Brief for the Respondent in Opposition — Stamatakos v. Hunter Shipping Co.

Supreme Court brief1974

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Supreme Court of the Unite

October Term, 1973.

No. 73-1696.

ANASTASSIOS STAMATAKOS,

Petitioner,

0.

HUNTER SHIPPING COMPANY, &. A.,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT LY OPPOSITION.

Rawis & Henperson,

Of Counsel. —

International Printing Co., 711 So. 60mm St, Phila., Pa. 19143 — Tel. (215) 727-8711

.

CCE Wor

:

-

"COT (ORS

INDEX TO BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT.

Page

OUI TREE -cccscccnucncascccsndonnscccessscessese 1

CounTer-STATEMENT OF QuESTIONS PresENTED ror Review 2

CounTEeR-STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..........-.0e0eeeeee: 3

Reasons ror DENYING THE WRIT ..............+-00000: 7

1. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Affirming the

District Court’s Judgment in Favor of Petitioner in

the Amount of $10,000 Is Not in Conflict With This

Court’s Decisions or With Those of Other Circuits 7

2. The Decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals Is Not in

Conflict With the Treaty Between the United States

SE REE au vdcbdcancuchsnesnosudunctesbnanseus 11

3. The Supreme Court Should Not Grant Certiorari

Merely Because the Circuit Court of Appeals Chose

to Affirm Without a Full Opinion ................. 14

INDEX TO RESPONDENT'S APPENDIX.

Page

Letter Dated April 2, 1971, Shuster to Judge Van Artsdalen A19

Excerpts From Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Application of

ee MEE EAU 00ncnscscnensebecanbabcutacuwawes A20

United States Court of Appeals Release, January 17, 1973 .. A25

Excerpt From Appellant's Brief Before Third Circuit ....... A27

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

Page

Anastasiadis v. SS Little John, 346 F. 2d 281 (C. A. 5, 1965) 14

Andrews v. Chemical Carriers, Inc., 457 F. 2d 636 (C. A. 3,

DEE) Won cUsdwnneauesdscnnncecescoscesasescescoccsce 8

Brillis v. Chandris USA, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 520 (S. D. N. Y.

ME Adeansksevsadburoucccneéneusecctocsoccocceoses 12

Damaskinos v. Soc. Nav. Interamericana S. A., 255 F. Supp.

es Oe ik ED ccncccccpesseccccccocsecsees 9,11

Dassigienis v. Cosmos Carriers & Trading Corp., 442 F. 2d

ao cece speenoeneausaessqeeses ll

Gaiven v. Pease, 367 U. S. SEB (ISGS) 2. cccccccccccccecee 16

Hatzogliou v. Asturias Shipping Co., S. A., 193 F. Supp. 195

Dt i PhD <osshinddndésesqucsoueseseesoonce 11

Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 U. S. 306 (1970) .......... 7, 10, 13

Frangiskatos v. Konkar Maritime Enterprise, S. A., 471 F. 2d

og ee 12

Kontos v. S. S. Sophie C, 236 F. Supp. 664 (E. D. Pa. 1964) 10, 12

Labor Board v. Pittsburgh SS Co., 340 U. S. 498 (1950) ... 10

Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S. 571 (1952) ............... 7, 10, 11

Magnum Co. v. Coty, 262 U. S. 159 (1923) .............. 19

Mihalinos v. Liberian SS Trikala, 342 F. Supp. 1237 (S. D.

Sp MD cnsebgeescaseeecavoeabbiadsansesesdeccece 12

MS Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Company, 407 U. S. 1 (1972)

12, 13,14

Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., 386 U. S. 317

SE. dntenntchddddctaedanchnanendneceenceneseece ll

Orgettas v. S/T Crinis, 488 F. 2d 89 (C. A. 4, 1973) ...... ll

Sfiridas v. Santa Cecelia Co., S. A., 358 F. Supp. 108 (E. D.

Pa. 1973) ; aff'd C. A. 3, April 9, 1974 ............... 12

ee ee ie ee OO CED weesncctsccccescece il

Tamboris v. Kainis, 439 F. 2d 1131 (C. A. 5, 1971) ........ 11,12

U. S. v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173 (1944) ... 11

Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1949) ...... 15

ae ea renee agi ol

MISCELLANEOUS.

Page

Due Process Clause, Fifth Amendment .................... 16

Internal Security Act of 1950, Section 22 .............---- 16

Judiciary Act of T505, 43 Stat. GEG ..... 2 cccccccccccccess 19

Legal Intelligencer, April 8, 1974 .....................-.- 18

Note, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 52 ..13, 14

Remarks, Chief Justice Burger, Semiannual Meeting, U. S.

Judicial Conference, March 7-8, 1974 ........-......... 15

SO ST ST eR PP CE eg res re eee

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Ocroser Term, 1973.

No. 73-1696.

ANASTASSIOS STAMATAKOS,

Petitioner,

v.

HUNTER SHIPPING COMPANY, S&S. A.,

Respondent.

Ow Petition ror A Writ oF CERTIORARI TO THE Unirep S7aTes

Court or APPEALS FoR THE THirp Crecv!rt.

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION.

OPINIONS BELOW.

The opinion of the District Court is unofficially re-

ported at 1972 AMC 1001. It is also printed at pages A9-

A18 annexed to Petitioner’s Brief. The Order of the Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit is printed herein at pages

A2-A3. The Order denying appellant’s Petition for a re-

hearing is dated February 12, 1974 and is printed at

page Al.

. a

2 Brief for Respondent in Opposition

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS

PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

1. Should the Supreme Court grant certiorari to review

a Court of Appeals resolution of a case where the Court

of Appeals affirmed a decision by the District Court, enter-

ing a judgment in favor of petitioner in the amount of

$10,000 and where there is no conflict between the decision

of the Court of Appeals and the U. S. Supreme Court or

between any other Circuit?

2. Should the Supreme Court grant certiorari to re-

view a Court of Appeals’ resolution of a case concerning an

issue which was not presented to the Court of Appeals or

the District Court?

3. Should the Supreme Court grant certiorari to review

the fact that a Decision is rendered by a Circuit Court of

Appeals without a Full Written Opinion?

ee oe PR em

Brief for Respondent in Opposition 3

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The facts found by the District Court and affirmed by

the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit were fully sup-

ported by the evidence. :

Plaintiff is a Greek citizen, born in Greece and at the

time of this incident was a citizen and resident of Greece.

[FOF 20 (A12) & 29 (A13)]. He brought an action against

the Greek owner of the S/T Micnaeu L, a Liberian flag

merchant vessel owned by a Panamanian corporation, to

recover damages arising from an accident which allegedly

occurred about 8:00 p.m. on September 7, 1966, while the

S/T Micnaet L was in New York Harbor.

His theories of recovery were negligence and unsea-

worthiness although nowhere in his Complaint was the

Jones Act or any U. S. Statute mentioned (4a-6a). He

joined the crew of the vessel as Chief Steward 1:00 p.m. on

September 7, 1966. At the time of the injury, plaintiff was

twenty-seven years old, and had been going to sea on Greek

ships since 1957, except for two years of service in the

Greek Air Force (93a). ;

On September 7, 1966, plaintiff was taken to Bayonne

Hospital where he remained until September 28, 1966 when

he was repatriated to his home in Greece. He arrived in

Piraeus, Greece on October 16, 1966, and the following day

started receiving outpatient treatment from Dr. Tsiminakis

at Athens University Hospital which continued until No-

vember 22, 1966, when he became an inpatient. He re-

mained in the hospital for extensive neurological and

psychiatric examinations and treatment under the direction

of Dr. Tsiminakis and about nine other physicians until

May 1967. [FOF 29 & 30 (A13)]. Virtually all diagnostic

and recuperative treatment was rendered in Athens, Greece,

by Greek doctors who speak only that language. Plaintiff

himself spoke no English, only Greek, at the time of this

incident.

Perey od eis meee

a buapiamess

PUL Ae Pend Pepe

ix peed

a Se ee ee

4 Brief for Respondent in Opposition

Plaintiff came to this country on September 9, 1968,

under a visa for ‘which he was sponsored by his brother.

[92a & FOF 31 (A13)]. His mother was a Greek citizen

and his father and two other brothers are Greek citizens and

residents (98a). _

On July 18, 1966 plaintiff executed two documents in-

dicating he was ‘‘affiliated with the Panhellenic Seaman’s

Federation’’, a Greek seaman’s union. [105a & 106a &

FOF 28 (A13)].

Plaintiff signed an employment agreement (103a &

104a) on July 19, 1966, with the Nereus Shipping Co., de-

fendant’s agent, wherein he specifically agreed to the ap-

plication of Greek law. [FOF 21 & 22 (A12)].

Plaintiff was initially scheduled to be Chief Steward

on the M/V Faros, a Greek vessel, under Liberian flag,

owned by a Panamanian corporation [the officers of which

are the same as Hunter (FOF 24 (A12)] for which Nereus

was acting as agent. [FOF 24 (A12)]. After being trans-

ported to Norfolk on the SS Frsrxos, also operated by

Nereus [FOF 25 (A12)], plaintiff orally agreed to join the

S/T Micuae. L as Chief Steward. [FOF 26 (A13)]. If

plaintiff had stayed on the Micuae. L for more than the

seven or eight hours he did, he would have had to sign

an employment agreement specifically for the Micuaz. L

and it would have been the same as the one he did sign

in connection with the Faros. [Tsakos’ affidavit dated

March 17, 1971 (100a & 101a) ].

The officers of the defendant corporation are all citizens

and residents of Greece. The stock is made to bearer and

the sole stockholder is a Greek citizen, who resides in

England. [FOF 8 &9 (A11)].

When vessels operated by Nereus are operating in

North America, Triton Shipping Co. acts solely as a hus-

banding agent pursuant to a specific sub-agency agreement

Brief for Respondent in Opposition 5

between Triton and Nereus. [FOF 12 (A11)]. Triton has

never acted as a principal in relation to the MicHae. L.

[Xistris deposition p. 51 (42a) ].

Nereus Shipping S. A. is a Greek corporation having

its only office in Piraeus, Greece. It has no offices in the

United States. [FOF 32 (A13)].

Costas Lemos was the sole shareholder of Triton in

1966 and currently resides in Lausanne, Switzerland and

comes to this country ‘‘occasionally.’’ [Xistris deposition

pp. 17-18 (36a-37a)]. Mr. Lemos was a citizen of this

country until 1962, when he was appointed as a representa-

tive of the Greek Government to serve on a NATO com-

mittee [Xistris deposition pp. 22 and 55 (40a and 45a)],

and since then has resided in Switzerland. Furthermore, he

has no stock interest in defendant Hunter. [See defend-

ant’s answer to plaintiff’s No. 47 (121a & 123a)].

The Micuaet L was built in this country under a Mari-

time Administration Contract, and the defendant [recog-

nized bv the U. S. Government as an alien (Transfer Order

No. MAF-178 (23a)], assumed the conditions of that con-

tract. The sole purpose of the conditions is to allow the

U. S. to use an American built vessel in the event of war

or a similar national emergency. [See Statutes cited in

Maritime Administration Records (11la-14a)].

Babis Meliaressis did sign, on behalf of Hunter, the

papers with the Maritime Administration mentioned above

and engaged into the negotiations concerning the mortgage

in question. However, he performed both services for

Hunter pursuant to a specific resolution by the Board of

Directors of Hunter (19a-21a). He was not acting as an

employee of Triton when serving as attorney-in-fact for

Hunter.

The time charters under which the vessel was operating

[See Exhibits 8 & 9 of Xistris deposition (67a-80a)] were

St Nihs Be

EOE RCT Ree Lh Ter) een Le

ria

6 Brief for Respondent in Opposition

signed ‘‘Triton Shipping, Inc., as agents for owners’’, and

were with Metropolitan Petroleum Co., a Montreal Cor-

poration. There is no requirement that the vessel call in

New York or its vicinity. Clause C of the charter party

dated April 29, 1963 provides: ‘‘ Western Hemisphere Trad-

ing, one or two loading ports to one discharge port or one

loading port to one or two discharge ports, at Charterer’s

option.’’

The issue of choice of law was submitted to the Honor-

able Donald W. Van Artsdalen by stipulation on November

29, 1971 (107a & A7). Both parties prepared and submitted

comprehensive findings of fact and the issues involved were

thoroughly briefed (A7). Nowhere in the proceedings

below did plaintiff’s counsel at any time urge the applica-

tion of Liberian Law. Plaintiff’s brief was entitled ‘‘Plain-

tiff’s Brief in Support of Application of United States

Law’’ and plaintiff termed the contacts with Liberia ‘‘incon-

sequential’’—a term similarly applied to the Greek contacts.

After considering the entire record below Judge Van

Artsdalen made findings of fact, wrote a comprehensive

opinion and entered his Order of January 18, 1972, ruling

that Greek Law be applied to this non-jury case. (A9-A18).

On March 28, 1973 the District Court entered judgment

in petitioner’s favor in the amount of $10,000 from which

petitioner appealed for a second time. The first appeal was

dismissed as premature. (A6). The second appeal was

thoroughly briefed and full oral argument (30 minutes per

party) was held before the Court of Appeals on January

8,1974. The Court of Appeals on January 18, 1974 affirmed

in writing the judgment of the District Court. (A2-A3).

Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing was denied on Feb-

ruary 12, 1974, in writing, and respondent’s Motion to pay

funds into Court to satisfy the judgment was granted by

the District Court on March 22, 1974, after which the funds

were s0 paid.

Brief for Respondent in Opposition 7

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT. |

1, The Decision of the Court of Appeals Affirming the

District Court’s Judgment in Favor of Petitioner in

the Amount of $10,000 Is Not in Conflict With This

Court’s Decisions or With Those of Other Circuits.

Petitioner mistakenly has suggested the Court of Ap-

peals in affirming the District Court’s opinion reached a

conclusion in conflict with Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U. S.

571 (1952). Merely stating there is a conflict does not create

that conflict. The most cursory glance of the district

court’s opinion (A13-A18) shows how painstakingly the

court applied the ‘‘seven tests’’ of Lauritzen plus the ‘‘base

of operations’’ test of Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S.

306 (1970). The Court in effect found in applying the dis-

puted facts to the law, admitting ‘‘the matter appears to be

extremely close’’, that the requisite counterweight existed

to have Greek Law applied.

Petitioner argues that Liberian Law was ‘‘erroneously

rejected’’, claiming he argued for its application ‘‘in the

alternative’’. The plea to apply Liberian law to this case

was made by plaintiff for the first time subsequent to Janu-

ary 18, 1972; otherwise the trial judge had no reason to

state: ‘‘Plaintiff contends that the United States law and

the Jones Act apply’’ (A9); and ‘‘Neither party contends

that Liberian Law should prevail’’ (A14).

Counsel for respondent has studied all the pleadings —

in this case and nowhere prior to his brief in support of

his Motion to Reconsider filed on January 26, 1972 is there

any statement, direct or indirect, to show petitioner was

seeking to have Liberian law applied to the facts of this

ease. It must be recalled that parties stipulated on

November 29, 1971 that the ‘‘facts of record’’ as of that

date ‘‘shall constitute the record upon which the Court will

Soins ita a Til

Satta aaa dbath., aad o eae

c.3 Brief for Respondent in Opposition

make his findings of facts and conclusions of law on the

choice of law issue.’’ (107a). Petitioner did not then plead

the applicability of American law and/or Liberian law as

he now does. ‘In effect, what petitioner now seeks to do is

circumvent or alter the effect of the stipulation. Cf. Andrews

v. Chemical Carriers, Inc., 457 F. 2d 636 (C. A. 3, 1972),

particularly footnote 5 on page 640..

One need only look to petitioner’s own language in his

enclosure letter (A19) and brief in the district court on the

issue of the applicable law (A20-A24) to see that he never

contended Liberian law applied: :

1. Petitioner’s brief concerning the choice of law

issue was titled ‘‘Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Ap-

plication of United States Law’’ (A20) ;

2. The entire ‘‘Introduction’’ of that same brief

makes no mention of Liberian law (A20-A21) ;

3. Petitioner states in the ‘‘Introduction’’, ‘‘ Plain-

tiff claims that defendant is liable to him under United

States statutory and non-statutory maritime law,’’ (al-

though no mention of this was made in his Complaint).

It is noteworthy that the. and/or approach was not

there used (A20) ;

4. On page 11 of that brief petitioner says: ‘‘The

other choice of law factors which result in contacts

with Liberia, Panama and Greece are inconsequential

compared with the United States contacts.’’ (Emphasis

supplied) (A21); |

5. On page 13 of that same brief petitioner states,

‘*United States statutory and non-statutory maritime

law govern this action... .’’ (Again no and/or ap-

proach) '(A23), and finally ;

Brief for Respondent in Opposition 9

6. On page 13 of that brief the statement is made,

‘‘The other choice of law factors which result in con-

tacts with Liberia, Panama and Greece are imconse-

quential compared with the United States contacts.’’

(Emphasis supplied) (A24).

Thus, as of November 29, 1971, petitioner was using

the word ‘‘inconsequential’’ and referring to Greek and

Liberian law in conjunctive terms. It is now logically in-

consistent to attempt to refer to Liberian law in ‘‘and/or’’

terms with United States law.

In any event, as the district court found ‘‘the realities

of this case are such that the ‘law of the flag’ should not

prevail’’ (A15).

Courts have disregarded the flag of a vessel where it is

the plaintiff seaman who seeks to look beyond the flag of

convenience to the real allegiance of the corporate struc-

ture. The rationale for this is the comment in Lauritzen

which indicates that it is common practice for American

shipowners to use a foreign flag to avoid stricter American

laws.

In the instant case, one must ask for whose convenience

the Liberian flag is being used. From the counterstatement

of facts and the court’s findings of fact, it is clear no United

States corporation is attempting directly or indirectly to

avoid American law since no United States corporation is

here involved. The flag of Liberia is flown for the con-

venience of a Panamanian corporation whose true alle-

giance is to the Kingdom of Greece.

In Damaskinos v. Soc. Nav. Interamericana S. A., 255

F. Supp. 919 (S. D. N. Y. 1966), which is factually indistin-

guishable from the present one, except for the locus of the

injury, the court in holding that Greek, not American or

Liberian law should be applied where a Greek seaman was

injured on a Liberian flag vessel owned by a Panamanian

10 Brief for Respondent in Opposition

corporation whose officers and shareholders were Greek and

whose operations were conducted from Greece, made the

following comment (at page 923):

‘“*Tf the Liberian flag of the vessel is thought to be a

‘flag of convenience,’ it is one for the convenience of

the Greeks, not Americans. If Greek nationals choose

to operate their shipping business through the medium

of a Panamanian corporation whose vessels are regis-

tered in Liberia, that policy is of no concern to the

United States, and it affords no reason for the applica-

tion of the law of the United States to the claims of

seamen on those vessels.”’

In Kontos v. S. S. Sophie C, 236 F. Supp. 664 (E. D. Pa.

1964), a case which is similarly indistinguishable from the

instant case, except the locus of the injury, the trial court

looked beyond the vessel’s Liberian flag and held that Greek

law, not American or Liberian law, applied to both the claim

for damages and for maintenance and cure.

No federal question of substance has been advanced by

petitioner in his first argument urging the granting of his

petition. The Third Circuit by affirming the decision of

the lower court, in effect adopted its reasoning. That lower

court opinion correctly cited the law to be applied to the

facts, i.c. Lauritzen v. Larsen, supra; and Hellenic Lines

v. Rhoditis, supra. Petitioner is displeased with the out-

come. However, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter so aptly stated

in reviewing the findings of the Labor Board:

‘*This is not the place to review a conflict of evidence

nor to reverse a Court of Appeals because were we in

its place, we would find the record tilting one way

rather than the other, though fair-minded judges could

find it tilting either way.’’ Labor Board v. Pittsburgh

SS Co., 340 U. S. 498 (1950) at p. 503.

NE Fr SPEED tay ee oe

<a ere ee ere,

Brief for Respondent in Opposition il

2. The Decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals Is Not in

Conflict With the Treaty Between the United States

and Liberia.

At the outset, it must be noted that the alleged conflict

with a treaty is being raised for the first time. It was not

presented either to the district court (A19-A24) or to the

Third Circuit (Compare Miscellaneous Citations on A27

with Miscellaneous Citations in petitioner’s present peti-

tion). It is a general rule of appellate review that only in

very unusual circumstances (not here present) will the

reviewing court consider for the first time issues not raised

below. Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.S.

317 (1967); Silber v. U. S., 370 U. S. 717 (1962); U.S. v.

Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173 (1944). For this

reason alone this court should not grant the petition in the

instant case.

The petition should also be denied inasmuch as there is

no conflict between the Liberian Treaty and the decision by

the Circuit Court of Appeals. If petitioner’s analysis were

correct, the result would be that in every case involving a

Liberian flag vessel, brought in this country, U. S. Courts

would be compelled to apply Liberian law if U. S. law were

ruled inapplicable. This was clearly not the intent of the

seven tests advanced in Lauritzen v. Larsen, supra.

There are numerous instances where courts in this

country, on facts similar to those in this case, have either

declined jurisdiction (a result which is more harmful to a

foreign litigant than that obtained in the instant case) or

have applied Greek law. See Damaskinos v. Soc. Nav.

Interamericana S. A., supra; Hatzoglou v. Asturias Ship-

ping Co., S. A., 193 F. Supp. 195 (S. D. N. Y. 1961);

Dassigienis v. Cosmos Carriers € Trading Corp., 442 F. 2d

1016 (C. A. 2, 1971); Tamboris v. Kainis, 439 F. 2d 1131

(C. A. 5, 1971) ; Orgettas v. S/T Crinis, 488 F. 2d 89 (C. A.

Ey SE SE RE LS Oe ee TTS ea SS ee ae

=

12 \ Brief for Respondent in Opposition

4, 1973); Brillis v. Chandris USA, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 520

(S. D. N. Y. 1963) ; Mihalinos v. Liberian SS Trikala, 342

(S. D. Cal. 1972); and Frangiskatos v.

Konkar Maritime Enterprises, S. A., 471 F. 2d 714 (C. A.

2, 1972)—all cases involving Liberian flag vessels brought

by Greek seamen with facts analogous to the instant case

and in which the Court declined to exercise jurisdiction.

Instances where jurisdiction was retained but Greek law

was applied are Kontos v. S. S. Sophie C, supra; and

Sfiridas v. Santa Cecelia Co., S. A., 358 F. Supp. 108 (E. D.

Pa. 1973); aff’d by the Court of Appeals for the Third

Cireuit by decision dated April 9, 1974.

An important factor cited by the district court and

accepted by the appellate court in the present case was

petitioner’s acceptance of a contract by which he agreed to

the applicability of Greek law and the Greek Collective

Agreement in the event of ‘‘illness or injury’. (FOF 21-26,

A12-A13.) Similar contracts have been cited and approved

by other courts as significant factors in declining juris-

diction or applying Greek law in cases brought by Greek

seamen sailing on Liberian flag vessels owned and operated

by foreign interests. See all cases cited above in the pre-

ceding paragraph except Frangiskatos and Tamboris in

neither of which was there a statement as to the existence

or non-existence of a contract. |

Moreover, this Court in MS Bremen v. Zapata Offshore

Company, 407 U. S. 1 (1972), was called upon to interpret

a contract to litigate any dispute\involving the contract in

English Courts. Zapata brought suit in the United States

and the owners of the MS Bre moved to dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction citing among other things the contract °

in effect. The District Court and the Fifth Circuit held that

jurisdiction should not be declined on the basis of forum non

—<et> POT I, ES OTA om

—- at he eat ee ee |

RO ETRE te GEE LEE ELE EOE LE TT LS = 5s 2 - ~~

Brief for Respondent in Opposition 13

conveniens and after discussing at length the policy consid-

erations involving a contract with a specified foreign forum,

the U. S. Supreme Court reversed the two lower courts. In

reaching that decision, the court substantially repudiated

the philosophy that foreign forum selection clauses are

‘‘contrary to public policy’’ and held:

‘*that such clauses are prima facie valid and should be

enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting

party to be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.

We believe this is the correct doctrine to be followed by

District Courts sitting in Admiralty.’’

On discussing the burden of the resisting party to show

that enforcement is ‘‘unreasonable’’, the Court stated:

‘*thus in light of present day commercial realities and

expanding international trade, we conclude that the

forum clause should control absent a strong showing

it should be set aside. The correct approach would

have been to enforce the forum clause specifically un-

less Zapata could clearly show that the enforcement

would be unreasonable and unjust or that the clause

was invalid for such reasons as fraud or over-reach-

ing.’’ (Emphasis supplied).

In another portion of the Court’s decision it placed on

the resisting party, Zapata, a ‘‘heavy burden”’ to show the

foreign forum selection clause should not be enforced. See

also note discussing Bremen case in The Supreme Court,

1971 Term, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 52, pp. 52-62.

In the instant case there is absolutely no evidence or

even an allegation that the contract signed by plaintiff re-

quiring that Greek Law be applied to the dispute was signed

by him as a result of fraud or overreaching.

Even more significant is the fact that the Court in

reaching its verdict in Bremen (decided since Rhoditis)

14 Brief for Respondent in Opposition

cites the case of Anastasiadis v. SS Little John, 346 F. 2d

281 (C. A. 5, 1965) to support the proposition in the first

quote above. The Anastasiadis case involved a Greek sed-

man who was injured on a Liberian flag vessel, owned by a

Liberian corporation which in turn was owned by an

American corporation, owned and controlled by a U. S.

citizen. In affirming the district court’s decision to decline

jurisdiction, the appellate court placed great emphasis on

the fact Anastasiadis had signed an employment contract

agreeing to the applicability of Greek law.

Thus, this Court in the Bremen case has, by implica-

tion, approved giving great weight to a contract stipulating

the applicable law where there is no showing of fraud or

over-reaching, neither of which is claimed here.

3. The Supreme Court Should Not Grant Certiorari Merely

Because the Circuit Court of Appeals Chose to Affirm

Without a Full Opinion.

Petitioner’s position appears to be that the Third

Circuit by its decision of January 18, 1974, violated the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by failing to render

a formal opinion and further by the alleged lack of notice

that it would dispose of some appeals without full opinions.

Carried to its logical extreme, adoption of petitioner’s

argument would require that this Court as well, render a

full opinion in every case or at least provide an explanation

as to why ‘‘his appeal (or petition) did not warrant a (full)

written opinion’’. Petitioner’s Brief p. 15. As a matter

of fact, the number of cases in which formal decisions were

rendered by this Court during the 1971 Term was 151 or

less than 5 percent of the 3,645 cases given disposition dur-

ing that Term. In addition, 3,190 or about 89 percent were

disposed of by denial of petitions for certiorari or by dis-

missal of appeals. The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86

Harv. L. Rev. 52 (especially Table IT at p. 303).

LO Re FT SENS PS OS RNIN I rN aT oe.

ere eee 1

— en

~

PRIS Me oe

Brief for Respondent in Opposition 15

That table also shows that petitions for certiorari

and/or appeals were granted in 8.5 percent of the cases on.

the Appellate Docket and 1.7 percent on the Miscellaneous

Docket. 3

Given the great increase in cases coming before this ©

Court, the requirement of a full opinion or even an expla- —

nation as to why no full opinion was written in each case

would totally stagnate the disposition of cases. That the

same result would occur in the Cireuit Courts is evidenced’ ~

by the remarks of Chief Justice Burger at the Semiannual

Meeting of the U. S. Judicial Conference on March 7-8,

1974:

‘‘The startling increase in cases flooding into the fed-

eral appeals courts shows no sign of abating. Rather,

the increase goes on. Filings in federal appeals courts

have risen another 11 percent during the first six

months of this fiscal year. This is imposing immense

burdens on the federal judges as they attempt to keep

abreast of the demands of justice.’’

Traditionally due process has required that a person

not be deprived of life, liberty or property without a fair

hearing, ‘‘one before a tribunal which meets at least the

currently prevailing standards of impartiality’. Wong

Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1949) at p. 50. In

the instant case, petitioner through his able counsel stipu-

lated that the issue of applicable law was to be decided by

the trial court; prepared and filed proposed findings of

fact, and a brief in support of his position; prepared and

filed a brief for reconsideration aft-r receiving from the

trial court a result which disappointed him; prepared and

filed an extensive brief before the Third Circuit ; and finally

was afforded the opportunity to present, and in fact pre-

sented, oral argument before the Third Circuit. Surely, the

16 Brief for Respondent in Opposition

constitutional requirements of due process have been met

in the instant case. Even counsel for the petitioner would

agree that the Third Circuit is a ‘‘tribunal which meets at

least the currently prevailing standards of impartiality’’.

The mere fact it decided this case by a Judgment Order and

not a full opinion does not violate due process or the ‘‘pre-

vailing standards of impartiality.’’

Petitioner brought to respondent’s attention the case

of Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522 (1953). In that case,

Galvan urged that his deportation under Section 22 of the

Internal Security Act of 1950 violated the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment since it was applied to his

having been a member of the Communist party from 1944

46. The Court rejected this argument specifically and in

doing so said:

‘*Tn light of the expansion of the concept of substantive

due process as a limitation upon all powers of Con-

gress, even the war power, see Hamilton v. Kentucky

Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 155, much could be said

for the view, were we writing on a clean slate, that the

Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of political dis-

cretion heretofore recognized as belonging to Congress

in regulating the entry and deportation of aliens. And

since the intrinsic consequences of deportation are so

close to punishment for crime, it might fairly be said

also that the ex post facto Clause, even though appli-

cable only to punitive legislation, should be applied to

deportation.

‘‘But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the

power of Congress under review, there is not merely ‘a

page of history,’ New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256

U. S. 345, 349, but a whole volume. Policies pertaining

to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here

are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of

— SRP OS PL TIE ERO TR REPRO OT SRL a

Way Rorss-

Brief for Respondent in Opposition 17

government. In the enforcement of these policies, the

Executive Branch of the Government must respect the

procedural safeguards of due process. The Japanese

Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 101; Wong Yang Sung v.

McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 49. But that the formulation

of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress

has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative

and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect

of our government.’’

Again, ‘‘the slate is not clean’’; ‘‘whole volumes’’ have

been written; and it is equally imbedded in the ‘‘judicial

tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our govern-

ment”’ that a court can regulate its own procedures. The

entire rationale of disposition of petitions for certiorari

underscores this point.

However, the Third Circuit did not merely dismiss peti-

tioner’s appeal. It gave ‘‘careful consideration’’ to the

issues raised by petitioner, ‘‘particularly that the district

court erred in its choice of law governing this action’’, and

affirmed. The affirmance means the Third Circuit found

no reversible error in the procedures, law, or application

of the facts to the law in the district court’s decision on

the choice of law. In effect it agreed with and adopted the

lower court’s reasoning as set forth in the latter’s opinion

of January 18, 1972. (A2-3).

Petitioner’s second argument on the due process issue

is an alleged lack of prior notice (by publication) that cases

would be disposed of without full opinions but rather by

orders. Petitioner does not challenge the usage of Judg-

ment Orders subsequent to the alleged first date of pub-

lication and thus accepts the fact and necessity of their

usage thereafter.

This Court does not have the benefit of the Internal

Operating Procedures cited by petitioner as having been

9 AS GEER EER TE ES SE Ie =

18 Brief for Respondent in Opposition

published in the Legal Intelligencer on April 8, 1974. How-

ever, it was there stated:

‘*These IOP’s implement: A. Statutory Mandates;

B. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; C. Rules of

the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; and D. Cus-

toms practices and traditions of this Court.’’

It then went on to explain when a Judgment Order would

be used.

Petitioner states on page 14 of his Petition that ‘‘on

or before January 18, 1974, the Third Circuit had not given

public notice of the standards and criteria, if any, it utilized

in deciding an appeal without a written opinion’’. This

statement is untrue. One year and one day prior to Jan-

uary 18, 1974, the same Legal Intelligencer published the

Third Circuit’s ‘‘New Procedures’’ which pointed out that

‘*no longer [would the court] prepare opinions for publica-

tion in all cases’’ and that ‘‘ccriain cases will be terminated

by orders’’. The standards and criteria for full opinions

versus orders was then specified. (A25-A26).

It is thus apparent petitioner has had all the safeguards

of due process and even the notice provisions he alleges

were not made. There is thus no reason for this Court to

grant certiorari on this issue.

Brief for Respondent in Opposition 19

CONCLUSION.

The granting of a writ of certiorari is discretionary

under Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 936. That discretion

should not be exercised by the Court in the instant case.

In the last analysis this petition for certiorari is made

by a litigant who has been disappointed in the resolution of

disputed facts below and their application to the law. As

stated by Chief Justice Taft in Magnum Co. v. Coty, 262

U.S. 159, 163 (1923) :

‘*The jurisdiction (of the U. S. Supreme Court to re-

view cases by way of certiorari) was not conferred

upon this Court merely to give the defeated party in

the Circuit Court of Appeals another hearing. Our

experience shows that eighty percent of those who peti-

tion for certiorari do not appreciate these necessary

limitations upon our issue of the writ.’’

Respectfully submitted,

Wii E. Rapp,

Attorney for Respondent.

Raw.e & HENDERSON,

Of Counsel.

/

Letter Dated April 2, 1971 ——

RESPONDENT'S APPENDIX.

(Letterhead of)

Mores M. Suuster

Attorney at Law and Proctor in Admiralty

1530 Western Saving Fund Bldg.

Broad and Chestnut Streets

Philadelphia, Pa. 19107

PE 5-3223

April 2, 1971

Honorable Donald W. Van Artsdalen

3058 U. S. Courthouse

9th & Chestnut Streets

Philadelphia, Pa. 19107

Re: Anastasios Stamatakos

Vs: Hunter Shipping Co., S. A.

Civil Action No, 68-1094

/

Dear Judge Van Artsdalen:

I am enclosing with this letter Plaintiff’s Brief In Sup-

port Of Application Of United States Law.

Mr. Rapp joins with me in requesting that Your Honor

postpone the filing of Pre-Trial Memoranda in this case

until there has been a final determination of the choice of

law issue.

Respectfully yours,

Morris M. Shuster

MMS :at

enc.

ce: William E. Rapp, Esquire w/enc.

A20 Excerpts From Plaintiff’s Brief

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Eastern District or PENNSYLVANIA.

t eee

' Crvm Action No. 68-1094. ©

Ce ‘

- ANASTASSIOS STAMATAKOS

Vv,

HUNTER SHIPPING CO., S. A.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION

OF UNITED STATES LAW.

I. INTRODUCTION.

On September 7, 1966 plaintiff was seriously injured

while employed as a seaman aboard the defendant’s vessel,

SS ‘‘Michael L’’ while it was berthed in Bayonne, New

Jersey. Plaintiff claims that defendant is liable to him

under United States statutory and non-statutory mari-

time law, which provides for ‘the recovery of damages for

injuries caused by the vessel’s unseaworthiness and/or

defendant’s negligence as well as a recovery for main-

tenance and cure. The items of damage recoverable under

United States maritime law include past and future loss

of earning power, past and future medical expenses, past

and future pain, suffering and inconvenience, and past

and future loss of life’s pleasures.

The resolution of plaintiff’s action requires the Court

to make a threshold decision on the choice of substantive

law. It is plaintiff’s position that the substantial relevant

contacts in the action with the United States mandate the

Excerpts From Plaintiff’s Brief A21

application of United States maritime non-statutory and

statutory law, the Jones Act, 46 U.S. C. A. Sec. 688.

Since September 9, 1968, plaintiff has been a permanent

resident of the United States and intends to become a

United States citizen. He has been employed in the United

States as a dishwasher because his injuries prevent him

from returning to work at sea. His earnings in the United

States are substantially less than he could earn in the

United States maritime industry. He has continued under

the medical care of United States doctors since his return

to the United’ States. Plaintiff’s allegiance and domicile

is thus now to the United States. Although he was a

Greek citizen at the time of his accident, Greece no longer

has an immediate concern for his well being as does the

United States. ‘‘We extend to such an alien the same con-

stitutional protections of due process that we accord citi-

zens.’’ Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Phoditis, supra, 8. Ct. 1734.

Since the United States does have an immediate con-

cern for plaintiff’s well being, even the disseniers in

Rhoditis, supra, would extend the benefits of United States

law to plaintiff. Justice Harlan’s dissent stated, 90 S. Ct.

1736:

‘‘The only justification that I can see for extending

extra-territorially, a remedial-type provision like Sec.

688 is that the injured seaman is an individual whose

well-being is a concern of this country.’’

The other choice of law factors which result in con-

tacts with Liberia, Panama, and Greece are inconsequen-

tial compared with the United States contacts. Moreover,

the contact with Liberia, the law of the flag, adds further

support to the application of United States law since

Liberian law adopts the non-statutory general maritime

A22 Excerpts From Plaintiff’s Brief

law of the United States. Title 22 of the Liberian Code

of Laws of 1956, effective March 1, 1958, as amended April

23, 1964 and effective August 18, 1964, Section 30, provides:

‘* Adoption of General American Maritime Law.—In-

sofar as it does not conflict with any other provisions

of this Title, the nonstatutory general Maritime Law

of the United States of America is hereby declared to

be and is hereby adopted as the general Maritime Law

of the Republic of Liberia.’’

The only contact with Panama is defendant’s incorpo-

ration in that country. The insignificance of this factor

is demonstrated by the anonymity of defendant’s stock-

holders. Defendant’s stock is made to bearer. In this

action, the individual stockholders have yet to file an

affidavit of ownership in which they identify themselves.’

The contact with Greece other than plaintiff’s Greek

citizenship at the time of the accident is Nereus Shipping,

a Greek corporation, the vessel’s ‘‘Operating Manager’’.

Other than contacting with Triton Shipping Company, Inc.

to act as agent for the vessel, the record is devoid of any

other activity by Nereus on behalf of the vessel other than

as a conduit between Triton and Hunter.

It is thus evident that the i -ertion of Nereus between

Triton and Hunter was for the purpose of giving the

vessel’s operation a Greek facade.

In Rhoditis, supra, the Supreme Court refused to apply

Greek law where there was more Greek contacts than here

and held at 99 S. Ct. 17341735: _

“Tf . . . the liberal purposes of the Jones Act are to

be effectuated the facade of th, operation must be

2. An officer of defendant has taken an. affidavit which states

that bas:d on information and belief that a named Greek citizen who

resides in Great Britain owns defendant’s stock. However, no affi-

davit from the alleged owner has been obtained and filed of record.

NG BS RR ewe ee oe > Oe ee EN en ey IN eee ae —————

Excerpts From Plaintiff’s Brief A23

considered as minor, compared with the real nature

of the operation and a cold objective look at the actual

operational contacts that this ship and this owner

have with the United States.’’

IV. CONCLUSION.

United States statutory and non-statutory maritime

law govern this action because the substantial choice of

law contacts are with the United States in that:

1. The SS ‘‘Michael L’’ and Hunter Shipping Com-

pany, S. A. are subject to United States law and the con-

trol of the Maritime Administration.

2. A United States bank extended credit to Hunter

so that Hunter could acquire ownership of the vessel.

3. A United States company was appointed by Hunter

to accept service of process on its behalf in the United

States.

; 4. A United States company was the active agent for

Hunter.

5. The charter agreements for the vessel were executed

in the United States.

6. From January, 1963 to the time of plaintiff’s acci-

dent, United States ports were regular ports of origin or

termination of the vessel’s voyages.

7. Payment for the vessel’s services, Hunter’s entire

scurce of income, were made in the United States in United

States currency.

8. Plaintiff’s accident occurred in the United States.

9. Plaintiff was originally employed by Hunter in

the United States.

Am Excerpts From Plaintiff’s Brief

10. Plaintiff is now and has been a permanent resident

of the United States and intends to become a citizen of the

United States.

The other choice of law factors which result in con-

tacts with Liberia, Panama, and Greece are inconsequen-

tial compared with the United States contacts.

The defendant has reaped the benefits of United States

law and United States commerce. Accordingly, it should

be required to meet the obligations of the United States

law. Moreover, the plaintiff is an individual whose well

being is now the concern of the United States. He should

be given those rights or recovery and damages provided

by United States law.

Respectfully submitted,

Morgis M. Suvuster,

Attorney for Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Release A2%5

FOR RELEASE JANUARY 17, 1973.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

DEALS WITH DELAY.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-

cuit reports that it has made substantial progress in dealing

with the problem of delay in appeals of criminal cases and

has now instituted an experimental system to reduce the

delays in civil cases as well.

Bacxcrounp. Since 1961, there has been a steady an-

ual increase in case load. In 1961, there were 334 appeals

filed ; for the year ending June 30, 1972, the number rose to

1179, an increase of 253%. The current rate of increase in

filings is approximately 7% a year. Over the past two

years, the Court of Appeals has taken several steps to cope

with the situation such as:

— Reducing or eliminating oral arguments.

— Increasing the number of sittings per judge.

— Increasing by 334% the number of cases for dis-

position each argument week.

The result of these steps has been a progessive reduc-

tion in the mean average time for disposing of criminal

eases, as follows:

— For eases docketed in Fiscal Year 1970—11.5

months

— For eases dockected in Fiscal Year 1971—9.5

months

— For eases docketed in Fiscal Year 1972—7 or 8

months (est.)

a a Re ee as — a

A26 Court of Appeals Release

New Procepurgs. To further reduce the aging of cases,

the Court will soon increase the number listed for dis-

position each argument week by another 25%. Thus, the

case lists will have been increased from 15 per week, which

was the practice prior to September, 1971, to 25 per week,

or an increase of 40%.

Also, to furnish the judges with necessary time to

handle the increased case load, the Court of Appeals has

accepted the recommendation of the Federal Judicial Center

and the Advisory Judicial Appellate Council and has estab-

lished new guidelines for the publication of opinions. The

Court no longer will prepare opinions for publication in all

eases. Under a new plan, certain cases will be terminated

by orders which will be duly recorded in tables and indices

in the Federal Reporter Series. There will be no publica-

tion of dispositions which are without general significance

to the public, to the legal profession, or to the institutions

of the law. Published opinions will be limited to those

eases which establish a new rule of law, which alter or

modify an existing rule, or involve a jegal issue of con-

tinuing public interest, or which criticize existing law, or

represent a significant new contribution to the legal litera-

ture through historical review or resolution of apparent

conflict. Thus, traditional opinions will be written only in

those cases having precedental or institutional value. The

Court is confident that it will be able to handle the con-

stantly increasing case load without undue delay to the

litigants and, at the same time, carry on its important

mission as an appellate court.

A27

EXCERPT FROM APPELLANT’S BRIEF

BEFORE THIRD CIRCUIT.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Page

DR eS: his aia cat eee etek ea cdkey 8

Goodrich, Handbook on Conflict of Laws (4th Ed., 1964) ... 20

Jones Act:

4 eee a ean eens 10, 16, 22, 25

46 U. S. C. Sec. 688, 45 U. S. C. Sec. 55 ......... 10, 16, 22, 25

Liberian Code of Laws, Title 22:

GN ns Vcvcicns cadoeinonsdscueak ae 35

es ON ee ao ection te 2, 17, 22, 23

Restatement 2nd Conflict of Laws, Section 187 Com. b. (1971) 21

UE SS ks Tika bei Soescc ce ee 3

FD fe mes gets care I ee eee ener

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.