8.

EMMETT C. LEE, JR., Colonel, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF

ENGINEERS, DISTRICT ENGINEER, DEPART-

MENT OF THE ARMY, JACKSONVILLE, FLOR-

IDA DISTRICT, ROBERT F. FROEHLKE, SECRE-

TARY OF THE ARMY, and UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, R oie

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner, GABLES BY THE SEA, INC., a Florida

corporation respectfully prays for the issuance of a writ

of certiorari to review the judgment and opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals, for the Fifth Circuit,

entered and rendered in the above entitled cause on July

9, 1974, to which a petition for rehearing was denied on

August 2, 1974,

2

DECISIONS BELOW

I. Federal decisions: ©:

| ‘

a. The judgment of the Court of Appeals

affirming the decision of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida granting summary

judgment for the’ Respondents has not been officially

reported at this time but appears as “A” in the Appendix

‘accompanying this petition. The appellate court’s decision

was rendered without the benefit of oral argument, the

cause having been disposed of on the summary calendar.

The order of the Court of Appeals denying the petition

for rehearing appears as “B” in the Appendix.

b. The United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida’s order granting summary

judgment to the Respondents is not reported but appears

as “C” in the Appendix. The District Court did enter a

memorandum opinion reported at 365 F.Supp. 826. A

copy of that opinion appears as “D” in the Appendix.

The District Court’s order granting summary judgment

was entered: without Petitioner having been granted the

opportunity for oral argument in opposition ‘to the 1n0-

tion for summary judgment.

e. The District Court’s summary judgment

affirmed the decision of the United States Department

of the Army and the United States Army Corps of Engi-

neers denying an extension of a permit to dredge and

fill a certain small, privately'owned area along the West-

erly shore of Biscayne Bay in Coral Gables, Florida.

That decision was rendered without the benefit of a pub-

lic hearing. A copy of that unreported decision appears

i

3

as “E” in the Appendix and a copy of the report of the

Army Corps of Ergineers upon which that decision is

based appears as “F” in the Appendix.

II. State of Florida decisions:

a. The decision of the Circuit Court of the

Second Judicial Circuit of Florida (Trial Court), not of-

ficially reported appears as “G” in the Appendix, and it

established the Petitioner’s right to dredge and fill its

property for a period of two hundred and twenty three

(223) days, which was the unexpired period of the original

permit granted by the United States Army Corps of Engi-

neers, that would have remained but for the illegal, un-

warranted interference by the State of Florida.

b. The decision of the District Court of Ap-

peal of Florida, First District, 251 So.2d 880 (Fla.App.

1971), appears as “H” in the Appendix and it affirmed

the judgment of the Trial Court.

e. The Circuit Court (Trial court) rendered

a post judgment order enforcing its final judgment, said

order appears as “I” in the Appendix. The District Court

of Appeals of Florida, First District, 258 So.2d 822 (Fla.

App. 1972), quashed the appeal taken from that post

judgment order and the Supreme Court of Florida denied

certiorari. The appellate court ruling appears as “J” in

the appendix.

|

4

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is invoked

under Title 28, U.S.C. $1254 and Rule 19(b) of the Rules

of the Supreme Court of the United States. This cause

involves vitally important questions of both Federal and

State law which have not been settled by this Supreme

Court of the United States and the decisions of the United

States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Florida, as

well as the administrative decision of the Department

of the Army and the United States Army Corps of En-

gineers have resulted in a drastic departure from the

accepted and usual course of due process to such an ex-

tent as to deny this Petiticner its fundamental rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED:

a. Whether or not a property owner can be con-

stitutionally deprived of its vested property rights by

governmental action without having been afforded a

hearing or an opportunity for a hearing?

b. Whether or not the determination of the “pub-

lic interest” involved in a proceeding pursuant to the re-

quirement of the Water Quality Act, Title 33, U.S.C.

$1171, et seq, as amended and reorganized in the Fed-

eral Water Pollution Control Act, Title 33, U.S.C. §1341,

et seq, and the National Environmental Protection Act,

Title 42 U.S.C. $4822, et seq, permits a decision based on

public clamor rather than competent, substantial evi-

dence that the requested activity will have an adverse

impact on the environment?

5

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND

RULE PROVISIONS INVOLVED:

This cause involves the Fourteenth Amendment to

the Constitution of the United States; the Water Quality

Act, Title 33, U.S.C. §1171, et seq, as amended and reor-

ganized by the Federal Pollution Control Act of October

1972, Title 33, U.S.C. $1341, et seq; the National Environ-

mental Protection Act, Title 42, U.S.C. $4321, et seq; the

Code of Federal Regulations, Section 209.120(g) (1) (2);

Local Rule 10 of the Federal District Court for the South-

ern District of Florida; and Local Rule 18 of the Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The pertinent parts of

the above provisions are reprinted at “K” of the

Appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Gables by the Sea, Inc., purchased bay front property

located in Coral Gables, Dade County, Florida, from the

Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of

Florida for residential uses and purposes. To enable de-

velopment the Trustees sold to Gables by the Sea suffi-

cient bay bottom to fill the property. Petitioner subdi-

vided its property, which was zoned for residential pur-

poses, and paid taxes on that basis. Without filling the

property, it cannot be used for any purpose.

The United States Corps of Engineers granted a

permit to complete the dredging and filling of the sub-

division which did not expire until December 31, 1968.

(A-L)' In. 1972 Petitioner applied for an extension and

'The symbol “A” will be utilized to designate pages of the ap-

pendix to this Petition.

6

renewal of that permit. (A-M) The Department of the

Army and the Corps of Engineers denied the requested

permit without granting Petitioner a hearing.

Gables by the Sea, Inc. filed its complaint in the -

United States District Court for the Southern District

of Florida alleging essentially that it was denied of a

valuable property right without the benefit of procedural

due process in the form of a public hearing and without

the benefit of substantive due process in that the De-

partment of the Army and the Corps of Engineers denied

the renewal and extension of the permit on the alleged

basis that the project would be contrary to the public

interest without making a finding that the project would

cause ecological damage to that degree and extent that

would in fact make it contrary to the public interest.

The Corps of Engineers basec their denial of the re-

quested permit upon the following findings:

“Based on an evaluation of the comments by both

the developer and state and federal agencies

competent to make an evaluation of ecological

factors incident to the proposed development, it

is my conclusion that the degree of ecological

damage to ve occasioned by the project is subject

to conjecture. There will however be some irre-

versible commitment of biologically productive

areas resulting in ecological damage of one de-

gree or another. More significant however is the

lack of public acceptance of the project. Opposi-

tion to the project by virtually all governmental

agencies, citizens groups and even the Dade

County Planning Department have convinced me

that permitting of the project will not be in the

7

public interest. I therefore request authority to

deny the permit on the basis that the develop-

. ment would irretrievably commit biologically

productive lands, lacks acceptability from both

the public and private sector, and would not be

in the public interest.”

The United States District Court for the Southern

District of Florida entered a summary judgment in favor

of the government pursuant to its Local Rule 10(b) wich

permits the granting of judgment without the benefit of

a hearing. The trial court refused to permit Gables by

the Sea to proceed with scheduled depositions privr to the

disposition of the motion for summary judgment (A-N-68)

Petitioner would have established by those depositions that

the Corps of Engineers did not consider the relevant fac-

tors in reaching its decision.

Petitioner prosecuted an appeal to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The appeal was

placed on the summary calendar pursuant to Local Rule

18 of the Fifth Circuit and Petitioner was thereby denied

the opportunity to present oral argument. The Court of

Appeals affirmed the summary judgment entered by the

District Court. Thus, based on the false premise that due

precess and the ends of justice consist of a clear calendar

and administrative efficiency, the Petitioner has been

through the entire Federal administrative hierarchy, the

Federal trial court level and now through the Federal

appellate court level without the benefit of any hearing

whatsoever and without its attorneys being permitted to

make a single appearance at any hearing in any court

recom. The cumulative result is that Petitioner has been

deprived of a substantial property right without the bene-

8

fit of substantive or procedural due process of law as

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

It appears from the decisions of the Courts below,

concerning judicial review of a denial of a requested

dredge and fill permit, that as a matter of policy the

Fifth Circuit will not inquire into procedural or substan-

tive matters regarding decisions by the Army Corps of

Engineers. The Fifth Circuit equates the “public interest”

with a determination of whether the vocal members of the

public are opposed to a project rather than objective find-

ings based on competent evidence.

Undoubtedly, as a direct result of the failure to afford

Petitioner a hearing, the denial of the requested dredge and

fill permit was not based upon the prescribed legislative

standards contained in the Water Quality Act, Title 33

U.S.C. $1171, et seq, as amended and reorganized in the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Title 33 U-S.C.

§1341, et seq, the National Environmental Protection

Act, Title 42, U.S.C. §4322, et seq, and the applicable pro-

visions of the Code of Federal Regulations, all of which

provide that the denial of a dredge and fill permit must

be based on findings that the activity if permitted would

cause such extensive damage as to be contrary to the pub-

lic interest because of its adverse effect on the environ-

ment. A minor impact on the ervironment will not, under

the applicable law, justify the denial of a permit. The

determination of the “public interest” is not a matter of

taking a popularity poll, but rather a determination based

upon competent, substantial evidence that the requested

9

activity will cause such extensive damage as to have an

adverse impact on the environment.

The above quoted findings of the District Engineer

established that there would be no substantial damage or

injury to the ecology or to biologically productive areas.

Such a finding requires the issuance of the requested per-

mit. The permit was not issued because tie District En-

gineer found “more significant however, is the lack of

public acceptance of the project.” It is respectfully sub-

mitted that “public acceptance” and “contrary to pub-

lic interest” are two entirely different concepts. The lat-

ter is based on objective standards; whereas, the former

contemplates a popularity contest and relegates a property

owner’s right to the whim of public clamor.”

The decisions below are tainted by the denial of pro-

cedural due process resulting from the cumulative effect of

the failure of the United States Army Corps of Engineers

to afford the Petitioner a public hearing contrary to its own

regulations; the granting by the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Florida of a summary

final judgment in favor of the Respondents pursuant to its

Local Rule 10(b), which permits the granting of-a sum-

mary judgment without the benefit of a hearing before the

Court; the District Court’s further action in not permitting

Petitioner to proceed with scheduled depositions prior to the

disposition of the motion for summary judgment contrary

to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which

provides that depositions will be considered by the Court

in ruling on a motion for summary judgment; and by

the effect of Local Rule 18 of the Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit which permitted this cause to be placed

23 Andersons American Law of Zoning, §15.27, page 155-156.

BF OEE OTTER

10

on the summary calendar and thereby deprived Petitioner

of the opportunity to present oral argument.

Title 33, U.S.C. §1344 became effective on October

18, 1972, and provided for permits for dredging and filling

after notice and opportunity for public hearing. This

Statute was in effect prior to November 22, 1972, when

Colonel Lee, the District Engineer, prepared his report on

the Petitioner’s application recommending denial of the

permit and prior to January 18, 1973, when final action

was taken denying the permit. Yet, despite this legisla-

tive mandate requiring a hearing, none was held.

Compounding the denial of procedural due process, the

District Court refused to allow Petitioner the right to

take depositions of the administrative officials participat-

ing in the proceeding which resulted in the denial of the

requested permit. It was an absolute necessity for the trial

court to determine whether the United States Army Corps

of Engineers based its decision denying the requested per-

mit on the relevant factors. Citizens to Preserve Overton

Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814 (1971);

Chrysler Co~poration v. Department of Transportation,

472 F.2d 65y (6th Cir. 1972). Depositions were essential

for a determination of whether or not the administ:‘ative

bureaucracy of the Corps of Engineers had based their

decision upon consideration of the relevant factors. The

purpose of taking the scheduled depositions was to estab-

lish that the administrative officials and agencies that

submitted written reports had no factual predicate, either

by inspection or otherwise, for their reports, and that

these reports were forwarded automatically without re-

gard or relationship to the true relevant facts concerning

the effect, if any, on the environment by the granting

of the requested permit. It was these unsupported reports

11

that gave rise to the objectiuns relied on by the District

Engineer in making his findings. The scheduled discov-

ery was prohibited, but if permitted, would have revealed

the arbitrary and capricious nature of the decision of the

Corps of Engineers because of the lack of any evidence

to support the decision. In fact, the District Engineer,

Col. Lee, found “that the.degree of ecological damage to

be occasioned by the project is subject to conjecture.”

The United States Supreme Court held in Citizens to

Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, supra, that the

administrative officials who participated in an adminis-

trative decision, even in the absence of de novo review,

may be required to give testimony in order to afford

adequate judicial review in the United States District

Court. See also Committee for Nuclear Responsibility,

Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In the in-

stant cause the trial court held and the Court of Appeals

affirmed that no discovery would be permitted because

Petitioner was bound by the administrative record and

any discovery would be irrelevant. The effect of such a

ruling was to prevent judicial review and an examination

of whether or not the administrative hierarchy considered

the relevant factors and statutory standards.

The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of

Florida held that if the filling and dredging would injure

the environment to such an extent as to adversely affect

the public interest, then the State of Florida could exer-

cise the power of eminent domain and take the property

by paying the owner just compensation. Government can

not, after selling submerged land to private owners for

valuable consideration, deny the right to use that land in

the only way in which private ownership can have any

value. By denying the permit the Corps of Engineers

12

deprived the Petitioner of a valuable property right, that

is, the use of the property. In rendering such a decision it

was essential that Petitioner be afforded a full and open

hearing and a fair opportunity to meet the issues and be

heard before the Corps issued its final command.

The United States Supreme Court has consistently

held that a party who has been deprived of property by

administrative action is entitled to procedural due process

in the form of notice and an opportunity to be heard. This

protection found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution has been read broadly by this

Court to include protection of any significant property

interest. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 48, 56 S.Ct. 906

(1926); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773

(1938); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 598, 92 S.Ct. 2694

(1972); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408

U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972) and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407

USS. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (1972); The United States Supreme

Court in Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent.R.Co., 305 U.S. 177,

59 S.Ct. 160 (1938), held that the statutory requirement

that a determination by the Interstate Commerce Com-

mission as to whether or not an electric railway was

subject to the Railway Labor Act could only be made after

a hearing and that the reference to “hearing” intended a

proceeding in which evidence is received and weighed

along with argument. The Court described in that case the

phrase “hearing” as follows:

‘. . - The Commission must determine ‘after

hearing’. The requirement of a ‘hearing’ has

obvious reference ‘to the tradition of judicial

proceedings in which evidence is received and

weighed by the trier of facts.’ The ‘hearing’ is

13

‘the hearing of evidence and argument’. Morgan

v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 480, 56 S.Ct. 906

911, 80 L.Ed. 1288. And the manifest purpose in

requiring a hearing is to comply with the re-

quirements of due process upon which the parties

affected by the determination of an administra-

tive body are entitled to insist. ...” (at page 163)

In the Fuentes v. Shevin case, supra, this Court held

that the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment in-

cludes the right and opportunity to be heard at a mean-

ingful time and in a meaningful manner by a person who

held less than absolute ownership in a physical object. This

protection applies equally to a person with the right to

dredge and fill nis property which is useless unless he can

do so.

It is indeed unfortunate that the recent enforcement

of the admirable goal of protection of the environment

for the present and future has resulted in administrative

agencies riding roughshod over private property owners

without affording them due process of law. It must be

remembered that private property owners are persons

within the protection of the Constituticn and their rights

can only be encroached upon by governmental interfer-

ence if they are afforded the full protection of the Con-

stitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. To do less would

simply mean that the judicial, executive and legislative

branches of the United States government have decided

that the ends justify the means and the individual liber-

ties preserved and protected by the United States Con-

stitution have been eroded and undermined in the over

zealous pursuit of an otherwise worthwhile object. The

environment can and must be protected but due Process

of Law can not be allowed to fall in the path of that goal.

Sarr ce

14

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that this Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted, |

- MARION E. SIBLEY

and

ALLAN M. GLASER

of the law firm of

SIBLEY, GIBLIN, LEVENSON

& WARD

Attorneys for Petitioners

605 Lincoln Road, Suite 707

P.O. Box 390360

Miami Beach, Florida 33139

By: /s/ Marion E. Sibley

MARION E. SIBLEY

By: /s/ Allan M. Glaser

ALLAN M. GLASER

15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy

of the foregoing “Reply Brief of Appellant” was mailed

to EDWARD J. SHAWAKER, attorney for Appellees,

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, and to

PAUL & THOMSON, attorneys for Intervenors, 1300

First National Bank Building, Miami, Florida 33131,

this ___. day of September, 1974.

/s/ Allan M. Glaser

a ti

tee oe

et

oe

SIAR Y

BUPREME COURT, U. &

No. 74-28 7

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.,

a Florida corporation,

Petitioner,

EMMETT C. LEE, JR., Colonel, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF

ENGINEERS, DISTRICT ENGINEER, DEPART-

MENT OF THE ARMY, JACKSONVILLE, FLOR-

IDA DISTRICT, ROBERT F. FROEHLKE, SECRE-

TARY OF THE ARMY, and UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA,

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Appendix

Designation Page

A Decision of the United States Court of

Appeals, Fifth Circuit —.-_»_-____ 1

B Order denying petition for rehearing of

the United States Court of re Fifth

Circuit — ii a 2

C Order Granting Summary Final Judgment

for Defendant entered by the United States

District Court for the Southern District

ef Tee a ES 3

D Memorandum Opinion entered by the

United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida... =~ 5

E_ Final decision of the Corps of Engineers 17

ee a eee 19

G Final Judgment of the Circuit Court of the

Second Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon

County, Florida 24

H Decision of the District Court of —

First District of Florida - Phe 38

I Final Judgment entered by the Circuit

Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in and

for Leon County, Florida. =. == = 46

I

INDEX TO APPENDIX (cont.

Appendix

Designation

J Decision on Motion to quash appeal entered

sts oa aa pelmaieara

L

First District

Pertinent Text of Statutes and Rules

a) Title 33, U.S.C., § 1171(b) (4)

b) Title 33, U.S.C, $1344

c) Title 42, U.S.C., § 4321

d) Code of Federal Regulations,

§ 209.120(g) (1) and (2) —.

e) Local Rule 10, United States District

Court for the Southern District of

Pewee £2

f) Local Rule 18, United States Court of

Appeals, Fifth District _

Original permit

Application for Extension filed in 1972 __

Order Quashing Notices to Take Deposi-

tions and Staying Discovery entered by

the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida...» a

Page

- & 8

57

57

75

tae?

A-A

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

EMMETT C. LEE. Jr., Colonel, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 74-1028

Summary Calendar.*

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

July 9, 1974.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida; William O. Mehrtens, Judge.

Before GEWIN, GODBOLD and CLARK, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In this case, Gables by the Sea, Inc., seeks reversal of

the district court’s order granting summary judgment to

the appellees. After giving full consideration to the briefs,

trial record, and the district court opinion, 365 F.Supp.

826, we discern no valid basis for reversal under the facts

disclosed by the record in this case. Moreover, our recent

opinion in Di Vosta Rentals, Inc. v. Lee, 488 F.2d 674

(5th Cir. 1973), demonstrates to us that appellant’s con-

tentions are without merit. Accordingiy, the judgment of

the district court is affirmed.

*Rule 18, Sth Cir. See Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty

Co. of New York et al., Sth Cir. 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part 1.

as

2

A-B

[TITLE OMITTED]

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

(Filed August 2, 1974)

Before GEWIN, GODBOLD and CLARK, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing

filed in the above entitled and numbered cause be and the

same is hereby denied.

3

A-C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 73-752-Civ-WM

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.,

a Florida corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

EMMETT C. LEE, JR., etc., et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY FINAL

JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT

This cause came on to be heard upon the motion of

the defendants for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule

56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and counsel having

submitted memoranda of law in support of their respec-

tive positions, and the Court having considered the rec-

ord, most particularly the administrative record filed by

defendants in support of their motion for summary judg-

ment, and the Court being otherwise duly advised in the

premises, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

1. That the motion of the defendants for summary

judgment be, and the same is, hereby granted.

ee eS eo tn ie ee ee kc as ee eae eee

4

2. That the plaintiff shall take nothing by this ac-

tion and summary final judgment is hereby entered in

favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, and

the defendants shall go hence without day .

DONE AND ORDERED in chambers at Miami, Dade

County, Florida, this 23rd day of October, 1973.

/s/ W. O. Mehrtens

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE

cc: Marion E. Sibley, Esq.

United States Attorney (Reynolds)

James R. Walpole, Esq.

5

A-D

[TITLE OMITTED]

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This suit, brought against the United States and cer-

tain named individuals is, in essence, a challenge of the

administrative determination made by the Corps of Engi-

neers to deny the plaintiffs application for a “dredge and

fill permit” pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 403. A brief account

of the facts alleged in the Complaint will precede a dis-

cussion of the legal issues.

In 1956 the Corps of Engineers issued a dredge and

fill permit to Gables Venetian Waterway, Inc., predeces-

sor in title to plaintiff in the instant action. The permit

authorized dredging and filling operations on the western

shore of Biscayne Bay, a navigable water of the United

States. By its terms, the permit had an expiration date of

December 31, 1959. Several revisions in the application

were made and extensions of the permit granted from

1959 through 1965. In the fall of 1965 plaintiff again

requested an extension of the permit, in order to complete

the work, to December 31, 1968. The Corps granted this

extension. No further requests were made for [310] ex-

tensions prior to the expiration date and plaintiff's permit

expired December 31, 1968.

Approximately four years later’ on July 28, 1972, a

representative of Gables submitted a permit application

‘Apparently after the Corps granted the permit extension to De-

cember 31, 1968, Gables was involved in a series of litigation in the

Florida state courts involving the issuance of certain State permits and

certification. The State court litigation has no effect on the instant case.

6

to the Corps seeking to conduct dredge and fill activities

in the same vicinity of the prior dredge and fill opera-

tions. Pursuant to its standard procedures, the Corps

issued a public notice of the application. The Corps then

received over 500 comments, including reports from State

and Federal agencies, in opposition to the proposed proj-

ect. In response to such adverse comments, Gables submit-

ted a technical report to the Corps attempting to show

that the permit should be issued. On January 18, 1973,

the Corps denied the application.

Shortly thereafter Gables filed the instant case seek-

ing to have the Corps issue the permit. The Government

filed a motion to dismiss which was denied. A motion to

intervene on behalf of the defendants was filed by the

Tropical Audubon Society, Inc., the National Audubon

Society, Inc. and the Florida Audubon Society. This Court

denied the motion to intervene. The Government then filed

a motion for summary judgment upon which I will now

rule.

[311] SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The procedural aspect of the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment should be considered before reaching

the substantive issues presented in such motion.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a

judgment should be rendered if the pleadings and other

papers filed show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), F.R.C.P. See

Natural Screen Service v. Poster Exchange, 305 F.2d 647

(C.A. 5, 1962). Defendants have filed a motion for sum-

7

mary judgment and have attached to it the entire admin-

istrative record (in excess of 600 pages) upon which the

Corps of Engineers based its decision to deny the plain-

tiff’s permit along with two affidavits indicating that the

Corps’ decision was based on the record. Defendants take

the position that there is no genuine issue as to any mate-

rial fact other than those established in the pleadings and

the attached papers. This Court has carefully reviewed the

papers filed in the case and, in spite of the plaintiff's

opposition, is persuaded that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact in the instant case. I now turn to the

question of whether the defendants are entitled to judg-

ment as a matter of law.

DECISION OF THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS

The Complaint, after describing various State court

proceedings which involved the plaintiff, alleges that the

defendants did not conduct an adversary hearing and

“that there was no substantial evidence to support the

judgment of [312] the district engineer in denying plain-

tiff’s application for an extension of its permit, and said

judgment is arbitrary, capricious and without sufficient

support in the record before the District Engineer.” (Com-

plaint, paragraph 12) These items will be discussed indi-

vidually in determining whether or not defendants are

entitled to summary judgment.

1. Adversary Hearing. Plaintiff takes the position

that it is entitled to an adversary hearing prior to a deter-

mination by the Corps on its permit application. if for no

other reason than for the Corps to consider the issue of

the “public interest” of the project. Defendants on the

other hand argue that the plaintiff may have requested,

8

and had the opportunity for, a public hearing but this

opportunity was waived since no hearing was ever re-

quested. The question this Court must decide is whether

the plaintiff is entitled as a matter of right to a public

hearing. In making this determination I look first to the

statute which authorizes the defendants to issue permits

for dredge and fill activities—Section 10 of the Rivers and

Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. 403. This section makes it unlaw-

ful to, inter alia, excavate, fill or alter the course, condi-

tion or capacity of the channel of any navigable water

“unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of

Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army

prior to beginning the same.” 333 U.S.C. 403.? The statute

then clearly provides the Secretary of the Army with [313]

the authority to issue permits to conduct dredge and fill

operations but it nowhere provides that any type of hear-

ing must be held prior to the issuance of such permits.

In examining the issue of whether or not this Act requires

a hearing, the Court in Sisselman v. Smith, 432 F. aa 750,

754 (C.A. 3, 1970), found:

“The Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act

of 1899 . . . may be searched in vain for any

language indicating the need for an adversary

hearing before the authority contained therein -

may be exercised. . . .”

The Rivers and Harbors Act nowhere requires that a

hearing be held prior to the issuance of a permit. Further,

the issuance or denial of such is not contingent on adver-

sary proceedings, although such proceedings are clearly

Section 12 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 406, provides for criminal pen-

alties up to $2500 for each violation and for the removal of any unlaw-

ful structures.

9

' not prohibited by the Act. In examining the regulations

of the Corps of Engineers I find that the applicant is

provided with an adequate opportunity to present any

information or evidence upon which it wishes to support

the application or to rebut objections to the application.

See 33 C.F.R. §202.120(f). In the instant case the plain-

tiff never requested the Corps to conduct a hearing. While

the Corps was considering its application, plaintiff sub-

mitted a technical report rebutting certain of the adverse

comments and reports submitted to the Corps. The plain-

tiff was free to request a hearing at that point or to pre-

sent the Corps with any further information or reports

that it felt appropriate. I find that since the plaintiff had

its opportunity to request a hearing and elected not to do

so, it may not challenge denial of the permit on the basis

that it did not receive a hearing.

[314] 2. Scope of Review. In order to determine

whether or not the decision of the Corps of Engineers to

deny the permit was proper, it is first necessary to estab-

lish the proper scope of judicial review. Plaintiff has

sought to conduct extensive discovery procedures, presum-

ably to determine whether the Corps properly denied the

application. Defendants have opposed the discovery proce-

dures on the basis that this action is a challenge, pursuant

to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.,701 et seq.,

to a final agency decision of the Corps and as such should

be reviewed only on the administrative record. I find the —

position of the defendants to be proper.

The plaintiff seeks to review a final administrative

decision of the Corps of Engineers; the Complaint alleges

jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act. It is

well established that the extent of judicial review of an

10

administrative decision is determined by the statute upon

which the decision is based. In the absence of statutory

authorization, review of an administrative decision is

based upon the administrative record of the particular

agency., This was recently affirmed by the Supreme

_ Court in Camp v. Pitts, _— US. ——, 98 S.Ct. 1241,

1244 (1978) :

_ “The appropriate standard for review was ac-

cordingly whether the comptroller’s adjudication

was ‘arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discre-

tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,’

_as specified in 5 U.S.C. §706(2) (A).”

“In applying that standard the focal point for

judicial review should be the administrative rec-

ord already in existence, not some new record

‘made initially in the reviewing court.”

2 2 *

“The validity of the comptroller’s action must,

therefore, stand or fall on the propriety of that

finding, judged, of course, by the appropriate

standard of review.”

[315] The Supreme Court also dealt with this issue in

_ Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,

420 (1971): ,

“Thus it is necessary to, remand this case to

. the district court for plenary review of the Secre-

tary’s decision. That review is to be based on the

full administrative record that was before the

Secretary at the time he made his decision.”

a

Judicial review, then, must be centered’ around the

contents of the administrative record. Information extra-

neous to the record should not be considered in the review

procedure. If the agency action is found to be improper,

the matter would be remanded to the agency; it would be

improper to conduct de novo proceedings in the form of a

trial by the district court to consider extra-record infor-

mation.

I find that the scope of review in the instant case is

limited to the administrative record upon which the Corps

of Engineers made its decision.

3. Arbitrary, Capricious, and Abuse of Discretion

Or Not in Accordance with Law.

Plaintiff urges that the denial of its permit by the

Corps was arbitrary and capricious and further alleges

that the District Engineer found that the project would

cause no harmful effect to the navigable waters of Bis-

cayne Bay. (Complaint, paragraph 13) Defendants on the

other hand deny such allegations and assert that the deci-

sion of the Corps was proper and that the [316] admin-

istrative record supports this position. The record contains

over 500 adverse comments on the project including those

from the United States Environmental Protection Agency,

the Department of Interior, the Metropolitan Dade County

Planning Department, the Florida Audubon Society and

the National Audubon Society as well as reports from the

Department of Interior, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and

Wildlife and the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish

'The Court may also consider the inherent expertise of the agency

making the decision. City of Chicago v. F.P.C., 458 F.2d 731, 746

(C.A. D.C. 1971).

12

Commission. Hundreds of interested citizens, including at

least one United States Senator and two Congressmen,

submitted comments opposing the project. Less than five

comments were received in favor of the project. Also in-

cluded in the record is a twenty-six page technical report

submitted by the plaintiff which discusses and rebuts cer-

tain of the adverse comments. The Department of Interior,

Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, in its report to

the Corps, stated:

“The project, as proposed, will result in a sig-

nificant destruction in degradation of the marine

resources of South Biscayne Bay. Approximately

128 acres red mangroves and 50 acres of open

shallow water will be lost as the result of the

proposed filling. In addition, 240 aercs of bay

bottom will be altered or disturberi as t™. result

of the proposed dredging op-ration. Areas previ-

ously dredged in accordance with the original

permit are over 10 feet deep, receive little or no

light penetration, contair lwrge deposits of silt,

and have not revegetated. It is obvious that re-

vegetation cannot be anticipated in the proposed

dredge area.”

The Florida Fresh Water and Fish Commision stated in

its report to the Corps:

[317] “The proposed project’s finger fill system

will contribute to increased urban runoff which

in conjunction with the excessively deep canals

will contribute to eutrophication of adjacent

waters. ...”

13

“This project will completely obliterate or de-

grade more than three hundred and fifty acres

of biologically productive submerged land and

title swamp, thus eliminating a significant por-

tion of the Biscayne Bay ecosystem, its food

webs and wildlife habitat. . . .”

The Department of Interior, Office of the Secretary

stated in its letter to the Corps:

“ The dredging proposed would permanently

disrupt these [complex and valuable biological}

communities in both the area to be filled and

the area dredged to obtain the fill material. Per-

haps of greater importance would be the damage

caused by siltation and turbidity resulting from

the dreging operation. . . .”

In order to upset the final agency decision, there must

be a clear showing that such decision was improper. The

burden of proving that the action was improper is on the

party challenging the decision. It is well settled that there

is a definite presumption of regularity in favor of the

administrative decision. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279

(1965); Chaney v. United States, 406 F.2d 809 (C.A. 5,

1969), cert. den. 396 U.S. 867. In reviewing this action

this Court may determine only whether the agency acted

properly and it must not “substitute its judgment for

that of the agency.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.

Volpe, 301 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). After reviewing the

administrative record, which I find adequate for the pur-

poses of judicial review, this Court is of the opinion and

finds that the Corps’ decision was proper, was not arbi-

trary, capricious, was not an abuse of discretion and in

14

accordance with law. I find [318] that the decision was

based on a consideration of the relevant factors; that

there was no “clear error of judgment”, Citizens to Pre-

serve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971);

and that the Corps’ action in denying the permit was a

“reasoned decision’, International Harvester v. Ruckels-

haus, 478 F.2d 615, 648 (C.A. D.C. 1973). See also Essex

Chemical Corporation et al. v. Ruckelshaus, No. 72-1079,

C.A. D.C., decided September 10, 1973, slip opinion pages

12, 18, 19 and 25.

4. Sufficiency of Fact Finding. Plaintiff contends

that the decision of the Corps is not supported by the

record. This is, in effect, an attack on the sufficiency of

the fact finding procedures of the administrative agency.

However, nowhere does the plaintiff clearly establish any

defect in the procedures or the establishment of the admin-

istrative record. The procedures of the Corps of giving

public notice of the permit application, accepting written

comments, providing the applicant with copies of comments

and by allowing the applicant to rebut comments, are not

on their face inadequate procedures in the administrative

process. In the instant case these procedures, as evidenced

by the record, were properly and adequately carried out

by the Corps.

Plaintiff also contends that there “was no substantial

evidence” to support the decision of the Corps of Engi-

neers. This argument is not relevant to the Corps’ fact

finding procedures since the substantial evidence test need

only be utilized in an [319] adjudicatory or formal rule

*Plaintiff does assert that no adversary hearing was conducted,

but it never asserts that this resulted in faulty fact finding by the

Corps.

— ———

15

making procedure. It is not involved in the type of decision

making process involved in the instant case. Citizens to

Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414, 417

(1971); Camp v. Pitts, __ US. —_. %8 S.Ct. 1241

(1973) ; Delaware Citizens for Clear Air, Inc. v. Ruckels-

haus, 480 F.2d 972 (C.A. 3, 1973).

I find the Corps’ fact finding procedures to be ade-

quate, based upon substantial evidence, and that they were

adequately carried out in the instant situation.

CONCLUSION

Having considered the pleadings and papers, includ-

ing the administrative record, in this matter, I find that

there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the

defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter

of law. The administrative determination of the Corps of

Engineers in denying the plaintiff's application for a per-

mit pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 403 is upheld and the relief

sought by the plaintiff is denied.

DONE and ORDERED at Miami, Florida, this 15th

day of October, 1973.

/s/ W. O. Mehrtens

United States District Judge

{320] copies to:

Robert W. Rust, U.S. Attorney

By: Robert Reynolds, Asst. U.S. Attorney

300 Ainsley Bldg., Miami, Fla. 33132

16

James R. Walpole, Attorney, Dept. of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

Sibley, Giblin, Levenson & Ward

By: Marion E. Sibley, Esq.

P.O. Box 360

Miami Beach, Fla. 33139

Stuart Simon, Esq.,

Metropolitan Dade County Attorney

1626 Dade County Courthouse,

Miami, Fla. 33130

Paul & Thomson

By: Parker D. Thomson, Esq.

1300 First National Bank Bldg.,

Miami, Fla. 33131

17

A-E

[65]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Jacksonville District, Corps of Engineers

P. O. Box 4970

Jacksonville, Florida 32201

SAJSC Permits (56-188) 18 January 1973

Mr. Edmund Friedman

Connell Associates, Inc.

P. O. Box 677

Miami, Florida 33135

Dear Mr. Friedman:

This is in reference to your letter of 28 July 1972 sub-

mitting an application in behalf of Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc.,

to modify and extend a Department of the Army permit

originally issued 18 June 1956 to dredge and fill in certain

areas along the westerly shore of Biscayne Bay at Coral

Gables, Florida.

Your application was given careful and thorough consider-

ation by all levels of the Department of the Army prior to

final action in the matter.

The final findings and conclusions of the Army, based on

all available evidence, are that issuance of the requested

permit:

1. Is not believed to be consistent with current public

interest in the preservation of man’s natural environment

as enunciated in Public Law 91-190,

18

2. Would destroy a biologically productive area in

Biscayne Bay, and

3. Is opposed by the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and

Wildlife of the Department of the Interior, the Environ-

mental Protection Agency, the State of Florida Game and

Fresh Water Fish Commission and Department of Natural

Resources, the Dade County Planning Department, and

was the subject of over 500 letters of opposition from the

general public.

In view of the above, we have concluded that the proposed

work would not be in the public interest and regret that

we must inform you that the request for modification and

extension to Department of the Army permit 56-188 is

hereby denied.

BY AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE

ARMY:

s/ EMMETT C. LEE, JR.

Colonel, Corps of Engineers

District Engineer

19

A-F

[19]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Jacksonville District, Corps of Engineers

P. O. Box 4970

Jacksonville, Florida 32201

SAJSC Permits (56-188) 22 November 1972

SUBJECT: Report on Application to Modify Depart-

ment of the Army Permit to Dredge and Fill

in Biscayne Bay

THRU: Division Engineer, South Atlantic

ATTN: SADKO

TO: HQDA (DAEN-CWO-N)

WASH DC 20314

1. Name of applicant: Gables By the Sea, Inc., c/o

Connell Associates, Inc., P.O. Box 677, Miami, Florida

33135.

2. Location of work: westerly shore of Lower Bis-

cayne Bay, south of the mouth of Snapper Creek Canal

and north of Shoal Point, Sections 17 and 18, Township

55 S., Range 41 E., City of Coral Gables, Dade County,

Florida.

3. Estate and other primary authority: The appli-

cant has necessary estate rights.

4. Character of proposed work: It is proposed to

dredge approximately 1,300,000 cubic yards of material

20

from Lower Biscayne Bay to a depth of -13.0 mean sea

level (approximately 55 acres) and upland canals. Ma-

terial would consist of some sand, mud, and oolitic lime-

stone. Retaining mounds would be constructed to inclose

and contain the dredged materials. Weirs would be used

at the easterly edge of the proposed fill. See report sub-

mitted by Dr. Howard J. Teas which gives in detail the

proposed work and his opinion of the effect of the work

on the environment (Incl 11).

5. Views of local and State authority: The State

Department of Pollution Control issued a letter of certi-

fication on 15 May 1972 as a result of a court order but

stated that they had not reviewed and analyzed the proj-

ect, and consequently did not know whether or not there

would be reasonable assurance that the project would not

violate applicable water quality standards of the State

of Florida. The Trustees of the Internal Improvement

Trust Fund withheld comment on the Corps’ public notice

since they were [20] under a court order to grant a State

permit. See letter dated 12 September 1972 (Incl 7). The

Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission of the State of

Florida objected to the proposed work in letter dated 18

September 1972 (Incl 7). By letter of 22 September 1972

Metropolitan Dade County requested the permit be denied

(Inel 8).

6. Date for sending information to other interested

parties and summary of objections offered: A public no-

tice was issued 17 August 1972 (see Inclosures 2 and 3).

Approximately 515 objections were received. This oppo-

sition is discussed in a subsequent paragraph and reflected

in Inclosure 9. Two letters in favor of the project were

received (Incl 10).

21

7. Views of District Engineer concerning probable

effect on:

a. Navigation: There would be no unreasonable ob-

struction to navigation.

b. Harbor lines: Not applicable.

ce. Flood heights and drift: Not applicable.

d. Beach erosion and accretion : Not applicable.

e. Fish and wildlife: The U.S. Bureau of Sport

Fisheries and Wildlife recommended the permit be denied.

The work was also opposed by Florida State Game and

Fresh Water Fish Commission and the State Department

of Natural Resources.

f. Pollution: Similarly, the Environmental Protec-

tion Agency in letter dated 12 October 1972 recommended

the permit be denied. As previously stated, the State De-

partment of Pollution Control issued letter of certifica-

tion as a result of a court order.

g. Esthetics: During the period of construction, the

proposed work would be esthetically objectionable but upon

completion should present an attractive waterfront devel-

opment.

h. Ecology: The opposition of the Federal and State

agencies and the general public is based, to a large extent,

on the loss of an ecologically valuable area.

i. Oceanography: Not applicable.

22

j. Public Interest: The reaction of the public notice

makes it clear that granting the permit would not be con-

sistent with the public interest.

[21] 8. Other pertinent remarks:

a. On 18 June 1956, the District Engineer issued a

Department of the Army permit to the applicant to dredge

and fill, the dredged material to be contained by adequate

dikes, modified and extended 5 December 1957, extended

4 December 1959, revised 6 July 1960 and extended 12

November 1965. No protests were received. The present

application is to revive, modify and extend this permit.

(See Inclosure 1).

b. The application has been the subject of wide-

spread public interest. Over 515 responses were received

to our public notice of which all but two were in opposi-

tion. See Inclosure 9 as a representative sample of this

opposition; the remaining are in our files as a matter of

record but are not transmitted because of the great bulk

involved.

ce. There were many requests received for a public

hearing, including requests from Senator Chiles and Con-

gressmen Pepper and Fascell. However, it was my con-

clusion that a hearing would only serve to further delay

a final decision as it was felt that sufficient response

was received on the public notice to adequately reflect the

public interest in the proposal.

d. The Fish and Wildlife Service and EPA recom-

mended that the permit be denied. (See Inclosures 5

and 6).

-e. The recognized conservation groups are also unan-

imously opposed to the work as proposed. (Included in In-

closure 9).

f. Inclosure 12 was received from the applicant in

_ response to objections made by Environmental Protection

Agency, Department of the Interior, Metropolitan Dade

County and: Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish” Com-,

mission.

9. Conclusions and recommendations: Based on an

evaluation of the comments by both the developer and state

and. federal agencies competent to make an evaluation of

ecological factors incident to the proposed development,

it is my conclusion that the degree of ecological damage to

be occasioned by the project is subject to conjecture. There

will however be some irreversible commitment of biologi-

cally productive areas resulting in ecological damage of

one degree or another. More significant however is the

lack of public acceptance of the project. Opposition to the

project by virtually all governmental agencies, citizens

groups and even the Dade County Planning Department

have convinced me that permitting of the project will not

bein the public interest. I therefore request authority to

deny the permit on the basis that the development would

irretrievably commit biologically productive lands, lacks

acceptability from both the public and private sector, and

would not be in the public interest.

/s/ Emmett C. Lee, Jr.

EMMETT C. LEE, JR.

Colonel, Corps of Engineers

District Engineer

* * *

24

A-G

(17)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR

LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA

CIVIL ACTION NO. 69-984 |

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.,

a Florida corporation,

ms Plaintiff,

vs.

CLAUDE P . KIRK, JR., Governor of the State of Flor-

ida; TOM ADAMS, Secretary of State of the State

of Florida; EARL FAIRCLOTH, Attorney General

of the State of Florida; FRED O. DICKINSON, JR.,

Comptroller of the State of Florida; BROWARD

WILLIAMS, Treasurer of the State of Florida;

FLOYD T. CHRISTIAN, Superintendent of Public

Instruction of the State of Florida; DOYLE CON-

NER, Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of

. Florida, and their successors in office, as the BOARD

OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVE-

MENT TRUST FUND OF THE STATE OF

FLORIDA,

, Defendants.

FINAL JUDGMENT

'

The ‘issues between the parties require the deter-

mination of the rights of plaintiff to dredge fill material

from the public waters of Biscayne Bay and use it to fill

25

certain bottoms owned by plaintiff. The facts are rather

involved and can best be evaluated if stated chronologi-

cally. Plaintiff is the successor in title to other parties

with respect to some of the rights now asserted but, for

the purpose of simplicity, the word ‘plaintiff’ will be used

to describe both plaintiff and its predecessors in title.

On January 6, 1936, plaintiff acquired by purchase

from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund a

substantial tract of bottoms in Biscayne Bay and within

the City of Coral Gables. This tract extended seaward to

the then established bulkhead line.

[18] Some time after the purchase of these bottoms,

the bulkhead line was reestablished some distance sea-

ward from its previous location.

In 1956 plaintiff began to seek the necessary permits

to dredge from the adjacent public bottoms and fill its

land. Under date of May 17, 1956, the Trustees agreed

to the issuance by the U.S. Corps of Engineers of a per-

mit for this dredging. Everyone concerned seems to have

regarded this as, at least, a license to plaintiff to remove

the fill from the public bottoms.

During 1957 plaintiff sought to acquire by purchase

from the Trustees a parcel of bottoms consisting of the

area between the bulkhead line as it had previously

existed and the new bulkhead line which had been estab-

lished somewhat seaward from the old line.

In the course of these negotiations several letters

were written on behalf of the Trustees which are perti-

nent to the present inquiry.

26

On March 5, 1957, W. Turner Wallis, engineer for the

Trustees wrote:

“The present policy of the Trustees, applica-

ble to Dade and Palm Beach Counties, is limited

to arrangements under which material may be

used by the upland owner for filling the adjoin-

ing submerged land. The application to purchase

the desired quantity of material should be ac-

companied by a suitable map showing both the

area to be filled and the area and depth limits

of proposed excavation.

“Upon payment of the appraised value for the

filled area (prior to filling) and the completion

of such work, the Trustees will issue a disclaimer

of title.”

Plaintiff filed a formal application with the Trustees,

accompanied by a map which indicated the bottoms to be

acquired, [19] the areas to be filled and areas from which

the proposed fill was to be dredged. This map clearly in-

dicates that the area to be filled embraced the parcel pre-

viously acquired and the proposed new acquisition.

Under date of September 6, 1957, Van H. Ferguson,

Director, wrote:

“The grant of the deeds to the submerged

lands includes approval for dredging the area in-

dicated for this purpose on the map which ac-

companied the applications.”

Other correspondence is of similar tenor.

wooo eee or

port en

ISAO TET:

27

Under date of September 25, 1957, in the light of this

background plaintiff purchased and paid for the second

parcel of bottoms — that lying between the old and the

new bulkhead lines.

Plaintiff asserts the right to dredge from public bot-

toms to fill its now privately-owned submerged land on

two theories: (1) the right to the unexpired portion of a

dredging permit which, it alleges, defendants illegally re-

voked, and (2) a legal right to a new permit.

Without discussing all the voluminous documents

filed before the Court or the transcript of testimony, it

is sufficient at this time to point out the following:

It is alleged by the plaintiff and admitted by the de-

fendant that prior to October 18, 1965 the City of Coral

Gables approved a fill permit to plaintiff and on No-

vember 2, 1965 this permit was formally approved by the

Trustees. It is also admitted that this permit was ex-

tended until December 31, 1968. See Paragraph VIII of

Complaint and Page 2 of Answer.

The extension of the fill permit took the form of an

approval by the Trustees of an extension of a permit

issued [20] by the Corps of Engineers.

The defendants now argue that this was not a valid

extension because it was for a period longer than two

years and they say the Trustees are bound by the require-

ment of Section 253.124, Florida Statutes (as it then

existed) that no construction permit shal] be issued un-

less the proposed work is to be completed within two

years next after the date of the issuance of such permit.

Laying aside the question of the possible estoppel of the

Trustees to now assert their own wrong in approving a

three-year extension of plaintiff's dredging rights, it is

apparent that the statute places no limit upon the length

of an extension of a dredging permit. It provides “Such

time may be extended for good cause, upon showing that

all due effort and diligence toward completion of said

work have been made.” In the absence of proof to the

contrary the Court must assume that the necessary show-

ing was made or this permit would not have been ex-

tended.

On May 21, 1968 the Trustees adopted a resolution

prohibiting any person from thereafter dredging pur-

suant to any pre-existing permit unless dredging opera-

tions had already commenced. Plaintiff respected this

resolution and, not having begun dredging, did not there-

after attempt to dredge under its permit.

As regards this permit the Court holds:

1. The right of plaintiff under the circum-

stances of this case to dredge fill material for

public bottoms to fill the submerged land pur-

chased from the Trustees was an incident to the

purchase of submerged land and became a vested

right.

2. This right did not extend in perpetuam

and would be lost if not exercised within a rea-

sonable time.

3. A reasonable time does not extend beyond

the expiration date of the last extension granted

by the Trustees.

29

[21] 4. The granting of dredge and fill per-

mits by the Trustees served to perpetuate the

rights of plaintiff for the life of such permits.

5. The action of the Trustees in attempting

to abrogate an extension of a fill permit pre-

viously granted was without lawful authority,

and void.

6. Plaintiff should not be penalized for obey-

ing the demands of the highest officers of the

State and respecting the order not to dredge.

7. Plaintiff is entitled to dredge from the

designated areas under the terms and conditions

of its permit in effect on May 21, 1968 for a

number of days after this judgment becomes

final, and the time for appeal expires, equal to

the number of days from the adoption of the

above-described resolution of the Trustees to

December 31, 1968.

After the Trustees had attempted to abrogate the

then current permit plaintiff applied to the City Com-

mission of Coral Gables for a new permit. A hearing

was had and this permit was granted by the City Com-

missioners. It was then transmitted to the Trustees for

their approval. After several rather stormy sessions the

Trustees disapproved the permit.

As regards this action of the Trustees, plaintiff raises

three questions. It contends: (1) the Trustees were limited

to “formal” approval of the permit granted by the City,

and since the permit was in proper form and had been

30

issued after all statutory formalities had been observed,

the Trustees had no discretion and should have approved

the permit; (2) that the Trustees acted arbitrarily and

capriciously in disapproving the action of the City of

Coral Gables in approving the permit, and (3) that the

Trustees illegally and in violation of plaintiff’s rights re-

ceived additional evidence at a subsequent meeting when

plaintiff was not represented after the taking of evidence

had been closed. These contentions require separate con-

sideration.

Prior to the Legislative session of 1967, the statutes

vested in local officials the power to determine discre-

tionary [22] matters relating to the issuance of dredge

and fill permits. The power of the Trustees was limited

to formal approval — that is, approval of the procedure

followed in the issuance of the permits. Chapter 253,

Florida Statutes, 1965. Trustees v. Venetian Isles Develop-

ment Corp., 166 So.2d 765. Burns v. Wiseheart, 205 So.2d

708.

Chapter 253 was amended in 1967. This amendment

purports to vest broad powers in the Trustees to disap-

prove permits authorized by cities and counties. Plaintiff

contends that the amendment is invalid because it provides

that “The Trustees shall consider any other factors af-

fecting the public interest”. This language, plaintiff

argues, is so broad as to constitute a delegation of legis-

lative powers to the Trustees in violation of the well-

established rule which requires reasonable guidelines

regulating the exercise of discretion by executive officers

in matters affecting the rights of the people. If the

quoted language were all the change in the law, this argu-

ment would require most careful consideration. However,

TO A

31

Section 253.124(2) as it stands after the 1967 amendment,

provides for the granting of fill permits by local officers

only after the consideration of specifically enumerated

matters and then provides that the Trustees shall have

power to “approve, reject or issue” the permit.

The most casual reading of the matters required to

be considered reveals that they include things of general

public interest to the people of the State, as well as the

local interests of the inhabitants of the cities and counties

in which the proposed dredging and filling will occur. It

would be an undue restriction of the plain language of the

statute to hold that the Trustees, in approving or rejecting

an application, should not exercise their independent judg-

ment in regard to the [23] enumerated matters required

to be considered.! The Trustees do not sit merely as an

appellate tribunal to review the action of the local au-

thorities. They exercise for the general public of the State

the same original powers which local authorities exercise

with respect to local interests.

Even should it be determined that the sentence “The

Trustees shall also consider any other factors affecting

the public intent” is invalid, that would not affect the

remainder of the amendatory statute and the authority of

the Trustees to exercise independent judgment in regard

to the matters specifically enumerated in the statute would

remain.

It is next contended that the Trustees acted arbi-

trarily and capriciously in refusing to approve the dredge

and fill permit authorized by the City of Coral Gables.

1Jt would appear that the amendment of the statute was for the

purpose of changing the law announced in the Venetian Isles and

Wiseheart cases.

32

In support of this position, plaintiff relies largely

upon the case of Zabel v. Pinellas County Water and

Navigation Control Authority, 171 So.2d 376.

A dredge and fill permit contemplates two things —

the taking of fill material from one place and depositing

that fill material in another. As applied to the situation

presently before the Court, the rights of the plaintiff are

entirely different with respect to the two operations. The

place from which the material is sought to be dredged is

public property held by the Trustees for the benefit of the

public. On the other hand the place where the plaintiff

desires to deposit this fill material is private property

owned by plaintiff by purchase from the Trustees. To

the extent, if any, that action of the Trustees in refusing

the requested permit is [24] motivated by a desire to pre-

vent the reasonable development by filling of plaintiff's

privately owned bottoms the action of the Trustees is arbi-

trary, capricious and without sufficient support in the

record before the Trustees or the record before this Court.

See Zabel v. Pinellas County Water and Navigation Con-

trol Authority, 171 So. 2d 376. DiVosta Rentals, Inc. v.

Kirk, Leon County No. 69-1219.

: As regards the removal of fill from public bottoms

for the purpose of filling these privately owned bottoms

an entirely different situation is presented.

‘As has been heretofore observed, the plaintiff has

acquired a right to fill its land by dredging from public

bottoms as an incident to its original purchase. But the

right to dredge from public bottoms was not included in

the deed or conveyed by express grant. It was in the na-

ture of an implied agreement on the part of the Trustees

33

as an incident to the purchase by plaintiff, enforceable

more by equitable estoppel than the protection of any

title acquired by any conveyance by the Trustees of an

interest in the public bottoms from which the fill was to

be removed. It would be quite unreasonable to infer from

the circumstances of the conveyance to plaintiff that it

was not the intention of the parties that plaintiff would

have the right to dredge for public bottoms for the pur-

pose of filling those submerged lands. It would be equally

unreasonable to infer from these circumstances any in-

tent that this right to dredge was intended to exist for all

time to come. The only logical conclusion is that the right

to dredge should exist for a reasonable time. Plaintiff

has lost by inaction any legal right to a permit to dredge

from public bottoms to fill the land in question, arising

from or as an incident to its purchase of the [25] bottoms

it now desires to fill beyond the time agreed to by the

Trustees.

The present granting of any dredge permit authoriz-

ing plaintiff to obtain material from public bottoms to

fill its submerged land would be a matter of grace on the

part of the public. However, statutes may be enacted

which permit citizens to qualify for public grants and

when the terms of a valid statute are fully met, it is the

legal duty of public officials to execute such grants. If

plaintiff has fully met the requirements of a valid statute

or if the Trustees, in denying it a permit, have not ac-

corded plaintiff all its legal rights, it is the duty of the

Court to grant appropriate relief.

In this case the Court finds that the Trustees con-

sidered plaintiff’s application for a dredge and fill permit

after affording plaintiff a hearing, and upon the basis

34

of the evidence before them denied this permit. To the

extent that this decision constituted a denial of the right

of plaintiff to fill submerged land owned by it, the action

of the Trustees was not justified by the evidence before

them and was legally arbitrary and capricious. To the

extent that this decision of the Trustees constituted a

denial of a permit authorizing plaintiff to dredge material

from public bottoms for the purpose of filling its privately

owned submerged land the action of the Trustees was

within the scope of their statutory powers. Since the per-

mit applied for was for both dredging and filling it was

lawfully denied in that form. It would be the legal duty of

the Trustees to issue a permit to plaintiff to fill its sub-

merged land by the use of suitable material from other

sources.

If such filling would injure the aquatic life of the

vicinity to such an extent as to adversely affect the public

[26] interest, the State has the power of eminent domain

to take, for just compensation, the plaintiff’s property.

But the State cannot, after selling submerged land to

private owners, deny such owners the right to use those

lands in the only way in which private ownership can

be of any value.

Finally, plaintiff complains that the Trustees denied

it due process of law by taking evidence at a meeting of

the Trustees at which plaintiff was not represented. The

record shows that, acting rather informally, the Trustees

had received evidence and argument for and against the

granting of the permit and on July 29, 1969 took the mat-

ter “under advisement.”

35

On August 5th a representative of the Trustees wrote

plaintiff’s attorney:

“This will acknowledge receipt of depositions,

documents and other exhibits submitted to the

Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement

Trust Fund in regular meeting on July 29, 1969.

“For your information we enclose an unofficial

copy of the Trustees’ minutes relative to your

appearance before the Board.

“After the Trustees have had an opportunity to

properly review your exhibits, we shall be pleased

to hear from you as to what date you may desire

this matter to be placed before the Trustees for

consideration.”

Plaintiff’s attorney replied:

“With reference to your letter of August 5,

1969, please be advised that the evidence in this

matter has been submitted to-the Board at a

regular meeting held on July 29, 1969 and the

Board is now considering the case.

“We have no objections to the Board voting on

this matter at its meeting on August 19, 1969.

“Please advise us of the result of such vote.”

The representative of the Trustees then wrote plain-

tiff’s attorney:

36

{27] “Your letter of August 7 indicating that you

would have no objection to this matter coming

before the Trustees on August 19, 1969, is hereby

acknowledged.

“We will advise the Attorney General of your

position and will await his directive.”

Plaintiff’s attorney selected a date for the Trustees

to act on this application. In doing so he had no authority

to limit the scope of the action of the Trustees to simply

voting to approve or disapprove the permit. He had no

right to assume that the Trustees would not at that time

reopen the taking of evidence. While it would have been

a courtesy to plaintiff’s attorney to inform him in ad-

vance that more evidence would be offered, failure to

give such notice does not deny due process of law. Plain-

tiff was on notice that the Trustees would take action on

the application on a date chosen by plaintiff’s attorney.

That is sufficient.

It is therefore, ADJUDGED:

1. The plaintiff has the lawful right to dredge ma-

terial from the areas indicated on the application for a

dredge and fill permit and to use such material to fill

its privately owned submerged land indicated on such

application for a period of time consisting of 223 days

beginning on the day this judgment becomes final by the

expiration of the time of appeal, or the filing of the man-

date of an Appellate Court affirming this Judgment,

whichever is the later date.

37

2. Plaintiff has not shown a legal right to a permit »

to dredge from public bottoms in excess of the rights out-

lined in paragraph 1 supra. {faa

8, Upon proper application it would be the legal

duty of the Trustees to grant plaintiff a permit to fill

its privately owned’ submerged ‘land, purchased from the

Trustees, by use of materials from other sources.

DONE at Tallahassee, Florida, this’ 10 day of Sep-

tember, A.D. 1970.

/s/ Hugh M. Taylor

!

38

\ A- H

[41] |

| | IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

1

JULY TERM, A.D. 1971.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES |

TO FILE REHEARING PETITION AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.

' CASE NO, 0-167.

‘CLAUDE R. KIRK, JR., Governor of the

State of Florida, et al.,

Appellants,

VS.

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.,

‘a Florida corporation,

: Appellee.

Opinion filed August 31, 1971.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

‘Hugh M. Taylor, Judge.

Philip S. Bennett and Herbert D. Sikes, for Appellants.

Sibley, Giblin, Levenson & Ward; and Gerald T. Wether-

ington, for Appellee. |

JOHNSON, J.

39

This is an appeal by the Trustees of the Internal

Improvement Trust Fund of a judgment rendered by the

Circuit Court of Leon County, Florida, on the 10th day

of September, 1970, in a cause brought by the Appellee,

Gables By The Sea, Inc., a Florida corporation, against

the Trustees. The judgment of the lower court adjudicated

that Gables By The Sea was entitled to dredge from a

certain designated area in Biscayne Bay to procure mate-

rial to fill the corporation’s swamp and overflow land it

had purchased from the Trustees.

142] The crux of the complaint filed by the plaintiff-

appellee herein, was to obtain quashal of an order or

ruling of the Trustees of the Improvement Trust Fund

and a declaratory decree.

At the time the corporation entered into negotiations

with the Trustees for the purchase of the land in question,

it was agreed that the Trustees would agree to sell the

fill material required and that the payment would be made

for the material on the basis of appraised price of the land

to be filled; and that the purchase price of $480.00 per

acre (plus the advertising costs) will in addition to paying

for the acquisition of the bay bottom land, also include »

the necessary fill from the bay bottom in front of the

property in sufficient quantity to fill the acquired land

to grade. Thereafter the corporation paid for the land,

which included the appraised value of the fill material.

The trial court held an extended hearing and there-

after entered its final judgment, in which the judge cited

some ten pages of findings and reasons upon which to

premise his judgment. The adjudicative portion of the

Order was as follows:

tne erence cena Beene SET SCN TROPA NOT,

40

“It is, therefore, ADJUDGED:

“1. The plaintiff has the lawful right to

dredge material from the areas indicated on the

application for a dredge and fill permit and to

use such material to fill its privately owned sub-

merged land indicated on such application for a

period of time consisting of 223 days beginning

on the day this judgment becomes final by the

expiration of the time of appeal, or the filing of

the mandate of an Appellate Court affirming

this judgment, whichever is the later date.

“2. Plaintiff has not shown a legal right to a

permit to dredge from public bottoms in excess

of the rights outlined in paragraph 1 supra.

“3. Upon proper application it would be the

legal duty of the Trustees to grant plaintiff a

permit to fill its privately owned submerged land,

purchased from the Trustees, by use of materials

from other sources.”

Prior to oral argument of this cause before this Court,

the [43] Appellee filed a motion to correct the judgment,

as follows:

“Under the terms and provisions of the final

judgment rendered by the lower court in this

cause the appellee (plaintiff) was adjudged to

have ‘the lawful right to dredge material from

the areas indicated on the appllication for a

dredge and fill permit and to use such material

to fill its privately owned submerged land indi-

41

cated on such application for a period of time

consisting of 223 days beginning on the day this

judgment becomes final by the expiration of the

time of appeal, or the filing of the mandate of

“Final hearing in the court below occurred on

March 3, 1970. At the time of submission of said

cause to the lower court, a permit to dredge the

area referred to in said judgment was awarded

by the United States Department of the Army,

Corps of Engineers, as @ matter of course upon

the receipt of an approval of such dredging by

the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund.

At that time the Corps of Engineers granted such

permit to dredge as a mere formality when it

appeared that such dredging would not interfere

with navigation. As shown by the record in this

cause the Corps had determi that the dredg-

ing of the area described in the judgment would

not interfere with navigation and it had granted

a permit to dredge, which permit is dated the

12th day of November, 1965, but which has now

expired. (See Exhibit LL).

“After the submission of this cause to the

lower court, and on April 3, 1970, the United

States Congress passed Public Law 91-224, Sec-

tion 1171 of which prohibited the United States

Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers

from granting a permit to dredge unless and

until the Department of Air and Water Pollu-

tion Control of the State of Florida issued a cer-

42

tificate authorizing said dredging. A true copy of

said Act is hereto attached, marked Exhibit A,

and made a part hereof. The refusal of the

State to issue said certificate requires the United

States Department of Army Corps of Engineers

to decline the issuance of a dredging permit.

“After the passage of the Public Law 91-224,

the State of Florida, Department of Air and

Water Pollution Control issued its notice and its

certification information, a true copy of which

is hereto attached and marked Exhibit B and

made a part hereof which outlines the conditions

and the requirements imposed upon the Appel-

lee in order to procure a certification, which is

essential before the Corps of Engineers will ac-

cept an application for the issuance of a dredg-

ing permit

“The acts and conduct of the State and Fed-

eral Governments which occurred subsequent to

the submission of this cause on final hearing to

the lower court will deprive the Appellee of the

benefit of the judgment rendered by the lower

court in which it was intended that the Appellee

would receive [44] 223 clear days within which

to accomplish the dredging authorized by said

judgment for the reason that the procedures re-

quired of the Appellee in order to procure certif-

ication from the State and a Federal permit wiil

consume a major portion, if not all, of said 223

days, if the running of said days commences from

the day of the final determination of this cause

in the Courts of Florida The appellee cannot

43

make application for its permit to the Corps of

Engineers until a favorable and final determina

tion of this litigation has occurred

“Thus, subsequent to the rendition of the judg-

ment the procedures adopted both by the Fed-

eral and State Governments in connection with

the issuance of a permit by the United States

Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers,

has been radically changed and the time required

to acquire a permit has been lengthened to the

point where the State and Federal authorities

can through the natural delays provided by their

present procedure, require of the appellee more

than 223 days to acquire the Corps of Engineers’

permit This would defeat the judgment of the

lower court and deny to the appellee the rights

assured to it by the said judgment

“Wherefore, in the event the District Court of

Appeal of Florida, 1st District, affirms the judg-

ment of the lower court, the appellee respect-

fully moves that the mandate issued upon such

affirmance provide that the 223 day period ac-

corded to the appellee as its period to dredge, as

set forth in the judgment, shall begin to run on

the day of the issuance of the permit by the

United States Department of Army, Corps of

Engineers and not on the day the judgment

becomes final. See $59.34, F.S.”

Therefore, in order not to defeat the judgment of

the lower court and thereby deny the rights of the appl-

44

lee assured by the said judgment, this Court does hereby

grant the motion of appellee and does extend the 223 day

period accorded the appellee in the lower court’s judg-

ment as hereinafter provided.

Upon the call of this cause for oral argument, the

Appellants announced that they wished to withdraw their

appeal, and admitted in open court that the Appellee’s

motion had merit and that it would be unjust to cause

the Appellee to lose the benefit of the judgment it recov-

ered resulting from delays created by the enactment of

the Federal law and by the action of the Department of

Air and Water Pollution Control. The Appellants, how-

ever, urged that this matter should be considered and the

motion granted by the trial [45] court rather than this

Court. The Appellants sought to reserve the right to ap-

peal from the lower court’s order granting the Appellee’s

motion. There is no dispute about the matters set forth

in the motion and it is not only within the power of this

Court to assure to the Appellee the benefits of the fruitful

judgment it has obtained, but it is this Court’s duty to do

so and avoid endless, fruitless litigation. From an exam-

ination of this directive covering the certification infor-

mation required by the Department of Air and Water

Pollution Control, it appears that the exact information

required for certification has already been furnished to

other departments of the state, including Appellants. The

very issues suggested by the required application were

actually the issues tried in the lower court and found in

favor of the Appellee. It would be grossly unfair and con-

trary to the long recognized legal concept of terminating

litigation and avoiding a multiplicity of legal action to

now either expect or require the Appellee to start anew

in the administrative departments of Government after it

SRE QaS NAGE STRODE Ak BBC:

45

has successfully established its position to a final conclu-

sion in the Courts.

The judgment for the Appellee was rendered on Sep-

tember 10, 1970. The Appellants waited until July 14,

1971, after the call of the case on oral argument, to an-

nounce the withdrawal of this appeal. During this period

of time the Appellee has been denied the use of his prop-

erty, as ordered by the lower court. The Appellants frank-

ly stated orally before the Court that they could give no

assurance that they would not appeal an order rendered

by the lower court upon said motion, even though they

conceded it was meritorious. We think under these circum-

stances that we are required to bring this case to a final

termination. It is, [46] therefore, ordered that the judg-

ment in the lower court be amended so that the same shall

read, as amended, that the Appellee shall have the lawful

right to dredge material from the areas indicated on the

application for a dredge and fill| permit and to use such

material to fill its privately owned submerged land indi-

cated on such application for a period of time consisting

of 223 days, beginning either on the day after the Army

Corps of Engineers issues its final permit permitting the

appellee to dredge and fill as aforesaid, or beginning on

the first day after there are no legal impediments to the

appellee commencing its filling operation. In all other re-

spects the final judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed and motion to correct judgment granted.

CARROLL, DONALD, Acting Chief Judge, and RAWLS,

J., CONCUR.

A-I

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDI-

CIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY,

FLORIDA. CASE NO. 69-984

GABLES-BY-THE-SEA, INC., a

Florida corporation,

\

2

REUBIN O’D. ASKEW, Governor of the State of Florida;

DOROTHY W. GLISSON, Secretary of State; ROB-

ERT L. SHEVIN, Attorney General; FRED 0. DICK-

INSON, JR., Comptroller; THOMAS D. O’MALLEY,

Treasurer; DOYLE ‘CONNER, Commissioner of

Agriculture; RALPH M. TURLINGTON, Commis-

missioner of Education; as Trustees of the Internal

Improvement Trust Fund of the State of Florida,

and JOEL KUPERBERG, Executive Director, Board

of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund;

Defendants.

Plaintiff,

vs.

~

FINAL JUDGMENT

This cause came on for hearing before the Court on

February 11 on the Motion of the Defendants to Discharge

the Rule Nisi entered in this cause January 21, 1972 and

directed to the Board of Air and Water Pollution Control,

and argument of counsel for the respective parties having

been heard and the Court being advised of its opinion in

the premises, it is thereupon

ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

47

1. The rule nisi is issued to the defendants directing

them to show cause why the defendants should not approve

the permit referred to in the Final Judgment of this

Court rendered September 10, 1970 and affirmed and

corrected on appeal by the First District Court of Appeals

in Kirk, et al v. Gables By the Sea, Inc., 251 So.2d 880.

2. It appears to the Court that this case involved

pure questions of law and that final judgment may be

rendered herein on the questions of law which have been

raised by [55] mentioned rule nisi and the Motion to

Discharge same. The facts and issues have been fully dis-

cussed and set forth in the Final Judgment of this Court

above mentioned and in the opinion of the First District

Court of Appeals above cited.

3. The Court is of the view that the opinion and

judgment of the First District Court of Appeals, above

cited, has fully considered and disposed of the conten-

tions between the plaintiff and the defendant, even

though the defendant Board was not a party to proceed-

ings prior to the issuance of the rule nisi by this Court.

In the last analysis the issues involved are between the

plaintiff on the one hand and the State of Florida, acting

through its agencies, on the other. Though the Trustees of

the Internal Improvement Fund and the Board of Air

and Water Pollution Control and the Department of Air

and Water Pollution Control are separate and distinct

agencies of the State, they are nevertheless mere agencies

of the State and the question before this Court is not

whether the actions of one may be the actions of another

but whether or not the State is bound by the results of

litigation involving one of such agencies.

48

4. The First District Court of Appeals had before

it the very circumstances concerning the effect of the Act

of Congress passed as Public Law 91-224, Section 1171

and the certificate required of the Department of Air and

Water Pollution Control. The following portions of said

opinion appear to be dispositive of the problem before this

Court:

“From an examination of this directive covering

the certification information required by the De-

partment of Air and Water Pollution Control, it

appears that the exact information required for

certification has already been furnished to other

departments of the state, including Appellants.

The very issues suggested by the required appli-

cation were actually the [56] issues tried in the

lower court and found in favor of the Appellee.

It would be grossly unfair and contrary to the

long recognized legal concept of terminating liti-

gation and avoiding a multiplicity of legal action

to now either expect or require the Appellee to

start anew in the administrative departments of

Government after it has successfully established

its position to a final conclusion in the Courts.

The judgment for the Appellee was rendered

on September 10, 1970. The Appellants waited

until July 11, 1971, after the call of the case on

oral argument, to announce the withdrawal of

this appeal. During this period of time the Ap-

pellee has been denied the use of his property, as

ordered by the lower court. The Appellants frank-

ly stated orally before the Court that they could

give no assurance that they would not appeal an

49

order rendered by the lower court upon said mo-

tion, even though they conceded it was merito-

rious. We think under these circumstance. that

we are required to bring this case to a final

termination.”

Accordingly, it’s the judgment of this Court that the Plain-

tiff has completed all procedures required by law to entitle

him to certification on behalf of the State of Florida that

the derdge permits be issued and that it be given the full

benefit that the judgment of this Court has approved and

corrected by the opinion and decision of the First District

Court of Appeals.

6. Deeming the defendants will discharge their legal

duties, as authoritatively adjudicated by courts of com-

petent jurisdiction, this Court will withhold the issuance

of any coercive writ unless same shall become necessary to

give effect to rights herein adjudged, jurisdiction being

reserved for such purpose.

6. In all other respects this judgment may be deemed

final in the dispositions of the questions of fact and law

arising in this cause. :

ORDERED and ADJUDGED in Chambers at Talla-

hassee, Florida this 16th day of February, A.D., 1972.

50

[57]

A-J

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

JANUARY TERM, A.D. 1972.

CASE NO. 0-167.

REUBIN O0’DONOVAN ASKEW, Governor of the

State of Florida, etc., et al.,

Appellants,

vs.

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.,

a Florida corporation,

Appellee.

Opinion filed March 16, 1972.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Hugh M. Taylor, Judge.

Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General ; and Howell L. Fergu-

son, Assistant Attorney General; and Philip S. Ben-

nett and Herbert D. Sikes, for Appellants.

Gerald H. Wetherington; and Marion E. Sibley, of Sibley,

Giblin, Levenson & Ward, for Appellee.

' 51

ON MOTION TO QUASH APPEAL

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff-appellee has filed its motion to dismiss an |

appeal taken by the appellants or to peremptorily affirm

the judgment of the lower court, which this Court treats

as a motion to quash the appeal.

It appears to this Court that all issues involved in this

cause were adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff in this

Court’s prior mandate filed August 31, 1971, which af-

firmed the judgment of the trial court. Said mandate’ en-

compassed all the affected agencies of the State of Florida.

Pursuant to said mandate, the trial court issued a rule nisi

directed to the Board of Air and Water [58] Pollution Con-

trol of the Department of Air and Water Pollution Control

requiring it to show cause why it should not approve the

permit referred to in'the trial court’s final judgment and

the mandate of this Court affirming said judgment. The

appellant moved to discharge said rule nisi, and the trial

court entered final judgment ordering that the dredge per-

mits be issued. It is from this judgment that appellanis

now appeal. As

It is the conclusion of this Court that the appeal herein

is dilatory in nature, is sought by appellants for the sole

purpose of further frustrating and delaying compliance

with the mandate of this Court and the final judgment of

the trial court, is frivolous, and not taken in good faith.

This Court does hereby conclude that the final judgment

entered by the trial court is an appropriate order rendered

in strict compliance with the mandate of this Court.

52

The motion of appellee to quash the appeal is granted

and upon the going down of our mandate, the trial court

is directed to institute such proceedings and to take such

coercive action in the premises as is deemed necessary and

advisable to secure full compliance with its order of Feb-

ruary 16, 1972. In view of the inordinate delays already

incurred in connection with the final disposition of this

litigation, no petition for rehearing on this judgment will

be entertained.

‘

CARROLL, DONALD, Acting Chief Judge, RAWLS and

JOHNSON, JJ., CONCUR.

5 i A-Ka

Titie 33, U.S.C. $1171 (B) (4)

(4) Prior, to the initial operation of any federally

_ licensed or permitted facility or activity which may result

in any discharge into the navigable waters of the United

States and with respect to which a certification has been

obtained pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection,

which facility or activity is not subject to a Federa] op-

erating license. or permit, the license or permittee shall

provide an opportunity for such certifying State or, if

appropriate, the interstate agency or, the Secretary to

review the manner in which the facility or activity shall be

operated or conducted for the purposes of assuring that

applicable water quality standards will not be violated.

Upon notification by the certifying State or, if appropriate,

‘ the interstate agency or the Secretary that the operation

of any such federally licensed or permitted facility or ac-

tivity will violate applicable water quality standards, such

Federal agency may, afer public hearing, suspend such

‘ \

53

license or permit. If such license or permit is suspended,

it shall remain suspended until notification is received from

the certifying State, agency, or Secretary, as the case may

be, that there is reasonable assurance that such facility or

activity will not violate applicable water quality standards.

A-Kb

Title 33, U.S.C. $1344

$1344, Permits for dredged or fill material

(a) The Secretary of the Army, acting through the

Chief of Engineers, may issue permits, after notice and

opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of

dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at spe-

cified disposal sites.

(b) Subject to subsection (c) of this section, each

such disposal site shall be specified for each such permit

by the Secretary of the Army (1) through the application

of guidelines developed by the Administrator, in conjunc-

tion with the Secretary of the Army, which guidelines

shall be based upon criteria comparable to the criteria

applicable to the territorial seas, the contiguous zone, and

the ocean under sec'‘on 1348(c) of this title, and (2) in

any case where such guidelines under clause (1) alone

would prohibit the specifications of a site, through the

application additionally of the economic impact of the site

on navigation and anchorage.

(ce) The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the

specification (including the withdrawal of specification)

of any defined area as a disposal site, and he is author-

54

ized to deny or restrict the use of any defined area for

specification (including the withdrawal of specification)

as a disposal site, whenever he determines, after notice

and opportunity for public hearings, that the discharge

of such materials into such area will have an unaccept-

able adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish

beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding

areas), wildlife,¥er recreational areas. Before making

such determination, the Administrator shall consult with

the Secretary of the Army. The Administrator shall set

forth in writing and make public his findings and his

reasons for making any determination under this sub-

section.

June 30, 1948, c. 758, Title IV, § 401, as added Oct. 18,

1972, Pub. L. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 884.”

A-Ke

Title 42, U.S.C.

§4321. Congressional declaration of purpose

The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a na-

tional policy which will encourage productive and enjoy-

able harmony between man and his environment; to pro-

mote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to

the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health

and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the

ecological systems and natural resources important to the

Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental

Quality.

Pub.L. 91-190, § 2, Jan. 1, 1970, 83 Stat. 852.

55

A-Kd

Code of Federal Regulations, §209.120(g)(1) and (2)

(g) Public hearing. (1) It is the Policy of the Chief

of engineers to conduct his civil works program in an at-

mosphere of public understanding, trust, and mutual co-

operation, and in a manner resposive to public needs and

desires. To this end, public hearings are helpful and will

be held whenever there appears to be sufficient public

interest to justify such action. In case of doubt, a public

hearing should be held.

(2) Among the instances warranting public hear-

ings are general public opposition to isuance of a permit

for work in navigable waters of the United States. Dis-

trict Engineers will notify the Division Engineers of the

need for a hearing, state the proposed arrangements and

obtain his concurrence. Public hearings will be held in

connection with applications for permits in navigable

waters of the United States when Congressional interests

or responsible local authorities make an official and valid

request therefor and such action will fulfill the above

stated policy and objectives.

A-Ke

GENERAL RULES

RULE 10. MOTIONS

A. FILING. Every motion when filed shall be ac-

companied by a memorandum of law citing supporting

authorities, and stamped addressed envelopes for each

56

party entitled to notice of the order when issued by the

judge. The Clerk shall not accept for filing any motion

which is not in conformance with this rule.

B. HEARINGS. No hearings will be held on mo-

tions unless set by the Court.

C. REPLY MEMORANDUM. Each party oppos-

ing a motion shall serve and file a reply memorandum not

later than five days after service of the motion as computed

in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to do so

may be deemed sufficient cause for granting the motion

by default.

D. MOTIONS PENDING ON REMOVAL. When

an action or proceeding is removed to this Court with pend-

ing motions on which briefs have not been submitted, the

moving party shall file and serve a memorandum in sup-

port thereof within five days after removal, or within five

days after denial of any motion to remand. Each party

opposing the motions shall then comply with paragraph C

hereof.

E. NOTICE THAT ACTION iS AT ISSUE. All

counsel shall have a continuing duty to notify the court

promptly upon an action or proceeding becoming at issue.

F. MOTIONS TO TAX COSTS. Motions te tax

costs in actions or proceedings shall be filed by the parties,

nee”

57

A-Kf

U. S. COURT OF APPEALS—RULES

RULE 18. SUMMARY CALENDAR

(b) A separate summary calender will be maintained

for those cases to be considiered without oral argument.

Cases will be placed on the summary calendar by the clerk,

pursuant to directions from tthe court.

(e) Notice in writing shall be given to the parties or

their counsel of the transfer of the case to the summary

calendar.

See Isbell Enterprises, Ince. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of

New York, et al., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 209.

Adopted Dec. 24, 1968.

A-L

[12] GABLES BY THE SEA, INC.

LEGAL DESCRIPTION:

All that land in the Citty of Coral Gables, Dade

County, Florida, lying east of Red Road and

south of Bella Vista Awenue, which is a part of

the land shown in Plat. Book 68, at page 60, of

58

the Public Records of Dade County, Florida,

known as Coral Bay, which land when dredged

and filled is designated as Blocks 15 through 24,

inclusive, on said Plat, and also Blocks 25 and

26, Tract A, as shown on replat of a portion of

Coral Bay, Section D, appearing in Plat Book

76, at page 69, of the Public Records of Dade

County, Florida. All of said property lies west

of bulkhead line of the City of Coral Gables,

Florida.

EXHIBIT B

[13] DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Note—It is to be understood that this instrument

does not give any property rights either in real estate or

material, or any exclusive priviléges; and that it does not

authorize any injury to private property or invasion of

private rights, or any infringement of Federal, State, or

local laws or regulations, nor does it obviate the neces-

sity of obtaining State consent to the work authorized. It

merely expresses the assent of the Federal Government so

far as concerns the public rights of navigation. (See Cum-

mings v. Chicago, 188 U.S., 410.) 10—13165-c

PERMIT

SAKSP 8060.61 (56-188)

District Engineer, Corps of Engineers.

erecemony Florida

18 June _ Se SS Se 3S Oe.

5Y

Gables Venetian Waterways, Inc.

6801 Granada Boulevard

Coral Gables 46, Fla.

Gentlemen :

Referring to written request dated 13 April 1956

I have to inform you that, upon the recommendation of

the Chief of Engineers, and under the provisions of Sec-

tion 10 of the Act of Congress approved March 3, 1899,

entitled “An act making appropriations for the construc-

tion, repair, and preservation of certain public works on

rivers and harbors, and for other purposes,” you are here-

by authorized by the Secretary of the Army.

to dredge and fill, the dredged material to be contained

by adequate dikes, in and connecting with Lower Bis-

cayne Bay, westerly shore, -

at your property, southerly from the mouth of Snapper

Creek Canal and north of Shoal Point, in the City of Coral

Gables, Dade County, Florida,

in accordance with the plans shown on the drawing at

tached hereto marked: Proposed Dredging in Biscayne

Bay South of Snapper Creek and North of Shoal Point,

Dade County, Florida,

Subject to the following conditions:

[14] (a) That the work shall be subject to the super-

vision and approval of the District Engineer, Corps of

Engineers, in charge of the locality, who may temporarily

suspend the work at any time, if in his judgment the in-

terests of navigation so require.

60 a

(b) That any material dredged in the prosecution of

the work herein authorized shall be removed evenly and

no large refuse piles, ridges across the bed of the water-

way, or deep holes that may have a tendency to cause

injury to navigable channels or to the banks of the water-

way shall be left. If any pipe, wire, or cable hereby author-

ized is laid in a trench, the formation of permanent ridge:

across the bed of the waterway shall be avoided and the

back filling shall be so done as not to increase the cost of _

future dredging for navigation. Any material to be de-

posited or dumped under this authorization, either in the

waterway or on shore above high-water mark, shall be

deposited or dumped at the locality shown on the drawing

hereto a:tached, and, if so prescribed thereon, within or

behind a good and substantial bulkhead or bulkheads, such

as will prevent escape of the material in the waterway.

If the material is to be deposited in the harbor of New

York, or in its adjacent or tributary waters, or in Long

Island Sound, a permit therefor must be previously ob-

tained from the Supervisor of New York Harbor, White-

hall Building, New York City.

(c) That there shall be no unreasonable interference

with navigation by the work herein authorized.

(d) That if inspections or any other operations by

the United States are necessary in the interest of navi-

gation, all expenses connected therewith shall be borne

_by the permittee.

(e) That no attempt shall be made by the permittee

or the owner to forbid the full and free use by the public

of all navigable waters at or adjacent to the work or struc-

ture.

61

(f) That if future operations by the United States

require an alteration in the position of the structure or

work herein authorized, or if, in the opinion of the Sec-

retary of the Army, it shall cause unreasonable obstruc-

tion to the free navigation of said water, the owner will

be required upon due notice from the Secretary of the

Army, to remove or alter the structural work or obstruc-

tions caused thereby without expense to the United States,

so as to render navigation reasonably free, easy, and unob-

structed; and if, upon the expiration or revocation of this

permit, the structure, fill, excavation, or other modifica-

tion of the watercourse hereby authorized shall not be

completed, the owners shall, without expense to the United

States, and to such extent and in such time and manner

as the Secretary of the Army may require, remove all or

any portion of the uncompleted structure or fill and

restore to its former condition the navigable capacity of

the watercourse. No claim shall be made against the Unit-

ed States on account of any such removal or alteration.

(g) That the United States shall in no case be liable

for any damage or injury to the structure or work here-

in authorized which may be caused by or result from fu-

ture operations undertaken by the Government for the

conservation or improvement of navigation, or for other

purposes, and no claim or right to compensation shall ac-

crue from any such damage.

(h) That if the display of lights and signals on any

work hereby authorized is not otherwise provided for by

law, such lights and signals as may be prescribed by the

U. S. Coast Guard, shall be installed and maintained by

and at the expense of the owner. 3

62

(i) That the permittee shall notify the said district

engineer at what time the work will be commenced, and

as far in advance of the time of commencement as the

said district engineer may specify, and shall also notify

him promptly, in writing, of the commencement of work,

suspension of work, if for a period of more than one

week, resumption of work, and its completion.

(j) That if the structure or work herein authorized

is not completed on or before the 31st day of December,

1959, this permit, if not previously revoked or specifically

extended, shall cease and be null and void.

By authority of the Secretary of the Army:

/s/ E. E. KIRKPATRICK

E. E. KIRKPATRICK

Colonel, Corps of Engineers

District Engineer

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July 28, 1972 3

Corps of Engineers

P. O. Box 4970

Jacksonville, Florida 32211

SUBJECT: Gables By the Sea, Inc., Corps of Engineers

Permit No. 56-188.

Dear Sirs:

We are submitting herewith a revised permit application

regarding Gables-By-the-Sea, a subdivision in the City of

Coral Gables, Dade County, Florida. This permit was orig-

inally issued June 18, 1956, subsequently modified April

9, 1957, again modified in 1960, 1962 and the time ex-

tended to 1965, Application for further extension was made

in 1968, but was refused because of objections raised by

the Internal Improvement Fund of the State of Florida.

These matters have been adjudicated by the Florida Courts

and the final judgment states: —“the Plaintiff has com-

pleted all procedures required by law to entitle him to cer-

tification on behalf of the State of Florida that the dredge

permits be issued, and that he be given the full benefit

that the judgment of this Court has approved and cor-

rected by the opinion and decision of the First District

Court of Appeals.” Accordingly, the State of Florida has

issued their necessary approvals for this project, as shown

on attached exhibits.

During the time interval between the isuance of the orig-

inal permit and this date, the land area has been re-platted

to reflect the new harbor line and acquisition of additional

property from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement

Ss

66

/ i

Fund. This has resulted in a revision in the filled area,

although the harbor line is not changed. The area to be

filled is presently zoned by the City of Coral Gables for

single family residences, multi-family, and 2-8 story apart-

ments, as shown on permit drawing. No building has been

or will be constructed on the property until it has been

filled to the elevation established by the City of Coral

Gables.

‘ ‘ , ‘

Very truly yours,

CONNELL ASSOCIATES, INC, |

/s/ Edmund Friedman

EF :nw

Attachments ,

a, 67 ’ “ot * "PORM Arenovio

ach a @ so ane _ OMB NO, 49-0 toes

DEPANTISCIT OF THE ARMY, CORPS OF ENCINECKS

APPLICATION FOR PERSUE 10 CISCHANGE OR TIORK IN NAVIGABLE WATERS AND THEIN TRIGUTANIES

° 1. Serce | Azolication Number (te be omicned BD Corps of Engineered

| SECTION L CENERAL INFONSAATION Sere: SS ‘ins aeeeee

‘ —=—| Oiv, Dist. Tree Sequence fe.

R.Rompanenpnanan end ottp of Ngtingetde Gudles Cy the Sea, tne.

. Clena © Stina, Vice President

2. Boiling address of af inane thos Sy the See mae ae

12591_f-¢ Baad

be + Ciel 622129. Florida 33156 __

a ed ee

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Connsil Associetes, inc Btresticos E. Friecnan

P.0, fox 677 05-642 -3200

BMiewl, Fioriga 33135

BOTE TO APPLICANT: Ref re te tre @rmat'et eniittod “Permits ler Werk ond Strvetwras in end lor Discharger or De ponte inte Novigobie Water

Beleore attemy tins 19.6 mom ete this form, .’

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eenund powt of Sreatnenge of depeuk .

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Be Berty wil Oceur, .

° Suv Covnty Cay of Tews .

. 6. Florids , Oads let Coral Cables

:

B. Name of waternvey of the hc ction of Une acteety e

as 19,———__Biscayre Ssy “

20. Rtays and ceetel.es ectich ow the Iserten 073 s of ech oF activity, including amy ond oll eutiel devices, deporte Cevnet,

2B. Fer cemssu ton OF wor). ot Meet ols WHIIEE Hot Meewtle 8 DR ET* POTeI ob Bww et wNCer 33 U S.C. £33. the character Of each <2 Stute vst SP

t

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2 eH Ms Op O TP HOM. Mote On thee or o"

© Bebe Freee Sof 2 Soret tos £52 tase

2f wh Dw ete Crear: at lerme-

22. Let 2% spprewsis of Com-sls groves by Feds, wtersiate, State or local szencas for any

é Cersidod wm thos agaicavon,

a Type of dosument 14. Ne. awe

Var Dep't. Permit 56-188 11/12/65

. Resolution s 144825 . 5/13/69

é - Peralt ~ “ 6/19/72

* Oredge & FIII Certificate - 6/15/72

: °

‘ = i. - , ° . : =

, *3 ; .

Corps of Enginsers

City of Coral Cables, Fa.

Trustees of the Internal

Improvement Fund, Flor’da

Ocpartment of Pollution

Control, Florida

: 23. Crack A focility existed or was Lewtelly unter cons suction prior te Aped 3, 1970,

4. * 24, 8 dracsing oF tithing wat cour:

.

.

oe Meme

Grate Che txg0 of enstanists txetoed,, Gale eaten in edie yorts, end Gag posed method of

- Haterial will consist of some sand, some gud, and colitic lime stonc,

| = 7 Estimated volume Is 1,300,C00 cu. yds. In place, ,

| — ss se ; 2 is : - «

." { : x i . e. °

IP-. 8 “ : 3

|] % 2% | 25. Descrse nee 4 mersod of Rach will be aed to mamure the wel me of any solds wach may be devoured and se

‘ Patarmmnre is eflect wom the watern ay. .

. : Katerlals will te measured In place as deposited, Mounds will be

ae ” eonstructed to enclose and contain the dredged material, Welrs

; : will Bu located senerally as shown. ;

s ath .

] 25, Serta evtes ond perseds of dspor-tion érucrbed in item 73.

a } . * Dredging must be completed within a period of 223 days after

. issuance of final Corps of Engincers permit In accordance with . 2

ee. Florida Internal I-proverent Fund Persiit, :

° 4 ng ;

. anssona ,.. ‘i

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= s =

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ORSLEING TO HOM. SL. OR HW: x , x LeAnn sa is

APPROUAATELT 1,075.00 CY OF MATERIAL me Ba sl yarace

70 €E O8T4INES F OTM THE OREOCING AREA . . a >

oOo

PROPOSED ORIEDLIKG tN OISCAYTNE SAT

} SOUTH OF SHAPES 2 TLTEK ANO wORTH leer

1 OF SHOAL PUKT, OFDE COUNTY, FLORIDA SCAINE

7 LLEVATION SxHoay REFER TO Use ~g CS Barwe SITE “>

° LOCATION MAP

7 MES 20

3 Py) re Foose ons aioe

PAOPOCIES €445E PROPOSES BHanksd

ham — oo TRACEO FROM USCS

ea reek Sf fasts Cee FIRIOA

e STD A 8 ht enee

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: ° TIFICAL SECTION A-A* MOUND TO CONTAIN FILL

4 L*, s> 20°VERT. :

. HO SCALE HORIZ. 16.0

. HI LINE SV

SECIT-SS- 44

. "ss gwoRnELINE

WE CORSE % SEC 18-35-4 2

= COR. S¥2 SEC. 18-53-41

3

; ArE. LUCO “61.2 fe”

{ SALT WATER /

OAEOSING C Fite IN THIS AREA DONE

MIRUSION £1006 UNDER FERAUT NO. $4-168

r DATED 6/18/56 MODIFIED Uftef6s

7 ” -

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x

el, aoloa TEMPORARY MIMD

cq 290 . : {S24 is

ie : | pe ie i! Al ~~ 4 OREDGING x *s &

j - menezet ty iad ntsil a] NAREA FOR NM

eT tt B AREA TO 2L FLLED + x \N

i { if gl aa 19% tae Bar SECOND” ine Rew OFKs No

os bpp. DUET rearaceces, raceas 2) NS. “ss

4 i : | i & edt any a Ee a A Zz = . oo g

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-— £ ---——— 1... — * oot =e — = a” Seen ; a he $380 ‘. —%.

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swecr GERLTILAVYAMA AVC. Vas > A au ‘

SEC. 18-55-45 Fn A y SE COR. sine

as” UASORART MOND SEC 18-SS-40 SEC. 47-SS-48

*

. a

al .

APPittawTt:

: 648163-87- THE-3EA,INC.

‘ , ‘ 3 4990 4UC0 ave

puta CORAL GABLES, FLA.

° 1000 PROPOSED MODIFICATION T0 PERMIT NO. S6+183

SCALE INSET NOVEMOLF 12, 1365

or’

75

A-N

UNITED. STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN

DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 73-752-Civ-WM

GABLES BY THE SEA, INC,,

a Florida corporation, ,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

EMMETT C. LEE, JR., etc., et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER QUASHING NOTICES TO TAKE

DEPOSITIONS AND STAYING DISCOVERY

The defendants having moved to quash notices of

taking depositions in three separate cities on October 3,

4, and 5, 1973, respectively, and having also moved for a

protective order, and the Court being advised in the prem-

ises, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the notices of tak-

ing depositions in Vero Beach, Jacksonville and Atlanta

be and the same hereby are quashed, and that all discovery

in this cause be and the same hereby is stayed pending

resolution of the defendants’ motion for summary judg-

ment, or until further order of the Court.

76

DONE and ORDERED at Miami, Florida, this 2nd

day of October, 1973.

/s/ W. O. Mehrtens

United States District Judge

ec: Robert N. Reynolds,

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Marion E. Sibley, Esq.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Gables by Sea, Inc. v. Lee · 419 U.S. 1105 | Frix