Petition for Rehearing — Foster v. American Machine & Foundry Co.

Supreme Court brief1974

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Vol. tl SUMMER 1974 No. 3

A discussion on the compulsory licensing of patents in the United States by:

S. Delvalle Goldsmith of New York, N.Y.

Leroy Whitaker of Indianapolis, Ind.

W. Brown Morton, Jr. of Washington, D.C.

B. R. Pravel of Houston, Tex.

A LAW JOURNAL

for

THE PATENT BAR

by

THE PATENT BAR

A forum for free exchange of views and ideas for the Patent, Trade-

mark and Copyright practitioner.

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© 1974 by the American Patent Law Association

ee —L—

APLA

QUARTERLY

JOURNAL

Published quarterly by the

American Patent Law Association

EDITORS

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Editor-in-Chief Managing Editor

Coliseum Building, 26th Floor

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FFF ² AAA N 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

.. ei cece cok eek Res aden ee Rene ra gaen oe 144

The Case For Restricted“ Compulsory Licensing

by S. Delvalle GO fkk hh 146

Compulsory Licensing Another Nail In The Coffin

by Leroy Whitaker ........ cece cece ee eeeencnacncees 155

Reasons Advanced In Support of Compulsory Licensing ... 155 .

// ² aes candy f ; . wd 155

. ͤ cick eases F 158

R lo 159

Limited Compulsory Licensing Already In Effect ...... 162

Arguments Against Compulsory Licensing 163

ae q 163

Reduces Product Competitioo gs 165

Discourages Investment 167

Brnoourages Sere ee 167

Encourages Competition From Abroad .............. 168

— / ² ——U—U—· Mt TEEPE 169

Compulsory Licensing An Unplanned-for Addition

to the United States Patent System

by W. Brown Morton, Ilir 171

%% / ⁰˙mAĩ 171

J.. earn roy errs far 171

The Foster Precedents Analyzed .............--.e+eees 176

The Hoe Il Citations Revle wee 179

Conclusion ....... JJV 182

Say No“ To More Compulsory Licensing Statutes

/// ̃ ⁰³ ̃ ᷣ˙uwul.. ci derdenean keg estes 185

I a on os Pho ¼ d ½ Ag é ²⁰˙⁰r˙C c vee 185

Constitutional Limitations Re Taking“ Private Property ... 186

Constitutional Limits Re “Taking” of Patents ............ 189

Court-Imposed Compulsory Licensing of Patents ........ 193

The Constitutional Limits on Congress with Respect to

. m ks karen tndawesshivwinccascseeons 199

Proposed Legislation Re Compulsory Licensing ......... 201

“Comprehensive” Compulsory Licensing Statutes

% MM 45 205

d , . amg roe 208

AGL OP . PAST TM SALE ROR ep VAI PING ERE TD FAM GE INS

EDITORIAL

Our summer issue of the JOURNAL is devoted to compulsory

licensing. This topic has been much discussed by the patent bar,

primarily because several proposed Congressional bills have con-

tained such provisions.

When we first decided on this issue, Foster II, which a consensus

of authors considers a most significant departure from the present

law in this area, had not as yet been handed down. Now with this

new decision, the treatment of this subject should be of timely

interest.

Our topic this time is not treated in the typical po and con fashion,

because we found it substantially impossible to find any spokesmen

for the completely pro compulsory licensing approach. Thus, we

have the limited pro approach being taken by Messrs. Goldsmith

and Morton, the former suggesting important bases for compulsory

licensing both in history and foreign practice, as well as interpreting

the constitutional grant as requiring compulsory licensing when

non-use is apparent. The latter finds his justification for proceeding

with a specific legislative proposal in the precedent of the Foster II

case. The exceedingly wide-ranging papers of Messrs. Whitaker and

Pravel set down what might properly be described as the majority

view of most patent practitioners.

As before, we invite your thoughts and suggestions for the JOUR-

NAL. N i

144

S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH

S. Delvalle Goldsmith is a senior partner of the law firm of Ladas,

Parry, Von Gehr, Goldsmith & Deschamps. He is a member of the

New York Bar and received his A.B. degree from Columbia College

and his J.D. degree from New York University Law School.

Mr. Goldsmith is a member of the Council of the Patent, Trade-

mark and Copyright Section of the American Bar Association as well

as a member of the Executive Committee of the International

Patent and Trademark Association (AIPPI). He has also been

active in the American Patent Law Association, the New York

Patent Law Association, and the Interamerican Industrial Property

Association (ASIPI). He has given numerous talks and is a frequent

author in the field of patents.

145

IRN SIE mC Re Ny Mago e

THE CASE FOR “RESTRICTED”

COMPULSORY LICENSING

BY S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH

Compulsory licensing for “non-working” of a patented invention

is a fact of law, but not a fact of life, in most other countries. A fact

of law because there are compulsory licensing provisions in the

patent laws of nearly every important country except in the United

States. Not a fact of life because there are few grants of compulsory

licenses in countries having these provisions. This does not mean

that the compulsory license laws are not working but that, with such

laws in the background, the parties that might be subject to their

control would usually rather deal with each other on a voluntary

basis“.

The reference to few compulsory license grants applies to compul-

sory licenses for non-working and not to compulsory licenses ob-

tainable in many countries for food and drug inventions whether

they are worked or not. Numerous compulsory licenses of the latter

type have been granted, particularly in Canada’.

The above points up a basic difference between the two types of

compulsory licensing: on the one hand compulsory licensing as

advocated by some (usually those who do not believe in a patent

system at all) under which all patents, or all patents in a particu-

lar field, are subject to compulsory licensing whether or not the

patented invention is worked; on the other hand, restricted com-

where an invention for which there is a demand is not “worked”

63-65 (1936). See

i that:

the sealing of

(Great Britain) —10th edition, page 249 (1961).

3. Thus, in the case of Sterilab Corp. Lid. s: Chas. Pfizer & Co. Inc. 62 Canadien Raters

Reporter 94 (1970), an Editorial of the reporter says “As a matter, the

license (for a pharmaceutical patent) will be granted almost as a matter of course.”

146

S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH 147

by the patentee or allowed by him to be worked by others, i.e.

prevented from reaching the market place.

The first type of compulsory licensing, as exemplified by the afore-

mentioned food and drug licenses, if extended to all areas of tech-

nology, would probably mean the end of patents as such and possi-

bly also serious diminution of research and development. What in-

centive would there be to spend money on R & D when, after an

invention was successfully commercialized, a competitor could get a

license to use it without spending money for research, development,

pilot plants and consumer-education? In fact, with such a regime of

general compulsory licensing, not only would competitors not en-

gage in research, but there would not be any research in the first

place for them to take advantage ot.

The second type of compulsory licensing (i. e. for non-working) is

quite different. As long as the invention is put to use by the

patentee or a lic , no compulsory licenses would be granted.

On the other hand, if the patentee did not use the invention him-

self and refused to allow a third party desirous of using it to do so,

i.e. where there was so-called “suppression” of an invention, the

patent in question would be open to compulsory licensing—with

royalty payment to the patentee if a license is granted and with an

opportunity for the patentee to prevent or postpone grant of a com-

pulsory license, if he could justify non-use of the invention.

The main objection that seems to have been raised to compulsory

licensing for non-working is a rather weak one, namely that there is

in fact no “suppression” of patented inventions. This may be true

bacause, in our competitive economy, an individual or company

having a meritorious invention with public appeal is usually anxious

to put it into practice and reap the rewards of commercial success.

But the short answer to this objection is that, with compulsory

licensing for non-working, compulsory licenses will not be granted

if there is in fact no suppression. So anyone who doesn’t like com-

pulsory licensing should not be dissatisfied with compulsory licens-

ing legislation of this type.

„3 se

n Francisco in as being op to types of com i i i

would dilute the incentives. . . 1 bvided by the patent system”. He pointed out that

“a compulsion to invent around would not exist with a broad system of compulsory

licensing” (emphasis aded). It is unfortunate that, in the «ame speech Commissioner

Gottschaik also said “compulsory — 4 . . precludes the patentee’s option to „

tice his invention in an exclusive basis.“ i l the

word “bread” is understood before “compulsory licensing”. See the 1972 Summary of

Proceedings of the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law—American Bar

Association, p. 168 et seq.

148 S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH

To be fair we should also consider the other objections to compul -

sory licensing, especially as they may be somewhat more logical than

the objection discussed above.

The first of these other objections is that any sort of compulsory

licensing reduces the value of a patent and consequently the incen-

tive to use a patent system. Of course this is true. Any one of a

number of factors will reduce the value of a patent, for example

setting the term at 10 instead of 17 years, providing more grounds

for attack on patent validity, or restricting licensing and other

ways of making money from a patent. Reduction in value of a

patent (and consequent reduction of incentive to obtain patents)

is a matter of degree. In each instance, the disadvantage of reduction

in value of the patent must be weighed against any advantages ob-

tained by the restrictive factor involved.

Another objection raised against compulsory licensing is that it

would be difficult for the Courts (or an administrative body) to

decide if there is or is not non-working of a patented invention such

as to justify the grant of a compulsory license. This is undoubtedly

true, but certainly no more difficult than other questions that have to

be decided by our Courts such as non-obviousness in patent cases

generally, application of the “rule of reason” in anti-trust cases,

and guilt or innocence in criminal cases. If there are advantages to

compulsory licensing, we should not shut ourselves out from them

merely because difficult issues may have to be decided’.

The main advantage of compulsory licensing is to bring an inven-

tion to the market place which would not otherwise get there. A

fringe benefit of compulsory licensing is that it would probably

improve the public image of the patent system.

Patents (in the eyes of the general public and even the judiciary)

start out with several strikes against them. In the first place, they

are not understood. As former Justice Fortas states:

“Many federal appellate judges—perhaps most of them—ap-

5. Three of the very few British cases on compulsory working the

following: Kamborian’s Patent, Ar of Patent, — and Teeter Cuan

) 403—Compulsory license

S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH 149

proach patents with the kind of suspicion and hostility that a

city-bred boy feels when he must traverse a jungle full of snakes.

In the second place, as they are monopolies, they are looked upon

as anti-competitive and consequently bad. Here again there is a

lack of understanding. Patents—although they are monopolies—

are basically competitive rather than anti-competitive. They are

competitive because of their very nature as monopolies: competitors

are stimulated to “invent around” the patent monopoly, i.e. to

create equal or better products which will not infringe the patent.

Opponents contend that compulsory licensing would reduce this

competitive effect of patents. However, this would be true, only if

the patentee did not use or permit others to use his invention. If,

as opponents of compulsory licensing say, there is no such suppres-

sion, competitors could not obtain a compulsory license and would

still have the incentive to “invent around” the patent. If a patented

invention is suppressed, the grant might presumably be held invalid

in the absence of the less severe penalty of compulsory licensing

provided by a restricted compulsory licensing law.“

The third difficulty for patents is the patent-antitrust “interface”

which seems to set the patent—mistakenly looked upon as an anti-

consumer monopoly—against the consumer-protective features of

antitrust law. Here again there is confusion. To the extent that

the exercise of patent rights is coextensive with a properly granted

patent monopoly (i.e. for a new and non-obvious fully disclosed

invention), there is no conflict with antitrust law. On the other

hand, where patent rights are asserted on the basis of an invalid

patent or extend veyond the boundaries of the patent right (for

example to control unpatented material), there is a conflict with

antitrust law. In such a case the abuse of the patent law (not the

patent law itself) will be struck down by the Courts.

All this may seem to lead away from a discussion of compulsory

licensing itself, but there is the underlying concept that, if more

popular support for patents can be secured by providing for com-

pulsory licensing, this may lessen attacks on the patent sysiem itself.

In this connection Justice Fortas writes:

“We must recognize the depth of the attack (on the patent sys-

tem) and of the public attitude from which it emerges. It is a

6. A. Fortas, The Patent System in Distress 53 JPOS 810, (1971).

7. In Blount Manufacturing Co. v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co., 166 F 555. D. Mass.

1909. the court stated: “An attempt to make profit out e üer patest by suppressing

the invention covered thereby is outside the patent grant

| 150 S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH

dangerous period, for those who believe they are attacking the

abuses of the system may inadvertently damage the system itself.

In final support of compulsory licensing for non-working, the

question can be posed as to whether a patent law without such a

provision (supplied judicially if not legislatively) complies with

the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of science and

useful arts”. Query: are science and the useful arts really advanced if

an invention is patented, not used by the patentee, and not allowed

by the patentee to be used by others, even if there is a need for the

patented product? With a situation such as this, science and the

useful arts would seemingly be stagnated rather than advanced.

where he states:

It is . . . difficult to see how suppression of patents can be recon-

ciled with the provision of the statute which authorizes a grant

of the ‘exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention or

discovery’ . . . How may the words to make, use, and vend” be

read to mean not to make, not to use, and not to vend?”

Another way in which science and the arts may be stagnated rather

than advanced by a “suppressed” patent is where a substantial im-

provement of a patented invention is made and cannot be brought

to the market place without the permission of the patentee, which

permission is refused. Many foreign countries provide for this type

of compulsory licensing as well as compulsory licensing for non-

working per sel“.

In addition to the constitutional purpose of promoting progress

of science and useful arts, which must of course be carried out by

any constitutionally proper patent law, there is on the other hand

the constitutional requirement of securing to the inventors the

exclusive right to their discoveries. Does this mean an exclusive right

to “own” their discoveries? It would seem not. They already own

them exclusively and can keep them secret if they desire. It must

mean the exclusive right to use their discoveries, i.e. to prevent

others from using their discoveries wtihout their permission’. In

other words, the purpose of the patent provision in the Constitution

is not just to reward the inventor, but to promote the progress of

9. 324 U.S. 370, 64 USPJ 525 (1945).

10. See for instance Article 46 of the Swedish Patent law r! part as follows:

“The owner of a patent for an invention, the exploitation of h is dependent on a

patent owned by another person, may obtain a compulsory license to use the invention

pustssted theske, peovided thet die fo seasenable in view of the importance ‘of the

ret · mentioned invention or for other special reasons prevailing.”

11. Supra, note 9.

S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH 151

science and useful arts for the general benefit of the country’s

economy. This can only be accomplished by use rather than sup-

pression of patented inventions. And this is what compulsory

licensing for non-working is all about.

In the recent Kewanee decision"?, the Supreme Court refers to the

object of the Constitution's patent provision in the following terms:

“The productive effort thereby fostered (by the patent laws) will

have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new

products into the economy... (emphasis added).

Is there any such “introduction of new products into the economy”

if a patented invention is suppressed?

Later in the same decision, the Court refers to the fact that under

the patent laws the Federal Government is willing to pay the high

price of 17 years of exclusive use for its (the invention’s) disclo-

sure. (emphasis added). Is there any such use (properly exclu-

sive, i.e. by the patentee or his licensees only) if a patented invention

is suppressed ?

Certainly, British patent law, and also United States patent law to

a considerable extent, have a basis in the British Statute of Monop-

olies!® which declared invalid all monopolies (such as were formerly

granted by the King to his favorites for staple articles of trade)

except monopolies for “the sole working or making of any manner

of new manufacture within this realm . . so as also they be not...

mischievous to the State . . . or hurt of trade or generally inconveni-

ent.” Thus, at the very inception of modern patent law, the idea

of “working” and “making” was involved. It was recognized that

even a patent monopoly for a new manufacture might be hurtful

rather than advantageous and would be void on that ground. The

interface between patent laws and other laws (such as our antitrust

laws) is accordingly nothing new. Where a patent serves a proper

and useful purpose, it is a beneficial monopoly. Where it is hurtful

or inconvenient to the economy it should be invalidated or, as a

lesser penalty, subject to measures such as compulsory licensing.

A counter argument against the Constitutional argument for com-

pulsory licensing where an invention is not used is that, even with-

out use of the invention, the grant of a patent will promote the

progress of science and useful arts, because a description of the

12. Kawanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. U.S., 181 USPQ 673 (1974).

13. Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. 1, c.3, enacted May 24, 1624.

152 S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH

patented invention has been supplied and published and that, if

the value of a patent is too much reduced by compulsory licensing,

there will be more of a tendency to keep inventions secret rather

than disclosing and patenting them. It may be true that some in-

ventions could be maintained in secrecy, but this is certainly not

true for many types of inventions such as consumer products. If

the invention is a consumer product which the patentee intends to

put on the market, secrecy will of course be impossible and compul-

sory licensing would have no effect as far as secrecy is concerned.

If the invention is susceptible of secrecy (e.g. a process not dis-

closed by the finished product) there may be a tendency to try and

maintain the invention as a trade secret instead of patenting it.

Secrecy, however, involves the standard dangers that the secret may

teak out or that the invention may be independently invented by

another. In the latter case, the first inventor would not only lose

his secret, but might even be prevented from further practice of

his own invention. State trade secret laws (as validated by the

Kewanee decision) protect the secret only from thievery or use fol-

lowing confidential disclosure. They offer no protection against

copying the invention after it has been publicly disclosed & against

use and control of the invention by an independent invenfor.

7

In Kewanee (supra) the Supreme Court held

In the case of trade secret law no reasonable risk of deterrence

from patent application by those who can reasonably be expected

to be granted patents exists.

Trade secret law provides far weaker protection in many respects

than the patent law.

Thus, in the unlikely case of suppression, the possibility of the

stronger protection under patent law (even with compulsory licens-

ing) would have to be weighed against the weaker protection under

the trade secrets law. The latter might ultimately result in no pro-

tection at all. In all these cases, the question of whether or not there

is a compulsory licensing law is of no importance as regards secrecy

if the inventor intends to use his invention since, with a compulsory

licensing law for suppression only, no compulsory licenses would

be granted.

|

14. Supra note 12. Also see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Company, 376 U.S. 225, 140

USPQ 524 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 376 U.S. 234, 140 USPQ 531 (1964).

ERT ERTS I ED WEP repens — 6

* SELES mme EIS PELL LLG ˙ A · IO BEND LEG

S. DELVALLE GOLDSMITH 153

It should not be forgotten that the Courts already have compulsory

licensing power and have exercised this power in antitrust situa-

tions!s. Also, in cases of public health or welfare’* the Courts have

denied injunctive relief to a patentee who does not permit the

patented invention to be used. In the very recent case of Foster v.

American Machine &. Foundry.Co."" the Second Circuit approved a

compulsory license granted apparently not for any considerations of

anti-trust abuse or special public interest, but because of non-us®

of the invention by the patentee. The patentee has asked the

Supreme Court to.review the Circuit Court's decision.

So compulsory licensing (in the sense that it may destroy some of

the exclusivity of the patent grant) is not such a radical departure

from the principles of U.S. patent law as the opponents of compul-

sory licensing tend to imply. The further step from a judicial to a

legislative definition of compulsory licensing would be a logical

one and would have the double advantage of definiteness on the

one hand and probable improvement of the public and judicial

image of our patent system on the other hand. Just as the “Scott

Amendments” under consideration in the current proposals for

general revision of our patent law would provide legislated rules as

to proper and improper licensing restrictions (rather than rules

imposed by the Courts on a case-by-case basis varying with the cur-

rent philosophy of the judiciary), legislated rules for compulsory

licensing would give the patentee and manufacturer some indica-

tion in advance of what would or would not be proper as regards

non-use of a patented invention. The Courts could then return to

their proper function of interpreting and applying a law made by

Congress rather than making law themselves. All this would proba-

bly mean less work for patent lawyers but, on the other hand, a more

stable regime for the business community and economy generally.

— —

15. Hartford. Empire Co. v. United States 323 U.S. 386, 64 USPQ 18 (1945); 324 US.

570, 65 USPQ 1 (1945).

— — * of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69F. 2d 577, 21 USPQ 69 (7th

ir. 1

17. 492 F.2d 1317, 181 USPQ 1 (1974).

18. In Special Equipment Co v. Coe, see note 9, even though the majority opinion is

said to stand for the positicn that “non-use is not misuse”, it recognized the possibility

of compulsory licensing legislation by indicating that compulsory use or licensing was a

matter for Congress to consider.

19. The petition for certiorari in Foster v. American Machine & Foundry Co., supra,

note 17, although violently opposing compulsory licensing as confusing “the exclusive

privilege of valid patents and the rights of patentees” seems to recognize “the right of

Congress” to legislate in this field. See BNA's Patent, Trademark & Copyright Journal,

No. 181, June 6, 1974, p. A-8.

= VPP

. Se

LEROY WHITAKER

Leroy Whitaker is a Senior Patent Attorney for Eli Lilly and Com-

pany in Indianapolis, Indiana. He obtained his Bachelor’s and

Masters Degrees in Chemistry from North Texas State University

and his Ph.D. from the University of Illinois. His Juris Doctor

Degree is from the University of Houston.

Mr. Whitaker has been active in the national patent law associa-

tions as a member of the American Bar Associations’ Patent, Trade-

mark and Copyright Section; Chairman of the Drug Subcommittee

on the Chemical Practice Committee of the American Patent Law

Association and serves currently as the Chairman of the Patent,

Trademark and Copyright Section of the Indiana State Bar Associa-

tion.

154

COMPULSORY LICENSING —

ANOTHER NAIL IN THE COFFIN

BY LEROY WHITAKER

For several years, the patent system has been under attack from

various quarters. Detractors continue their efforts in the courts and

in Congress to weaken the patent system. The objective appears to

be to make patents more difficult to obtain, more difficult to enforce,

and of less value to the patentee. We in the patent bar and those

we represent must resist such efforts rather than support or instigate

them, as appears to be the case with many of them.

The compulsory licensing of patents is an issue that has been widely

discussed in recent years. As has been frequently pointed out, the

grant of exclusivity provided by the Constitution is being slowly

chipped away by judicial decision and special legislation. There are

those who now advocate a general compulsory licensing statute.

It is the thesis of this paper that such a statute would be a severe

blow to the patent system—another nail in the coffin in which op-

ponents of the system would like to see it buried.

Reasons Advanced In Support of Compulsory Licensing

Why is there support for a general compulsory licensing statute?

Are there cogent reasons why such a statute is needed? Proponents

of compulsory licensing have given several reasons for their support.

Let’s review these reasons.

Suppression

One of the most frequently heard arguments in support of compul-

sory licensing is that meritorious inventions are being kept from the

public by patentees who cannot or will not supply the demand and

will not license others to do so. Such arguments usually mention

the 50 mile per gallon carburetor, the 100,000 mile tire, or the

cancer cure. Since we've been hearing of these marvelous inventions

for many, many years, the patents covering some of them must have

expired years ago. However, none of these inventions are on the

market. Somehow, the patentee must have found a way to continue

to suppress the invention after the expiration of his patent.

Proponents of compulsory licensing who argue suppression have

155

8

saber Sake Weer Easter E22

156 LEROY WHITAKER

difficulty in finding instances of suppression to support their posi-

tion. An invention becomes a matter of public record when the

patent on it is granted. Seventeen years later anyone is free to prac-

tice the invention. As then Commissioner of Patents Gottschalk

said in August, 1972, “Yet I am sure that I never heard of any

single instance where a single ‘suppressed’ invention suddenly

blossomed out when the patent on it expired.

In the few cases of suppression that have occurred, the courts have

had no difficulty in providing a remedy. In Vitamin Technologists

v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, the licensing practices

of the patentee were found to be contrary to the public interest and

the court concluded that the patent was unenforceable. In the

recent case of Foster v. American Machine & Foundry Ca., the

patentee was not using the invention nor had he licensed others

to do so. The court denied an injunction and, instead, granted a

compulsory license to the infringer. Apparently there was no find-

ing of a public interest and no harm to anyone other than the de-

fendant through enforcement of the patent. It is submitted that

in ihe absence of such a finding the decision in Foster is at variance

with the widely accepted view that a pateniee is free to use his

patent or not, as he wishes.

Yet, in spite of the lack of substantial evidence of suppression of

patented inventions, and in the face of the irrationality of believing

that a patented invention can be forever suppressed, there are still

those who argue that compulsory licensing is needed to prevent

suppression. In introducing Senate Bill $.2287, Senator Hart stated

that one of the goals of his bill is to provide that the patent system

cannot be used to block the implementation of technology which

is in the public interest.‘

Senator Hart considers the failure to use a patented invention as

“an abuse of the patent monopoly”. In my opinion, the Senator's

view fails to recognize the true nature of a patent grant. A patent

does not confer a monopoly in the generally accepted sense. In

order to obtain a patent, an inventor must have discovered some-

thing new, ie., something not previously available. Therefore, a

patent does not confer a monopoly in the generally accepted sense.

In order to obtain a patent, an inventor must have discovered

1. Address by the Hon. Robert Gottschalk before the Section of Patent, Trademark and

Copyright Law, American Bar Association, San Francisco, California, August 12, 1972,

published in U. S. Department of Commerce News (Patent Office), August 12, 1972.

2. 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945).

3. 492 F.2d 1317, 182 USPQ 1 (2nd Cir. 1974).

TI Cong. Rec. 15021 (daily ed. July 30, 1973).

1 —

LEROY WHITAKER 157

something new, i.e., something not previously available. Therefore,

a patent does not deprive the public of something which was pre-

viously available, but merely allows the patentee to control the

new invention for a limited time. After a patent expires, the

patented invention is freely available to all. The limited period of

exclusivity conferred upon the inventor by the government is con-

sideration for his disclosing the invention to the public so that it

will be available for use by anyone upon the expiration of the

patent.

But perhaps we in the patent bar take a more narrow view of the

meaning of suppression“ than do those outside the patent bar.

Is a patented invention being suppressed ‘if the patentee asks more

for a license than the prospective licensee is willing to pay? The

remarks of Mr. E. Nobles Lowe made before the American Patent

Law Association in October, 1972, ‘ndicate that at least in his view

such a disagreement over the terms of a patent license might be

considered to be suppression. Certainiv, Mr. Lowe’s remarks could

be interpreted to support the proposition that it is suppression to

ask an exorbitant“ fee for a license. But who is to determine what

fee is exorbitant? It is frequently very difficu:t to determine what

is a proper royalty.

And then there is the case of the thorough researcher who obtains

a number of patents directed to a number of similar, but patentably

distinct devices, all of which have the same utility. He chooses to

market the one device he considers to be the best and fully meets

the demand for such device. Is he suppressing his unused“ patents

if he refuses to grant a license to permit a third party to manufac-

ture and sell a device to compete with one he is marketing? I sub-

mit that he is not, since he is fully satisfying the demand for a device

of the type in question. He should not be required to use the fruits

of his research to put his competitors in business. I suspect there

are those who disagree with me on this point.

I raise the issue of the meaning of suppression“ to suggest that

before we glibly agree to legislation aimed at correcting the evil of

suppression, we should first determine how the term is defined.

In the context uf compulsory licensing, the definition should be

limited to failure to use or license the invention, which failure is

detrimental to the public welfare.

7

5. Remarks of E. Nobles Lowe, Symposium on Modified Compulsory Licensing. American

Patent Law Association, Washington, D.C., October 20, 19/'2, published in APLA Bulle-

tin, October-November, 1972.

6. American Photocopy Equipment Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 359 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1966).

158 LEROY WHITAKER

Price

Compulsory licensing proponents also argue that ‘patents contribute

to artificially high prices and that compulsory licensing will result

in the lowering of the prices of patented products. In remarłs before

the Senate, Senator Nelson has expressed the opinion that patents

are at least partly to blame for what he considers to be high drug

prices and he has advocated compulsory licensing of such patents

as the cure for the alleged evil.“ A like view was expressed by Con-

gressman Rosenthal in 1973 when he introduced H.R. 5737.8

The pricing of products is a complex issue involving many factors

such as the costs of research including the costs of research failures,

the costs of market development, price competition from existing

products, and the need for profit. Further, innovative companies

are usually quite conscious of quality, incurring the further expense

of quality control, while coat-tailers frequently don’t worry about it.

Generally, patents play a relatively minor role in pricing policies.

It is rare for even a patented product to enjoy a true monopoly

position so that the patentee can charge what the traffic will bear.“

There is almost always another product that will do the job of the

patented product, although perhaps not as well. However, even

though the patented product may be superior, it must be reasonably

priced in relation to the inferior product in order to gain a share

of the market. Frequently, when a patented new product comes on

the market, competitors will “invent around” the patent and will

soon have a similar product for sale, again fostering price competi-

tion.

One might expect that a licensee who has borne no research and

development costs can sell a product cheaper than the patentee who

must recover all his research expenses, both successful and unsuccess-

ful, from the product he sells. This is especially true if the licensee

is required to pay only the usual “reasonable” royalty of five percent.

The argument for lower prices also loses sight of the fact that price

competition is not the only form of competition. Of much more

benefit to the consumer is competition in the discovery and develop-

ment of new products. Is it worth killing the research goose that

i

7. 118 Cong. Rec. 16336 (daily ed. September 29, 1972); 119 Cong. Rec. 15063 (daily

ed. July 30, 1973):

8. 119 Cong. Rec. 1886 (daily ed. March 19, 1973).

9. Arnold and Janicke. Compulsory Licensing Anyone?”, 55 JPOS 149 (1973); Sease,

“Common Sense, Nonsense and the Compulsory License,” 55 JPOS 233 (1973).

7

LEROY WHITAKER 159

lays the golden eggs of future products in order to obtain some

price reduction on presently existing products?

Proponents of compulsory licensing who use the price argument

are asking that research-based companies subsidize those who are

not. This is a queer way to promote innovation and progress. We

shall reward those who do nothing to promote progress at the

experte of those who do. If this doesn’t discourage research, nothing

Will.

Such a result will frustrate the Constitutional mandate of promot-

ing the progress of science and the useful arts. Historically, price

control has not been a function of the patent system and it should

not now be allowed to become a function of the system.“ Such a

use of the patent system is clearly contrary to the intent of the

Constitution.

Foreign Practice

The third major argument for compulsory licensing is that many

foreign countries already have compulsory licensing provisions in

their laws. It is argued that compulsory licensing would merely

bring the United States into line with other major industrial na-

tions. This was another objective cited by Senator Hart in introduc-

ing S. 2287.1 However, the situation in the United States is different

from that which brought on compulsory licensing in other countries,

and we should not be stampeded into accepting compulsory licens-

ing, because others have it.

In many countries, most notably the underdeveloped nations, com-

pulsory licensing statutes are based on nonuse of the patent. It is

understandable that such countries want to encourage the establish-

ment of manufacturing industries with the attendant increased em-

ployment opportunities. There is no research to be discouraged by

compulsory licensing laws.

But many of the great industrial countries of the world also have

compulsory licensing provisions in their laws. How do such pro-

visions operate and what have been their effects?

Under Japanese law, a iicense may be demanded where the working

of the patented invention has not been appropriately carried out in

88 et al., Patent Reform and the Drug Industry”, Drug & Cosm. Indus. 52

11. Supra, note 4.

160 LEROY WHITAKER

Japan continuously for three or more years, where a second patentee

requires a license under a dominating patent in order to practice

his own invention and for nonworking if “specially necessary for

the public interest”. If the demand for the license is unsuccessful,

arbitration by the Patent Office may be had. All these compulsory

licensing provisions were enacted in 1960 and since that time there

have been 12 demands for arbitration. To date, no compulsory

licenses have been granted in Japan. There have been no serious

efforts to strengthen or repeal compulsory licensing statutes in

Japan.

Since 1911, West German patent law has included compulsory

licensing provisions provided it “is in the public interest”. Prior to

the second world war, about 25 licenses were issued, and since

1945 there have been approximately ten requests. No compulsory

license has been granted in the past 25 years.

Swiss patent law has since 1928 included provisions for com

licensing in situations substantially similar to those applicable in

Japan. Only a few compulsory licenses have been granted by the

Swiss courts, and all have related to the practice of a dependent

invention under a dominating patent.

The concept of compulsory licensing is found in French law in

the event of nonworking in France, in order to practice an im-

proved second invention, for national defense purposes or if the

interest of public health requires it and, in the case of drug patents,

if the drug is not available in sufficient quantity or quality or is

available only at an abnormally high price. Compulsory licenses

have been granted under French law, only because of insufficient

local working of the invention.

British law provides for compulsory licensing for abuse of patents

or other showing of prejudice to local commercial or industrial

activity or hindrance to exports. During the ten-year period from

1958 to 1968, two of 16 applications were allowed. There is also

a provision relating to the compulsory licensing of patents on drugs

and foods. The history of this provision is of interest.

Section 41 of the British Patents Act calls for the grant of a license

under any patent which relates to a substance which is capable of

used as a food or medicine. Such provisions were first put

into British law in 1919. During World War I, it became apparent

that the United Kingdom was suffering from a lack of medicines

and drugs, many of which involved inventions that were covered

— —

LEROY WHITAKER 161

by British patents held by foreigners. There simply was no sub-

stantial British pharmaceutical industry. To correct this situation,

the Patents Act of 1907 was amended to provide for the compulsory

licensing of drug patents.“

The causes which led to the enactment of the forerunner of present

Section 41 of the British Patents Act clearly do not exist today.

However, the section remains to plague the British pharmaceutical

industry. In 1967, the Banks Committee was organized under the

chairmanship of Mr. Morris Banks to examine the British patent

system. The Committee concluded that there is no reason in prin-

ciple why drugs should be treated differently from other patentable

matters. They recommended the repeal of Section 41."

Other commonwealth countries have adopted provisions patterned

after Section 41 of the British Patents Act. None of such countries

has a significant pharmaceutical industry. Canada is typical.

In 1971, A. M. Laidlaw, the Commissioner of Patents for Canada,

in defending the compulsory licensing system in Canada, pointed

out that the situation there is quite different from that in the United

States.“ Commissioner Laidlaw noted that approximately 95 per-

cent of Canadian patents are granted to non-residents while almost

80 percent of United States patents are issued to United States na-

tionals. It appears that the Canadian government recognizes and is

willing to accept the fact that little research is done in Canada, and

therefore, a strong patent system is not needed.

A low level of pharmaceutical research in Canada was also noted

by the Banks Committee.“ The Committee found the present

Canadian situation to bear some resemblance to that which led to

the introduction in 1919 of the special compulsory licensing pro-

visions of British law. It found the purpose of compulsory licensing

provisions in Canadian law to be the encouragement of pharmaceu-

tical manufacturing in Canada, as well as to make drugs cheaper by

means of increased price competition. Conditions under which

drugs are manufactured and supplied in Canada are very different

from those presently obtaining in the United Kingdom and, of

12. Address by A. J. Pickford before the Licensing Executives Society, Kingdom

— 17, 1965. —

13. Banks, The British Patent System, Report of the Committee to Examine the Patent

System and Patent Law, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London (1970).

14. Address the Hon. A. M. Laidlaw before the Anwrican Patent Law Association,

— C., January 25, 1971, published in API A Bulletin, January-February,

15. Supra, note 13.

162 LEROY WHITAKER

course, in the United States. Further, the few available figures con-

cerning the effect of compulsory licensing on drug prices in Canada

are confusing at best, and certainly do not show a clear reduction

of prices to the consumer.

In view of the limited use of compulsory licensing provisions in

foreign countries, it is argued that compulsory licensing would be

little used in the United States. Such a conclusion does not necessar-

ily follow. There is an anti-patent climate here that would encourage

the grant of compulsory licenses. Also, the strong price motivation

possessed by some would encourage the grant of compulsory licenses.

Limited Compulsory Licensing Already in Effect

It is argued that statutory compulsory licensing is not new to the

United States. It is said to be found in such fields as atomic energy.

pollution technology. and with regard to the protection of plants.“

In addition, under the provisions of 2 U.S.C. Section 1498, a

patented invention may be used or manufactured by or for the

United States without a license. The patentee’s remedy is an

action against the government in the Court of Claims. Such statutes

are either directed to highly specialized technology of extreme im-

portance to public safety or they are not directed to the compulsory

licensing of patents. For example, 28 U.S.C. 1498 is an eminent

domain statute, while 7 U.S.C. 2404 is not concerned with patents,

but with a different form of protection.

There have also been several instances of the judicial grant of a

compulsory license in infringement cases where the infringer's prac-

tice of the patented invention was found to be important to public

health, safety, or the environment.!“ Courts have also refused to

grant injunctive relief in cases of fraud on the Patent Office,“ of

patent misuse,*' or of antitrust violations.**

The argument advanced is that we already have compulsory licens-

ing and there is no reason why we should resist further compulsory

16. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2183.

17. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1857(h) (6).

18. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2404.

19. The City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577. 21 — 2

1934); Viatmin Technologists v. Wisconsin A Alumni Research Foundation, 1 46 F.2d 941.

63 USPQ 262 (och Cir. 1945).

8 Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 401 F 2d 574, 159 USPQ 193

( b >

21. Allied Research Products, Inc. v. Heatbath Corp., 300 F. Supp. 656, 161 USPQ 527

(N.D. TH. 1969).

22. Hartford-Empire v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 64 USPQ 18 (1945).

LEROY WHITAKER 163

licensing provisions. However, it is apparent that the courts already

have sufficient authority to prevent any of the alleged abuses of

patent rights which are being cited as reasons for compulsory licens-

ing. Therefore, there is no reason to adopt further compulsory

licensing statutes.

Arguments Against Compulsory Licensing

The alleged benefits to be derived from compulsory licensing, even

if realized, will not offset the many adverse effects. Many of the

more important of such adverse effects are discussed below.

Discourages Research

Compulsory licensing would act as a deterrent to research in two

ways. First, one objective of research has always been to gain a com-

petitive edge, either with a new and better product or a new and

better process. This objective would no longer exist if the competitor

were assured of a license under inventions coming from research.

Second, today’s profits pay for the research leading to tomorrow's

discoveries. If today’s profits are curtailed as a result of having to

compete price-wise with a licensee who has no research expenses,

then of necessity research expenditures must be curtailed.

Any research program is by nature a risky undertaking. It would be

rare indeed for any researcher to achieve immediate success with no

failures strewn in his wake. Yet compulsory licensing would allow

one who has not undertaken the risk of research to reap the benefits

of the successful research of others. It is certainly unfair to reward

those who make no contribution toward progress at the expense of

those who have risked much in making a discovery.

Of significance too is the psychological effect of investing time,

sweat, and money in a research program that eventually leads to a

successful product only to see that product appropriated by others

for their own gain. The situation is analogous to the ambitious

young worker who tries conscientiously to do a good job while his

more experienced co-workers do no more than is necessary. Our

young worker soon learns that he gains nothing by his extra efforts

since advancement is based on seniority, not merit. He soon loses

his ambition. The research worker who finds his discoveries appro-

priated by others will soon lose his incentive to invent.

Money is a very necessary element of any research program. Indus-

trial research is financed by company profits generated from current

164 LEROY WHITAKER

sales. If the research is successful, the resulting new products

and new processes will generate further profits, a portion of which

can in turn be invested in further research. If the profits from

which research investment come are reduced, it is inevitable that

research will be reduced.

A research-based company that is forced to share its successful re-

search with others will inevitably suffer a decline in profits. The in-

troduction of competitive products to the marketplace will mean a

loss in sales by the patentee with a resultant loss in profits even if

the licensee sells at a price substantially equivalent to that of the

patentee. If the licensee takes advantage of his lack of research costs

to sell at a lower price, the patentee will be forced to meet the

price and will suffer even further lost profits. If the licensee does

not sell at a reduced price, he will be reaping windfall profits from

which he will not be required to pay research expenses.

Concern over the threat to research posed by compulsory licensing

has been voiced by such well-knokn persons as Dr. Vannevar Bush,

noted for his outstanding contributions to academia, government

and industry. In 1961 when Congress was considering compulsory

licensing in the pharmaceutical industry, Dr. Bush made the state-

ment that if compulsory licensing were to become law, America

would no longer lead the world in the development of new and

useful drugs. It was Dr. Bush’s contention that industrial research

programs on drug development would be severely cut back if the

bill on compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents was passed.

The factors which prompted Dr. Bush's conclusions are still rele-

vant. and it is not difficult to apply his reasoning to industrial re-

search in any area in which. patents are subject to compulsory

licensing.

Some argue that if the expected decline in industrial research occurs,

the slack can be taken up by increased government research. In

any event, the consumer will pay the costs of research either as

profits to a corporation or taxes to the government. A recent study

in one field of technology has indicated that he will pay far more

as a taxpayer.

Dr. L. L. Deutsch of the University of Wisconsin made a study of

the relative productivity of industrial research and government re-

search in the discovery of new drugs.“ According to Dr. Deutsch,

23. Statement of Dr. Vannevar Bush before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly

of the Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate, Concerning S. 1552, December 7, 1961.

24. Deutsch, “Research Performance in the Ethical Drug Industry”, Marquette Business

Review, Fall 1973.

LEROY WHITAKER 165

in the period 1940 through 1967, 525 new drugs were discovered

in the United States. Industrial laboratories accounted for 457 or 87

percent of these new drugs. In a typical year (1960), industry allo-

cated $215 million to all types of research and development in

medicine while government provided $341 million and private

support amounted to $100 million. Taking out $112 million of

government funds which were spent on basic research, industry's

percentage of research expenditures was 39.5. Yet this percentage

of expenditures accounted for 87 percent of the new drugs dis-

covered. Dr. Deutsch concluded that industrial research makes a

significant contribution to the drugs being marketed in the United

States and recommended that the patent system be continued as

an incentive for such research.

Reduces Product Competition

There is no greater incentive to discover new products than to have

a competitor introduce a successful new product on which he has

an exclusive position. To remain competitive, an equivalent or

superior product mug, be discovered. Efforts are made to invent

around the competitor's patent, often opening whole new areas of

activity. This leapfrogging results in more and frequently better

products for the consumer.

Commissioner Dann recently made this same point when pointing

out that both patent law and antitrust law tend to stimulate com-

petition, probably more often than they inhibit it.? In discussing

the role patents play in fostering competition, Commissioner Dann

stated:

“The patent system provides a spur to competition in research

and development simply by the threat posed to everyone in an

industry that his competitor may get patents on its inventions.”

Without the exclusivity which the patent system provides to the

discoverer of the first product, there would be no incentive for a

competitor to try to develop a competing product. If a license is

available on a product already proved to be successful, why risk

investment in research with the possibility of failure? It is much

more practical to take a license and enter the market with the same

product. In this way, the public and the patentee lose, but not the

licensee.

25. Address by the Hon. C. Marshall Dann before the FBA-BNA B Conference on

Patents, Antitrust, and Trade Secrets, Washington, D.C., June 6, 1974, published in

U. S. Depar ment of Commerce News (Patent Office), June 6, 1974.

166 LEROY WHITAKER

Leapfrogging may also occur by what has been referred to as “me

too” research; i.e., research which is directed toward modification

of the original product in an effort to avoid the patent. Such re-

search has been criticized as curbing more exploratory research.“

It is argued that competitors are encouraged by the prospect of

obtaining “me too” patents to follow the leads disclosed in previ-

ously issued patents of their competitors at the expense of research

in new fields. Research in such a previously defined area is rela-

tively low-risk research offering a high probability of commercial

success. However, even “me too” research is preferable, to no re-

search at all.

Further, me too” research frequently leads to significant discover-

ies. The Deutsch study points out the importance of “me too”

research and so-called “molecular manipulation” in the chemical

and pharmaceutical fields. Based on a survey of 90 physicians in

Madison, Wisconsin, Deutsch selected 18 drugs as being the most

frequently prescribed or the most useful to physicians. Eight of the

18 drugs on the list had been discovered as a result of inventing

around competitive patents. Many of these products exhibited effects

quite different from the original drug, although closely related in

chemical structure.

Thus, leapfrogging benefits the consumer by leading to new prod-

ucts and fostering product competition. This is so whether the

leapfrogging occurs through “me too” research or research into

new areas.

Product competition and the discovery of new products is essential

to successful competition in international markets. In studying

proposed mergers between British pharmaceutical companies, the

British Monopolies Commission found that a high level of research

activity was necessary within the pharmaceutical industry since suc-

cessful international competition demands the discovery of new

products.** The Commission concluded that the patent and trade-

mark laws encourage research, and foster competition. Conversely,

anything that tends to weaken such laws will discourage research

and inhibit competition.

26. Chem. & Eng'r. News 48, November 13, 1961.

27. Supra, note 24.

28. The Monopolies Pp and Glaxo Group Limited;

The Boots Company Limited and Glaxo Grou Limited; A Report on the Proposed

LEROY WHITAKER 167

Discourages Investment

The making of an invention is merely the first step in bringing the

benefits of the invention to the public. Generally, a further sub-

stantial investment in time and money is required between discovery

and marketing. The development of the invention includes the de-

velopment of a commercially feasible manufacturing process, bring-

ing the invention itself to commercial status which may include ob-

taining governmental approval for marketing, and promoting the

invention and developing a market for it. The costs for such develop-

ment programs might be substantially more than the costs for the

research which led to the initial discovery.

In order to justify the investments necessary to market an invention,

a sufficient period of exclusivity in the marketplace is required.

Even a large corporation with a large and successful marketing

component that can compete on equal footing with competitors

would have a difficult time in justifying development expenditures

with the knowledge that its competitors would soon be on the

market too. Certainly, an independent inventor or small business-

man would not be able to gain financial support for even the most

meritorious invention when faced with certain competition from

larger companies who can outperform him in the marketplace.

Unless the necessary investment is made to develop an invention,

the public is denied the benefit of it.

Investment in a new product or new venture is risky at best. The

risk is justified only if there is a reasonable assurance of making

a profit on the investment if the venture is successful. There is no

such assurance when there is a certainty that competitors will move

in on any successful venture. The competitor benefits from the

patentee’s investment and development costs, but incurs no risk of

failure since he has the option of selecting only successful products.

Encourages Secrecy

The objective of the patent system is to promote the progress of

science and the useful arts. This is done by buraging inventors

to make the results of their research available to the public in

return for the limited exclusivity conferred by the patent grant.

Others can then build upon the knowledge disclosed in the patent

literature. One can only speculate as to the effect of withdrawing

exciusivity. It is reasonable to expect that, at the least, inventors

will be reluctant to publicly disclose the fruits of their labors when

they get little or nothing in return.

168 LEROY WHITAKER

Not all inventions can be kept secret while being utilized. Inven-

tions which can be discovered by “reverse engineering’ of the mar-

keted product are not likely subjects for secrecy. However, there

are many inventions which can be maintained as trade secrets

while being practiced. Compulsory licensing will certainly encour-

age the use of trade secrets rather than the patent laws to protect

such inventions. Science and the useful arts are not advanced by

secrecy.

Ironically, when special compulsory licensing legislation is adopted

or proposed for a particular field of technology, it frequently is

directed to a field of technology where progress is most needed.

Such is certainly true in such fields as human health, pollution

technology, and energy. Compulsory licensing in such fields can

serve only to inhibit research and the disclosure of technology and

thus retard, rather than advance, technology in such fields.

Commissioner Dann has expressed surprise at the number of Con-

gressmen and others who seem to feel that compulsory licensing is

necessary in critical fields of technology.? He views such thinking

as shortsighted in terms of national policy. The more important the

technological area, the greater is the need for effective incentives

to spur creative and innovative developments. Also, there is a

greater need in such areas for early disclosure of new discoveries

so that others may build on such discoveries, leading to further

developments. Secrecy in such fields of technology is very unde-

sirable.

Encourages Competition From Abroad

Although compulsory licensing will be a boon to domestic com-

panies who do not engage in research, it will be an even greater

boon to foreign companies. Domestic companies will compete with

the patentee on the basis of comparable equipment and labor costs

but will realize an advantage from no research investment. A foreign

company, on the other hand, in addition to having no research in-

vestment, may also have a. substantial advantage in equipment and

labor costs.

A low-cost foreign operation has a very real potential for under-

selling all domestic producers—not only the patentee, but also

domestic licensees. The prospective effect on the U.S. labor market

should alone be enough to dissuade supporters of compulsory

licensing.

29. Supra, note 25.

LEROY WHITAKER 169

The spectre of low-cost foreign competition would be an even

further deterrent to investment in research and development. Why

make new discoveries and develop new markets with the prospect

of being put out of business by foreign competition.“ Low-cost

foreign operations already have a competitive edge; let’s not be

foolhardy enough to increase their advantage.

Recommended Action

The vast majority of the patent bar agree that compulsory licensing

is an evil that threatens the patent system. We disagree as to the

steps that should be taken to meet the threat. There are two general

schools of thought. One is that some form of compulsory licensing

is inevitable and the patent bar should take the lead in fashioning

tHe statute so as to make it palatable. The other is that compulsory

licensing in any form is unthinkable and we should do everything

within our power to educate the public and Congress as to the

mischief that will be wrought by compulsory licensing.

Those of the first school believe that a statute can be written to

satisfy the goals of those who want compulsory licensing without

sacrificing the values of the patent system. I think one need look

only to the goal of price reduction to see that no statute can be

devised which will satisfy this goal while preserving the patent

system. Those who have drafted a compulsory licensing statute have

intentionally omitted price as a criterion for demanding a license.“

Such an omission will not satisfy proponents of compulsory licensing

who attribute alleged high prices to patents.

It is folly to think that a compulsory licensing statute making no

concession to price will be acceptable to those members of Congress

who associate patents with what they consider to be high prices.

It is just such members of Congress who are the most adamant in

demanding compulsory licensing legislation. If they are not satisfied,

they will continue their demands and we will have unacceptable

compulsory licensing legislation unless we can convince Congress

that such legislation in any form is undesirable.

30. Supra, note 9.

31. Supra, note 9.

W. BROWN MORTON, JR.

W. Brown Morton, Jr. is the senior partner of the Washington,

D.C. firm of Morton, Bernard, Brown Roberts and Sutherland and

is a well-known trial lawyer who received his B.A. and LL. B. de-

grees from the University of Virginia where he has been teaching

patent law since 1958.

Brown Morton was a president of the American Patent Law As-

sociation in the year of 1964-65 and a member of the Board of Man-

agers of the Association from 1956-59. He has been the APLA’s

delegate to the ABA House of Delegates since October 1965.

He has also been extremely active in Bar Association and related

activities among which he was an advisor to the United States

Delegation at the Washington Diplomatic Conference on the Patent

Corporation Treaty in 1970, a member of the Advisory Committee

on the Civil Rules, 1961-1970, and is an ABA representative on the

National Conference of Representatives of the ABA and the Ameri-

can Association for the Advancement of Science, this year, 1974.

170

eee

COMPULSORY LICENSING

An Unplanned-for Addition to the

United States Patent System

BY W. BROWN MORTON, JR.

Introduction :

‘It has been said that I am for“ compulsory licensing and thus

deserving of various uncomplimentary epithets, the average of which

is adequately expressed by a misguided subversive“. When I was

asked to write this article some months ago dealing with a limited

form of compulsory licensing, the Foster v. American Machine and

Foundry Company! case had not yet been decided, but I was lucky.

In my natural inclination to leave undone the things I ought to

have done, I delayed long enough to have before me the opinion

of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in this Foster case,

hereinafter “Foster II.

Actually, I am personally opposed to compulsory licensing and

recognize it as clearly antithetical to the basic premise of the patent

system. I believe in the philosophy of the Paper Bag Patent Cases:

“From the character of the right of the patentee we may judge

of his remedies. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the right

can only retain its attribute of exclusiveness by a prevention

of its violation. Anything but prevention takes away the privi-

lege which the law confers upon the patentee. If the concep-

tion of the law that a judgment in an action at law is repara-

tion for the trespass, it is only for the particular trespass that

is the ground of the action. There may be other trespasses

and continuing wrongs and the vexation of many actions. These

are well-recognized grounds of equity jurisdiction, especially

in patent cases, and a citation of cases is unnecessary. Whether,

however, a case cannot arise where, regarding the situation

of the parties in view of the public interest, a court of equity

might be justified in withholding relief by injunction, we do

not decide.” '

I subscribe to the spirit of Mr. Justice Holmes’ dissent in Dr. Mills

Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co.s:

1. 492 F. 2d 1317, 182 USPQ 1 (2nd Cir. 1974).

2 20 U. S. 405, at 430 (1908).

3. 220 U. S. 373, at 411 (1911).

171

a W. BROWN MORTON, JR.

ei think that at least it is safe to say that the most en-

lightened judicial policy is to let people manage their own

business in their own way, unless the ground for interference

is very clear.***.”

I endorse Mr. Justice Frankfurter's like dissent in Scott Paper Co.

v. Marcalus Co.“: f

As against the loss to the public of one possible manu-

facturer is put the public policy of fair dealing between man

and man.“.

Notwithstanding these personal beliefs, 1 think the point of view

Tom Arnold and I expressed at the 1973 APLA Spring Meeting in

St. Paul® was the course of wisdom and I think Foster J] proves our

point. I shall proceed to an analysis of Foster II.

The F oster II Decision

The decision here under analysis deals solely with the remedy

to be afforded an owner fa patent found valid and infringed.

The patent in suit, No. 2, 382,384 issued April 14, 1959 entitled

Welding System“, related to an improvement’ in electrical con-

tact resistance welding and included both apparatus and use claims.

It was found valid and infringed in “Foster 1“. Damages were

awarded on a reasonable royalty theory based on the output power

of the infringing apparatus. We are not here concerned with this

application of 35 U.S.C. §284 (relating to damages); rather we are

concerned with the revolutionary application of 35 U.S.C. 52837,

the full text of which “revolution” I quote verbatim:

!

“Appellant contends that the District Court erred in denying

an injunction and adjudging, in lieu thereof, a compulsory

licensing in favor of appellant at the royalty fixed by the Court.

“We do not find any difficulty in agreeing with Judge Palmieri

that an injunction would be an inappropriate remedy in this

4. 326 U.S. 249, 67 USPQ 193 (1945). : é :

5. 1973 Spring Meeting of the American Patent Law Association at St. Paul, see APLA

Bulletin, April-May 1973, pp. 255-259.

$. Bestetaten Magnetic Heating Corporation, 297 F. Supp. 572, 160 USPJ 246, aff'd

per curiam, 410 F.2d 12, 161 USPQ 133 (2 Cir.), cert. denied; 396 U.S. 829, 163

USPQ 704.

7. §283 Injunction

The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunc-

tions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any

right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.

W. BROWN MORTON, JR. 173

case. An injunction to protect a patent against infringement,

like any other injunction, is an equitable remedy to be deter-

mined by the circumstances, 35 U.S.C. §283. It is not intended

as a club to be wielded by a patentee to enhance his negotiating

stance. See Hoe v. Boston Daily Advertiser Corp., 14 F. 914.

Here, as the District Court noted, the appellee manufactures a

product; the appellant does not. In the assessment of relative

equities, the court could properly conclude that to impose

irreparable hardship on the infringer by injunction, without

any concomitant benefit to the patentee, would be inequitable.

Nerney v. New York, N.H. & N. R. Co., 83 F.2d 490, 410-411,

29 USPQ 456, 457-458; American Safety Device Co. v. Kurland

Chemical Co. 68 F.2d 734, 21 USPQ 30.

“Instead, the District Court avoided ordering a cessation of

business to the benefit of neither party by compensating appel-

lant in the form of a compulsory license with royalties. This

Court has approved such a ‘flexible approach’ in patent litiga-

tion Royal-McBee Corp. v. Smith-Corona Marchant, Inc.,

295 F.2d 1, 6, 130 USPQ 377,381. Here the compulsory license

is a benefit to the patentee who has been unable to prevail in

his quest for injunctive relief. To grant him a compulsory

royalty is to give him half a loaf. In the circumstance of his

utter failure to exploit the patent on his own, that seems fair“.

It is apparent that the Second Circuit“ does not acknowledge the

revolutionary nature of its ruling, but rather seeks to cloak . ae

cision in the respectable trappings of precedent, We shall "show

these trappings to be no more rea than the celebrated Emperor 's

clothes,

Turning to the facts found operative in the application of 35 U.S.C.

$283 in Foster II as stated in the Second Circuit opinion, these

include:

* * *

The appellant, Julius E. Foster, the patentee and the owner

of the patent in suit, is a patent solicitor and a member of the

Bar of the State of New York and of the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania. He has been at the Bar for almost fifty years.

He has never engaged in any manufacturing or other business

connected with the patent in suit.

8. Supra note 1, at p. 6.

9. The decision was made by a panel consisting of Circuit Pes Waterman and

Feinberg, both active Second Circuit judges, and District Ju — Gurfein, sitting by

designation from the Southern District of New York. Judge Gurfein

wrote the opinion.

174 W. BROWN MORTON, JR.

“The principal defendant and real party in interest is appellee

American Machine & Foundry Co. (AMF). Infringement of

the patent has occurred as a result of the commercial activity

of AMF's wholly-owned subsidiary, AMF Thermatool, Inc.,

and its predecessors, and the individual proprietors of such

predecessor corporations (herein collectively referred to as

Thermatool.) Thermatool manufactured welding machinery,

which included as à component an impeder, which embodied

the process protected by Foster's patent.

“Thermatool in turn sold and leased the welding systems, both

chose containing the infringing impeder and those without it,

to foreign and domestic mil! producers for the production of

longitudinally welded tubes and pipes. The master found that

‘the value of the impeder process, as disclosed in the Foster

patent, constitutes a minor but significant fraction of the total

“In practical terms, Foster had a patent which obviously re-

quired the manufacture of a piece of equipment to make it

usable. Foster does not have any licensee who manufactures

his patented apparatus or uses his patented process. The para-

meters of his patent embraced a component in a larger system

which utilized his process. He did not have equipment to sell

directly to the mill operators. He was hardly in a position to

work out an agreement directly with the mill operators. His

theoretical licensee, in the formulation of a license agreement,

was the manufacturer of the welding equipment who could

use his process. And it is precisely in hypothetical negotiation

with that prospective licensee that the District Court fixed the

reasonable royalty.

“Finally, we note that there are no other factors that would

have been considered at the ‘suppositious meeting’ to deter-

mine the reasonable royalty. Since Foster never operated com-

mercially, there are no such factors as Foster's marketing pro-

gram, Foster's lost sales of non-patented items because of the

infringement, or Foster's lost profits.

* * *

“Twenty-six of these [37] units [not the subject of any relief]

were sold before April 14, 1959, the issue date of the Foster

patent. Eleven of these units were allegedly sold after the issue

date.

10. Supra note 1, at p. 3.

II. ibid, at p. 5.

TLE eee

W. BROWN MORTON, JR. 175

“With respect to the units sold before the issue date of the

Foster patent, the sale could not have been at the time, an in-

fringement, or an inducement to infringe. Coakwell v. United

States, 372 F.2d 508, 511, 153 USPQ 307, 308-309. The units

sold were Thermatool's infringing units. We think that the

continued use of the welding systems by the mill operators

after the flat payment for the systems when bought, did not

later constitute an infringement of the after-issued Foster

patent. See Aluminum Extrusion Co. v. Soule Steel Co., 260 F.

Supp. 221, 224, 151 USPQ 609, 610-611. All the revenues from

these sales were derived by AMF before the Foster patent issued.

“Since Foster has shown no actual damage, we revert to the

‘suppositious meeting’ after the Foster patent issued, to fix a

royalty. We agree with Judge Palimeri ‘that the parties would

have to agree that no royalty would be payable with respect to

infringing equipment sold prior to the issuance of plaintiff's

patent’.

“With respect to the eleven units allegedly sold after the issue

of the Foster patent, the master found that ‘the evidence does

not establish that such eleven units have actually been fitted

with impeders and operated in the United States for the pro-

duction of longitudinally welded tube and pipe.’ The appellant

points to no evidence to convince us that the finding is clearly

erroneous."

Several things emerge from these facts. First, the patentee is the

inventor himself, not an assignee; his only relevant contact with

welding technology is as an inventor, not as a manufacturer of weld-

ing equipment or a practioner of a welding process." Strangely,

the fact that he thus occupied the very role of inventor which the

Constitution seeks to foster, served to diminish the remedy available

to him from what would have been available to him as a manufac-

turer or processor who was the assignee of his patent.

Second, not only was the manufacturer of “infringing” apparatus

that had been sold before the issue date of the patent free of any

liability for making and selling iti“, but the purchasers of it are free

from liability for continued use of it to practice the separately

claimed process after the issue date, a mode of proceeding con-

demned in the cases“.

12. ibid, at pp. 5-6.

13. He is a patent lawyer, but his contacts in that role with the welding industry, if

any, be clearly irrelevant.

14. Correctly so as far as the record shows.

15. Eg., Am. Midlings Pur. Co. v. Christian, Fed. Cas. No. 307 (C.C., D. Minn. 1877).

—

176 W. BROWN MORTON, JR.

Third, the patentee was allowed no recovery for units not shown to

have been assembled and used commercially in the United States,

though sold after the issue date.

Fourth, the defendant AMF was the “prime” infringer in the sense

that he was the sole commercial source of the infringing apparatus

and the obvious efficient repository of power to license the process

to all users without discrimination, harassment, or a multiplicity

of suits. Thus Foster had not sued the “secondary” infringers, but

had moved directly against the real party in interest.

Ironically, though one might properly think that each of these four

factors was one which suggested a need for injunctive relief, each

seems to have been taken by the Second Circuit the other way

round. At least the opinion candidly and literally acknowledges

that it is approving the judicial grant of “a compulsory license

That compulsory license operates to authorize prospective infringe-

ment by a direct infringer (of apparatus claims) who is also a con-

tributory and inducing infringer (of process claims), thus trans-

ferring control over commercialization of the invention from the

inventor to that infringer. No other decision I know of that

far. The court's stated grounds are the patentee’s “utter Eure to

exploit the patent on his own”. No other decision I know of relies

on such grounds alone. The opinion suggests that the plaintiff

should be grateful for “half a loaf’. No other decision I know of so

condescendingly destroys the exclusivity of a patent grant.

The Foster Precedents A nalyzed

The Second Circuit cited only the following cases, listed in inverse

chronological order:

Royal-McBee Corporation v. Smith-Corona Marchant, Inc. is

Nerney v. New York, N. H. & H.R. Co.

American Safety Device Co. v. Kurland Chemical Co.

Hoe v. Boston Daily Advertiser Corp'n. s, (hereinafter “Hoe II.).

None of these cases is authority for the grant of an on-going com-

pulsory license to a primary infringer who has been finally held

liable in damages for all of his actionable infringements. None

makes reference to the patentee’s non-working of the invention as

a circumstance relevant to the remedy available to him.

<<

2 .

W. BROW?! MORTON, JR. 177

Royal-McBee related to a patent issued July 4, 1933 on a typewriter

margin control which was being used by the successful assignee-

patentee in large scale production, and also by at least two large

scale infringers, the defendant, Smith-Corona, and another losing

defendant, Remington**. The District Court found Royal's con-

duct vis-a-vis Smith-Corona to have been such as to forfeit Royal's

right even to the legal relief of damages for infringements committed

prior to the actual filing of the suit. The same conduct was also

found to justify the withholding of the equitable remedy of injunc-

tion for the 33 months remaining before expiration of the patent,

but not to justify the denial of damages for continued infringement

after the complaint was filed. It was this action of the District Court

in giving something other than an all-or-nothing effect to Smith-

Corona’s estoppel defense which the Royal-McBee panel of the

Second Circuit approved as a “flexible approach” in 1961. This

was scarcely the addition of a compulsory working requirement

to the patent statutes of the United States, a step the Congress has

consistently refused to take.

Nerney is the familiar freight car case. What is not usually noted

is that the defendant railroad, the New Haven, was already under

an injunction with respect of its own cars, over which it had such

control as to make the enforcement of the ban entirely practical

and merely an economic burden on the defendant's private purse.

Nerney sought to extend his injunction to forbid the New Haven

to accept infringing cars belonging to other companies for transit

over the New Haven tracks. It was found to be simply impractical

to enforce the ban at the car-interchange points and further to place

a substantial burden on the public by disrupting the freight service

of wholly innocent shippers. The court was at pains to point out

that the principal other infringer was the Pennsylvania against

which Nerney had available a complete remedy, including a direct

injunction. Thus, the Nerney decision cited is no authority at all

for grant of a compulsory license to a primary private infringer.

Indeed, it appears to follow the common-sense of Judge Lacombe

in Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Union Ry. Co., 78 Fed. 365,2.

American Safety Device is even more remote; it is merely one in a

long chain of decisions which decline injunctive relief to a patentee

whose patent expires during the pendency of the law suit.

Hoe iI might seem better to support the action of the Second Cir-

20. See Royal Typewriter Ca. v. Remington Rand, 168 F.2d 691 (2 Cir. 1948).

21. See the Paper Bag Patent Case, supra note 2.

22. 78 Fed. 365 (C. C., S.D.N.Y. 1896).

178 W. BROWN MORTON, JR.

cuit in Foster JJ, but careful reading shows this is not so. The patent

in suit, No. 131,217, was for a combination of elements comprising

a part of a large printing press in daily use producing the Boston

defendant's newspaper. The matter arose on a motion for a pre-

liminary injunction, the patent having already been found valid

and infringed by a soon-to-be justice of the Supreme Court, Blatch-

ford, C. I. sitting as a circuit judge, Hoe v. Kahler, (Hoe I). The

Boston defendant had bought its machine with notice of Hoe’s

claim and had been indemnified by its manufacturer. In denying

Hoe's motion, Circuit Judge Lowell had this to say:

“Is this a case for an injunction? The improvement in question

is but part of a large machine, upon which the daily newspaper

of the defendants is printed, and a change of this part of it,

though possible, is difficult, and might embarrass the usual

course of business of the company, and would cause much

expense to the defendants, or, rather, to their guarantors. Nor

would it be of any advantage to the plantiffs, except to coerce

a settlement, for they do not use printing machines, but make

and sell them in the market. Whatever they are entitled to in

the way of damages, amounts, in effect, to a royalty. Their real

damage suffered when this machine was bought, and is

not affected by the amount or duration of its use. Acting on

this view of the matter, the parties have been negotiating for

the payment of a license fee, but are very far apart in their

estimate of its amount. The only advantage which the plaintiffs

could derive from an injunction, would be to put them in a

better situation than they are now in, or than the defendants

will then be in for the further conduct of the negotiation. if

the case were in such a situation that I could now decide the

question of damages, I might, perhaps, order an injunction,

unless that amount were paid within a reasonable time.“

Clearly, Hoe II is not a case sustaining the grant of a compulsory

license for the continuation of an infringing course of conduct by

a primary infringer, for, as the court observed, “[t]he contest is, in

fact, between rival manufacturers”. The nominal defendant in

Hoe II was a newspaper publisher—a relatively innocent bystander

or secondary infringer, the interruption of whose use of the inven-

tion was in some measure a detriment to the public. And Hoe's

competing manufacturer had already been enjoined. Hoe II is good

authority for Nerney; it is not, for Foster II.

23. 12 Fed. 111 (C.C., S.D.N.Y. 1882).

24. Supra note 21 at p. 915.

W. BROWN MORTON, JR. 179

The Hoe II Citations Reviewed

Hoe II is notable if only because the redoubtable Frederick P. Fish,

Esq. appeared for the losing complainants. Circuit Judge Lowell

noted that “[t]he decisions which refuse an injunction, in cases

very like the present, have been collected by the diligence of coun-

sel”. They are here tabulated chronologically and those cases not

later reviewed by Circuit Judge Lacombe in Campbell Printing

Press & Manufacturing Co. u. Maulialtan Railway Co.**, are marked

with an asterisk:

Barnard v. Gibson, (1849);

Forbush v. Bradford, (1858);

Howe v. Morton, (1860);

Sanders v. Logan, (1861);

Stainthorp v. Humiston, e (1862);

Lowell Manuf’g. Co. v. Hartford Carpet Co., (1864);

Morris v. Lowell Manuf g. Co. 2 (1866);

Bliss v. Brooklyn,3* Fed. Cas. No. 1544, (C. C., E. D. N. v. (1871);

Wells v. Gill, (1872);

Amer. Middlings Pur. Co. v. Christian, (1877);

Colgate v. Gold & Stock Tel. Co. (1879);

N. P. R. Co. v. St. P., M. & M. Ry. Co., (1880);

M’ Crary v. Pennsylvania Canal Co. (1880);

New York Grape Sugar Co. v. American Grape Sugar Co. (1882);

Ballard v. Pittsburgh, (1882); and

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—

180 W. BROWN MORTON, JR.

Hoe Il and most of its citations were authoritatively reviewed by

Judge Lacombe in Campbells Judge Lacombe anticipated Mr.

Justice Peckham in E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., in

refusing to follow the ruling of Judge Blodgett in Hoe v. Knap,“

[Hoe iii}.

In Hoe Ill the proposition was advanced, “under a patent which

gives a patentee a monopoly, he is bound either to use the patent

himself, or allow others to use it, on reasonable terms’’**. Whether

one adopts Judge Lacombe's view, no authorities for this proposi-

tion *** are cited ***, nor is such a construction of the statute ***

supported by argument “or Justice Peckham’s” ‘*** The dictum

found in [Hoe III] is not supported by reason or authority [em-

phasis in original], it is apparent that Foster II revives a long-

discredited doctrine. Which is not to say that Judge Lacombe was

blind to “the principles of equity [35 U.S.C. §283]”. In fact, in

Campbell, he observed:

“Defendant also insists that injunction should not issue because

the infringing couplings now in use by it are used in the service

of the public, and to enjoin would be to work great hardship

to the public. In Bliss v. Brooklyn, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 596, in-

junction was refused because the hose couplings complained

of were necessary for the daily use of the city in the prevention

of fires; and there is a long line of authorities to the same

effect. There is, however, nothing in the case at bar, beyond

the bare assertion of the defendant, to show that an injunction

properly regulated as to time may not be dbeyed without in

any way interfering with the service which defendant renders

to the public as a common carrier of passengers. It seems to

have experienced no difficulty at all in temporarily withdraw-

ing its locomotives and cars from such service at suitable sea-

sons, for a sufficient length of time to affix the complainant's

couplings. Why it may not, in like manner, remove them, does

not appear. Complainant may take decree for account and in-

junction. The terms of the injunction, providing from how

many cars and locomotives the infringing couplings shall be

removed each week, may bet settled on notice. .

42. Supra note 25.

43. 186 U. S. 70 (1902).

44. 27 Fed. 204 (C. C., N.D. IH. 1886).

45. id. at p. 212.

46. Supra note 25 at p. 935.

47. ibid.

W. BROWN MORTON, JR. 181

He followed the same pattern in equitably shaping injunctive relief

in Thompson- Houston“, and in Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v.

Great Northern Ry. Co.“

One of the cases cited in Hoe II, not reviewed in Campbell, is Bal-

lard v. City of Pittsburgh.se This points up a proposition as to

which there is no substantial question, namely, that public services

will not be interrupted by patent injunctions shutting off the con-

tinued use of substantially completed facilities. In Ballard, a pat-

ented wooden pavement had been installed in the defendant city’s

streets. The court rightly declined to order it torn up. This, in no

sense, authorized Pittsburgh to build like streets in the future. The

clear rationale of this line of cases is no doubt the reason the

Second Circuit, in Foster II, made no reference to the celebrated

case of City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc. By extension,

the courts have also declined to cause gross economic waste by or-

dering the scrapping or disuse of existing devices in private hands,

e. g. Landis Tool Co. v. Ingle®.

Another Hoe II case not reviewed in Campbell is Am. Middlings

Pur. Co. v. Christian**. This points up the important procedural

matter of the status of patentee’s established position on validity

and infringement. Only if these are virtually ironclad will an in-

junction issue before final decree making them certain, but in lieu

of injunction a patentee may well be protected by a bond and a

direction for a periodical report of the accused infringing acts.

That this is, indeed, acting “in accordance with the principles of

equity [35 U.S.C. §283] is shown by the third Hoe JI citation not

reviewed in Campbell, N. P. R. Co. v St. P., M. & AI. Ry. Co.,

supra, where a like bond requirement in lieu of injunction was

ordered in a non-patent case. And see also Rule 93 of the Rules

of Equity“.

It would overextend the bounds of this paper to review all the

decisions I have read or noted as being of real or seeming relevance

to the correctness of Foster II. 1 simply repeat my initial observa-

tion that Foster II is a precedent-shatteri

of which I cannot guess. As we have seen from the quoted passages

48. Supra note 22.

49. 86 Fed. 132 (C. C., S.D.N.Y. 1898).

50. Supra note 40.

51. 69 F.2d 577, 21 U.S.P.Q. 69, (7 Cir. 1934).

52. 286 Fed. 5, (3 Cir. 1923).

53. Supra note 35.

54. Supra note 41.

182 W. BROWN MORTON, JR.

8

dealing with the Foster IJ facts, the Second Circuit is not proceed-

ing on the assumption that Foster's invention was vital to the U. S.

welding industry or even to the defendant manufacturer. There is

no logical reason to limit the rationale of Foster II to cases where

an entire patent is not being exploited. Why does it not justify a

compulsory license under an unexploited claim? Similarly, where a

patent i part of a portfolio of related patents, why does Foster II

not justify a compulsory license under Patent A even though the

patentee is exploiting a competitive substitute covered by his

Patent B? Those are the reasons why I reach the following conclu-

sion. \

\

Conclusion

\

It is the thrùst of this article that Foster II demonstrates that the

courts are succumbing to the current pressures for compulsory

licensing in a manner materially to reshape the patent system and

that, therefore, legislation is required to prevent a United States

patent from becoming, by judicial fiat, nothing materially different

in effect from a Soviet “inventor's certificate”. Hence, I urge that

Title 35, United States Code, be amended by adding thereto a

section 294, as follows:

N

N

8294. Compulsory Licensing

„(a) (1) At any time more than three years after the issuance of a

patent and more than four years after the filing of the application for

the patent, any person may, in accordance with the requirements of

this section, commence a civil action against a patentee to obtain a

compulsory license.under such patent.

“(2) The venue of a civil action commenced pursuant to the foregoing

sub-section shall be the district court for the district in which the

patentee, if a natural person, resides or in which the patentee, if a

corporation, is incorporated or has its principal place of business or,

in the case of a non-resident patentee, as provided in section 293 of

this title.

“(b) The complaint in the action shall set forth the nature and pur-

pose of the use which plaintiff intends to make of the license, the steps

taken by plaintiff to ere a voluntary license, and statements of the

ted uence of failure to obtain the license and the ted

mar sary rey ee es

“(c) Within ten days after service of the summons and complaint,

plaintiff shall serve a a on each exclusive licensee under the

patent whose license is recorded in the Patent Office who shall have

the right to intervene in the action.

“(d) Plaintiff shall be entitled to an order directing the patentee to

grant a non-exclusive license to plaintiff, if:

(I) the invention covered by the patent is of primary importance in

a general field of endeavor;

“(2) for a period of at least three years prior to the commencement

W. BROWN MORTON, JR. 183

of the action, there has existed a public need for the invention which

has not been reasonably satisfied by the patentee, his licensees (includ-

ing prior compulsory licensees), and alternative products or processes;

(3) plaintiff has both the requisite resources and intent to market

goods or services of good quality unde: the license sought which will

satisfy the public need ;

“(4) plaintiff cannot otherwise obtain a license on terms which the

court deems to be reasonable for the use of the invention intended to

be made by plaintiff; and

“(5) plaintiff has not for six months before commencement of the

action, or during the action, committed acts which he knew or reason-

ably should have known were acts of infringement of the patent.

“(e) the court shall not order the grant of any license pursuant to this

section for any purpose other than stated in the complaint; nor shall

any court order the grant of any license under a patent already the

subject of a license ordered under this section without action com-

menced pursuant to this section and separate findings as provided

herein.

“(f) In any decree ordering a license hereunder, plaintiff shall be or-

dered to pay compensation therefor to the patentee and any then ex-

clusive licensee under the patent in such manner and at such times as

the court may find reasonable under the circumstances, and in such

allocation between patentee and exclusive licensees as the court deems

just.

“(g) The amount paid by the licensee shall not be less than reasonable

for use of the invention and for loss of exclusivity which the license

imposes upon the patentee and his exclusive licensees. In determining

the compensation the court shall consider:

“(1) the risks undertaken in first completing the patented invention;

“(2) the cost of research and development which led to the invention

and the development thereof into marketable form;

“(3) the costs of failures and losses encountered by the patentee, his

predecessors in title, and his exclusive licensees in other research or

development efforts in the same general field;

(4) the efforts and expenditures made by the patentee, his predecessors

in title, and his exclusive licensees in developing the market for the

patented invention, in prosecuting and defending the patent right, and

in defending actions for licenses under this section; and

(5) the savings achievable by the proposed licensee through use of

the invention.

“(h) The order of the court shall specify the duration of any license

ordered under this section, and shall specify such other terms and

conditions as the court deems advisable to protect both the public in-

terest and the property interest of the patent owner and his exclusive

licensee in the invention”.

All other statutory provisions for compulsory license under United

States patents except 28 U.S.C. §1498 (a) should be repealed. The

legislative history of this proposal should make it plain that Foster

is being overruled, but that §283 is being continued and Judge

Lacombe's application of its principles in Campbell are being ap-

proved.

B. R. PRAVEL

B. R. Pravel is a partner in the Houston law firm of Pravel & Wilson.

The firm has specialized for many years in patent law, anti-trust

law and related fields of law.

Mr. Pravel has been a lecturer in the patent field on numerous oc-

casions over the last trenty years, and he has authored a number of

articles in the patent field. He has served as Chairman of the Patent,

Trademark & Copyright Section of the State Bar of Texas. He also

served as Chairman of the National Council of Patent Law Associa-

tions. For the past three years he has served on the Board of Man-

agers of the American Patent Law Association.

184

SAY “NO” TO MORE COMPULSORY

LICENSING STATUTES

BY B. R. PRAVEL

1

Introduction (

The United States Supreme Court has, in all of its dignity and

rightful authority, declared for posterity:

“That a patent is property, protected against appropriation both

by individuals and by the government, has long been settled“.

In any proposal for a compulsory license statute, whether it be

general, (i. e. one intended to cover all situations where licensing of

patents could be forced against the will or desires of the patent

owner), or specific, (i. e. where the patent owner ‘could be forced to

license his patents only for a selected situation, such as non-use,

excessive profits etc.), the basic recognition of a patent as property

is essential. In this area, the United States Supreme Court stands

as the bulwark against the waves of destruction often pounding

against this fundamental which has its origin in nothing less than

the United States Constitution.’

Compulsory licensing in any form is an in-road on such property

right.? No doubt there are now, and have been for many years past,

those who regard any kind of private ownership of property as evil,

and there are others, who, even though they would not go so far as

to condemn the ownership of all private property, believe that, at

least, the private ownership of patents cannot be tolerated. The

comments in this article are directed to those two groups, and to a

third group as well, which has sincere proponents of the patent

system, who have mistakenly become convinced that it is necessary

o “pacify” the first two groups by proposing compulsory licensing

statutes. To that group, it is the author's hope that this article will

say, as in the famous words of John Paul Jones, Don't give up the

ship. We have just begun to fight.”

The fight is not of recent vintage.‘ In Hartford-Empire® the Supreme

Court observed:

1. Hartford-Empire Co. U. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415, 64 USPQ 18, (1945).

2. U. S. Constitution, Art. I, sec. 8, clause 8.

3. James M. Wetzel, Can Patent Properties Be Redistributed Thro Compulsory Li-

censing?, 1 APLA Quarterly Journal pp. 184-191, No. 3, (Summer 1973).

4. S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, “Cases on Federal Anti-Trust Laws”, (1948), pp. 494-495.

185

i

—

186 ‘ B. R. PRAVEL

|

U

“Congress was asked as early as 1877, and frequently since, to

adopt a system of compulsory licensing of patents. It has failed to

enact these proposals into law.”

Also, as observed in the Hartford-Empire case, the Temporary Na-

tional Economic Committee (TNEC) made a Final Report“ which

recommended compulsory licensing legislation, which will require

that any future patent is to be available for use by anyone who may

desire its use and who is willing to pay a fair price for the privilege.”

From that extreme, which would be completely destructive of the

value of patents, we find a number of currently proposed compul-

sory licensing bills of varying degrees of specificity and scope. The

primary thesis of this article is that compulsory, licensing statutes

are not necessary, even for specific situations wherein compulsory

licensing would be constitutional, because in those rare instances,

the courts can adequately provide for compulsory licensing under

the strictures of the United States Constitution and within the

framework of judicial precedent: It should be emphasized that the

fact that under certain conditions compulsory licensing may be

proper does not in any sense establish the desirability for a com-

pulsory licensing statute or statutes, as has been argued by some

proponents recently for a general licensing statute.” On the contrary,

the presence of adequate safeguards through judicial control, of

patents is submitted to negate any desirability or need for a general

compulsory licensing statute, or even specific statutory compulsory

licensing provisions. The concern which we should all have is that

expressed by Judge Frank in a slightly different context, but with

equal applicability when compulsory licensing of patents is con-

cerned;

“We should not throw out the baby with the bathwater.”

In other words, we need to be certain that neither Congress nor

the courts “throw out” or destroy the patent system with its value to

the economy of the United States by attempting to correct abuses,

imagined or real, of patents by some patent owners.

Constitutional Limitations Re “ Taking” Private Property

Before considering patents specifically, a brief look at some of the

controlling constitutional limits on property in general must be

made.

5. Supra, note 1, at p. 401 or 389,

6. U. S. Con Senate, Final Report and Recommendations of the Temporary Na-

tional Economic Committee, S. Doc. 35, 77th Cong., Ist sess., 1941, pp. 36,37.

7. W Congress, Senate, Hart Bill, S. 2287, 93rd Cung., Ist sess.; Morton, article at

p. .

\

— sanenaseenaneenananme

B. R. PRAVEL 187

The only constitutional provision for taking“ private property is

that of eminent domain as provided for in the United States Con-

stitution, Fifth Amendment, the pertinent portion of which reads:

.. . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without

just compensation.”

In the usual case of a taking“ of private property under eminent

domain, the taking is by the (a) government for (b) “public use“.“

Normally, there is “one complete taking and one complete accrual

of the right of the owner to compensation“. When private property

is taken by the government under eminent domain, the Constitu-

tion further provides for the protection of due process“. % The

courts have had numerous occasions to spell out the requirements

of due process,” such as that of notice reasonably calculated, under

all the circumstances, to appraise interested parties of the pendency

of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-

tions. m With respect to the requirements of “due process”, when

the government is exercising its powers of eminent domain, there

are clearly established legal guidelines and precedents. The courts

are likewise experienced and well adapted for determining the “just

compensation” for the private property taken by the government for

public use.:

Under the mantle of “police power“, Justice Douglas, speaking for

the Supreme Court, extended the scope of eminent domain in

Berman v. Parker to permit the District of Columbia to take a

man’s department store in a slum area under an area redevelopment

statute. Although the store owner made the argument that the

“taking” was unconstitutional because it was “a taking from one

businessman for the benefit of another businessman”, the argument

was rejected on the broad basis of the public welfare. Although the

case is subject to broader ramifications, the property was within a

large blighted area and Congress had elected to attack the problem

on an area basis rather than a structure-by-structure basis, so limita-

tion is implicit in the decision—namely, in the absence of the public

need to deal with the whole area as an entity, it would not have been

constitutional to have taken the property from one person for the

benefit of another person.

8. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158, 160 (1922): “The pro-

— of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for

p use.

9. Irving Air Chute Company, Inc. v. U. S., 93 F. Supp 633, 87 USPQ 246 (Ct. Cl. 1950).

10. U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment.

Tae Cone Renpuer Rank & Frost, 800:U.S. 206, 70 8. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865

12, United States v. Pewee Coal Co, Ine, 341 U.S. 114, 71 S. Ct. 670 (1951).

13. 348 U.S., 26, 75 S. Ct. 98, (1954).

188 B. R. PRAVEL

However, since “police power” is frequently referred to in cases

dealing with eminent domain as well as other constitutional law

cases, the applicability of that power is likewise pertinent before

dealing specifically with the compulsory licensing of patent ques-

tions.

The scope of “police power” as exercised under the Constitution

is broader than that of eminent domain and it is universally con-

ceded to include everything essential to the public safety, health,

and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by

proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a “public nuisance.”

The police power extends to the United States within the field of

interstate commerce. i As explained in the Speert case:

“While the Federal government does not have the same police

power as is reserved to the states, nevertheless, once a general

subject is properly within the scope of the powers granted in the

Constitution to the Federal government, that government has

powers to prescribe police regulations concerning that subject,

and these powers are as broad as those which a state government

possesses concerning subjects within its reserved powers.

The plethora of court decisions dealing with the application of the

police power in various situations confirms the wide experience and

guidelines available in this area from the court decisions.

The exercise of the police power by Congress is “for the benefit of

the public.” The latitude with respect to the police power is, how-

ever, judicially circumscribed so that it is used to “protect” the

Court to permit regulation purely on the basis of speculative public

benefit and traditionally has extended to such items as regulation

14. Lawton ex al v. Steele, 152 US. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499, (1894) ; Goldblatt v. Town of

lempstead, New Y ork, 369 US. 59, 82 S. Ct. 987, (1962).

v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S. Ct. 345 (1925); Speert et al v. Morgen-

than et al, 116 F. 2d 301 (D. C. App. 1940).

16. Supra, note 15, Brooks b. United States.

=

B. R. PRAVEL 189

of liquor. prostitution, is fertilizer works. ic and brick yards.

In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, wherein

the majority opinion was rendered by Justice Holmes in a direct

confrontation with the renowned Justice Brandeis in dissent, the

following statement limiting “police power” rings out with clarion

sound as a warning which is applicable to the particular topic here-

under consideration, namely compulsory licensing:

“The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment

presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it

shali not be taken for such use without compensation. A similar

assumption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth Amend-

ment. Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. 13 Ann. Cas. 1008.

When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified

by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to

extend the qualification more and more until at last private prop-

erty disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way

under the Constitution of the United States. (Emphasis added).

Constitutional Limits Re “Taking” of Patents

Patents stand on the same footing as other private property with

respect to the constitutional limitations applicable to the “taking”

of such property. The United States Supreme Court in the historic

case of James v. Campbell. correlated the patent property right

to other property rights insofar as the constitutional protection is

concerned:

“That the government of the United States, when it grants letters

patent for a new invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon

the patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention

which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself,

without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or

use, without compensation, land which has been patented to a

private purchaser, we have no doubt. The Constitution gives to

Congress power “to promote the progress of science and useful

arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the

exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries,’ which

could not be effected if the government had a reserved right to

17. * — v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 679 (1887).

L’ ote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900).

“es

190 B. R. PRAVEL

publish writings** or to use such inventions without the consent

of the owner.”

Some proponents of compulsory licensing have suggested that since

the patent is primarily for the “public benefit”, the patentee is

under a sort of moral obligation to see that the public acquires the

to the free use of that invention as soon as is conveniently pos-

sible** and others have urged that the patentee should be required

to license all comers at reasonable royalties.** Fortunately, for the

patent system and for the American economy, the United States

Supreme Court in the Continental Paper Bag Company case replied

to that position by stating, “We dissent entirely from the thought

thus urged”, and Congress has likewise consistently refused to adopt

. ee eee eee

some specific compulsory licensing legislation has been passed by

Congress. ——ñ———

general eminent domain statute relating to the use of patents by the

government, 28 U.S.C. 1498, will be considered later.

It is submitted that although patents deal with the intangible

(product of a person's mind) rather than the tangible (land, build-

ings, personal property), the nature of the property right is the same

and should be governed under the law by the same considerations,

and particularly the constitutional limitations with respect to the

taking of property. Even though a patent is “conditioned by a public

purpose. that public purpose is fulfilled by the inventor disc’ osing

to the world his invention as his quid pro quo for the exclusive

rights to that invention under the patent grant. The public is served

by having available to it the knowledge of that invention in the

disclosure of the patent itself. The contractual obligation of the

government in granting the patent is that the rights to that inven-

tion shall be “exclusive” as provided for in the Constitution and

anything less than that, whether it be in the original grant or in a

23.

24. Continental Paper Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 US. 405, 1908 CD+594

February 15, 1974. 492 1317 182 USPQ 1 (and Cin 1974).

a ee cy eg

26. Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 22

Act, 42 U.S.C. 2183; Aue Act, 42 US.C. 185, Sec. 308; Ten-

Act, 16 U.S.C. 831r.

ereoid 5. ontinent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 S. Ct. 268, 88 L.

B. R. PRAVEL 191

property, are essentially condemning the monopoly or exclusive

nature of patents with the popular appeal of public benefit. Such

an approach is obviously mere confiscation of private property

which the inventor has in good faith made available to the world in

exchange for such property and finds no support in any decided

opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court. Even when framing anti-trust

remedies for abuses of patent rights, the courts have been careful

to limit the decrees so that they simply restore competition and

prevent abuse, without attempting to confiscate the patents.“

Aside from the constitutionality of the eminent domain concept

embodied in the patent eminent domain statutes,” it is quite sur-

prising to find that very little has been discussed or written with

respect to whether or not any other type of compulsory licensing

of patents by statute is constitutional. One writer** who provided

us with a very scholarly historical study with respect to the meaning

intended by the word “exclusive” in Article |, section 8, clause 8,

relating to the patent grant, concludes that the constitutional pro-

vision “to promote the progress of science and useful arts” was pur-

posely made “exclusive”, but he believed that was the utmost limit

of the Constitution were willing to go, and

he expressed his opinion that less than exclusive rights in a patentee

would be constitutional. However, the following quote from that

Article is more convincing, and represents the prevailing view that

the word “exclusive” was intentionally inserted in the Constitution

to provide the necessary incentive to inventors:

“In arguing that the use of the term ‘exclusve right’ referred to

in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, would render a com-

pulsory licensing system or cancellation of a patent for non-use

unconstitutional, stress has been laid on the act that in Madison's

draft, submitted to the Convention on August 18th, 1787, the

phrase used was “to encourage by premiums and provisions the

advancement of useful knowledge and disiovery’, furthermore,

that Charles Pinckney, on the same date, proposed ‘to grant

patents for useful inventions’, while the phraseology as finally

adopted on September 5th, 1787, by Judge 3rearley’s Committee

on Postponed Matters, read ‘by securing’ for limited times to

inventors, the ‘exclusive’ right to their respecive *** discoveries.”

From this change in phraseology it has ben argued by a very

learned authority on patent law, Mr. Karl Fenning that:

‘It is significant, therefore, that in framing the Constitution

in its final form, the words “Patent” and “Copyright” were not

used, possibly lest the power be limited tc the particular forms

192 B. R. PRAVEL

of conditional exclusive rights which were at that time known

as “Copyrights and Patents

“From the ‘words finally chosen for the Constitution’, Mr. Fen-

ning deduces that ‘these seem to allow no limitations on the

‘exclusive’ right such as requirements for working or compulsory

licensing.’ "#3

Perhaps it might be better to allow the constitutionality question

with respect to the compulsory licensing of patents to rest strictly

upon the constitutional requirement of Article I, Section 8, that

the patent right must be “exclusive”, but the author has the nagging

belief that this is not the entire answer and would not be the only

basis considered by the Supreme Court should this matter reach

that level for a decisive judgment. For one thing the Supreme Court

itself has authorized compulsory licensing of patents where there

has been an abuse of the patent rights, such as by an anti-trust viola-

tion, beginning with the Hartford-Empire case. Apparently, the

constitutionality has been assumed by the Supreme Court and in-

stead, the constitutionality focus has been upon the issue of whether

or not the compulsory licensing should be “royalty-free” or on a

reasonable royalty basis. In United States v. National Lead Co.,

et al, the Supreme Court held that “on the facts before us” the

issuance of a royalty-free license under the patents was not justified

to effectively enforce the Anti-Trust Act. In 1952, the Supreme

Court stated in Besser Mfg. Co., et al v. United States, that com-

pulsory patent licensing is a well recognized remedy where patent

abuses are proved in anti-trust actions and it is required for effective

relief. Presumably, the constitutional basis for such compulsory

licensing by the courts must rest under the judicial power in

“equity” extended in Article III, Section 2, discussed in a later

section.

Further, a more in-depth view of the matter is forced upon us also

by the “police power” authority available to Congress, and the

extent of its applicability to, and limitations on, the compulsory

licensing of patenits.

L

33. J

-

30. US. 444, 447, 72 S. Ct. 838, 841 (1952).

B. R. PRAVEL 193

Court-Imposed Compulsory Licensing of Patents

In a recent non-patent case, the scope of equity powers in shaping

equity decrees and the guiding principles behind such equity

powers, has been spelled out for us“:

“In shaping equity decrees, the trial court is vested with broad

discretionary power; appellate review is correspondingly narrow.

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S.

1, 15, 27 n. 10, 91 S. Ct. 1267, 1275, 1281, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1971).

Moreover, in constitutional adjudication as elsewhere, equitable

remedies are a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair,

and what is workable. “Traditionally, equity has been character-

ized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a

facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.’

Brown v. Board of Education (II), 349 U.S. 294, 300, 75 S. Ct.

753, 756, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955). Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for

the Court, has said, ;

The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the

Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the neces- ;

sities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has

distinguished it. The qualities of mercy aiid practicality have

made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and recon-

ciliation between the public interest and private need as well

as between competing private claims.’ Hecht Co. v. Bowles,

321 U.S. 321, 329-330, 64 S.Ct. 587, 592, 88 L. Ed. 754 (1944).

(Emphasis added).

See also Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396, 66 S.Ct.

582, 584, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946).

In equity as nowhere else courts eschew rigid absolutes and look

to the practical realities and necessities inescapably involved in

reconciling competing interests, notwithstanding those interests

have constitutional roots.

Equitable remedies are likewise cognizant of the “public interest

involved” and of the “public policy” of statutory provisions within

their jurisdiction.**

A striking example of the exercise of the equity powers of the Fed-

eral court is found in the typical remedies for antitrust violations

N. Lemon v. Kurtzman, . . U.S. . ., 93 S.Ct. 1463, 1469 (1973).

38. United States v. Morgan et al, 307 U.S. 183, 59 S.Ct. 795 (1939).

194 B. R. PRAVEL

which include the three “D's” of antitrust enforcement, divestiture,

divorcement, and dissolution.**® The statutory basis for the jurisdic-

tion of the Federal Courts under the antitrust laws is under the

various antitrust statutes such as the Sherman Act, which has a

very broad delegation of power, vesting the District Courts of the

United States with jurisdiction “to prevent and restrain violations

of this Act.” In view of such general language, the relief accorded

under the Sherman Act clearly rises out of the inherent equity

powers of the Federal Courts and further on the basis of regulating

“interstate commerce” under the Constitution.

Geing back to the Hartford-Empire case, u the Supreme Court es-

tablished the use of compulsory patent licensing as an equitable

remedy where there had been an antitrust violation. In that case,

the government wea have the patents forfeited or cancelled

because of the anti violations, and instead, the Court limited

its punishment to the requirement for compulsory licensing “at

standard royalties and without discrimination or restriction.” In a

sense, the Hartford-Empire case represents a clash of the public

policy of the patent laws and the public policy of the antitrust laws.

The dominant standard in both is the general public interest or

welfare. Both bodies of law are aimed at the protection of the public

interest in competitive technology and in competitive trade and

commerce.*? The limitations on the right of the patent-holder, such

as the requirement for compulsory licensing, are reached within that

broad scope of general policy of the patent laws and the antitrust

law, which is capsulated in the following quotation from the Hart-

ford-Empire case (pages 442-453):

Ihe general policy has been to restrict the right of the patent-

holder rigidly within the terms of his grant and, when he over-

reaches its boundary, to deny him the usual protections of the

holder of property. That this ordinarily has been done in infringe-

ment suits or suits for cancellation does not qualify the fact or

the policy. On the other hand, the anti-trust statutes have re-

ceived a hroad construction and corresponding enforcement,

where violation has been clearly shown. When the patent holder

so far overreaches his privilege as to intrude upon the rights of

others and the public protected by the anti-trust legislation, and

does this in such a way that he cannot further exercise the privi-

39. Malcolm A. Hoffman and Arthur I. Winard, Hoffman's Antitrust Law and Tech-

niques, Vol. I, (1963), pp. 407-425.

40. Timken Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 602, 71 S. S. Ct. 971

B. R. PRAVEL 195

lege without also trespassing upon the rights thus protected, either

his right or the other person’s, and the public right, must give

way. It is wholly incongruous in such circumstances to say that

the privilege of the trespasser shall be preserved and the rights

of all others which he has transgressed shall continue to give way

to the consequences of his wrongdoing.’ ”

In the National Lead case, cited supra, the Supreme Court recog-

nized the “issue of the constitutionality with respect to requiring

a royalty free compulsory license, but specifically side-stepped the

issue. The Supreme Court apparently assumed so long as “reason-

able royalties” were required for payment, there was no constitu-

tional issue. The Supreme Court did not deal with the more difficult

issue, namely, whether the transfer of private property from one

individual to another, can be categorized as the taking of private

property for “public use.” It might be argued that compulsory

licensing places a product into use by the public and this makes it

a public use,” but that kind of logic or reasoning could justify the

requirement by the government for the transfer of any private

property from one individual to another so long as the property

being transferred is used or sold to the public for use. More specific-

ally, in the field of patents, if such rationale were carried to its

logical conclusion, it would mean that the “exclusive” right con-

templated by the Constitution for patents would be destroyed.

In addition to the antitrust cases, wherein compulsory licensing of

a patent was the remedy, the Second Circuit has recently required

a compulsory license on the basis of the patent owner being a non-

user.“ In that case, the patentee was a patent attorney who “never

engaged in any manufacturing or other business connected with the

patent in suit.” The master appointed by the District Court had

applied the “willing licensor-willing licensee” test to ascertain a

reasonable royalty for the compulsory license which was ordered

with respect to future infringement. There was a decided difference

of opinion between the patentee and the infringer as to the basis

and the amount of the royalty which should be paid by the infringer,

and the Second Circuit concluded that the patentee was not within

his rights because the patent “is not intended as a club to be wielded

by a patentee to enhance his negotiating stance.” The entire premise

of the Second Circuit was on the basis of the equities and they con-

cluded that it would be inequitable to impose irreparable hardship

on the infringer by injunction without any concomitant benefit to

the patentee. They of course overlooked the fact that the patentee |

; E hd Cin 1978) 18M decided

: ruary : A Cir. 1974). . .

196 B. R. PRAVEL

might get a much greater benefit in the form of royalties from some-

one else who would be licensed by the patentée. They concluded

that the compulsory license was a “benefit to the patentee” and that

“To grant him a compulsory royalty is to give him half a loaf. In

the circumstances of his utter failure to exploit the patent on his

own, that seems fair.“

As an aside, the Foster decision, in approving the compulsory licens-

ing of the patent, relied primarily upon Nerney v. New York, N.H.

& H.R. Co. ; American Safety Device Co. v. Kurland Chemical

Co. and Royal-McBee Corp. v. Smith-Corona Marchant, Inc. The

Nerney case involved a denial of an injunction which would have

required the defendant to notify other infringers to refrain from

sending railroad cars having the infringing brakes to the defendant's

trackage. The court specifically recognized that the plaintiff might

properly proceed against the other infringers, but such denial did

not result in a compulsory licensing to the defendant. The Ameri-

can Safety Device case was a situation in which the patent had

expired and the patentee was attempting to obtain an injunction

to restrain the further use of the infringing machines made during

the life of the patent. The court refused the injunction because

there was a plain and adequate remedy at law since damages would

suffice. The Royal-McBee case was a case in which compulsory li-

censing was ordered on the basis of “the relatively short period re-

maining of the life of the patent.” The Royal-McBee court observed

with respect to such award of a compulsory license: *

We find this flexible approach towards a difficult problem of

balancing equities in patent litigation most desirable, and we

think the remedy was fully warranted by the facts of this case.”

The “flexible approach” was also emphasized in the Foster v. Ameri-

can Machine & Foundry Co. case, but ii is significant that the cases

relied upon By ster court did not order compulsory licensing

merely because of a non-use by the patentee. Such decision raises

co ional questions as to the scope of the equit wer of the

courts, which ee . te ee reme

Court the potion for wilt OF ICG f e Se . 55

say, that even CONGWESS HAT WOT 38H Hi to Paar eee Technion nies

would require compulsory licensing of a patent merely because of

non-use, and as discussed hereinafter, such power would appear to

B. R. PRAVEL 197

be beyond the constitutional authority granted to Congress. Al-

though the equity powers of the courts are not as well-defined as

the powers of Congress under the Constitution, certainly it would

be inconsistent for an equity court to have the power to take private

property on any broader scope than permitted under the Constitu-

tion for Congress. The Fifth Amendment limitation should cer-

tainly be applicable to the judiciary as well as to Congress, so

mere non-use of a patent by a patentee should not justify compul-

sory licensing by either the judiciary or Congress.

Despite the undesirable result which was reached by the Second

Circuit in the Faster case, those who would advocate more legislation

with respect to-compulsory licensing should agree that the Foster

case does emphasize the fact the courts are in a position to use the

“flexible approach,” so long as they are within the constitutional

limits. Thus, where compulsory licensing is a proper remedy, the

courts are in a position to require compulsory licensing. On the

other hand, if the courts exceed their constitutional authority by

requiring compulsory licensing in a situation which amounts to the

taking of private property for use by another, hopefully there is

likewise a remedy to the patentee through the protection of the

courts. Certainly, the court procedures are available for the patentee

to assert his position and claim his rights if they are abused under

the guise of equity powers.

The courts have also exercised their equity powers with respect to

patents in other instances, such as the renowned Activated Sludge

case, which is frequently cited by advocates of compulsory licensing

as a justification for more compulsory licensing. However, that case

is actually an eminent domain se in which the city of Milwaukee

was the governmental body acting within the scope of its obligations

to protect the welfare of its citizens. It was recognized in that case

that both parties had strong equities, but “there are many others

who are indirectly concerned whose equities are even stronger than

those of the parties.” The court observed that if the injunction

preventing patent infringemeiii was made permanent, it would close

the sewage plant, leaving the entire community without any means

for the disposal of raw sewage other than running it into Lake

Michigan, thereby polluting its waters and endangering the health

and lives of that and other adjoining communities. The health and

the lives of more than one-half million people were involved. Even

if such Activated Sludge case is not recognized as an eminent domain

case, it certainly must be recognized as a case in which the equity

— aed of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc. 69 F. 2d 577, 21 USPQ 69 (7th Cir.

198 B. R. PRAVEL

powers are properly exercised within the scope of those police

powers” normally available for the public welfare. It is believed

that the Activated Sludge case represents a proper use of compulsory

licensing when needed for equitable relief, but within the constitu-

tional requirements. Where there has been a misuse of the patent,

the courts have fashioned the remedy of refusal of relief, at

least until the misuse has been discontinued.“ Where there has

been a prolonged refusal to make available a patented product or

process, such as in Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin Alumni

Research Foundation,®® the courts have similarly concluded that

the patent is unenforceable in the public interest. Although the

Vitamin Technologists case was decided on the basis of the patent

being invalid for other reasons, the court recognized that the ques-

tion was raised as to the “public interest in restoring the health

of the afflicted”. The Continental Paper Bag case“ was discussed

with respect to the holding in that case that the suppression of the

use of the patent was the right of the holder of the patent monopoly.

The distinction in the case of the refusal of the patentee to license

the use of his patent to protect the health of great numbers of the

public, as compared to the refusal to license the patent for paper

bags was recognized by the court. This type of recognition is im-

portant and is a fundamental advantage in having the courts deter-

mine when compulsory licensing should be required, rather than

having statutory provisions for compulsory licensing which would

attempt to cover across-the-board situations. Thus, the non-use of a

patent on a paper bag is certainly a far cry from the non-use of a

valuable vitamin which should have been used for its health value

to the public, particularly where the showing was that the patent

owner literally refused to offer such product to the public. This of

course may also require a distinction between different types of

drugs, which would be virtually impossible for Congress to define

in terms of which ones would be subject to a compulsory license.

Thus, unless the drug was one which had been suppressed for an

excessive period of time without cause and such a drug was necessary

to protect the health of great numbers of the public, compulsory

licensing would not be justified. Again, the flexibility and the de-

sirability of leaving the matter of compulsory licensing with the

courts is evidenced by the history of the judicial process in this area.

Summarizing briefly with respect to the compulsory licensing re-

quired under the equity powers by the courts, it should first

USPQ 21 (1944) ; Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 52 USPJ 30 (1942).

50. 146 F. 2d 941,

(9th Cir, 1944).

B. R. PRAVEL 199

be noted that compulsory licensing of a patent has not been re-

quired by the courts except where there has been some type of

activity such as an anti-trust violation, misuse or aggravated abuse,

other than in the recently decided Foster case“, which is still hope-

fully subject to review by the Supreme Court, The ability of the

courts to deal with specific situations and to develop all the neces-

sary evidence and pertinent facts is submitted to be a safeguard

which is present under the equity powers of the courts, which is,

for the most part, being cxercised with constitutional restraint and

with the typical fairness expected in equity.

The Constitutional Limits on Congress with Respect

to Compulsory Licensing

The powers vested in Congress under the Constitution appear in

Article I, Section 8. One of such powers is of course the power:

“To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing

for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to

their respective writings and discoveries”.

Congress also has the right “to regulate commerce“ which of course

brings within its jurisdiction the right to pass legislation dealing

with antitrust matters. As noted previously, the traditional police

power is also available to Congress.

\

“Congress can certainly regulate interstate commerce to the ex-

tent of forbidding and punishing the use of such commerce as

an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty or the spread of any

evil or harm to the people of other states from the state of origin.

In doing this it is merely exercising the police power for the

benefit of the public’”’.®*

Thus, the exercise of the police power by Congress is to be “for the

benefit of the public“. The latitude with respect to the police power

is, however, circumscribed so that it must be used only to “protect”

the health, safety and morals of the community and to prevent “the

spread of any evil or harm“. In other words, regulation under the

police power by Congress has never been so broadly construed so

as to permit regulation purely on the basis of speculative public

benefit.

The United States Supreme Court recognized the limits of Con-

52. Supra, note

53. Brooks v. United States, 267 US. 432, 45 S. Ct. 345 (1925).

200 B. R. PRAVEL

gressional powers in the landmark case of Mugler v. Kansas, when

it stated:

“Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use

of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dis-

pose of it..

Compulsory licensing necessarily does disturb the owner in the

control or use of his property for lawful purposes and it does restrict

his right to dispose of it, so compulsory licensing really does not

fall within the scope of control or regulation contemplated by the

police power, whether it be considered under the commerce clause

of the Constitution“ as described by the Supreme Court in Brooks

v. United States, cited supra, or whether the “police power” is more

broadly defined as in those cases dealing with the application of

police power by the States. The consideration of the scope of police

power as a general proposition has been thoroughly considered.**

It must be concluded that the police powers are primarily directed

towards regulation and when the regulation reaches the point that

it is “taking” the private property, the police power no longer ap-

plies, but instead, the constitutional requirement for “public use”

by or for the government applies. Since the essence of a patent right

is the “exclusive” nature of the right, any diminution of such ex-

clusive nature constitutes a “taking” from the patent owner, There-

fore, since compulsory licensing necessarily constitutes a diminution

of the exclusive nature of the patent right, it follows that compul-

sory licensing cannot be considered a mere regulation under the

police power, but must be construed as a “taking”.

This is not to say that within the framework of the United States

Constitution, there cannot be regulations under the police power

with respect to patents, and in some rare instances, even compulsory

licensing, providing such action is within the framework of the

Constitution and patents are treated in the same manner as other

private property. The eminent domain provisions with respect to

the patents found in 28 U.S.C. 1498 are consistent with the Fifth

Amendment obligations permitting the taking of private property

for “public use” with “just compensation”. “Due process” is also

provided for in such statute. The key language of 28 U.S.C. 1498

is that the use or manufacture shall be “by or for the United States”,

so the taking of the patent is by the government which qualifies

54. 123 U.S. 623, 668-669, 8 S. Ct. 273, 301 (1887).

55. Article I. section 8, clause 3,

4. Takings and the Police Power, Yale Law Journal, Volume 74, pages 36-76

B. N. PRAVEL 201

for the “public use“ requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 28

U.S.C. 1498 clearly provides for the “recovery of his reasonable

and entire compensation” which has thus been left to the Court of

Claims for determination.

A similar but essentially outdated, provision for government use

is found in the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 16 U.S.C, 8311,

which provides for use by a government corporation and permits

recovery of “reasonable compensation”.

The conclusion must be reached that statutory provisions for com-

pulsory licensing would be constitutional only if within the stric-

tures of Brooks v. United States.: For that reason, mere non-use

of a patent, regardless of the length of time of the non-use, would

not be the proper subject for compulsory licensing, even though

this has been advocated.** On the basis of police powers, the Atomic

Energy Act compulsory licensing provisions,“ are constitutionally

justified because of the evil or harm to the people if atomic energy

is not properly used and controlled.*® The instances of a commodity

such as atomic power or nuclear energy is rare enough so that such

statutory provisions do not set a precedent for any general compul-

sory licensing statutes as some have suggested.

Certainly the ability of the courts to handle the flagrant situations

which would require compulsory licensing, other than in special

situations such as atomic energy, is amply demonstrated over a long

period of time and supports the basic premise that legislation in

this area is not only unnecessary, but undesirable. The following

brief consideration of some of the recently proposed legislation deal-

ing with compulsory licensing is believed to demonstrate the prob-

lems in attempting to handle by anticipatory legislation the excep-

tional and flagrant abuses which would be constitutionally subject

to compulsory licensing by Congress, rather than leaving it to the

courts.

Proposed Legislation Re Compulscry Licensing

Where compulsory licensing of patents is required such as under

the federal Non Nuclear Energy and Research Development Act

of 1974%, as a result of research, development or other projects

57. Supra, note 53.

58. wien Supra, note 4; Picard v. United States, 128 F. 2d 632 (2 Cir, 1942).

59. 42 U.S.C. 2183.

60. Interesting] enough, a recent inquiry by the author to the Atomic Energy Commis-

sion — that in foe one application (A a license was made and it was withdrawn

in 1971. No orders have issued for compulsory licensing under the Act.

61. H. R. 13565, (93d Cong. 2d Sess.)

1

—— — —— — —

202 8. f. PRAVEL

which are contracted for with the Government by a private party,

the constitutionality of such provisions cannot be questioned. There

is of course no “taking” because the arrangement is a voluntary

contractual one. Whether or not the provisions are desirable, par-

ticularly with respect to the disclosure and licensing of “background

patents, trade secrets, knowhow, or proprietary information” from

the standpoint of inducement for parties to enter into the contract

is certainly questionable. On the other hand, Section 308 of the

“Clean Air Act’’®*, is submitted to be unconstitutional. It is not

within the eminent domain rights of the government since the

compulsory licensing is made available to non-government entities,

and it goes beyond the police powers of Congress as outlined in the

Brooks v. United States case by taking away the exclusive rights of

the patent owner with an inadequate showing of a public need by

the Administrator of the Act. ‘The requirement that the “unavaila-

bility of such (patent) right may result in a substantial lessening

of competition or a tendency to create monopoly” inherently exists

if the patent was the only method of accomplishing the requirements

set by the Administrator. Therefore, that requirement is essentially

meaningless and is not a limitation, even though it is couched in

the typical antitrust statutory language.

It is submitted that only if an aggravated refusal to market under

the patent can be shown and such refusal results in “evil or harm

to the people * is there any justification for compulsory licensing

under the police power. Such limitation consistent with the police

power is clearly lacking in Section 308 of the Clear Air Act, and

therefore since no other constitutional basis would support such

Act, it is the writer’s conclusion that Section 308 is not constitu-

tional.

The Hart Bill S. 2287 (93d Cong., Ist Sess.) is likewise submitted

to be unconstitutional for several reasons. First, it provides that not

only the patent shall be subject to a compulsory license, but “all

available knowhow necessary commercially to work the best mode

of working the subject matter of the patent” shall also be subject

to the compulsory license. The value of “know-how” is in its secrecy

and exclusiveness, or at least its control by the owner so as to limit

its disclosure. A requirement that this type of information be li-

censed on a compulsory basis is clearly a confiscation of private

property which destroys the property itself. For the same reasons as

expressed above in connection with the Clean Air Act, the pro-

visions relating to the lessening of competition are submitted to be

62. 42 U.S.C. 1857 (1967, 1973).

63. Supra, note 53.

PE r an —

. x . SS LEFT EIE BTR: F —

B. R. PRAVEL 203

meaningless. The statute purports to express a public interest to

justify the compulsory licensing by directing its attention to subject

matter “involving or related to pubiic health, safety, or protection

of the environment”. Just because a patent happens to fall into

those particular areas of public interest does not mean that the

police power of Congress can be automatically exercised. There

must be a showing of some evil or harm to the people with respect

to the public health, safety or environment by reason of the failure

to use or license the patented subject matter to justify compulsory

licensing under the police power.

The further provision cf the Hart Bill which provides for compul-

sory licensing for the non-working of the patented invention for a

period of three years following the date of issue of the patent or

four years following the date of application of the patent is clearly

unconstitutional. There is no constitutional requirement for the

use of a patent. As stated in the famous Continental Paper Bag case,

cited supra:

“His title is exclusive, and so clearly within the constitutional

provisions in respect of private property that he is neither bound

to use his discovery himself nor permit others to use it.

In a more recent case, the same basic right of a patentee was recog-

nized:

“The restrictions in the various agreements seem only to be the

exercise by a patentee of his right either to decline to practice

its invention; to practice it exclusively itself; to grant a single

license or exclusive licenses with or without cross-licensing (Sperry

Products, Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 171 F. Supp. 901

(N.D. Ohio, 1959), aff'd and mod. 285 F.2d 911, 925-926 (6 Cir.

1960) cert. den. 368 U.S. 890, 82 S. Ct 139, 7 LEd. 2d 87 (1961),

or to grant non-exclusive licenses.

It has been suggested by some that since the Constitution provides

for the grant of exclusive rights for limited times that such con-

stitutional language justifies a shorter period of time for a nonuser

of his patent than for a user of his patent, but it is submitted that

such thinking is not consistent with or supported by the still viable

Supreme Court language from the Continental Paper Bag case

quoted above. Further, the Constitution would not permit discrimi-

nation as to the time limits for patent rights to different inventors

6. & Voss AG v. Prudential-Crace Lines, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1116, 1137 (D.C.

Stes, SR NRE EES PPP

re

204 B. R. PRAVEL

based upon use or non-use. To place an interpretation on the con-

stitutional language “for limited times” so as to attempt to justify

compulsory licensing on no other grounds except non-use is sub-

mitted to be in total disregard of the normal reading of such words.

The absurdity of such a reading of the Constitution is illustrated

by considering a hypothetical fact situation in which Mr. Smith

has invented a light bulb with a carbon filament and another light

bulb with a tungsten filament, both of which are patented. Mr.

Smith determines that both light bulbs will work, but he can get

the carbon filaments at a lower price, so he elects to make the carbon

filament light bulb. The Giant Electric Corp. without any expense

for research on its part on this product determines that it can make

the tungsten filament bulb at a lower price than Mr. Smith can.

If Smith is forced to grant a compulsory license to the Giant Elec-

tric Corp. on the tungsten filament bulb, his business could be

injured or destroyed by a competitor who had no research cost to

recover. Under the non-use proposal, Smith would be forced to grant

the license simply because he is not using one of his patents even

though he is offering a good product to the public at a price which

is reasonable. Such example is not exhaustive, but is merely illustra-

tive of the unfairness and counter-productiveness of such proposal

for compulsory licensing merely because of non-use of a patent.

Considering now other paragraphs C, D and E of the Hart Bill, it is

immediately apparent that they have no police power justification

at all and are clearly unconstitutional. Paragraph C would permit

a compulsory license to a party who obtained a “subsequently issued

patent” which he could not use until the expiration of a prior issued

patent. Paragraph D would permit a compulsory license when a per-

son has commercially worked the patented subject matter before

the actual filing date of the patent. Paragraph E permits the appli-

cant to seek a compulsory license when the portion of a product

which he is making or selling embodies the patented subject matter

to the extent of 10% or only a minor part. Quite clearly, none of

the foregoing requirements in paragraphs C, D, and E of the Hart

Bill have anything to do with the police power of the Federal gov-

ernment and they cannot be justified under the Constitution.

The Nelson Bill S. 954, (83d Cong., Ist Sess.) contains compulsory

licensing provisions in Sections 399d and 399e, primarily based upon

the price of drugs covered by patents. The drug industry has been

under attack, particularly with respect to patents on drugs, for a

number of years, and there always seems to be someone suggesting

the compulsory licensing of patents on drugs on the unsupported

and illogical theory that this is going to make drugs less expensive

. LIEGE IED EADIE LORE Dy CHOY PEs HR ts rs

„ ——:v ————

B. R. PRAVEL 205

and more available to the public. The fact that is overlooked by

most advocates of compulsory licensing of drug patents is that, in

the absence of the incentive for a substantial return on the success-

ful drugs that are discovered, the incentive to spend millions to

invent or discover new drugs would be virtually destroyed or ma-

terially diminished. If it were not for the incentive to develop new

drugs, there would have been no reason for private industry to have

spent the vast sums for research to invent the many “wonder drugs”

presently available to the public. Although those of us who are not

directly connected with the drug industry might consider it an

easy way out to suggest that the drug industry should be the one

and only industry subjected to compulsory licensing, it should be

remembered that if price or the profit made with respect to any

product is the criteria for compulsory licensing, such criteria (to

be non-discriminatory) should apply to all patented products. The

distaste most businessmen would justifiably have for “Big Brother”

regulating the price or profit of their patented products, would cer-

tainly cause a devastating curtailment on invention. There is no

justification under the police power for broadly requiring compul-

sory licensing of drug patents on the basis of prices charged, if no

misuse or violation occurs. Drugs can be obtained, even though

high prices must be paid for some of them. For the indigent, the

government can certainly provide appropriations for health pur-

poses under public welfare, as is already done. This is an area where

we clearly would be “throwing out the baby with the bath water”

if compulsory licensing of drug patents is permitted. Of course,

if it could be shown, as in the Vitamin Technologists case, that a very

vital drug was not being produced by anyone and the patent owner

refused to produce it, and such refusal placed persons in danger

with respect to life or death, that would justify compulsory licensing

and it would be constitutional under the police powers, but that

of course is not the basis for the Nelson Bill or any other bills of

that type.

“Comprehensive” Compulsory Licensing Statutes

With “Safeguards”

The typical reasons advanced for favoring a comprehensive or gen-

eral compulsory licensing statute with “safeguards”*> has been the

following:

(A) to meet the demands of those who contend there has been

65. APLA proposed resolution (Minneapolis Meeting, 1973), which proposal was re-

jected. Similar proposals have been consistently rejected by the Patent, Trademark &

Copyright Section of the American Bar Association in recent years (1972, 1973).

— —-—- ——2ſm e eden BMD ee e Ams ee er

206 B. R. PRAVEL

significant suppression of patents (without any substantial proof);

(B) The compulsory licensing statutes are not used, and would not

be used, to any extent, particularly when enough “safeguards” are

included in the statute;

(C) Compulsory licensing is a present reality in the United States

law and practice.

For those who contend that we should adopt such a general com-

pulsory licensing statute because of the allegations of “suppression”

or non-use, the answer is submitted to be very simple. The foregoing

portion of this article is believed to clearly support the proposition

that legislation is not necessary to prevent that type of abuse when

it is sufficiently severe and is within the constitutional powers of

Congress or the courts to prevent. The Vitamins Technologists case

is an excellent example where the court stood ready to require com-

pulsory licensing because of the public need for the invention which

was being suppressed.

The recent case of Foster u. American Foundry and Machinery Co.,

although believed beyond the constitutional powers of the court in

exercising its equity powers, is an indication of the willingness of

the courts to test their outer limits of authority in dealing with sup-

pression and non-use of patents when the need arises.

In answer to the argument that the compulsory licensing statutes

with “safeguards” will not be used anyway to any substantial ex-

tent.“ it is submitted such argument does not follow merely because

the compulsory licensing statutes which have been in effect for

specific instances, such as atomic energy, have not been widely

utilized. Certainly, there is a greater temptation to seek compulsory

licenses under a general compulsory licensing statute than under a

specific one and although foreign compulsory license provisions

have not been used extensively, they have certainly been used more

than under the Atomic Energy Act. Further, if it be true that there

would really be a lack of use of a general comprehensive compulsory

licensing statute, what is the reason for having one? Particularly

when the courts can handle any compulsory licenses which should

be required for abuses of patent rights.

The fact that compulsory licensing is a present reality in a limited

sense does not recommend a greater scope for compulsory licensing.

At present, compulsory licensing, both in the statutes and in the

pra, note 43.

A recent report from the Atomic Energy Commission reveals that there has been

only one application for a license pursuant to 42 USC 2183 and that application was

withdrawn before the license was issued.

— —

r..

B. R. PRAVEL 207

court decisions is relatively limited, as it should be. The statutes

are discussed above and relate to such things as eminent domain

where the government is involved in the use, and those situations

which are a clear abuse of patent rights. As noted previously, when

the compulsory licensing statutes or the court decisions go beyond

merely correcting abuses or carrying out the public policies such as

expressed under the anti-trust laws, they become seriously question-

able with respect to the constitutional basis. In any event, the pres-

ence of some limited compulsory licensing in the law today does

not provide a stepping stone into the deep and stormy waters of

general compulsory licensing with all the ramifications and disad-

vantages resulting therefrom.

There are many disadvantages of a general compulsory licensing

statute of the type proposed by the recently defeated American

Patent Law Association Resolution.“ Reliance upon the courts to

require compulsory licensing where such is within their constitu-

tional authority is much more desirable than any general compul-

sory licensing statute. The courts have the “flexible approach”

rather than the more rigidified approach which necessarily results

la any attempt to provide a general compulsory licensing statute.

The courts can deal with the problems as they arise and are in a

Position to obtain the evidence and the facts upon which the court

renders such equitable relief. By reason of the responsible nature of

most courts, the exercise of the compulsory licensing power will

normally be tempered with reason and sparingly used so that it

does not become commonplace and destroy the patent system. The

statutory approach, on the other hand, tends to encourage compul-

sory licensing by making it seem accessible and authorized.

Furthermore, the mere presence of a general compulsory licensing

statute would tend to promote litigation. The attitude it's worth a

try” for a party to seek the compulsory licensing could become the

norm. Such legislation could provide a sword which could be used

by large and small companies alike to force competitors into highly

disadvantagous positions, not only by the expense of the litigation,

but by being forced to license patents which would otherwise pro-

vide a competitive advantage and for which the patent owner had

paid the price in the form of personal ingenuity, research, expense

or royalties. No justification can be seen for thrusting such addi-

tional burden upon patent owners when the courts are fully capable

of handling compulsory licensing when needed, as is believed evi-

dent from the foregoing discussion in this article.

68. Supra, note 65.

i — a *

208 B. R. PRAVEL

Conclusion

Most efforts at drafting legislation for compulsory licensing have

resulted in unconstitutional legislative proposals, which fortunately

have almost universally been refused by Congress. The present

statutes which are constitutional, 28 USC 1498 and 42 USC 2183,

are examples of the constitutional use of eminent domain and the

police power. Any attempt at a general compulsory licensing statute

strictly for non-use, excessive pricing or profits, or for other reasons

that do not fall within the categories of eminent domain and police

power are unconstitutional, and it is submitted that all of the re-

cently proposed legislation in these categories falls within the un-

constitutional area.

Furthermore, the need for statutory compulsory licensing has not

been established. In cases where there are abuses, misuses or aggra-

vated suppression, as discussed above, the courts are adequately

equipped to handle the remedies in equity, within the framework

and with the safeguards of the Constitution. The circumstances

when compulsory licensing is the judicial remedy have been rare,

and should be rare. The courts are equipped with the flexibility

to handle compulsory licensing as a remedy when it is needed, and

the rigidifying effects of any statutory provisions would oniy tend

to make the task of the courts more difficult.

Compulsory licensing statutes, particularly of a general type, are

especially undesirable because of the fostering of litigation to com-

pel licensing an incipient or actual infringer and the consequent

resistance to licensing by the patentee. Not only would the consti-

tutional issues have to be resolved with respect to many statutory

provisions, but the expense of each individual fact situation which is

litigated would have to borne by the patentee and prospective

licensee as well.

Having reached the foregoing conclusions, some may raise the now

ancient, but still asserted, hue and cry that such position merely

demonstrates the negativism“ of the majority of the patent bar.

Such criticism is not and should not be disturbing because prevent-

ing a weakening of the patent system with the resultant weakening

of the American economy by more compulsory licensing statutes

transcends the criticism. Although the fight is not of recent vintage,

it apparently is one which will continue because the advocates of

compulsory licensing seem perennial. Steadfast opposition is neces-

sary to defeat the destructive in-roads proposed by such proponents

of compulsory licensing statutes. The importance of the needed op-

position should commit us to fight.

aS CSPI OEY

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Petition for Rehearing — Foster v. American Machine & Foundry Co. · 419 U.S. 833 | Frix