Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Northway Coin-Clean, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp.

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SUPREME COURT OF THE JNITEDO

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC., a corporation,

BORG-WARNER CORPORATION

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

—_—_—_

“T | LED

ATERy 8 1974

In The

HHIGHAEL RODAK, JR..

OCTOBER TERM, 1973

nw. €38-1815

Petitioner

Vv.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

and APPENDIX

FRANK E. COHO

ROBERT G. MacALISTER

1410 Grant Building

Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219

Attorneys for Petitioners

PLAS FD CML Se ING BE? SNE SI ey

INDEX

Opinions below

Jurisdiction

Question presented

Constitution and statutes

Statement

Reasons for granting writ

Conclusion

Appendix A

Appendix B

Appendix C (9la)

Appendix D

Appendix E oo

Appendix F (75a

Parts of Transcripts

referred to or relevant to

Appendix A, Note l

(la thru 5a; 32a thru 38a;

Wna-USa; 50a thru 75a, Qla)

CITATIONS

CASES:

BENTON v. MARYLAND, 395 U.S. 784,

795, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2063: (1959)

BLOOM v. ILLINOIS, 391 U.S. 194,

195, 88 s.ct. 1477, 1478" (1968)

BODDIE v. CONNECTICUT, 401 U.S.

271, 378-379, 91 S.Ct. 780,786

(1971

FUENTES v. SHEVIN, 407 U.S. 67, 80,

92 S.Ct. 1983, 1994 (1972)

SAUNDERS v. SHAW, 244 U.S. 317,

37 S.Ct. 638 (1917)

II.

Page

CONSTITUTION: 5

Fifth Amendment . 3

Article ITIi 3

STATUTES:

Judicial Code:

28 USC Sec. 132(a 4

28 USC Sec. 43 (a h

28 U.S.C. Sec. 2403 MAY BE

APPLICABLE TO THIS PROCEEDING AND,

THEREFORE, COPIES OF THIS PETITION

ARE BEING SERVED ON THE SOLICITOR

GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530, PURSUANT

TO RULE 33 2.(b).

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1973

No.

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC., a corporation,

: Petitioner

Vv.

BORG-WARNER CORPORATION

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC.,

a corporation, prays that a Writ of

Certiorari issue to review the judgments

of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Third Circuit, dated January 3, 1974,

refusing to grant a rehearing of its

Judgment Order dated November 20, 1973.

be Rt ee es ee ne Soe a

Viele i, dbun DE Oa enone tina iae? i fe meme

2

OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinion of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit, decided

November 20, 1973 (Appendix A), is not

reported. The Petitioner's petition for

rehearing was denied on January 3, 1974

(Appendix B). The opinion of the United

States District Court for the Middle

District of Pennsylvania, filed January 1l,

1973, is not reported (Appendix C). The

Order of Mr. Justice Brennan extending

the time to file Petition For Writ of

Certiorari until June 3, 1974, is

Appendix D. The Order of the District

Court for the Western District of

Pennsylvania dismissing without prejudice

a prior suit on the same claim is

Appendix E. That Court's refusal to

vacate the dismissal without prejudice

is Appendix F. Appendices & and F are

parts of the record before the court

below referred to in Footnote No. 1 of

Appendix A. Appendix C is page 9la of

the same transcript. Appendix E is at

38a and Appendix F at 75a thereof.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1). The

judgment sought to be reviewed was

entered by the United States District

Court for the Middle District of

Pennsylvania on January 11, 1973.

(Appendix C). The judgment of the Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit,

affirming the District Court judgment

was entered November 20, 1973 (Appendix A).

A Petition for Rehearing was denied on

January 3, 1974 (Appendix B).

PROVES PTI ILL ELIOT OLE ER EW sit . ,

* EE RLS TNE LLLP LL TC OD SIE SIROTA BBD ANY BEANE ces

MRR,

3

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether petitioner, having had a com-

plaint in a diversity action dismissed

without prejudice in the United States

District Court for the Western District

of Pennsylvania, was deprived of liberty

or property without due process of law,

contrary to Amendment 5 of the United

States Constitution, when it later filed

a similar complaint in the United States

District Court for the Middle District of

Pennsylvania and the complaint was

summarily dismissed by that court with

prejudice because of the prior dismissal

without prejudice.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS APPLICABLE

AMENDMENT 5 TO UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

so far as relevant here:

"ARTICLE V

"No person shall ... be deprived of

life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; ...

ARTICLE III OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

so far as relevant here:

"ARTICLE III

"Section 1. The judicial Power of the

United States, shall be vested in one

Supreme Court, and in such inferior

Courts as the Congress may from time to

time ordain and establish. ....

OLEATE Be Oe Ce IN TS ET SEE SIS ELLE LEK ND RE BAEC OE DEN PA POTS RE 9 Pra eres Ee

ae Se Te eee ee

4

Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat.

869, as Amended, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq.,

relating to the creation and composition

of district courts and Courts of Appeals:

28 U.S.C., Section 132(a):

"(a) There shall be in each judicial

district a district court which shall be

a court of record known as the United

States District Court for the district."

28 U.S.C., Section 43(a):

"(a) There shall be in each circuit

a’ court of appeals, which shall be a

court of record, Known as the United

- States Court of Appeals for the circuit.”

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was filed in the District

Court for the Middle District of

Pennsylvania on June 7, 1972. The com-

plaint filed in the United States

District Court for the Middle District

of Pennsylvania is at pages 2a through

5a of the Transcript following Appendix F.

In the complaint, your Petitioner, in

Paragraph IX, stated that it learned of

the deceit of the defendant for the first

time on or about June 10, 1966, less

than six years prior to the filing of the

action in the Middle District. The

statute of limitation in matters of

deceit in Pennsylvania is six years. The

prior action in the Western District. of

Pennsylvania, at No. 66-865, proceeded

to the point of a pretrial conference,

at which point Petiticner found itself

without sufficient evidence to proceed

to trial. Since that time, Petitioner

has discovered evidence not available

then that Petitioner believes would

enable it to prove its case. Because of

inability to proceed to trial on

October 1, 1969, the District Court for

the Western District of Pennsylvania

entered an order dismissing the action

"without prejudice." (Appendix E)

Plaintiff moved to have the dismissal

order vacated, but on October 1, 1969,

the District Court for the Western

District of Pennsylvania denied the

motion to vacate and left the order of

dismissal in effect "without prejudice."

(Appendix F) No hearing on the merits of

this case has ever been held by either

District Cour. or any other Court.

ey a an Ate it ce ew Tite aided nt Ho Oo

6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Petitioner has been denied the oppor-

tunity to be heard on the merits of its

cause of action. Petitioner has been

denied a determination of its cause of

action in accordance with the due pro-

cess assured by the United States

Constitution. ,

A reading of the cases collected in

the 52-some volume publication known as

"Words and Phrases" under "Due Process

of Law", pages 194 and 195, shows that

the Supreme Court of the United States

has repeatedly stated that the due pro-

cess clause applies to legal proceedings

as such, as well as actions taken oy

other branches of the government.

Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317, 37 S.Ct.

638 (1917).

Likewise, in the same publication

under "Without Prejudice", it will be

found that cases have universally eld

that the dismissal of an action without

prejudice does not affect the cause of

action and allows a new action to 5e

brought on the same cause of action.

In the present situation, the action

was originally brought in Alleghery

County, Pennsylvania because this is

where the Petitioner we.s located and

service of process could be obtained

on the defendant in Allegheny County.

Later, as Petitioner prepared for triel,

it discovered that there were a number

of similar cases pending in the United

States District Court for the Middle

7

District of Pennsylvania, and that the

evidence necessary to prove the case was

more readily available in the Middle

District than in the Western District of

Pennsylvania. It was for that reason

that when the Petitioner reached the

point at which it felt it would be

possible to prove its case, the renewal

action was brought in the Middle District

rather than in the Western District of

Pennsylvania.

The District Court for the Middle

Dictrict of Pennsylvania dismissed on

the ground that the dismissal witnout

prejudice should be treated as a final

dismissal. Ths Circuit Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit affirmed on this

basis and also stated that the matter

was beyond the statute of limitations,

although the complaint itself shows that

it is within the period of the statute

of limitations. Invocation of a statute

of limitations is a matter of pleading

rather than dismissal on a preliminary

motion under any circumstances.

It is clear that both Federal courts

and State courts must obey the due pro-

cess requirements of the United States

Constitution. For the Federal courts

those requirements are in the Fifth

Amendment. For the State courts those

requirements are in the Fourteenth Amend-

ment.

The Supreme Court of the United States

has repeatedly emphasized the meaning of

due process, pointing out that whether

the Fifth Amendment. or the Fourteenth

Amendment is applicable, "an opportun-

ity to be heard must be granted at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.

67, 80, 92 S.Ct. 1933, 1994 (1972).

5 Similar declarations will be found in

following recent decisions of the

Supreme Court of the United States:

Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 734, 793-

> x A , 2062 (1969); Bloom

2 v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 195, 88 S.Ct.

: 1477, 1470 (1968); Boddie v. Connecticut,

q hol U.S. 271, 378-379, 91 S.Ct. TU,

: 786 (1971).

It is therefore respectfully submitted

that this is a situation deserving con-

sideration of granting a petition of

certiorari to determine whether a sum-

mary dismissal of a diversity action

pecause of a prior dismissal of a simi-

lar complaint without prejudice devrived

petitioner of liberty and property with-

out due process of law, contrary to

Amendment 5 to the United States

Constitution.

¥

.

»

-

7

9

CONCLUSION

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

should be granted for the reasons set out

above.

Respectfully submitted,

Veena ,

RANK E. COHO

ROBERT G. MacALISTER

Attorneys for

Plaintiff-Petitioner

1410 Grant Building

Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219

(412) 471-6963

Mesos eee |

: 10

; APPENDIX A

{ . In The

3 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

4 No. 73-1227

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC., a corporation,

Aopellant

Ve

BORG-WARNER CORPORATION

Meee tena ty Rhalok

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Cnet antl lelbe Dh aaiaee Xe Sela oi Teenie os tat

Submitted under 3rd Cir. Rule 12(4)

July 27, 1973 Before VAN DUSEN and

WEIS, Circuit Judges

Resubmitted under 3rd Cir. Rule 12/5)

August 15, 1973 Before VAN DUSEN,

ROSENN and WEIS, Circuit Judges

i

Robert G. MacAlister, =sqa.,

Frank E. Coho, Esa., and

Gilbert E. Morcroft, =Esa.,

Pittsburgh, Pa.

Christian V. Graf, Esa.,

Harrisburg, Pa.,

Attorneys for Avpellant

£4

aa

Clayton A. Sweeney, Esq. and

Thomas L. VanKirk, Esq., of

Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald,

Kyle & Buerger,

| Pittsburgh, Pa.,

Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGMENT ORDER

After consideration of the contentions

of plaintiff-appellant, fhe briefs of

counsel, and the record,

It is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the

January 11, 1973, district court order,

entering judgment in favor of defendant,

is affirmed and costs are taxed against

appellant.

BY THE COURT:-

/s/ Van Dusen

Circuit Judge

Dated: Nov. 20, 1973

+- For example, see the trenscript of

the proceedings before the district court

(W.D. Pa., Civil No. 66-865) on Septem-

ber 8, 1970 (5la-74a). Also it is noted

that no appeal was taken from the Septem-

ber 8, 1970 final order of the United

States District Court for the Western

District of Pennsylvania in Northway

Coin-Clean, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corpora-

tion, Civil No. 66-865 (75a).

ad

ee Oa eh arte eR. eR)

ELST OB BION BE SR Py ee eee

12

APPENDIX B

In The

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC., a corporation,

Aopellant

Ve

BORG-WARNER CORPORATION

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: SEITZ, Chief Judge, an

: VAN DUSEN, ALDis=xt, ADAMS,

GIBBONS, ROSEN, HUNTER,

WEIS and GARTH, Circuit

Judges.

The petition for rehearing filei by

appellant in the above entitled case

having been submitted to the judzes who

participated in the decision of tis

court and to all the other availaoie

circuit judges of the circuit in regzgu-

lar active service, and no judge wo

concurred in the decision having asxed

for rehearing, and a majority of the

circuit judges of the circuit in regu-

lar active service not having voted for

rehearing by the court in banc, the

petition for rehearing is denied.

By the Court,

OES II EE II CT BN I BEING ISNA ORE TE SEE TO be

x

ae Bites

13

APPENDIX D

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. A-920

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC.,

Petitioner

Vv.

BORG WARNER CORPORATION

ORDER EXTENDING TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

UPON CONSIDERATION of the appli-

cation of counsel for petioner(s).

IT IS ORDERED that the time for

filing a petition for writ of certiorari

in the above-entitled cause be, and the

same is hereby, extended to and includ-

ing June 3, 1974.

/s/ William J. Brennan, Jr.

Associate Justice of the Supreme

Court of the United States

Dated this lst

day of April, 1974

14-16

PARTS OF TRANSCRIPT

referred to in

Opinion of lower court,

APPENDIX A, Note 1,

pages la thru 5a;

32a thru 38a;

4ha-Uoa;

50a thru 75a; QJla

17

Docket Entries. la

June 7, 1972, 1—COMPLAINT—filed at Harrisburg, Pa.

and demand for trial by jury.

June 7, 1972, 2—SUMMONS—Issued and together with

copies of Complaint handed to U. S. Marshal for service.

June 7, 1972, J. S.5

July 21, 1972, SUMMONS—returned served 7/6/72,

together with copy of Complaint. (MF&E $9.24)

July 24, 1972, 3—MOTION—of Defendant to Dismiss,

and

July 24, 1972, MOTION—of Defendant for Summary

Judgment.

Oct. 6, 1972, 4—NOTICE—of Clerk to counsel of record

listing Defendant’s Motion to dismiss and Motion for Sum-

mary Judgment for October 20, 1972 at 2:00 P. M. at Harris-

burg, Pa.

Oct. 12, 1972, S—AFF.DAVIT—of Clayton A. Sweeney,

Esquire, Counsel for the defendant, Borg-Warner Corp.

Oct. 12, 1972, 6—BRIEF—in support of defendant’s

motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment.

Oct. 12, 1972, 7—CERTIFICATE—of service of Thomas

L. Van Kirk.

Oct. 18, 1972, 8—PLAINTIFF’S BRIEF—contra motion

to dismiss and defendant’s motion for summary judgment,

and

CERTIFICATE—of service thereof.

Oct. 18, 1972, 9—AFFIDAVITS—of Erle M. Heath and

Robert G. Mac Alister

Oct. 20, 1972, 1O0—MINUTE SHEET—of Clerk, re

argument on defendant’s motion to dismiss or for summary

judgment.

OLS EEE LEE DE SOE

NA | ee

Tete i ct EE a tl

18

Complaint.

Oct. 20, 1972, Argued and taken under advisemert. (H)

Jan. 11, 1973, 11I—ORDER—Re Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment. Motion of

defendant is granted because action is granted because the

action is barred by the statute of limitations and because the

action has already been, dismissed with finalty of Civ. Action

No. 66-865 by the U. S. Dist. Ct. for the Western Dist. of

Penna.

Summary judgment is accordingly entered in favor of the

defendant and against the plaintiff. (H).

Jan. 11, 1973, J. S. 6 Copy to counsel, from Hbg. office.

Feb. 5, 1973, 12—NOTICE OF APPEAL—of Plaintiff

from final judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint and en-

tering summary judgment for defendant on Jan. ii, 1973.

Copy to counsel of record and to U. S. Court of Appeals

for Third Circuit.

Feb. 5, 1973, 13—STATEMENT—that ceitified check in

amount of $250.00 is deposited with Court to secure payment

of costs if appeal is finally dismissed or judgment affirmed.

Mar. 2, 1973 RECORD ON APFEAL—mailed to U. S.

Court of Appeals for Third Circuit.

Mar. 8, 1973, 14—RECEIPT-—-for record on appeal.

Complaint.

(Filed June 7, 1972.)

I Plaintiff, Northway Coin-Clean, Inc., herein called

Northway, is a corporation organized and existing under the

ERT Ae REN 6S RE Ley

/9

Complaint.

3a

laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with principal

place of business at 2423 Saw Mill Run Boulevard, City of

Pittsburgh, County of Allegheny and Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania.

II Defendant, Borg-Warner Corporation, herein called

Borg-Warner, is a corporation organized and existing under

the laws of the State of Illinois with principal place of

business in the City of Chicago therein. Defendant maintains

a branch office in York, Pennsylvania, within the Middle

District of Pennsylvania.

The matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of costs and

interest, the sum of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars.

III On or about August 1, 1962, Northway entered into a

business known as “Northway Cleaning Village”, located

71S McKnight Road, McCandless Township, Allegheny

County, Penasylvania, for the purpose of providing to the

public certain self service coin Operated laundry and dry

cleaning facilities.

IV During the year 1962 and thereafter Borg-Warner un-

dertook to sell and deliver to purchasers thereof certain

newly developed commercial coin operated dry cleaning

machines and similar equipment through a division of Borg-

Warner known as Norge.

V_ At all relevant times, Borg-Warner did through its

own servants, agents and employees, sell and deliver in

Pennsylvania commercial coin operated dry cleaning

machinery and similar equipment through its aforesaid

Norge division.

VI On or about August 1, 1962, defendant Borg-Warner,

through its servants, agents and employees, who at said time

were acting on said defendant’s behalf within the scope of

5

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r | MRD tn on cesstcesen WO pct Rel ETERE RSA ARORA > SM PSTONA CEE :

: '

K

& TREO GE) 8 ABOALSS Ser 4d 8 De Soa ON ere eer em

METS

20

4a

Complaint.

their authority and upon defendant's business contacted

plaintiff and urged plaintiff to invest in a “Norge Village”

dry cleaning concept developed by defendant, which concept

required. utilization of the aforesaid Norge division

machinery and equipment to be purchased by plaintiff.

VII At said time defendant, through and by its aforesaid

servants, agents and employees, represented to plaintiff that

purchase by plaintiff of the Norge equipment recommended

and the establishment by plaintiff of a cleaning village

utilizing same could and would lead to unusual and sub-

stantial profits for plaintiff because:

(a) the total per load operating cost using Norge

—~—-- equipment was substantially lower than that using com-

petitive machinery;

(b) full time attention to management of such village

by plaintiff would not be required in that no more than

10 to 20 ‘hours per’ week personal supervision or

management was required for such operation.

VIII In reliance upon such representations and assuran-

ces by defendant, acting by and through its aforesaid ser-

‘vants, agents and employees, plaintiff, on or about August l,

1962, purchased from Borg-Warner, defendant, and took

delivery of, all that certain Norge coin operated automatic

jaundry and dry cleaning equipment which defendant ad-

vised plaintiff was necessary to provide the basic equipment

needed for the operation by Northway of an integrated and

‘coin operated plant pursuant to the Norge concept.

IX On or about June 10, 1966, plaintiff learned for the

first time that defendant's representations and assertions to

it relating to its purchasing of said Norge equipment and its

operation of a Norge village were false, fictitious and

fraudulent in that:

‘

‘

2/

5a

Complaint.

(a) the total per load cost of operating Norge equip-

ment was then and there grossly and deliberately un-

derstated by defendant, its servants, agents and em-

ployees aforesaid, and the falsity of such cost statement

was well known to defendant at the time;

(b) the management time requirement statements

were totally false;

(c) besides the falsity of such statements of which it

was-aware as aforesaid, defendant further knew that it

did not at the time have in its possession adequate facts

upon which to base a belief or any statement as to actual

and true total per load cost;

(d) in defendant's eagerness and anxiety to secure a

top position in the newly developing coin operated dry

cleaning machinery market, defendant deliberately and

fraudulently misrepresented said machinery and equip-

ment and the uses thereof to plaintiff although defen-

dant knew or had every reason to know that the

representations so made by it to plaintiff were false and

fraudulent.

X As the direct and proximate result of the aforesaid

fraudulent practices and statements of defendant, plaintiff

was thereafter forced to dispose of its aforesaid business,

“Northway Cleaning Village’, suffering great financial loss

in the process thereof.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against

defendant in the sum of Two Hundred Thousand

($200,000.00) Dollars, together with interest and costs.

FRANK E. COHO,

Attorney for Plaintiff.

Ppewtevvisnswer ice Dod MIR a tegen

22

Exhibit “G”" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

32a

Exhibit “G”.

In the

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

For the Western District of Pennsylvania

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC.,

| a corporation,

Plaintiff.

v.

BORG-WARNER CORPORATION,

a corporation,

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 66-865.

MOTION TO DISMISS.

NOW COMES the defendant, Borg-Warner Corporation,

by its attorneys, Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald, Kyle &

Buerger, and moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 41 b. of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss with prejudice

the within action, and as grounds therefor avers the

following:

1. This action was filed on July 19, 1966.

2. Thereafter, the parties carried on discovery by means

of depositions and interrogatorics.

3. Since this lengthy discovery period disclosed that it

was virtually impossible to determine the basis of the plain-

23

33a

Exhibit “G" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

tiff's alleged cause of action, the attorneys for both parties

conferred with the Court on November 7, 1968, in an at-

tempt to establish a special pretrial procedure which would

compel the plaintiff to state the basis of its cause of action

and allow the defendant a brief period of discovery based

on the plaintiff's statement.

4. The plaintiff's attorneys drafted such an order, to

which the attorneys for both parties consented.

5. On November 18, 1968, the Court signed the order as

prepared by the attorneys for the plaintiff, which order

required the following:

a. Plaintiff to complete all of its discovery within 60 days

of the order [that is, by January 17, 1969}:

b. Plaintiff to file within 70 days of the order [that is, by

January 27, 1969] a narrative written statement of facts and

law, including citations;

c. Defendant to complete all its discovery within 130

days of the order [that is, by March 28, 1969];

d. Defendant to file within 140 days of the order [that is,

by April 7, 1969] a narrative written statement of facts and

law, including citations;

e. Attorneys for the parties to meet within 150 days of

the order [that is, by April 17, 1969] and to make a pretrial

stipulation, to mark exhibits and to explore settlement

possibilities;

f. Extensions of time to be granted only upon timely

motion;

g. The Court to notify the parties thereafter of the

scheduling of a pretrial conference.

Sean MRE tb gin

24

34a

Exhibit “G”" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

6. On or about November 18, 1968, the Court notified

the attorneys for the parties that motions for further ex-

tensions of time would not be viewed with favor by the

Court because of the lengthy period of time during which

this action had already been carried on the Court's docket.

7. The attorneys for the plaintiff engaged in no discovery

pursuant to the November 18 order until December 30, 1968,

on which date the plaintiff's attorneys mailed to the defen-

dant’s attorneys a lengthy set of interrogatories.

8. On January 13, 1969, the fact having become plain to

the attorneys for the defendant that they could not obtain

from the defendant the material necessary to make timely

response to the interrogatories, the attorneys for the defen-

dant requested and were granted an extension of time so to

respond of 10 days, that is, to January 23, 1969.

9. On January 23, 1969, the defendant answered all but

two of the plaintiff's interrogatories, to which two it fiied

objections.

10. By an order dated January 24, 1969, this Court di-

rected the parties to file briefs and set a date for argument.

This order made no provision for staying the November 18,

1968 consent order and, to the best of defendant's attorneys’

knowledge, no such stay was requested.

11. On February 14, 1969, having received briefs from

the parties and having that day heard argument on the defen-

dant’s objections to interrogatories, this Court ordered that

those objections be sustained. No stay of the November 18

order was requested at that argument and none was granted.

12. After the said argument, an attorney for the defen-

dant questioned an attorney for the plaintiff regarding the

filing of the narrative written statement required of the

plaintiff by the November 18 order and regarding discovery

25

Exhibit “G" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

35a

procedure which the defendant desired after such filing. The

defendant's attorney agreed to refrain from calling the

plaintift’s delinquency to the Court's attention if the plain-

tiff’s attorneys would file their statement and facilitate the

defendant’s discovery within a short time after that

discussion.

13. What followed were more than six weeks of silence

from the plaintiff's attorneys which virtually circumvented

and destroyed the intention and the efficacy of the Novem-

ber 18. 1968 order.

14. Because the plaintiff's failure to file its narrative

written statement was depriving the defendant of its right to

discovery as provided in the order of November 18, the at-

torneys for the defendant, on April 1, 1969, demanded that

the plaintiff's attorneys immediately file their narrative writ-

ten statement.

15. The plaintiff answered this demand by filing, on

April 4, 1969, a motion to transfer this action to the Middle

District of Pennsylvania. The motion to transfer clearly con-

templated that this action of the plaintiff would be turned

over to other attorneys and consolidated with other actions.

16. On April 7, 1969, the defendant filed a Motion to

Dismiss, the first fifteen paragraphs of which are republished

hereinabove.

“17. Argument on the said Motion to Dismiss and on the

plaintiff's Motion to Transfer was held on April 16, 1969.

18. By its Order dated April 16, 1969, this Court, after

argument, denied the plaintiff's Motion to Transfer.

19. In a separate order dated April 16, 1969, this Court

found that the plaintiff had failed to file a pretrial narrative

Statement as and when required by this Court’s Order of

November 18, 1969, that the plaintiff had been unable to

. %

Bisnnis Py oe ee nee oe

26

Exhibit “G" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

36a

secure certain documents, that the defendant's attorneys

would make these documents available at Harrisburg, and

that the plaintiff's attorneys would require five months to

copy and organize these documents. This Court then made

the following Order:

NOW, THEREFORE, it is ordered that the defen-

dant’s Motion to Dismiss be and the same hereby is

denied, and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff may con-

tinue its discovery and shall file its narrative written

statement in accordance with the order of November 18,

1968 on or before September 16, 1969, and the timetable

established by the said order of court shall be then con-

strued as if September 16, 1969-were 70 days from the

date of the said order; PROVIDED THAT if the plain-

tiff shall fail to file its narrative statement as provided

for herein, then upon proper motion, the action shall be

dismissed with prejudice, and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the pretrial con-

ference in this action, scheduled for May 20, 1969, be

and the same hereby is continued. [Emphasis supplied. }

20. On the day following the argument and Orders

discussed in the three paragraphs immediately above, the

defendant's attorneys confirmed the availability of the

documents discussed in paragraph 19 hereof by a letter to the

plaintitf’s attorneys, a copy of which is attached hereto

labelled Exhibit “A” and made a part hereof.

21. As represented in Exhibit “A”, the said documents

have been available from April 17, 1969 to the present. The

plaintiff's attorneys have never during that period ap-

proached the defendant's attorneys, either in Pittsburgh or in

Harrisburg, for the purpose of examining or copying the said

documents or for any other purpose. The defendant can ©

“7 37a

Exhibis *\ 3" JA ttached to Defendant's * ‘otion.

conclude only that representations made by the plaintiff's at-

torneys at argument on April 16, 1969 were intended to

delay the adjudication of this action.

22. At the time of filing this Motion—fully two weeks af-

ter the deadline set by this Court in its Order of April 16,

23. The plaintiff has ignored two orders of this Court,

namely that of November 18, 1968 and that of April 16, 1969,

1969 as required by this Court's order of April 16, 1969. The

defendant moves the Court to implement the Proviso con-

tained in its Order of April 16, 1969.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/) JAMES D. MORTON,

/s)\ ALAN BRUCE BOWDEN,

Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald,

Kyle & Buerger,

Attorneys for the Defendant.

2?

5 38a

Exhibit “H" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

PENDIX E Exhibit “H”.

In the

4 DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

: For the Western District of Pennsylvania

i

j

; NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC.,

’ a corporation,

j Plaintiff,

: v.

BORG-WARNER CORPORATION,

a corporation,

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 66-865.

ORDER.

AND NOW, to wit, this Ist day of October, 1959, upon

consideration of the within Motion to Dismiss, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the above-

captioned action be and the same hereby is dismissed

without prejudice.

'

Sadi tive, a. sensi at Aenean a Ryesgade LN Sai diate, SL

:

RABE F. MARSH,

United States District Judge.

29

44a ~

Exhibit “J” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

Exhibit “J”.

In the

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

For the Western District of Pennsylvania

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC., a corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

BORG-WARNER CORPORATION, a corporation,

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 66-865

MOTION TO VACATE ORDER.

Plaintiff, Northway Coin-Clean, Inc., moves the Court to

vacate and set aside its Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice

in the above-entitled Action, entered on October 1, 1969,

and allow the above action to Proceed to trial, on the

grounds that plaintiff's failure to Prosecute this action prior

to said order was inadvertent and unintentional, that plain-

tiff has now located necessary witnesses not heretofore

known or available to plaintiff in this case, and that the in-

Crease of known claims against the same defendant involving

Similar questions of fact and law in the Middle District of

Pennsylvania since October 1, 1969 indicates this is a proper

case for consideration by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict

30

Exhibit “J” Attached to Defendant's Sfotion.

45a

Finens ar igeets,

Litigation, as appears more fully from the affidavit of

Robert G. MacAlister, Esquire, attached hereto.

June 25, 1970.

i igh A i a ole ay

ee ees

ROBERT G. MacALISTER,

Robert G. MacAlister,

FRANK E. COHO,

Frank E. Coho,

ALAN R. ASH,

Alan R. Ash,

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

1410 Grant Building,

Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219,

471-6963.

Saati aces Sip eas a Sb aa ala cde a

RRA cht, NARA LAS RIE EE RAE ROIE RARER

bie Rese es

3]

50a

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

Exhibit “K”.

In the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

For the Western District of Pennsylvania

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC., a corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

THE BORG-WARNER CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 66-865.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS.

Pretrial Conference held at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,

Tuesday, September 8, 1970, before: Honorable Herbert P.

Sorg. -

Appearances:

For the Plaintiff: Robert G. MacAlister, Esq., 3320

Grant Building, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 15219

For the Defendant: Clayton A. Sweeney, Esq.,

Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald, Kyle and Buerger, 1800

Oliver Building, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 15222

Marion C. Wike, Official Reporter.

cS ee

Fei Ui ROBES ROR RG ER NP bal Sindy OD Be LN le, Bre tend ae

32

Exhibit “K" Attached to Defendant's Mation.

5la

{2] PROCEEDINGS.

The Court: Good afternoon. This is Northway Coin

against Borg-Warner, Motion to vacate order of June 26th,

1970.

I dismissed this action without prejudice on October l,

1969, having allowed about eight postponements for the

Plaintiff to get ready.

Why should I restore it?

Mr. MacAlister: If Your Honor please, for one simple

and basic reason:

The Court: Tell me what rule you are under first.

Mr. MacAlister: I am under 60, and also 1407, transfer

to the multi-district panel.

The Court: That was in effect October 1, 1969.

Mr. MacAlister: You are right, sir, and I didn’t know

about it.

The Court: I can’t help that. Ignorance of the law is no

excuse.

Mr. MacAlister: I know that, Your Honor. 1 am sure it is

not. I don’t think every lawyer is supposed to know all the

law. At least, I don’t.

The Court: No lawyer, and no judge, knows [3] all the

law.

Mr. MacAlister: 1 didn’t know the existence of the rule

at that time, or I would have followed it.

The Court: Why did I dismiss it without prejudice? I told

you I was going to dismiss it with prejudice.

33

Exhibit “K" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

52a

Mr. MacAlister: I, at that time, thought you did it to give

‘us a chance'to do something about it.

The Court: So you can bring another suit?

Mr. MacAlister: We can not, because the statute has long

run against us.

The Court: That is why I think I did it.

Mr. MacAlister: I think you are more than fair, under

some of the circumstances, you know, to dismiss it without

prejudice, and I interpreted that you must have felt there was

some reason and some legitimacy and some basic right in the

case which we had.

Now, my position is simply this: This case is relatively sim-

ple, but we have to carry the burden of proof on two, really

three, bases of facts.

First, this being a fraud and deceipt case, we have to be

2ble to go to the Jury and be able to give evidence to the

Jury as to who prepared the financial statements wherein

Borg-Warner represented the profitability of these fran-

chises that my client bought from them. Now, I can’t [4] do

that, your Honor, unless 1 know who prepared the financial

Stutements. I can’t do it, Your Honor, unless 1 get a chance

to see the records upon which they were prepared, and I

have never been able to get that information.

I think Mr. Sweeney should, answer that. Why has Borg-

Warner fought me getting that information? If I had that in-

formation, and if I was able to review it, I could readily

determine whether or not the financial statements were

honest, whether they were dishonest, who prepared them,

and on what basis.

the tet

Tat, tiie ele i tad 9 ee ae

SET TTI Be

i.

34

53a

Exhibit “K” ‘Attached to Defendant's Motion.

If I found out they were honestly prepared, and if I found

out they did represent the facts at that time, | would walk

away from this lawsuit so fast that 1 would actually file my

own order, asking a dismissal.

But I have never had a chance to find that out yet, and that

is basic to any fraud and deceipt.

Secondly, I have not been able to find out who determined

the process and equipment which Borg-Warner sold my

client were satisfactory and suitable for a profitable, self-

operated business. They have never given me the opportunity

‘to find out. They refuse to tell me who the employees were

who worked on it, and where the reports are, and where the

records are. Again, if I could find that out, —I don’t want to

be in Court fighting lawsuits I can’t win, but why not let Mr.

‘Sweeney answer that? Why have they re- [5] fused to make

that information available? It seems to me if they are going

to win lawsuits denying discovery, and keeping us from get-

ting information, is this justice?

As I see it, you had a legitimate position in this last

argument. I wasn’t here, but you said, “Why have you not

filed a narrative statement?”

I will tell you why we have not done it, because we

couldn't file an honest one, a complete one and full one,

without that basic information. That is the whole case, and I

am not in the habit of filing any narrative statement unless |

expect to be held to that when I come to court, and I was not

able to do that, because I didn’t have the two basic bits of in-

formation. |

I know certain things. I know my client lost $200,000. I

know the, people who sold them went bankrupt in less than a

year, because everybody lost money. I know publicly in

35

54a

Exhibit “K" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

Time Magazine they admitted, Borg-Warner, that the deal

didn’t work the way it was supposed to. I know those things,

but I don’t know the true foundation of the lawsuit; first,

who prepared the financial statements, were they false or

true. I don’t know who made the determination as to

whether or not the equipment was suitable for the use they

sold it.

Then, again, I have not been able to get any information

as to who put out that glowing advertisement that all the in-

vestor had to do was put his money in the deal and [6] he

was taken care of.

Again, I say if I had those three bits of information and I

was able to see for my own eyes these people weren’t guilty

of fraud and deceit, because it appeared from everything

else they did that they were, and I say to you in conclusion,

there is one other—incidentally, my related counsel, counsel

in related cases that are down in the Middle District, are in

pretrial today with Judge Sheridan, and that is why they are

not here to appear with us and answer your questions which

were legitimate: Are those cases consolidated down there?

We don’t know. I think we will know after today.

The Court: Well, they have not been consolidaied up to

this day?

Mr. MacAlister: No, but I think we will know after this

pretrial meeting.

Seriously, my case is really simple. Why won't Borg-

Warner make available for us the evidence that would prove

those financial statements were honest, and why won't they

make available the proof that the process was suitable and

satisfactory for the operation, when, in fact, we know that

last part from our own observation, that it wasn’t.

WO OO. er ae Pie

an

wee

36

55a

Exhibit “K" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

We don’t know anything about the financial statements,

except when we got into the business we found out what they

said represented profitability just wasn't possible under [7]

the operation. Again, I would like Mr. Sweeney to answer

that.

In closing, your Honor may well believe from what the

record shows to date that somehow or other we have been

sitting on our hands and not doing any work in this case. I

checked my own records this morning in my own office on

the amount of time we put into this case already. In my of-

fice—and this doesn’t include Mr. Shearer, who keeps his

own records, we have spent 427 hours in this case since we

first got it. Out of my own pocket I have advanced $1,800-

plus in out-of-pocket expenses, so we have been trying to get

the information. We have been trying, and I seriously believe

it would be a great miscarriage of justice if because of

technical arguments which are quite well done by Mr.

Sweeney—he has cited the rules—he has cited them weil. But

one thing he has not emphasized is what a harsh application

of them would do, and that is that it would take away from

us an Opportunity to lose our own lawsuit in a Courtroom,

and this we should have. This we should do.

Here we are alleging fraud and deceipt, and fraud and

deceipt is not done under Kaufmann’s clock at high noon. It

is done in secret. We should have the opportunity to see that

evidence.

If the Court please, if you would give us that opportunity

and instruct the defendant they must furnish us [8] that

evidence, and not say, “We don’t know where the records

are. We don't know where the witnesses are.”

Then I think we can dispose of this case honestly and

quickly. That is the only thing I would like to have, and that

37

Sha

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

is all I want. If I am asking for too much, I just can’t un-

derstand why, because all I want here is justice.

I also further think that when you read their deposition

saying they don’t know where the records are, and they sold

them to a corporation called Fedders, and that we can get

the records from Fedders, what right? We have no contract

with Fedders, even if they did sell the records. It makes it

difficult for me to believe, and I think your Honor might

find it difficult to believe, that this Borg-Warner keeps the

responsibility of defending these suits and sold the records,

so they don’t have any records to defend it on.

These are practical things I am talking about. I know if !

had a corporation I represented and they were being sued, I

wouldn't have sold my records, and I would know who the

witnesses were that I needed to defend the cases. It just

doesn’t make any sense to me, none whatsoever.

The Court: You say you have located necessary witnesses

not heretofore known or available to the Plaintiff? Who?

Mr. MacAlister: These are the ones in the Middle

District case.

‘(9] The Court: Who are they?

Mr. MacAlister: There are scads of them.

The Court: Name them.

Mr. MacAlister: I don’t have the list, but there are many

of them. When Mr. Shuman was here the last time at the

arguments, he—I forget how many thousands of records he

has compiled with the names of witnesses, the evidence, and

where he—he found them all the way from Texas to

Delaware. They have spent a tremendous amount of time on

this case, and a tremendous amount of effort.

' 38

: 57a

4 Exhibit “K" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

The Court: You have access to them, don’t you?

ta ct

Mr. MacAlister: Only in the Middle District. How can I

get them here?

The Court: Copy them.

Mr. MacAlister: I can copy the records, but I am

Deeb aes ee one

to get it, and they got it before we got into the picture.

: thinking of the witnesses.

/ The Court: Four thousand records, you say?

i Mr. MacAlister: Yes.

$

: The Court: Copy them and bring them up.

Mr. MacAlister: Without the witnesses, they are not

' much good. They are pieces of paper.

| The Court: There are ways of getting witnesses,

- depositions, subpoenas.

Mr. MacAlister: We have tried the deposition [10] route,

i and we have failed pretty well, because, as I have said to

' your Honor, Borg-Warner has very effectively kept us from

; getting any information, and yet these people have been able

Every time Borg-Warner found out somebody knew about

this case, then the next Plaintiff is shut out.

The Court: The co-counsel in the Middle District has the

names of those witnesses?

ee ee ee nT

Pry

Mr. MacAlister: Yes, but the case has to be tried there. It

must be tried there. It must be consolidated. Why take up the

time of this Court to go through a case that can take a month

or six weeks to try? Why shouldn't it go to the Middle

District?

The Court: Because you brought it here.

39

58a

Exhibit “K" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

Mr. MacAlister: We should have brought it there. Had

we known there was cases there, it sure would have brought

there.

In our Interrogatorics, we asked if there were other cases,

and this Court saw fit to say “You have no right to know

that.” .

The Court: Oh, no. I said you do have a right to know,

but you could find it out just as easily as the person you

asked.

Mr. MacAlister: Maybe I misunderstood.

{11} The Court: Why make these people go around to the

records of the United States, when you could do the same

thing?

Mr. MacAlister: I could have. Admitted. I could have,

but why were they afraid to answer that question? Why

didn’t they want us to know? If that Interrogatory comes

across my desk, as corporate counsel, I wouldn't hesitate to

answer that at all. I really can’t understand why they were

afraid to admit that. For fear we might find out something

about the case? For fear we might win the case? For fear we

might get some evidence? These are the things that bother

me. I wouldn’t have hesitated to tell them. I would have

thought this my duty, as a member of the Court.

The Court: Well, you found out, anyway.

Mr. MacAlister: How did I find out? Let me tell you.

One rainy night in New York City, I, about 5:30 in the

evening, | am walking down Lexington Avenue, and I

remember where I had read that there is a trade magazine

which deals with the cleaning and dying industry. I stop ina

phone booth and I looked up the name of this magazine, and

Bieta a Maat ie 5 a

YO

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant’s Motion.

§$9a

1 happened to be within a block of it. I went up into the—to

see if there was anybody in the office, and there was. The

editor was there. And I introduced myself, and I told him

what I wanted to know. I said, “What have you written in

your trade magazine about these franchise deals so I could

[12] get some practical background?”

He said, “Who do you represent?”

I told him I represented Northway, out of Pittsburgh. I

asked him, because | couldn't find out from Mr. Sweeney. I

asked him, “Do you know of any other cases?”

He said, “Oh, sure.”

I said, “Where are they?”

He told me, and he gave me the name of a man to call,

who, incidentally, when I called him, was so afraid to talk

for fear he would get himself in trouble—he finally did. He

told me that there were cases right in the Middle District.

This man happened to live in Harrisburg. That is how I

found out. That was the first time.

Up until that time, the—I had no knowledge of it, and, the

fact of the matter—in the Philadelphia case, which is also

under this 1407 Petition, in there, Borg-Warner, in their In-

terrogatories, say, state clearly there are no other cases. The

one in the Eastern District, which is also attemping to get up

in the Middle District through the use of 1407—now, if this

is not misrepresentation, if this is not bald, outright lies, I

would like to know what it is. They knew that. They had to.

Those Interrogatories were signed by Mr. Houchias, who is

the house counsel for Borg-Warner, and who stood there the

days we took the depositions, and we were told the

deposition—the one we did take, they [13] didn’t know

where the records were, and they didn’t know who the em-

4/7

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

60a

ployees were. They didn’t know this. They didn’t know that.

They had no information about this. And here we are in this

Court today, and I believe we have been put on, to say the

least. | wouldn’t want to think that the Court would also be

put on like we have been.

The Court: There has been many a potential lawsuit lost

because they couldn’t get the witnesses.

Mr. MacAlister: You are right. But everybody has a right

to get into a courtroom. Why can’t we lose it there? Why

isn't that fair?

The Court: Because you won't comply with the pretrial

order.

Mr. MacAlister: We couldn’t. We would have, but we

couldn't. These people kept up from getting the evidence.

The Court: I say it frequently happens you can not prove

your case, and then you have no case.

Mr. MacAlister: I would like to see the eviderce on

which I couldn't prove it.

The Court: It seems to me I gave you a lot of time.

Mr. MacAlister: You did, and I know your fairness in

doing that, but sometimes a lot of time is not enough, par-

ticularly when, here we are, we are little Goliaths— [14]

rather, little David, fighting big Goliath. We can not even get

a pebble to throw at Goliath. We are held out from getting

the basic information which we need for our lawsuit by

evasions, by statements, by conduct and all the other things.

Now, I think justice—and that is the only important thing

I think we should be interested in; not technicalities, not

time or anything else—we ought to be interested in deter-

a ey

Pe Bhdos

aaa naire Lh Ae Sader) > von

42

Exhibit “K" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

6la

mining whether or not these people did fraudulently and

deceiptfully do what they did, which we say they did. How

can anybody be injured here by this Court opening up this

judgment and permitting us to try through 1407 to get it over

to the Middle District? How can justice be hurt by doing

that? Maybe the Panel will say, “Look you are too late,” or

any number of reasons, and throw us out, and then we will

be dead. But I think we should have that chance.

The Court: You say the statute of limitations has run?

Mr. MacAlister: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: When did it run?

Mr. MacAlister: Quite some time ago.

The Court: When?

Mr. MacAlister: Well, it was long before. It ran shortly

after we started the lawsuit, because it took us [15] the best

part of three or four years to realize what had been done to _

use.

The Court: When did it scart?

Mr. MacAlister: I think it started at a date when we en-

tered into the agreement.

The Court: When was that?

Mr. MacAlister: This is so many years back now, I would

be guessing. I think it was sometime around ‘62 that—We

filed in July, 1966, and it was a four-year statute, so it was

sometime in 1962 of "63.

The Court: It was a four-year statute?

Mr. MacAlister: I don’t know. Maybe it was six years.

But I know it was shortly before the statute was run that we

filed it.

43

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

62a

Also, Your Honor might like to know how it actually

dawned upon stupid me that this could have well happened

to us, this fraud and deccipt.

I was corporate counsel for the company catiee Carmen

Pittsburgh Company. Their business is here in Pittsburgh,

and their business is selling supplies to cleaning and dying

and laundry companies. As such, I had to go to the directors’

meeting, and when I was there it became increasingly clear,

as the months weny by, all these little coin-clean operators

weren't able to pay their bills for their supplics, so I began to

wonder why is this? Then the people started [16] to come to

see me. I sent for them to talk about—to talk to them

about—why didn’t they pay their bills. They told me what

happered after they entered into these franchises, how they

weren't profitable; they couldn't be profitable.

My client happens to be a very successful—the client, the

principal owner of my client’s business happens to be a

lawyer who was able to afford to pay his commitment for

this equipment. Most of the people couldn't do that. Most of

them had to close up. Many of them lost all their savings,

and there was more than one company in this business.

I think you would be hard put today, with the exception of

a few operations in this country, to find out they are even

existing today, because they weren't profitable. They were

mis-stated. They were sold under misrepresentation.

This is how I began to find out about the situation. I

blamed the situation on my client and myself of maybe poor

businessmen, but we never had a chance. We never had a

chance. And why didn’t we have a chance? It appears as how

the business could never have been operated profitably in

such a way to have done to get out of the deal. This is how 1]

found out about it. That is why I was a long time bringing

BJ

2

3

3

2

2

a

4

a

$

oy

63a

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

the lawsuit. It took a while, stupid as I am, believing what

big corporations say, and thinking they tell the truth,

because this is my background. I have been as- [17] sociated

in business all my life, and generally they tell the truth, but

this time I think they put us on.

I still think the only fair thing for Your Honor to do is to

give us a chance in a courtroom with—after giving us an op-

portunity to again confront Borg-Warner and say, “Let us

see those records on which you prepared those financial

records. Let us see the record itself. Let us talk to the people

who did it.”

If they are honest, I guarantee you—and I promise you I

will file my own Motion to Dismiss.

The Court: It is not as simple as you state.

Under the Rule 16 that you say you are under, I don't

think | can grant your Motion. You don’t fit any one of

them.

Mr. MacAlister: But Mr. Sweeney says, “Oh, yes, I do.

Only one.”

The Court: Which one is that?

Mr. MacAlister: That is the only one I want. I agree on

the other ones, I don’t. He says this on page 22 of his brief.

The only Rule 60-B reason which could conceivably cover

this ground is the sixth clause, “Any other reason justifying

release of judgment.”

He says Rule 60-B is a residual clause to cover these few

extraordinary circumstances which do not come within [18]

the preceding five clauses.

But the overriding justice rules are only to make it

possible for the litigation to take place. They are not to be

a

ota

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

the substance of my argument, Your Honor. The substance is

we have been kept from getting the basic information we

have to have to find out whether or not we should lose or

win a case in a courtroom, and if we had that op-

portunity—and it is that simple. It is not complicated.

The Court: Mr. MacAlister, I should have been told that

last fall.

Mr. MacAlister: You should have been. I am sorry. I

wasn't here, or maybe I would have said that.

Mr. MacAlister: I was not here in person at the

arguments, but this has been my deep feeling in this case

from the beginning. | am in the embarrassing position of a

lawyer who represented the people that went into this deal,

and it is a pretty serious thing when based upon represen-

tations which I believe also—you may be sure I find that my

clients have lost all this money, and is generally true in the

whole business of these coin-operated laundries.

The Court: It seems last fall—and my recollection may

be faulty—but you had the lawyer for the cases in the Middle

District, and he was right here, and you said you needed five

months to get the records of the Defendant in the Middle

District, and they were sent to Pittsburgh, [19] and you

never looked at them.

You had access to the 4,000 exhibits that the Plaintiff had.

You had access to the names of the witnesses the Plaintiff

had, and you were not able to file your pretrial narrative

statement.

Mr. MacAlister: If your Honor please, it came to me as

a tremendous surprise when I read Mr. Sweeney's brief and

arguments that these records were in Pittsburgh. We never

were told that.

eer |

* diss Raden aes

HE

Exhibit “K”" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

65a

The Court: Whether you were or not, they were available

to you in Harrisburg.

Mr. MacAlister: They were available in Harrisburg, and

counsel in the related cases said, “You are wasting your

time. There is nothing relevant in there. Don’t spend your

time and money.”

The Court: You asked me for five months to do it.

Mr. MacAlister: Admittedly, and you fairly granted it to

me, but when we found out it was a red herring—

The Court: You never looked at them.

Mr. MacAlister: Counsel in the related cases did.

The Court: Well, you had his records and witnesses.

{20} Mr. MacAlister: They are only good in the Middle

District. I couldn’t see how I can bring those records there,

and bring them into this District.

The Court: I can’t argue with you.

Mr. MacAlister: If I understand you to say that if I

brought those copies of those records down here I could use

them in this courtroom, — |

The Court: Copies of records time and again are offered

in evidence in this courtroom. It is very rarely I get an

original anymore.

Mr. MacAlister: Again, why is it too late for me to do it

now? How is anybody injured?

The Court: We will have to hear Mr. Sweeney on that.

Mr. MacAlister: Except me?

The Court: If nobody is injured, he ought to agree.

47

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

66a

Mr. MacAlister: Thank you, your Honor.

The Court: Who is injured, Mr. Sweeney?

Mr. Sweeney: If your Honor please, I am Clayton

Sweeney, and I believe at the monent nobody is injured, but

if your Honor reconsiders his order dated, correctly, Oc-

tober I, 1969, I believe my client would be injured, and: I

believe my client would be injured for a very good reason.

{21] We have filed with your Honor affidavits addressing

ourselves, as ‘best we were able, to what _we believed Mr.

MacAlister’s position would be when we got here.

The Court: I must compliment you on your very

thorough brief.

Mr, .Sweency: With your Honor’s permission, I would

like to pass it on to Mr. Thompson.:He was the one who

prepared the brief.

The Court: It was very thorough and diligent.

Mr. Sweeney: I would like to accept it, but I am not en-

titled, so I must pass it on to him.

The Court: If you get into more litigation, Mr. Thomp-

son, it is a very good brief.

Mr. Thompson: Thank you, your Honor.

Mr. Sweeney: I think my client would be injured for a

number of reasons, and Mr. MacAlister repeats a series of

allegations and accusations I Suppose against me, my law

firm, and my client, for not permitting them to do a lot of

vague things which I can not, frankly, identify.

We filed affidavits by Mr. Houchins, by Mr. Schisler, who

was the attorney in three unconsolidated actions in

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MESSRS AEE AE SB GROSS RR

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67a

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

Harrisburg, and Mr. Bowden in our office, in which we at-

tempted to set forth what had taken place here.

We made available the witnesses who were in our [22]

power to make available, and if memory serves me correctly,

‘produced all who were sought. Mr. MacAlister is frank in _

admitting atthe moment he has no cause of action, and I

can’t help that.

But. I .submit to your Honor that last October we had a

right to come back and ask’ you to make that dismissal with

prejudice, because you had earlier indicated you would.

The Court: I can’t recall why I didn’t.

Mr. Sweeney: I can’t answer that. We filed the motion

some weeks after the default had taken place, and after five

months had been granted. I was not snapping a judgment.

You will recall on April 18, 1969. Mr. MacAlister’s co-

counsel frankly admitted they were in default then.

The Court: And I lost patience in April, and he per-

suaded me to give him another five months, and he had the

lawyer from Harrisburg who said he would cooperate with

him, and the Defendant said he,would open up his records to

him, and I was overcome and I gave him five months.

I don’t know why I did it without prejudice.

Mr. Sweeney: In that connection, I would like to state on

April 17, the day after you were overcome, our firm wrote a

letter making available in Pittsburgh or Harrisburg all these

documents. We kept them in Harrisburg, if memory serves

me correctly, a couple months. We had them [23] available,

and then we brought them to Pittsburgh. I did not go

through them on behalf of Mr. MacAlister.

At the enc of that period, Mr. Bowden—I at that time was

' engaged in another case—and Mr. Bowden called and said,

47

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

68a

“Gentlemen, your time has run, and perhaps we ought to

clear the default.”

Nothing. A couple weeks went by, and we decided, if I

recall, we made another call, and we didn’t hang on a

technical dissent. This time went on, and nothing happened,

and so we filed it and requested in that that it be with

prejudice.

The Court: Do you know when the statute of limitations

would have run?

Mr. Sweeney: Your Honor, | pleaded in the Answer to

the original Complaint that the statute of limitations had

already run, and I am convinced it had run before the filing

of the Complaint in 1966, the transaction having taken place

in 1962.

If it was a fraud, Mr. MacAlister admits it was when he

discovered it way back then. The exact date, I can’t pin-

point.

The Court: Why would it be only four years?

Mr. Sweeney: I think that is the four years provided un-

der the Uniform Commercial Code.

[24] The Court: Is that your idea?

Mr. Sweeney: That is one of the bases, but their Com-

plaint does not state on what basis it was filed.

Your Honor may remember the somewhat unusual pretrial

order when I urged your Honor to permit them to complete

their discovery before we went forward with ours, because

we couldn’t identify what their cause of action was.

As I recall, Mr. Shearer drafted this, and we went over

and submitted it to your Honor.

A Wiha Demtitalae nad Crd etl owe tert

woe” “ete

Jo

69a

Exhibit “K" Attached to Defendant's Motion.

Apparently, Mr. MacAlister does not know to this day. I

submit we have answered everything we had to answer. I will

not waste your Honor’s time justifying my client.

The Court: The reason I was searching for answers on

the statute of limitations is because heretofore when I en-

tered in default without prejudice it is to give them a chance

to bring another suit within the statute of limitations. I can’t

understand why I did it without prejudice here.

Mr. Sweeney: I assumed at the time you entered the or-

der that was the reason, and I thought, to be honest with

you, perhaps there was a six-year statute. They could allege

they didn’t become aware of the fraud until a subsequent

date. I thought there would be a factual allegation and your

Honor thought “I will put this out and let them go.”

[25] Then there arrived a Motion to Transfer before the

Multi-District Panel. You can not transfer—I am mixing this

up in my language.

The Multi-District Panel can not transfer something that

does not exist. They are doing nothing. | would add, the

Motion to Transfer was made before you. You denied the

transfer. I don't believe the circumstances have changed. I

don't have the names of any witnesses. The situs is here in

Western Pennsylvania. The Plaintiff is here, and we went

through Mr. Bowden's argument outlining where all the

people are. There is nobody in the Middle District, with the

possible exception of one witness, and we could depose him,

if we need it.

Now we come to the Motion under 1407, which was enac-

ted almost two years before your Honor ruled last October.

As I recall, the enactment date was April, 1968.

a/

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

70a

The Court: That is right. April 29.

Mr. Sweeney: So that I submit. your Honor, it could not

be an after-discovered effect, and, furthermore, there is a

mistake on our brief on page 8 in a date at the top of the

page.

Your Honor, we pointed out beginning on page 7, “There

has been no change in this litigation, and no increase in

claims since September 5, 1969.”

With your Honor’s permission, I would like to [26] orally

correct that to 1965. There has been no increase in the plain-

tiffs. There has been no consolidation.

You recall on April 16 you pointed out they could move

to consolidate before the summer. Why this switch in the

Middle District? I represent a client against whom suit was

filed. We were not technical or harsh, with our adversary.

Nothing has happened. Nothing new has been added that

would require, in the interests of justice, you do it, and, as

we indicate, respectfully, in our brief, I don’t think your

Honor can do it. I think that is legitimate.

The Court: As much as I would like to give them another

chance, I don’t think I can.

Mr. Sweeney: I don't think the law permits it. I think,

quite frankly, they have had every chance.

This is not a case of somebody snapping a judgment, and

the discovery was extended seven or eight times.

The Court: Eight times. I counted.

Mr. Sweeney: We did object to an Interrogatory, but

from what Mr. MacAlister says, I find out that didn’t matter.

I will add one thing. The Pennsylvania cases pending in

Harrisburg are being argued before Judge Sheridan. There

52

Tia

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

has been a severance motion filed. | am not one to suggest

that you can predict what any Judge will do, but in- [27]

dications are Judge Sheridan is not going to consolidate

them.

Mr. MacAlister has indicated the background is com-

pletely different. The 4,000 documents that were the big

thing, suddenly only relate to that case. Why would we

transfer it to the Middle District anyway?

The Court: I can’t think of the detail, but I was con-

vinced it would have been an imposition on the Middle

District for me to transfer this case down there. The reason

for it, I don’t know now, but I would have resented it if they

had transferred theirs up here.

Mr. Sweeney: I think the reasons are simple, if I can jog

your memory, the business was operated out of the Western

District and it was and is still in operation in the Western

District by a man who, according to the records, operated it

at a profit ever since 1964. The Plaintiff is a resident of the

Western District, and the sales people involved are here in

the Western District. The only people who would be in-

convenienced were our people, and all the documents were

here in the Western District. There was no reason to transfer

it.

And 1 submit they are articulated before your Honor in

the April, 1969, hearing. There is a transcript of that hearing.

The Court: 1 know. I was hoping I would get the time to

read it today, but I didn’t.

[28] Mr. Sweeney: I think the reasons are in there. I

won't, unless your Honor has questions to ask me, extend

the argument.

33

72a

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

I think with all deference to Mr. MacAlister, the equities

are with us. They had their day in court, and they are frank

to admit today they are unable to prove a claim. I think the

end of the line is here. It has to be so.

The Court: I think the end of the line is here.

Mr. MacAlister: If your Honor please, again, not-

withstanding your determination that the end of the line is

here, I must again say that this case is being lost by client

because he never was able to get the information under

which he could have won the case by the actions of Borg-

Warner.

Unfortunately, I have not been able to convince your

Honor of that. But I am sure in my own mind and heart that

this is what happened to us.

The Court: Well, Mr. MacAlister,—

Mr. MacAlister: I think it is quite a tragedy that we are

now—our Case is all over with your statement, “The end of

the line is here.” It is all over, and I shouldn't be making any

more speeches, but I just have to.

The Court: Go right ahead.

[29] Mr. MacAlister: I just have to, because we have been

put on, and I am afraid your Honor has been, too.

I stood up before your Honor representing a man in a

criminal tax case, and he was lying to you in the sentencing

here, a man by the name of Bachman.

The Court: Bachman?

Mr. MacAlister: Yes. But you had the card in your hand.

You had the probation officer's report with the truth in it,

and he told your Henor that héwas going to the doctor so

x4

73a

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Mation.

many times, and you looked down at him and said, “Stop

putting me on.”

I think if your Honor had that same kind of information

in front of him today from an independent third source, you

_ could look down and, not say to Mr. Sweeney, because I am

- not accusing him of any of this, but 1 think you could look

+ down at him and say, “Your client is putting me on.”

cb dis » oe "

Nace ata siti and oN Kalas er |

Can you believe, your Honor, that they don’t know who

- made those financial statements? Can you believe that they

don’t know whether or not that was suitable for a use? Can

you believe what you are doing here? Can you believe they

- g0ld those records and they couldn’t get them?

These are so simple and so direct and so real.

The Court: All I can see, Mr. MacAlister, for a period of

years, and over eight continuances, I gave you [30] the op-

3 portunity to get it.

Mr. MacAlister: You did. And, remember, I say fraud is

not commited under Kaufmann’s cl< ck. It is very difficult to

’ prove.

When you get into a case like this, you have got dif-

ficulties. You carry a tremendous burden. But, still, if I had

those three things, as | said today, if they are telling the

truth, they will hear nothing more from me, but I doubt that

they are. I think through technicalities and through skills

which I don’t have, they have been able to keep me from get-

ting the truth, and if—Who is afraid of the truth— Who is

afraid of the truth? The man who is not telling it.

If they weren't afraid of the truth, they would say,

“MacAlister, come here and look at these things and see for

yourself.”

PORT eee ee, eT ee eS

ee

SS

74a

Exhibit “K” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

The Court: They told you they sold the records to Fed-

ders Company. Did you go to Fedders?

Mr: MacAlister: No, I have no right. All they need to say

to me is, “Why are you coming here? These records belong

to us.”

I have no right to look at their records.

The Court: Why do you say that?

Mr. MacAlister: Because it makes common sense to me.

[31] The Court: I can’t argue with you.

Mr. MacAlister: I don’t want your Honor to argue with

me. I would hope before you write your order you will con-

sider those three simple, basic arguments of mine, which go

right to the argument of the whole case, and Mr. Sweeney

could, if he would, he could stand up and say, “What do we

have to lose? Let MacAlister look at those and shut him up

once and forever.”

The Court: If Mr. MacAlister and Mr. Shearer, who is

an excellent lawyer, couldn't get those things you have wan-

ted since 1966, you are not going to get them now.

I hate to impose on you, gentlemen, but if you will now

write the proper order, I will sign it.

Mr. Sweeney: Yes, your Honor.

(Court was adjourned.)

I HEREBY CERTIFY the foregoing to be a true and

correct transcript of the testimony had in the matter of Civil

Action 66-865, September 8, 1970.

MARION C. WIKE,

Official Reporter.

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75a

Exhibit “L” Attached to Defendant's Motion.

Exhibit “L”. APPENDIX F

In the

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

For the Western District of Pennsylvania

NORTHWAY COIN-CLEAN, INC.,

a corporation,

Plaintiff.

Vv.

BORG-WARNER CORPORATION,

a corporation,

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 66-865.

ORDER OF COURT.

AND NOW, to-wit, this 8th day of September. 1970, after

hearing and upon due consideration of Plaintiff's Motion to

Vacate Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice entered on Oc-

tober 1, 1969, IT IS ORDERED that said Motion be and the

same hereby is denied.

s/ RABE F. MARSH,

United States District Judge.

57

9la

APPENDIX C

Order.

(Fiied January 11, 1973.)

AND NOW, this 1 ith day of January 1973, Defendant's

Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment

having come on for hearing, and the court having duly con-

sidered the said motions with accompanying exhibits and af-

fidavits, and having duly considered the contra affidavits of

the plaintiff; and after consideration of the briefs and

arguments of both parties and being fully advised, the

motion of the defendant is granted because the action is

barred by the statute of limitations and because the action

has already-been dismissed with finality at Civil Action No.

66-365 by the United States District Court for the Western

District of Pennsylvania.

Summary judgment is accordingly entered in favor of the

defendant and against the plaintiff.

R. DIXON HERMAN,

United States District Judge,

Middle District of Pennsylvania.

FD ELE PLAS TIAL Tn Ee

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