Petition for Rehearing — Foster v. American Machine & Foundry Co.
Supreme Court brief1974
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
. * 4 "He a et, U N ‘ {
5
APLA
QUARTERLY
OURNAL
- » + *
LLL 06 wore v2 “Pte 8 e ee LTE,
° ‘ 6. 6
a a — 7 7 — * id
grew [Oe e. e CMA PF
s 7 ‘ —
. L727 2. — er
J
me. ar, re
.. B77 2
aD
x
LA SCC PUL j
Vol. tl SUMMER 1974 No. 3
A discussion on the compulsory licensing of patents in the United States by:
S. Delvalle Goldsmith of New York, N.Y.
Leroy Whitaker of Indianapolis, Ind.
W. Brown Morton, Jr. of Washington, D.C.
B. R. Pravel of Houston, Tex.
A LAW JOURNAL
for
THE PATENT BAR
by
THE PATENT BAR
A forum for free exchange of views and ideas for the Patent, Trade-
mark and Copyright practitioner.
All articles, manuscripts or comments are to be addressed to the
Editor-in-Chief or the Managing Editor at Coliseum Building, 26ih
Floor, 10 Columbus Circle, New York, N.Y., 10019. Telephone:
(212) 245-2600.
Published by American Patent Law Association. Distributed to all
members gratis.
Non-member and Law Library subscriptions (per year) 515.00
Foreign rate (per year) $17.50
Single issue price $4.00
Requests for subscriptions by non-members, law libraries and for
single issues are to be addressed to APLA Headquarters at Suite 203,
2001 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Va. 22202. Telephone:
(703) 521-1680.
© 1974 by the American Patent Law Association
ee —L—
APLA
QUARTERLY
JOURNAL
Published quarterly by the
American Patent Law Association
EDITORS
Lester Horwitz Michael N. Meller
Editor-in-Chief Managing Editor
Coliseum Building, 26th Floor
10 Columbus Circle, New York, N.Y. 10019
REGIONAL EDITORS
Paul J. Luckern H. Fredrick Hamann
Department of Justice Rockwell International Corp.
Washington, D.C. 20530 Electronics Group
3370 Miraloma
Jack Goldstein Anaheim, Cal. 92803
2100 Transco Tower
Houston, Tex. 77027
Marc S. Gross Raymond C. Stewart
551 Fifth Avenue 310 Hillwood Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017 Falls Church, Va. 22046
ADVISORY PANEL
Donald W. Banner Borg-Warner Corporation
200 South Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Iilinois 60604
Robert B. Benson Allis-Chalmers Corporation
Box 512
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201
James W. Falk Bell Telephone Labs., Inc.
Murray Hill, New Jersey 07971
FFF ² AAA N 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
.. ei cece cok eek Res aden ee Rene ra gaen oe 144
The Case For Restricted“ Compulsory Licensing
by S. Delvalle GO fkk hh 146
Compulsory Licensing Another Nail In The Coffin
by Leroy Whitaker ........ cece cece ee eeeencnacncees 155
Reasons Advanced In Support of Compulsory Licensing ... 155 .
// ² aes candy f ; . wd 155
. ͤ cick eases F 158
R lo 159
Limited Compulsory Licensing Already In Effect ...... 162
Arguments Against Compulsory Licensing 163
ae q 163
Reduces Product Competitioo gs 165
Discourages Investment 167
Brnoourages Sere ee 167
Encourages Competition From Abroad .............. 168
— / ² ——U—U—· Mt TEEPE 169
Compulsory Licensing An Unplanned-for Addition
to the United States Patent System
by W. Brown Morton, Ilir 171
%% / ⁰˙mAĩ 171
J.. earn roy errs far 171
The Foster Precedents Analyzed .............--.e+eees 176
The Hoe Il Citations Revle wee 179
Conclusion ....... JJV 182
Say No“ To More Compulsory Licensing Statutes
/// ̃ ⁰³ ̃ ᷣ˙uwul.. ci derdenean keg estes 185
I a on os Pho ¼ d ½ Ag é ²⁰˙⁰r˙C c vee 185
Constitutional Limitations Re Taking“ Private Property ... 186
Constitutional Limits Re “Taking” of Patents ............ 189
Court-Imposed Compulsory Licensing of Patents ........ 193
The Constitutional Limits on Congress with Respect to
. m ks karen tndawesshivwinccascseeons 199
Proposed Legislation Re Compulsory Licensing ......... 201
“Comprehensive” Compulsory Licensing Statutes
% MM 45 205
d , . amg roe 208
AGL OP . PAST TM SALE ROR ep VAI PING ERE TD FAM GE INS
EDITORIAL
Our summer issue of the JOURNAL is devoted to compulsory
licensing. This topic has been much discussed by the patent bar,
primarily because several proposed Congressional bills have con-
tained such provisions.
When we first decided on this issue, Foster II, which a consensus
of authors considers a most significant departure from the present
law in this area, had not as yet been handed down. Now with this
new decision, the treatment of this subject should be of timely
interest.
Our topic this time is not treated in the typical po and con fashion,
because we found it substantially impossible to find any spokesmen
for the completely pro compulsory licensing approach. Thus, we
have the limited pro approach being taken by Messrs. Goldsmith
and Morton, the former suggesting important bases for compulsory
licensing both in history and foreign practice, as well as interpreting
the constitutional grant as requiring compulsory licensing when
non-use is apparent. The latter finds his justification for proceeding
with a specific legislative proposal in the precedent of the Foster II
case. The exceedingly wide-ranging papers of Messrs. Whitaker and
Pravel set down what might properly be described as the majority
view of most patent practitioners.
As before, we invite your thoughts and suggestions for the JOUR-
NAL. N i
144
S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH
S. Delvalle Goldsmith is a senior partner of the law firm of Ladas,
Parry, Von Gehr, Goldsmith & Deschamps. He is a member of the
New York Bar and received his A.B. degree from Columbia College
and his J.D. degree from New York University Law School.
Mr. Goldsmith is a member of the Council of the Patent, Trade-
mark and Copyright Section of the American Bar Association as well
as a member of the Executive Committee of the International
Patent and Trademark Association (AIPPI). He has also been
active in the American Patent Law Association, the New York
Patent Law Association, and the Interamerican Industrial Property
Association (ASIPI). He has given numerous talks and is a frequent
author in the field of patents.
145
IRN SIE mC Re Ny Mago e
THE CASE FOR “RESTRICTED”
COMPULSORY LICENSING
BY S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH
Compulsory licensing for “non-working” of a patented invention
is a fact of law, but not a fact of life, in most other countries. A fact
of law because there are compulsory licensing provisions in the
patent laws of nearly every important country except in the United
States. Not a fact of life because there are few grants of compulsory
licenses in countries having these provisions. This does not mean
that the compulsory license laws are not working but that, with such
laws in the background, the parties that might be subject to their
control would usually rather deal with each other on a voluntary
basis“.
The reference to few compulsory license grants applies to compul-
sory licenses for non-working and not to compulsory licenses ob-
tainable in many countries for food and drug inventions whether
they are worked or not. Numerous compulsory licenses of the latter
type have been granted, particularly in Canada’.
The above points up a basic difference between the two types of
compulsory licensing: on the one hand compulsory licensing as
advocated by some (usually those who do not believe in a patent
system at all) under which all patents, or all patents in a particu-
lar field, are subject to compulsory licensing whether or not the
patented invention is worked; on the other hand, restricted com-
where an invention for which there is a demand is not “worked”
63-65 (1936). See
i that:
the sealing of
(Great Britain) —10th edition, page 249 (1961).
3. Thus, in the case of Sterilab Corp. Lid. s: Chas. Pfizer & Co. Inc. 62 Canadien Raters
Reporter 94 (1970), an Editorial of the reporter says “As a matter, the
license (for a pharmaceutical patent) will be granted almost as a matter of course.”
146
S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH 147
by the patentee or allowed by him to be worked by others, i.e.
prevented from reaching the market place.
The first type of compulsory licensing, as exemplified by the afore-
mentioned food and drug licenses, if extended to all areas of tech-
nology, would probably mean the end of patents as such and possi-
bly also serious diminution of research and development. What in-
centive would there be to spend money on R & D when, after an
invention was successfully commercialized, a competitor could get a
license to use it without spending money for research, development,
pilot plants and consumer-education? In fact, with such a regime of
general compulsory licensing, not only would competitors not en-
gage in research, but there would not be any research in the first
place for them to take advantage ot.
The second type of compulsory licensing (i. e. for non-working) is
quite different. As long as the invention is put to use by the
patentee or a lic , no compulsory licenses would be granted.
On the other hand, if the patentee did not use the invention him-
self and refused to allow a third party desirous of using it to do so,
i.e. where there was so-called “suppression” of an invention, the
patent in question would be open to compulsory licensing—with
royalty payment to the patentee if a license is granted and with an
opportunity for the patentee to prevent or postpone grant of a com-
pulsory license, if he could justify non-use of the invention.
The main objection that seems to have been raised to compulsory
licensing for non-working is a rather weak one, namely that there is
in fact no “suppression” of patented inventions. This may be true
bacause, in our competitive economy, an individual or company
having a meritorious invention with public appeal is usually anxious
to put it into practice and reap the rewards of commercial success.
But the short answer to this objection is that, with compulsory
licensing for non-working, compulsory licenses will not be granted
if there is in fact no suppression. So anyone who doesn’t like com-
pulsory licensing should not be dissatisfied with compulsory licens-
ing legislation of this type.
„3 se
n Francisco in as being op to types of com i i i
would dilute the incentives. . . 1 bvided by the patent system”. He pointed out that
“a compulsion to invent around would not exist with a broad system of compulsory
licensing” (emphasis aded). It is unfortunate that, in the «ame speech Commissioner
Gottschaik also said “compulsory — 4 . . precludes the patentee’s option to „
tice his invention in an exclusive basis.“ i l the
word “bread” is understood before “compulsory licensing”. See the 1972 Summary of
Proceedings of the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law—American Bar
Association, p. 168 et seq.
148 S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH
To be fair we should also consider the other objections to compul -
sory licensing, especially as they may be somewhat more logical than
the objection discussed above.
The first of these other objections is that any sort of compulsory
licensing reduces the value of a patent and consequently the incen-
tive to use a patent system. Of course this is true. Any one of a
number of factors will reduce the value of a patent, for example
setting the term at 10 instead of 17 years, providing more grounds
for attack on patent validity, or restricting licensing and other
ways of making money from a patent. Reduction in value of a
patent (and consequent reduction of incentive to obtain patents)
is a matter of degree. In each instance, the disadvantage of reduction
in value of the patent must be weighed against any advantages ob-
tained by the restrictive factor involved.
Another objection raised against compulsory licensing is that it
would be difficult for the Courts (or an administrative body) to
decide if there is or is not non-working of a patented invention such
as to justify the grant of a compulsory license. This is undoubtedly
true, but certainly no more difficult than other questions that have to
be decided by our Courts such as non-obviousness in patent cases
generally, application of the “rule of reason” in anti-trust cases,
and guilt or innocence in criminal cases. If there are advantages to
compulsory licensing, we should not shut ourselves out from them
merely because difficult issues may have to be decided’.
The main advantage of compulsory licensing is to bring an inven-
tion to the market place which would not otherwise get there. A
fringe benefit of compulsory licensing is that it would probably
improve the public image of the patent system.
Patents (in the eyes of the general public and even the judiciary)
start out with several strikes against them. In the first place, they
are not understood. As former Justice Fortas states:
“Many federal appellate judges—perhaps most of them—ap-
5. Three of the very few British cases on compulsory working the
following: Kamborian’s Patent, Ar of Patent, — and Teeter Cuan
) 403—Compulsory license
S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH 149
proach patents with the kind of suspicion and hostility that a
city-bred boy feels when he must traverse a jungle full of snakes.
In the second place, as they are monopolies, they are looked upon
as anti-competitive and consequently bad. Here again there is a
lack of understanding. Patents—although they are monopolies—
are basically competitive rather than anti-competitive. They are
competitive because of their very nature as monopolies: competitors
are stimulated to “invent around” the patent monopoly, i.e. to
create equal or better products which will not infringe the patent.
Opponents contend that compulsory licensing would reduce this
competitive effect of patents. However, this would be true, only if
the patentee did not use or permit others to use his invention. If,
as opponents of compulsory licensing say, there is no such suppres-
sion, competitors could not obtain a compulsory license and would
still have the incentive to “invent around” the patent. If a patented
invention is suppressed, the grant might presumably be held invalid
in the absence of the less severe penalty of compulsory licensing
provided by a restricted compulsory licensing law.“
The third difficulty for patents is the patent-antitrust “interface”
which seems to set the patent—mistakenly looked upon as an anti-
consumer monopoly—against the consumer-protective features of
antitrust law. Here again there is confusion. To the extent that
the exercise of patent rights is coextensive with a properly granted
patent monopoly (i.e. for a new and non-obvious fully disclosed
invention), there is no conflict with antitrust law. On the other
hand, where patent rights are asserted on the basis of an invalid
patent or extend veyond the boundaries of the patent right (for
example to control unpatented material), there is a conflict with
antitrust law. In such a case the abuse of the patent law (not the
patent law itself) will be struck down by the Courts.
All this may seem to lead away from a discussion of compulsory
licensing itself, but there is the underlying concept that, if more
popular support for patents can be secured by providing for com-
pulsory licensing, this may lessen attacks on the patent sysiem itself.
In this connection Justice Fortas writes:
“We must recognize the depth of the attack (on the patent sys-
tem) and of the public attitude from which it emerges. It is a
6. A. Fortas, The Patent System in Distress 53 JPOS 810, (1971).
7. In Blount Manufacturing Co. v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co., 166 F 555. D. Mass.
1909. the court stated: “An attempt to make profit out e üer patest by suppressing
the invention covered thereby is outside the patent grant
| 150 S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH
dangerous period, for those who believe they are attacking the
abuses of the system may inadvertently damage the system itself.
In final support of compulsory licensing for non-working, the
question can be posed as to whether a patent law without such a
provision (supplied judicially if not legislatively) complies with
the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of science and
useful arts”. Query: are science and the useful arts really advanced if
an invention is patented, not used by the patentee, and not allowed
by the patentee to be used by others, even if there is a need for the
patented product? With a situation such as this, science and the
useful arts would seemingly be stagnated rather than advanced.
where he states:
It is . . . difficult to see how suppression of patents can be recon-
ciled with the provision of the statute which authorizes a grant
of the ‘exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention or
discovery’ . . . How may the words to make, use, and vend” be
read to mean not to make, not to use, and not to vend?”
Another way in which science and the arts may be stagnated rather
than advanced by a “suppressed” patent is where a substantial im-
provement of a patented invention is made and cannot be brought
to the market place without the permission of the patentee, which
permission is refused. Many foreign countries provide for this type
of compulsory licensing as well as compulsory licensing for non-
working per sel“.
In addition to the constitutional purpose of promoting progress
of science and useful arts, which must of course be carried out by
any constitutionally proper patent law, there is on the other hand
the constitutional requirement of securing to the inventors the
exclusive right to their discoveries. Does this mean an exclusive right
to “own” their discoveries? It would seem not. They already own
them exclusively and can keep them secret if they desire. It must
mean the exclusive right to use their discoveries, i.e. to prevent
others from using their discoveries wtihout their permission’. In
other words, the purpose of the patent provision in the Constitution
is not just to reward the inventor, but to promote the progress of
9. 324 U.S. 370, 64 USPJ 525 (1945).
10. See for instance Article 46 of the Swedish Patent law r! part as follows:
“The owner of a patent for an invention, the exploitation of h is dependent on a
patent owned by another person, may obtain a compulsory license to use the invention
pustssted theske, peovided thet die fo seasenable in view of the importance ‘of the
ret · mentioned invention or for other special reasons prevailing.”
11. Supra, note 9.
S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH 151
science and useful arts for the general benefit of the country’s
economy. This can only be accomplished by use rather than sup-
pression of patented inventions. And this is what compulsory
licensing for non-working is all about.
In the recent Kewanee decision"?, the Supreme Court refers to the
object of the Constitution's patent provision in the following terms:
“The productive effort thereby fostered (by the patent laws) will
have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new
products into the economy... (emphasis added).
Is there any such “introduction of new products into the economy”
if a patented invention is suppressed?
Later in the same decision, the Court refers to the fact that under
the patent laws the Federal Government is willing to pay the high
price of 17 years of exclusive use for its (the invention’s) disclo-
sure. (emphasis added). Is there any such use (properly exclu-
sive, i.e. by the patentee or his licensees only) if a patented invention
is suppressed ?
Certainly, British patent law, and also United States patent law to
a considerable extent, have a basis in the British Statute of Monop-
olies!® which declared invalid all monopolies (such as were formerly
granted by the King to his favorites for staple articles of trade)
except monopolies for “the sole working or making of any manner
of new manufacture within this realm . . so as also they be not...
mischievous to the State . . . or hurt of trade or generally inconveni-
ent.” Thus, at the very inception of modern patent law, the idea
of “working” and “making” was involved. It was recognized that
even a patent monopoly for a new manufacture might be hurtful
rather than advantageous and would be void on that ground. The
interface between patent laws and other laws (such as our antitrust
laws) is accordingly nothing new. Where a patent serves a proper
and useful purpose, it is a beneficial monopoly. Where it is hurtful
or inconvenient to the economy it should be invalidated or, as a
lesser penalty, subject to measures such as compulsory licensing.
A counter argument against the Constitutional argument for com-
pulsory licensing where an invention is not used is that, even with-
out use of the invention, the grant of a patent will promote the
progress of science and useful arts, because a description of the
12. Kawanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. U.S., 181 USPQ 673 (1974).
13. Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. 1, c.3, enacted May 24, 1624.
152 S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH
patented invention has been supplied and published and that, if
the value of a patent is too much reduced by compulsory licensing,
there will be more of a tendency to keep inventions secret rather
than disclosing and patenting them. It may be true that some in-
ventions could be maintained in secrecy, but this is certainly not
true for many types of inventions such as consumer products. If
the invention is a consumer product which the patentee intends to
put on the market, secrecy will of course be impossible and compul-
sory licensing would have no effect as far as secrecy is concerned.
If the invention is susceptible of secrecy (e.g. a process not dis-
closed by the finished product) there may be a tendency to try and
maintain the invention as a trade secret instead of patenting it.
Secrecy, however, involves the standard dangers that the secret may
teak out or that the invention may be independently invented by
another. In the latter case, the first inventor would not only lose
his secret, but might even be prevented from further practice of
his own invention. State trade secret laws (as validated by the
Kewanee decision) protect the secret only from thievery or use fol-
lowing confidential disclosure. They offer no protection against
copying the invention after it has been publicly disclosed & against
use and control of the invention by an independent invenfor.
7
In Kewanee (supra) the Supreme Court held
In the case of trade secret law no reasonable risk of deterrence
from patent application by those who can reasonably be expected
to be granted patents exists.
Trade secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects
than the patent law.
Thus, in the unlikely case of suppression, the possibility of the
stronger protection under patent law (even with compulsory licens-
ing) would have to be weighed against the weaker protection under
the trade secrets law. The latter might ultimately result in no pro-
tection at all. In all these cases, the question of whether or not there
is a compulsory licensing law is of no importance as regards secrecy
if the inventor intends to use his invention since, with a compulsory
licensing law for suppression only, no compulsory licenses would
be granted.
|
14. Supra note 12. Also see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Company, 376 U.S. 225, 140
USPQ 524 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 376 U.S. 234, 140 USPQ 531 (1964).
ERT ERTS I ED WEP repens — 6
* SELES mme EIS PELL LLG ˙ A · IO BEND LEG
S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH 153
It should not be forgotten that the Courts already have compulsory
licensing power and have exercised this power in antitrust situa-
tions!s. Also, in cases of public health or welfare’* the Courts have
denied injunctive relief to a patentee who does not permit the
patented invention to be used. In the very recent case of Foster v.
American Machine &. Foundry.Co."" the Second Circuit approved a
compulsory license granted apparently not for any considerations of
anti-trust abuse or special public interest, but because of non-us®
of the invention by the patentee. The patentee has asked the
Supreme Court to.review the Circuit Court's decision.
So compulsory licensing (in the sense that it may destroy some of
the exclusivity of the patent grant) is not such a radical departure
from the principles of U.S. patent law as the opponents of compul-
sory licensing tend to imply. The further step from a judicial to a
legislative definition of compulsory licensing would be a logical
one and would have the double advantage of definiteness on the
one hand and probable improvement of the public and judicial
image of our patent system on the other hand. Just as the “Scott
Amendments” under consideration in the current proposals for
general revision of our patent law would provide legislated rules as
to proper and improper licensing restrictions (rather than rules
imposed by the Courts on a case-by-case basis varying with the cur-
rent philosophy of the judiciary), legislated rules for compulsory
licensing would give the patentee and manufacturer some indica-
tion in advance of what would or would not be proper as regards
non-use of a patented invention. The Courts could then return to
their proper function of interpreting and applying a law made by
Congress rather than making law themselves. All this would proba-
bly mean less work for patent lawyers but, on the other hand, a more
stable regime for the business community and economy generally.
— —
15. Hartford. Empire Co. v. United States 323 U.S. 386, 64 USPQ 18 (1945); 324 US.
570, 65 USPQ 1 (1945).
— — * of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69F. 2d 577, 21 USPQ 69 (7th
ir. 1
17. 492 F.2d 1317, 181 USPQ 1 (1974).
18. In Special Equipment Co v. Coe, see note 9, even though the majority opinion is
said to stand for the positicn that “non-use is not misuse”, it recognized the possibility
of compulsory licensing legislation by indicating that compulsory use or licensing was a
matter for Congress to consider.
19. The petition for certiorari in Foster v. American Machine & Foundry Co., supra,
note 17, although violently opposing compulsory licensing as confusing “the exclusive
privilege of valid patents and the rights of patentees” seems to recognize “the right of
Congress” to legislate in this field. See BNA's Patent, Trademark & Copyright Journal,
No. 181, June 6, 1974, p. A-8.
= VPP
. Se
LEROY WHITAKER
Leroy Whitaker is a Senior Patent Attorney for Eli Lilly and Com-
pany in Indianapolis, Indiana. He obtained his Bachelor’s and
Masters Degrees in Chemistry from North Texas State University
and his Ph.D. from the University of Illinois. His Juris Doctor
Degree is from the University of Houston.
Mr. Whitaker has been active in the national patent law associa-
tions as a member of the American Bar Associations’ Patent, Trade-
mark and Copyright Section; Chairman of the Drug Subcommittee
on the Chemical Practice Committee of the American Patent Law
Association and serves currently as the Chairman of the Patent,
Trademark and Copyright Section of the Indiana State Bar Associa-
tion.
154
COMPULSORY LICENSING —
ANOTHER NAIL IN THE COFFIN
BY LEROY WHITAKER
For several years, the patent system has been under attack from
various quarters. Detractors continue their efforts in the courts and
in Congress to weaken the patent system. The objective appears to
be to make patents more difficult to obtain, more difficult to enforce,
and of less value to the patentee. We in the patent bar and those
we represent must resist such efforts rather than support or instigate
them, as appears to be the case with many of them.
The compulsory licensing of patents is an issue that has been widely
discussed in recent years. As has been frequently pointed out, the
grant of exclusivity provided by the Constitution is being slowly
chipped away by judicial decision and special legislation. There are
those who now advocate a general compulsory licensing statute.
It is the thesis of this paper that such a statute would be a severe
blow to the patent system—another nail in the coffin in which op-
ponents of the system would like to see it buried.
Reasons Advanced In Support of Compulsory Licensing
Why is there support for a general compulsory licensing statute?
Are there cogent reasons why such a statute is needed? Proponents
of compulsory licensing have given several reasons for their support.
Let’s review these reasons.
Suppression
One of the most frequently heard arguments in support of compul-
sory licensing is that meritorious inventions are being kept from the
public by patentees who cannot or will not supply the demand and
will not license others to do so. Such arguments usually mention
the 50 mile per gallon carburetor, the 100,000 mile tire, or the
cancer cure. Since we've been hearing of these marvelous inventions
for many, many years, the patents covering some of them must have
expired years ago. However, none of these inventions are on the
market. Somehow, the patentee must have found a way to continue
to suppress the invention after the expiration of his patent.
Proponents of compulsory licensing who argue suppression have
155
8
saber Sake Weer Easter E22
156 LEROY WHITAKER
difficulty in finding instances of suppression to support their posi-
tion. An invention becomes a matter of public record when the
patent on it is granted. Seventeen years later anyone is free to prac-
tice the invention. As then Commissioner of Patents Gottschalk
said in August, 1972, “Yet I am sure that I never heard of any
single instance where a single ‘suppressed’ invention suddenly
blossomed out when the patent on it expired.
In the few cases of suppression that have occurred, the courts have
had no difficulty in providing a remedy. In Vitamin Technologists
v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, the licensing practices
of the patentee were found to be contrary to the public interest and
the court concluded that the patent was unenforceable. In the
recent case of Foster v. American Machine & Foundry Ca., the
patentee was not using the invention nor had he licensed others
to do so. The court denied an injunction and, instead, granted a
compulsory license to the infringer. Apparently there was no find-
ing of a public interest and no harm to anyone other than the de-
fendant through enforcement of the patent. It is submitted that
in ihe absence of such a finding the decision in Foster is at variance
with the widely accepted view that a pateniee is free to use his
patent or not, as he wishes.
Yet, in spite of the lack of substantial evidence of suppression of
patented inventions, and in the face of the irrationality of believing
that a patented invention can be forever suppressed, there are still
those who argue that compulsory licensing is needed to prevent
suppression. In introducing Senate Bill $.2287, Senator Hart stated
that one of the goals of his bill is to provide that the patent system
cannot be used to block the implementation of technology which
is in the public interest.‘
Senator Hart considers the failure to use a patented invention as
“an abuse of the patent monopoly”. In my opinion, the Senator's
view fails to recognize the true nature of a patent grant. A patent
does not confer a monopoly in the generally accepted sense. In
order to obtain a patent, an inventor must have discovered some-
thing new, ie., something not previously available. Therefore, a
patent does not confer a monopoly in the generally accepted sense.
In order to obtain a patent, an inventor must have discovered
1. Address by the Hon. Robert Gottschalk before the Section of Patent, Trademark and
Copyright Law, American Bar Association, San Francisco, California, August 12, 1972,
published in U. S. Department of Commerce News (Patent Office), August 12, 1972.
2. 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945).
3. 492 F.2d 1317, 182 USPQ 1 (2nd Cir. 1974).
TI Cong. Rec. 15021 (daily ed. July 30, 1973).
1 —
LEROY WHITAKER 157
something new, i.e., something not previously available. Therefore,
a patent does not deprive the public of something which was pre-
viously available, but merely allows the patentee to control the
new invention for a limited time. After a patent expires, the
patented invention is freely available to all. The limited period of
exclusivity conferred upon the inventor by the government is con-
sideration for his disclosing the invention to the public so that it
will be available for use by anyone upon the expiration of the
patent.
But perhaps we in the patent bar take a more narrow view of the
meaning of suppression“ than do those outside the patent bar.
Is a patented invention being suppressed ‘if the patentee asks more
for a license than the prospective licensee is willing to pay? The
remarks of Mr. E. Nobles Lowe made before the American Patent
Law Association in October, 1972, ‘ndicate that at least in his view
such a disagreement over the terms of a patent license might be
considered to be suppression. Certainiv, Mr. Lowe’s remarks could
be interpreted to support the proposition that it is suppression to
ask an exorbitant“ fee for a license. But who is to determine what
fee is exorbitant? It is frequently very difficu:t to determine what
is a proper royalty.
And then there is the case of the thorough researcher who obtains
a number of patents directed to a number of similar, but patentably
distinct devices, all of which have the same utility. He chooses to
market the one device he considers to be the best and fully meets
the demand for such device. Is he suppressing his unused“ patents
if he refuses to grant a license to permit a third party to manufac-
ture and sell a device to compete with one he is marketing? I sub-
mit that he is not, since he is fully satisfying the demand for a device
of the type in question. He should not be required to use the fruits
of his research to put his competitors in business. I suspect there
are those who disagree with me on this point.
I raise the issue of the meaning of suppression“ to suggest that
before we glibly agree to legislation aimed at correcting the evil of
suppression, we should first determine how the term is defined.
In the context uf compulsory licensing, the definition should be
limited to failure to use or license the invention, which failure is
detrimental to the public welfare.
7
5. Remarks of E. Nobles Lowe, Symposium on Modified Compulsory Licensing. American
Patent Law Association, Washington, D.C., October 20, 19/'2, published in APLA Bulle-
tin, October-November, 1972.
6. American Photocopy Equipment Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 359 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1966).
158 LEROY WHITAKER
Price
Compulsory licensing proponents also argue that ‘patents contribute
to artificially high prices and that compulsory licensing will result
in the lowering of the prices of patented products. In remarłs before
the Senate, Senator Nelson has expressed the opinion that patents
are at least partly to blame for what he considers to be high drug
prices and he has advocated compulsory licensing of such patents
as the cure for the alleged evil.“ A like view was expressed by Con-
gressman Rosenthal in 1973 when he introduced H.R. 5737.8
The pricing of products is a complex issue involving many factors
such as the costs of research including the costs of research failures,
the costs of market development, price competition from existing
products, and the need for profit. Further, innovative companies
are usually quite conscious of quality, incurring the further expense
of quality control, while coat-tailers frequently don’t worry about it.
Generally, patents play a relatively minor role in pricing policies.
It is rare for even a patented product to enjoy a true monopoly
position so that the patentee can charge what the traffic will bear.“
There is almost always another product that will do the job of the
patented product, although perhaps not as well. However, even
though the patented product may be superior, it must be reasonably
priced in relation to the inferior product in order to gain a share
of the market. Frequently, when a patented new product comes on
the market, competitors will “invent around” the patent and will
soon have a similar product for sale, again fostering price competi-
tion.
One might expect that a licensee who has borne no research and
development costs can sell a product cheaper than the patentee who
must recover all his research expenses, both successful and unsuccess-
ful, from the product he sells. This is especially true if the licensee
is required to pay only the usual “reasonable” royalty of five percent.
The argument for lower prices also loses sight of the fact that price
competition is not the only form of competition. Of much more
benefit to the consumer is competition in the discovery and develop-
ment of new products. Is it worth killing the research goose that
i
7. 118 Cong. Rec. 16336 (daily ed. September 29, 1972); 119 Cong. Rec. 15063 (daily
ed. July 30, 1973):
8. 119 Cong. Rec. 1886 (daily ed. March 19, 1973).
9. Arnold and Janicke. Compulsory Licensing Anyone?”, 55 JPOS 149 (1973); Sease,
“Common Sense, Nonsense and the Compulsory License,” 55 JPOS 233 (1973).
7
LEROY WHITAKER 159
lays the golden eggs of future products in order to obtain some
price reduction on presently existing products?
Proponents of compulsory licensing who use the price argument
are asking that research-based companies subsidize those who are
not. This is a queer way to promote innovation and progress. We
shall reward those who do nothing to promote progress at the
experte of those who do. If this doesn’t discourage research, nothing
Will.
Such a result will frustrate the Constitutional mandate of promot-
ing the progress of science and the useful arts. Historically, price
control has not been a function of the patent system and it should
not now be allowed to become a function of the system.“ Such a
use of the patent system is clearly contrary to the intent of the
Constitution.
Foreign Practice
The third major argument for compulsory licensing is that many
foreign countries already have compulsory licensing provisions in
their laws. It is argued that compulsory licensing would merely
bring the United States into line with other major industrial na-
tions. This was another objective cited by Senator Hart in introduc-
ing S. 2287.1 However, the situation in the United States is different
from that which brought on compulsory licensing in other countries,
and we should not be stampeded into accepting compulsory licens-
ing, because others have it.
In many countries, most notably the underdeveloped nations, com-
pulsory licensing statutes are based on nonuse of the patent. It is
understandable that such countries want to encourage the establish-
ment of manufacturing industries with the attendant increased em-
ployment opportunities. There is no research to be discouraged by
compulsory licensing laws.
But many of the great industrial countries of the world also have
compulsory licensing provisions in their laws. How do such pro-
visions operate and what have been their effects?
Under Japanese law, a iicense may be demanded where the working
of the patented invention has not been appropriately carried out in
88 et al., Patent Reform and the Drug Industry”, Drug & Cosm. Indus. 52
11. Supra, note 4.
160 LEROY WHITAKER
Japan continuously for three or more years, where a second patentee
requires a license under a dominating patent in order to practice
his own invention and for nonworking if “specially necessary for
the public interest”. If the demand for the license is unsuccessful,
arbitration by the Patent Office may be had. All these compulsory
licensing provisions were enacted in 1960 and since that time there
have been 12 demands for arbitration. To date, no compulsory
licenses have been granted in Japan. There have been no serious
efforts to strengthen or repeal compulsory licensing statutes in
Japan.
Since 1911, West German patent law has included compulsory
licensing provisions provided it “is in the public interest”. Prior to
the second world war, about 25 licenses were issued, and since
1945 there have been approximately ten requests. No compulsory
license has been granted in the past 25 years.
Swiss patent law has since 1928 included provisions for com
licensing in situations substantially similar to those applicable in
Japan. Only a few compulsory licenses have been granted by the
Swiss courts, and all have related to the practice of a dependent
invention under a dominating patent.
The concept of compulsory licensing is found in French law in
the event of nonworking in France, in order to practice an im-
proved second invention, for national defense purposes or if the
interest of public health requires it and, in the case of drug patents,
if the drug is not available in sufficient quantity or quality or is
available only at an abnormally high price. Compulsory licenses
have been granted under French law, only because of insufficient
local working of the invention.
British law provides for compulsory licensing for abuse of patents
or other showing of prejudice to local commercial or industrial
activity or hindrance to exports. During the ten-year period from
1958 to 1968, two of 16 applications were allowed. There is also
a provision relating to the compulsory licensing of patents on drugs
and foods. The history of this provision is of interest.
Section 41 of the British Patents Act calls for the grant of a license
under any patent which relates to a substance which is capable of
used as a food or medicine. Such provisions were first put
into British law in 1919. During World War I, it became apparent
that the United Kingdom was suffering from a lack of medicines
and drugs, many of which involved inventions that were covered
— —
LEROY WHITAKER 161
by British patents held by foreigners. There simply was no sub-
stantial British pharmaceutical industry. To correct this situation,
the Patents Act of 1907 was amended to provide for the compulsory
licensing of drug patents.“
The causes which led to the enactment of the forerunner of present
Section 41 of the British Patents Act clearly do not exist today.
However, the section remains to plague the British pharmaceutical
industry. In 1967, the Banks Committee was organized under the
chairmanship of Mr. Morris Banks to examine the British patent
system. The Committee concluded that there is no reason in prin-
ciple why drugs should be treated differently from other patentable
matters. They recommended the repeal of Section 41."
Other commonwealth countries have adopted provisions patterned
after Section 41 of the British Patents Act. None of such countries
has a significant pharmaceutical industry. Canada is typical.
In 1971, A. M. Laidlaw, the Commissioner of Patents for Canada,
in defending the compulsory licensing system in Canada, pointed
out that the situation there is quite different from that in the United
States.“ Commissioner Laidlaw noted that approximately 95 per-
cent of Canadian patents are granted to non-residents while almost
80 percent of United States patents are issued to United States na-
tionals. It appears that the Canadian government recognizes and is
willing to accept the fact that little research is done in Canada, and
therefore, a strong patent system is not needed.
A low level of pharmaceutical research in Canada was also noted
by the Banks Committee.“ The Committee found the present
Canadian situation to bear some resemblance to that which led to
the introduction in 1919 of the special compulsory licensing pro-
visions of British law. It found the purpose of compulsory licensing
provisions in Canadian law to be the encouragement of pharmaceu-
tical manufacturing in Canada, as well as to make drugs cheaper by
means of increased price competition. Conditions under which
drugs are manufactured and supplied in Canada are very different
from those presently obtaining in the United Kingdom and, of
12. Address by A. J. Pickford before the Licensing Executives Society, Kingdom
— 17, 1965. —
13. Banks, The British Patent System, Report of the Committee to Examine the Patent
System and Patent Law, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London (1970).
14. Address the Hon. A. M. Laidlaw before the Anwrican Patent Law Association,
— C., January 25, 1971, published in API A Bulletin, January-February,
15. Supra, note 13.
162 LEROY WHITAKER
course, in the United States. Further, the few available figures con-
cerning the effect of compulsory licensing on drug prices in Canada
are confusing at best, and certainly do not show a clear reduction
of prices to the consumer.
In view of the limited use of compulsory licensing provisions in
foreign countries, it is argued that compulsory licensing would be
little used in the United States. Such a conclusion does not necessar-
ily follow. There is an anti-patent climate here that would encourage
the grant of compulsory licenses. Also, the strong price motivation
possessed by some would encourage the grant of compulsory licenses.
Limited Compulsory Licensing Already in Effect
It is argued that statutory compulsory licensing is not new to the
United States. It is said to be found in such fields as atomic energy.
pollution technology. and with regard to the protection of plants.“
In addition, under the provisions of 2 U.S.C. Section 1498, a
patented invention may be used or manufactured by or for the
United States without a license. The patentee’s remedy is an
action against the government in the Court of Claims. Such statutes
are either directed to highly specialized technology of extreme im-
portance to public safety or they are not directed to the compulsory
licensing of patents. For example, 28 U.S.C. 1498 is an eminent
domain statute, while 7 U.S.C. 2404 is not concerned with patents,
but with a different form of protection.
There have also been several instances of the judicial grant of a
compulsory license in infringement cases where the infringer's prac-
tice of the patented invention was found to be important to public
health, safety, or the environment.!“ Courts have also refused to
grant injunctive relief in cases of fraud on the Patent Office,“ of
patent misuse,*' or of antitrust violations.**
The argument advanced is that we already have compulsory licens-
ing and there is no reason why we should resist further compulsory
16. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2183.
17. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1857(h) (6).
18. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2404.
19. The City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577. 21 — 2
1934); Viatmin Technologists v. Wisconsin A Alumni Research Foundation, 1 46 F.2d 941.
63 USPQ 262 (och Cir. 1945).
8 Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 401 F 2d 574, 159 USPQ 193
( b >
21. Allied Research Products, Inc. v. Heatbath Corp., 300 F. Supp. 656, 161 USPQ 527
(N.D. TH. 1969).
22. Hartford-Empire v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 64 USPQ 18 (1945).
LEROY WHITAKER 163
licensing provisions. However, it is apparent that the courts already
have sufficient authority to prevent any of the alleged abuses of
patent rights which are being cited as reasons for compulsory licens-
ing. Therefore, there is no reason to adopt further compulsory
licensing statutes.
Arguments Against Compulsory Licensing
The alleged benefits to be derived from compulsory licensing, even
if realized, will not offset the many adverse effects. Many of the
more important of such adverse effects are discussed below.
Discourages Research
Compulsory licensing would act as a deterrent to research in two
ways. First, one objective of research has always been to gain a com-
petitive edge, either with a new and better product or a new and
better process. This objective would no longer exist if the competitor
were assured of a license under inventions coming from research.
Second, today’s profits pay for the research leading to tomorrow's
discoveries. If today’s profits are curtailed as a result of having to
compete price-wise with a licensee who has no research expenses,
then of necessity research expenditures must be curtailed.
Any research program is by nature a risky undertaking. It would be
rare indeed for any researcher to achieve immediate success with no
failures strewn in his wake. Yet compulsory licensing would allow
one who has not undertaken the risk of research to reap the benefits
of the successful research of others. It is certainly unfair to reward
those who make no contribution toward progress at the expense of
those who have risked much in making a discovery.
Of significance too is the psychological effect of investing time,
sweat, and money in a research program that eventually leads to a
successful product only to see that product appropriated by others
for their own gain. The situation is analogous to the ambitious
young worker who tries conscientiously to do a good job while his
more experienced co-workers do no more than is necessary. Our
young worker soon learns that he gains nothing by his extra efforts
since advancement is based on seniority, not merit. He soon loses
his ambition. The research worker who finds his discoveries appro-
priated by others will soon lose his incentive to invent.
Money is a very necessary element of any research program. Indus-
trial research is financed by company profits generated from current
164 LEROY WHITAKER
sales. If the research is successful, the resulting new products
and new processes will generate further profits, a portion of which
can in turn be invested in further research. If the profits from
which research investment come are reduced, it is inevitable that
research will be reduced.
A research-based company that is forced to share its successful re-
search with others will inevitably suffer a decline in profits. The in-
troduction of competitive products to the marketplace will mean a
loss in sales by the patentee with a resultant loss in profits even if
the licensee sells at a price substantially equivalent to that of the
patentee. If the licensee takes advantage of his lack of research costs
to sell at a lower price, the patentee will be forced to meet the
price and will suffer even further lost profits. If the licensee does
not sell at a reduced price, he will be reaping windfall profits from
which he will not be required to pay research expenses.
Concern over the threat to research posed by compulsory licensing
has been voiced by such well-knokn persons as Dr. Vannevar Bush,
noted for his outstanding contributions to academia, government
and industry. In 1961 when Congress was considering compulsory
licensing in the pharmaceutical industry, Dr. Bush made the state-
ment that if compulsory licensing were to become law, America
would no longer lead the world in the development of new and
useful drugs. It was Dr. Bush’s contention that industrial research
programs on drug development would be severely cut back if the
bill on compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents was passed.
The factors which prompted Dr. Bush's conclusions are still rele-
vant. and it is not difficult to apply his reasoning to industrial re-
search in any area in which. patents are subject to compulsory
licensing.
Some argue that if the expected decline in industrial research occurs,
the slack can be taken up by increased government research. In
any event, the consumer will pay the costs of research either as
profits to a corporation or taxes to the government. A recent study
in one field of technology has indicated that he will pay far more
as a taxpayer.
Dr. L. L. Deutsch of the University of Wisconsin made a study of
the relative productivity of industrial research and government re-
search in the discovery of new drugs.“ According to Dr. Deutsch,
23. Statement of Dr. Vannevar Bush before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate, Concerning S. 1552, December 7, 1961.
24. Deutsch, “Research Performance in the Ethical Drug Industry”, Marquette Business
Review, Fall 1973.
LEROY WHITAKER 165
in the period 1940 through 1967, 525 new drugs were discovered
in the United States. Industrial laboratories accounted for 457 or 87
percent of these new drugs. In a typical year (1960), industry allo-
cated $215 million to all types of research and development in
medicine while government provided $341 million and private
support amounted to $100 million. Taking out $112 million of
government funds which were spent on basic research, industry's
percentage of research expenditures was 39.5. Yet this percentage
of expenditures accounted for 87 percent of the new drugs dis-
covered. Dr. Deutsch concluded that industrial research makes a
significant contribution to the drugs being marketed in the United
States and recommended that the patent system be continued as
an incentive for such research.
Reduces Product Competition
There is no greater incentive to discover new products than to have
a competitor introduce a successful new product on which he has
an exclusive position. To remain competitive, an equivalent or
superior product mug, be discovered. Efforts are made to invent
around the competitor's patent, often opening whole new areas of
activity. This leapfrogging results in more and frequently better
products for the consumer.
Commissioner Dann recently made this same point when pointing
out that both patent law and antitrust law tend to stimulate com-
petition, probably more often than they inhibit it.? In discussing
the role patents play in fostering competition, Commissioner Dann
stated:
“The patent system provides a spur to competition in research
and development simply by the threat posed to everyone in an
industry that his competitor may get patents on its inventions.”
Without the exclusivity which the patent system provides to the
discoverer of the first product, there would be no incentive for a
competitor to try to develop a competing product. If a license is
available on a product already proved to be successful, why risk
investment in research with the possibility of failure? It is much
more practical to take a license and enter the market with the same
product. In this way, the public and the patentee lose, but not the
licensee.
25. Address by the Hon. C. Marshall Dann before the FBA-BNA B Conference on
Patents, Antitrust, and Trade Secrets, Washington, D.C., June 6, 1974, published in
U. S. Depar ment of Commerce News (Patent Office), June 6, 1974.
166 LEROY WHITAKER
Leapfrogging may also occur by what has been referred to as “me
too” research; i.e., research which is directed toward modification
of the original product in an effort to avoid the patent. Such re-
search has been criticized as curbing more exploratory research.“
It is argued that competitors are encouraged by the prospect of
obtaining “me too” patents to follow the leads disclosed in previ-
ously issued patents of their competitors at the expense of research
in new fields. Research in such a previously defined area is rela-
tively low-risk research offering a high probability of commercial
success. However, even “me too” research is preferable, to no re-
search at all.
Further, me too” research frequently leads to significant discover-
ies. The Deutsch study points out the importance of “me too”
research and so-called “molecular manipulation” in the chemical
and pharmaceutical fields. Based on a survey of 90 physicians in
Madison, Wisconsin, Deutsch selected 18 drugs as being the most
frequently prescribed or the most useful to physicians. Eight of the
18 drugs on the list had been discovered as a result of inventing
around competitive patents. Many of these products exhibited effects
quite different from the original drug, although closely related in
chemical structure.
Thus, leapfrogging benefits the consumer by leading to new prod-
ucts and fostering product competition. This is so whether the
leapfrogging occurs through “me too” research or research into
new areas.
Product competition and the discovery of new products is essential
to successful competition in international markets. In studying
proposed mergers between British pharmaceutical companies, the
British Monopolies Commission found that a high level of research
activity was necessary within the pharmaceutical industry since suc-
cessful international competition demands the discovery of new
products.** The Commission concluded that the patent and trade-
mark laws encourage research, and foster competition. Conversely,
anything that tends to weaken such laws will discourage research
and inhibit competition.
26. Chem. & Eng'r. News 48, November 13, 1961.
27. Supra, note 24.
28. The Monopolies Pp and Glaxo Group Limited;
The Boots Company Limited and Glaxo Grou Limited; A Report on the Proposed
LEROY WHITAKER 167
Discourages Investment
The making of an invention is merely the first step in bringing the
benefits of the invention to the public. Generally, a further sub-
stantial investment in time and money is required between discovery
and marketing. The development of the invention includes the de-
velopment of a commercially feasible manufacturing process, bring-
ing the invention itself to commercial status which may include ob-
taining governmental approval for marketing, and promoting the
invention and developing a market for it. The costs for such develop-
ment programs might be substantially more than the costs for the
research which led to the initial discovery.
In order to justify the investments necessary to market an invention,
a sufficient period of exclusivity in the marketplace is required.
Even a large corporation with a large and successful marketing
component that can compete on equal footing with competitors
would have a difficult time in justifying development expenditures
with the knowledge that its competitors would soon be on the
market too. Certainly, an independent inventor or small business-
man would not be able to gain financial support for even the most
meritorious invention when faced with certain competition from
larger companies who can outperform him in the marketplace.
Unless the necessary investment is made to develop an invention,
the public is denied the benefit of it.
Investment in a new product or new venture is risky at best. The
risk is justified only if there is a reasonable assurance of making
a profit on the investment if the venture is successful. There is no
such assurance when there is a certainty that competitors will move
in on any successful venture. The competitor benefits from the
patentee’s investment and development costs, but incurs no risk of
failure since he has the option of selecting only successful products.
Encourages Secrecy
The objective of the patent system is to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts. This is done by buraging inventors
to make the results of their research available to the public in
return for the limited exclusivity conferred by the patent grant.
Others can then build upon the knowledge disclosed in the patent
literature. One can only speculate as to the effect of withdrawing
exciusivity. It is reasonable to expect that, at the least, inventors
will be reluctant to publicly disclose the fruits of their labors when
they get little or nothing in return.
168 LEROY WHITAKER
Not all inventions can be kept secret while being utilized. Inven-
tions which can be discovered by “reverse engineering’ of the mar-
keted product are not likely subjects for secrecy. However, there
are many inventions which can be maintained as trade secrets
while being practiced. Compulsory licensing will certainly encour-
age the use of trade secrets rather than the patent laws to protect
such inventions. Science and the useful arts are not advanced by
secrecy.
Ironically, when special compulsory licensing legislation is adopted
or proposed for a particular field of technology, it frequently is
directed to a field of technology where progress is most needed.
Such is certainly true in such fields as human health, pollution
technology, and energy. Compulsory licensing in such fields can
serve only to inhibit research and the disclosure of technology and
thus retard, rather than advance, technology in such fields.
Commissioner Dann has expressed surprise at the number of Con-
gressmen and others who seem to feel that compulsory licensing is
necessary in critical fields of technology.? He views such thinking
as shortsighted in terms of national policy. The more important the
technological area, the greater is the need for effective incentives
to spur creative and innovative developments. Also, there is a
greater need in such areas for early disclosure of new discoveries
so that others may build on such discoveries, leading to further
developments. Secrecy in such fields of technology is very unde-
sirable.
Encourages Competition From Abroad
Although compulsory licensing will be a boon to domestic com-
panies who do not engage in research, it will be an even greater
boon to foreign companies. Domestic companies will compete with
the patentee on the basis of comparable equipment and labor costs
but will realize an advantage from no research investment. A foreign
company, on the other hand, in addition to having no research in-
vestment, may also have a. substantial advantage in equipment and
labor costs.
A low-cost foreign operation has a very real potential for under-
selling all domestic producers—not only the patentee, but also
domestic licensees. The prospective effect on the U.S. labor market
should alone be enough to dissuade supporters of compulsory
licensing.
29. Supra, note 25.
LEROY WHITAKER 169
The spectre of low-cost foreign competition would be an even
further deterrent to investment in research and development. Why
make new discoveries and develop new markets with the prospect
of being put out of business by foreign competition.“ Low-cost
foreign operations already have a competitive edge; let’s not be
foolhardy enough to increase their advantage.
Recommended Action
The vast majority of the patent bar agree that compulsory licensing
is an evil that threatens the patent system. We disagree as to the
steps that should be taken to meet the threat. There are two general
schools of thought. One is that some form of compulsory licensing
is inevitable and the patent bar should take the lead in fashioning
tHe statute so as to make it palatable. The other is that compulsory
licensing in any form is unthinkable and we should do everything
within our power to educate the public and Congress as to the
mischief that will be wrought by compulsory licensing.
Those of the first school believe that a statute can be written to
satisfy the goals of those who want compulsory licensing without
sacrificing the values of the patent system. I think one need look
only to the goal of price reduction to see that no statute can be
devised which will satisfy this goal while preserving the patent
system. Those who have drafted a compulsory licensing statute have
intentionally omitted price as a criterion for demanding a license.“
Such an omission will not satisfy proponents of compulsory licensing
who attribute alleged high prices to patents.
It is folly to think that a compulsory licensing statute making no
concession to price will be acceptable to those members of Congress
who associate patents with what they consider to be high prices.
It is just such members of Congress who are the most adamant in
demanding compulsory licensing legislation. If they are not satisfied,
they will continue their demands and we will have unacceptable
compulsory licensing legislation unless we can convince Congress
that such legislation in any form is undesirable.
30. Supra, note 9.
31. Supra, note 9.
W. BROWN MORTON, JR.
W. Brown Morton, Jr. is the senior partner of the Washington,
D.C. firm of Morton, Bernard, Brown Roberts and Sutherland and
is a well-known trial lawyer who received his B.A. and LL. B. de-
grees from the University of Virginia where he has been teaching
patent law since 1958.
Brown Morton was a president of the American Patent Law As-
sociation in the year of 1964-65 and a member of the Board of Man-
agers of the Association from 1956-59. He has been the APLA’s
delegate to the ABA House of Delegates since October 1965.
He has also been extremely active in Bar Association and related
activities among which he was an advisor to the United States
Delegation at the Washington Diplomatic Conference on the Patent
Corporation Treaty in 1970, a member of the Advisory Committee
on the Civil Rules, 1961-1970, and is an ABA representative on the
National Conference of Representatives of the ABA and the Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement of Science, this year, 1974.
170
eee
COMPULSORY LICENSING
An Unplanned-for Addition to the
United States Patent System
BY W. BROWN MORTON, JR.
Introduction :
‘It has been said that I am for“ compulsory licensing and thus
deserving of various uncomplimentary epithets, the average of which
is adequately expressed by a misguided subversive“. When I was
asked to write this article some months ago dealing with a limited
form of compulsory licensing, the Foster v. American Machine and
Foundry Company! case had not yet been decided, but I was lucky.
In my natural inclination to leave undone the things I ought to
have done, I delayed long enough to have before me the opinion
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in this Foster case,
hereinafter “Foster II.
Actually, I am personally opposed to compulsory licensing and
recognize it as clearly antithetical to the basic premise of the patent
system. I believe in the philosophy of the Paper Bag Patent Cases:
“From the character of the right of the patentee we may judge
of his remedies. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the right
can only retain its attribute of exclusiveness by a prevention
of its violation. Anything but prevention takes away the privi-
lege which the law confers upon the patentee. If the concep-
tion of the law that a judgment in an action at law is repara-
tion for the trespass, it is only for the particular trespass that
is the ground of the action. There may be other trespasses
and continuing wrongs and the vexation of many actions. These
are well-recognized grounds of equity jurisdiction, especially
in patent cases, and a citation of cases is unnecessary. Whether,
however, a case cannot arise where, regarding the situation
of the parties in view of the public interest, a court of equity
might be justified in withholding relief by injunction, we do
not decide.” '
I subscribe to the spirit of Mr. Justice Holmes’ dissent in Dr. Mills
Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co.s:
1. 492 F. 2d 1317, 182 USPQ 1 (2nd Cir. 1974).
2 20 U. S. 405, at 430 (1908).
3. 220 U. S. 373, at 411 (1911).
171
a W. BROWN MORTON, JR.
ei think that at least it is safe to say that the most en-
lightened judicial policy is to let people manage their own
business in their own way, unless the ground for interference
is very clear.***.”
I endorse Mr. Justice Frankfurter's like dissent in Scott Paper Co.
v. Marcalus Co.“: f
As against the loss to the public of one possible manu-
facturer is put the public policy of fair dealing between man
and man.“.
Notwithstanding these personal beliefs, 1 think the point of view
Tom Arnold and I expressed at the 1973 APLA Spring Meeting in
St. Paul® was the course of wisdom and I think Foster J] proves our
point. I shall proceed to an analysis of Foster II.
The F oster II Decision
The decision here under analysis deals solely with the remedy
to be afforded an owner fa patent found valid and infringed.
The patent in suit, No. 2, 382,384 issued April 14, 1959 entitled
Welding System“, related to an improvement’ in electrical con-
tact resistance welding and included both apparatus and use claims.
It was found valid and infringed in “Foster 1“. Damages were
awarded on a reasonable royalty theory based on the output power
of the infringing apparatus. We are not here concerned with this
application of 35 U.S.C. §284 (relating to damages); rather we are
concerned with the revolutionary application of 35 U.S.C. 52837,
the full text of which “revolution” I quote verbatim:
!
“Appellant contends that the District Court erred in denying
an injunction and adjudging, in lieu thereof, a compulsory
licensing in favor of appellant at the royalty fixed by the Court.
“We do not find any difficulty in agreeing with Judge Palmieri
that an injunction would be an inappropriate remedy in this
4. 326 U.S. 249, 67 USPQ 193 (1945). : é :
5. 1973 Spring Meeting of the American Patent Law Association at St. Paul, see APLA
Bulletin, April-May 1973, pp. 255-259.
$. Bestetaten Magnetic Heating Corporation, 297 F. Supp. 572, 160 USPJ 246, aff'd
per curiam, 410 F.2d 12, 161 USPQ 133 (2 Cir.), cert. denied; 396 U.S. 829, 163
USPQ 704.
7. §283 Injunction
The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunc-
tions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any
right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.
W. BROWN MORTON, JR. 173
case. An injunction to protect a patent against infringement,
like any other injunction, is an equitable remedy to be deter-
mined by the circumstances, 35 U.S.C. §283. It is not intended
as a club to be wielded by a patentee to enhance his negotiating
stance. See Hoe v. Boston Daily Advertiser Corp., 14 F. 914.
Here, as the District Court noted, the appellee manufactures a
product; the appellant does not. In the assessment of relative
equities, the court could properly conclude that to impose
irreparable hardship on the infringer by injunction, without
any concomitant benefit to the patentee, would be inequitable.
Nerney v. New York, N.H. & N. R. Co., 83 F.2d 490, 410-411,
29 USPQ 456, 457-458; American Safety Device Co. v. Kurland
Chemical Co. 68 F.2d 734, 21 USPQ 30.
“Instead, the District Court avoided ordering a cessation of
business to the benefit of neither party by compensating appel-
lant in the form of a compulsory license with royalties. This
Court has approved such a ‘flexible approach’ in patent litiga-
tion Royal-McBee Corp. v. Smith-Corona Marchant, Inc.,
295 F.2d 1, 6, 130 USPQ 377,381. Here the compulsory license
is a benefit to the patentee who has been unable to prevail in
his quest for injunctive relief. To grant him a compulsory
royalty is to give him half a loaf. In the circumstance of his
utter failure to exploit the patent on his own, that seems fair“.
It is apparent that the Second Circuit“ does not acknowledge the
revolutionary nature of its ruling, but rather seeks to cloak . ae
cision in the respectable trappings of precedent, We shall "show
these trappings to be no more rea than the celebrated Emperor 's
clothes,
Turning to the facts found operative in the application of 35 U.S.C.
$283 in Foster II as stated in the Second Circuit opinion, these
include:
* * *
The appellant, Julius E. Foster, the patentee and the owner
of the patent in suit, is a patent solicitor and a member of the
Bar of the State of New York and of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. He has been at the Bar for almost fifty years.
He has never engaged in any manufacturing or other business
connected with the patent in suit.
8. Supra note 1, at p. 6.
9. The decision was made by a panel consisting of Circuit Pes Waterman and
Feinberg, both active Second Circuit judges, and District Ju — Gurfein, sitting by
designation from the Southern District of New York. Judge Gurfein
wrote the opinion.
174 W. BROWN MORTON, JR.
“The principal defendant and real party in interest is appellee
American Machine & Foundry Co. (AMF). Infringement of
the patent has occurred as a result of the commercial activity
of AMF's wholly-owned subsidiary, AMF Thermatool, Inc.,
and its predecessors, and the individual proprietors of such
predecessor corporations (herein collectively referred to as
Thermatool.) Thermatool manufactured welding machinery,
which included as à component an impeder, which embodied
the process protected by Foster's patent.
“Thermatool in turn sold and leased the welding systems, both
chose containing the infringing impeder and those without it,
to foreign and domestic mil! producers for the production of
longitudinally welded tubes and pipes. The master found that
‘the value of the impeder process, as disclosed in the Foster
patent, constitutes a minor but significant fraction of the total
“In practical terms, Foster had a patent which obviously re-
quired the manufacture of a piece of equipment to make it
usable. Foster does not have any licensee who manufactures
his patented apparatus or uses his patented process. The para-
meters of his patent embraced a component in a larger system
which utilized his process. He did not have equipment to sell
directly to the mill operators. He was hardly in a position to
work out an agreement directly with the mill operators. His
theoretical licensee, in the formulation of a license agreement,
was the manufacturer of the welding equipment who could
use his process. And it is precisely in hypothetical negotiation
with that prospective licensee that the District Court fixed the
reasonable royalty.
“Finally, we note that there are no other factors that would
have been considered at the ‘suppositious meeting’ to deter-
mine the reasonable royalty. Since Foster never operated com-
mercially, there are no such factors as Foster's marketing pro-
gram, Foster's lost sales of non-patented items because of the
infringement, or Foster's lost profits.
* * *
“Twenty-six of these [37] units [not the subject of any relief]
were sold before April 14, 1959, the issue date of the Foster
patent. Eleven of these units were allegedly sold after the issue
date.
10. Supra note 1, at p. 3.
II. ibid, at p. 5.
TLE eee
W. BROWN MORTON, JR. 175
“With respect to the units sold before the issue date of the
Foster patent, the sale could not have been at the time, an in-
fringement, or an inducement to infringe. Coakwell v. United
States, 372 F.2d 508, 511, 153 USPQ 307, 308-309. The units
sold were Thermatool's infringing units. We think that the
continued use of the welding systems by the mill operators
after the flat payment for the systems when bought, did not
later constitute an infringement of the after-issued Foster
patent. See Aluminum Extrusion Co. v. Soule Steel Co., 260 F.
Supp. 221, 224, 151 USPQ 609, 610-611. All the revenues from
these sales were derived by AMF before the Foster patent issued.
“Since Foster has shown no actual damage, we revert to the
‘suppositious meeting’ after the Foster patent issued, to fix a
royalty. We agree with Judge Palimeri ‘that the parties would
have to agree that no royalty would be payable with respect to
infringing equipment sold prior to the issuance of plaintiff's
patent’.
“With respect to the eleven units allegedly sold after the issue
of the Foster patent, the master found that ‘the evidence does
not establish that such eleven units have actually been fitted
with impeders and operated in the United States for the pro-
duction of longitudinally welded tube and pipe.’ The appellant
points to no evidence to convince us that the finding is clearly
erroneous."
Several things emerge from these facts. First, the patentee is the
inventor himself, not an assignee; his only relevant contact with
welding technology is as an inventor, not as a manufacturer of weld-
ing equipment or a practioner of a welding process." Strangely,
the fact that he thus occupied the very role of inventor which the
Constitution seeks to foster, served to diminish the remedy available
to him from what would have been available to him as a manufac-
turer or processor who was the assignee of his patent.
Second, not only was the manufacturer of “infringing” apparatus
that had been sold before the issue date of the patent free of any
liability for making and selling iti“, but the purchasers of it are free
from liability for continued use of it to practice the separately
claimed process after the issue date, a mode of proceeding con-
demned in the cases“.
12. ibid, at pp. 5-6.
13. He is a patent lawyer, but his contacts in that role with the welding industry, if
any, be clearly irrelevant.
14. Correctly so as far as the record shows.
15. Eg., Am. Midlings Pur. Co. v. Christian, Fed. Cas. No. 307 (C.C., D. Minn. 1877).
—
176 W. BROWN MORTON, JR.
Third, the patentee was allowed no recovery for units not shown to
have been assembled and used commercially in the United States,
though sold after the issue date.
Fourth, the defendant AMF was the “prime” infringer in the sense
that he was the sole commercial source of the infringing apparatus
and the obvious efficient repository of power to license the process
to all users without discrimination, harassment, or a multiplicity
of suits. Thus Foster had not sued the “secondary” infringers, but
had moved directly against the real party in interest.
Ironically, though one might properly think that each of these four
factors was one which suggested a need for injunctive relief, each
seems to have been taken by the Second Circuit the other way
round. At least the opinion candidly and literally acknowledges
that it is approving the judicial grant of “a compulsory license
That compulsory license operates to authorize prospective infringe-
ment by a direct infringer (of apparatus claims) who is also a con-
tributory and inducing infringer (of process claims), thus trans-
ferring control over commercialization of the invention from the
inventor to that infringer. No other decision I know of that
far. The court's stated grounds are the patentee’s “utter Eure to
exploit the patent on his own”. No other decision I know of relies
on such grounds alone. The opinion suggests that the plaintiff
should be grateful for “half a loaf’. No other decision I know of so
condescendingly destroys the exclusivity of a patent grant.
The Foster Precedents A nalyzed
The Second Circuit cited only the following cases, listed in inverse
chronological order:
Royal-McBee Corporation v. Smith-Corona Marchant, Inc. is
Nerney v. New York, N. H. & H.R. Co.
American Safety Device Co. v. Kurland Chemical Co.
Hoe v. Boston Daily Advertiser Corp'n. s, (hereinafter “Hoe II.).
None of these cases is authority for the grant of an on-going com-
pulsory license to a primary infringer who has been finally held
liable in damages for all of his actionable infringements. None
makes reference to the patentee’s non-working of the invention as
a circumstance relevant to the remedy available to him.
<<
2 .
W. BROW?! MORTON, JR. 177
Royal-McBee related to a patent issued July 4, 1933 on a typewriter
margin control which was being used by the successful assignee-
patentee in large scale production, and also by at least two large
scale infringers, the defendant, Smith-Corona, and another losing
defendant, Remington**. The District Court found Royal's con-
duct vis-a-vis Smith-Corona to have been such as to forfeit Royal's
right even to the legal relief of damages for infringements committed
prior to the actual filing of the suit. The same conduct was also
found to justify the withholding of the equitable remedy of injunc-
tion for the 33 months remaining before expiration of the patent,
but not to justify the denial of damages for continued infringement
after the complaint was filed. It was this action of the District Court
in giving something other than an all-or-nothing effect to Smith-
Corona’s estoppel defense which the Royal-McBee panel of the
Second Circuit approved as a “flexible approach” in 1961. This
was scarcely the addition of a compulsory working requirement
to the patent statutes of the United States, a step the Congress has
consistently refused to take.
Nerney is the familiar freight car case. What is not usually noted
is that the defendant railroad, the New Haven, was already under
an injunction with respect of its own cars, over which it had such
control as to make the enforcement of the ban entirely practical
and merely an economic burden on the defendant's private purse.
Nerney sought to extend his injunction to forbid the New Haven
to accept infringing cars belonging to other companies for transit
over the New Haven tracks. It was found to be simply impractical
to enforce the ban at the car-interchange points and further to place
a substantial burden on the public by disrupting the freight service
of wholly innocent shippers. The court was at pains to point out
that the principal other infringer was the Pennsylvania against
which Nerney had available a complete remedy, including a direct
injunction. Thus, the Nerney decision cited is no authority at all
for grant of a compulsory license to a primary private infringer.
Indeed, it appears to follow the common-sense of Judge Lacombe
in Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Union Ry. Co., 78 Fed. 365,2.
American Safety Device is even more remote; it is merely one in a
long chain of decisions which decline injunctive relief to a patentee
whose patent expires during the pendency of the law suit.
Hoe iI might seem better to support the action of the Second Cir-
20. See Royal Typewriter Ca. v. Remington Rand, 168 F.2d 691 (2 Cir. 1948).
21. See the Paper Bag Patent Case, supra note 2.
22. 78 Fed. 365 (C. C., S.D.N.Y. 1896).
178 W. BROWN MORTON, JR.
cuit in Foster JJ, but careful reading shows this is not so. The patent
in suit, No. 131,217, was for a combination of elements comprising
a part of a large printing press in daily use producing the Boston
defendant's newspaper. The matter arose on a motion for a pre-
liminary injunction, the patent having already been found valid
and infringed by a soon-to-be justice of the Supreme Court, Blatch-
ford, C. I. sitting as a circuit judge, Hoe v. Kahler, (Hoe I). The
Boston defendant had bought its machine with notice of Hoe’s
claim and had been indemnified by its manufacturer. In denying
Hoe's motion, Circuit Judge Lowell had this to say:
“Is this a case for an injunction? The improvement in question
is but part of a large machine, upon which the daily newspaper
of the defendants is printed, and a change of this part of it,
though possible, is difficult, and might embarrass the usual
course of business of the company, and would cause much
expense to the defendants, or, rather, to their guarantors. Nor
would it be of any advantage to the plantiffs, except to coerce
a settlement, for they do not use printing machines, but make
and sell them in the market. Whatever they are entitled to in
the way of damages, amounts, in effect, to a royalty. Their real
damage suffered when this machine was bought, and is
not affected by the amount or duration of its use. Acting on
this view of the matter, the parties have been negotiating for
the payment of a license fee, but are very far apart in their
estimate of its amount. The only advantage which the plaintiffs
could derive from an injunction, would be to put them in a
better situation than they are now in, or than the defendants
will then be in for the further conduct of the negotiation. if
the case were in such a situation that I could now decide the
question of damages, I might, perhaps, order an injunction,
unless that amount were paid within a reasonable time.“
Clearly, Hoe II is not a case sustaining the grant of a compulsory
license for the continuation of an infringing course of conduct by
a primary infringer, for, as the court observed, “[t]he contest is, in
fact, between rival manufacturers”. The nominal defendant in
Hoe II was a newspaper publisher—a relatively innocent bystander
or secondary infringer, the interruption of whose use of the inven-
tion was in some measure a detriment to the public. And Hoe's
competing manufacturer had already been enjoined. Hoe II is good
authority for Nerney; it is not, for Foster II.
23. 12 Fed. 111 (C.C., S.D.N.Y. 1882).
24. Supra note 21 at p. 915.
W. BROWN MORTON, JR. 179
The Hoe II Citations Reviewed
Hoe II is notable if only because the redoubtable Frederick P. Fish,
Esq. appeared for the losing complainants. Circuit Judge Lowell
noted that “[t]he decisions which refuse an injunction, in cases
very like the present, have been collected by the diligence of coun-
sel”. They are here tabulated chronologically and those cases not
later reviewed by Circuit Judge Lacombe in Campbell Printing
Press & Manufacturing Co. u. Maulialtan Railway Co.**, are marked
with an asterisk:
Barnard v. Gibson, (1849);
Forbush v. Bradford, (1858);
Howe v. Morton, (1860);
Sanders v. Logan, (1861);
Stainthorp v. Humiston, e (1862);
Lowell Manuf’g. Co. v. Hartford Carpet Co., (1864);
Morris v. Lowell Manuf g. Co. 2 (1866);
Bliss v. Brooklyn,3* Fed. Cas. No. 1544, (C. C., E. D. N. v. (1871);
Wells v. Gill, (1872);
Amer. Middlings Pur. Co. v. Christian, (1877);
Colgate v. Gold & Stock Tel. Co. (1879);
N. P. R. Co. v. St. P., M. & M. Ry. Co., (1880);
M’ Crary v. Pennsylvania Canal Co. (1880);
New York Grape Sugar Co. v. American Grape Sugar Co. (1882);
Ballard v. Pittsburgh, (1882); and
\
Rule 93, Rules of Practice in Equity, (1879).
Fed. 930 (C.C., S.D.N.Y. 1892).
U.S. 1849).
iber
ae
88
88
PP
a
7
8
2
a
8
888
So
88
:
.
8
5
5
*
13280 (CC., N. D. N. V. 1862). \
wei RETTT TET ®
F SSE:
9825
8
2
—
8
C.C., ND. N v. 1882).
D. Pa. 1882).
. S. (1879). Rule 93 of the Rules of Practice in Equity
825
ga
28
2
9
FSSESKRSERESSRNRR
x is 4
cause, he may, in his discretion, at time of such allowance, make an order
2 TTT
t
the rights of the opposite party.” (Promulgated January 13, .
—
180 W. BROWN MORTON, JR.
Hoe Il and most of its citations were authoritatively reviewed by
Judge Lacombe in Campbells Judge Lacombe anticipated Mr.
Justice Peckham in E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., in
refusing to follow the ruling of Judge Blodgett in Hoe v. Knap,“
[Hoe iii}.
In Hoe Ill the proposition was advanced, “under a patent which
gives a patentee a monopoly, he is bound either to use the patent
himself, or allow others to use it, on reasonable terms’’**. Whether
one adopts Judge Lacombe's view, no authorities for this proposi-
tion *** are cited ***, nor is such a construction of the statute ***
supported by argument “or Justice Peckham’s” ‘*** The dictum
found in [Hoe III] is not supported by reason or authority [em-
phasis in original], it is apparent that Foster II revives a long-
discredited doctrine. Which is not to say that Judge Lacombe was
blind to “the principles of equity [35 U.S.C. §283]”. In fact, in
Campbell, he observed:
“Defendant also insists that injunction should not issue because
the infringing couplings now in use by it are used in the service
of the public, and to enjoin would be to work great hardship
to the public. In Bliss v. Brooklyn, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 596, in-
junction was refused because the hose couplings complained
of were necessary for the daily use of the city in the prevention
of fires; and there is a long line of authorities to the same
effect. There is, however, nothing in the case at bar, beyond
the bare assertion of the defendant, to show that an injunction
properly regulated as to time may not be dbeyed without in
any way interfering with the service which defendant renders
to the public as a common carrier of passengers. It seems to
have experienced no difficulty at all in temporarily withdraw-
ing its locomotives and cars from such service at suitable sea-
sons, for a sufficient length of time to affix the complainant's
couplings. Why it may not, in like manner, remove them, does
not appear. Complainant may take decree for account and in-
junction. The terms of the injunction, providing from how
many cars and locomotives the infringing couplings shall be
removed each week, may bet settled on notice. .
42. Supra note 25.
43. 186 U. S. 70 (1902).
44. 27 Fed. 204 (C. C., N.D. IH. 1886).
45. id. at p. 212.
46. Supra note 25 at p. 935.
47. ibid.
W. BROWN MORTON, JR. 181
He followed the same pattern in equitably shaping injunctive relief
in Thompson- Houston“, and in Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v.
Great Northern Ry. Co.“
One of the cases cited in Hoe II, not reviewed in Campbell, is Bal-
lard v. City of Pittsburgh.se This points up a proposition as to
which there is no substantial question, namely, that public services
will not be interrupted by patent injunctions shutting off the con-
tinued use of substantially completed facilities. In Ballard, a pat-
ented wooden pavement had been installed in the defendant city’s
streets. The court rightly declined to order it torn up. This, in no
sense, authorized Pittsburgh to build like streets in the future. The
clear rationale of this line of cases is no doubt the reason the
Second Circuit, in Foster II, made no reference to the celebrated
case of City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc. By extension,
the courts have also declined to cause gross economic waste by or-
dering the scrapping or disuse of existing devices in private hands,
e. g. Landis Tool Co. v. Ingle®.
Another Hoe II case not reviewed in Campbell is Am. Middlings
Pur. Co. v. Christian**. This points up the important procedural
matter of the status of patentee’s established position on validity
and infringement. Only if these are virtually ironclad will an in-
junction issue before final decree making them certain, but in lieu
of injunction a patentee may well be protected by a bond and a
direction for a periodical report of the accused infringing acts.
That this is, indeed, acting “in accordance with the principles of
equity [35 U.S.C. §283] is shown by the third Hoe JI citation not
reviewed in Campbell, N. P. R. Co. v St. P., M. & AI. Ry. Co.,
supra, where a like bond requirement in lieu of injunction was
ordered in a non-patent case. And see also Rule 93 of the Rules
of Equity“.
It would overextend the bounds of this paper to review all the
decisions I have read or noted as being of real or seeming relevance
to the correctness of Foster II. 1 simply repeat my initial observa-
tion that Foster II is a precedent-shatteri
of which I cannot guess. As we have seen from the quoted passages
48. Supra note 22.
49. 86 Fed. 132 (C. C., S.D.N.Y. 1898).
50. Supra note 40.
51. 69 F.2d 577, 21 U.S.P.Q. 69, (7 Cir. 1934).
52. 286 Fed. 5, (3 Cir. 1923).
53. Supra note 35.
54. Supra note 41.
182 W. BROWN MORTON, JR.
8
dealing with the Foster IJ facts, the Second Circuit is not proceed-
ing on the assumption that Foster's invention was vital to the U. S.
welding industry or even to the defendant manufacturer. There is
no logical reason to limit the rationale of Foster II to cases where
an entire patent is not being exploited. Why does it not justify a
compulsory license under an unexploited claim? Similarly, where a
patent i part of a portfolio of related patents, why does Foster II
not justify a compulsory license under Patent A even though the
patentee is exploiting a competitive substitute covered by his
Patent B? Those are the reasons why I reach the following conclu-
sion. \
\
Conclusion
\
It is the thrùst of this article that Foster II demonstrates that the
courts are succumbing to the current pressures for compulsory
licensing in a manner materially to reshape the patent system and
that, therefore, legislation is required to prevent a United States
patent from becoming, by judicial fiat, nothing materially different
in effect from a Soviet “inventor's certificate”. Hence, I urge that
Title 35, United States Code, be amended by adding thereto a
section 294, as follows:
N
N
8294. Compulsory Licensing
„(a) (1) At any time more than three years after the issuance of a
patent and more than four years after the filing of the application for
the patent, any person may, in accordance with the requirements of
this section, commence a civil action against a patentee to obtain a
compulsory license.under such patent.
“(2) The venue of a civil action commenced pursuant to the foregoing
sub-section shall be the district court for the district in which the
patentee, if a natural person, resides or in which the patentee, if a
corporation, is incorporated or has its principal place of business or,
in the case of a non-resident patentee, as provided in section 293 of
this title.
“(b) The complaint in the action shall set forth the nature and pur-
pose of the use which plaintiff intends to make of the license, the steps
taken by plaintiff to ere a voluntary license, and statements of the
ted uence of failure to obtain the license and the ted
mar sary rey ee es
“(c) Within ten days after service of the summons and complaint,
plaintiff shall serve a a on each exclusive licensee under the
patent whose license is recorded in the Patent Office who shall have
the right to intervene in the action.
“(d) Plaintiff shall be entitled to an order directing the patentee to
grant a non-exclusive license to plaintiff, if:
(I) the invention covered by the patent is of primary importance in
a general field of endeavor;
“(2) for a period of at least three years prior to the commencement
W. BROWN MORTON, JR. 183
of the action, there has existed a public need for the invention which
has not been reasonably satisfied by the patentee, his licensees (includ-
ing prior compulsory licensees), and alternative products or processes;
(3) plaintiff has both the requisite resources and intent to market
goods or services of good quality unde: the license sought which will
satisfy the public need ;
“(4) plaintiff cannot otherwise obtain a license on terms which the
court deems to be reasonable for the use of the invention intended to
be made by plaintiff; and
“(5) plaintiff has not for six months before commencement of the
action, or during the action, committed acts which he knew or reason-
ably should have known were acts of infringement of the patent.
“(e) the court shall not order the grant of any license pursuant to this
section for any purpose other than stated in the complaint; nor shall
any court order the grant of any license under a patent already the
subject of a license ordered under this section without action com-
menced pursuant to this section and separate findings as provided
herein.
“(f) In any decree ordering a license hereunder, plaintiff shall be or-
dered to pay compensation therefor to the patentee and any then ex-
clusive licensee under the patent in such manner and at such times as
the court may find reasonable under the circumstances, and in such
allocation between patentee and exclusive licensees as the court deems
just.
“(g) The amount paid by the licensee shall not be less than reasonable
for use of the invention and for loss of exclusivity which the license
imposes upon the patentee and his exclusive licensees. In determining
the compensation the court shall consider:
“(1) the risks undertaken in first completing the patented invention;
“(2) the cost of research and development which led to the invention
and the development thereof into marketable form;
“(3) the costs of failures and losses encountered by the patentee, his
predecessors in title, and his exclusive licensees in other research or
development efforts in the same general field;
(4) the efforts and expenditures made by the patentee, his predecessors
in title, and his exclusive licensees in developing the market for the
patented invention, in prosecuting and defending the patent right, and
in defending actions for licenses under this section; and
(5) the savings achievable by the proposed licensee through use of
the invention.
“(h) The order of the court shall specify the duration of any license
ordered under this section, and shall specify such other terms and
conditions as the court deems advisable to protect both the public in-
terest and the property interest of the patent owner and his exclusive
licensee in the invention”.
All other statutory provisions for compulsory license under United
States patents except 28 U.S.C. §1498 (a) should be repealed. The
legislative history of this proposal should make it plain that Foster
is being overruled, but that §283 is being continued and Judge
Lacombe's application of its principles in Campbell are being ap-
proved.
B. R. PRAVEL
B. R. Pravel is a partner in the Houston law firm of Pravel & Wilson.
The firm has specialized for many years in patent law, anti-trust
law and related fields of law.
Mr. Pravel has been a lecturer in the patent field on numerous oc-
casions over the last trenty years, and he has authored a number of
articles in the patent field. He has served as Chairman of the Patent,
Trademark & Copyright Section of the State Bar of Texas. He also
served as Chairman of the National Council of Patent Law Associa-
tions. For the past three years he has served on the Board of Man-
agers of the American Patent Law Association.
184
SAY “NO” TO MORE COMPULSORY
LICENSING STATUTES
BY B. R. PRAVEL
1
Introduction (
The United States Supreme Court has, in all of its dignity and
rightful authority, declared for posterity:
“That a patent is property, protected against appropriation both
by individuals and by the government, has long been settled“.
In any proposal for a compulsory license statute, whether it be
general, (i. e. one intended to cover all situations where licensing of
patents could be forced against the will or desires of the patent
owner), or specific, (i. e. where the patent owner ‘could be forced to
license his patents only for a selected situation, such as non-use,
excessive profits etc.), the basic recognition of a patent as property
is essential. In this area, the United States Supreme Court stands
as the bulwark against the waves of destruction often pounding
against this fundamental which has its origin in nothing less than
the United States Constitution.’
Compulsory licensing in any form is an in-road on such property
right.? No doubt there are now, and have been for many years past,
those who regard any kind of private ownership of property as evil,
and there are others, who, even though they would not go so far as
to condemn the ownership of all private property, believe that, at
least, the private ownership of patents cannot be tolerated. The
comments in this article are directed to those two groups, and to a
third group as well, which has sincere proponents of the patent
system, who have mistakenly become convinced that it is necessary
o “pacify” the first two groups by proposing compulsory licensing
statutes. To that group, it is the author's hope that this article will
say, as in the famous words of John Paul Jones, Don't give up the
ship. We have just begun to fight.”
The fight is not of recent vintage.‘ In Hartford-Empire® the Supreme
Court observed:
1. Hartford-Empire Co. U. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415, 64 USPQ 18, (1945).
2. U. S. Constitution, Art. I, sec. 8, clause 8.
3. James M. Wetzel, Can Patent Properties Be Redistributed Thro Compulsory Li-
censing?, 1 APLA Quarterly Journal pp. 184-191, No. 3, (Summer 1973).
4. S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, “Cases on Federal Anti-Trust Laws”, (1948), pp. 494-495.
185
i
—
186 ‘ B. R. PRAVEL
|
U
“Congress was asked as early as 1877, and frequently since, to
adopt a system of compulsory licensing of patents. It has failed to
enact these proposals into law.”
Also, as observed in the Hartford-Empire case, the Temporary Na-
tional Economic Committee (TNEC) made a Final Report“ which
recommended compulsory licensing legislation, which will require
that any future patent is to be available for use by anyone who may
desire its use and who is willing to pay a fair price for the privilege.”
From that extreme, which would be completely destructive of the
value of patents, we find a number of currently proposed compul-
sory licensing bills of varying degrees of specificity and scope. The
primary thesis of this article is that compulsory, licensing statutes
are not necessary, even for specific situations wherein compulsory
licensing would be constitutional, because in those rare instances,
the courts can adequately provide for compulsory licensing under
the strictures of the United States Constitution and within the
framework of judicial precedent: It should be emphasized that the
fact that under certain conditions compulsory licensing may be
proper does not in any sense establish the desirability for a com-
pulsory licensing statute or statutes, as has been argued by some
proponents recently for a general licensing statute.” On the contrary,
the presence of adequate safeguards through judicial control, of
patents is submitted to negate any desirability or need for a general
compulsory licensing statute, or even specific statutory compulsory
licensing provisions. The concern which we should all have is that
expressed by Judge Frank in a slightly different context, but with
equal applicability when compulsory licensing of patents is con-
cerned;
“We should not throw out the baby with the bathwater.”
In other words, we need to be certain that neither Congress nor
the courts “throw out” or destroy the patent system with its value to
the economy of the United States by attempting to correct abuses,
imagined or real, of patents by some patent owners.
Constitutional Limitations Re “ Taking” Private Property
Before considering patents specifically, a brief look at some of the
controlling constitutional limits on property in general must be
made.
5. Supra, note 1, at p. 401 or 389,
6. U. S. Con Senate, Final Report and Recommendations of the Temporary Na-
tional Economic Committee, S. Doc. 35, 77th Cong., Ist sess., 1941, pp. 36,37.
7. W Congress, Senate, Hart Bill, S. 2287, 93rd Cung., Ist sess.; Morton, article at
p. .
\
— sanenaseenaneenananme
B. R. PRAVEL 187
The only constitutional provision for taking“ private property is
that of eminent domain as provided for in the United States Con-
stitution, Fifth Amendment, the pertinent portion of which reads:
.. . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”
In the usual case of a taking“ of private property under eminent
domain, the taking is by the (a) government for (b) “public use“.“
Normally, there is “one complete taking and one complete accrual
of the right of the owner to compensation“. When private property
is taken by the government under eminent domain, the Constitu-
tion further provides for the protection of due process“. % The
courts have had numerous occasions to spell out the requirements
of due process,” such as that of notice reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to appraise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions. m With respect to the requirements of “due process”, when
the government is exercising its powers of eminent domain, there
are clearly established legal guidelines and precedents. The courts
are likewise experienced and well adapted for determining the “just
compensation” for the private property taken by the government for
public use.:
Under the mantle of “police power“, Justice Douglas, speaking for
the Supreme Court, extended the scope of eminent domain in
Berman v. Parker to permit the District of Columbia to take a
man’s department store in a slum area under an area redevelopment
statute. Although the store owner made the argument that the
“taking” was unconstitutional because it was “a taking from one
businessman for the benefit of another businessman”, the argument
was rejected on the broad basis of the public welfare. Although the
case is subject to broader ramifications, the property was within a
large blighted area and Congress had elected to attack the problem
on an area basis rather than a structure-by-structure basis, so limita-
tion is implicit in the decision—namely, in the absence of the public
need to deal with the whole area as an entity, it would not have been
constitutional to have taken the property from one person for the
benefit of another person.
8. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158, 160 (1922): “The pro-
— of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for
p use.
9. Irving Air Chute Company, Inc. v. U. S., 93 F. Supp 633, 87 USPQ 246 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
10. U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment.
Tae Cone Renpuer Rank & Frost, 800:U.S. 206, 70 8. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865
12, United States v. Pewee Coal Co, Ine, 341 U.S. 114, 71 S. Ct. 670 (1951).
13. 348 U.S., 26, 75 S. Ct. 98, (1954).
188 B. R. PRAVEL
However, since “police power” is frequently referred to in cases
dealing with eminent domain as well as other constitutional law
cases, the applicability of that power is likewise pertinent before
dealing specifically with the compulsory licensing of patent ques-
tions.
The scope of “police power” as exercised under the Constitution
is broader than that of eminent domain and it is universally con-
ceded to include everything essential to the public safety, health,
and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by
proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a “public nuisance.”
The police power extends to the United States within the field of
interstate commerce. i As explained in the Speert case:
“While the Federal government does not have the same police
power as is reserved to the states, nevertheless, once a general
subject is properly within the scope of the powers granted in the
Constitution to the Federal government, that government has
powers to prescribe police regulations concerning that subject,
and these powers are as broad as those which a state government
possesses concerning subjects within its reserved powers.
The plethora of court decisions dealing with the application of the
police power in various situations confirms the wide experience and
guidelines available in this area from the court decisions.
The exercise of the police power by Congress is “for the benefit of
the public.” The latitude with respect to the police power is, how-
ever, judicially circumscribed so that it is used to “protect” the
Court to permit regulation purely on the basis of speculative public
benefit and traditionally has extended to such items as regulation
14. Lawton ex al v. Steele, 152 US. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499, (1894) ; Goldblatt v. Town of
lempstead, New Y ork, 369 US. 59, 82 S. Ct. 987, (1962).
v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S. Ct. 345 (1925); Speert et al v. Morgen-
than et al, 116 F. 2d 301 (D. C. App. 1940).
16. Supra, note 15, Brooks b. United States.
=
B. R. PRAVEL 189
of liquor. prostitution, is fertilizer works. ic and brick yards.
In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, wherein
the majority opinion was rendered by Justice Holmes in a direct
confrontation with the renowned Justice Brandeis in dissent, the
following statement limiting “police power” rings out with clarion
sound as a warning which is applicable to the particular topic here-
under consideration, namely compulsory licensing:
“The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment
presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it
shali not be taken for such use without compensation. A similar
assumption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. 13 Ann. Cas. 1008.
When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified
by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to
extend the qualification more and more until at last private prop-
erty disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way
under the Constitution of the United States. (Emphasis added).
Constitutional Limits Re “Taking” of Patents
Patents stand on the same footing as other private property with
respect to the constitutional limitations applicable to the “taking”
of such property. The United States Supreme Court in the historic
case of James v. Campbell. correlated the patent property right
to other property rights insofar as the constitutional protection is
concerned:
“That the government of the United States, when it grants letters
patent for a new invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon
the patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention
which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself,
without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or
use, without compensation, land which has been patented to a
private purchaser, we have no doubt. The Constitution gives to
Congress power “to promote the progress of science and useful
arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries,’ which
could not be effected if the government had a reserved right to
17. * — v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 679 (1887).
L’ ote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900).
“es
190 B. R. PRAVEL
publish writings** or to use such inventions without the consent
of the owner.”
Some proponents of compulsory licensing have suggested that since
the patent is primarily for the “public benefit”, the patentee is
under a sort of moral obligation to see that the public acquires the
to the free use of that invention as soon as is conveniently pos-
sible** and others have urged that the patentee should be required
to license all comers at reasonable royalties.** Fortunately, for the
patent system and for the American economy, the United States
Supreme Court in the Continental Paper Bag Company case replied
to that position by stating, “We dissent entirely from the thought
thus urged”, and Congress has likewise consistently refused to adopt
. ee eee eee
some specific compulsory licensing legislation has been passed by
Congress. ——ñ———
general eminent domain statute relating to the use of patents by the
government, 28 U.S.C. 1498, will be considered later.
It is submitted that although patents deal with the intangible
(product of a person's mind) rather than the tangible (land, build-
ings, personal property), the nature of the property right is the same
and should be governed under the law by the same considerations,
and particularly the constitutional limitations with respect to the
taking of property. Even though a patent is “conditioned by a public
purpose. that public purpose is fulfilled by the inventor disc’ osing
to the world his invention as his quid pro quo for the exclusive
rights to that invention under the patent grant. The public is served
by having available to it the knowledge of that invention in the
disclosure of the patent itself. The contractual obligation of the
government in granting the patent is that the rights to that inven-
tion shall be “exclusive” as provided for in the Constitution and
anything less than that, whether it be in the original grant or in a
23.
24. Continental Paper Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 US. 405, 1908 CD+594
February 15, 1974. 492 1317 182 USPQ 1 (and Cin 1974).
a ee cy eg
26. Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 22
Act, 42 U.S.C. 2183; Aue Act, 42 US.C. 185, Sec. 308; Ten-
Act, 16 U.S.C. 831r.
ereoid 5. ontinent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 S. Ct. 268, 88 L.
B. R. PRAVEL 191
property, are essentially condemning the monopoly or exclusive
nature of patents with the popular appeal of public benefit. Such
an approach is obviously mere confiscation of private property
which the inventor has in good faith made available to the world in
exchange for such property and finds no support in any decided
opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court. Even when framing anti-trust
remedies for abuses of patent rights, the courts have been careful
to limit the decrees so that they simply restore competition and
prevent abuse, without attempting to confiscate the patents.“
Aside from the constitutionality of the eminent domain concept
embodied in the patent eminent domain statutes,” it is quite sur-
prising to find that very little has been discussed or written with
respect to whether or not any other type of compulsory licensing
of patents by statute is constitutional. One writer** who provided
us with a very scholarly historical study with respect to the meaning
intended by the word “exclusive” in Article |, section 8, clause 8,
relating to the patent grant, concludes that the constitutional pro-
vision “to promote the progress of science and useful arts” was pur-
posely made “exclusive”, but he believed that was the utmost limit
of the Constitution were willing to go, and
he expressed his opinion that less than exclusive rights in a patentee
would be constitutional. However, the following quote from that
Article is more convincing, and represents the prevailing view that
the word “exclusive” was intentionally inserted in the Constitution
to provide the necessary incentive to inventors:
“In arguing that the use of the term ‘exclusve right’ referred to
in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, would render a com-
pulsory licensing system or cancellation of a patent for non-use
unconstitutional, stress has been laid on the act that in Madison's
draft, submitted to the Convention on August 18th, 1787, the
phrase used was “to encourage by premiums and provisions the
advancement of useful knowledge and disiovery’, furthermore,
that Charles Pinckney, on the same date, proposed ‘to grant
patents for useful inventions’, while the phraseology as finally
adopted on September 5th, 1787, by Judge 3rearley’s Committee
on Postponed Matters, read ‘by securing’ for limited times to
inventors, the ‘exclusive’ right to their respecive *** discoveries.”
From this change in phraseology it has ben argued by a very
learned authority on patent law, Mr. Karl Fenning that:
‘It is significant, therefore, that in framing the Constitution
in its final form, the words “Patent” and “Copyright” were not
used, possibly lest the power be limited tc the particular forms
192 B. R. PRAVEL
of conditional exclusive rights which were at that time known
as “Copyrights and Patents
“From the ‘words finally chosen for the Constitution’, Mr. Fen-
ning deduces that ‘these seem to allow no limitations on the
‘exclusive’ right such as requirements for working or compulsory
licensing.’ "#3
Perhaps it might be better to allow the constitutionality question
with respect to the compulsory licensing of patents to rest strictly
upon the constitutional requirement of Article I, Section 8, that
the patent right must be “exclusive”, but the author has the nagging
belief that this is not the entire answer and would not be the only
basis considered by the Supreme Court should this matter reach
that level for a decisive judgment. For one thing the Supreme Court
itself has authorized compulsory licensing of patents where there
has been an abuse of the patent rights, such as by an anti-trust viola-
tion, beginning with the Hartford-Empire case. Apparently, the
constitutionality has been assumed by the Supreme Court and in-
stead, the constitutionality focus has been upon the issue of whether
or not the compulsory licensing should be “royalty-free” or on a
reasonable royalty basis. In United States v. National Lead Co.,
et al, the Supreme Court held that “on the facts before us” the
issuance of a royalty-free license under the patents was not justified
to effectively enforce the Anti-Trust Act. In 1952, the Supreme
Court stated in Besser Mfg. Co., et al v. United States, that com-
pulsory patent licensing is a well recognized remedy where patent
abuses are proved in anti-trust actions and it is required for effective
relief. Presumably, the constitutional basis for such compulsory
licensing by the courts must rest under the judicial power in
“equity” extended in Article III, Section 2, discussed in a later
section.
Further, a more in-depth view of the matter is forced upon us also
by the “police power” authority available to Congress, and the
extent of its applicability to, and limitations on, the compulsory
licensing of patenits.
L
33. J
-
30. US. 444, 447, 72 S. Ct. 838, 841 (1952).
B. R. PRAVEL 193
Court-Imposed Compulsory Licensing of Patents
In a recent non-patent case, the scope of equity powers in shaping
equity decrees and the guiding principles behind such equity
powers, has been spelled out for us“:
“In shaping equity decrees, the trial court is vested with broad
discretionary power; appellate review is correspondingly narrow.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S.
1, 15, 27 n. 10, 91 S. Ct. 1267, 1275, 1281, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1971).
Moreover, in constitutional adjudication as elsewhere, equitable
remedies are a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair,
and what is workable. “Traditionally, equity has been character-
ized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a
facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.’
Brown v. Board of Education (II), 349 U.S. 294, 300, 75 S. Ct.
753, 756, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955). Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for
the Court, has said, ;
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the
Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the neces- ;
sities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has
distinguished it. The qualities of mercy aiid practicality have
made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and recon-
ciliation between the public interest and private need as well
as between competing private claims.’ Hecht Co. v. Bowles,
321 U.S. 321, 329-330, 64 S.Ct. 587, 592, 88 L. Ed. 754 (1944).
(Emphasis added).
See also Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396, 66 S.Ct.
582, 584, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946).
In equity as nowhere else courts eschew rigid absolutes and look
to the practical realities and necessities inescapably involved in
reconciling competing interests, notwithstanding those interests
have constitutional roots.
Equitable remedies are likewise cognizant of the “public interest
involved” and of the “public policy” of statutory provisions within
their jurisdiction.**
A striking example of the exercise of the equity powers of the Fed-
eral court is found in the typical remedies for antitrust violations
N. Lemon v. Kurtzman, . . U.S. . ., 93 S.Ct. 1463, 1469 (1973).
38. United States v. Morgan et al, 307 U.S. 183, 59 S.Ct. 795 (1939).
194 B. R. PRAVEL
which include the three “D's” of antitrust enforcement, divestiture,
divorcement, and dissolution.**® The statutory basis for the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Courts under the antitrust laws is under the
various antitrust statutes such as the Sherman Act, which has a
very broad delegation of power, vesting the District Courts of the
United States with jurisdiction “to prevent and restrain violations
of this Act.” In view of such general language, the relief accorded
under the Sherman Act clearly rises out of the inherent equity
powers of the Federal Courts and further on the basis of regulating
“interstate commerce” under the Constitution.
Geing back to the Hartford-Empire case, u the Supreme Court es-
tablished the use of compulsory patent licensing as an equitable
remedy where there had been an antitrust violation. In that case,
the government wea have the patents forfeited or cancelled
because of the anti violations, and instead, the Court limited
its punishment to the requirement for compulsory licensing “at
standard royalties and without discrimination or restriction.” In a
sense, the Hartford-Empire case represents a clash of the public
policy of the patent laws and the public policy of the antitrust laws.
The dominant standard in both is the general public interest or
welfare. Both bodies of law are aimed at the protection of the public
interest in competitive technology and in competitive trade and
commerce.*? The limitations on the right of the patent-holder, such
as the requirement for compulsory licensing, are reached within that
broad scope of general policy of the patent laws and the antitrust
law, which is capsulated in the following quotation from the Hart-
ford-Empire case (pages 442-453):
Ihe general policy has been to restrict the right of the patent-
holder rigidly within the terms of his grant and, when he over-
reaches its boundary, to deny him the usual protections of the
holder of property. That this ordinarily has been done in infringe-
ment suits or suits for cancellation does not qualify the fact or
the policy. On the other hand, the anti-trust statutes have re-
ceived a hroad construction and corresponding enforcement,
where violation has been clearly shown. When the patent holder
so far overreaches his privilege as to intrude upon the rights of
others and the public protected by the anti-trust legislation, and
does this in such a way that he cannot further exercise the privi-
39. Malcolm A. Hoffman and Arthur I. Winard, Hoffman's Antitrust Law and Tech-
niques, Vol. I, (1963), pp. 407-425.
40. Timken Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 602, 71 S. S. Ct. 971
B. R. PRAVEL 195
lege without also trespassing upon the rights thus protected, either
his right or the other person’s, and the public right, must give
way. It is wholly incongruous in such circumstances to say that
the privilege of the trespasser shall be preserved and the rights
of all others which he has transgressed shall continue to give way
to the consequences of his wrongdoing.’ ”
In the National Lead case, cited supra, the Supreme Court recog-
nized the “issue of the constitutionality with respect to requiring
a royalty free compulsory license, but specifically side-stepped the
issue. The Supreme Court apparently assumed so long as “reason-
able royalties” were required for payment, there was no constitu-
tional issue. The Supreme Court did not deal with the more difficult
issue, namely, whether the transfer of private property from one
individual to another, can be categorized as the taking of private
property for “public use.” It might be argued that compulsory
licensing places a product into use by the public and this makes it
a public use,” but that kind of logic or reasoning could justify the
requirement by the government for the transfer of any private
property from one individual to another so long as the property
being transferred is used or sold to the public for use. More specific-
ally, in the field of patents, if such rationale were carried to its
logical conclusion, it would mean that the “exclusive” right con-
templated by the Constitution for patents would be destroyed.
In addition to the antitrust cases, wherein compulsory licensing of
a patent was the remedy, the Second Circuit has recently required
a compulsory license on the basis of the patent owner being a non-
user.“ In that case, the patentee was a patent attorney who “never
engaged in any manufacturing or other business connected with the
patent in suit.” The master appointed by the District Court had
applied the “willing licensor-willing licensee” test to ascertain a
reasonable royalty for the compulsory license which was ordered
with respect to future infringement. There was a decided difference
of opinion between the patentee and the infringer as to the basis
and the amount of the royalty which should be paid by the infringer,
and the Second Circuit concluded that the patentee was not within
his rights because the patent “is not intended as a club to be wielded
by a patentee to enhance his negotiating stance.” The entire premise
of the Second Circuit was on the basis of the equities and they con-
cluded that it would be inequitable to impose irreparable hardship
on the infringer by injunction without any concomitant benefit to
the patentee. They of course overlooked the fact that the patentee |
; E hd Cin 1978) 18M decided
: ruary : A Cir. 1974). . .
196 B. R. PRAVEL
might get a much greater benefit in the form of royalties from some-
one else who would be licensed by the patentée. They concluded
that the compulsory license was a “benefit to the patentee” and that
“To grant him a compulsory royalty is to give him half a loaf. In
the circumstances of his utter failure to exploit the patent on his
own, that seems fair.“
As an aside, the Foster decision, in approving the compulsory licens-
ing of the patent, relied primarily upon Nerney v. New York, N.H.
& H.R. Co. ; American Safety Device Co. v. Kurland Chemical
Co. and Royal-McBee Corp. v. Smith-Corona Marchant, Inc. The
Nerney case involved a denial of an injunction which would have
required the defendant to notify other infringers to refrain from
sending railroad cars having the infringing brakes to the defendant's
trackage. The court specifically recognized that the plaintiff might
properly proceed against the other infringers, but such denial did
not result in a compulsory licensing to the defendant. The Ameri-
can Safety Device case was a situation in which the patent had
expired and the patentee was attempting to obtain an injunction
to restrain the further use of the infringing machines made during
the life of the patent. The court refused the injunction because
there was a plain and adequate remedy at law since damages would
suffice. The Royal-McBee case was a case in which compulsory li-
censing was ordered on the basis of “the relatively short period re-
maining of the life of the patent.” The Royal-McBee court observed
with respect to such award of a compulsory license: *
We find this flexible approach towards a difficult problem of
balancing equities in patent litigation most desirable, and we
think the remedy was fully warranted by the facts of this case.”
The “flexible approach” was also emphasized in the Foster v. Ameri-
can Machine & Foundry Co. case, but ii is significant that the cases
relied upon By ster court did not order compulsory licensing
merely because of a non-use by the patentee. Such decision raises
co ional questions as to the scope of the equit wer of the
courts, which ee . te ee reme
Court the potion for wilt OF ICG f e Se . 55
say, that even CONGWESS HAT WOT 38H Hi to Paar eee Technion nies
would require compulsory licensing of a patent merely because of
non-use, and as discussed hereinafter, such power would appear to
B. R. PRAVEL 197
be beyond the constitutional authority granted to Congress. Al-
though the equity powers of the courts are not as well-defined as
the powers of Congress under the Constitution, certainly it would
be inconsistent for an equity court to have the power to take private
property on any broader scope than permitted under the Constitu-
tion for Congress. The Fifth Amendment limitation should cer-
tainly be applicable to the judiciary as well as to Congress, so
mere non-use of a patent by a patentee should not justify compul-
sory licensing by either the judiciary or Congress.
Despite the undesirable result which was reached by the Second
Circuit in the Faster case, those who would advocate more legislation
with respect to-compulsory licensing should agree that the Foster
case does emphasize the fact the courts are in a position to use the
“flexible approach,” so long as they are within the constitutional
limits. Thus, where compulsory licensing is a proper remedy, the
courts are in a position to require compulsory licensing. On the
other hand, if the courts exceed their constitutional authority by
requiring compulsory licensing in a situation which amounts to the
taking of private property for use by another, hopefully there is
likewise a remedy to the patentee through the protection of the
courts. Certainly, the court procedures are available for the patentee
to assert his position and claim his rights if they are abused under
the guise of equity powers.
The courts have also exercised their equity powers with respect to
patents in other instances, such as the renowned Activated Sludge
case, which is frequently cited by advocates of compulsory licensing
as a justification for more compulsory licensing. However, that case
is actually an eminent domain se in which the city of Milwaukee
was the governmental body acting within the scope of its obligations
to protect the welfare of its citizens. It was recognized in that case
that both parties had strong equities, but “there are many others
who are indirectly concerned whose equities are even stronger than
those of the parties.” The court observed that if the injunction
preventing patent infringemeiii was made permanent, it would close
the sewage plant, leaving the entire community without any means
for the disposal of raw sewage other than running it into Lake
Michigan, thereby polluting its waters and endangering the health
and lives of that and other adjoining communities. The health and
the lives of more than one-half million people were involved. Even
if such Activated Sludge case is not recognized as an eminent domain
case, it certainly must be recognized as a case in which the equity
— aed of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc. 69 F. 2d 577, 21 USPQ 69 (7th Cir.
198 B. R. PRAVEL
powers are properly exercised within the scope of those police
powers” normally available for the public welfare. It is believed
that the Activated Sludge case represents a proper use of compulsory
licensing when needed for equitable relief, but within the constitu-
tional requirements. Where there has been a misuse of the patent,
the courts have fashioned the remedy of refusal of relief, at
least until the misuse has been discontinued.“ Where there has
been a prolonged refusal to make available a patented product or
process, such as in Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation,®® the courts have similarly concluded that
the patent is unenforceable in the public interest. Although the
Vitamin Technologists case was decided on the basis of the patent
being invalid for other reasons, the court recognized that the ques-
tion was raised as to the “public interest in restoring the health
of the afflicted”. The Continental Paper Bag case“ was discussed
with respect to the holding in that case that the suppression of the
use of the patent was the right of the holder of the patent monopoly.
The distinction in the case of the refusal of the patentee to license
the use of his patent to protect the health of great numbers of the
public, as compared to the refusal to license the patent for paper
bags was recognized by the court. This type of recognition is im-
portant and is a fundamental advantage in having the courts deter-
mine when compulsory licensing should be required, rather than
having statutory provisions for compulsory licensing which would
attempt to cover across-the-board situations. Thus, the non-use of a
patent on a paper bag is certainly a far cry from the non-use of a
valuable vitamin which should have been used for its health value
to the public, particularly where the showing was that the patent
owner literally refused to offer such product to the public. This of
course may also require a distinction between different types of
drugs, which would be virtually impossible for Congress to define
in terms of which ones would be subject to a compulsory license.
Thus, unless the drug was one which had been suppressed for an
excessive period of time without cause and such a drug was necessary
to protect the health of great numbers of the public, compulsory
licensing would not be justified. Again, the flexibility and the de-
sirability of leaving the matter of compulsory licensing with the
courts is evidenced by the history of the judicial process in this area.
Summarizing briefly with respect to the compulsory licensing re-
quired under the equity powers by the courts, it should first
USPQ 21 (1944) ; Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 52 USPJ 30 (1942).
50. 146 F. 2d 941,
(9th Cir, 1944).
B. R. PRAVEL 199
be noted that compulsory licensing of a patent has not been re-
quired by the courts except where there has been some type of
activity such as an anti-trust violation, misuse or aggravated abuse,
other than in the recently decided Foster case“, which is still hope-
fully subject to review by the Supreme Court, The ability of the
courts to deal with specific situations and to develop all the neces-
sary evidence and pertinent facts is submitted to be a safeguard
which is present under the equity powers of the courts, which is,
for the most part, being cxercised with constitutional restraint and
with the typical fairness expected in equity.
The Constitutional Limits on Congress with Respect
to Compulsory Licensing
The powers vested in Congress under the Constitution appear in
Article I, Section 8. One of such powers is of course the power:
“To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries”.
Congress also has the right “to regulate commerce“ which of course
brings within its jurisdiction the right to pass legislation dealing
with antitrust matters. As noted previously, the traditional police
power is also available to Congress.
\
“Congress can certainly regulate interstate commerce to the ex-
tent of forbidding and punishing the use of such commerce as
an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty or the spread of any
evil or harm to the people of other states from the state of origin.
In doing this it is merely exercising the police power for the
benefit of the public’”’.®*
Thus, the exercise of the police power by Congress is to be “for the
benefit of the public“. The latitude with respect to the police power
is, however, circumscribed so that it must be used only to “protect”
the health, safety and morals of the community and to prevent “the
spread of any evil or harm“. In other words, regulation under the
police power by Congress has never been so broadly construed so
as to permit regulation purely on the basis of speculative public
benefit.
The United States Supreme Court recognized the limits of Con-
52. Supra, note
53. Brooks v. United States, 267 US. 432, 45 S. Ct. 345 (1925).
200 B. R. PRAVEL
gressional powers in the landmark case of Mugler v. Kansas, when
it stated:
“Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use
of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dis-
pose of it..
Compulsory licensing necessarily does disturb the owner in the
control or use of his property for lawful purposes and it does restrict
his right to dispose of it, so compulsory licensing really does not
fall within the scope of control or regulation contemplated by the
police power, whether it be considered under the commerce clause
of the Constitution“ as described by the Supreme Court in Brooks
v. United States, cited supra, or whether the “police power” is more
broadly defined as in those cases dealing with the application of
police power by the States. The consideration of the scope of police
power as a general proposition has been thoroughly considered.**
It must be concluded that the police powers are primarily directed
towards regulation and when the regulation reaches the point that
it is “taking” the private property, the police power no longer ap-
plies, but instead, the constitutional requirement for “public use”
by or for the government applies. Since the essence of a patent right
is the “exclusive” nature of the right, any diminution of such ex-
clusive nature constitutes a “taking” from the patent owner, There-
fore, since compulsory licensing necessarily constitutes a diminution
of the exclusive nature of the patent right, it follows that compul-
sory licensing cannot be considered a mere regulation under the
police power, but must be construed as a “taking”.
This is not to say that within the framework of the United States
Constitution, there cannot be regulations under the police power
with respect to patents, and in some rare instances, even compulsory
licensing, providing such action is within the framework of the
Constitution and patents are treated in the same manner as other
private property. The eminent domain provisions with respect to
the patents found in 28 U.S.C. 1498 are consistent with the Fifth
Amendment obligations permitting the taking of private property
for “public use” with “just compensation”. “Due process” is also
provided for in such statute. The key language of 28 U.S.C. 1498
is that the use or manufacture shall be “by or for the United States”,
so the taking of the patent is by the government which qualifies
54. 123 U.S. 623, 668-669, 8 S. Ct. 273, 301 (1887).
55. Article I. section 8, clause 3,
4. Takings and the Police Power, Yale Law Journal, Volume 74, pages 36-76
B. N. PRAVEL 201
for the “public use“ requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 28
U.S.C. 1498 clearly provides for the “recovery of his reasonable
and entire compensation” which has thus been left to the Court of
Claims for determination.
A similar but essentially outdated, provision for government use
is found in the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 16 U.S.C, 8311,
which provides for use by a government corporation and permits
recovery of “reasonable compensation”.
The conclusion must be reached that statutory provisions for com-
pulsory licensing would be constitutional only if within the stric-
tures of Brooks v. United States.: For that reason, mere non-use
of a patent, regardless of the length of time of the non-use, would
not be the proper subject for compulsory licensing, even though
this has been advocated.** On the basis of police powers, the Atomic
Energy Act compulsory licensing provisions,“ are constitutionally
justified because of the evil or harm to the people if atomic energy
is not properly used and controlled.*® The instances of a commodity
such as atomic power or nuclear energy is rare enough so that such
statutory provisions do not set a precedent for any general compul-
sory licensing statutes as some have suggested.
Certainly the ability of the courts to handle the flagrant situations
which would require compulsory licensing, other than in special
situations such as atomic energy, is amply demonstrated over a long
period of time and supports the basic premise that legislation in
this area is not only unnecessary, but undesirable. The following
brief consideration of some of the recently proposed legislation deal-
ing with compulsory licensing is believed to demonstrate the prob-
lems in attempting to handle by anticipatory legislation the excep-
tional and flagrant abuses which would be constitutionally subject
to compulsory licensing by Congress, rather than leaving it to the
courts.
Proposed Legislation Re Compulscry Licensing
Where compulsory licensing of patents is required such as under
the federal Non Nuclear Energy and Research Development Act
of 1974%, as a result of research, development or other projects
57. Supra, note 53.
58. wien Supra, note 4; Picard v. United States, 128 F. 2d 632 (2 Cir, 1942).
59. 42 U.S.C. 2183.
60. Interesting] enough, a recent inquiry by the author to the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion — that in foe one application (A a license was made and it was withdrawn
in 1971. No orders have issued for compulsory licensing under the Act.
61. H. R. 13565, (93d Cong. 2d Sess.)
1
—— — —— — —
202 8. f. PRAVEL
which are contracted for with the Government by a private party,
the constitutionality of such provisions cannot be questioned. There
is of course no “taking” because the arrangement is a voluntary
contractual one. Whether or not the provisions are desirable, par-
ticularly with respect to the disclosure and licensing of “background
patents, trade secrets, knowhow, or proprietary information” from
the standpoint of inducement for parties to enter into the contract
is certainly questionable. On the other hand, Section 308 of the
“Clean Air Act’’®*, is submitted to be unconstitutional. It is not
within the eminent domain rights of the government since the
compulsory licensing is made available to non-government entities,
and it goes beyond the police powers of Congress as outlined in the
Brooks v. United States case by taking away the exclusive rights of
the patent owner with an inadequate showing of a public need by
the Administrator of the Act. ‘The requirement that the “unavaila-
bility of such (patent) right may result in a substantial lessening
of competition or a tendency to create monopoly” inherently exists
if the patent was the only method of accomplishing the requirements
set by the Administrator. Therefore, that requirement is essentially
meaningless and is not a limitation, even though it is couched in
the typical antitrust statutory language.
It is submitted that only if an aggravated refusal to market under
the patent can be shown and such refusal results in “evil or harm
to the people * is there any justification for compulsory licensing
under the police power. Such limitation consistent with the police
power is clearly lacking in Section 308 of the Clear Air Act, and
therefore since no other constitutional basis would support such
Act, it is the writer’s conclusion that Section 308 is not constitu-
tional.
The Hart Bill S. 2287 (93d Cong., Ist Sess.) is likewise submitted
to be unconstitutional for several reasons. First, it provides that not
only the patent shall be subject to a compulsory license, but “all
available knowhow necessary commercially to work the best mode
of working the subject matter of the patent” shall also be subject
to the compulsory license. The value of “know-how” is in its secrecy
and exclusiveness, or at least its control by the owner so as to limit
its disclosure. A requirement that this type of information be li-
censed on a compulsory basis is clearly a confiscation of private
property which destroys the property itself. For the same reasons as
expressed above in connection with the Clean Air Act, the pro-
visions relating to the lessening of competition are submitted to be
62. 42 U.S.C. 1857 (1967, 1973).
63. Supra, note 53.
PE r an —
. x . SS LEFT EIE BTR: F —
B. R. PRAVEL 203
meaningless. The statute purports to express a public interest to
justify the compulsory licensing by directing its attention to subject
matter “involving or related to pubiic health, safety, or protection
of the environment”. Just because a patent happens to fall into
those particular areas of public interest does not mean that the
police power of Congress can be automatically exercised. There
must be a showing of some evil or harm to the people with respect
to the public health, safety or environment by reason of the failure
to use or license the patented subject matter to justify compulsory
licensing under the police power.
The further provision cf the Hart Bill which provides for compul-
sory licensing for the non-working of the patented invention for a
period of three years following the date of issue of the patent or
four years following the date of application of the patent is clearly
unconstitutional. There is no constitutional requirement for the
use of a patent. As stated in the famous Continental Paper Bag case,
cited supra:
“His title is exclusive, and so clearly within the constitutional
provisions in respect of private property that he is neither bound
to use his discovery himself nor permit others to use it.
In a more recent case, the same basic right of a patentee was recog-
nized:
“The restrictions in the various agreements seem only to be the
exercise by a patentee of his right either to decline to practice
its invention; to practice it exclusively itself; to grant a single
license or exclusive licenses with or without cross-licensing (Sperry
Products, Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 171 F. Supp. 901
(N.D. Ohio, 1959), aff'd and mod. 285 F.2d 911, 925-926 (6 Cir.
1960) cert. den. 368 U.S. 890, 82 S. Ct 139, 7 LEd. 2d 87 (1961),
or to grant non-exclusive licenses.
It has been suggested by some that since the Constitution provides
for the grant of exclusive rights for limited times that such con-
stitutional language justifies a shorter period of time for a nonuser
of his patent than for a user of his patent, but it is submitted that
such thinking is not consistent with or supported by the still viable
Supreme Court language from the Continental Paper Bag case
quoted above. Further, the Constitution would not permit discrimi-
nation as to the time limits for patent rights to different inventors
6. & Voss AG v. Prudential-Crace Lines, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1116, 1137 (D.C.
Stes, SR NRE EES PPP
re
204 B. R. PRAVEL
based upon use or non-use. To place an interpretation on the con-
stitutional language “for limited times” so as to attempt to justify
compulsory licensing on no other grounds except non-use is sub-
mitted to be in total disregard of the normal reading of such words.
The absurdity of such a reading of the Constitution is illustrated
by considering a hypothetical fact situation in which Mr. Smith
has invented a light bulb with a carbon filament and another light
bulb with a tungsten filament, both of which are patented. Mr.
Smith determines that both light bulbs will work, but he can get
the carbon filaments at a lower price, so he elects to make the carbon
filament light bulb. The Giant Electric Corp. without any expense
for research on its part on this product determines that it can make
the tungsten filament bulb at a lower price than Mr. Smith can.
If Smith is forced to grant a compulsory license to the Giant Elec-
tric Corp. on the tungsten filament bulb, his business could be
injured or destroyed by a competitor who had no research cost to
recover. Under the non-use proposal, Smith would be forced to grant
the license simply because he is not using one of his patents even
though he is offering a good product to the public at a price which
is reasonable. Such example is not exhaustive, but is merely illustra-
tive of the unfairness and counter-productiveness of such proposal
for compulsory licensing merely because of non-use of a patent.
Considering now other paragraphs C, D and E of the Hart Bill, it is
immediately apparent that they have no police power justification
at all and are clearly unconstitutional. Paragraph C would permit
a compulsory license to a party who obtained a “subsequently issued
patent” which he could not use until the expiration of a prior issued
patent. Paragraph D would permit a compulsory license when a per-
son has commercially worked the patented subject matter before
the actual filing date of the patent. Paragraph E permits the appli-
cant to seek a compulsory license when the portion of a product
which he is making or selling embodies the patented subject matter
to the extent of 10% or only a minor part. Quite clearly, none of
the foregoing requirements in paragraphs C, D, and E of the Hart
Bill have anything to do with the police power of the Federal gov-
ernment and they cannot be justified under the Constitution.
The Nelson Bill S. 954, (83d Cong., Ist Sess.) contains compulsory
licensing provisions in Sections 399d and 399e, primarily based upon
the price of drugs covered by patents. The drug industry has been
under attack, particularly with respect to patents on drugs, for a
number of years, and there always seems to be someone suggesting
the compulsory licensing of patents on drugs on the unsupported
and illogical theory that this is going to make drugs less expensive
. LIEGE IED EADIE LORE Dy CHOY PEs HR ts rs
„ ——:v ————
B. R. PRAVEL 205
and more available to the public. The fact that is overlooked by
most advocates of compulsory licensing of drug patents is that, in
the absence of the incentive for a substantial return on the success-
ful drugs that are discovered, the incentive to spend millions to
invent or discover new drugs would be virtually destroyed or ma-
terially diminished. If it were not for the incentive to develop new
drugs, there would have been no reason for private industry to have
spent the vast sums for research to invent the many “wonder drugs”
presently available to the public. Although those of us who are not
directly connected with the drug industry might consider it an
easy way out to suggest that the drug industry should be the one
and only industry subjected to compulsory licensing, it should be
remembered that if price or the profit made with respect to any
product is the criteria for compulsory licensing, such criteria (to
be non-discriminatory) should apply to all patented products. The
distaste most businessmen would justifiably have for “Big Brother”
regulating the price or profit of their patented products, would cer-
tainly cause a devastating curtailment on invention. There is no
justification under the police power for broadly requiring compul-
sory licensing of drug patents on the basis of prices charged, if no
misuse or violation occurs. Drugs can be obtained, even though
high prices must be paid for some of them. For the indigent, the
government can certainly provide appropriations for health pur-
poses under public welfare, as is already done. This is an area where
we clearly would be “throwing out the baby with the bath water”
if compulsory licensing of drug patents is permitted. Of course,
if it could be shown, as in the Vitamin Technologists case, that a very
vital drug was not being produced by anyone and the patent owner
refused to produce it, and such refusal placed persons in danger
with respect to life or death, that would justify compulsory licensing
and it would be constitutional under the police powers, but that
of course is not the basis for the Nelson Bill or any other bills of
that type.
“Comprehensive” Compulsory Licensing Statutes
With “Safeguards”
The typical reasons advanced for favoring a comprehensive or gen-
eral compulsory licensing statute with “safeguards”*> has been the
following:
(A) to meet the demands of those who contend there has been
65. APLA proposed resolution (Minneapolis Meeting, 1973), which proposal was re-
jected. Similar proposals have been consistently rejected by the Patent, Trademark &
Copyright Section of the American Bar Association in recent years (1972, 1973).
— —-—- ——2ſm e eden BMD ee e Ams ee er
206 B. R. PRAVEL
significant suppression of patents (without any substantial proof);
(B) The compulsory licensing statutes are not used, and would not
be used, to any extent, particularly when enough “safeguards” are
included in the statute;
(C) Compulsory licensing is a present reality in the United States
law and practice.
For those who contend that we should adopt such a general com-
pulsory licensing statute because of the allegations of “suppression”
or non-use, the answer is submitted to be very simple. The foregoing
portion of this article is believed to clearly support the proposition
that legislation is not necessary to prevent that type of abuse when
it is sufficiently severe and is within the constitutional powers of
Congress or the courts to prevent. The Vitamins Technologists case
is an excellent example where the court stood ready to require com-
pulsory licensing because of the public need for the invention which
was being suppressed.
The recent case of Foster u. American Foundry and Machinery Co.,
although believed beyond the constitutional powers of the court in
exercising its equity powers, is an indication of the willingness of
the courts to test their outer limits of authority in dealing with sup-
pression and non-use of patents when the need arises.
In answer to the argument that the compulsory licensing statutes
with “safeguards” will not be used anyway to any substantial ex-
tent.“ it is submitted such argument does not follow merely because
the compulsory licensing statutes which have been in effect for
specific instances, such as atomic energy, have not been widely
utilized. Certainly, there is a greater temptation to seek compulsory
licenses under a general compulsory licensing statute than under a
specific one and although foreign compulsory license provisions
have not been used extensively, they have certainly been used more
than under the Atomic Energy Act. Further, if it be true that there
would really be a lack of use of a general comprehensive compulsory
licensing statute, what is the reason for having one? Particularly
when the courts can handle any compulsory licenses which should
be required for abuses of patent rights.
The fact that compulsory licensing is a present reality in a limited
sense does not recommend a greater scope for compulsory licensing.
At present, compulsory licensing, both in the statutes and in the
pra, note 43.
A recent report from the Atomic Energy Commission reveals that there has been
only one application for a license pursuant to 42 USC 2183 and that application was
withdrawn before the license was issued.
— —
r..
B. R. PRAVEL 207
court decisions is relatively limited, as it should be. The statutes
are discussed above and relate to such things as eminent domain
where the government is involved in the use, and those situations
which are a clear abuse of patent rights. As noted previously, when
the compulsory licensing statutes or the court decisions go beyond
merely correcting abuses or carrying out the public policies such as
expressed under the anti-trust laws, they become seriously question-
able with respect to the constitutional basis. In any event, the pres-
ence of some limited compulsory licensing in the law today does
not provide a stepping stone into the deep and stormy waters of
general compulsory licensing with all the ramifications and disad-
vantages resulting therefrom.
There are many disadvantages of a general compulsory licensing
statute of the type proposed by the recently defeated American
Patent Law Association Resolution.“ Reliance upon the courts to
require compulsory licensing where such is within their constitu-
tional authority is much more desirable than any general compul-
sory licensing statute. The courts have the “flexible approach”
rather than the more rigidified approach which necessarily results
la any attempt to provide a general compulsory licensing statute.
The courts can deal with the problems as they arise and are in a
Position to obtain the evidence and the facts upon which the court
renders such equitable relief. By reason of the responsible nature of
most courts, the exercise of the compulsory licensing power will
normally be tempered with reason and sparingly used so that it
does not become commonplace and destroy the patent system. The
statutory approach, on the other hand, tends to encourage compul-
sory licensing by making it seem accessible and authorized.
Furthermore, the mere presence of a general compulsory licensing
statute would tend to promote litigation. The attitude it's worth a
try” for a party to seek the compulsory licensing could become the
norm. Such legislation could provide a sword which could be used
by large and small companies alike to force competitors into highly
disadvantagous positions, not only by the expense of the litigation,
but by being forced to license patents which would otherwise pro-
vide a competitive advantage and for which the patent owner had
paid the price in the form of personal ingenuity, research, expense
or royalties. No justification can be seen for thrusting such addi-
tional burden upon patent owners when the courts are fully capable
of handling compulsory licensing when needed, as is believed evi-
dent from the foregoing discussion in this article.
68. Supra, note 65.
i — a *
208 B. R. PRAVEL
Conclusion
Most efforts at drafting legislation for compulsory licensing have
resulted in unconstitutional legislative proposals, which fortunately
have almost universally been refused by Congress. The present
statutes which are constitutional, 28 USC 1498 and 42 USC 2183,
are examples of the constitutional use of eminent domain and the
police power. Any attempt at a general compulsory licensing statute
strictly for non-use, excessive pricing or profits, or for other reasons
that do not fall within the categories of eminent domain and police
power are unconstitutional, and it is submitted that all of the re-
cently proposed legislation in these categories falls within the un-
constitutional area.
Furthermore, the need for statutory compulsory licensing has not
been established. In cases where there are abuses, misuses or aggra-
vated suppression, as discussed above, the courts are adequately
equipped to handle the remedies in equity, within the framework
and with the safeguards of the Constitution. The circumstances
when compulsory licensing is the judicial remedy have been rare,
and should be rare. The courts are equipped with the flexibility
to handle compulsory licensing as a remedy when it is needed, and
the rigidifying effects of any statutory provisions would oniy tend
to make the task of the courts more difficult.
Compulsory licensing statutes, particularly of a general type, are
especially undesirable because of the fostering of litigation to com-
pel licensing an incipient or actual infringer and the consequent
resistance to licensing by the patentee. Not only would the consti-
tutional issues have to be resolved with respect to many statutory
provisions, but the expense of each individual fact situation which is
litigated would have to borne by the patentee and prospective
licensee as well.
Having reached the foregoing conclusions, some may raise the now
ancient, but still asserted, hue and cry that such position merely
demonstrates the negativism“ of the majority of the patent bar.
Such criticism is not and should not be disturbing because prevent-
ing a weakening of the patent system with the resultant weakening
of the American economy by more compulsory licensing statutes
transcends the criticism. Although the fight is not of recent vintage,
it apparently is one which will continue because the advocates of
compulsory licensing seem perennial. Steadfast opposition is neces-
sary to defeat the destructive in-roads proposed by such proponents
of compulsory licensing statutes. The importance of the needed op-
position should commit us to fight.
aS CSPI OEY
INSTRUCTIONS
I. The applicant will fl out in full the questions set forth above.
II. Send ten dollar admission tee
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.