Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — OSTRERER V. UNITED STATES (Nos. CD-0053-74, 73-1631)

Supreme Court brief1973

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Table of Contents.

Opinions below 1

Jurisdiction 2

Questions presented 2

Constitutional provisions involved 4

Statutory provisions involved +

Statement of the case: The juror issue 5

Reasons for granting the writ 13

I. The decision below, denying a hearing on the

ground that no evidence was presented that Ju-

rer Rush had ever been formally adjudicated

insane, failed to take into account the major

changes that have occurred in the treatment of

the mentally ill over the past two decades—

changes that have virtually eliminated the use

of such formal adjudications 13

A. The lower court opinions 13

B. The trend away from formal adjudication

of insanity 15

il. The decision below, denying a hearing in a

case where the juror’s own letter revealed that

matters not in evidence ‘‘appear before [her]

on the jury bench,’’ is inconsistent with the tra-

ditional case law regulating the introduction of

extra-judicial information into the delibera-

tions of the jury 19

III. The decision below, allowing to stand the

prosecutor’s comment on the defendant’s failure

to present testimony, annihilates this Court’s

decision in Griffin v. California

& &

Conclusion

ii TABLE OF AUTHOBITIES CITED

Table of Authorities Cited.

Cases.

Bates v. Preble, 151 U.S. 149 (1894) 22n

Cole v. Mancusi, 429 F. 2d 61 (2d Cir. 1970) 31

Eastman Kodak Stores Inc. v. Summers, 377 S.W.

476 (Kansas C.C.A. 1964) 14n, 15n

Gafford v. Warden, 434 F. 2d 318 (10th Cir.

1970) 22n, 23n

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) 28, 30, 31, 32

Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) 23n

Miller v. United States, 403 F. 2d 77

(2d Cir. 1968) 24n, 25n

Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) 21n

Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) 27

Paz v. United States, 462 F. 2d 740

(5th Cir. 1972) 22n

Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) 21n, 22n

United States v. Curiale, 414 F. 2d 744

(2d Cir. 1969) 30

United States v. Driscoll, 276 F. Supp. 333

(S.D. N.Y. 1967) 25n

United States v. Farries, 459 F. 2d 1057

(3d Cir. 1972) 33n

United States v. Flannery, 451 F. 2d 880

(1st Cir. 1971) 31, 32

United States v. Gray, 421 F. 2d 316

(5th Cir. 1970) 27n

United States v. Hart, 407 F. 2d 1087

(2d Cir. 1969) 30

POLES OE eR PALETTE IEA INS ARE A TIME ae TE LU mt

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED iil

United States v. Kum Seng Seo, 300 F. 2d 623

(3d Cir. 1962) 22n

United States ex rel. Leak v. Follette, 418 F. 2d 1266

(2d Cir. 1969) 30

United States v. Lipton, 467 F. 2d 1161

(2d Cir. 1972) 30

United States v. Marcus, 401 F. 2d 563

(2d Cir. 1968) 30

United States v. McKinney, 429 F. 2d 1019

(5th Cir. 1970) 20, 21

United States v. Nasta, 398 F. 2d 283

(2d Cir. 1968) 30

United States ex rel. Satz v. Mancusi, 414 F. 2d 90

(2d Cir. 1969) 30, 31

United States v. Schipani, 44 F.R.D. 461

(E.D. N.Y. 1968) 33n

United States v. Smart, 448 F. 2d 931

(2d Cir. 1971) 30

United States ex rel. Walls v. Mancusi, 406 F. 2d 505

(2d Cir. 1969)

STaTUTEs. —

United States Constitution

Fifth Amendment =

Sixth Amendment 4, 21n

28 U.S.C.

§ 1254 2

§ 1865 2, 4, 14

§ 1865(b) (4) 13

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sé pr Pain Gears ounces BAMA =o :

iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 4

Cal. Welf. and Institutions Code 5000 et seq. 16n

Lanterman-Petris-Short Act 16n

Mass. Gen. Laws, ec. 123, § 1 et seq. 16

New York Mental Hygiene Law § 1.01 et seq. 16n

MISCELLANEOUS.

Dahl and Leopold, eds., Mental Health and Urban

Social Policy (1968) 16n

Detri and Jarecki, Modern Psychiatric Treatment

(1971) 20n

Fairweather, Sanders, Maynard, Chessler, and Block,

Community Life for the Mentally Ill: An Alterna-

tive to Institutional Care (1969) 17n

Freedman and Kaplan, Comprehensive Textbook of

Psychiatry (1967) 20n, 21n

P. Friedman, The Mentally Handicapped Citizen and

Institutional Labor, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 567 (1974) 27n

Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Ju-

rors: A Constitutional Right, 39 Brooklyn

L.J. 290 (1972) 18n

Joost and McGarry, Massachusetts Mental Health

Code: Promise and Performance, 60 A.B.A.J. 95

(1974) 16n

Kolb, Bernard and Dobrenweind, eds., Urban Chal-

lenges to Psychiatry: The Case History of a Re-

sponse (1969) 16n

Marx, Test and Stein, Extrahospital Management of

Severe Mental Illness, 29 Arch. Gen. Psychiat.

505 (1973)

17n

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

McGee & Wolf, Patterns of Community Mental

Health Development in Major American Cities,

8 Community Mental Health J. 17 (1972)

Ozarin and Feldman, Implications for Health Service

Delivery: The Community Mental Health Centers

Amendments of 1970, 61 Am. J. Public Health 1780

(1971)

Ryan, ed., Distress in the City: Essays on the De-

sign and Administration of Urban Mental Health

Services (1969)

Stubblebine and Decker, Are Urban Mental Health

Centers Worth It? 127 Am. J. Psychiatry 908

(1971)

Weinman, Sanders, Kleiner and Wilson, Community

Based Treatment of the Chronic Psychotic, 6

Commun. Ment. Health J. 13 (1970)

American Bar Foundation, The Mentally Disabled

a

16n

17n

16n

16n

17n

and the Law (1971) 15, 17n

Developments in the Law—Civil Commitment of the

Mentally Ill, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1193 (1974)

Report of the Administrative Board of the Judicial

Conference of the State of New York, App. F,

Table 8 (1974)

World Health Organization, Hospitalization of Men-

tal Patients (1955)

15n

17n

15n

NSA AY RR BAH I BET cas DPE NTO RR ElAe CEU

Supreme Court of the United States.

Octoser TEx, 1973.

No.

LOUIS OSTRER,

PETITIONER,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENT.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Second Circuit.

Louis Ostrer petitions for a writ of certiorari to review

the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Cireuit affirming his conviction and denying his

motion for a new trial.

Opinions Below.

The opinion of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York denying the motion for

new trial is as yet unreported and is found in Appendix 1,

infra. The opinion of the Court of Appeals, also not yet

reported, is found in Appendix 2, infra.

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Jurisdiction.

On January 26, 1973, defendant-petitioner, Louis Ostrer,

was convicted in the District Court for the Southern Dis-

trict of Nw York after a three-week jury trial on

17 counts involving a complicated stock manipulation

scheme. Prior to sentencing, petitioner moved for a new

trial on the ground that one of his jurors was in-

competent, or, in the alternative, for an evidentiary hear-

ing, which motion was denied by the District Court on

April 12, 1973, on which date judgment of conviction was

entered, and petitioner was sentenced to 3 years imprison-

ment and a $55,000 fine. On appeal, his conviction and the

denial of the motion for new trial were affirmed in a judg-

ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit entered March 1, 1974. Upon timely application

for an extension of time in which to file a petition for writ

of certiorari, Mr. Justice Marshall extended the said filing

time to and including April 30, 1974. This Court has juris-

diction to review the judgment below under the provisions

of 28 U.S.C. § 1254.

Questions Presented.

1. Whether a post-verdict, unsolicited letter from a ju-

ror who says, infer alia, that she can ‘‘see things before

it happen’’ and that various things ‘‘appear before me

when I was on the jury bench’’ requires further inquiry

into whether the juror is ‘“‘incapable, by reason of men-

tal . . . infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service’? (28

U.S.C. § 1865), where seven psychiatrists have all agreed,

without contradiction, that the letter evidences hallucina-

tions, delusions and probable psychosis, and where the

government has proposed a hearing procedure that it ac-

knowledges would ‘‘provide maximum safeguards for the

jurors’ individual rights of privacy.”’

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2. Whether the dramatic shift away from formal ad-

judications of insanity in trextment of the mentally ill in

the last two decades, which has virtually eliminated use

of such adjudications, requires reversal of the decisions

below which relied on pre-1952 precedents in holding that

hearings are not required without a prior showing that the

juror had ever been formally adjudicated insane.

3. Whether the decision below denying a hearing in

a ezse where the juror’s own unsolicited letter revealed

that matters not in evidence ‘‘appear before [her] on the

jury bkench’’ and where uncontradicted psychiatric studies

of the letter indicate a likelihood that during the trial the

juror was probably suffering from delusions and hallucina-

tions, and where there is evidence on the record that the

juror was lucid-appearing on the surface and hence could

introduce delusional ‘‘facts’’ into the jury room, is incon-

sistent with the traditional case law regulating the intro-

duction of extra-judicial information into the deliberations

of the jury.

4. Whether this case be remanded for a hearing where

the lower courts based their refusal to hold a hearing into

the juror’s competence in part upon that juror’s indica-

tions on pre-trial voir dire that she held a responsible posi-

tion as a ‘‘patient attendant’’ in a metropolitan hospital,

where it now appears that the juror may, in fact, have been

a patient at the hospital who worked part time as a patient-

attendant, rather than an outside employee.

5. Whether it violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment

privilege against :If-incrimination for the prosecutor to

coniment in his su.imation to the jury that ‘‘it is a terribly

significant factor’’ that the testimony of the government’s

chief witness as to the defendant’s guilty scienfer remains

uncontradicted beeause the defense put no witness on the

stand with respect to that point, where that testimony im-

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volved a meeting between the government witness and the

defendant concerning which the defendant himself was the

only available witness.

Constitutional Provisions Involved.

Unitrep States Constitution.

AMENDMENT 5.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-

wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment

of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval

forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of

War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for

the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;

nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-

erty, without due process of law; nor shall private property

be taken for public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT 6.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjov the

right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury cf

the State and district wherein the crime shall have been

committed, which district shall have been previously as-

certained by law, and to be informed of the nature and

cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses

against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-

nesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel

for his defence.

Statutory Provisions Involved.

28 U.S.C. § 1865 (Jury Setection anp Service Act or 1968,

P.L. 90-274, 82 Srar. 53):

SETA

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(b) In making such determination [whether a juror is

qualified to serve] the chief judge of the district court, or

such other district court judge as the plan may provide,

shall deem any person qualified to serve on gunn and petit

juries unless he .

(4) is ineapable, by reason of mentai or physical

infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service. ...

Statement of The Case: the Juror Issue, *

The facets giving rise to the juror issue in this case are un-

disputed. Thirteen days after the jury returned a Verdict of

guilty, one of the defendants received an unsolicited and bi-

zarre letter from one of the jurors. In her letter, the*juror, a

Miss Genena Rush, claimed to ‘‘ have eves and ears that I can

see things before it happen.’’ She said that she could ‘‘tell

you about other and what they are thinking and -doing.”’

She indicated a desire to ‘‘visit’’ the defendant ‘‘when my

eyes fully open,’’ but she did not ‘‘know at the present

when they will open,’’ since ‘‘a curse was put upon them

some years ago.’’ She wanted to talk to the defendant

‘*about what appear before me. . . .’’ She could ‘‘not omit

what appear before me, when I was on the jury bench.’’

She assured the defendant that he did not have to worry

about having been convicted:

‘You feel that this is the end for you. However,

it is not. Something appear before me that I must do.

It is the good within you that I must use and within

that good, vou will gain what you have lost. If, how-

* The facts relating to the prosecutor’s comment are incorpo-

rated into part III of this petition, infra at p. 28.

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ever, I am wrong it is the first time. ... I was told you

will only have to serve one third of the time given.

So relax this is not the end. Soon you will be free.’’!

The letter included various references to the defendant’s

wife, whom the juror apparently claimed to ‘‘see’’ (al-

though it is uncontested that the defendant’s wife never

once appeared at the trial) :

‘“Why persecute your wife? Your mistake your

guilty then take it out on her. The ordeal you put her

through I wonder how she survive through it. One

word appear before me brave. She is a brave girl. She

love you. She never stop loving you not a single

moment. Tell her to please be careful. From what I

can see she is still in business. I suggest it is not wise

at this time. I believe she is being watch.’’?

The letter also included some sexual and racial allusions:

‘*T want you to look upon me as a woman and I look upon

you as a man and not white man and black woman. Olive

agree with me. Let’s leave color out, OK.”’’

The entire letter is reproduced in Judge Feinberg’s dis-

sent. Appendix 2, at pp. 50-52.

When this letter was brought to the attention of the

trial court, his response was to order that the juror not

be contacted by anybody or communicated with by any-

body in any possible way, directly or indirectly. ‘‘[BJoth

defense and government counsel apparently interpreted

the order as inhibiting any investigation of the juror, even

apart from talking to her.’’ Judge Feinberg’s dissent, at

1 It is not clear who—if anyone—‘‘told’’ this to Miss Rush, or

whether Miss Rush conveyed this item—or other items—of mis-

information to the other jurors.

* There is no basis in fact for these conclusions concerning the

defendant's wife.

Deere OO A ENE eR Saw HT a

7

A, p. 54. Forbidden from undertaking further investigation

of the juror, defense counsel did the next best thing: they re-

tained the professional services of seven expert psychiatrists

to analyze the letter. As the Court of Appeals acknowledged,

‘‘all’’? of these psychiatrists—who were Board certified

and whose credentials were not disputed—‘‘responded .. .

to the effect that, in their opinion, what Miss Rush had

written indicated hallucinatory tendencies, symptoms of

possible psychosis, paranoia, and grandiosity, and in gen-

eral an inability to appreciate reality without fantasizing.’’

Appendix 2, at p. 35. The conclusions of several of these

experts are excerpted below.

Dr. Stanley Portnow, former chief forensic psychiatrist

at Bellevue Hospital, submitted an affidavit which included

the following:

‘‘The letter is typical of those written by paranoid

psychotic individuals suffering from a schizophrenic

thought disorder found in great abundance in mental

hospitals throughout the country. [It] is replete with

psychopathology so blatant that one need not make

a careful dissection of it in order to conclude that the

juror was possessed of a substantially impaired abili-

ty to exercise judgment in the evaluation of evidence

and in following the requirements of law as given to

her by the instructions of a Judge.

‘‘Perhaps the most significant statement in the let-

ter concerning the juror’s state of mind during the

course of the trial is as follows: ‘As I stated I can-

not admit what appear before me, when I was on the

jury bench.’ We have here an admission that the juror

visually hallucinated during the course of the trial.’’

‘*People who suffer from visual hallucinations are

psychotic, that is, they are detached from reality and

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are unable to exercise critical judgment normally at-

tributable to the average person. The juror goes on

to reveal that her visions compel her to act in certain

ways: ‘Something appear before me that I must do.’

‘It is my professional opinion, based upon a care-

ful analysis of the letter, that the letter makes a posi-

tive presumptive showing that, at the time of the trial,

the juror suffered from a chronic psychotic thought

disorder which so severed her relationship with reali-

ty that she was unable to exercise critical judgment

or to function in an unbiased manner in the evaluation

of evidence produced ai the trial. Indeed, it would ap-

pear that her unsoundness of mind was so overwhelm-

ing that she was subject to auditory and visual hal-

lucinations, delusions and a belief in her own omni-

potence.

‘‘[T]he juror is, based on the evidence produced in

this letter, suffering from a psychotic disorder and

is a woman of unsound mind.

“‘Tt is my professional opinion that the letter in

question is positive presumptive evidence’ that the ju-

ror was psychotic at the time she wrote it and for some

time prior thereto, including the period of the trial.’”

(Emphasis added)

Dr. Robert Da:uino, the Medical Director of the Family

Court Mental Health Clinic of Nassau County, concluded

that:

9

‘‘The contents of the letter ... clearly indicate that

she was having visual hallucinations. ... [A]t the time

that she served on the jury she was utterly incapable

of thinking logically as to the evidence, and utterly

incapable of properly evaluating the evidence.’’

Dr. Jerry Atkins, associate attending psychiatrist at St.

Vincent’s Hospital, concluded that there is evidence in the

letter of ‘‘auditory and visual hallucinations’’ and that

Miss Rush ‘‘would have had great difficulty exercising

sound judgment during the trial mentioned in her letter.’’

Dr. John Vetter concluded that:

‘*Examination of the content of this letter reveals

clear cut evidence of mental disorder in the writer in

the form of repeated references to hallucinatory ex-

periences, with one specific reference to such an ex-

perience while serving as a juror at the trial. There is

also clear cut evidence of delusional thinking with

ideas of persecution and of being observed.

‘‘The abnormal thinking processes, impairment of

judgment, hallucinatory experience and delusional be-

lief directly involving the case at hand, would indicate

an incapacity, by reason of mental infirmity, to render

efficient jury service, or to have functioned efficiently

as a juror in the case concerned.’’ ;

Dr. Donald Brough concluded that:

=

‘*TIn my opinion it is most likely that she is, in fact;

suffering from a Paranoid Condition in which she has

hallucinatory experiences and delusional thinking.’’

10

Dr. Samuel Karlan concluded that:

“‘It is clear from this letter that this patient is

having imaginations about what she can see and what

she can do and these are in the form of visual hallu-

cinations and apparently auditory hallucinations. It

is also clear from this letter that she had these visions

while she was on the jury.’’

‘*It is therefore my opinion that the letter is evi-

dence that this patient underwent a psychotic episode

while she was on the jury and while she wrote this

letter, which is suggestive of a schizophrenic mecha-

nism and that she was not in contact with reality.’’

The District Court, without in any way disputing the

uncontradicted expert evidence of these psychiatrists, con-

cluded that the defendant had not made a showing sufficient

to warrant a hearing of any kind. It held that no hearing

is required unless a juror had been formally ‘‘adjudged

mentally incompetent’’ in a ‘‘separate and unrelated pro-

ceeding.’’ The District Court denied a hearing despite the

Government’s expressed acknowledgment that a hearing—

if conducted according to a procedure suggested by the

Government—‘‘ would provide maximum safeguards for the

juror’s individual rights of privacy.’’ See fn. 25, infra.

The majority of the Court of Appeals, in a two-to-one de-

cision, affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that

a hearing would be required ‘‘only’’ when ‘‘there be proof

of an adjudication of insanity or mental incompetence.

993

3 It is, of course, possible—indeed very likely—that Miss Rush

may, in fact, have been adjudicated insane or mentally ineom-

petent in the recent past. In light of the district court’s prohibi-

tion on investigating the juror, it cannot be assumed—for pur-

poses of deciding this case—that Miss Rush had not been certified.

Nor can it be assumed—as both lower courts did—that she is cur-

rently employed at a hospital. Indeed, her own statement on voir

11

Judge Feinberg ‘‘emphatically’’ dissented from the

Court of Appeals affirmance of the District Court’s deci-

sion. Characterizing the letter as ‘‘bizzare’’ and ‘‘stagger-

ing in its implications,’’ he observed that ‘‘[nlo special

training is needed to appreciate that this juror seems to

believe she is clairvoyant and can see things that may not,

or could not, be apparent to others.’’ Indeed, Judge Fein-

berg points to at least one thing that Miss Rush ‘‘saw”’

which others could not see: ‘‘Although Dioguardi’s wife

was never in the courtroom, the juror somehow knows

that Mrs. Dioguardi ‘is a brave girl’ and ‘is still in busi-

ness,’ but is being watched.’’ Moreover Judge Feinberg

pointed out that this is a case where there was expert evi-

dence by seven psychiatrists with extensive special train-

ing—evidence ‘‘uncontradicted on the record before us’’—

that confirmed what the letter itself strongly suggests:

that Miss Rush was suffering from ‘‘a seriously disabling

thought disorder which in their opinion would have im-

paired mental functioning during the trial and her abili-

ty to judge the case intelligently.’’

Judge Feinberg argued that ‘‘if juror Rush actually did

believe she was clairvoyant in this way’’—a conclusion that

this Court must accept on the record of this case—then it

is clear that:‘‘she could not fairly try the guilt or innocence

of any man’’:

... It seems obvious to me that a ‘‘clairvoyant’’ juror

might honestly ‘‘see’’ a defendant’s guilt despite the

lack of evidence because she can see into the defend-

ant’s mind. Or conversely, she might for the same

reason divine a defendant’s innocence, in the face of

dire that she is ‘‘a patient attendant’’ at a hospital with a large

psychiatric department is entirely consistent with the conelusion

that she may currently be a mental patient working part time as

a patient-attendant. See infra at pp. 25-26.

12

overwhelming proof of guilt. A person who was

known to regard herself as clairvoyant would certainly

not be allowed on a jury in the first place. United

States v. Silverman, 449 F. 2d 1341, 1344 (2d Cir. 1971),

cert. denied, 405 U.S. U.S. 918 (1972); United States

v. Benson, 31 Fed, 896, 900 (D. Cal. 1887). Such a

woman would clearly be ‘‘incapable, by reason of men-

tal . . . infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service

..”? under 28 U.S.C. 1865(b) (4). Cf. Jorgensen v.

York Ice Machinery Corp., 160 F. 2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947). Moreover, the in-

capacity on such a ground of even one juror would

poison the verdict regardless of the competency of the

remaining 11. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 366

(1966) (per curiam); United States v. Rattenni, 480

F, 2d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1973).

Judge Feinberg concluded that the ‘‘combined effect of

the uncontradicted record [of the seven psychiatrists’ con-

clusions that the juror was psychotic] and the apparently

intended scope of the judge’s order [not to conduct any in-

vestigation of the juror] requires a remand for a further

hearing.’’ He disputed the majority’s contention that a

remand would open ‘‘a Pandora’s box’’ of challenges to

jury verdicts, pointing to the wholly unsolicited nature of

this bizzare letter and the possibility of further investiga-

tion short of compelled examination of the juror.‘

4‘*The letter which forms the basis of the present attack on the

verdict below was, as I have stressed, unasked for, and not the

product of a fishing expedition. Moreover, an inquiry into com-

petence need not entail a probe of jury discussions. I have already

mentioned such alternative possibilities of enlarging the record

as cross-examination of appellant’s witnesses and testimony by

government experts. Counsel may also develop evidence by in-

vestigating the juror’s background or by persuading her to un-

dergo a voluntary mental examination.’’ Appendix 2 at p. 56.

13

Cireuit Judge Mansfield joined Judge Feinberg in dis-

senting from the Court of Appeals denial of rehearing en

banc,

Reasons for Granting the Writ.

I, Tue Deciston BeLow, Denyine a HEARING ON THE GROUND

tHat No EvipeNnce WAS PRESENTED THAT JUROR RusH HAD

Ever BEEN FormMa.tLty ApbgvupIcATED INSANE, FAILED TO

TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE MaJor CHANGES THAT HAVE Oc-

CURRED IN THE TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL OVER THE

Past Two Decapes—CHANGES THAT HAVE VIRTUALLY

ELIMINATED THE USE oF stuCH ForMAL ADJUDICATIONS.

The decisions of the lower courts in this case were based

on the anachronistic assumption that only persons who

have been formally adjudicated as insane are disqualified

from jury service under the ‘‘mental . . . infirmity’’ pro-

vision of 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (b)(4). This assumption reflects

an outdated view of the diminishing role of formal adjudi-

cations of insanity in the treatment of the mentally ill.

Over the past decade, formal adjudications of insanity

have virtually disappeared and have been replaced by in-

formal and voluntary treatment for the mentally ill. The

mentally ill persons who are now treated informally and

voluntarily are no more competent to serve on juries than

were the mentally ill who have been adjudicated insane in

past decades. Accordingly, formal adjudication of insani-

ty can no longer be regarded as the benchmark of disquali-

fication from jury service.

A. The Lower Court Opinions.

The Court of Appeals, in affirming the District Court’s

denial of petitioner’s motion without a hearing, summarized

the law on which it. was relying in the following terms:

14

‘* .. courts have refused to set aside a verdict, or

even to make further inquiry, unless there be proof

of an adjudicatior. of insanity or mental incompetence

closely in advance of the time of jury service. Only

when proof of this nature has been offered, or proof

of a closely contemporaneous and independent post-

trial adjudication of incompetency, have courts con-

ducted hearings to determine whether the disability in

fact affected the juror at the time of trial.’’

The District Court likewise concluded that a hearing would

be required only in situations where there had been a for-

mal ‘‘adjudication of incompetency, without a restoration

to competency. .. .’’ Absent an ‘‘adjudication of incom-

petency,’’ the judge said, the courts are justified in refus-

ing to hold an evidentiary hearing. The decisions of both

lower courts, therefore, were explictly premised on the as-

sumption that the mental infirmity disqualification of 28

U.S.C. § 1865 applied only to mentally ill persons who have

been formally adjudicated as ‘‘insane’’ or ‘‘incompetent”’

and that a convicted defendant may not obtain a new trial

if he discovers shortly after the verdict that one (or pre-

sutnably several) of his jurors were mentally ill, so long

as they were never formally adjudicated as insane.

In support of this view of the law, the Court of Appeals

cited 13 cases for the proposition that evidentiary hearings

are properly denied on a claim of juror incompetency when

there is no showing that there had been a formal adjudica-

tion of insanity; every single one of those decisions was

rendered before the year 1952°—the approximate begin-

5 The Court of Appeals did cite one 1964 case, Kastman Kodak

Stores Inc. v. Summers, 377 S.W. 476 (Kansas ©.C.A.). But it

miscited the case: in Kastman the challenged juror had been ‘‘ad-

judicated to be a person of unsound mind’’ some 40 years prior

to his service on the jury. On the basis of this fact alone, ‘‘the

15

ning of the trend away from formal adjudications of in-

sanity. In light of the dramatic developments, to be sum-

marized below, these cases—and the doctrine for which

they were relied on by the lower courts—can no longer be

regarded as good law.

B. The Trend Away from Formal Adjudication

of Insanity.

In 1949, nearly 90 per cent of all admissions to mental

hospitals were by means of certifications of insanity (or

other comparable ‘‘involuntary’’ proceedings) ; only about

10 per cent of mental hospital admissions were informal

or voluntary.* By 1972—the last year for which there

are reliable statistics—these figures had shifted dramati-

cally : only 44 per cent of all admissions were by formal cer-

tification ; 54 per cent were voluntary or non-protesting ad-

missions.’ In certain urban centers—such as New York,

Court, on its own motion, held a hearing... .’’ At that hearing

the testimony established that the juror ‘‘operated a farm, bought

and sold livestock, transacted other farm business, and appeared

to be normal. Dr. V. P. Dryer, the juror’s physician for many

years, said he had treated Crutchfield for epilepsy but believed he

was of sound mind.’’ It was on the basis of that testimony—eli-

cited at a hearing—that a new trial was denied. 7d. at 481.

® World Health Organization, Hospitalization of Mental Patients

(1955), cited in American Bar Foundation, The Mentally Disabled

and the Law, 17, n. 8 (rev. ed. S. Brakel and R. Rock, eds. 1971).

7 During 1972, state and county mental hospitals admitted 403,

924 patients: 41.8 per cent (169,032) were involuntarily commit-

ted, 1.5 per cent (6,190) were transferees from prisons, 2.3 per

cent were admitted after a finding of incompetency to stand trial,

and 54.4 per cent were admitted on a voluntary (196,346) or non-

protesting (23,095) basis. Letter from National Institute of Men-

tal Health to Harvard Law Review, April 5, 1974 (Enclosure A),

cited in Developments in the Law—Civil Commitment of the Men-

tally Til, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, n. 3 (1974) (in press).

16

where this case occurred—the shift has been even more

dramatic.“ In San Francisco, for example, during the five-

year period between 1964 and 1969, the number of formal

insanity commitments dropped by about 96 per cent (from

2,882 to 108).° This dramatic shift—characterized in the

American Journal of Psychiatry as the ‘‘virtual disap-

pearance of commitment except for a handful of patients’’

—resulted from a decision to reorganize the mental serv-

ices of that city from a hospital-based system to a com-

munity center-based system. This process is being carried

on throughout the United States, with equally dramatic

reductions in formal commitments and adjudications."

Adjudications of incompetency are also in the process

of disappearing. During the 1972-1973 judicial year only 113

incompetency proceedings were initiated in all of New York

"See generally McGee and Wolf, Patterns of Community Men-

tal Health Development in Major American Cities, 8 Community

Mental Health J. 17 (1972); Kolb, Bernard, and Dobrenweind,

eds., Urban Challenges to Psychiatry: The Case History of a Re-

sponse (1969); Dahl and Leopold, eds.. Mental Health and Urban

Social Policy (1968); Ryan, ed., Distress in the Cit@: Essays on

the Design and Administration of Urban Mental Health Services

(1969).

* Stubblebine and Decker, Arc Urban Mental Health Centers

Worth It? 127 Am. J. Phychiatry 908,910 (1971).

Td.

™ See ¢g., Joost and McGarry, Massachusetts Mental Health

Code: Promise and Performance, 60 A.B.A.J. 95 (1974), re-

porting that the percentage of voluntary admissions to state hos-

pitals rose from 27 per cent in 1971 to 77 per cent in 1972, follow-

ing a comprehensive revision of that state’s mental! health laws;

see Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 123, § 1 et seq. See also Cal. Welf. and

Institutions Code, 5000 et seq. (The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act,

effective July 1. 1969) and the New York Mental Hygiene Law

§ 1.01 et seq. (McKinney Supp.) (enacted 1972 and effective Jan-

uary 1, 1973) as recent examples of complete recodification and re-

form of statutes regarding mental illness.

Pe es -. e

17

State; in New York County—where this trial oceurred—

there was but one single incompetency case brought dur-

ing that year. All the authorities agree that there has

been a marked trend away from formal adjudications of

insanity, from involuntary commitment to mental hospi-

tals, and from adjudications of incompetency. ™

The reason for this shift has not been a reduction in the

incidence of serious mental illness; indeed, there is no in-

dication that the number of seriously mentally ill persons

has significantly decreased over the past two decades."* The

mental patients who are now being treated voluntarily in

community-based programs without certification or com-

mitment are—on the whole—no less seriously mentally ill

than were those patients who used to be formally certified

and involuntarily committed.” It is undisputed that hun-

dreds of thousands of extremely iientally ill patients are

now being treated on an informal and non-certified basis.

These seriously ill patients—many of whom are grossly

psychotic and actively hallucinatory—are no more com-

* Bronx and Richmond Counties reported no incompetency

cases, Kings County reported 15, and Queens County 17. Report

of the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference of the

State of New York, App. F., Table 8 (1974).

8 See generally, American Bar Foundation, 77. Mentally Dis-

abled and the Law, 1-65 (rev. ed. 1971); Fairweather, Sanders,

Maynard, Chessler, and Block, Community Life for the Mentally

Ill: An Alternative to Institutional Care (1969).

The demand for services has, in fact, increased. See. ¢.g.,

Ozarin and Feldman, ‘‘Implications for Health Service Delivery :

The Community Mental Health Centers Amendments of 1970."’

61 Am. J. Public Health 1780 (1971).

See ¢.g., Marx, Test and Stein, ‘‘Extrahospital Management

of Severe Mental Illness,’ 29 Arch. Gen. Psychiat. 505 (1973) ;

Weinman, Sanders, Kleiner, and Wilson.. ‘‘Community Based

Treatment of the Chronic Psychotic,’’ 6 Commun. Ment. Health J.

13 (1970).

18

petent to serve on juries than were the certified inmates of

mental hospitals several decades ago. The reason that this

generation of psychotic mentally ill patients have not been

certified or committed bears no relation to their competency

to serve as jurors.’"* Improvenients in the legal status of

the mentally ill should not inure to the disadvantage of

criminal defendants. Those legislatures that have voted

to eliminate—or reduce the frequency of—adjudications of

insanity never contemplated that formerly certified men-

tally ill persons would now become eligible for jury serv-

ice. Yet, under the principles of law relied on by the lower

courts iu this case, the presence of an actively hallucinatory

psychotic—or even several—on a jury does not deny a de-

fendant his constitutional and statutory rights unless that

psychotic is among the rare group that has been adjudi-

cated or certified 2s insane, or unless his insanity has called

itself to the attention of counsel or the trial judge during

the voir dire.™

There is simply no basis in fact—or in law—for making

a determination of jury disqualification turn on formal

16 The handful of mentally ill persons who are currently ‘‘certi-

fied’ or ‘‘adjudicated’’ insane or incompetent are probably not

more seriously mentally ill than those who are not currently cer-

tified. They are more likely to be wealthy (and thus the object

of guardianship proceedings), involved in crime (and thus found

incompetent to stand trial, or not guilty by reason of insanity)

or live in areas where certification is more routinely employed than

in other areas.

It is significant that this case grows out of the Southern Dis-

trict of New York, where extremely limited voir dires are con-

ducted by the judge and not by counsel. This is unlike the practice

in many jurisdictions where defense counsel may question prospec-

tive jurors directly. The Second Circuit practice makes it far

more difficult to ferret out the existence of mental illness among

potential jurors. See, Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir

Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional Right, 39 Brooklyn L.J. 290

(1972).

ST ae -

Ae ee a eer,

19

adjudications of insanity. The time has now come for this

Court authoritatively to reject the approach relied on by

the lower courts, and to substitute criteria for jury dis-

qualification that are more realistically related to the ap-

propriate qualifications for serving on a federal jury.

This case provides this Court with a suitable context in

which to perform this function: it need not decide any

factual issues; it need only remand the case to the lower

courts for a hearing and for a reconsideration of the ap-

propriate standards; in light of the development in mental

health law and practices over the past several decades. ™*

Nor would such a remand open up a ‘‘Pandora’s Box,”’ as

the District Court feared. The wholly unsolicited nature

of the letter at issme here dramatically distinguishes this

ease from the run of cases where disappointed litigants

might seek to engage in fishing expeditions concerning the

competency of jurors. See Judge Feinberg’s dissent, Ap-

pendix 2 at p. 56.

II. Tue Decisiox Berow, Dexyrxc a Hearrne rs a Case

WHERE THE JcROR’s Own Letrer REVEALED THAT MaTTERS

Nor ry Evivence ‘‘appear BEFORE [HER] ON THE JURY

BENCH,”’ Is INCONSISTENT WITH THE TRADITIONAL CasE

Law Recviatixnc tHe Ixtropuction or Extra-Jvpicia.

INFORMATION INTO THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE JURY.

A cardinal principle underlying our system of trial by

jury is that:

‘while the jury may leaven its deliberations with its

wisdom and experience, in doing so it must not bring

extra facts into the jury room.... To the greatest

extent possible all factual [material] must pass through

the judicial sieve, where the fundamental guarantees

The limited scope of such an evidentiary hearing is discussed

at pp. 23-24, infra.

eK OE SE te ey

20

of procedural law protect the rights of those accused

of crime.’’ United States v. McKinney, 429 F. 2d 1019,

1023 (Sth Cir. 1970).

It is undisputed on the record of this case, that juror

Rush believed she saw, heard, or knew various matters

‘‘while [she] was on the jury bench’’ that were not in evi-

dence—and were indeed not true. She saw that the de-

fendant was ‘‘persecut[ing] your wife’’ and ‘‘tak[ing] it

out on her’’; that his wife ‘‘is still in business’’; that she

is trying ‘‘hard’’; but that ‘‘she is being watch.’’ (The

wife never appeared in the courtroom.) Juror Rush also

saw what other people ‘‘are thinking and doing.’’ She was

told—by whom or what we do not know—that ‘‘you will

only have to serve one-third of the time given’’ and that

**soon you will be free.’’ Perhaps most ominously, ‘‘some-

thing appear before me that I must do.’’ What that some-

thing was we do not know; but it is not unreasonable to as-

sume that whatever it was, it told her that she must vote

to convict the defendant so that he may ‘‘repent.’’ (‘‘Re-

pent’’ was another word that ‘‘appear before me.’’)

There is also undisputed psychiatric evidence in this

case—which, absent a hearing or government affidavits,

must be taken as true—that what the juror saw and heard

were ‘‘hallucinations’’ and ‘‘delusions,’’ and it is univer-

sally aceepted in the psychiatric literature that ‘‘by defini-

tion delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by

reasoning. . . ,”’’® and that ‘‘hallucinations may absorb

much or all of the patient’s attention and may motivate

his behavior to a considerable extent.’’ *

1 Freedman and Kaplan, Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry

(1967), chapter by Lehmann, ‘‘Schizophrenia: Clinical Features,’’

at 623.

2° Freedman and Kaplan, Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry

(1967), chapter by Lehmann, ‘‘Schizophrenia: Clinical Features,

at 623. See also Detri and Jarecki, Modern Psychiatric Treatment

ee

é

woe Oe GM ARES Sey am

21

A juror who brings into the jury room not only a mind

incapable of reasoning on the basis of the evidence pre-

sented ‘‘through the judicial sieve,’’ United States v. Mc-

Kinney, supra, but a mind which purports to have knowl-

edge learned from sources other than those appearing at the

trial, poses the danger not only of depriving the defendant

of one in twelve competent jurors,’ but the further danger

that other jurors might be infected by the delusional juror’s

presentation in the jury room of ‘‘facts,’’ either about the

case or about the defendant, which are false or inadmis-

sible.

Courts have generally required hearings in cases where

extra-judicial facts are shown to have crept into the jury

room, and where such material may have been communi-

(1971), at 414 (‘‘[the patient] may . . . exhibit illusive pseudo-

recognition, misidentifying relative strangers . . . as persons he has

known in the past.”’) and at 117 (‘‘hallucinations may occur even

while [the patient] appears fully awake and increase to the point

where they dominate his entire subjective experience and gover:

all his waking behavior.’’); Freedman and Kaplan, id., chapter

by Lin, ‘‘Clinical Manifestations of Psychiatric Disorders,”’ at

565 (‘‘A hallucination is . . . an internal psychological event . . .

mistakenly attributed to an external source.’’).

2! Of course, even if eleven out of twelve jurors are competent,

a defendant has been deprived of his Sixth Amendment rights to

a fair jury trial. This would even be true in a jurisdiction which

allows convictions by a less than unanimous vote. Parker v. Glad-

den, 385 ae 363, 366 (1966).

*2 Courts have been extremely careful to preserve the integrity

of the ‘‘judicial sieve.’’ See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363

(1966) (court bailiff made remarks to two jurors which were de-

rogatory to the accused; held, such communications violated the

commands of the Sixth Amendment relating to trial by an impar-

tial jury and the right of confrontation); Remmer v. United

States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (during trial a person unnamed

had communicated with a juror a remark that he could profit by

bringing in a verdict favorable to the defendant: held, ‘‘[i]n a

criminal case, any private communication ... with a juror...

aa

eels Ohad.

neg = Oe ee eT ee rey

Ayes ia Mh bade

ata

Se AO ene te as

22

cated to one or more jurors, and where such communication

could not be assumed to be harmless to the defendant.**

In order to determine whether or not juror Rush did in-

deed make any such delusional ‘‘factual’’ communications

to the jurors, one would not have to delve into the thought

about the matter pending before the jury is . . . deemed presump-

tively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the

court and the instructions and directions of the court made dur-

ing the trial. . . ."’) ; Bates v. Preble, 151 U.S. 149 (1894) (reversi-

ble error for trial judge to allow an entire book into the jury room

without sealing off the pages not admitted into evidence) ; United

States v. Kum Seng Seo, 300 F. 2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962) (trial court

permitted jurors to testify that a member of the jury had brought

a newspaper article into the jury room and that the article had

been passed around the room and discussed by some of the jurors) ;

Paz v. United States, 462 F. 2d 740, 745, 746 (Sth Cir. 1972) (at-

torneys and judge discovered during tria! in Jury room two books

about narcoties traffic; Court ordered hearing into availability of

books to jurors, the extent of their use, and ‘‘such other matters

as may bear on the issue of the reasonable possibility of whether

they affected the verdict’’); Gafford v. Warden, 434 F. 2d 318

(10th Cir. 1970) (one juror went outside the evidence and checked

certain facts which were relevant to a second degree murder case,

such as the time a late show ended, and the time a certain gas

station closed; Court reversed for a hearing because ‘‘[w]e have

nothing before us upon which we can determine whether the jury

did receive and consider evidence from e<trajudicial sources. . . .

Taken at face value the [juror’s] affidavi' [attached to the motion

for new trial] shows at the very least the possibility that the jurors

considered facts which did not emanate from the witness stand.’’)

*3 The standard usually enunciated in the cases is that a new

trial is required if there was a ‘‘reasonable possibility’’ that the

juror’s condition affected the verdict. The application of this

standard does not require an inquiry in‘® whether the condition

figures in the verdict, or actually influenced it; the court simply

has to decide whether, given the nature 9f the condition and the

nature of its manifestation, it can be said that the condition rea-

sonably would not be expected to affect the verdict. This same

standard applies in deciding when any ‘regularity has infected

a jury’s verdict. Remmer v. United Stats, 347 U.S. 227 (1954):

Paz v. United States, 462 F. 2d 740, 746 (5th Cir. 1972) ; Bates v.

Preble, 151 U.S. 149 (1894).

23

processes or deliberations of either juror Rush or of any

other jurors. The trial court would simply have to call to

the stand one or more jurors—not necessarily juror Rush—

to testify as to whether or not juror Rush did or did not

convey to other jurors any information similar to that

contained in her post-verdict letter.**

Certainly a hearing of such limited scope does not raise

the spectre of unreasonable intrusion into the inner sanc-

tum of the jury room. In fact, after petitioner’s motion

for a new trial was filed in the District Court in this case,

the court asked the parties to submit briefs suggesting the

format that a hearing should take in the event the court

convened a hearing. In response to that invitation, the

Government suggested a procedure which, it acknowledged,

‘‘would provide maximum safeguards for the jurors’ in-

dividual rights of privacy.’’ That procedure is set out in

the margin.” Petitioner agrees in general with the hearing

procedure suggested by the Government. In light of the

Government’s acknowledgment that such a_ procedure

*4 This Court long ago made it abundantly clear that while post-

verdict inquiry could not be made as to *‘matters resting in the

personal consciousness of one juror”’ and into the deliberative

process, evidence could be taken as to ‘‘overt acts’’ which can ve

testified to by all jurors present. A juryman can thus testify as

to any extraneous influence, although not as to how far that in-

fluence operated upon his mind. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S.

140 (1892). See also Gafford v. Warden, 434 F. 2d 318 (10th Cir.

1970} (‘‘Although the personal consciousness of a juror cannot

be explored . . . , overt acts which are susceptible to the knowledge

of other jurors may be established by the evidence of a juror.’’)

23**The Government suggests the following procedure in the

event the Court decides that sufficient facts have been adduced to

require a hearing:

(1) Call witnesses (perhaps including juror Rush herself)

to establish such facts as what jobs she has held, whether she

has functioned adequately in ordinary social environments

over a period of years, and the like; also to establish the facts

surrounding the authenticity of the letter and the cireum-

stances under which it was written.

\

7

24

would ‘‘provide maximum safeguards for the juror’s in-

dividual rights of privacy,’’ it is difficult to comprehend

why no such hearing was conducted.

The absolute necessity of conducting a hearing—even

of narrow scope—in a case like this is dramatically evi-

denced by the reliance placed by the lower courts on as-

sumptions of fact about juror Rush that may simply not

be true. For example, the lower courts premised their de-

cision on the ‘‘facts’’ that juror Rush had never been ad-

(2) On the basis of the evidence adduced in step 1 and

on the basis of the letter, obtain expert opinion evidence (if

required) as to the probable nature and extent of Miss Rush's

mental disease (if any), and how it is likely to have affected

her ability to comprehend the case and communicate about

it (if at all).

(3) If, after steps 1 and 2, there is a prima facie showing

of a mental condition which made juror Rush unable to com-

prehend the case or communicate intelligently about it, call

witnesses from the jury to determine whether any such con-

dition actually manifested itself or had any demonstrable af-

fect on the deliberations.

(4) If required as a result of steps 1 through 3, adduce

further psychiatric opinion evidence based both on the testi-

money regarding the jury deliberations and on any appro-

priate interviews or tests which juror Rush may undergo.

The procedure outlined above would provide maximum safe-

guards for the jurors’ individual rights of privacy. See Miller v.

United States, 403 F. 2d 77 (2d Cir. 1968).”’

The government did, of course, take the position that no hearing

was required, but suggested the above procedure in the event one

was ordered.

The Government advised the court to ‘‘defer any inquiry into

the jury’s deliberations and any psychiatrie examination of the

alleged incompetent juror herself, until the evidence clearly dem-

onstrated the absolute necessity of such steps.’? Reply Memoran-

dum for the United States of America Regarding Motion for a

New Trial.

This proposal is certainly a reasonable one, although it seems

to omit any inquiry of jurors to determine if extra-judicial,

erroneous ‘‘evidence’’ was introduced by the juror into the jury

room, unless such inquiry might be included within step (3)

25

judicated insane,”** and that she has been steadily employed

since 1944 and has been employed for the past four years

by ‘‘Flower Fifth Avenue Hospital as a patient atten-

dant.’’ 7 On the record of this case, however, it cannot be

assumed that Rush had never been adjudicated insane.

Nor can it be assumed that her statements on voir dire con-

cerning her alleged employment record were based on real,

rather than imagined facts. It is at least equally likely

that she was adjudicated; no one has ever checked the rel-

evant records or asked her, since the judge precluded any

such investigation.** Moreover, her statements on voir

dire concerning her employment record are pregnant with

ambiguity that cannot be cleared up without a hearing.

At first she indicated that she had been employed at Flower

Fifth Avenue Hospital for ‘‘a full year’’ and then for

‘‘four years.’’ See Appendix 3, at pp. 59-60. Most signifi-

cantly, however, she described herself as ‘‘a patient attend-

ant’’ ibid. This phrase bears two equally plausible construc-

tions: (1) that she is herself a patient, working part time

as an attendant; or (2) that she is simply an attendant

(‘‘eall witnesses from the jury to determine whether any such

condition actually manifested itself’’). Presumably Jaymen would

be more capable of reporting what juror Rush actuality said, rather

than interpreting the extent to which her conduct appeared bi-

zarre. The Government does seem to understand, however, that

a hearing need not delve at all into the thought or deliberative

process of any jurors or of the jury as a whole.

26**Tn the instant case, however, where the juror’s competency

has not been determined in a separate and unrelated proceed-

ing....’’ Appendix 1, at p. 13.

27 Appendix 2, at p. 39.

28 Refusal to convene a hearing would seem all the more inap-

propriate in those jurisdictions, including the Second Circuit,

which follow a policy of severely discouraging, and in some cases

making subject to disciplinary action, attempts by defense counsel

to investigate such claims on their own. See Miller v. United States,

403 F. 2d 77 (2nd Cir. 1968) ; United States v. Driscoll, 276 F. Supp.

333 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Indeed, in this case, the trial judge issued an

26

who attends patients. Many thousands of mental patients

are, in fact, employed as patient-attendants in hospitals

throughout the country.” And Flower Fifth Avenue Hos-

pital—the hospital in which juror Rush claimed to be a

‘‘natient attendant’’—does have a psychiatric service and

apparently does have a program of employing psychiatric

patients as attendants.

It is entirely possible—indeed, considering the contents

of her letter, very probable—that juror Rush was, in fact,

a meital patient at the very time—or shortly before—she

was serving on the jury in this case. There is simply noth-

ing in the record of this case that contradicts that possi-

bility. The spectre of an actively hallucinating psychotic

mental patient under an adjudication of insanity partici-

pating in the deliberation of petitioner’s jury simply can-

not be precluded on the basis of the record of this case.

order that the juror not be contacted, directly or indirectly. Counsei

for Ostrer would have been satisfied with that order, of course,

had ii not been followed by a subsequent refusal to hold a hear-

ing and seek evidence under the guidance and control of the judge.

2° Of course, all attendants attend patients, so this latter con-

struction would require a redundancy. The Court of Appeals,

however, subtly transformed the ‘‘patient attendant’’ response

(A. 39) into the description ‘‘nurse’s aide’’ (A. 44) without giv-

ing any thought as to what the phrase would mean had the Court

stenographer hyphenated ‘*patient-attendant.”’

30** As yet, neither the United States Department of Labor nor

any other organization has undertaken a comprehensive survey

of the extent of patient labor in American mental institutions.

Nonetheless, a 1972 study of 154 institutions in 47 states, which

represent 76 percent of existing facilities for the mentally retarded,

found that 32,180 of 150,000 residents were participating in a

work program, 30 percent of these receiving no pay at all, and

an additional 50 percent receiving less than $10 per week. Re-

search in Ohio indicates that as of January, 1973, 1,237 out of

8.000 residents in facilities for the retarded were ‘working res-

idents’, laboring as a group over 40,000 hours per week. And a

1969 study conducted by the Pennsylvania Department of Public

Welfare disclosed a resident working force of 3,040 out of a total

27

Nor is this possibility precluded by the trial judge’s re-

trospective recollection that he ‘‘did not notice anything

unusual about her’’.’ As this Court said in the related

context of an incompetency determination:

‘*While Robinson’s demeanor at trial might be rel-

evant to the ultimate decisions as to his sanity, it can-

not be relied upon to dispense with a hearing on that

very issue.’’ Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S, 375, 386 (1966).

Nor is it significant that ‘‘nothing unusual concerning her

[was] brought to [the trial judge’s] attention by either

the attorney or juror’’. * In the first place, absent a hear-

ing, it cannot be known whether the jurors observed any-

thing ‘‘unusual’’ about her which they did not communicate

to the judge. More fundamentally, however, the dangers

are even greater if the jurors did not observe anything

unusual about juror Rush—if they were not aware that

she was hallucinating.** Such a situation would increase

the likelihood that the jurors might have been influenced

population of 11,923 in nine state schools and hospitals for the

mentally retarded.’’ Friedman, P., The Mentally Handicapped

Citizen and Institutional Labor, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 568 (1974),

and numerous authorities cited therein.

31 Appendix 1, at p. 22.

82 Appendix 1, at p. 22.

*8 In reversing a trial judge's finding that a defendant was com-

petent, based upon lay observations of his actions, the Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said:

‘*The only evidence to the [effect that the defendant was

competent] came from laymen, all of whom testified . . . to noth-

ing more than that they had never observed an abnormal act

on the part of Gray, and none of whom had any ‘prolonged

and intimate contact with the accused.’ [Citation omitted.]

Their testimony is insufficient to establish Gray’s compentency

in the face of unimpeached expert testimony to the contrary.’’

(Emphasis added.) United States v. Gray, 421 F. 2d 316,

318-319 (5th Cir. 1970).

28

by eatra-judicial facts brought to their attention by juror

Rush—facts which they may have believed had a real

rather than an imagined basis.

Without some kind of evidentiary hearing, it simply

cannot be assumed that: (1) juror Rush was not under

an adjudication of insanity at the time of the trial; (2) her

employment record was as she stated; (3) she did not com-

municate to other jurors ‘‘information’’ that ‘‘appear[ed]

before’’ her or matters that she saw ‘‘before it happen.’’

In light of the evident need for a hearing to resolve these

issues and in light of the Government’s explicit acknowl-

edgment that a hearing of the kind it proposed would

‘*provide maximum safeguards for the jurors’ individual

rights of privacy,’’ petitioner respectfully requests this

Court either to remand the case for such a hearing or to

reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

III. Tue Decision Betow, ALLow1nG To STaND THE PROs-

ECUTOR’s COMMENT ON THE DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO

Present Testimony, ANNIHILATES THIS Court’s Decision

IN GRIFFIN v. CALIFORNIA.

| Petitioner attempted at trial to obtaiii a severance from

his co-defendant, because the latter had an infamous repu-

tation as a high underworld figure, and also because the

petitioner wanted to testify on his own behalf but feared

doing so in the presence of a jury in view of a minor prior

criminal conviction. But when the co-defendant objected,

the trial judge denied the motion. Thus, petitioner went

forward reluctantly with a jury, and also reluctantly, de-

cided not to testify.

This latter decision, forced upon petitioner by the de-

nial of the motion for severance and for a jury-waived

trial, was taken advantage of by the prosecutor in his sum-

mation to the jury. The critical part of the Government’s

ease involved testimony by the initiator of the scheme, one

29

Hellerman, an indicted co-conspirator who had turned gov-

ernment witness, as to the contents of a conversation at

which the initiator claimed he informed petitioner of the

stock manipulation scheme. Were it not for this testimony,

the evidence could as easily have been interpreted as in-

dicating that petitioner was a victim of, rather than a

knowing perpetrator of, the illegal scheme.” The scienter

evidence thus rested on the initiator’s testimony of a single

meeting, concerning which only he and the petitioner were

in a position to testify. In the absence of testimony by pe-

titioner, the initiator’s testimony necessarily went uncon-

tradicted.

In his closing, government counsel addressed the jury

as follows:

‘The defense has alluded to the fact, and his Honor

will tell you, that it is the law that a defendant does

not need to call any witnesses whatsoever; the gov-

ernment has the obligation to prove its case beyond

a reasonable doubt. . . . However, the defense, just

like the government, has the capability of calling wit-

nesses, and there are witnesses who are available to

the defense, as well as to the government, I think his

Honvr will instruct you that you are entitled to draw

an inference, if you find it is appropriate to do so, or

you may draw no inference at all. [Objection here

by Ostrer’s trial counsel overruled.] Now, the fact

that nobody disputed Hellerman’s story directly or

on cross examination or in any other way to the facts

as opposed to proper cross examination directed to

show that he was an evil fellow, vou may find is a

terribly significant factor.’’

84 The petitioner did, in fact, lose a substantial amount of money

in the scheme, as did other investors.

30

At this point Ostrer’s counsel moved for a mistrial ‘‘in

view of the statement made by the prosecutor.’’ Again his

objection to the comment was overruled, and his motion

was denied.

The court below found no prejudice in the statement.“

The Second Circuit's refusal to reverse, even in such an

egregious case as this, is simply the latest in a long series

of cases in which that Court, since and in the face of this

Court’s decision in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609

(1965), has eroded the protection against comment to which

non-testifying defendants are clearly entitled.

The Second Cireuit has been employing a variety of de-

vices to circumvent the clear command of Griffin. For in-

stance, the court routinely interprets prosecutors’ remarks

as referring to issues different from the failure of the ac-

cused to testify. See United States v. Nasta, 398 F. 2d 283

(2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Marcus, 401 F. 2d 563

(2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Hart, 407 F. 2d 1087 (2d

Cir. 1969); United States v. Curiale, 414 F. 2d 744 (2d

Cir. 1969) ; United States ex rel. Leak v. Follette, 418 F. 2d

1266 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Smart, 448 F. 2d 931

(2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Lipton, 467 F. 2d 1161 (2d

Cir. 1972).

Frequently, too, the Court refuses to reverse if defense

counsel did not raise a prompt objection or did not re-

quest curative instructions. See United States v. Nasta,

supra; United States v. Marcus, supra; United States ex

rel. Walls v. Mancusi, 406 F. 2d 505 (2d Cir. 1969) ; United

States er rel. Satz v. Mancusi, 414 F. 2d 90 (2d Cir. 1969) ;

United States v. Smart, supra. On the other hand, if the

™ The court said that there were many people involved in the

scheme who could have testified. But the Court overlooked the fact

that on the issue of scienter, only the petitioner and Hellerman

could give relevant testimony. The prosecutor's object in comment-

ing seems clear enough. ;

31

trial court does instruct the jury on the defendant’s rights,

the court rules that such instruction nullifies any prejudice.

See Cole v. Mancusi, 429 F. 2d 61 (2d Cir. 1970).

Additionally, the court below has held several times

that a prosecutor’s remark was non-prejudicial or harm-

less error to the defendant. The rationales behind such

holdings vary. In United States ex rel. Satz v. Mancusi,

supra, the court held that the prosecutor’s remark that

the defendant had never vouched for his own credibility

was harmless error because the evidence overwhelmingly

pointed to the defendant’s guilt, even though the first jury

to hear the case was unable to reach a verdict.

The lower court itself acknowledged that it is an ex-

tremely rare occasion on which the Second Circuit would

recognize that reversible error had been committed when

the prosecutor or court comments on the failure of the de-

fendant to testify. The court announced that, ‘‘ remarks con-

cerning lack of contradiction are forbidden only in the

exceedingly rare case’’ and reasserted that the court

**will not be astute to find in this a veiled comment on

the defendant's failure to testify even if in practical

fact, although not in theory, no one else could controvert

them.’’ Appendix 2, at pp. 46-47. Such laxity in the inter-

pretation and application of Griffin in the Second Circuit

nurtures the frequency of such prejudicial comments by

prosecuting attorneys who hardly risk reversal by their

actions and thus continue to comment.

The practice in the Second Circuit now is similar to that

which prevailed in the First Cireuit until the Court of Ap-

peals for the First Circuit stated its frustration with the

frequency of such prosecutors’ comments and held that

such comments would in the future constitute prejudicial

error. United States v. Flannery, 451 F. 2d 880 (1st Cir.

32

1971). In Flannery the court included within the definition

of prejudicial error a situation, such as in the case at bar,

where the prosecutor argues to the jury that certain tes-

timony was uncontradicted, where only the defendant could

have been available to contradict it.

Here, the defendant was the only person who could con-

tradict Hellerman’s testimony on scienfer. The proseeu-

tor’s comment to the jury was unambiguous and its pur-

pose transparent. Defense counsel made two immediate and

strenuous objections (the prosecutor having repeated his

comment after the first objection was overruled), and the

trial judge refused twice to deliver an immediate curative ”

instruction.

If the lower court’s decision in this case is allowed to

stand, Griffin will have been virtually abrogated in the

Second Cireuit. ”

The court below stated that the danger of such a comment

was ‘‘neutralized’’ in this case by a ‘‘ prompt corrective instruc-

tion to the jury’’ given by the trial judge. This finding is puzzling

in light of the transcript of the proceedings, quoted at p. 29, supra,

showing clearly that two immediate objections by defense counsel

were overruled in the jury’s presence, and that only after those

rulings did the trial judge. in response to counsel's entreaty, tell

the jury that ‘‘the defense has no obligation to produce any wit-

nesses."’ And even then, the prosecutor later in his summation

commented for a third time, noting that the jurors could draw

an inference from the defendant’s failure to call witnesses to

contradict the Government’s witness. Once again, defense counsel’s

prompt objection was overruled.

*7 It is perhaps ironic to note that had the petitioner’s severance

motion been granted and had he been allowed the trial-by-judge

that he requested, he would not have been prejudiced either by

the delusional juror problem or by the prosecutor’s comment on

his failure to testify. (The record is clear that Ostrer would have

testified had he been allowed to waive trial by jury.) The problem

could have been avoided even without severance if, at the same

joint trial, the judge served as fact finder for petitioner and the

jury as fact finder for the co-defendant who demanded a jury

33

Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner respectfully re-

quests this Court to grat the instant petition and either

to set the case down for argu-nent, or to remand the case

for a new trial, or for the kind of hearing that the Gov-

ernment has acknowledged ‘‘ would provide maximum safe-

guards for the jurors’ individual rights of privacy.’’

Respectfully submitted,

ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ,

Counsel for Petitioner.

Of Counsel:

Henry J. Borre,

233 Broadway,

New York, New York 10007,

Harvey A. SuVERGLATE,

Sttverciate, Suaptro & GERTNER,

217 Lewis Wharf,

Boston, Massachusetts 02110.

trial. This latter possibility is discussed in United States v. Farrics,

459 F. 2d 1057, at 1061 (3d Cir. 1972). The dangers inherent in

foreing a defendant to go to trial by jury where his joint defend-

ant is a well-known underworld figure and where his right to

testify is hindered by even a minor prior conviction, were respon-

sible for the court granting a jury-waived trial to a defendant

even over the Government’s strenuous objections in United Statcs

v. Schipani, 44 F.R.D. 461, 463-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).

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Table of Contents.

Appendix 1

Opinion of United States District Court, Southern

District of New York, of July 18, 1973

Appendix 2

Opinion of United States Court of Appeals, Second

Circuit, of January 4, 1974

Appendix 3

Excerpt of testimony of pretrial voir dire of venire

EERIE ONE Is FRR NES

oa eee a ee, ae ers

Appendix 1.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PLAINTIFF,

against 71 Cr. 558 DNE

JOHN DIOGUARDI and LOUIS OSTRER,

DEFENDANTS.

EpE.sTEIn, Ch. J.

Opinion.

Defendants John Dioguardi and Louis Ostrer were in-

dicted on May 27, 1971, and brought to trial on January 4,

1973, for conspiring to violate and for violating the fed-

eral securities laws ' and regulations * and the federal mail

fraud statute.* On January 26, 1973, after three days of

deliberations, a jury returned verdicts of guilty against

1 Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, prohibiting fraud

in the sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). Wilful vio-

lation of this section is made criminally punishable by section 24

of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970).

2 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, prohibiting

fraud in the purchase and sale of securities. 17 C.F.R. Section

240.10b-5, promulgated under 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Wilful

violation of this rule is made criminally punishable by section

32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § T8ff

(1970).

317 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970), the federal mail fraud statute.

——ee

ee ORD te

RCL ANON

2

both defendants. * Defendants have now moved for a new

trial, pursuant to F.R.Cr.P. 33,° on the ground that one

of the jurors suffered from ‘‘a mental infirmity making

her incapable of rendering efficient jury service’’ within

the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1865(b) (4). °

In support of their motion, defendants rely upon a let-

ter which was sent to Dioguardi by the juror in ques-

tion. The letter portrays the juror as a person with re-

ligious feelings who believes herself to be a clairvoyant.

This clairvoyance, according to the letter, has enabled the

juror to conclude that Dioguardi is basically a good per-

son. (The juror repeated the phrase ‘‘ .. . I saw the good

Ceo sas 2b aa Tle ews

ys A ney oe

* The jury found Ostrer guilty of 11 of the 17 counts submitted

to them for their consideration; and Dioguardi guilty of 4 of the

19 counts submitted to them for their consideration.

* Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial

to him if required in the interest of justice. If trial was by

the court without a jury the court on motion of a defendant

for a new trial may vacate the judgment if entered, take ad-

ditional testimony and direct the entry of a new judgment.

A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly dis-

covered evidence may be made only before or within two years

after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending the court

may grant the motion only on remand of the case. A motion

for a new trial based on any other grounds shall be made

within 7 days after verdict or finding of guilty or within such

further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period.

As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966.

® Section 1865(b) (4) states, in pertinent part:

(b) In making such determination [whether a juror is

qualified to serve] the chief judge of the district court, or

such other district court judge as the plan may provide, shall

deem any person qualified to serve on grand and petit juries

in the district court unless he—

(4) is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirm-

ity, to render satisfactory jury service. .. .

within you. . .’’). Nevertheless, the juror affirms her be-

lief that Dioguardi is guilty (‘‘Your mistake your [sic]

guilty.’’?); admonishes him for becoming involved with

criminals (‘‘Why you let such a relationship exist between

you and a man like Hellerman?’’* and suggests that he

should repent and be saved. (‘‘If you repent and run a

clean business it is the good within you that will save you,

and you will gain what you have lost.’’)

Defendants have also submitted six letters from six. dif-

ferent psychiatrists and an affidavit from a seventh psychia-

trist. Based only upon an analysis of the juror’s letter

and, in some instances, an assumption of the juror’s re-

ligious feelings, cultural background and intelligence level,

the doctors offered, in various ways, their opinion that the

juror is, and was during trial, hallucinatory, delusional

psychotic, grandiose and suffered from guilt feelings and

a persecution complex; and they attempted to make the

legal determination that the juror was not mentally quali-

fied to serve on a jury.

Defendants have requested that this court either (a)

hold a hearing ‘‘with necessary mental examination’’ to

determine whether the juror was unqualified to serve, and

to grant a new trial ‘‘should the juror be found to have

been unqualified;’’ or (b) grant a new trial even if the

court refuses to hold a hearing.

The demand for a new trial based upon a post-verdict

attack on a juror’s mental competency is an issue of first

impression in this circuit. The problem, however, has been

considered by the highest tribunals of fourteen states, *

7 Michael Hellerman was the admitted architect of the scheme

for which the defendants were convicted and was a key witness

for the prosecution.

8 Arizona: Anderson v. State, 54 Ariz. 387, 96 P.2d 281 (1939);

Arkansas: Brown v. State, 219 Ark. 647, 243 S.W. 2d 938 (1951);

Grand Lodge A.O.U.W. of Ark v. Wood, 113 Ark. 502, 168 S.W.

eee rrr

vo ae Age eS

4

an intermediate appellate court in one other state,® and by

the Courts of Appeals for the First Cireuit ' and Third

Circuit.’' The decisions rendered by these courts all are

to the effect that a post-verdict inquiry into a juror’s

mental competency will not be permitted unless the party

seeking to set aside the jury’s verdict makes a strong

showing as to the existence of the alleged mental infirmi-

ty. At a minimum, this showing should be sufficient to over-

come the legal presumption that all men are sane An

analysis of the relevant cases reveals no precise formula

1070 (1914) ; Colorado: Austin v. People, 106 Col. 506, 107 P.2d

798 (1940) Georgia: Wall v. State, 126 Ga. 549, 55 S.E. 484 (1906),

(the Georgia Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court,

reaffirmed the Wall decision in Newton vy. State, 66 Ga. 103, 17

S.E. 2d 102 (Ct. App. 1941) ) ; Illinois: Mackin v. People, 115 Il.

312, 3 N.E. 222 (1885) ; Indiana: Deuthitt v. State, 144 Ind. 397,

42 N.E. 907 (1896) ; Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Jordan, 207

Mass. 259, 93 N.E. 809 (1911), aff’d. Jordan v, Massachusetts, 225

U.S. 167 (1912) ; Montana: State v. Bucy, 104 Mont: 416, 66 P.2d

1049 (1937) ; New Jersey: Iverson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Ameri-

va, 126 N.J.L. 280, 19 A.2d 214 (1941); Burik v. Dundee Woolen

Co., 66 N.J.L. 420, 49 A. 442 (1901) ; New Mezico: State v. Eskild-

son, 36 N.M. 238, 13 P.2d 417 (1932); Tennessee: Durham v.

State, 182 Tenn. 577, 188 S.W. 2d 555 (1945); Texas: Ex Parte

Lovelady, 152 Tex. Crim. 93, 207 S.W. 2d 396 (1947), cert. granted

333 U.S. 867, cert. dismissed 333 U.S. 879 (1948); McKenzie v.

State, 116 Tex. Crim. 395, 11 S.W. 2d 172 (1928) ; Carter v. State,

102 Tex. Crim. 517, 278 S.W. 840 (1925); Washington: State v.

Welty, 65 Wash. 244, 118 P. 9 (1911); West Virginia: State v.

Camp, 110 W. Va. 444, 158 S.E. 664 (1931).

® Missouri: Eastman Kodak Stores, Inc. v. Summers, 377 S.W.

2d 476 (Kan. City Ct. App. 1964).

10 Peterman v. Indian Motorcycle Co., 216 F.2d 289 (1st Cir.

1954).

11 United States ex rel. Daverse v. Hohn, 198 F.2d 934 (3rd Cir.

1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 913 (1953).

12 See, e.g. Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 377-378 (1897) ;

Davis‘v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 486-7 (1895) ; State v. Camp,

110 W.Va. 444, 158 S.E. 664, 667 (1931).

MEATY SONA ol ONG See TEIN oy

%

‘a

5

by which to measure the standard of proof necessary to

warrant a post-verdict investigation. They do reveal, how-

ever, a difference between a sufficient and an insufficient

showing.

These cases can be divided into three categories, ranging

in degree from the strongest to the weakest showings which

have been made in attacking a juror’s competency. The

strongest showing is illustrated by fact patterns in those

cases in which the juror, prior to trial, had been adjudged

mentally incompetent; had spent time in a hospital for the

mentally ill; and had not been legally restored to com-

petency during the period of his jury service. In such cases,

the mere adjudication of incompetency, without a restora-

tion to competency, regardless of the period of time which

had elapsed between the date of the adjudication and the

date of jury service, was sufficient to overcome the pre-

sunption that the juror was sane during the trial '* In these

circumstances, the courts have held a post-verdict investi-

gation to ascertain the extent to which the disability existed

during trial, and the effect the disability had on the juror’s

consideration of the facts of the case. ™

13 Indeed, unless there has been a restoration to competency,

there is a rebuttable presumption of continued incompetency.

Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 377-378 (1897); Tarvestad

v. United States, 418 F.2d 1943, 1050-51 (8th Cir. 1969), cert.

denied 367 U.S. 935 (1970) ; Hurt v. United States, 327 F.2d 978,

981 (8th Cir. 1964) ; Kitchens v. United States, 372 F.2d 757, 760

(10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960); Gunthers v.

United States, 215 F.2d 493, 496 n. 12 (D.C. Cir. 1954): Brown

v. State, 219 Ark. 647, 243 S.W.2d 938, 939 (1951) ; State v. Bucy,

104 Mont. 416, 66 P.2d 1049, 1050 (1937).

14 For example, in Anderson v. State, 54 Ariz. 387, 96 P.2d 281

(1939), the juror, severa) months before trial, had been formally

declared incompetent to manage his business affairs and had re-

mained under the disability throughout the trial. At the hearing

evidence was adduced which indicated that the juror was an al-

eoholic, that his business was being ruined as a result of his afflic-

tion, that his income was being consumed by his habit, and that

6

The second category of cases involves jurors who have

been declared insane shortly after the verdict was rendered.

the declaration of incompetency was an attempt to save both his

money and his business. The court further found that when sober

the juror was of sound mind and normal intelligence. Declaring

that *‘there was nothing to show that at the time of trial his con-

dition was not normal,’’ (96 P.2d at 283) the court held that the

juror’s disability did not adversely affect his ability to properly

perform the functions of a juror. For other cases involving pre-

trial adjudications of incompetency in which the court conducted

a post-verdict investigation, sec Grand Lodge A.O.U.W. of Ark.

v. Wood, 113 Ark. 5302, 168 S.W. 1070 (1914 (‘‘several months”’

before trial the juror had been declared insane; had been sent to

a mental hospital had remained there for ‘‘a short period ;"’ and

had been **paroled;*’ but had never been *‘legally emancipated

from the disability of instanity’’); Austin v. People, 106 Col. 506,

107 P.2d 798 (1940) (16 months before trial, the juror had been

adjudged a mental incompetent, but had never been institution-

alized nor restored to competency) ; Brown v. State, 219 Ark. 647,

243 S.W. 2d 938 (1951) (approximately 2 years before trial the

juror had been adjudged insane by the probate court; had been

confined in a mental hospital for 3 months; and had been released

without a judicial restoration to sanity); Ex Parte Lovelady, 152

Tex. Crim. 93, 207 S.W. 2d 396 (1947). cert. granted, 333 US.

867, cert. dismissed 333 U.S. 879 (1948) (the juror had been ad-

judged insane approximately 7 years before the trial, had been

confined in a hospital for the insane; and had been discharged

**soon after his confinement’’ without having been legally re-

stored to sanity); Douthitt v. State, 182 Tenn. 577, 188 S.W. 2d

555 (1945) (the juror had been confined for a short period in an

*‘imsane hospital"’ approximately 8 years before trial and had

been discharged as *‘improved’’); State v. Bucy, 104 Mont. 416,

66 P.2d 1949 (1937) (approximately 10 years before trial the

juror had been declared insane; had been confined in an insane

asylum for less than 2 months; and had been released but had

never been judicially restored to competency); Eastman Kodak

Stores, Inc. v. Summers, 377 S.W. 2d 476, 481 (Kan. City Ct.

App. 1964) (approximately 20 years before trial the juror had

been ‘adjudicated to be a person of unsound mind and had never

been restored;"’ and had, thereafter, been treated for epilepsy).

Three other cases involved similar facts, but no time periods were

stated. Durham v. State, 182 Tenn. 577, 188 S.W. 2d 555 (1945);

Carter v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 517. 278 S.W. 840 (1925) ; Newton

v. State, 66 Ga. 103, 17 S.E. 2d 102 (Ct. App. 1941).

a SSS LTC TTT

Tape

7

The adjudications were by un independent tribunal, and

the proceedings were completely unrelated to the post-

verdict investigation of the jurors’ qualifications. As in

the first category of cases, the presumption of sanity had

been overcome. However, an adjudication of incompeten-

cy does not determine a person's mental capacity prior to

the determination. Yet, the inference is clear that the

underlying causes of the incompetent condition existed be-

fore the adjudication. Thus, in this category of cases, due

process requires” that there be a hearing to establish

whether the disability existed during trial, and if it did

exist, the effect it had on the juror’s deliberations."*

% Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 174 (1912) aff’g. Com-

monwealth v. Jordan, 207 Mass. 259, 93 N.E. 809 (1911). In

Jordan, the juror was found to be insane and was committed to an

**insane hospital’’ four days after the verdict was rendered. Aiter

a lengthy hearing the presiding justice denied defendant's metion

for a new trial, ruling that *‘a fair preponderance of all the evi-

dence’’ indicated that the juror was possessed of *‘sufficient mental

capacity during the entire trial’’ to enable him to render an in-

telligent verdict. Quoted in 93 N.E. at 814. Both the Supreme

Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the United States Supreme

Court affirmed. Although the precise question before the Supreme

Court involved the propriety of using the *‘ preponderance of the

evidence’’ standard, the Court noted that the holding of a hear-

ing complied with the due process requirement.

State v. Camp. 110 W.Va. 444, 158 S.E. 664 (1931). (The

juror became insane the day after the verdict was rendered and

was hospitalized two weeks thereafter); Burik v. Dundee Woolen

Co., 66 N.J.L. 420, 49 A. 442 (1901) (the juror became insane

*‘some days”’ after the verdict); Iverson v. Prudential Ins. Co.

of America, 126 N.J.L. 280, 19 A.2d 214 (1941) (the juror began

evidencing symptoms of a mental illness 6 days after the trial’s

conclusion and was declared, 2 days later, to be suffering from a

type of insanity ‘“‘which conjures up an imaginary world and

results in a loss of ‘contact with reality.’"’ 19 A.2d at 218);

State v. Welty, 65 Wash. 244, 118 P. 9 (1911) (The juror had

been twice adjudged insane and committed to an insane asylum

prior to trial; and not been restored to sanity at the time of trial ;

and 5 months after trial had been re-committed to the asylum).

mn A FE Ny RN mg

Absent the type of showing demonstrated in the first

two categories, the courts have been extremely reluctant to

invade the privacy of the jury room. Thus, the Court of

Appeals for the First Circuit, in Peterman v. Indian Motor-

cycle Co., 216 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1954), the Court of Ap-

peals for the Third Circuit, in United States ex rel. Daverse

v. Hohn, 198 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1952), and the Supreme

Court of New Mexico, in State v. Eskildson, 36 N.M. 238,

13 P.2d 417 (1932), approved the trial court’s refusal to

hold an evidentiary hearing absent an adjudication of in-

competency. In Peterman, the movants offered to prove

that

. . . the juror in question, because of mental disturb-

ance, [had| been receiving disability compensation

from the Veterans Bureau, that he [had) difficulty in

sleeping and concentrating; that his memory [was]

not good; that he [had| had depressed periods during

which he entertained the idea of suicide; that he [had]

had to undergo treatment for anxiety reaction to a

psychic episode expressed by auditory hallucinations;

that he has been under the care of a psychiatrist for

an extended period, with little prospect of an early

overcoming of his difficulties.

216 F.2d at 293 (emphasis added). Yet, Judge Wyzanski

of the United States District Court for the District of

Massachusetts refused to hold an evidentiary hearing.

According to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Judge

~~" Wyzanski’s reason was based upon the fact that the offer

of proof, ‘‘taken at its face value,’’ did not present ‘‘a

sufficient ground for impeaching a verdict once returned”’

because it ‘‘contained no suggestion that the juror was in-

sane or had at any time been confined in a sanitorium ‘or

was so incapacitated that he did not perform as adequately

9

as many people do ordinary occupational tasks.’’’ Id.

The Court of Appeals noted that Judge Wyzanski observed

the juror during the trial and that he did not get the im-

pression that the juror was incompetent. In its affirmance,

the Court of Appeals indicated its approval of ‘‘the strong

policy against the too-ready impeachment of jury verdicts

on the basis of such afterthoughts suggested by a disap-

pointed litigant.’’ Jd.

Similarly, in Eskildson, defendants sought to establish a

juror’s mental incompetency through the testimony of a

psychiatrist. The trial court, however, refused to hold

an evidentiary hearing because there had not been ‘‘an ad-

judication that settled [the juror’s] status.’’ 13 P.2d at

421. The Supreme Court of New Mexico, while sanction-

ing the adjudication requirement adopted by the trial court,

suggested that a hearing might also be appropriate if the

trial judge believed, based upon his observations of the

juror during trial, that the juror was incompetent.”

Finally, the Third Circuit’s opinion in Daverse, although

not precisely on point, is consonant with the policy reflected

in Peterman and Eskildson. In Daverse, the defendant

attempted to amend a paragraph of a petition for habeas

corpus by adding an allegation that the juror suffered

from a mental disease. This proposed amendment, how-

ever, was framed in uncertain, rather than specific, lan-

guage (‘‘... [the] juror... may be suffering from a men-

tal disease... .’’) 198 F.2d at 937 (emphasis added). Fo-

eusing upon the failure to allege ‘‘specifically that [the

'? But see, MeKenzie v. State, 116 Tex. Crim. 395, 11 S.W. 2d

172 (1928) in which a post-verdict inquiry was conducted not-

withstanding the absence of an adjudication of incompetency. The

juror’s mental competence was challenged on the basis of an ‘‘ap-

plication, filed by the juror, for compensation on the ground of

nervous and mental disability incurred during the World War.”

11 S.W. 2d at 179. It does not appear that the parties put into

issue the propriety of conducting a post-verdict investigation.

10

juror] was in fact mentally incompetent or ‘insane,’ ”’ the

Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s refusal to

allow the amendment. In so doing, the court stated:

If a juror’s mental competence is to be attacked at

the late stage offered by a habeas corpus proceeding,

the charge must be made in much more certain terms

and not on a tentative basis. A fishing expedition into

a juror’s competency may not be employed as a basis

to attack a conviction valid on its face. To rule other-

wise would be to strike a serious blow at the sanctity

of the jury system for any juror, who it was alleged

might be suffering from paranoid tendencies, could in

effect be put on trial as to his mental competence. We

cannot sanction such a course.

198 F.2d at 938 (citation omitted). Clearly, something

more than just a bare statement of incompetency is de-

manded. At a minimum, a party attacking a juror’s quali-

fications must make an offer of proof which, as the First

Cireuit stated, suggests ‘‘that the juror was insane or had

at any time been confined in a sanitorium ‘or was so in-

capacitated that he did not perform as adequately as many

people do ordinary occupational tasks.’’’ 216 F.2d at 293.

It would be myopie to read the Daverse opinion as requir-

ing anything less than a strong showing of mental incapac-

ity. It makes little difference, absent such a strong show-

ing, whether movants charge that a juror is suffering from

a mental disease or that the juror may be suffering from a

mental disease. In both instances, the effect of defendant’s

attack is the same: permission to employ a ‘fishing expedi-

tion into a juror’s competency’? would be required. Such

an expedition cannot be tolerated.

A comparison of the offer of proof in the case at bar with

the offers made in the cases above should make it abun-

11

dantly clear that the defendants’ offer of proof is insuffi-

cient to warrant a post-verdict inquiry into the juror’s

mental competency. Since there has been no adjudication

of incompetency, this case comes within the weakest of the

three categories discussed above. Even within this cate-

gory, the showing is extremely weak. In Peterman, for

example, the offer of proof was much stronger than the

offer made here. There, the allegations were, in effect, that

the juror had a history of mental disturbances, and had

been, prior to and throughout the trial, under the care of a

psychiatrist. Yet, Judge Wyzanski and the First Circuit

were in accord that these allegations, even if true, would

not warrant the impeachment of the verdicts. 216 F.2d at

293. Here, there is no indication that the juror has a his-

tory of psychiatric disorders or that the juror has under-

gone psychiatric treatments. At best, the defendants’ posi-

tion is comparable with the defendant’s position in Da-

verse: a bare allegation of incompetency combined with a

request that the court conduct an investigation. To per-

mit a post-verdict inquiry based upon defendants’ offer of

proof would be to accept the proposition that a fishing ex-

pedition may be employed to attack a conviction valid on its

face. This cannot be countenanced, particularly in light of

Peterman and Daverse.

Moreover, based upon an examination of the general

ease law governing a post-verdict inquiry into a juror’s

qualifications, it is clear that a hearing is not required. The

purpose of a hearing is not to determine whether or not

the claimed disability does exist. Rather, the function of

a hearing is to ascertain the extent to which the disability

existed during trial, and the effect the disability had upon

the juror’s deliberations. This view finds support in the

Supreme Court’s opinion in Remmer v. United States, 347

U.S. 227 (1954). During the trial in Remmer, an improper

Pe ee « St, %.

i2

communication was made to a juror and was reported im-

mediately to the court. Improper communications, such

as those involved in Remmer, have been deemed to be so

presumptively prejudicial as to require a new trial."* Yet,

the trial court never informed the defendant-petitioner of

the incident. Instead, based upon the results of a requested

F.B.L. investigation, the court concluded that the incident

was harmless. Upon learning of these events after trial,

the defendant-petitioner moved for a new trial. Without

holding a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and

the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 205 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1953).

The Supreme Court, however, held that a hearing was

necessary—not to determine whether the incident occurred

—but rather to ‘‘determine the cireumstances [surrounding

the incident], the impact thereof upon the juror, and wheth-

er or not it was prejudicial.’ 347 U.S. at 230.

This concept of the limited purpose of a Hearing is also

suggested by the Second Cireuit’s decision in United States

v. Silverman, 449 F.2d 1341 (2d Cir. 1971). There the court

indicated that a hearing would be necessary—again, not to

determine whether a claimed disqualification existed—but

rather to determine whether ‘‘the claimed disqualification

might have adversely affected the challenged juror’s ability

to decide the case intelligently.”’ 449 F.2d at 1344. In

Silverman, an income tax evasion case, the juror’s in-

ability to read and write English was not disputed. At the

hearing, therefore, the only question facing the court was

whether this disability precluded the juror from rendering

a fair and impartial verdict.

18 This principle had been enunciated prior to Remmer, Mattox

v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-150 (1892), Morley v. Cran-

more Skimobiles, 67 F.Supp. 812 (D.N.H. 1946) ; and has been re-

affirmed since Remmer, Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1963)

(per curiam) ; Marshal v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).

13

Similarly, in other cases involving a post-verdict attack

upon a juror’s qualifications, the existence of the dis-

abling condition was not in issue, for the factors relied up-

on as being responsible for the disabling condition were

readily evident.” Thus, where the juror suffered from a

physical impairment, the existence of the impairment was

not disputed. Where the juror was unable to read or write,

this inability was not controverted. Where the juror was

an alien, infant or convicted felon, the alienage, infancy or

conviction of the juror was not in issue. Where the juror

had engaged in some form of misconduct, the fact that the

misconduct occurred was not questioned. And where the

juror’s mental competency was determined in a separate

and unrelated proceeding, mental capacity was not con-

tested. What was questioned and what was contested

though, was the extent to which the disqualifying factor

tainted a juror’s deliberations and prevented him from

rendering a fair and impartial verdict.

In the instant case, however, where the juror’s compe-

tency has not been determined in a separate and unrelated

proceeding, the court would be constrained to perform

the additional task of delving into the mind of the juror

and making the initial determination of whether or not the

® See, c.g., Raub v. Carpenter, 187 U.S. 159, 161-162 (1902)

(infancy, felony conviction) ; United States v. Silverman, 449 F.2d

1341 (2nd Cir. 1971) (inability to read and write English) ; United

States v. DeLeon, 462 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1972) (juror under in-

dictment) ; Holmes v. United States, 284 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1960)

(improper communications to jury); Ford v. United States, 201

F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1953) (juror convicted of felony); Ryan v.

United-States, 191 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied sub.

nom., Dunean v. United States, 342 U.S. 928 (1951) (improper

communications to jurors) ; Faith v. Neely, 41 F.R.D. 361 (N.D.W.

Va. 1966) (juror misconduct, intoxication); Hollingsworth v.

Duane, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 353 (Pa. Dist. 1801) (alienage) ; Lindsay

v. State, 189 Tenn. 355, 225 S.W. 2d 533 (1949) (deafness) :

Batson v. State, 216 Ala. 275, 113 So. 300 (1927) (alienage).

aE can Cd KS ea ptt

14

juror was mentally competent.” Such a probe was not

undertaken in Peterman, Eskildson and Daverse; and the

court would be ill-advised to undertake such a probe here.

Testimony would be necessary at the very least, not only

from the subject juror regarding her deliberations, but

also from her fellow jurors, regarding the nature and ex-

tent of the subject juror’s participation in the delibera-

tions.” Yet, such a probe militates against the well-estab-

*” Although the defendants have requested that the juror under-

go a mental examination, it is highly doubtful whether the court

has the authority to order such an examination. The Supreme

Court has held that federal courts do not have the common law

power to order such an examination; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bots-

ford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); see also Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312

U.S. 1 (1941) ; Camden and Suburban Ry. Co. v. Stetson, 177 U.S.

172 (1900) ; and no statute can be found which authorizes it. In-

deed, in civil cases, the court may only order, upon a motion for

good cause, a party or a person under the legal control of party

to submit to a mental examination. F.R.Civ.P.35(a). See, cy.

Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). Similarly, in crim-

inal cases, only the defendant is subject to the court’s control. 18

U.S.C. §§ 4244, 4245. See also Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1965)

(per curiam) ; United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700, 710 (2d Cir.

1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1026 (1970); United States v. Dris-

coll, 399 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Albright, 388

F.2d 719, 722-724 (4th Cir. 1968); Alexander v. United States,

380 F.2d 33, 39 (8th Cir. 1967) ; Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d

710, 721 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other

grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968). No authority has been cited—in-

deed, no authority has been found—which permits the court to

order a person who is neither a party nor a person under the con-

trol of a party in a judicial proceeding, to undergo a mental ex-

amination.

2! It has been held that where a juror was able ‘‘to intelligently

consider the evidence, appreciate the arguments of counsel, the

rulings of law, the charge of the court, and to arrive at a rational

conelusion,’’ a new trial will not be granted. Commonwealth v.

Jordan, 207 Mass. 259, 93 N.E. 809, 814-815 (1911), aff’d Jordan

v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167 (1912). See Ex Parte Lovelady,

152 Tex. Crim. 93, 207 S.W. 2d 396, cert. granted, 333 U.S. 867,

cert. dismissed, 333 U.S. 879 (1948); Anderson v. State, 54 Ariz.

OE eee ae

-—_

7 AEN ATI Me

15

lished general rule which inhibits a court from inquiring

‘‘in any way whatever as to what occurred during the

jury’s deliberations.’’ United States v. Grieco, 261 F.2d

414, 415 (2nd Cir. 1958), cert. denied 395 U.S. 907 (1959).

Indeed, it is axiomatic that jurors are incompetent to tes-

tify as to matters which would impeach their verdict, re-

gardless of the means employed. Hence, courts have

consistently refused to consider letters and affidavits of

jurors which attempt to impeach their verdict.”

These general rules, however, are not absolute. The

Supreme Court, having recognized that the adherence to

inflexible rules is incompatable with the administration of

justice, has relaxed the rigidity of these rules in order to

protect the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair

and impartial jury. McDenald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268-

269 (1915). Nonetheless, post-verdict inquiries remain

limited to extraordinary circumstances in which funda-

mental incompetency or actual bias is shown. Thus, to

387, 96 P.2d 281 (1939); State v. Camp, 110 W.Va. 444, 158 S.E.

664 (1931) ; Burik v. Dundee Woolen Co., 66 N.J.L. 420, 49 A. 442

(1901) ; Mackin v. People, 115 Ill. 312, 3 N.E. 222 (1885). Sce

also United States v. Silverman, 449 F.2d 1341, 1344 (2nd Cir.

1971) (in which the Court of Appeals stated that a juror must be

able ‘‘to decide a case intelligently’’) ; Ford v. United States, 201

F.2d 300, 301 (Sth Cir. 1953). In those circumstances in which

a hearing might be required, testimony from the subject juror and

the other jurors would be necessary to determine whether a juror

deliberated intelligently.

*2 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); Hyde v. United

States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S.

140 (1892).

*3'The refusal to receive affidavits from jurors attempting to

impeach their verdict can be traced to Lord Mansfield’s ruling in

1785, Vaise v. Delaval, I.T.R. 11 (1785); and has been *‘univer-

sally followed”’ in this country. McDonald, 238 U.S. at 268.

*4 See, e.g. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 168 (1950) :

Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 512-514 (1948) ; Mattox v.

ee ee ee

PAE SE Os

16

come within this high standard, ‘‘[t]here must be a show-

ing of a prima facie case sufficient to satisfy the judge that

the [exposure of the jury’s discussions during deliberations]

should be let in.’’ Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14

(1952). The alleged disability must be ‘‘so obvious a dis-

qualification or so inherently prejudicial as a matter of

law ... to require the court, of its own motion or on peti-

tioner’s suggestion afterward to set the verdict aside and

grant a new trail.’’*

It has been said that the showing must be of a ‘‘constitu-

tional dimension.’’ United States v. Provenzano, 240

F.Supp. 393, 408 (D.N.J.); aff’d per curiam 353 F.2d 1011

(3rd Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 905 (1966). The mere

allegation of the existence of a disability, the ‘‘mere charge

of a wrongdoing . . . without more,’’ United States v.

Silverman, 449 F.2d 1341, 1344 (2d Cir. 1971), the mere

inclusion in the panel of a disqualified juror, United States

v. Clark, 289 U.S. 1, 14 (1933), does not warrant the dis-

closure of the debates, thoughts and votes of the jury while

considering their verdict.** Clearly, post-verdict statements

of a juror, without more, which reflect certain beliefs, con-

sidered by some to be unconventional, neither meet the

high standards mandated by the Supreme Court and the

Second Circuit; nor justify tearing down the veil of secre-

cy which properly protects the jury’s deliberations.

United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892); United States v. Silverman,

449 F.2d 1341, 1344 (2nd Cir. 1971) ; Ford v. United States, 201

F.2d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 1953).

* Frazier, 335 U.S. at 513. Sce also Clark, 289 U.S. at 14;

McDonald, 238 U.S. at 268-269; Mattoz, 146 U.S. at 149.

*6 Even the “‘mere opportunity for prejudice or corruption’’

may not be a sufficient showing. As Mr. Justice Holmes stated

in Hold v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 251 (1910), ‘‘If the mere

opportunity for prejudice or corruption is to raise a presumption

that they exist, it will be hard to maintain a jury trial under the

conditions of the present day.’’

SRE ARI as ni RAE. VE YPN OA LEPC <a

17

Furthermore, if the jurors were permitted to testify,

questions relating to the motives and influences which af-

fected their deliberations would be improper. As Judge

Timbers has pointed out

Few doctrines are more firmly established in our

jurisprudence than the proposition that the validity

of a verdict may not be attacked, and hence a new trial

will not be granted, upon a showing of the mental op-

erations and emotional reactions of jurors in reaching

a particular verdict.

United States v. Reed, 313 F.Supp. 451, 454 (D. Conn. 1970).

This rule, which was adopted by the Supreme Court in

Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892), has been con-

sistently reaffirmed both by the Supreme Court* and the

Second Circuit.** Mattox drew the distinction between prop-

*7 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1952) ; Hyde v. United

States, 225 U.S. 347, 382-384 (1911); Mattox v. United States,

146 U.S. 140 (1892).

“8 United States v. Miller, 403 F.2d 77, 83-84 n. 11 (2nd Cir.

1968); United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1961),

cert. denied sub. nom. Mittelman v. United States, 368 U.S. 984

(1962) ; United States v. Grieco, 261 F.2d 414 (2nd Cir. 1958),

cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907 (1959); Rotondo v. Isthmian Steam-

ship Co., 243 F.2d 581, 583 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834

(1957) ; United States v. Reed, 313 F.Supp. 451, 454 (D. Conn.

1970), aff'd 487 F.2d 57 (2nd Cir. 1971). Other circuits have

also continued to follow this rule. See, e.g. Armstrong v. United

States, 228 F.2d 764, 769 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 918

(1956) ; Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739, 745 (4th Cir.) cert.

denied 335 U.S. 826 (1948); Young v. United States, 163 F.2d

187, 188-190 (10th Cir.), cert. denicd 332 U.S. 770 (1947). The

ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, ap-

proved, in 1968, the following standard relating to impeachment

of a verdict.

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, no evidence

shall be received to show the effect of any statement, conduct,

erg el ae a

Bea ia eit bas eS ee a ae eal Ga

DLO RAMS SA SOLD PCIE A ENE BORE

18

er and improper testimony: testimony as to objective mat-

ters (‘‘any facts bearing upon the question of the existence

of any extraneous influences’’) was declared to be proper;

however, testimony as to subjective matters (‘‘how far that

influence operated upon his [the juror’s] mind’’) was

deemed to be improper. 146 U.S. at 149.

The refusal of the Second Cireuit to deviate from this

rule is amply supported by their decisions. In Rotondo v.

Isthmian Steamship Co. 243 F.2d 581 (2d Cir. 1957), a per

curiam opinion, the court refused to allow a post-verdict

examination of the jury, stating

it is completely well settled that, when objection rests

upon the jurors’ testimony as to what were the rea-

sons that in fact induced them to find their verdict, the

court will not hear them.

243 F.2d at 583 (citations omitted). Moreover, in United

States v. Crosby; 299 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied

sub. nom. Mittelman v. United States, 368 U.S. 984 (1962),

the Mattox subjective-objective limitation on the scope of

inquiry was specifically relied upon in rejecting a request

for a post-verdict examination of jurors. In Crosby, the

defendants claimed that the jury’s deliberations were

tainted by the use and knowledge of information obtained

from news accounts. Citing Mattox, the Court of Appeals

acknowledged that juror testimony could be received ‘‘to

prove the fact that they read the newspapers,’’ 294 F.2d at

949, but not to establish the effect of such knowledge upon

event or condition upon the mind of a juror or concerning

the mental processes by which the verdict was determined.

ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Trial

by Jury, § 5.7(a) (1968).

Dm CN EIS eA Dee LE

19

their reasoning. Thus, as Judge Friendly declared in

Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1968), ‘‘any

relaxation of the Mattox rule’’ relating to a post-verdict

inquiry into a juror’s mental process would be viewed with

‘‘apprehension”’ by this court. 403 F.2d at 84 n. 11.

Continued adherence to these rules is reasonable. To

permit a disappointed litigant to distort certain facts, in-

nocent on their face, as a basis for attacking a jury’s ver-

dict, would be to open the proverbial Pandora’s box. As

Judge Smith said in Crosby, and Judge Friendly subse-

quently adopted in Miller,

There are many cogent reasons militating against

post-verdict inquiry into jurors’ motives for decision.

The jurors themselves ought not be subjected to har-

assment; the courts ought not be burdened with large

numbers of applications mostly without real merit; the

chances and temptations for tampering ought not be

increased; verdicts ought not be made so uncertain.

United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d at 950; Miller v. United

States, 403 F.2d at 82.*° In addition, to permit a verdict,

to be reopened without a sufficient basis,in fact, would be

*° The Court of Appeals held that the refusal to ‘‘examine the

jurors as to their mental process’’ was not error by the district

court. 294 F.2d at 950.

%°TIn State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118 A.2d. 812 (1955), the

Court stated :

The better reasoned decisions support the exclusion of jurors’

testimony as to their mental processes . . . upon the sounder

ground that, being personal to each juror, the working of

the mind of any of them cannot be subjected to the test of

other testimony, and therefore .. . such testimony should not

be received to overthrow the verdict to which all assented.

118 A.2d at 816 (citations omitted.)

20

to seriously impair the integrity of a verdict. And, by di-

luting the efficacy of a jury’s pronouncement, the constitu-

tional guarantee of trial by jury, asserted by defendants,

would also be weakened; for the integrity of a jury’s ver-

dict is an undeniable cornerstone of this Sixth Amendment

right. Cf. United States ex rel. Daverse v. Hohn, 198 F.2d

934, 938 (Srd Cir. 1950). Therefore, before an assault on

a verdict receives judicial approval, the Supreme Court’s

warning in McDonald v. Pless should be considered:

But let it once be established that verdicts solemniy

made and publicly returned into court can be attacked

and set aside on the testimony of those who took part

in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many

would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of discov-

ering something which might invalidate the finding.

Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated

party in an effort to secure from them evidence of

facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set

aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus

used, the result would be to make what was intended

to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of

public investigation—to the destruction of all frank-

ness and freedom of discussion and conference.

238 U.S. at 267-268.

Considering the instant case, I do not believe that the

facts justify the reopening of the jury’s verdict. Defend-

ants have not offered any evidence of a separate, unrelated

determination of mental incompetency. Nor have they sus-

tained their burden of overcoming the presumption of

sanity which protects the juror. The most that can be said

of their shallow showing is that it invites a ‘‘fishing ex-

pedition into a juror’s compentency.’’ This cannot be

countenanced. Moreover, there was nothing in the de-

21

meanor of the juror during voir dire, trial or deliberations

to indicate that she was anything but competent to serve

on the jury. On voir dire, ihe jurors were asked group

questions in an effort to elicit from them their feelings of

bias or prejudice which would prevent them from render-

ing a fair and impartial verdict." In direct colloquy with

*! The jurors were asked the following group questions relating

to bias and prejudice:

Does any juror have any mental reservation as to the ac-

ceptance of these principles of law?

And I would assume in response to each and every one of

my questions that your silence indicates that you do not.

Do you have any preconceived ideas or prejudices that

would prevent or hinder you from following the instructions

that the Court will give you in greater detail at a later time

and the principles of law which have just recently been out-

lined for you? -s

Does any juror have any prejudice or bias for or against

any point of view concerning the charges summarized for you

from the indictment?

Does any juror know or has any juror or member of his

family or any associate had any dealings, either directly or

indirectly, with the defendants named in the indictment and

presently on trial before you or, for that matter, with any

member of their families or friends or associates?

Has any past experience of a juror in any way whatso-

ever caused a juror to doubt his ability to sit as a completely

impartial and unbiased trier of the facts? Ladies and gentle-

men, I have tried in these questions to direct your attention

to possible reasons you might not be able to sit as a fair juror.

Let me now ask you quite apart from any prior questions,

does any juror have the slightest doubt in his mind for any

reason whatsover that he would be able to serve conscien-

tiously, fairly and impartially in this case and render a true

and just verdict according to the law as it will be explained?

Let me try it a different way. I am sure you can recognize

that even if I sat here until eternity caught up with me and

if I had the infinite judgment of our diety I could not pos-

22

me, the juror answered directly and responsively, stating

that she understood my questions and comments, and speci-

fying the particular ones which applied to her. Nothing

in her responses and demeanor indicated that her reason-

ing abilities or mental processes were deficient. Indeed,

her ability to recall my questions applicable to her, con-

veyed the opposite impression. Likewise, during the three

weeks of trial and three days and nights of deliberations,

I did not notice anything unusual about her. Nor was any-

thing unusual concerning her brought to my attention by

either the attorneys or jurors. (1 might add that the at-

torneys and the jurors were always quick to bring matters

to my attention which they thought of moment).

sibly be secure that I have covered every possible question

which would root out and bring to the surface any possible

prejudice which is important to a consideration of this case.

Il am not unaware that all of us, without exception, are the

subject of various conditioning influences that we acquire

in life’s work and by virtue of experiences which either bruises

us or elevates us, but what you are asked to do as jurors is

to sublimate any prejudices or any bias which you may have

in determining the facts of the case and to accept the law as

given you.

So what I am attempting to find out, and essentially this

must rely upon your honesty, your good faith and your will-

ingness to be candid with the Court, what I want to find out

is upon an examination of yourselves, can you say that you

can sit fairly and impartially in judgment in this case should

you ultimately be chosen to serve?

Do you have any doubt whatsoever about your ability to

render a fair and impartial verdict upon the facts in evidence

and the law to be applied to those facts?

Soul searching is what is necessary at this point because

essentially, really regardless of how you answer any ques-

tions, the fact of the matter remains that I must appeal to

your honesty and your sense of fairness to reveal to the Court

any sense or any feeling which might make it difficult or im-

possible for you to render a fair and impartial verdict.

Transcript of January 4, 1973, at pp. 10, 21-23.

23

The defendants’ second request that the verdicts be set

aside even without a hearing is utterly without foundation.

A showing which is too weak to permit an inquiry into the

jury’s deliberations is, a fortiori, too weak to warrant a

new trial. Also, based upon a comparison of the facts of

this case with the facts of those cases in which mental in-

competency was alleged by movants and rejected by the

courts, it is clear that defendants’ showing is too weak to

justify setting aside the verdict.

*2 In all cases in which a juror’s incompetency has been alleged

as a basis for attacking a verdict, the courts, for differing reasons,

have been unanimous in refusing to grant a new trial. Thus, for

example, in Iverson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 126 N.J.L.

280, 19 A.2d 214 (1941), within a week after a verdict was ren-

dered, a juror was found to be suffering from a type of insanity

‘‘which conjures up an imaginary world and results in a loss of

‘contact with reality.”’’ 19 A.2d at 218. Nevertheless, the trial

court refused to grant a new trial because ‘‘it was not shown that

the juror was so incompetent at trial as not to be able to com-

prehend ‘the nature and quality’ of his acts.’’ Jd. In State v. Welty,

65 Wash. 244, 118 P.9 (1911), a juror, prior to trial, had been

twice adjudged insane and committed to and discharged from an

asylum. Five months after trial, the juror was again adjudged in-

sane and committed to an asylum. The trial court denied defend-

ant’s motion for a new trial and the Supreme Court of Washington

affirmed. In Anderson v. State, 54 Ariz. 387, 96 P.2d 281 (1939),

the juror in question was declared incompetent to manage his own

24

Accordingly, defendants’ motion is denied.

So ordered.

DAVID N. EDELSTEIN,

Chief U.S.D.J.

Dated: New York, New York

July 18, 1973

affairs *‘some months’’ before trial, and remained under the dis-

ability throughout the trial. The Supreme Court of Arizona up-

held the trial court’s rejection of defendant’s motion for a new

trial, holding that only a declaration of insanity, without the

requisite restoration to sanity, would be sufficient to disqualify a

juror. Similarly in Grand Lodge A.O.U.W. of Ark. v. Wood, 113

Ark. 502, 168 S.W. 1070 (1914), the juror in question had been

adjudged insane ‘‘[s]everal months before the trial’? and had been

committed to the appropriate state hospital. Although he was re-

leased after a *‘short period’’ of confinement the juror was never

legally restored to sanity. Admitting that the juror was disquali-

fied to serve, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, nevertheless re-

fused to order a new trial. The court reasoned that the disquali-

fication was merely a technical violation of the statute which estab-

lished qualifications for jurors, and therefore did not warrant a

new trial.

Sce also the cases listed in n. 8, supra.

25

Appendix 2.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For tHe Seconp Circuit

Nos. 113-114—September Term, 1973.

(Argued September 13, 1973 Decided January 4, 1974.)

Docket Nos. 73-1759, 73-1769

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JOHN DIOGUARDI ayn LOUIS OSTRER,

Defendants-A ppellants.

Before:

LuMBarD, FRIENDLY AND FEINBERG,

Circuit Judges.

Appeal from convictions, after a jury verdict, in the

District Court for the Southern District, David N. Edel-

stein, Chief Judge, for violations of the federal securities

laws (15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 77x, 78j(b) and 78ff), Rule 10b-5

of the Securities and Exchange Commission (17 CFR 240.

10b-5), and federal mail fraud statute (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341),

and for conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371); and from a denial

of new trial motions for alleged incompetency on the part

of a juror contrary to 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (4).

Affirmed.

Tes é

RL mye am

26

Haroitp F. McGuime, Jr., Assistant United States Attor-

ney for the Southern District of New York (Paul J.

Curran, United States Attorney for the Southern

District of New York, S. Andrew Schaffer and John

W. Nields, Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys

for the Southern District of New York, on the brief),

for Appellee.

GretcHEN Wuire Oserman, New York, New York (Jay

Goldberg, on the brief), for Appellant Dioguardi.

SHetpon H. Eisen, New York, New York (Orans, Elsen

& Polstein, Lewis Shapiro, Anthony J. Ferrara and

Henry J. Boitel, on the brief), for Appellant Ostrer.

Lumsagrp, Circuit Judge:

John Dioguardi and Louis Ostrer appeal from judgments

of conviction entered on April 12, 1973, after a three-week

jury trial held in January 1973 in the Southern District,

and from the denial by Chief Judge Edelstein of new trial

motions. The forty-count indictment was filed May 27, 1971,

against the appellants and seven others ' Count one charged

the defendants with conspiring, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 371 to violate provisions of the federal securities laws

and regulations, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 77x, 78j(b), and 78ff,

1 Of the seven other defendants named in the indictment, three

entered guilty pleas (Michael Hellerman, Fred Goodman, and

Michael Caricato). Three were tried jointly in a separate trial

and were convicted of one or two offenses (Gary Fredericks,

Richard Greenberg, and Anthony Soldano), see United States v.

Greenberg, doe. no. 72-2368 (2d Cir.), aff’d from the bench, Feb.

16, 1973. The case of the seventh defendant (Morris Winter) was

not tried in view of his cooperation with the government and his

guilty plea in a related case. Winter, Hellerman, and Goodman

testified for the government, as did Steven Schoengold and Bruce

Halpern, both named as co-conspirators.

ow

sve oe mr te

27

and Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR 240.10b-5,? and the federal mail

and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343. The

remaining counts charged substantive violations of these

same provisions, except 18 U.S.C. § 1343.

On January 26, 1973, the jury found Ostrer guilty on

eleven of the seventeen counts submitted to them by the

court, and Dioguardi on four of the nineteen counts sub-

mitted as to him* Prior to sentencing, the defendants

moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, for an evi-

dentiary hearing. The basis for this motion was an un-

solicited letter from one of the jurors to Dioguardi which

allegedly established the incompetency of that juror. In

reliance on this, and on the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1865

*15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) codifies section 17(a) of the Securities Act

of 1933, prohibiting fraud in the sale of securities. Wilful viola-

tion of this section is made criminally punishable by section 24 of

the Securities Act of 1933, now 15 U.S.C. § 77x. Rule 10b-5 of the

Securities and Exchange Commission (17 C.F.R. ¢ 240.10b-5),

which prohibits fraud or the use of manipulative devices in both

the purchase and sale of securities, was promulgated under 15

U.S.C. § 78j(b), originally section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-

change Act of 1934. Wilful violation of this rule is made crim-

inally punishable by section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act

of 1934, now 15 U.S.C. § 78ff.

3 Both defendants were found guilty on the conspiracy count

(18 U.S.C. § 371). Ostrer was found guilty on the following sub-

stantive counts :

9—Causing a sale confirmation to be placed in the mail in

furtherance of a fraudulent scheme for the sale of stock (15

U.S.C. §§ Tiq(a), T7x) ;

16 through 19—Causing purchase confirmation to be placed

in the mail as part of a manipulative device in contravention

of Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; 15 U.S.C. §$§ 78j(b),

78ff) ;

31, 33 through 36—Use of the mails as part of a scheme to

defraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341).

Dioguardi was found guilty on only three of the substantive

counts: 16, 17, and 31.

basa 25d 2 Rnanteh to) Tete anette anil, Mev ae |

Re eee

28

(b)(4), they claim that they had been deprived of their

right to have their case heard and decided by a panel

of twelve competent jurors. Judge Edelstein denied the

motion on April 12th. He sentenced Dioguardi to nine

years’ imprisonment and a $30,000 fine, and Ostrer to three

years’ imprisonment and a $55,000 fine. *

In addition to their objections relating to alleged juror

incompetency, the defendants raise four other claims of

error in the conduct of the trial: first, that the govern-

ment prosecutor’s argument in summation, to the effect

that neither defendant called witnesses to contradict the

governnent’s testimony, was improper comment on each

appellant’s failure to testify in view of the assertion by

each that he alone was in a position to contradict the

government’s witnesses; secondly, that it was error for

the trial court to have refused to charge, as requested,

that the testimony of admitted perjurers and felons was

to be scrutinized with care and caution; thirdly, that it

was improper for the trial court to have ruled that Dio-

guardi’s acquittal of another crime could not be proved

when the government intended to utilize the acts underly-

ing the acquittal to show a prior course of illegal con-

duct; finally that consecutive sentences for Dioguardi on

two of the counts charging securities law violations, counts

16 and 17, were improper since the underlying facts con-

stituted only a single offense.

4 The sentences imposed by Judge Edelstein were as follows: in

the case of Dioguardi, a prison term of 5 years and a $10,000 fine

on count 1, 2 years and $10,000 on count 16 and similarly on count

17, and 5 years and $1000 on count 31; and in the case of Ostrer,

3 years and a $10,000 fine on count 1, 3 years and a $5000 fine on

count 9, 2 years and a $10,000 fine on each of counts 16 through 19,

3 years on each of counts 31 and 33 through 35, and 5 years on

count 36. Dioguardi’s prison terms are consecutive, Ostrer’s con-

current. The sentence imposed on Dioguardi on count 31 was

suspended, with five years’ probation. The sentence imposed on

Ostrer on count 36 was also suspended, with one day’s probation.

29

We find the defendants’ arguments unpersuasive and

we accordingly affirm the convictions below and let Dio-

guardi’s sentences stand.

1.

The evidence at trial revealed a scheme to manipulate

the price of the stock of Belmont Franchising Corporation

(‘*Belmont’’), a substantially worthless over-the-counter

security. The book value of the stock was almost negli-

gible (Belmont’s assets were essentially paper holdings

in other concerns); it had been traded for only a short

time and for at most a few dollars a share®

In January of 1970, Michael Hellerman, who pleaded

guilty and testified for the government, began steps to

5 Belmont’s initial offering of stock to the public was made in the

spring of 1969. In an offering circular dated March 21, 1969, and

under the statutory exemption from registration for small issues,

Belmont offered 100,000 shares out of an authorized 1,000,000, par

value 1¢, at an offering price of $3 a share. The circular stated

that the offering was speculative and that the price of the shares

bore no relation to the book value of the company. In fact, at the

time, Belmont’s total assets amounted to roughly $10,000 and its

liabilities to roughly $7000.

By October 20, 1969, according to the 2A form filed by Belmont

with the Securities and Exchange Commission on that date, only

870 shares of the offering had been sold, with 99,130 unsold shares

remaining.

On January 2, 1970, in exchange for a total of 195,000 restricted

shares of Belmont stock, Belmont acquired 100% holdings in three

other concerns: Top Secret International Programming, Slimo-

rama International Corp., and Wonderful World of Grooming.

Prior sales of these newly-acquired companies amounted to merely

a few thousands of dollars, and net profits for each were about

$1000. Nonetheless they listed total assets slightly in excess of

$1,000,000. Top Secret International Programming listed a ‘‘com-

puter program’’ value at $500,000, and the other two enterprises

each listed ‘‘formula rights’’ valued at $250,000... These assets

were reflected in supplementary notes in Belmont’s financial state-

ments for the end of 1969, but the underlying statements of the

“hip BR cis EARLE RAT

:

;

30

drive up the price of Belmont stock, first tu $5 or $6 a

share and then to nearly $50 a share. At thai time two

stock manipulators, Anthony Soldano and Fred Goodman,

in concert with Hellerman, commenced acquiring substan-

tially all of the 28,720 known publicly tradeable shares of

Belmont. Goodman and Soldano executed their purchases

ostensibly through the open market, using brokers who

quoted prices for Belmont through the National Quota-

tion Bureau’s pink sheets for over-the-counter securities.

These purchases created the appearance of an active pub-

lic market in the stock.

By early March, 1970 Goodman and Soldano had caused

the market price of Belmont as quoted in the pink sheets

to reach $15 a share. They did this primarily through

directions to their brokers, who traded small quantities

of the stock among themselves. In the meantime, Good-

man and Soldano had acquired control, they believed, of

all the outstanding stock.

At this point Hellerman’s role became paramount. Ac-

cording to his testimony, he already had an understanding

with Dioguardi that ‘‘whatever I did in the future ,...

he would have 25 per cent.’’ It had also been agreed

between Hellerman, on one side, and Goodman and Sol-

dano on the other that once the price of Belmont stock

reached $15, Hellerman and his associates would purchase

all the stock at the $15 level, with a $5 per share kickback,

prior to further manipulation upwards. In confirming this

arrangement with Goodman and Soldano, Hellerman took

Soldano to Dioguardi’s office ‘‘to make sure it was on the

record,’’

three subsidiaries, conveniently acquired after the start of the year,

were unaudited.

Belmont’s second 2A statement, filed with the SEC in April,

1970, indicated that 28,720 shares of the March 21, 1969, offering

had been sold, and that no more of the original 100,000 shares were

still being offered.

31

According to Hellerman, it was at this time in early

March that he brought Ostrer into the scheme, although

the two were only recently acquainted. Ostrer agreed to

commit himself to buy 14,000 shares of Belmont at $15

a share ($210,000 total), with the understanding that he

would split any future profits with Hellerman, that Heller-

man would guarantee him against loss, and that a loan

of the purchase money would be arranged so that he would

not have to ‘‘lay out a quarter’’ of the $210,000. Purchase

orders in Ostrer’s name or in his behalf were to be made

through various New York Stock Exchange firms.

Ostrer then placed crders in his own name and in his

sister’s for 14,000 shares of Belmont. However, most Ex-

change firms which he approached refused to accept his

orders, and he was forced to place relatively large block

orders through firms where brokers were already in league

with Hellerman. °

Contemporaneously, Hellerman made arrangements with

others to purchase the remaining 14,000 or so shares of

Belmont. These individuals were able to pay the selling

brokers (at the $15 a share price), but Ostrer was unable

to raise the $210,000 needed to ‘‘hold up’’ his end of the

deal, a circumstance which left his brokers unpaid. Ac-

cording to Hellerman, he thereupon obtained a loan for

Ostrer through Dioguardi. The funds, totalling $60,000,

came from Hickey DiLorenzo, at an interest rate of 142%

a week. DiLorenzo also demanded and received $24,000

from Hellerman for this favor (pari of the kickback

® Among these orders were ones through Bruce & Co. on March

10, 1970, for 2000 shares, and through Kelsey & Co. on Mareh 11,

1970, for 3500 shares. Co-conspirator Bruce Halpern (see fn, 1

supra) was a principal of Bruce & Co. Co-conspirator Schoengold

was a vice president of Kelsey & Co., and Hellerman was an un-

disclosed owner of Kelsey.

These particular purchases on March 10th and 11th are relevant

to defendant Dioguardi’s challenge (discussed further below) to

alleged pyramiding of offenses.

Le ie 65 Aba Fas ee PE AS eT eee

32

profits already made). In addition, Hellerman also ad-

vanced Ostrer $52,500, and Ostrer obtained the balance he

needed from other sources.

Thereafter, from the end of March through late April,

1970, Hellerman directed purchases and sales of Belmont

stock at ever-increasing prices among the individuals and

brokers whom he controlled. He kept Dioguardi, Ostrer,

_ and DiLorenzo informed as the price rose. He also arranged

for Ostrer to sell off enough stock, through a nominee, to

repay the $60,000 loan from DiLorenzo—with a $1700 profit

left over which he split with Ostrer. By the end of April

he had received approximately $140,000 in kickbacks from

Goodman and Soldano. He gave $30,000 to Dioguardi, and

invested $9,000 more in a business in which Dioguardi had

an interest.

In early May, 1970, the scheme failed. The president of

Belmont, through a broker unknown to the manipulators,

began to sell heavily his own ‘‘investment’’ stock in the

corporation. The market was unable to absorb’ the sales,

and Hellerman was unwilling to buy the stock and could not

find other purchasers. Consequently the market for Bel-

mont collapsed, leaving Ostrer (among others) with large

quantities of unsold stock. Ostrer then tried to hold Heller-

man responsible for his losses. Hellerman became worried

because DiLorenzo took Ostrer’s side. Dioguardi subse-

quently arbitrated the dispute to some extent, and arranged

for partial compensation to Ostrer to the sum of $25,000.

At trial Dioguardi called no witnesses and based his de-

fense primarily on cross-cxamination going to the lack

of credibility of the government’s major witnesses, who

were all accomplices, Ostrer did not testify but he did call

two witnesses whose testimony indicated that Ostrer had

been a ‘‘victim’’ of Hellerman’s machinations,

About ten days after trial, Dioguardi received a letter

from one of the jurors, Miss Genena Rush, a nurse’s aide

33

employed at Flower Fifth Avenue Hospital in New York

City. The letter was written on stationery bearing the

zodiac sign of Libra, and on one page the legend that it

was ‘‘the heavenly house under which I was born.’’ The

juror wrote of her clairvoyant powers which enabled her

to see that Dioguardi was basically a good person. She

stated her belief that he was guilty, ‘‘Your mistake your

guilty,’’ and questioned him about Hellerman, ‘‘Why you

let such a relationship exist between you and a man like

Hellerman?,’’ and called upon him to repent, ‘‘One word

appear before me repent. If you repent and run a clean

business it is the good within you that will save you, and

you will gain what you have lost.’’ Miss Rush stated that

I have eyes and ears that I can see things before it

happen. I can tell you about other and what they are

thinking and doing.

and that her eyes

are only partly open .... Unfortunate, a curse was

put upon them some years ago. I have some people

working on them.

The letter is reproduced in full in the margin. *

7™ Miss Rush’s letter reads as follows:

521 W 152 Street, New York, N.Y. 10031

February 8th—1973

Dear Mr. Dioguardi,

Under the situation and such circumstance T hope that I

have made the right decision. I talk to my friends Bertha and

her husband Olive about this, Olive agree that I write to you.

Bertha, however, was against it. Nevertheless, I felt I had to

write you. I cannot omit what I have seen. When I saw the

good within you and how hard your wife was trying; I prayed

about it. One word appear before me repent. If you repent

and run a clean business it is the good within you that will

save you, and you will gain what you have lost. Before T

continue T must explain something to you. I have eyes and

34

Dioguardi’s attorneys sent copies of the letter to seven

psychiatrists, all of whom responded (one in an affidavit)

ears that | can see things before it happen. I can tell you

about other and what they are thinking and doing. If I am

wrong about this it is the first time.

I would like to visit you. I would like to talk to you about

what appear before me. 1 would like to do so when my eyes

fully open. They are only partly open. | don’t know at the

present when they will open. Unfortunate, a curse was put

upon them some years ago. I have some people working on

them. Everything is being done that can be done. So we

will have to wait. As I stated I cannot omit what appear be-

fore me, when I was on the jury bench. You feel that this

is the end for you. However, it is not. Something appear

before me that I must do. It is the good within you that I

must use and within that good, you will gain what you have

lost. If, however, I am wrong it is the first time.

Why, you let such a relationship exist between you and a

man like Hellerman? When I think of the good that I saw

within you it does not add up. Where did Hellerman get those

fur coats? Does he have any for sail? Omit the question.

I really can't afford one, and if I probably be afraid to wear it.

Why persecute your wife? Your mistake your guilty then

take it out on her. The ordeal you put her through I wonder

how she survive through it. One word appear before me brave.

She is a brave girl. She love you. She never stop loving you

not a single moment. Tell her to please be careful. From

what I can see she is still in business. I suggest it is not wise

at*this time. I believe she is being watch.

That was a good lawyer you had. I entain to send him some

custom as soon as my eyes open.

Tell Ostrer I am praying for him.

Mr. Dioguardi, I want to ask a favor of you please.

I want you to look upon me as a woman and I look upon

you as a man and not white man and black woman. Olive

agree with me.

Let’s leave color out, OK.

I was told you will only have to serve one third of the time

given. So relax this is not the end. Soon you will be free.

When I call the Federal information center and the record

room yesterday they all know you. They all seem to have it

in for you. Its seated deep within them like a personal matter.

. Sin . ely,

Genena

35

to the effect that, in their opinion, what Miss Rush had

written indicated hallucinatory tendencies, symptoms of

possible psychosis, paranoia, and grandiosity, and in gen-

eral an inability to appreciate reality without fantasizing. *

The psychiatrists also pointed out that further psychiatric

analysis was needed before a diagnosis could be ventured

with any certainty, or before it could be said that Miss

Rush’s infirmities, whatever their nature and extent, might

have rendered her unable to comprehend the proceedings at

triel.* The psychiatrists were given no information about

The letter sheets were printed with the word ‘‘LIBRA’”’ and a pic-

ture of a woman with scales. On the last page of the letter, under

the picture, Miss Rush wrote, ‘‘The sign Libra is the heavenly

house of the zodiac under which I was born.’’ The letter was ad-

dressed to ‘‘Mr. John Dioguardi, Federal Correction Institution,

Dan Bury, Conn. 06813.”

8 The copy of the letter which Dioguardi’s attorneys used at first

was not the original from Jaror Rush. Rather it was a hand-

written copy which Dioguardi had made of the original and which

he had forwarded to them. Somewhere in transcribing the word

‘‘omit’’ was changed to ‘‘admit’’ in the fifth sentence of the first

paragraph and also in the ninth sentence of the second paragraph.

Thus ‘‘I cannot omit what I have seen . . .”’ became ‘‘I cannot

admit what I have seen .. .”” and, similarly, ‘‘I cannot omit what

appear before me . . .’” became “‘I cannot admit what appear be-

fore me....’’ Six of the seven psychiatrists (all except Dr. Port-

now) received their copy of the letter in this incorrect form. These

errors may have influenced their reading and subsequent analysis

of the letter, but we do not think significantly. The defendants’

contentions concerning the competency of Miss Rush rest as much

on the letter taken as a whole as on any particular sentences. While

not belittling its importance, we do not think that reliance on the

incorrect word ‘‘admit’’ was, as the government contended, ‘‘the

cornerstone of [the] various psychiatric opinions.”’

® The supporting letters of the psychiatrists and the affidavit of

Dr. Portnow need not be set out at length. Samples of their con-

clusions are as follows:

1.) Dr. Stanley L. Portnow (affidavit of April 2. 1973) :

[T]he letter makes a positive presumptive showing that . . .

the juror suffered from a chronic psychotie thought disorder

the juror or about the trial and the issues, and the court

had forbidden anyone to seek to interview her.

which so severed her relationship with reaiiiy that she was un-

able to exercise critical judgment or to function in an un-

biased manner in the evaluation of evidence produced at the

trial. Indeed, it would appear that her unsoundness of mind

was so overwhelming that she was subject to auditory and

visual hallucinations, delusions and a belief in her own omni-

potence.

The exact nature of the type of psychosis which the juror is

afflicted, can be further investigated. ... Such an investiga-

tion would entail clinical psychiatric interviews and, of par-

ticular importance, psychological testing. . . .

2.) Dr. Samuel C. Karlan (letter of March 15, 1973) :

It is clear from this letter that this patient is having imagi-

nations about what she can see and what she can do and these

are in the form of visual! hallucinations and apparently audi-

tory hallucinations. It is also clear from this letter that she

had these visions while she was on the jury.

It is therefore my opinion that the letter is evidence that

this patient underwent a psychotic episode while she was ou

the jury and while she wrote this letter, which is suggestive

of a schizophrenic mechanism and that she was not in contact

with reality.

3.) Dr. Robert W. Damino (letter of March 15, 1973) :

The contents of the letter written by Gemena (sic) Rush

indicate that she is substantially disturbed in reality relation-

ships . . . that she was having visual hallucinations . . . [and]

that this woman was making an identification with the ac-

[A]t the time she served on the jury she was utterly incapable

of thinking logically as to the evidence, and utterly incapable

of properly evaluating the evidence.

4.) Dr. Jerry C. Atkins (letter of March 16, 1973) :

My impression is judging from this letter Miss Rush would

have had great difficulty exercising sound judgment during

the trial mentioned in her letter. Her religious convictions

could be classified aS’ being ideas of grandiosity and further-

more there is evidence of auditory and visual halucinations

(sic) in her description of herself.

5.) Dr. John J. Vetter (letter of March 15, 1973) :

[T]here is clear cut evidence of mental disorder.... The

abnormal thinking processes, impairment of judgment, halluci-

37

On the basis of Miss Rush’s letter and the opinions of

the psychiatrists, Dioguardi and Ostrer moved pursuant

natory experience and delusional belief directly involving the

case at hand, would indicate an incapacity, by reason of mental

infirmity, to render efficient jury service, or to have functioned

efficiently as a juror in the case concerned.

6.) Dr. Arnold H. Zucker (letter of March 5, 1973) :

The writer is emotionally involved with Mr. Dioguardi, in

an intensive manner.

The writer is concerned with Mr. Dioguardi’s welfare and

fate.

The writer wishes to be helpful and supportive.

The writer believes: she possesses powers of clairvoyance and

feels impelled to act upon her revelations.

The writer experiences guilt about Mr. Dioguardi’s incar-

ceration. She is conwinced about his ‘‘bad’’ behavior (wrong-

doing, association with ‘‘a man like Hellerman’’) but ‘‘sees””

the ‘‘good’’ in him. Her responses are somewhat appropriate

in the context of her educational, cultural, and religious back-

ground. To alleviate her guilt feelings an ‘save’? Mr. Dio-

guardi, she urges him to ‘‘repent’’, mend his ways, and main-

I believe that the data suggests the following psychodiag-

nostic impressions, which require clinical confirmation (psy-

chiatric evaluation of the writer).

1. Above the culttural-religious beliefs, autistic (patholog-

ical fantasy preoccupation) frends are indicated . .. .

2. Paranoid trend's are significant. . . .

[M]y psychiatric impression is that of a highly paranoid,

autistically preoccupied (probably psychotic ) individual, who

has maintained fairly adequate external controls and function-

ing, but who may be decompensating due to the strong emo-

tions produced by her role in the trial.

) Dr. Donald M. Brough (letter of February 28, 1973) :

[T ]his letter was written consciously with every good inten-

tion on the part of Mrs. (sic) Rush in an effort to behelpful

to Mr. Dioguardi. Hiowever, . . . the writer was here showing

evidence of being Inallucinated, delusional and would prove

to be suffering from a Paranoid Condition.

Taking it in a far- less literal fashion, allowing the greatest

degree of latitude imterpreting what she wrote, so that it can

en ee Ee ee ee

38

to Rule 33, F.R.Crim.P., for a new trial or, in the alterna-

tive, for an evidentiary hearing on the competency of Miss

Rush as a juror. They asserted that an uncontroverted

showing of incompetency had been made out, in violation

of 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(4) and their constitutional rights. ”

Judge Edelstein, after hearing oral arguments and re-

ceiving briefs, denied the motion for a new trial and <

further investigation of the juror’s competency on Apri

12, 1973, and later filed a thorough and considered opinion

on July 18, 1973. He stated:

be taken as a somewhat picturesque, idiosyncratic expression

of her ideas, influenced by educational, cultural and religious

factors, I still would find important grounds for believing

that the letter shows that she was involved in this situation

in a very unreal and unusual way.

In my opinion it is most likely that she is, in fact, suffering

from a Paranoid Condition in which she has hallucinatory

experiences and delusional thinking.

Whatever the court may consider the proper steps to take

in regard to any other aspect of the case, it would be my hope

that further psychiatric examination would be gently encour-

aged upon her, and that she would be willing to cooperate.

#28 U.S.C. § 1865, which is part of the Jury Selection and

Service Act of 1968, P.L. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53, provides in relevant

part as follows:

(b) In making such determination [whether a juror is

qualified to serve] the chief judge of the district court, or

such other district court judge as the plan may provide, shall

deem any person qualified to serve on grand and petit juries

unless he...

(4) is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmity,

to render satisfactory jury service. .. .

The Act provides no guidelines, however, for what procedures are

to be followed where there is, after trial, discovery of possible

grounds for juror disqualification. However, see fn. 12, below. See

also ABA Standards Relating to Trial by Jury, Parts IT, V, and

Commentary (Approved Draft 1968).

39

Moreover, there was nothing in the demeanor of the

juror during voir dire, trial or deliberations to indicate

that she was anything but competent to serve on the

jury. On voir dire, the jurors were asked group ques-

tions in an effort to elicit from them their feelings

of bias or prejudice which would prevent them from

rendering a fair and impartial verdict. [footnote

omitted] In direct colloquy with me, the juror an-

swered directly and responsively, stating that she un-

derstood my questions and comments, and specifying

the particular ones which applied to her. Nothing in

her responses and demeanor indicated that her rea-

soning abilities or mental processes were deficient. In-

deed, her ability to recall my questions applicable to

her, conveyed the opposite impression. Likewise, during

the three weeks of trial and three days and nights of

deliberations, I did not notice anything unusual about

her. Nor was anything unusual concerning her brought

to my attention by either the attorneys or jurors.

Examination of the juror on the voir dire had disclosed

that she was then employed by Flower Fifth Avenue Hos-

pital as a patient attendant assisting the nurses and had

been so employed for four years. In answer to the court’s

question as to whether any questions or comments applied

to her, she stated that in 1944 she was employed by the

Navy Department in Cleveland as assistant to the foreman

in the cleaning department. Prior to her current hospital

employment she was a silk finisher in a cleaning shop in

the Bronx.

II.

A—Competency of Juror Rush -

It is well settled that only clear evidence of a juror’s in-

competence to understand the issues and to deliberate at

ad

eT eee nae

40

the time of his service requires setting aside a verdict. And

only strong evidence that it is likely that the juror suf-

fered from such incompetence during jury service will

justify an inquiry into whether such incompetence in fact

did exist. In our view the juror’s letter, and the essentially

horseback uninformed opinions of the psychiatrists regard-

ing the letter, fall considerably short of justifying any fur-

ther inquiry. Furthermore, the appellants have not cited

a single authority which supports a grant of their motion

on this record. Judge Edelstein was entirely correct in

denying the motion.

Reluctance to inquire into the state of mind of any juror

and into the conduct of the jurors during their delibera-

tions rests on sound reason." The rule against any inquiry

whatever recognizes exceptions only where there is clear

and incontrovertible evidence of incompetence shortly be-

fore or after jury service, clear evidence of some criminal

act, or evidence of some ‘‘objective fact’’ of internal im-

propriety. '* Even in the case of recent incompetence a hear-

™ See 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2349, 2352-2354 (McNaughton

rev., 1961). As the Supreme Court said in Stein v. New York, 346

U.S. 156, 178 (1953) :

Nor have the courts favored any public or private post-trial

inquisition of jurors as to how they reasoned, lest it operate

to intimidate, beset and harass them. This Court will not ac-

cept their own disclosure of forbidden quotient verdicts in

damage cases. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264. Nor of com-

promise in a criminal case whereby some jurors exchanged

their convictions on one issue in return for concession by other

jurors on another issue. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347.

**If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would

be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the

constant subject of public investigaton—to the destruction

of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.’’

McDonald v. Pless, [238 U.S. 264 (1915) ] at 267-268.

See 18 U.S.C. $4 245(b), 1503, 1504. See also 28 U.S.C.

§ 1867(f). Such exceptions as these whicl the law has condoned

to the privacy and sanctity of the jury refbct the need to preserve

41

ing will be had to establish that it must have existed during

jury service.

The strong policy against any post-verdict inquiry into

a juror’s state of mind was stated by this court regarding

an analogous situation in United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d

928, 950 (1961), cert. denied sub nom. Mittelman v. United

States, 368 U.S. 984 (1962) :

its impartiality. The quickfiess with which jury findings will be

set aside when there is proof of tampering or external influence,

and the severe penalties imposed on those attempt such interference,

parallel the reluctance of courts to inquire into jury deliberations

when a verdict is valid on its face. See Mattoc v. United States, 146

U.S. 140, 149-50 (1892). Such exceptions support rather than un-

dermine the rationale of the rule that possible internal abnormali-

ties in a jury will not be inquired into except ‘in the gravest and

most important cases.’’ McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269

(1915).

These considerations explain the one exception to the rule against

a jury impeaching its own verdict allowed in those instances when

the evidence offered of internal impropriety concerns ‘‘objective

facts.”’ This ‘‘distinction between what may and what may not

be established by the testimony of jurors to set aside a verdict”’

has been recognized by the Supreme Court. See Mattox v. United

States, supra, at 148-149. However, courts have invoked the excep-

tion and permitted inquiry into a jury's deliberation only when

there has been a strong showing of ‘‘objective’’ impropriety, such

as blood relation between juror and defendant or extraneous ma-

terial brought to the jurors attention during deliberations. As the

Supreme Court said in United States v. Reid, 53 US. 360, 366

(1851), ‘‘{C]ases might arise in which it would be impossible to

refuse [evidence of impropriety] without violating the plainest

principles of justice.’’ But ** [u]nquestionably such evidence ought

always to be received with great caution.”’ Nor has the Court seen

fit since then to relax its position, McDonald v. Pless, supra, at

269. See Rotondo v. Isthmian Steamship Co., 243 F.2d 581, 583

(2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 949-950

(2d Cir. 1961). cert, den. sub nom. Mittelman v. United States,

368 U.S. 984 (1962); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2349 (McNaughton

rev.. 1961). See also ABA Standards Relating to Trial by Jury,

Sec. 5.7; United States v. ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 812

(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 US. 906 (1971); and Judge

Friendly’s discussion in Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77 (2d

Cir. 1968), fn. 11, at 83-84. ;

42

There are many cogent reasons militating against

post-verdict inquiry into jurors’ motives for decision.

The jurors themselves ought not be subjected to ha-

rassment; the courts ought not be burdened with large

numbers of applications mostly without real merit;

the chances and temptations for tampering ought not

be increased ; verdicts ought not be made so uncertain.

We cited this language in Miller v. United States, 403

F.2d 77 (1968) where the court also emphasized, at page 82,

the importance of the dangers presented by inquiries that

go beyond objective facts: ‘‘inhibition of jury room delib-

erations, harassment of jurors, and increased incidence of

jury tampering.’’ See also Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.

156, 178 (1953); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268

(1915); and Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 147-151

(1892).

With respect to post-verdict evidence of possible juror

incomvetency during the trial, courts have refused to set

aside a verdict, or even to make further inquiry, unless

there be proof of an adjudication of insanity or mental in-

competence closely in advance of the time of jury ser-

vice. * Only when proof of this nature has been offered, or

proof of a closely contemporaneous and independent post-

trial adjudication of incompetency, * have courts conducted

13 See Anderson v. State, 54 Ariz. 387, 96 P.2d 281 (1939) ; Grand

Lodge A.O.U.W. of Ark. v. Wood, 113 Ark. 502, 168 S.W. 1070

(1914) ; Austin v. People, 106 Colo. 506, 107 P.2d 798 (1940);

Brown v. State, 219 Ark. 647, 243 S.W. 2d 938 (1951); Ex parte

Lovelady, 207 S.W. 2d 396 (Tex. Crim., 1947), cert. granted, 333

U.S. 867, cert. dism., 333 U.S. 897 (1948); Douthitt v. State, 182

Teun. 577, 188 S.W. 2d 555 (1945) ; State v. Buey, 104 Mont. 416,

66 P.2d 1049 (1937); Eastman Kodak Stores, Inc. vy. Summers,

277 S.W. 2d 476 (Kan. C.C.A. 1964).

4 See Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167 (1912), aff’g. Com-

monwealth v. Jordan, 207 Mass. 259, 93 N.E. 809 (1911) ; State v.

Camp, 110 W.Va. 444, 158 S.E. 664 (1931); Burik v. Dundee

a

43

hearings to determine whether the disability in fact affected

the juror at the time of trial.

But absent such substantial if not wholly conclusive evi-

dence of incompetency, courts have been unwilling to sub-

ject a juror to a hearing on his mental condition merely on

the allegations and opinions of a losing party. In Peterman

v. Indian Motorcycle Co., 216 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1954), the

plaintiff, shortly after judgment against him in a civil suit

for personal injury, moved for a new trial on the grounds

‘‘that certain information, discovered since the trial, dis-

closed the mental unfitness of the foreman of the jury,

whose condition, if it had been known .. ., would have b: 2n

a ground for disqualification.’”’ Judge Wyzanski heard

counsel on the motion and requested an offer of proof

from the plaintiff’s attorney.

The offer of proof was... that the juror in question,

because of his mental disturbance, has been receiving

disability compensation from the Veterans Bureau;

that he has difficulty in sleeping and concentrating;

that his memory is not good; that he has had depressed

periods during which he entertained the idea of suicide ;

that he has had to undergo treatment for anxiety re-

action to a psychic episode expressed by auditory hai-

lucinations; that he has been under the care of a psy-

chiatrist for an extended period, with little prospect of

an early overcoming of his difficulties. [Jd., at 293.]

s

Judge Wyzanski held that the offer of proof was inadequate

and denied the plaintiff’s motion.'* The Court of Appeals

for the First Cireuit agreed, stating that:

- Woolen Co., 66 N.J.L. 420, 49 A. 442 (1901) ; Iverson v. Prudential

Ins. Co. of Amer., 126 N.J.L. 280, 19 A.2d 214 (1941) ; State v.

Welty, 65 Wash. 244, 118 P. 9 (1911).

15Tt is not clear to what extent Judge Wyzanski treated the

plaintiff’s motion for a new trial in Peterman as also being a mo-

Re! 2S Stee Se

q

:

4

4

q

7

44

Considering the strong policy against the too-ready

impeachment of jury verdicts on the basis of such

after-thoughts suggested by a disappointed litigant, . . .

the trial judge cannot be held to have abused his dis-

cretion in declining to grant a new trial on this ground.

[Id.}

See also United States ex rel. Daverse v. Hohn, 198 F.2d

934 (3rd Cir. 1952).

In light of this legal background, we do not believe ap-

pellants made enough of a case to justify further inquiry

into the competence of Juror Rush. No evidence was of-

fered of any history of mental instability on the part of

Miss Rush, much less evidence of any adjudication of in-

sanity or incompetence. Indeed, what we do know of her

past, although it is little, reflects quite the contrary situa-

tion. She has held steady employment over the past four

years as a nurse’s aide at Flower Fifth Avenue Hospital,

and apparently had steady employment before that as well.

The trial judge, as noted above, found the juror alert and

responsive and he noted nothing unusual about her during

the three weeks of trial and three days and nights of de-

liberation. Although the opinions of experts are not to be

dismissed altogether, they were here of necessity formed in

a vacuum, based on one piece of evidence, and fall far

short of constituting the sort of ‘‘objective fact’’ which can

justify inquiry into the internal workings of the jury. The

fact that there is no evidence of harassment of Miss Rush

or solicitation of the letter does not render irrelevant the

policy considerations which forbid inquiry into the internal

workings of the jury absent objective evidence of impro-

priety. In another case a letter coul

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Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — OSTRERER V. UNITED STATES (Nos. CD-0053-74, 73-1631) | Frix