Brief for the Respondent in Opposition — Stamatakos v. Hunter Shipping Co.
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Supreme Court of the Unite
October Term, 1973.
No. 73-1696.
ANASTASSIOS STAMATAKOS,
Petitioner,
0.
HUNTER SHIPPING COMPANY, &. A.,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT LY OPPOSITION.
Rawis & Henperson,
Of Counsel. —
International Printing Co., 711 So. 60mm St, Phila., Pa. 19143 — Tel. (215) 727-8711
.
CCE Wor
:
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"COT (ORS
INDEX TO BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT.
Page
OUI TREE -cccscccnucncascccsndonnscccessscessese 1
CounTer-STATEMENT OF QuESTIONS PresENTED ror Review 2
CounTEeR-STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..........-.0e0eeeeee: 3
Reasons ror DENYING THE WRIT ..............+-00000: 7
1. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Affirming the
District Court’s Judgment in Favor of Petitioner in
the Amount of $10,000 Is Not in Conflict With This
Court’s Decisions or With Those of Other Circuits 7
2. The Decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals Is Not in
Conflict With the Treaty Between the United States
SE REE au vdcbdcancuchsnesnosudunctesbnanseus 11
3. The Supreme Court Should Not Grant Certiorari
Merely Because the Circuit Court of Appeals Chose
to Affirm Without a Full Opinion ................. 14
INDEX TO RESPONDENT'S APPENDIX.
Page
Letter Dated April 2, 1971, Shuster to Judge Van Artsdalen A19
Excerpts From Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Application of
ee MEE EAU 00ncnscscnensebecanbabcutacuwawes A20
United States Court of Appeals Release, January 17, 1973 .. A25
Excerpt From Appellant's Brief Before Third Circuit ....... A27
TABLE OF CASES CITED.
Page
Anastasiadis v. SS Little John, 346 F. 2d 281 (C. A. 5, 1965) 14
Andrews v. Chemical Carriers, Inc., 457 F. 2d 636 (C. A. 3,
DEE) Won cUsdwnneauesdscnnncecescoscesasescescoccsce 8
Brillis v. Chandris USA, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 520 (S. D. N. Y.
ME Adeansksevsadburoucccneéneusecctocsoccocceoses 12
Damaskinos v. Soc. Nav. Interamericana S. A., 255 F. Supp.
es Oe ik ED ccncccccpesseccccccocsecsees 9,11
Dassigienis v. Cosmos Carriers & Trading Corp., 442 F. 2d
ao cece speenoeneausaessqeeses ll
Gaiven v. Pease, 367 U. S. SEB (ISGS) 2. cccccccccccccecee 16
Hatzogliou v. Asturias Shipping Co., S. A., 193 F. Supp. 195
Dt i PhD <osshinddndésesqucsoueseseesoonce 11
Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 U. S. 306 (1970) .......... 7, 10, 13
Frangiskatos v. Konkar Maritime Enterprise, S. A., 471 F. 2d
og ee 12
Kontos v. S. S. Sophie C, 236 F. Supp. 664 (E. D. Pa. 1964) 10, 12
Labor Board v. Pittsburgh SS Co., 340 U. S. 498 (1950) ... 10
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571 (1952) ............... 7, 10, 11
Magnum Co. v. Coty, 262 U. S. 159 (1923) .............. 19
Mihalinos v. Liberian SS Trikala, 342 F. Supp. 1237 (S. D.
Sp MD cnsebgeescaseeecavoeabbiadsansesesdeccece 12
MS Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Company, 407 U. S. 1 (1972)
12, 13,14
Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., 386 U. S. 317
SE. dntenntchddddctaedanchnanendneceenceneseece ll
Orgettas v. S/T Crinis, 488 F. 2d 89 (C. A. 4, 1973) ...... ll
Sfiridas v. Santa Cecelia Co., S. A., 358 F. Supp. 108 (E. D.
Pa. 1973) ; aff'd C. A. 3, April 9, 1974 ............... 12
ee ee ie ee OO CED weesncctsccccescece il
Tamboris v. Kainis, 439 F. 2d 1131 (C. A. 5, 1971) ........ 11,12
U. S. v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173 (1944) ... 11
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1949) ...... 15
ae ea renee agi ol
MISCELLANEOUS.
Page
Due Process Clause, Fifth Amendment .................... 16
Internal Security Act of 1950, Section 22 .............---- 16
Judiciary Act of T505, 43 Stat. GEG ..... 2 cccccccccccccess 19
Legal Intelligencer, April 8, 1974 .....................-.- 18
Note, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 52 ..13, 14
Remarks, Chief Justice Burger, Semiannual Meeting, U. S.
Judicial Conference, March 7-8, 1974 ........-......... 15
SO ST ST eR PP CE eg res re eee
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
Ocroser Term, 1973.
No. 73-1696.
ANASTASSIOS STAMATAKOS,
Petitioner,
v.
HUNTER SHIPPING COMPANY, S&S. A.,
Respondent.
Ow Petition ror A Writ oF CERTIORARI TO THE Unirep S7aTes
Court or APPEALS FoR THE THirp Crecv!rt.
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION.
OPINIONS BELOW.
The opinion of the District Court is unofficially re-
ported at 1972 AMC 1001. It is also printed at pages A9-
A18 annexed to Petitioner’s Brief. The Order of the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit is printed herein at pages
A2-A3. The Order denying appellant’s Petition for a re-
hearing is dated February 12, 1974 and is printed at
page Al.
. a
2 Brief for Respondent in Opposition
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.
1. Should the Supreme Court grant certiorari to review
a Court of Appeals resolution of a case where the Court
of Appeals affirmed a decision by the District Court, enter-
ing a judgment in favor of petitioner in the amount of
$10,000 and where there is no conflict between the decision
of the Court of Appeals and the U. S. Supreme Court or
between any other Circuit?
2. Should the Supreme Court grant certiorari to re-
view a Court of Appeals’ resolution of a case concerning an
issue which was not presented to the Court of Appeals or
the District Court?
3. Should the Supreme Court grant certiorari to review
the fact that a Decision is rendered by a Circuit Court of
Appeals without a Full Written Opinion?
ee oe PR em
Brief for Respondent in Opposition 3
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The facts found by the District Court and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit were fully sup-
ported by the evidence. :
Plaintiff is a Greek citizen, born in Greece and at the
time of this incident was a citizen and resident of Greece.
[FOF 20 (A12) & 29 (A13)]. He brought an action against
the Greek owner of the S/T Micnaeu L, a Liberian flag
merchant vessel owned by a Panamanian corporation, to
recover damages arising from an accident which allegedly
occurred about 8:00 p.m. on September 7, 1966, while the
S/T Micnaet L was in New York Harbor.
His theories of recovery were negligence and unsea-
worthiness although nowhere in his Complaint was the
Jones Act or any U. S. Statute mentioned (4a-6a). He
joined the crew of the vessel as Chief Steward 1:00 p.m. on
September 7, 1966. At the time of the injury, plaintiff was
twenty-seven years old, and had been going to sea on Greek
ships since 1957, except for two years of service in the
Greek Air Force (93a). ;
On September 7, 1966, plaintiff was taken to Bayonne
Hospital where he remained until September 28, 1966 when
he was repatriated to his home in Greece. He arrived in
Piraeus, Greece on October 16, 1966, and the following day
started receiving outpatient treatment from Dr. Tsiminakis
at Athens University Hospital which continued until No-
vember 22, 1966, when he became an inpatient. He re-
mained in the hospital for extensive neurological and
psychiatric examinations and treatment under the direction
of Dr. Tsiminakis and about nine other physicians until
May 1967. [FOF 29 & 30 (A13)]. Virtually all diagnostic
and recuperative treatment was rendered in Athens, Greece,
by Greek doctors who speak only that language. Plaintiff
himself spoke no English, only Greek, at the time of this
incident.
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a buapiamess
PUL Ae Pend Pepe
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4 Brief for Respondent in Opposition
Plaintiff came to this country on September 9, 1968,
under a visa for ‘which he was sponsored by his brother.
[92a & FOF 31 (A13)]. His mother was a Greek citizen
and his father and two other brothers are Greek citizens and
residents (98a). _
On July 18, 1966 plaintiff executed two documents in-
dicating he was ‘‘affiliated with the Panhellenic Seaman’s
Federation’’, a Greek seaman’s union. [105a & 106a &
FOF 28 (A13)].
Plaintiff signed an employment agreement (103a &
104a) on July 19, 1966, with the Nereus Shipping Co., de-
fendant’s agent, wherein he specifically agreed to the ap-
plication of Greek law. [FOF 21 & 22 (A12)].
Plaintiff was initially scheduled to be Chief Steward
on the M/V Faros, a Greek vessel, under Liberian flag,
owned by a Panamanian corporation [the officers of which
are the same as Hunter (FOF 24 (A12)] for which Nereus
was acting as agent. [FOF 24 (A12)]. After being trans-
ported to Norfolk on the SS Frsrxos, also operated by
Nereus [FOF 25 (A12)], plaintiff orally agreed to join the
S/T Micuae. L as Chief Steward. [FOF 26 (A13)]. If
plaintiff had stayed on the Micuae. L for more than the
seven or eight hours he did, he would have had to sign
an employment agreement specifically for the Micuaz. L
and it would have been the same as the one he did sign
in connection with the Faros. [Tsakos’ affidavit dated
March 17, 1971 (100a & 101a) ].
The officers of the defendant corporation are all citizens
and residents of Greece. The stock is made to bearer and
the sole stockholder is a Greek citizen, who resides in
England. [FOF 8 &9 (A11)].
When vessels operated by Nereus are operating in
North America, Triton Shipping Co. acts solely as a hus-
banding agent pursuant to a specific sub-agency agreement
Brief for Respondent in Opposition 5
between Triton and Nereus. [FOF 12 (A11)]. Triton has
never acted as a principal in relation to the MicHae. L.
[Xistris deposition p. 51 (42a) ].
Nereus Shipping S. A. is a Greek corporation having
its only office in Piraeus, Greece. It has no offices in the
United States. [FOF 32 (A13)].
Costas Lemos was the sole shareholder of Triton in
1966 and currently resides in Lausanne, Switzerland and
comes to this country ‘‘occasionally.’’ [Xistris deposition
pp. 17-18 (36a-37a)]. Mr. Lemos was a citizen of this
country until 1962, when he was appointed as a representa-
tive of the Greek Government to serve on a NATO com-
mittee [Xistris deposition pp. 22 and 55 (40a and 45a)],
and since then has resided in Switzerland. Furthermore, he
has no stock interest in defendant Hunter. [See defend-
ant’s answer to plaintiff’s No. 47 (121a & 123a)].
The Micuaet L was built in this country under a Mari-
time Administration Contract, and the defendant [recog-
nized bv the U. S. Government as an alien (Transfer Order
No. MAF-178 (23a)], assumed the conditions of that con-
tract. The sole purpose of the conditions is to allow the
U. S. to use an American built vessel in the event of war
or a similar national emergency. [See Statutes cited in
Maritime Administration Records (11la-14a)].
Babis Meliaressis did sign, on behalf of Hunter, the
papers with the Maritime Administration mentioned above
and engaged into the negotiations concerning the mortgage
in question. However, he performed both services for
Hunter pursuant to a specific resolution by the Board of
Directors of Hunter (19a-21a). He was not acting as an
employee of Triton when serving as attorney-in-fact for
Hunter.
The time charters under which the vessel was operating
[See Exhibits 8 & 9 of Xistris deposition (67a-80a)] were
St Nihs Be
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ria
6 Brief for Respondent in Opposition
signed ‘‘Triton Shipping, Inc., as agents for owners’’, and
were with Metropolitan Petroleum Co., a Montreal Cor-
poration. There is no requirement that the vessel call in
New York or its vicinity. Clause C of the charter party
dated April 29, 1963 provides: ‘‘ Western Hemisphere Trad-
ing, one or two loading ports to one discharge port or one
loading port to one or two discharge ports, at Charterer’s
option.’’
The issue of choice of law was submitted to the Honor-
able Donald W. Van Artsdalen by stipulation on November
29, 1971 (107a & A7). Both parties prepared and submitted
comprehensive findings of fact and the issues involved were
thoroughly briefed (A7). Nowhere in the proceedings
below did plaintiff’s counsel at any time urge the applica-
tion of Liberian Law. Plaintiff’s brief was entitled ‘‘Plain-
tiff’s Brief in Support of Application of United States
Law’’ and plaintiff termed the contacts with Liberia ‘‘incon-
sequential’’—a term similarly applied to the Greek contacts.
After considering the entire record below Judge Van
Artsdalen made findings of fact, wrote a comprehensive
opinion and entered his Order of January 18, 1972, ruling
that Greek Law be applied to this non-jury case. (A9-A18).
On March 28, 1973 the District Court entered judgment
in petitioner’s favor in the amount of $10,000 from which
petitioner appealed for a second time. The first appeal was
dismissed as premature. (A6). The second appeal was
thoroughly briefed and full oral argument (30 minutes per
party) was held before the Court of Appeals on January
8,1974. The Court of Appeals on January 18, 1974 affirmed
in writing the judgment of the District Court. (A2-A3).
Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing was denied on Feb-
ruary 12, 1974, in writing, and respondent’s Motion to pay
funds into Court to satisfy the judgment was granted by
the District Court on March 22, 1974, after which the funds
were s0 paid.
Brief for Respondent in Opposition 7
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT. |
1, The Decision of the Court of Appeals Affirming the
District Court’s Judgment in Favor of Petitioner in
the Amount of $10,000 Is Not in Conflict With This
Court’s Decisions or With Those of Other Circuits.
Petitioner mistakenly has suggested the Court of Ap-
peals in affirming the District Court’s opinion reached a
conclusion in conflict with Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S.
571 (1952). Merely stating there is a conflict does not create
that conflict. The most cursory glance of the district
court’s opinion (A13-A18) shows how painstakingly the
court applied the ‘‘seven tests’’ of Lauritzen plus the ‘‘base
of operations’’ test of Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S.
306 (1970). The Court in effect found in applying the dis-
puted facts to the law, admitting ‘‘the matter appears to be
extremely close’’, that the requisite counterweight existed
to have Greek Law applied.
Petitioner argues that Liberian Law was ‘‘erroneously
rejected’’, claiming he argued for its application ‘‘in the
alternative’’. The plea to apply Liberian law to this case
was made by plaintiff for the first time subsequent to Janu-
ary 18, 1972; otherwise the trial judge had no reason to
state: ‘‘Plaintiff contends that the United States law and
the Jones Act apply’’ (A9); and ‘‘Neither party contends
that Liberian Law should prevail’’ (A14).
Counsel for respondent has studied all the pleadings —
in this case and nowhere prior to his brief in support of
his Motion to Reconsider filed on January 26, 1972 is there
any statement, direct or indirect, to show petitioner was
seeking to have Liberian law applied to the facts of this
ease. It must be recalled that parties stipulated on
November 29, 1971 that the ‘‘facts of record’’ as of that
date ‘‘shall constitute the record upon which the Court will
Soins ita a Til
Satta aaa dbath., aad o eae
c.3 Brief for Respondent in Opposition
make his findings of facts and conclusions of law on the
choice of law issue.’’ (107a). Petitioner did not then plead
the applicability of American law and/or Liberian law as
he now does. ‘In effect, what petitioner now seeks to do is
circumvent or alter the effect of the stipulation. Cf. Andrews
v. Chemical Carriers, Inc., 457 F. 2d 636 (C. A. 3, 1972),
particularly footnote 5 on page 640..
One need only look to petitioner’s own language in his
enclosure letter (A19) and brief in the district court on the
issue of the applicable law (A20-A24) to see that he never
contended Liberian law applied: :
1. Petitioner’s brief concerning the choice of law
issue was titled ‘‘Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Ap-
plication of United States Law’’ (A20) ;
2. The entire ‘‘Introduction’’ of that same brief
makes no mention of Liberian law (A20-A21) ;
3. Petitioner states in the ‘‘Introduction’’, ‘‘ Plain-
tiff claims that defendant is liable to him under United
States statutory and non-statutory maritime law,’’ (al-
though no mention of this was made in his Complaint).
It is noteworthy that the. and/or approach was not
there used (A20) ;
4. On page 11 of that brief petitioner says: ‘‘The
other choice of law factors which result in contacts
with Liberia, Panama and Greece are inconsequential
compared with the United States contacts.’’ (Emphasis
supplied) (A21); |
5. On page 13 of that same brief petitioner states,
‘*United States statutory and non-statutory maritime
law govern this action... .’’ (Again no and/or ap-
proach) '(A23), and finally ;
Brief for Respondent in Opposition 9
6. On page 13 of that brief the statement is made,
‘‘The other choice of law factors which result in con-
tacts with Liberia, Panama and Greece are imconse-
quential compared with the United States contacts.’’
(Emphasis supplied) (A24).
Thus, as of November 29, 1971, petitioner was using
the word ‘‘inconsequential’’ and referring to Greek and
Liberian law in conjunctive terms. It is now logically in-
consistent to attempt to refer to Liberian law in ‘‘and/or’’
terms with United States law.
In any event, as the district court found ‘‘the realities
of this case are such that the ‘law of the flag’ should not
prevail’’ (A15).
Courts have disregarded the flag of a vessel where it is
the plaintiff seaman who seeks to look beyond the flag of
convenience to the real allegiance of the corporate struc-
ture. The rationale for this is the comment in Lauritzen
which indicates that it is common practice for American
shipowners to use a foreign flag to avoid stricter American
laws.
In the instant case, one must ask for whose convenience
the Liberian flag is being used. From the counterstatement
of facts and the court’s findings of fact, it is clear no United
States corporation is attempting directly or indirectly to
avoid American law since no United States corporation is
here involved. The flag of Liberia is flown for the con-
venience of a Panamanian corporation whose true alle-
giance is to the Kingdom of Greece.
In Damaskinos v. Soc. Nav. Interamericana S. A., 255
F. Supp. 919 (S. D. N. Y. 1966), which is factually indistin-
guishable from the present one, except for the locus of the
injury, the court in holding that Greek, not American or
Liberian law should be applied where a Greek seaman was
injured on a Liberian flag vessel owned by a Panamanian
10 Brief for Respondent in Opposition
corporation whose officers and shareholders were Greek and
whose operations were conducted from Greece, made the
following comment (at page 923):
‘“*Tf the Liberian flag of the vessel is thought to be a
‘flag of convenience,’ it is one for the convenience of
the Greeks, not Americans. If Greek nationals choose
to operate their shipping business through the medium
of a Panamanian corporation whose vessels are regis-
tered in Liberia, that policy is of no concern to the
United States, and it affords no reason for the applica-
tion of the law of the United States to the claims of
seamen on those vessels.”’
In Kontos v. S. S. Sophie C, 236 F. Supp. 664 (E. D. Pa.
1964), a case which is similarly indistinguishable from the
instant case, except the locus of the injury, the trial court
looked beyond the vessel’s Liberian flag and held that Greek
law, not American or Liberian law, applied to both the claim
for damages and for maintenance and cure.
No federal question of substance has been advanced by
petitioner in his first argument urging the granting of his
petition. The Third Circuit by affirming the decision of
the lower court, in effect adopted its reasoning. That lower
court opinion correctly cited the law to be applied to the
facts, i.c. Lauritzen v. Larsen, supra; and Hellenic Lines
v. Rhoditis, supra. Petitioner is displeased with the out-
come. However, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter so aptly stated
in reviewing the findings of the Labor Board:
‘*This is not the place to review a conflict of evidence
nor to reverse a Court of Appeals because were we in
its place, we would find the record tilting one way
rather than the other, though fair-minded judges could
find it tilting either way.’’ Labor Board v. Pittsburgh
SS Co., 340 U. S. 498 (1950) at p. 503.
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<a ere ee ere,
Brief for Respondent in Opposition il
2. The Decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals Is Not in
Conflict With the Treaty Between the United States
and Liberia.
At the outset, it must be noted that the alleged conflict
with a treaty is being raised for the first time. It was not
presented either to the district court (A19-A24) or to the
Third Circuit (Compare Miscellaneous Citations on A27
with Miscellaneous Citations in petitioner’s present peti-
tion). It is a general rule of appellate review that only in
very unusual circumstances (not here present) will the
reviewing court consider for the first time issues not raised
below. Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.S.
317 (1967); Silber v. U. S., 370 U. S. 717 (1962); U.S. v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173 (1944). For this
reason alone this court should not grant the petition in the
instant case.
The petition should also be denied inasmuch as there is
no conflict between the Liberian Treaty and the decision by
the Circuit Court of Appeals. If petitioner’s analysis were
correct, the result would be that in every case involving a
Liberian flag vessel, brought in this country, U. S. Courts
would be compelled to apply Liberian law if U. S. law were
ruled inapplicable. This was clearly not the intent of the
seven tests advanced in Lauritzen v. Larsen, supra.
There are numerous instances where courts in this
country, on facts similar to those in this case, have either
declined jurisdiction (a result which is more harmful to a
foreign litigant than that obtained in the instant case) or
have applied Greek law. See Damaskinos v. Soc. Nav.
Interamericana S. A., supra; Hatzoglou v. Asturias Ship-
ping Co., S. A., 193 F. Supp. 195 (S. D. N. Y. 1961);
Dassigienis v. Cosmos Carriers € Trading Corp., 442 F. 2d
1016 (C. A. 2, 1971); Tamboris v. Kainis, 439 F. 2d 1131
(C. A. 5, 1971) ; Orgettas v. S/T Crinis, 488 F. 2d 89 (C. A.
Ey SE SE RE LS Oe ee TTS ea SS ee ae
=
12 \ Brief for Respondent in Opposition
4, 1973); Brillis v. Chandris USA, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 520
(S. D. N. Y. 1963) ; Mihalinos v. Liberian SS Trikala, 342
(S. D. Cal. 1972); and Frangiskatos v.
Konkar Maritime Enterprises, S. A., 471 F. 2d 714 (C. A.
2, 1972)—all cases involving Liberian flag vessels brought
by Greek seamen with facts analogous to the instant case
and in which the Court declined to exercise jurisdiction.
Instances where jurisdiction was retained but Greek law
was applied are Kontos v. S. S. Sophie C, supra; and
Sfiridas v. Santa Cecelia Co., S. A., 358 F. Supp. 108 (E. D.
Pa. 1973); aff’d by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Cireuit by decision dated April 9, 1974.
An important factor cited by the district court and
accepted by the appellate court in the present case was
petitioner’s acceptance of a contract by which he agreed to
the applicability of Greek law and the Greek Collective
Agreement in the event of ‘‘illness or injury’. (FOF 21-26,
A12-A13.) Similar contracts have been cited and approved
by other courts as significant factors in declining juris-
diction or applying Greek law in cases brought by Greek
seamen sailing on Liberian flag vessels owned and operated
by foreign interests. See all cases cited above in the pre-
ceding paragraph except Frangiskatos and Tamboris in
neither of which was there a statement as to the existence
or non-existence of a contract. |
Moreover, this Court in MS Bremen v. Zapata Offshore
Company, 407 U. S. 1 (1972), was called upon to interpret
a contract to litigate any dispute\involving the contract in
English Courts. Zapata brought suit in the United States
and the owners of the MS Bre moved to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction citing among other things the contract °
in effect. The District Court and the Fifth Circuit held that
jurisdiction should not be declined on the basis of forum non
—<et> POT I, ES OTA om
—- at he eat ee ee |
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Brief for Respondent in Opposition 13
conveniens and after discussing at length the policy consid-
erations involving a contract with a specified foreign forum,
the U. S. Supreme Court reversed the two lower courts. In
reaching that decision, the court substantially repudiated
the philosophy that foreign forum selection clauses are
‘‘contrary to public policy’’ and held:
‘*that such clauses are prima facie valid and should be
enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting
party to be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.
We believe this is the correct doctrine to be followed by
District Courts sitting in Admiralty.’’
On discussing the burden of the resisting party to show
that enforcement is ‘‘unreasonable’’, the Court stated:
‘*thus in light of present day commercial realities and
expanding international trade, we conclude that the
forum clause should control absent a strong showing
it should be set aside. The correct approach would
have been to enforce the forum clause specifically un-
less Zapata could clearly show that the enforcement
would be unreasonable and unjust or that the clause
was invalid for such reasons as fraud or over-reach-
ing.’’ (Emphasis supplied).
In another portion of the Court’s decision it placed on
the resisting party, Zapata, a ‘‘heavy burden”’ to show the
foreign forum selection clause should not be enforced. See
also note discussing Bremen case in The Supreme Court,
1971 Term, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 52, pp. 52-62.
In the instant case there is absolutely no evidence or
even an allegation that the contract signed by plaintiff re-
quiring that Greek Law be applied to the dispute was signed
by him as a result of fraud or overreaching.
Even more significant is the fact that the Court in
reaching its verdict in Bremen (decided since Rhoditis)
14 Brief for Respondent in Opposition
cites the case of Anastasiadis v. SS Little John, 346 F. 2d
281 (C. A. 5, 1965) to support the proposition in the first
quote above. The Anastasiadis case involved a Greek sed-
man who was injured on a Liberian flag vessel, owned by a
Liberian corporation which in turn was owned by an
American corporation, owned and controlled by a U. S.
citizen. In affirming the district court’s decision to decline
jurisdiction, the appellate court placed great emphasis on
the fact Anastasiadis had signed an employment contract
agreeing to the applicability of Greek law.
Thus, this Court in the Bremen case has, by implica-
tion, approved giving great weight to a contract stipulating
the applicable law where there is no showing of fraud or
over-reaching, neither of which is claimed here.
3. The Supreme Court Should Not Grant Certiorari Merely
Because the Circuit Court of Appeals Chose to Affirm
Without a Full Opinion.
Petitioner’s position appears to be that the Third
Circuit by its decision of January 18, 1974, violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by failing to render
a formal opinion and further by the alleged lack of notice
that it would dispose of some appeals without full opinions.
Carried to its logical extreme, adoption of petitioner’s
argument would require that this Court as well, render a
full opinion in every case or at least provide an explanation
as to why ‘‘his appeal (or petition) did not warrant a (full)
written opinion’’. Petitioner’s Brief p. 15. As a matter
of fact, the number of cases in which formal decisions were
rendered by this Court during the 1971 Term was 151 or
less than 5 percent of the 3,645 cases given disposition dur-
ing that Term. In addition, 3,190 or about 89 percent were
disposed of by denial of petitions for certiorari or by dis-
missal of appeals. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86
Harv. L. Rev. 52 (especially Table IT at p. 303).
LO Re FT SENS PS OS RNIN I rN aT oe.
ere eee 1
— en
~
PRIS Me oe
Brief for Respondent in Opposition 15
That table also shows that petitions for certiorari
and/or appeals were granted in 8.5 percent of the cases on.
the Appellate Docket and 1.7 percent on the Miscellaneous
Docket. 3
Given the great increase in cases coming before this ©
Court, the requirement of a full opinion or even an expla- —
nation as to why no full opinion was written in each case
would totally stagnate the disposition of cases. That the
same result would occur in the Cireuit Courts is evidenced’ ~
by the remarks of Chief Justice Burger at the Semiannual
Meeting of the U. S. Judicial Conference on March 7-8,
1974:
‘‘The startling increase in cases flooding into the fed-
eral appeals courts shows no sign of abating. Rather,
the increase goes on. Filings in federal appeals courts
have risen another 11 percent during the first six
months of this fiscal year. This is imposing immense
burdens on the federal judges as they attempt to keep
abreast of the demands of justice.’’
Traditionally due process has required that a person
not be deprived of life, liberty or property without a fair
hearing, ‘‘one before a tribunal which meets at least the
currently prevailing standards of impartiality’. Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1949) at p. 50. In
the instant case, petitioner through his able counsel stipu-
lated that the issue of applicable law was to be decided by
the trial court; prepared and filed proposed findings of
fact, and a brief in support of his position; prepared and
filed a brief for reconsideration aft-r receiving from the
trial court a result which disappointed him; prepared and
filed an extensive brief before the Third Circuit ; and finally
was afforded the opportunity to present, and in fact pre-
sented, oral argument before the Third Circuit. Surely, the
16 Brief for Respondent in Opposition
constitutional requirements of due process have been met
in the instant case. Even counsel for the petitioner would
agree that the Third Circuit is a ‘‘tribunal which meets at
least the currently prevailing standards of impartiality’’.
The mere fact it decided this case by a Judgment Order and
not a full opinion does not violate due process or the ‘‘pre-
vailing standards of impartiality.’’
Petitioner brought to respondent’s attention the case
of Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522 (1953). In that case,
Galvan urged that his deportation under Section 22 of the
Internal Security Act of 1950 violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment since it was applied to his
having been a member of the Communist party from 1944
46. The Court rejected this argument specifically and in
doing so said:
‘*Tn light of the expansion of the concept of substantive
due process as a limitation upon all powers of Con-
gress, even the war power, see Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 155, much could be said
for the view, were we writing on a clean slate, that the
Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of political dis-
cretion heretofore recognized as belonging to Congress
in regulating the entry and deportation of aliens. And
since the intrinsic consequences of deportation are so
close to punishment for crime, it might fairly be said
also that the ex post facto Clause, even though appli-
cable only to punitive legislation, should be applied to
deportation.
‘‘But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the
power of Congress under review, there is not merely ‘a
page of history,’ New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256
U. S. 345, 349, but a whole volume. Policies pertaining
to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here
are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of
— SRP OS PL TIE ERO TR REPRO OT SRL a
Way Rorss-
Brief for Respondent in Opposition 17
government. In the enforcement of these policies, the
Executive Branch of the Government must respect the
procedural safeguards of due process. The Japanese
Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 101; Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 49. But that the formulation
of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress
has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative
and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect
of our government.’’
Again, ‘‘the slate is not clean’’; ‘‘whole volumes’’ have
been written; and it is equally imbedded in the ‘‘judicial
tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our govern-
ment”’ that a court can regulate its own procedures. The
entire rationale of disposition of petitions for certiorari
underscores this point.
However, the Third Circuit did not merely dismiss peti-
tioner’s appeal. It gave ‘‘careful consideration’’ to the
issues raised by petitioner, ‘‘particularly that the district
court erred in its choice of law governing this action’’, and
affirmed. The affirmance means the Third Circuit found
no reversible error in the procedures, law, or application
of the facts to the law in the district court’s decision on
the choice of law. In effect it agreed with and adopted the
lower court’s reasoning as set forth in the latter’s opinion
of January 18, 1972. (A2-3).
Petitioner’s second argument on the due process issue
is an alleged lack of prior notice (by publication) that cases
would be disposed of without full opinions but rather by
orders. Petitioner does not challenge the usage of Judg-
ment Orders subsequent to the alleged first date of pub-
lication and thus accepts the fact and necessity of their
usage thereafter.
This Court does not have the benefit of the Internal
Operating Procedures cited by petitioner as having been
9 AS GEER EER TE ES SE Ie =
18 Brief for Respondent in Opposition
published in the Legal Intelligencer on April 8, 1974. How-
ever, it was there stated:
‘*These IOP’s implement: A. Statutory Mandates;
B. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; C. Rules of
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; and D. Cus-
toms practices and traditions of this Court.’’
It then went on to explain when a Judgment Order would
be used.
Petitioner states on page 14 of his Petition that ‘‘on
or before January 18, 1974, the Third Circuit had not given
public notice of the standards and criteria, if any, it utilized
in deciding an appeal without a written opinion’’. This
statement is untrue. One year and one day prior to Jan-
uary 18, 1974, the same Legal Intelligencer published the
Third Circuit’s ‘‘New Procedures’’ which pointed out that
‘*no longer [would the court] prepare opinions for publica-
tion in all cases’’ and that ‘‘ccriain cases will be terminated
by orders’’. The standards and criteria for full opinions
versus orders was then specified. (A25-A26).
It is thus apparent petitioner has had all the safeguards
of due process and even the notice provisions he alleges
were not made. There is thus no reason for this Court to
grant certiorari on this issue.
Brief for Respondent in Opposition 19
CONCLUSION.
The granting of a writ of certiorari is discretionary
under Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 936. That discretion
should not be exercised by the Court in the instant case.
In the last analysis this petition for certiorari is made
by a litigant who has been disappointed in the resolution of
disputed facts below and their application to the law. As
stated by Chief Justice Taft in Magnum Co. v. Coty, 262
U.S. 159, 163 (1923) :
‘*The jurisdiction (of the U. S. Supreme Court to re-
view cases by way of certiorari) was not conferred
upon this Court merely to give the defeated party in
the Circuit Court of Appeals another hearing. Our
experience shows that eighty percent of those who peti-
tion for certiorari do not appreciate these necessary
limitations upon our issue of the writ.’’
Respectfully submitted,
Wii E. Rapp,
Attorney for Respondent.
Raw.e & HENDERSON,
Of Counsel.
/
Letter Dated April 2, 1971 ——
RESPONDENT'S APPENDIX.
(Letterhead of)
Mores M. Suuster
Attorney at Law and Proctor in Admiralty
1530 Western Saving Fund Bldg.
Broad and Chestnut Streets
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107
PE 5-3223
April 2, 1971
Honorable Donald W. Van Artsdalen
3058 U. S. Courthouse
9th & Chestnut Streets
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107
Re: Anastasios Stamatakos
Vs: Hunter Shipping Co., S. A.
Civil Action No, 68-1094
/
Dear Judge Van Artsdalen:
I am enclosing with this letter Plaintiff’s Brief In Sup-
port Of Application Of United States Law.
Mr. Rapp joins with me in requesting that Your Honor
postpone the filing of Pre-Trial Memoranda in this case
until there has been a final determination of the choice of
law issue.
Respectfully yours,
Morris M. Shuster
MMS :at
enc.
ce: William E. Rapp, Esquire w/enc.
A20 Excerpts From Plaintiff’s Brief
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Eastern District or PENNSYLVANIA.
t eee
' Crvm Action No. 68-1094. ©
Ce ‘
- ANASTASSIOS STAMATAKOS
Vv,
HUNTER SHIPPING CO., S. A.
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION
OF UNITED STATES LAW.
I. INTRODUCTION.
On September 7, 1966 plaintiff was seriously injured
while employed as a seaman aboard the defendant’s vessel,
SS ‘‘Michael L’’ while it was berthed in Bayonne, New
Jersey. Plaintiff claims that defendant is liable to him
under United States statutory and non-statutory mari-
time law, which provides for ‘the recovery of damages for
injuries caused by the vessel’s unseaworthiness and/or
defendant’s negligence as well as a recovery for main-
tenance and cure. The items of damage recoverable under
United States maritime law include past and future loss
of earning power, past and future medical expenses, past
and future pain, suffering and inconvenience, and past
and future loss of life’s pleasures.
The resolution of plaintiff’s action requires the Court
to make a threshold decision on the choice of substantive
law. It is plaintiff’s position that the substantial relevant
contacts in the action with the United States mandate the
Excerpts From Plaintiff’s Brief A21
application of United States maritime non-statutory and
statutory law, the Jones Act, 46 U.S. C. A. Sec. 688.
Since September 9, 1968, plaintiff has been a permanent
resident of the United States and intends to become a
United States citizen. He has been employed in the United
States as a dishwasher because his injuries prevent him
from returning to work at sea. His earnings in the United
States are substantially less than he could earn in the
United States maritime industry. He has continued under
the medical care of United States doctors since his return
to the United’ States. Plaintiff’s allegiance and domicile
is thus now to the United States. Although he was a
Greek citizen at the time of his accident, Greece no longer
has an immediate concern for his well being as does the
United States. ‘‘We extend to such an alien the same con-
stitutional protections of due process that we accord citi-
zens.’’ Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Phoditis, supra, 8. Ct. 1734.
Since the United States does have an immediate con-
cern for plaintiff’s well being, even the disseniers in
Rhoditis, supra, would extend the benefits of United States
law to plaintiff. Justice Harlan’s dissent stated, 90 S. Ct.
1736:
‘‘The only justification that I can see for extending
extra-territorially, a remedial-type provision like Sec.
688 is that the injured seaman is an individual whose
well-being is a concern of this country.’’
The other choice of law factors which result in con-
tacts with Liberia, Panama, and Greece are inconsequen-
tial compared with the United States contacts. Moreover,
the contact with Liberia, the law of the flag, adds further
support to the application of United States law since
Liberian law adopts the non-statutory general maritime
A22 Excerpts From Plaintiff’s Brief
law of the United States. Title 22 of the Liberian Code
of Laws of 1956, effective March 1, 1958, as amended April
23, 1964 and effective August 18, 1964, Section 30, provides:
‘* Adoption of General American Maritime Law.—In-
sofar as it does not conflict with any other provisions
of this Title, the nonstatutory general Maritime Law
of the United States of America is hereby declared to
be and is hereby adopted as the general Maritime Law
of the Republic of Liberia.’’
The only contact with Panama is defendant’s incorpo-
ration in that country. The insignificance of this factor
is demonstrated by the anonymity of defendant’s stock-
holders. Defendant’s stock is made to bearer. In this
action, the individual stockholders have yet to file an
affidavit of ownership in which they identify themselves.’
The contact with Greece other than plaintiff’s Greek
citizenship at the time of the accident is Nereus Shipping,
a Greek corporation, the vessel’s ‘‘Operating Manager’’.
Other than contacting with Triton Shipping Company, Inc.
to act as agent for the vessel, the record is devoid of any
other activity by Nereus on behalf of the vessel other than
as a conduit between Triton and Hunter.
It is thus evident that the i -ertion of Nereus between
Triton and Hunter was for the purpose of giving the
vessel’s operation a Greek facade.
In Rhoditis, supra, the Supreme Court refused to apply
Greek law where there was more Greek contacts than here
and held at 99 S. Ct. 17341735: _
“Tf . . . the liberal purposes of the Jones Act are to
be effectuated the facade of th, operation must be
2. An officer of defendant has taken an. affidavit which states
that bas:d on information and belief that a named Greek citizen who
resides in Great Britain owns defendant’s stock. However, no affi-
davit from the alleged owner has been obtained and filed of record.
NG BS RR ewe ee oe > Oe ee EN en ey IN eee ae —————
Excerpts From Plaintiff’s Brief A23
considered as minor, compared with the real nature
of the operation and a cold objective look at the actual
operational contacts that this ship and this owner
have with the United States.’’
IV. CONCLUSION.
United States statutory and non-statutory maritime
law govern this action because the substantial choice of
law contacts are with the United States in that:
1. The SS ‘‘Michael L’’ and Hunter Shipping Com-
pany, S. A. are subject to United States law and the con-
trol of the Maritime Administration.
2. A United States bank extended credit to Hunter
so that Hunter could acquire ownership of the vessel.
3. A United States company was appointed by Hunter
to accept service of process on its behalf in the United
States.
; 4. A United States company was the active agent for
Hunter.
5. The charter agreements for the vessel were executed
in the United States.
6. From January, 1963 to the time of plaintiff’s acci-
dent, United States ports were regular ports of origin or
termination of the vessel’s voyages.
7. Payment for the vessel’s services, Hunter’s entire
scurce of income, were made in the United States in United
States currency.
8. Plaintiff’s accident occurred in the United States.
9. Plaintiff was originally employed by Hunter in
the United States.
Am Excerpts From Plaintiff’s Brief
10. Plaintiff is now and has been a permanent resident
of the United States and intends to become a citizen of the
United States.
The other choice of law factors which result in con-
tacts with Liberia, Panama, and Greece are inconsequen-
tial compared with the United States contacts.
The defendant has reaped the benefits of United States
law and United States commerce. Accordingly, it should
be required to meet the obligations of the United States
law. Moreover, the plaintiff is an individual whose well
being is now the concern of the United States. He should
be given those rights or recovery and damages provided
by United States law.
Respectfully submitted,
Morgis M. Suvuster,
Attorney for Plaintiff.
Court of Appeals Release A2%5
FOR RELEASE JANUARY 17, 1973.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
DEALS WITH DELAY.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit reports that it has made substantial progress in dealing
with the problem of delay in appeals of criminal cases and
has now instituted an experimental system to reduce the
delays in civil cases as well.
Bacxcrounp. Since 1961, there has been a steady an-
ual increase in case load. In 1961, there were 334 appeals
filed ; for the year ending June 30, 1972, the number rose to
1179, an increase of 253%. The current rate of increase in
filings is approximately 7% a year. Over the past two
years, the Court of Appeals has taken several steps to cope
with the situation such as:
— Reducing or eliminating oral arguments.
— Increasing the number of sittings per judge.
— Increasing by 334% the number of cases for dis-
position each argument week.
The result of these steps has been a progessive reduc-
tion in the mean average time for disposing of criminal
eases, as follows:
— For eases docketed in Fiscal Year 1970—11.5
months
— For eases dockected in Fiscal Year 1971—9.5
months
— For eases docketed in Fiscal Year 1972—7 or 8
months (est.)
a a Re ee as — a
A26 Court of Appeals Release
New Procepurgs. To further reduce the aging of cases,
the Court will soon increase the number listed for dis-
position each argument week by another 25%. Thus, the
case lists will have been increased from 15 per week, which
was the practice prior to September, 1971, to 25 per week,
or an increase of 40%.
Also, to furnish the judges with necessary time to
handle the increased case load, the Court of Appeals has
accepted the recommendation of the Federal Judicial Center
and the Advisory Judicial Appellate Council and has estab-
lished new guidelines for the publication of opinions. The
Court no longer will prepare opinions for publication in all
eases. Under a new plan, certain cases will be terminated
by orders which will be duly recorded in tables and indices
in the Federal Reporter Series. There will be no publica-
tion of dispositions which are without general significance
to the public, to the legal profession, or to the institutions
of the law. Published opinions will be limited to those
eases which establish a new rule of law, which alter or
modify an existing rule, or involve a jegal issue of con-
tinuing public interest, or which criticize existing law, or
represent a significant new contribution to the legal litera-
ture through historical review or resolution of apparent
conflict. Thus, traditional opinions will be written only in
those cases having precedental or institutional value. The
Court is confident that it will be able to handle the con-
stantly increasing case load without undue delay to the
litigants and, at the same time, carry on its important
mission as an appellate court.
A27
EXCERPT FROM APPELLANT’S BRIEF
BEFORE THIRD CIRCUIT.
MISCELLANEOUS.
Page
DR eS: his aia cat eee etek ea cdkey 8
Goodrich, Handbook on Conflict of Laws (4th Ed., 1964) ... 20
Jones Act:
4 eee a ean eens 10, 16, 22, 25
46 U. S. C. Sec. 688, 45 U. S. C. Sec. 55 ......... 10, 16, 22, 25
Liberian Code of Laws, Title 22:
GN ns Vcvcicns cadoeinonsdscueak ae 35
es ON ee ao ection te 2, 17, 22, 23
Restatement 2nd Conflict of Laws, Section 187 Com. b. (1971) 21
UE SS ks Tika bei Soescc ce ee 3
FD fe mes gets care I ee eee ener
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.