Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — OSTRERER V. UNITED STATES (Nos. CD-0053-74, 73-1631)
Supreme Court brief1973
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Table of Contents.
Opinions below 1
Jurisdiction 2
Questions presented 2
Constitutional provisions involved 4
Statutory provisions involved +
Statement of the case: The juror issue 5
Reasons for granting the writ 13
I. The decision below, denying a hearing on the
ground that no evidence was presented that Ju-
rer Rush had ever been formally adjudicated
insane, failed to take into account the major
changes that have occurred in the treatment of
the mentally ill over the past two decades—
changes that have virtually eliminated the use
of such formal adjudications 13
A. The lower court opinions 13
B. The trend away from formal adjudication
of insanity 15
il. The decision below, denying a hearing in a
case where the juror’s own letter revealed that
matters not in evidence ‘‘appear before [her]
on the jury bench,’’ is inconsistent with the tra-
ditional case law regulating the introduction of
extra-judicial information into the delibera-
tions of the jury 19
III. The decision below, allowing to stand the
prosecutor’s comment on the defendant’s failure
to present testimony, annihilates this Court’s
decision in Griffin v. California
& &
Conclusion
ii TABLE OF AUTHOBITIES CITED
Table of Authorities Cited.
Cases.
Bates v. Preble, 151 U.S. 149 (1894) 22n
Cole v. Mancusi, 429 F. 2d 61 (2d Cir. 1970) 31
Eastman Kodak Stores Inc. v. Summers, 377 S.W.
476 (Kansas C.C.A. 1964) 14n, 15n
Gafford v. Warden, 434 F. 2d 318 (10th Cir.
1970) 22n, 23n
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) 28, 30, 31, 32
Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) 23n
Miller v. United States, 403 F. 2d 77
(2d Cir. 1968) 24n, 25n
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) 21n
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) 27
Paz v. United States, 462 F. 2d 740
(5th Cir. 1972) 22n
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) 21n, 22n
United States v. Curiale, 414 F. 2d 744
(2d Cir. 1969) 30
United States v. Driscoll, 276 F. Supp. 333
(S.D. N.Y. 1967) 25n
United States v. Farries, 459 F. 2d 1057
(3d Cir. 1972) 33n
United States v. Flannery, 451 F. 2d 880
(1st Cir. 1971) 31, 32
United States v. Gray, 421 F. 2d 316
(5th Cir. 1970) 27n
United States v. Hart, 407 F. 2d 1087
(2d Cir. 1969) 30
POLES OE eR PALETTE IEA INS ARE A TIME ae TE LU mt
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED iil
United States v. Kum Seng Seo, 300 F. 2d 623
(3d Cir. 1962) 22n
United States ex rel. Leak v. Follette, 418 F. 2d 1266
(2d Cir. 1969) 30
United States v. Lipton, 467 F. 2d 1161
(2d Cir. 1972) 30
United States v. Marcus, 401 F. 2d 563
(2d Cir. 1968) 30
United States v. McKinney, 429 F. 2d 1019
(5th Cir. 1970) 20, 21
United States v. Nasta, 398 F. 2d 283
(2d Cir. 1968) 30
United States ex rel. Satz v. Mancusi, 414 F. 2d 90
(2d Cir. 1969) 30, 31
United States v. Schipani, 44 F.R.D. 461
(E.D. N.Y. 1968) 33n
United States v. Smart, 448 F. 2d 931
(2d Cir. 1971) 30
United States ex rel. Walls v. Mancusi, 406 F. 2d 505
(2d Cir. 1969)
STaTUTEs. —
United States Constitution
Fifth Amendment =
Sixth Amendment 4, 21n
28 U.S.C.
§ 1254 2
§ 1865 2, 4, 14
§ 1865(b) (4) 13
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sé pr Pain Gears ounces BAMA =o :
iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 4
Cal. Welf. and Institutions Code 5000 et seq. 16n
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act 16n
Mass. Gen. Laws, ec. 123, § 1 et seq. 16
New York Mental Hygiene Law § 1.01 et seq. 16n
MISCELLANEOUS.
Dahl and Leopold, eds., Mental Health and Urban
Social Policy (1968) 16n
Detri and Jarecki, Modern Psychiatric Treatment
(1971) 20n
Fairweather, Sanders, Maynard, Chessler, and Block,
Community Life for the Mentally Ill: An Alterna-
tive to Institutional Care (1969) 17n
Freedman and Kaplan, Comprehensive Textbook of
Psychiatry (1967) 20n, 21n
P. Friedman, The Mentally Handicapped Citizen and
Institutional Labor, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 567 (1974) 27n
Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Ju-
rors: A Constitutional Right, 39 Brooklyn
L.J. 290 (1972) 18n
Joost and McGarry, Massachusetts Mental Health
Code: Promise and Performance, 60 A.B.A.J. 95
(1974) 16n
Kolb, Bernard and Dobrenweind, eds., Urban Chal-
lenges to Psychiatry: The Case History of a Re-
sponse (1969) 16n
Marx, Test and Stein, Extrahospital Management of
Severe Mental Illness, 29 Arch. Gen. Psychiat.
505 (1973)
17n
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
McGee & Wolf, Patterns of Community Mental
Health Development in Major American Cities,
8 Community Mental Health J. 17 (1972)
Ozarin and Feldman, Implications for Health Service
Delivery: The Community Mental Health Centers
Amendments of 1970, 61 Am. J. Public Health 1780
(1971)
Ryan, ed., Distress in the City: Essays on the De-
sign and Administration of Urban Mental Health
Services (1969)
Stubblebine and Decker, Are Urban Mental Health
Centers Worth It? 127 Am. J. Psychiatry 908
(1971)
Weinman, Sanders, Kleiner and Wilson, Community
Based Treatment of the Chronic Psychotic, 6
Commun. Ment. Health J. 13 (1970)
American Bar Foundation, The Mentally Disabled
a
16n
17n
16n
16n
17n
and the Law (1971) 15, 17n
Developments in the Law—Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1193 (1974)
Report of the Administrative Board of the Judicial
Conference of the State of New York, App. F,
Table 8 (1974)
World Health Organization, Hospitalization of Men-
tal Patients (1955)
15n
17n
15n
NSA AY RR BAH I BET cas DPE NTO RR ElAe CEU
Supreme Court of the United States.
Octoser TEx, 1973.
No.
LOUIS OSTRER,
PETITIONER,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
RESPONDENT.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit.
Louis Ostrer petitions for a writ of certiorari to review
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Cireuit affirming his conviction and denying his
motion for a new trial.
Opinions Below.
The opinion of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York denying the motion for
new trial is as yet unreported and is found in Appendix 1,
infra. The opinion of the Court of Appeals, also not yet
reported, is found in Appendix 2, infra.
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Jurisdiction.
On January 26, 1973, defendant-petitioner, Louis Ostrer,
was convicted in the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Nw York after a three-week jury trial on
17 counts involving a complicated stock manipulation
scheme. Prior to sentencing, petitioner moved for a new
trial on the ground that one of his jurors was in-
competent, or, in the alternative, for an evidentiary hear-
ing, which motion was denied by the District Court on
April 12, 1973, on which date judgment of conviction was
entered, and petitioner was sentenced to 3 years imprison-
ment and a $55,000 fine. On appeal, his conviction and the
denial of the motion for new trial were affirmed in a judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit entered March 1, 1974. Upon timely application
for an extension of time in which to file a petition for writ
of certiorari, Mr. Justice Marshall extended the said filing
time to and including April 30, 1974. This Court has juris-
diction to review the judgment below under the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 1254.
Questions Presented.
1. Whether a post-verdict, unsolicited letter from a ju-
ror who says, infer alia, that she can ‘‘see things before
it happen’’ and that various things ‘‘appear before me
when I was on the jury bench’’ requires further inquiry
into whether the juror is ‘“‘incapable, by reason of men-
tal . . . infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service’? (28
U.S.C. § 1865), where seven psychiatrists have all agreed,
without contradiction, that the letter evidences hallucina-
tions, delusions and probable psychosis, and where the
government has proposed a hearing procedure that it ac-
knowledges would ‘‘provide maximum safeguards for the
jurors’ individual rights of privacy.”’
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2. Whether the dramatic shift away from formal ad-
judications of insanity in trextment of the mentally ill in
the last two decades, which has virtually eliminated use
of such adjudications, requires reversal of the decisions
below which relied on pre-1952 precedents in holding that
hearings are not required without a prior showing that the
juror had ever been formally adjudicated insane.
3. Whether the decision below denying a hearing in
a ezse where the juror’s own unsolicited letter revealed
that matters not in evidence ‘‘appear before [her] on the
jury bkench’’ and where uncontradicted psychiatric studies
of the letter indicate a likelihood that during the trial the
juror was probably suffering from delusions and hallucina-
tions, and where there is evidence on the record that the
juror was lucid-appearing on the surface and hence could
introduce delusional ‘‘facts’’ into the jury room, is incon-
sistent with the traditional case law regulating the intro-
duction of extra-judicial information into the deliberations
of the jury.
4. Whether this case be remanded for a hearing where
the lower courts based their refusal to hold a hearing into
the juror’s competence in part upon that juror’s indica-
tions on pre-trial voir dire that she held a responsible posi-
tion as a ‘‘patient attendant’’ in a metropolitan hospital,
where it now appears that the juror may, in fact, have been
a patient at the hospital who worked part time as a patient-
attendant, rather than an outside employee.
5. Whether it violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment
privilege against :If-incrimination for the prosecutor to
coniment in his su.imation to the jury that ‘‘it is a terribly
significant factor’’ that the testimony of the government’s
chief witness as to the defendant’s guilty scienfer remains
uncontradicted beeause the defense put no witness on the
stand with respect to that point, where that testimony im-
he a
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4
volved a meeting between the government witness and the
defendant concerning which the defendant himself was the
only available witness.
Constitutional Provisions Involved.
Unitrep States Constitution.
AMENDMENT 5.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
AMENDMENT 6.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjov the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury cf
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously as-
certained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.
Statutory Provisions Involved.
28 U.S.C. § 1865 (Jury Setection anp Service Act or 1968,
P.L. 90-274, 82 Srar. 53):
SETA
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(b) In making such determination [whether a juror is
qualified to serve] the chief judge of the district court, or
such other district court judge as the plan may provide,
shall deem any person qualified to serve on gunn and petit
juries unless he .
(4) is ineapable, by reason of mentai or physical
infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service. ...
Statement of The Case: the Juror Issue, *
The facets giving rise to the juror issue in this case are un-
disputed. Thirteen days after the jury returned a Verdict of
guilty, one of the defendants received an unsolicited and bi-
zarre letter from one of the jurors. In her letter, the*juror, a
Miss Genena Rush, claimed to ‘‘ have eves and ears that I can
see things before it happen.’’ She said that she could ‘‘tell
you about other and what they are thinking and -doing.”’
She indicated a desire to ‘‘visit’’ the defendant ‘‘when my
eyes fully open,’’ but she did not ‘‘know at the present
when they will open,’’ since ‘‘a curse was put upon them
some years ago.’’ She wanted to talk to the defendant
‘*about what appear before me. . . .’’ She could ‘‘not omit
what appear before me, when I was on the jury bench.’’
She assured the defendant that he did not have to worry
about having been convicted:
‘You feel that this is the end for you. However,
it is not. Something appear before me that I must do.
It is the good within you that I must use and within
that good, vou will gain what you have lost. If, how-
* The facts relating to the prosecutor’s comment are incorpo-
rated into part III of this petition, infra at p. 28.
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ever, I am wrong it is the first time. ... I was told you
will only have to serve one third of the time given.
So relax this is not the end. Soon you will be free.’’!
The letter included various references to the defendant’s
wife, whom the juror apparently claimed to ‘‘see’’ (al-
though it is uncontested that the defendant’s wife never
once appeared at the trial) :
‘“Why persecute your wife? Your mistake your
guilty then take it out on her. The ordeal you put her
through I wonder how she survive through it. One
word appear before me brave. She is a brave girl. She
love you. She never stop loving you not a single
moment. Tell her to please be careful. From what I
can see she is still in business. I suggest it is not wise
at this time. I believe she is being watch.’’?
The letter also included some sexual and racial allusions:
‘*T want you to look upon me as a woman and I look upon
you as a man and not white man and black woman. Olive
agree with me. Let’s leave color out, OK.”’’
The entire letter is reproduced in Judge Feinberg’s dis-
sent. Appendix 2, at pp. 50-52.
When this letter was brought to the attention of the
trial court, his response was to order that the juror not
be contacted by anybody or communicated with by any-
body in any possible way, directly or indirectly. ‘‘[BJoth
defense and government counsel apparently interpreted
the order as inhibiting any investigation of the juror, even
apart from talking to her.’’ Judge Feinberg’s dissent, at
1 It is not clear who—if anyone—‘‘told’’ this to Miss Rush, or
whether Miss Rush conveyed this item—or other items—of mis-
information to the other jurors.
* There is no basis in fact for these conclusions concerning the
defendant's wife.
Deere OO A ENE eR Saw HT a
7
A, p. 54. Forbidden from undertaking further investigation
of the juror, defense counsel did the next best thing: they re-
tained the professional services of seven expert psychiatrists
to analyze the letter. As the Court of Appeals acknowledged,
‘‘all’’? of these psychiatrists—who were Board certified
and whose credentials were not disputed—‘‘responded .. .
to the effect that, in their opinion, what Miss Rush had
written indicated hallucinatory tendencies, symptoms of
possible psychosis, paranoia, and grandiosity, and in gen-
eral an inability to appreciate reality without fantasizing.’’
Appendix 2, at p. 35. The conclusions of several of these
experts are excerpted below.
Dr. Stanley Portnow, former chief forensic psychiatrist
at Bellevue Hospital, submitted an affidavit which included
the following:
‘‘The letter is typical of those written by paranoid
psychotic individuals suffering from a schizophrenic
thought disorder found in great abundance in mental
hospitals throughout the country. [It] is replete with
psychopathology so blatant that one need not make
a careful dissection of it in order to conclude that the
juror was possessed of a substantially impaired abili-
ty to exercise judgment in the evaluation of evidence
and in following the requirements of law as given to
her by the instructions of a Judge.
‘‘Perhaps the most significant statement in the let-
ter concerning the juror’s state of mind during the
course of the trial is as follows: ‘As I stated I can-
not admit what appear before me, when I was on the
jury bench.’ We have here an admission that the juror
visually hallucinated during the course of the trial.’’
‘*People who suffer from visual hallucinations are
psychotic, that is, they are detached from reality and
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are unable to exercise critical judgment normally at-
tributable to the average person. The juror goes on
to reveal that her visions compel her to act in certain
ways: ‘Something appear before me that I must do.’
‘It is my professional opinion, based upon a care-
ful analysis of the letter, that the letter makes a posi-
tive presumptive showing that, at the time of the trial,
the juror suffered from a chronic psychotic thought
disorder which so severed her relationship with reali-
ty that she was unable to exercise critical judgment
or to function in an unbiased manner in the evaluation
of evidence produced ai the trial. Indeed, it would ap-
pear that her unsoundness of mind was so overwhelm-
ing that she was subject to auditory and visual hal-
lucinations, delusions and a belief in her own omni-
potence.
‘‘[T]he juror is, based on the evidence produced in
this letter, suffering from a psychotic disorder and
is a woman of unsound mind.
“‘Tt is my professional opinion that the letter in
question is positive presumptive evidence’ that the ju-
ror was psychotic at the time she wrote it and for some
time prior thereto, including the period of the trial.’”
(Emphasis added)
Dr. Robert Da:uino, the Medical Director of the Family
Court Mental Health Clinic of Nassau County, concluded
that:
9
‘‘The contents of the letter ... clearly indicate that
she was having visual hallucinations. ... [A]t the time
that she served on the jury she was utterly incapable
of thinking logically as to the evidence, and utterly
incapable of properly evaluating the evidence.’’
Dr. Jerry Atkins, associate attending psychiatrist at St.
Vincent’s Hospital, concluded that there is evidence in the
letter of ‘‘auditory and visual hallucinations’’ and that
Miss Rush ‘‘would have had great difficulty exercising
sound judgment during the trial mentioned in her letter.’’
Dr. John Vetter concluded that:
‘*Examination of the content of this letter reveals
clear cut evidence of mental disorder in the writer in
the form of repeated references to hallucinatory ex-
periences, with one specific reference to such an ex-
perience while serving as a juror at the trial. There is
also clear cut evidence of delusional thinking with
ideas of persecution and of being observed.
‘‘The abnormal thinking processes, impairment of
judgment, hallucinatory experience and delusional be-
lief directly involving the case at hand, would indicate
an incapacity, by reason of mental infirmity, to render
efficient jury service, or to have functioned efficiently
as a juror in the case concerned.’’ ;
Dr. Donald Brough concluded that:
=
‘*TIn my opinion it is most likely that she is, in fact;
suffering from a Paranoid Condition in which she has
hallucinatory experiences and delusional thinking.’’
10
Dr. Samuel Karlan concluded that:
“‘It is clear from this letter that this patient is
having imaginations about what she can see and what
she can do and these are in the form of visual hallu-
cinations and apparently auditory hallucinations. It
is also clear from this letter that she had these visions
while she was on the jury.’’
‘*It is therefore my opinion that the letter is evi-
dence that this patient underwent a psychotic episode
while she was on the jury and while she wrote this
letter, which is suggestive of a schizophrenic mecha-
nism and that she was not in contact with reality.’’
The District Court, without in any way disputing the
uncontradicted expert evidence of these psychiatrists, con-
cluded that the defendant had not made a showing sufficient
to warrant a hearing of any kind. It held that no hearing
is required unless a juror had been formally ‘‘adjudged
mentally incompetent’’ in a ‘‘separate and unrelated pro-
ceeding.’’ The District Court denied a hearing despite the
Government’s expressed acknowledgment that a hearing—
if conducted according to a procedure suggested by the
Government—‘‘ would provide maximum safeguards for the
juror’s individual rights of privacy.’’ See fn. 25, infra.
The majority of the Court of Appeals, in a two-to-one de-
cision, affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that
a hearing would be required ‘‘only’’ when ‘‘there be proof
of an adjudication of insanity or mental incompetence.
993
3 It is, of course, possible—indeed very likely—that Miss Rush
may, in fact, have been adjudicated insane or mentally ineom-
petent in the recent past. In light of the district court’s prohibi-
tion on investigating the juror, it cannot be assumed—for pur-
poses of deciding this case—that Miss Rush had not been certified.
Nor can it be assumed—as both lower courts did—that she is cur-
rently employed at a hospital. Indeed, her own statement on voir
11
Judge Feinberg ‘‘emphatically’’ dissented from the
Court of Appeals affirmance of the District Court’s deci-
sion. Characterizing the letter as ‘‘bizzare’’ and ‘‘stagger-
ing in its implications,’’ he observed that ‘‘[nlo special
training is needed to appreciate that this juror seems to
believe she is clairvoyant and can see things that may not,
or could not, be apparent to others.’’ Indeed, Judge Fein-
berg points to at least one thing that Miss Rush ‘‘saw”’
which others could not see: ‘‘Although Dioguardi’s wife
was never in the courtroom, the juror somehow knows
that Mrs. Dioguardi ‘is a brave girl’ and ‘is still in busi-
ness,’ but is being watched.’’ Moreover Judge Feinberg
pointed out that this is a case where there was expert evi-
dence by seven psychiatrists with extensive special train-
ing—evidence ‘‘uncontradicted on the record before us’’—
that confirmed what the letter itself strongly suggests:
that Miss Rush was suffering from ‘‘a seriously disabling
thought disorder which in their opinion would have im-
paired mental functioning during the trial and her abili-
ty to judge the case intelligently.’’
Judge Feinberg argued that ‘‘if juror Rush actually did
believe she was clairvoyant in this way’’—a conclusion that
this Court must accept on the record of this case—then it
is clear that:‘‘she could not fairly try the guilt or innocence
of any man’’:
... It seems obvious to me that a ‘‘clairvoyant’’ juror
might honestly ‘‘see’’ a defendant’s guilt despite the
lack of evidence because she can see into the defend-
ant’s mind. Or conversely, she might for the same
reason divine a defendant’s innocence, in the face of
dire that she is ‘‘a patient attendant’’ at a hospital with a large
psychiatric department is entirely consistent with the conelusion
that she may currently be a mental patient working part time as
a patient-attendant. See infra at pp. 25-26.
12
overwhelming proof of guilt. A person who was
known to regard herself as clairvoyant would certainly
not be allowed on a jury in the first place. United
States v. Silverman, 449 F. 2d 1341, 1344 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. U.S. 918 (1972); United States
v. Benson, 31 Fed, 896, 900 (D. Cal. 1887). Such a
woman would clearly be ‘‘incapable, by reason of men-
tal . . . infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service
..”? under 28 U.S.C. 1865(b) (4). Cf. Jorgensen v.
York Ice Machinery Corp., 160 F. 2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947). Moreover, the in-
capacity on such a ground of even one juror would
poison the verdict regardless of the competency of the
remaining 11. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 366
(1966) (per curiam); United States v. Rattenni, 480
F, 2d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1973).
Judge Feinberg concluded that the ‘‘combined effect of
the uncontradicted record [of the seven psychiatrists’ con-
clusions that the juror was psychotic] and the apparently
intended scope of the judge’s order [not to conduct any in-
vestigation of the juror] requires a remand for a further
hearing.’’ He disputed the majority’s contention that a
remand would open ‘‘a Pandora’s box’’ of challenges to
jury verdicts, pointing to the wholly unsolicited nature of
this bizzare letter and the possibility of further investiga-
tion short of compelled examination of the juror.‘
4‘*The letter which forms the basis of the present attack on the
verdict below was, as I have stressed, unasked for, and not the
product of a fishing expedition. Moreover, an inquiry into com-
petence need not entail a probe of jury discussions. I have already
mentioned such alternative possibilities of enlarging the record
as cross-examination of appellant’s witnesses and testimony by
government experts. Counsel may also develop evidence by in-
vestigating the juror’s background or by persuading her to un-
dergo a voluntary mental examination.’’ Appendix 2 at p. 56.
13
Cireuit Judge Mansfield joined Judge Feinberg in dis-
senting from the Court of Appeals denial of rehearing en
banc,
Reasons for Granting the Writ.
I, Tue Deciston BeLow, Denyine a HEARING ON THE GROUND
tHat No EvipeNnce WAS PRESENTED THAT JUROR RusH HAD
Ever BEEN FormMa.tLty ApbgvupIcATED INSANE, FAILED TO
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE MaJor CHANGES THAT HAVE Oc-
CURRED IN THE TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL OVER THE
Past Two Decapes—CHANGES THAT HAVE VIRTUALLY
ELIMINATED THE USE oF stuCH ForMAL ADJUDICATIONS.
The decisions of the lower courts in this case were based
on the anachronistic assumption that only persons who
have been formally adjudicated as insane are disqualified
from jury service under the ‘‘mental . . . infirmity’’ pro-
vision of 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (b)(4). This assumption reflects
an outdated view of the diminishing role of formal adjudi-
cations of insanity in the treatment of the mentally ill.
Over the past decade, formal adjudications of insanity
have virtually disappeared and have been replaced by in-
formal and voluntary treatment for the mentally ill. The
mentally ill persons who are now treated informally and
voluntarily are no more competent to serve on juries than
were the mentally ill who have been adjudicated insane in
past decades. Accordingly, formal adjudication of insani-
ty can no longer be regarded as the benchmark of disquali-
fication from jury service.
A. The Lower Court Opinions.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the District Court’s
denial of petitioner’s motion without a hearing, summarized
the law on which it. was relying in the following terms:
14
‘* .. courts have refused to set aside a verdict, or
even to make further inquiry, unless there be proof
of an adjudicatior. of insanity or mental incompetence
closely in advance of the time of jury service. Only
when proof of this nature has been offered, or proof
of a closely contemporaneous and independent post-
trial adjudication of incompetency, have courts con-
ducted hearings to determine whether the disability in
fact affected the juror at the time of trial.’’
The District Court likewise concluded that a hearing would
be required only in situations where there had been a for-
mal ‘‘adjudication of incompetency, without a restoration
to competency. .. .’’ Absent an ‘‘adjudication of incom-
petency,’’ the judge said, the courts are justified in refus-
ing to hold an evidentiary hearing. The decisions of both
lower courts, therefore, were explictly premised on the as-
sumption that the mental infirmity disqualification of 28
U.S.C. § 1865 applied only to mentally ill persons who have
been formally adjudicated as ‘‘insane’’ or ‘‘incompetent”’
and that a convicted defendant may not obtain a new trial
if he discovers shortly after the verdict that one (or pre-
sutnably several) of his jurors were mentally ill, so long
as they were never formally adjudicated as insane.
In support of this view of the law, the Court of Appeals
cited 13 cases for the proposition that evidentiary hearings
are properly denied on a claim of juror incompetency when
there is no showing that there had been a formal adjudica-
tion of insanity; every single one of those decisions was
rendered before the year 1952°—the approximate begin-
5 The Court of Appeals did cite one 1964 case, Kastman Kodak
Stores Inc. v. Summers, 377 S.W. 476 (Kansas ©.C.A.). But it
miscited the case: in Kastman the challenged juror had been ‘‘ad-
judicated to be a person of unsound mind’’ some 40 years prior
to his service on the jury. On the basis of this fact alone, ‘‘the
15
ning of the trend away from formal adjudications of in-
sanity. In light of the dramatic developments, to be sum-
marized below, these cases—and the doctrine for which
they were relied on by the lower courts—can no longer be
regarded as good law.
B. The Trend Away from Formal Adjudication
of Insanity.
In 1949, nearly 90 per cent of all admissions to mental
hospitals were by means of certifications of insanity (or
other comparable ‘‘involuntary’’ proceedings) ; only about
10 per cent of mental hospital admissions were informal
or voluntary.* By 1972—the last year for which there
are reliable statistics—these figures had shifted dramati-
cally : only 44 per cent of all admissions were by formal cer-
tification ; 54 per cent were voluntary or non-protesting ad-
missions.’ In certain urban centers—such as New York,
Court, on its own motion, held a hearing... .’’ At that hearing
the testimony established that the juror ‘‘operated a farm, bought
and sold livestock, transacted other farm business, and appeared
to be normal. Dr. V. P. Dryer, the juror’s physician for many
years, said he had treated Crutchfield for epilepsy but believed he
was of sound mind.’’ It was on the basis of that testimony—eli-
cited at a hearing—that a new trial was denied. 7d. at 481.
® World Health Organization, Hospitalization of Mental Patients
(1955), cited in American Bar Foundation, The Mentally Disabled
and the Law, 17, n. 8 (rev. ed. S. Brakel and R. Rock, eds. 1971).
7 During 1972, state and county mental hospitals admitted 403,
924 patients: 41.8 per cent (169,032) were involuntarily commit-
ted, 1.5 per cent (6,190) were transferees from prisons, 2.3 per
cent were admitted after a finding of incompetency to stand trial,
and 54.4 per cent were admitted on a voluntary (196,346) or non-
protesting (23,095) basis. Letter from National Institute of Men-
tal Health to Harvard Law Review, April 5, 1974 (Enclosure A),
cited in Developments in the Law—Civil Commitment of the Men-
tally Til, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, n. 3 (1974) (in press).
16
where this case occurred—the shift has been even more
dramatic.“ In San Francisco, for example, during the five-
year period between 1964 and 1969, the number of formal
insanity commitments dropped by about 96 per cent (from
2,882 to 108).° This dramatic shift—characterized in the
American Journal of Psychiatry as the ‘‘virtual disap-
pearance of commitment except for a handful of patients’’
—resulted from a decision to reorganize the mental serv-
ices of that city from a hospital-based system to a com-
munity center-based system. This process is being carried
on throughout the United States, with equally dramatic
reductions in formal commitments and adjudications."
Adjudications of incompetency are also in the process
of disappearing. During the 1972-1973 judicial year only 113
incompetency proceedings were initiated in all of New York
"See generally McGee and Wolf, Patterns of Community Men-
tal Health Development in Major American Cities, 8 Community
Mental Health J. 17 (1972); Kolb, Bernard, and Dobrenweind,
eds., Urban Challenges to Psychiatry: The Case History of a Re-
sponse (1969); Dahl and Leopold, eds.. Mental Health and Urban
Social Policy (1968); Ryan, ed., Distress in the Cit@: Essays on
the Design and Administration of Urban Mental Health Services
(1969).
* Stubblebine and Decker, Arc Urban Mental Health Centers
Worth It? 127 Am. J. Phychiatry 908,910 (1971).
Td.
™ See ¢g., Joost and McGarry, Massachusetts Mental Health
Code: Promise and Performance, 60 A.B.A.J. 95 (1974), re-
porting that the percentage of voluntary admissions to state hos-
pitals rose from 27 per cent in 1971 to 77 per cent in 1972, follow-
ing a comprehensive revision of that state’s mental! health laws;
see Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 123, § 1 et seq. See also Cal. Welf. and
Institutions Code, 5000 et seq. (The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act,
effective July 1. 1969) and the New York Mental Hygiene Law
§ 1.01 et seq. (McKinney Supp.) (enacted 1972 and effective Jan-
uary 1, 1973) as recent examples of complete recodification and re-
form of statutes regarding mental illness.
Pe es -. e
17
State; in New York County—where this trial oceurred—
there was but one single incompetency case brought dur-
ing that year. All the authorities agree that there has
been a marked trend away from formal adjudications of
insanity, from involuntary commitment to mental hospi-
tals, and from adjudications of incompetency. ™
The reason for this shift has not been a reduction in the
incidence of serious mental illness; indeed, there is no in-
dication that the number of seriously mentally ill persons
has significantly decreased over the past two decades."* The
mental patients who are now being treated voluntarily in
community-based programs without certification or com-
mitment are—on the whole—no less seriously mentally ill
than were those patients who used to be formally certified
and involuntarily committed.” It is undisputed that hun-
dreds of thousands of extremely iientally ill patients are
now being treated on an informal and non-certified basis.
These seriously ill patients—many of whom are grossly
psychotic and actively hallucinatory—are no more com-
* Bronx and Richmond Counties reported no incompetency
cases, Kings County reported 15, and Queens County 17. Report
of the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference of the
State of New York, App. F., Table 8 (1974).
8 See generally, American Bar Foundation, 77. Mentally Dis-
abled and the Law, 1-65 (rev. ed. 1971); Fairweather, Sanders,
Maynard, Chessler, and Block, Community Life for the Mentally
Ill: An Alternative to Institutional Care (1969).
The demand for services has, in fact, increased. See. ¢.g.,
Ozarin and Feldman, ‘‘Implications for Health Service Delivery :
The Community Mental Health Centers Amendments of 1970."’
61 Am. J. Public Health 1780 (1971).
See ¢.g., Marx, Test and Stein, ‘‘Extrahospital Management
of Severe Mental Illness,’ 29 Arch. Gen. Psychiat. 505 (1973) ;
Weinman, Sanders, Kleiner, and Wilson.. ‘‘Community Based
Treatment of the Chronic Psychotic,’’ 6 Commun. Ment. Health J.
13 (1970).
18
petent to serve on juries than were the certified inmates of
mental hospitals several decades ago. The reason that this
generation of psychotic mentally ill patients have not been
certified or committed bears no relation to their competency
to serve as jurors.’"* Improvenients in the legal status of
the mentally ill should not inure to the disadvantage of
criminal defendants. Those legislatures that have voted
to eliminate—or reduce the frequency of—adjudications of
insanity never contemplated that formerly certified men-
tally ill persons would now become eligible for jury serv-
ice. Yet, under the principles of law relied on by the lower
courts iu this case, the presence of an actively hallucinatory
psychotic—or even several—on a jury does not deny a de-
fendant his constitutional and statutory rights unless that
psychotic is among the rare group that has been adjudi-
cated or certified 2s insane, or unless his insanity has called
itself to the attention of counsel or the trial judge during
the voir dire.™
There is simply no basis in fact—or in law—for making
a determination of jury disqualification turn on formal
16 The handful of mentally ill persons who are currently ‘‘certi-
fied’ or ‘‘adjudicated’’ insane or incompetent are probably not
more seriously mentally ill than those who are not currently cer-
tified. They are more likely to be wealthy (and thus the object
of guardianship proceedings), involved in crime (and thus found
incompetent to stand trial, or not guilty by reason of insanity)
or live in areas where certification is more routinely employed than
in other areas.
It is significant that this case grows out of the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, where extremely limited voir dires are con-
ducted by the judge and not by counsel. This is unlike the practice
in many jurisdictions where defense counsel may question prospec-
tive jurors directly. The Second Circuit practice makes it far
more difficult to ferret out the existence of mental illness among
potential jurors. See, Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir
Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional Right, 39 Brooklyn L.J. 290
(1972).
ST ae -
Ae ee a eer,
19
adjudications of insanity. The time has now come for this
Court authoritatively to reject the approach relied on by
the lower courts, and to substitute criteria for jury dis-
qualification that are more realistically related to the ap-
propriate qualifications for serving on a federal jury.
This case provides this Court with a suitable context in
which to perform this function: it need not decide any
factual issues; it need only remand the case to the lower
courts for a hearing and for a reconsideration of the ap-
propriate standards; in light of the development in mental
health law and practices over the past several decades. ™*
Nor would such a remand open up a ‘‘Pandora’s Box,”’ as
the District Court feared. The wholly unsolicited nature
of the letter at issme here dramatically distinguishes this
ease from the run of cases where disappointed litigants
might seek to engage in fishing expeditions concerning the
competency of jurors. See Judge Feinberg’s dissent, Ap-
pendix 2 at p. 56.
II. Tue Decisiox Berow, Dexyrxc a Hearrne rs a Case
WHERE THE JcROR’s Own Letrer REVEALED THAT MaTTERS
Nor ry Evivence ‘‘appear BEFORE [HER] ON THE JURY
BENCH,”’ Is INCONSISTENT WITH THE TRADITIONAL CasE
Law Recviatixnc tHe Ixtropuction or Extra-Jvpicia.
INFORMATION INTO THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE JURY.
A cardinal principle underlying our system of trial by
jury is that:
‘while the jury may leaven its deliberations with its
wisdom and experience, in doing so it must not bring
extra facts into the jury room.... To the greatest
extent possible all factual [material] must pass through
the judicial sieve, where the fundamental guarantees
The limited scope of such an evidentiary hearing is discussed
at pp. 23-24, infra.
eK OE SE te ey
20
of procedural law protect the rights of those accused
of crime.’’ United States v. McKinney, 429 F. 2d 1019,
1023 (Sth Cir. 1970).
It is undisputed on the record of this case, that juror
Rush believed she saw, heard, or knew various matters
‘‘while [she] was on the jury bench’’ that were not in evi-
dence—and were indeed not true. She saw that the de-
fendant was ‘‘persecut[ing] your wife’’ and ‘‘tak[ing] it
out on her’’; that his wife ‘‘is still in business’’; that she
is trying ‘‘hard’’; but that ‘‘she is being watch.’’ (The
wife never appeared in the courtroom.) Juror Rush also
saw what other people ‘‘are thinking and doing.’’ She was
told—by whom or what we do not know—that ‘‘you will
only have to serve one-third of the time given’’ and that
**soon you will be free.’’ Perhaps most ominously, ‘‘some-
thing appear before me that I must do.’’ What that some-
thing was we do not know; but it is not unreasonable to as-
sume that whatever it was, it told her that she must vote
to convict the defendant so that he may ‘‘repent.’’ (‘‘Re-
pent’’ was another word that ‘‘appear before me.’’)
There is also undisputed psychiatric evidence in this
case—which, absent a hearing or government affidavits,
must be taken as true—that what the juror saw and heard
were ‘‘hallucinations’’ and ‘‘delusions,’’ and it is univer-
sally aceepted in the psychiatric literature that ‘‘by defini-
tion delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by
reasoning. . . ,”’’® and that ‘‘hallucinations may absorb
much or all of the patient’s attention and may motivate
his behavior to a considerable extent.’’ *
1 Freedman and Kaplan, Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry
(1967), chapter by Lehmann, ‘‘Schizophrenia: Clinical Features,’’
at 623.
2° Freedman and Kaplan, Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry
(1967), chapter by Lehmann, ‘‘Schizophrenia: Clinical Features,
at 623. See also Detri and Jarecki, Modern Psychiatric Treatment
ee
é
woe Oe GM ARES Sey am
21
A juror who brings into the jury room not only a mind
incapable of reasoning on the basis of the evidence pre-
sented ‘‘through the judicial sieve,’’ United States v. Mc-
Kinney, supra, but a mind which purports to have knowl-
edge learned from sources other than those appearing at the
trial, poses the danger not only of depriving the defendant
of one in twelve competent jurors,’ but the further danger
that other jurors might be infected by the delusional juror’s
presentation in the jury room of ‘‘facts,’’ either about the
case or about the defendant, which are false or inadmis-
sible.
Courts have generally required hearings in cases where
extra-judicial facts are shown to have crept into the jury
room, and where such material may have been communi-
(1971), at 414 (‘‘[the patient] may . . . exhibit illusive pseudo-
recognition, misidentifying relative strangers . . . as persons he has
known in the past.”’) and at 117 (‘‘hallucinations may occur even
while [the patient] appears fully awake and increase to the point
where they dominate his entire subjective experience and gover:
all his waking behavior.’’); Freedman and Kaplan, id., chapter
by Lin, ‘‘Clinical Manifestations of Psychiatric Disorders,”’ at
565 (‘‘A hallucination is . . . an internal psychological event . . .
mistakenly attributed to an external source.’’).
2! Of course, even if eleven out of twelve jurors are competent,
a defendant has been deprived of his Sixth Amendment rights to
a fair jury trial. This would even be true in a jurisdiction which
allows convictions by a less than unanimous vote. Parker v. Glad-
den, 385 ae 363, 366 (1966).
*2 Courts have been extremely careful to preserve the integrity
of the ‘‘judicial sieve.’’ See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363
(1966) (court bailiff made remarks to two jurors which were de-
rogatory to the accused; held, such communications violated the
commands of the Sixth Amendment relating to trial by an impar-
tial jury and the right of confrontation); Remmer v. United
States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (during trial a person unnamed
had communicated with a juror a remark that he could profit by
bringing in a verdict favorable to the defendant: held, ‘‘[i]n a
criminal case, any private communication ... with a juror...
aa
eels Ohad.
neg = Oe ee eT ee rey
Ayes ia Mh bade
ata
Se AO ene te as
22
cated to one or more jurors, and where such communication
could not be assumed to be harmless to the defendant.**
In order to determine whether or not juror Rush did in-
deed make any such delusional ‘‘factual’’ communications
to the jurors, one would not have to delve into the thought
about the matter pending before the jury is . . . deemed presump-
tively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the
court and the instructions and directions of the court made dur-
ing the trial. . . ."’) ; Bates v. Preble, 151 U.S. 149 (1894) (reversi-
ble error for trial judge to allow an entire book into the jury room
without sealing off the pages not admitted into evidence) ; United
States v. Kum Seng Seo, 300 F. 2d 623 (3d Cir. 1962) (trial court
permitted jurors to testify that a member of the jury had brought
a newspaper article into the jury room and that the article had
been passed around the room and discussed by some of the jurors) ;
Paz v. United States, 462 F. 2d 740, 745, 746 (Sth Cir. 1972) (at-
torneys and judge discovered during tria! in Jury room two books
about narcoties traffic; Court ordered hearing into availability of
books to jurors, the extent of their use, and ‘‘such other matters
as may bear on the issue of the reasonable possibility of whether
they affected the verdict’’); Gafford v. Warden, 434 F. 2d 318
(10th Cir. 1970) (one juror went outside the evidence and checked
certain facts which were relevant to a second degree murder case,
such as the time a late show ended, and the time a certain gas
station closed; Court reversed for a hearing because ‘‘[w]e have
nothing before us upon which we can determine whether the jury
did receive and consider evidence from e<trajudicial sources. . . .
Taken at face value the [juror’s] affidavi' [attached to the motion
for new trial] shows at the very least the possibility that the jurors
considered facts which did not emanate from the witness stand.’’)
*3 The standard usually enunciated in the cases is that a new
trial is required if there was a ‘‘reasonable possibility’’ that the
juror’s condition affected the verdict. The application of this
standard does not require an inquiry in‘® whether the condition
figures in the verdict, or actually influenced it; the court simply
has to decide whether, given the nature 9f the condition and the
nature of its manifestation, it can be said that the condition rea-
sonably would not be expected to affect the verdict. This same
standard applies in deciding when any ‘regularity has infected
a jury’s verdict. Remmer v. United Stats, 347 U.S. 227 (1954):
Paz v. United States, 462 F. 2d 740, 746 (5th Cir. 1972) ; Bates v.
Preble, 151 U.S. 149 (1894).
23
processes or deliberations of either juror Rush or of any
other jurors. The trial court would simply have to call to
the stand one or more jurors—not necessarily juror Rush—
to testify as to whether or not juror Rush did or did not
convey to other jurors any information similar to that
contained in her post-verdict letter.**
Certainly a hearing of such limited scope does not raise
the spectre of unreasonable intrusion into the inner sanc-
tum of the jury room. In fact, after petitioner’s motion
for a new trial was filed in the District Court in this case,
the court asked the parties to submit briefs suggesting the
format that a hearing should take in the event the court
convened a hearing. In response to that invitation, the
Government suggested a procedure which, it acknowledged,
‘‘would provide maximum safeguards for the jurors’ in-
dividual rights of privacy.’’ That procedure is set out in
the margin.” Petitioner agrees in general with the hearing
procedure suggested by the Government. In light of the
Government’s acknowledgment that such a_ procedure
*4 This Court long ago made it abundantly clear that while post-
verdict inquiry could not be made as to *‘matters resting in the
personal consciousness of one juror”’ and into the deliberative
process, evidence could be taken as to ‘‘overt acts’’ which can ve
testified to by all jurors present. A juryman can thus testify as
to any extraneous influence, although not as to how far that in-
fluence operated upon his mind. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S.
140 (1892). See also Gafford v. Warden, 434 F. 2d 318 (10th Cir.
1970} (‘‘Although the personal consciousness of a juror cannot
be explored . . . , overt acts which are susceptible to the knowledge
of other jurors may be established by the evidence of a juror.’’)
23**The Government suggests the following procedure in the
event the Court decides that sufficient facts have been adduced to
require a hearing:
(1) Call witnesses (perhaps including juror Rush herself)
to establish such facts as what jobs she has held, whether she
has functioned adequately in ordinary social environments
over a period of years, and the like; also to establish the facts
surrounding the authenticity of the letter and the cireum-
stances under which it was written.
\
7
24
would ‘‘provide maximum safeguards for the juror’s in-
dividual rights of privacy,’’ it is difficult to comprehend
why no such hearing was conducted.
The absolute necessity of conducting a hearing—even
of narrow scope—in a case like this is dramatically evi-
denced by the reliance placed by the lower courts on as-
sumptions of fact about juror Rush that may simply not
be true. For example, the lower courts premised their de-
cision on the ‘‘facts’’ that juror Rush had never been ad-
(2) On the basis of the evidence adduced in step 1 and
on the basis of the letter, obtain expert opinion evidence (if
required) as to the probable nature and extent of Miss Rush's
mental disease (if any), and how it is likely to have affected
her ability to comprehend the case and communicate about
it (if at all).
(3) If, after steps 1 and 2, there is a prima facie showing
of a mental condition which made juror Rush unable to com-
prehend the case or communicate intelligently about it, call
witnesses from the jury to determine whether any such con-
dition actually manifested itself or had any demonstrable af-
fect on the deliberations.
(4) If required as a result of steps 1 through 3, adduce
further psychiatric opinion evidence based both on the testi-
money regarding the jury deliberations and on any appro-
priate interviews or tests which juror Rush may undergo.
The procedure outlined above would provide maximum safe-
guards for the jurors’ individual rights of privacy. See Miller v.
United States, 403 F. 2d 77 (2d Cir. 1968).”’
The government did, of course, take the position that no hearing
was required, but suggested the above procedure in the event one
was ordered.
The Government advised the court to ‘‘defer any inquiry into
the jury’s deliberations and any psychiatrie examination of the
alleged incompetent juror herself, until the evidence clearly dem-
onstrated the absolute necessity of such steps.’? Reply Memoran-
dum for the United States of America Regarding Motion for a
New Trial.
This proposal is certainly a reasonable one, although it seems
to omit any inquiry of jurors to determine if extra-judicial,
erroneous ‘‘evidence’’ was introduced by the juror into the jury
room, unless such inquiry might be included within step (3)
25
judicated insane,”** and that she has been steadily employed
since 1944 and has been employed for the past four years
by ‘‘Flower Fifth Avenue Hospital as a patient atten-
dant.’’ 7 On the record of this case, however, it cannot be
assumed that Rush had never been adjudicated insane.
Nor can it be assumed that her statements on voir dire con-
cerning her alleged employment record were based on real,
rather than imagined facts. It is at least equally likely
that she was adjudicated; no one has ever checked the rel-
evant records or asked her, since the judge precluded any
such investigation.** Moreover, her statements on voir
dire concerning her employment record are pregnant with
ambiguity that cannot be cleared up without a hearing.
At first she indicated that she had been employed at Flower
Fifth Avenue Hospital for ‘‘a full year’’ and then for
‘‘four years.’’ See Appendix 3, at pp. 59-60. Most signifi-
cantly, however, she described herself as ‘‘a patient attend-
ant’’ ibid. This phrase bears two equally plausible construc-
tions: (1) that she is herself a patient, working part time
as an attendant; or (2) that she is simply an attendant
(‘‘eall witnesses from the jury to determine whether any such
condition actually manifested itself’’). Presumably Jaymen would
be more capable of reporting what juror Rush actuality said, rather
than interpreting the extent to which her conduct appeared bi-
zarre. The Government does seem to understand, however, that
a hearing need not delve at all into the thought or deliberative
process of any jurors or of the jury as a whole.
26**Tn the instant case, however, where the juror’s competency
has not been determined in a separate and unrelated proceed-
ing....’’ Appendix 1, at p. 13.
27 Appendix 2, at p. 39.
28 Refusal to convene a hearing would seem all the more inap-
propriate in those jurisdictions, including the Second Circuit,
which follow a policy of severely discouraging, and in some cases
making subject to disciplinary action, attempts by defense counsel
to investigate such claims on their own. See Miller v. United States,
403 F. 2d 77 (2nd Cir. 1968) ; United States v. Driscoll, 276 F. Supp.
333 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Indeed, in this case, the trial judge issued an
26
who attends patients. Many thousands of mental patients
are, in fact, employed as patient-attendants in hospitals
throughout the country.” And Flower Fifth Avenue Hos-
pital—the hospital in which juror Rush claimed to be a
‘‘natient attendant’’—does have a psychiatric service and
apparently does have a program of employing psychiatric
patients as attendants.
It is entirely possible—indeed, considering the contents
of her letter, very probable—that juror Rush was, in fact,
a meital patient at the very time—or shortly before—she
was serving on the jury in this case. There is simply noth-
ing in the record of this case that contradicts that possi-
bility. The spectre of an actively hallucinating psychotic
mental patient under an adjudication of insanity partici-
pating in the deliberation of petitioner’s jury simply can-
not be precluded on the basis of the record of this case.
order that the juror not be contacted, directly or indirectly. Counsei
for Ostrer would have been satisfied with that order, of course,
had ii not been followed by a subsequent refusal to hold a hear-
ing and seek evidence under the guidance and control of the judge.
2° Of course, all attendants attend patients, so this latter con-
struction would require a redundancy. The Court of Appeals,
however, subtly transformed the ‘‘patient attendant’’ response
(A. 39) into the description ‘‘nurse’s aide’’ (A. 44) without giv-
ing any thought as to what the phrase would mean had the Court
stenographer hyphenated ‘*patient-attendant.”’
30** As yet, neither the United States Department of Labor nor
any other organization has undertaken a comprehensive survey
of the extent of patient labor in American mental institutions.
Nonetheless, a 1972 study of 154 institutions in 47 states, which
represent 76 percent of existing facilities for the mentally retarded,
found that 32,180 of 150,000 residents were participating in a
work program, 30 percent of these receiving no pay at all, and
an additional 50 percent receiving less than $10 per week. Re-
search in Ohio indicates that as of January, 1973, 1,237 out of
8.000 residents in facilities for the retarded were ‘working res-
idents’, laboring as a group over 40,000 hours per week. And a
1969 study conducted by the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare disclosed a resident working force of 3,040 out of a total
27
Nor is this possibility precluded by the trial judge’s re-
trospective recollection that he ‘‘did not notice anything
unusual about her’’.’ As this Court said in the related
context of an incompetency determination:
‘*While Robinson’s demeanor at trial might be rel-
evant to the ultimate decisions as to his sanity, it can-
not be relied upon to dispense with a hearing on that
very issue.’’ Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S, 375, 386 (1966).
Nor is it significant that ‘‘nothing unusual concerning her
[was] brought to [the trial judge’s] attention by either
the attorney or juror’’. * In the first place, absent a hear-
ing, it cannot be known whether the jurors observed any-
thing ‘‘unusual’’ about her which they did not communicate
to the judge. More fundamentally, however, the dangers
are even greater if the jurors did not observe anything
unusual about juror Rush—if they were not aware that
she was hallucinating.** Such a situation would increase
the likelihood that the jurors might have been influenced
population of 11,923 in nine state schools and hospitals for the
mentally retarded.’’ Friedman, P., The Mentally Handicapped
Citizen and Institutional Labor, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 568 (1974),
and numerous authorities cited therein.
31 Appendix 1, at p. 22.
82 Appendix 1, at p. 22.
*8 In reversing a trial judge's finding that a defendant was com-
petent, based upon lay observations of his actions, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said:
‘*The only evidence to the [effect that the defendant was
competent] came from laymen, all of whom testified . . . to noth-
ing more than that they had never observed an abnormal act
on the part of Gray, and none of whom had any ‘prolonged
and intimate contact with the accused.’ [Citation omitted.]
Their testimony is insufficient to establish Gray’s compentency
in the face of unimpeached expert testimony to the contrary.’’
(Emphasis added.) United States v. Gray, 421 F. 2d 316,
318-319 (5th Cir. 1970).
28
by eatra-judicial facts brought to their attention by juror
Rush—facts which they may have believed had a real
rather than an imagined basis.
Without some kind of evidentiary hearing, it simply
cannot be assumed that: (1) juror Rush was not under
an adjudication of insanity at the time of the trial; (2) her
employment record was as she stated; (3) she did not com-
municate to other jurors ‘‘information’’ that ‘‘appear[ed]
before’’ her or matters that she saw ‘‘before it happen.’’
In light of the evident need for a hearing to resolve these
issues and in light of the Government’s explicit acknowl-
edgment that a hearing of the kind it proposed would
‘*provide maximum safeguards for the jurors’ individual
rights of privacy,’’ petitioner respectfully requests this
Court either to remand the case for such a hearing or to
reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.
III. Tue Decision Betow, ALLow1nG To STaND THE PROs-
ECUTOR’s COMMENT ON THE DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO
Present Testimony, ANNIHILATES THIS Court’s Decision
IN GRIFFIN v. CALIFORNIA.
| Petitioner attempted at trial to obtaiii a severance from
his co-defendant, because the latter had an infamous repu-
tation as a high underworld figure, and also because the
petitioner wanted to testify on his own behalf but feared
doing so in the presence of a jury in view of a minor prior
criminal conviction. But when the co-defendant objected,
the trial judge denied the motion. Thus, petitioner went
forward reluctantly with a jury, and also reluctantly, de-
cided not to testify.
This latter decision, forced upon petitioner by the de-
nial of the motion for severance and for a jury-waived
trial, was taken advantage of by the prosecutor in his sum-
mation to the jury. The critical part of the Government’s
ease involved testimony by the initiator of the scheme, one
29
Hellerman, an indicted co-conspirator who had turned gov-
ernment witness, as to the contents of a conversation at
which the initiator claimed he informed petitioner of the
stock manipulation scheme. Were it not for this testimony,
the evidence could as easily have been interpreted as in-
dicating that petitioner was a victim of, rather than a
knowing perpetrator of, the illegal scheme.” The scienter
evidence thus rested on the initiator’s testimony of a single
meeting, concerning which only he and the petitioner were
in a position to testify. In the absence of testimony by pe-
titioner, the initiator’s testimony necessarily went uncon-
tradicted.
In his closing, government counsel addressed the jury
as follows:
‘The defense has alluded to the fact, and his Honor
will tell you, that it is the law that a defendant does
not need to call any witnesses whatsoever; the gov-
ernment has the obligation to prove its case beyond
a reasonable doubt. . . . However, the defense, just
like the government, has the capability of calling wit-
nesses, and there are witnesses who are available to
the defense, as well as to the government, I think his
Honvr will instruct you that you are entitled to draw
an inference, if you find it is appropriate to do so, or
you may draw no inference at all. [Objection here
by Ostrer’s trial counsel overruled.] Now, the fact
that nobody disputed Hellerman’s story directly or
on cross examination or in any other way to the facts
as opposed to proper cross examination directed to
show that he was an evil fellow, vou may find is a
terribly significant factor.’’
84 The petitioner did, in fact, lose a substantial amount of money
in the scheme, as did other investors.
30
At this point Ostrer’s counsel moved for a mistrial ‘‘in
view of the statement made by the prosecutor.’’ Again his
objection to the comment was overruled, and his motion
was denied.
The court below found no prejudice in the statement.“
The Second Circuit's refusal to reverse, even in such an
egregious case as this, is simply the latest in a long series
of cases in which that Court, since and in the face of this
Court’s decision in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965), has eroded the protection against comment to which
non-testifying defendants are clearly entitled.
The Second Cireuit has been employing a variety of de-
vices to circumvent the clear command of Griffin. For in-
stance, the court routinely interprets prosecutors’ remarks
as referring to issues different from the failure of the ac-
cused to testify. See United States v. Nasta, 398 F. 2d 283
(2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Marcus, 401 F. 2d 563
(2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Hart, 407 F. 2d 1087 (2d
Cir. 1969); United States v. Curiale, 414 F. 2d 744 (2d
Cir. 1969) ; United States ex rel. Leak v. Follette, 418 F. 2d
1266 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Smart, 448 F. 2d 931
(2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Lipton, 467 F. 2d 1161 (2d
Cir. 1972).
Frequently, too, the Court refuses to reverse if defense
counsel did not raise a prompt objection or did not re-
quest curative instructions. See United States v. Nasta,
supra; United States v. Marcus, supra; United States ex
rel. Walls v. Mancusi, 406 F. 2d 505 (2d Cir. 1969) ; United
States er rel. Satz v. Mancusi, 414 F. 2d 90 (2d Cir. 1969) ;
United States v. Smart, supra. On the other hand, if the
™ The court said that there were many people involved in the
scheme who could have testified. But the Court overlooked the fact
that on the issue of scienter, only the petitioner and Hellerman
could give relevant testimony. The prosecutor's object in comment-
ing seems clear enough. ;
31
trial court does instruct the jury on the defendant’s rights,
the court rules that such instruction nullifies any prejudice.
See Cole v. Mancusi, 429 F. 2d 61 (2d Cir. 1970).
Additionally, the court below has held several times
that a prosecutor’s remark was non-prejudicial or harm-
less error to the defendant. The rationales behind such
holdings vary. In United States ex rel. Satz v. Mancusi,
supra, the court held that the prosecutor’s remark that
the defendant had never vouched for his own credibility
was harmless error because the evidence overwhelmingly
pointed to the defendant’s guilt, even though the first jury
to hear the case was unable to reach a verdict.
The lower court itself acknowledged that it is an ex-
tremely rare occasion on which the Second Circuit would
recognize that reversible error had been committed when
the prosecutor or court comments on the failure of the de-
fendant to testify. The court announced that, ‘‘ remarks con-
cerning lack of contradiction are forbidden only in the
exceedingly rare case’’ and reasserted that the court
**will not be astute to find in this a veiled comment on
the defendant's failure to testify even if in practical
fact, although not in theory, no one else could controvert
them.’’ Appendix 2, at pp. 46-47. Such laxity in the inter-
pretation and application of Griffin in the Second Circuit
nurtures the frequency of such prejudicial comments by
prosecuting attorneys who hardly risk reversal by their
actions and thus continue to comment.
The practice in the Second Circuit now is similar to that
which prevailed in the First Cireuit until the Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit stated its frustration with the
frequency of such prosecutors’ comments and held that
such comments would in the future constitute prejudicial
error. United States v. Flannery, 451 F. 2d 880 (1st Cir.
32
1971). In Flannery the court included within the definition
of prejudicial error a situation, such as in the case at bar,
where the prosecutor argues to the jury that certain tes-
timony was uncontradicted, where only the defendant could
have been available to contradict it.
Here, the defendant was the only person who could con-
tradict Hellerman’s testimony on scienfer. The proseeu-
tor’s comment to the jury was unambiguous and its pur-
pose transparent. Defense counsel made two immediate and
strenuous objections (the prosecutor having repeated his
comment after the first objection was overruled), and the
trial judge refused twice to deliver an immediate curative ”
instruction.
If the lower court’s decision in this case is allowed to
stand, Griffin will have been virtually abrogated in the
Second Cireuit. ”
The court below stated that the danger of such a comment
was ‘‘neutralized’’ in this case by a ‘‘ prompt corrective instruc-
tion to the jury’’ given by the trial judge. This finding is puzzling
in light of the transcript of the proceedings, quoted at p. 29, supra,
showing clearly that two immediate objections by defense counsel
were overruled in the jury’s presence, and that only after those
rulings did the trial judge. in response to counsel's entreaty, tell
the jury that ‘‘the defense has no obligation to produce any wit-
nesses."’ And even then, the prosecutor later in his summation
commented for a third time, noting that the jurors could draw
an inference from the defendant’s failure to call witnesses to
contradict the Government’s witness. Once again, defense counsel’s
prompt objection was overruled.
*7 It is perhaps ironic to note that had the petitioner’s severance
motion been granted and had he been allowed the trial-by-judge
that he requested, he would not have been prejudiced either by
the delusional juror problem or by the prosecutor’s comment on
his failure to testify. (The record is clear that Ostrer would have
testified had he been allowed to waive trial by jury.) The problem
could have been avoided even without severance if, at the same
joint trial, the judge served as fact finder for petitioner and the
jury as fact finder for the co-defendant who demanded a jury
33
Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, petitioner respectfully re-
quests this Court to grat the instant petition and either
to set the case down for argu-nent, or to remand the case
for a new trial, or for the kind of hearing that the Gov-
ernment has acknowledged ‘‘ would provide maximum safe-
guards for the jurors’ individual rights of privacy.’’
Respectfully submitted,
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ,
Counsel for Petitioner.
Of Counsel:
Henry J. Borre,
233 Broadway,
New York, New York 10007,
Harvey A. SuVERGLATE,
Sttverciate, Suaptro & GERTNER,
217 Lewis Wharf,
Boston, Massachusetts 02110.
trial. This latter possibility is discussed in United States v. Farrics,
459 F. 2d 1057, at 1061 (3d Cir. 1972). The dangers inherent in
foreing a defendant to go to trial by jury where his joint defend-
ant is a well-known underworld figure and where his right to
testify is hindered by even a minor prior conviction, were respon-
sible for the court granting a jury-waived trial to a defendant
even over the Government’s strenuous objections in United Statcs
v. Schipani, 44 F.R.D. 461, 463-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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Table of Contents.
Appendix 1
Opinion of United States District Court, Southern
District of New York, of July 18, 1973
Appendix 2
Opinion of United States Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, of January 4, 1974
Appendix 3
Excerpt of testimony of pretrial voir dire of venire
EERIE ONE Is FRR NES
oa eee a ee, ae ers
Appendix 1.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PLAINTIFF,
against 71 Cr. 558 DNE
JOHN DIOGUARDI and LOUIS OSTRER,
DEFENDANTS.
EpE.sTEIn, Ch. J.
Opinion.
Defendants John Dioguardi and Louis Ostrer were in-
dicted on May 27, 1971, and brought to trial on January 4,
1973, for conspiring to violate and for violating the fed-
eral securities laws ' and regulations * and the federal mail
fraud statute.* On January 26, 1973, after three days of
deliberations, a jury returned verdicts of guilty against
1 Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, prohibiting fraud
in the sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). Wilful vio-
lation of this section is made criminally punishable by section 24
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970).
2 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, prohibiting
fraud in the purchase and sale of securities. 17 C.F.R. Section
240.10b-5, promulgated under 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Wilful
violation of this rule is made criminally punishable by section
32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § T8ff
(1970).
317 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970), the federal mail fraud statute.
——ee
ee ORD te
RCL ANON
2
both defendants. * Defendants have now moved for a new
trial, pursuant to F.R.Cr.P. 33,° on the ground that one
of the jurors suffered from ‘‘a mental infirmity making
her incapable of rendering efficient jury service’’ within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1865(b) (4). °
In support of their motion, defendants rely upon a let-
ter which was sent to Dioguardi by the juror in ques-
tion. The letter portrays the juror as a person with re-
ligious feelings who believes herself to be a clairvoyant.
This clairvoyance, according to the letter, has enabled the
juror to conclude that Dioguardi is basically a good per-
son. (The juror repeated the phrase ‘‘ .. . I saw the good
Ceo sas 2b aa Tle ews
ys A ney oe
* The jury found Ostrer guilty of 11 of the 17 counts submitted
to them for their consideration; and Dioguardi guilty of 4 of the
19 counts submitted to them for their consideration.
* Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial
to him if required in the interest of justice. If trial was by
the court without a jury the court on motion of a defendant
for a new trial may vacate the judgment if entered, take ad-
ditional testimony and direct the entry of a new judgment.
A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence may be made only before or within two years
after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending the court
may grant the motion only on remand of the case. A motion
for a new trial based on any other grounds shall be made
within 7 days after verdict or finding of guilty or within such
further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period.
As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966.
® Section 1865(b) (4) states, in pertinent part:
(b) In making such determination [whether a juror is
qualified to serve] the chief judge of the district court, or
such other district court judge as the plan may provide, shall
deem any person qualified to serve on grand and petit juries
in the district court unless he—
(4) is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirm-
ity, to render satisfactory jury service. .. .
within you. . .’’). Nevertheless, the juror affirms her be-
lief that Dioguardi is guilty (‘‘Your mistake your [sic]
guilty.’’?); admonishes him for becoming involved with
criminals (‘‘Why you let such a relationship exist between
you and a man like Hellerman?’’* and suggests that he
should repent and be saved. (‘‘If you repent and run a
clean business it is the good within you that will save you,
and you will gain what you have lost.’’)
Defendants have also submitted six letters from six. dif-
ferent psychiatrists and an affidavit from a seventh psychia-
trist. Based only upon an analysis of the juror’s letter
and, in some instances, an assumption of the juror’s re-
ligious feelings, cultural background and intelligence level,
the doctors offered, in various ways, their opinion that the
juror is, and was during trial, hallucinatory, delusional
psychotic, grandiose and suffered from guilt feelings and
a persecution complex; and they attempted to make the
legal determination that the juror was not mentally quali-
fied to serve on a jury.
Defendants have requested that this court either (a)
hold a hearing ‘‘with necessary mental examination’’ to
determine whether the juror was unqualified to serve, and
to grant a new trial ‘‘should the juror be found to have
been unqualified;’’ or (b) grant a new trial even if the
court refuses to hold a hearing.
The demand for a new trial based upon a post-verdict
attack on a juror’s mental competency is an issue of first
impression in this circuit. The problem, however, has been
considered by the highest tribunals of fourteen states, *
7 Michael Hellerman was the admitted architect of the scheme
for which the defendants were convicted and was a key witness
for the prosecution.
8 Arizona: Anderson v. State, 54 Ariz. 387, 96 P.2d 281 (1939);
Arkansas: Brown v. State, 219 Ark. 647, 243 S.W. 2d 938 (1951);
Grand Lodge A.O.U.W. of Ark v. Wood, 113 Ark. 502, 168 S.W.
eee rrr
vo ae Age eS
4
an intermediate appellate court in one other state,® and by
the Courts of Appeals for the First Cireuit ' and Third
Circuit.’' The decisions rendered by these courts all are
to the effect that a post-verdict inquiry into a juror’s
mental competency will not be permitted unless the party
seeking to set aside the jury’s verdict makes a strong
showing as to the existence of the alleged mental infirmi-
ty. At a minimum, this showing should be sufficient to over-
come the legal presumption that all men are sane An
analysis of the relevant cases reveals no precise formula
1070 (1914) ; Colorado: Austin v. People, 106 Col. 506, 107 P.2d
798 (1940) Georgia: Wall v. State, 126 Ga. 549, 55 S.E. 484 (1906),
(the Georgia Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court,
reaffirmed the Wall decision in Newton vy. State, 66 Ga. 103, 17
S.E. 2d 102 (Ct. App. 1941) ) ; Illinois: Mackin v. People, 115 Il.
312, 3 N.E. 222 (1885) ; Indiana: Deuthitt v. State, 144 Ind. 397,
42 N.E. 907 (1896) ; Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Jordan, 207
Mass. 259, 93 N.E. 809 (1911), aff’d. Jordan v, Massachusetts, 225
U.S. 167 (1912) ; Montana: State v. Bucy, 104 Mont: 416, 66 P.2d
1049 (1937) ; New Jersey: Iverson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Ameri-
va, 126 N.J.L. 280, 19 A.2d 214 (1941); Burik v. Dundee Woolen
Co., 66 N.J.L. 420, 49 A. 442 (1901) ; New Mezico: State v. Eskild-
son, 36 N.M. 238, 13 P.2d 417 (1932); Tennessee: Durham v.
State, 182 Tenn. 577, 188 S.W. 2d 555 (1945); Texas: Ex Parte
Lovelady, 152 Tex. Crim. 93, 207 S.W. 2d 396 (1947), cert. granted
333 U.S. 867, cert. dismissed 333 U.S. 879 (1948); McKenzie v.
State, 116 Tex. Crim. 395, 11 S.W. 2d 172 (1928) ; Carter v. State,
102 Tex. Crim. 517, 278 S.W. 840 (1925); Washington: State v.
Welty, 65 Wash. 244, 118 P. 9 (1911); West Virginia: State v.
Camp, 110 W. Va. 444, 158 S.E. 664 (1931).
® Missouri: Eastman Kodak Stores, Inc. v. Summers, 377 S.W.
2d 476 (Kan. City Ct. App. 1964).
10 Peterman v. Indian Motorcycle Co., 216 F.2d 289 (1st Cir.
1954).
11 United States ex rel. Daverse v. Hohn, 198 F.2d 934 (3rd Cir.
1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 913 (1953).
12 See, e.g. Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 377-378 (1897) ;
Davis‘v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 486-7 (1895) ; State v. Camp,
110 W.Va. 444, 158 S.E. 664, 667 (1931).
MEATY SONA ol ONG See TEIN oy
%
‘a
5
by which to measure the standard of proof necessary to
warrant a post-verdict investigation. They do reveal, how-
ever, a difference between a sufficient and an insufficient
showing.
These cases can be divided into three categories, ranging
in degree from the strongest to the weakest showings which
have been made in attacking a juror’s competency. The
strongest showing is illustrated by fact patterns in those
cases in which the juror, prior to trial, had been adjudged
mentally incompetent; had spent time in a hospital for the
mentally ill; and had not been legally restored to com-
petency during the period of his jury service. In such cases,
the mere adjudication of incompetency, without a restora-
tion to competency, regardless of the period of time which
had elapsed between the date of the adjudication and the
date of jury service, was sufficient to overcome the pre-
sunption that the juror was sane during the trial '* In these
circumstances, the courts have held a post-verdict investi-
gation to ascertain the extent to which the disability existed
during trial, and the effect the disability had on the juror’s
consideration of the facts of the case. ™
13 Indeed, unless there has been a restoration to competency,
there is a rebuttable presumption of continued incompetency.
Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 377-378 (1897); Tarvestad
v. United States, 418 F.2d 1943, 1050-51 (8th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied 367 U.S. 935 (1970) ; Hurt v. United States, 327 F.2d 978,
981 (8th Cir. 1964) ; Kitchens v. United States, 372 F.2d 757, 760
(10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960); Gunthers v.
United States, 215 F.2d 493, 496 n. 12 (D.C. Cir. 1954): Brown
v. State, 219 Ark. 647, 243 S.W.2d 938, 939 (1951) ; State v. Bucy,
104 Mont. 416, 66 P.2d 1049, 1050 (1937).
14 For example, in Anderson v. State, 54 Ariz. 387, 96 P.2d 281
(1939), the juror, severa) months before trial, had been formally
declared incompetent to manage his business affairs and had re-
mained under the disability throughout the trial. At the hearing
evidence was adduced which indicated that the juror was an al-
eoholic, that his business was being ruined as a result of his afflic-
tion, that his income was being consumed by his habit, and that
6
The second category of cases involves jurors who have
been declared insane shortly after the verdict was rendered.
the declaration of incompetency was an attempt to save both his
money and his business. The court further found that when sober
the juror was of sound mind and normal intelligence. Declaring
that *‘there was nothing to show that at the time of trial his con-
dition was not normal,’’ (96 P.2d at 283) the court held that the
juror’s disability did not adversely affect his ability to properly
perform the functions of a juror. For other cases involving pre-
trial adjudications of incompetency in which the court conducted
a post-verdict investigation, sec Grand Lodge A.O.U.W. of Ark.
v. Wood, 113 Ark. 5302, 168 S.W. 1070 (1914 (‘‘several months”’
before trial the juror had been declared insane; had been sent to
a mental hospital had remained there for ‘‘a short period ;"’ and
had been **paroled;*’ but had never been *‘legally emancipated
from the disability of instanity’’); Austin v. People, 106 Col. 506,
107 P.2d 798 (1940) (16 months before trial, the juror had been
adjudged a mental incompetent, but had never been institution-
alized nor restored to competency) ; Brown v. State, 219 Ark. 647,
243 S.W. 2d 938 (1951) (approximately 2 years before trial the
juror had been adjudged insane by the probate court; had been
confined in a mental hospital for 3 months; and had been released
without a judicial restoration to sanity); Ex Parte Lovelady, 152
Tex. Crim. 93, 207 S.W. 2d 396 (1947). cert. granted, 333 US.
867, cert. dismissed 333 U.S. 879 (1948) (the juror had been ad-
judged insane approximately 7 years before the trial, had been
confined in a hospital for the insane; and had been discharged
**soon after his confinement’’ without having been legally re-
stored to sanity); Douthitt v. State, 182 Tenn. 577, 188 S.W. 2d
555 (1945) (the juror had been confined for a short period in an
*‘imsane hospital"’ approximately 8 years before trial and had
been discharged as *‘improved’’); State v. Bucy, 104 Mont. 416,
66 P.2d 1949 (1937) (approximately 10 years before trial the
juror had been declared insane; had been confined in an insane
asylum for less than 2 months; and had been released but had
never been judicially restored to competency); Eastman Kodak
Stores, Inc. v. Summers, 377 S.W. 2d 476, 481 (Kan. City Ct.
App. 1964) (approximately 20 years before trial the juror had
been ‘adjudicated to be a person of unsound mind and had never
been restored;"’ and had, thereafter, been treated for epilepsy).
Three other cases involved similar facts, but no time periods were
stated. Durham v. State, 182 Tenn. 577, 188 S.W. 2d 555 (1945);
Carter v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 517. 278 S.W. 840 (1925) ; Newton
v. State, 66 Ga. 103, 17 S.E. 2d 102 (Ct. App. 1941).
a SSS LTC TTT
Tape
7
The adjudications were by un independent tribunal, and
the proceedings were completely unrelated to the post-
verdict investigation of the jurors’ qualifications. As in
the first category of cases, the presumption of sanity had
been overcome. However, an adjudication of incompeten-
cy does not determine a person's mental capacity prior to
the determination. Yet, the inference is clear that the
underlying causes of the incompetent condition existed be-
fore the adjudication. Thus, in this category of cases, due
process requires” that there be a hearing to establish
whether the disability existed during trial, and if it did
exist, the effect it had on the juror’s deliberations."*
% Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 174 (1912) aff’g. Com-
monwealth v. Jordan, 207 Mass. 259, 93 N.E. 809 (1911). In
Jordan, the juror was found to be insane and was committed to an
**insane hospital’’ four days after the verdict was rendered. Aiter
a lengthy hearing the presiding justice denied defendant's metion
for a new trial, ruling that *‘a fair preponderance of all the evi-
dence’’ indicated that the juror was possessed of *‘sufficient mental
capacity during the entire trial’’ to enable him to render an in-
telligent verdict. Quoted in 93 N.E. at 814. Both the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the United States Supreme
Court affirmed. Although the precise question before the Supreme
Court involved the propriety of using the *‘ preponderance of the
evidence’’ standard, the Court noted that the holding of a hear-
ing complied with the due process requirement.
State v. Camp. 110 W.Va. 444, 158 S.E. 664 (1931). (The
juror became insane the day after the verdict was rendered and
was hospitalized two weeks thereafter); Burik v. Dundee Woolen
Co., 66 N.J.L. 420, 49 A. 442 (1901) (the juror became insane
*‘some days”’ after the verdict); Iverson v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of America, 126 N.J.L. 280, 19 A.2d 214 (1941) (the juror began
evidencing symptoms of a mental illness 6 days after the trial’s
conclusion and was declared, 2 days later, to be suffering from a
type of insanity ‘“‘which conjures up an imaginary world and
results in a loss of ‘contact with reality.’"’ 19 A.2d at 218);
State v. Welty, 65 Wash. 244, 118 P. 9 (1911) (The juror had
been twice adjudged insane and committed to an insane asylum
prior to trial; and not been restored to sanity at the time of trial ;
and 5 months after trial had been re-committed to the asylum).
mn A FE Ny RN mg
Absent the type of showing demonstrated in the first
two categories, the courts have been extremely reluctant to
invade the privacy of the jury room. Thus, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, in Peterman v. Indian Motor-
cycle Co., 216 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1954), the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit, in United States ex rel. Daverse
v. Hohn, 198 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1952), and the Supreme
Court of New Mexico, in State v. Eskildson, 36 N.M. 238,
13 P.2d 417 (1932), approved the trial court’s refusal to
hold an evidentiary hearing absent an adjudication of in-
competency. In Peterman, the movants offered to prove
that
. . . the juror in question, because of mental disturb-
ance, [had| been receiving disability compensation
from the Veterans Bureau, that he [had) difficulty in
sleeping and concentrating; that his memory [was]
not good; that he [had| had depressed periods during
which he entertained the idea of suicide; that he [had]
had to undergo treatment for anxiety reaction to a
psychic episode expressed by auditory hallucinations;
that he has been under the care of a psychiatrist for
an extended period, with little prospect of an early
overcoming of his difficulties.
216 F.2d at 293 (emphasis added). Yet, Judge Wyzanski
of the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts refused to hold an evidentiary hearing.
According to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Judge
~~" Wyzanski’s reason was based upon the fact that the offer
of proof, ‘‘taken at its face value,’’ did not present ‘‘a
sufficient ground for impeaching a verdict once returned”’
because it ‘‘contained no suggestion that the juror was in-
sane or had at any time been confined in a sanitorium ‘or
was so incapacitated that he did not perform as adequately
9
as many people do ordinary occupational tasks.’’’ Id.
The Court of Appeals noted that Judge Wyzanski observed
the juror during the trial and that he did not get the im-
pression that the juror was incompetent. In its affirmance,
the Court of Appeals indicated its approval of ‘‘the strong
policy against the too-ready impeachment of jury verdicts
on the basis of such afterthoughts suggested by a disap-
pointed litigant.’’ Jd.
Similarly, in Eskildson, defendants sought to establish a
juror’s mental incompetency through the testimony of a
psychiatrist. The trial court, however, refused to hold
an evidentiary hearing because there had not been ‘‘an ad-
judication that settled [the juror’s] status.’’ 13 P.2d at
421. The Supreme Court of New Mexico, while sanction-
ing the adjudication requirement adopted by the trial court,
suggested that a hearing might also be appropriate if the
trial judge believed, based upon his observations of the
juror during trial, that the juror was incompetent.”
Finally, the Third Circuit’s opinion in Daverse, although
not precisely on point, is consonant with the policy reflected
in Peterman and Eskildson. In Daverse, the defendant
attempted to amend a paragraph of a petition for habeas
corpus by adding an allegation that the juror suffered
from a mental disease. This proposed amendment, how-
ever, was framed in uncertain, rather than specific, lan-
guage (‘‘... [the] juror... may be suffering from a men-
tal disease... .’’) 198 F.2d at 937 (emphasis added). Fo-
eusing upon the failure to allege ‘‘specifically that [the
'? But see, MeKenzie v. State, 116 Tex. Crim. 395, 11 S.W. 2d
172 (1928) in which a post-verdict inquiry was conducted not-
withstanding the absence of an adjudication of incompetency. The
juror’s mental competence was challenged on the basis of an ‘‘ap-
plication, filed by the juror, for compensation on the ground of
nervous and mental disability incurred during the World War.”
11 S.W. 2d at 179. It does not appear that the parties put into
issue the propriety of conducting a post-verdict investigation.
10
juror] was in fact mentally incompetent or ‘insane,’ ”’ the
Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s refusal to
allow the amendment. In so doing, the court stated:
If a juror’s mental competence is to be attacked at
the late stage offered by a habeas corpus proceeding,
the charge must be made in much more certain terms
and not on a tentative basis. A fishing expedition into
a juror’s competency may not be employed as a basis
to attack a conviction valid on its face. To rule other-
wise would be to strike a serious blow at the sanctity
of the jury system for any juror, who it was alleged
might be suffering from paranoid tendencies, could in
effect be put on trial as to his mental competence. We
cannot sanction such a course.
198 F.2d at 938 (citation omitted). Clearly, something
more than just a bare statement of incompetency is de-
manded. At a minimum, a party attacking a juror’s quali-
fications must make an offer of proof which, as the First
Cireuit stated, suggests ‘‘that the juror was insane or had
at any time been confined in a sanitorium ‘or was so in-
capacitated that he did not perform as adequately as many
people do ordinary occupational tasks.’’’ 216 F.2d at 293.
It would be myopie to read the Daverse opinion as requir-
ing anything less than a strong showing of mental incapac-
ity. It makes little difference, absent such a strong show-
ing, whether movants charge that a juror is suffering from
a mental disease or that the juror may be suffering from a
mental disease. In both instances, the effect of defendant’s
attack is the same: permission to employ a ‘fishing expedi-
tion into a juror’s competency’? would be required. Such
an expedition cannot be tolerated.
A comparison of the offer of proof in the case at bar with
the offers made in the cases above should make it abun-
11
dantly clear that the defendants’ offer of proof is insuffi-
cient to warrant a post-verdict inquiry into the juror’s
mental competency. Since there has been no adjudication
of incompetency, this case comes within the weakest of the
three categories discussed above. Even within this cate-
gory, the showing is extremely weak. In Peterman, for
example, the offer of proof was much stronger than the
offer made here. There, the allegations were, in effect, that
the juror had a history of mental disturbances, and had
been, prior to and throughout the trial, under the care of a
psychiatrist. Yet, Judge Wyzanski and the First Circuit
were in accord that these allegations, even if true, would
not warrant the impeachment of the verdicts. 216 F.2d at
293. Here, there is no indication that the juror has a his-
tory of psychiatric disorders or that the juror has under-
gone psychiatric treatments. At best, the defendants’ posi-
tion is comparable with the defendant’s position in Da-
verse: a bare allegation of incompetency combined with a
request that the court conduct an investigation. To per-
mit a post-verdict inquiry based upon defendants’ offer of
proof would be to accept the proposition that a fishing ex-
pedition may be employed to attack a conviction valid on its
face. This cannot be countenanced, particularly in light of
Peterman and Daverse.
Moreover, based upon an examination of the general
ease law governing a post-verdict inquiry into a juror’s
qualifications, it is clear that a hearing is not required. The
purpose of a hearing is not to determine whether or not
the claimed disability does exist. Rather, the function of
a hearing is to ascertain the extent to which the disability
existed during trial, and the effect the disability had upon
the juror’s deliberations. This view finds support in the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Remmer v. United States, 347
U.S. 227 (1954). During the trial in Remmer, an improper
Pe ee « St, %.
i2
communication was made to a juror and was reported im-
mediately to the court. Improper communications, such
as those involved in Remmer, have been deemed to be so
presumptively prejudicial as to require a new trial."* Yet,
the trial court never informed the defendant-petitioner of
the incident. Instead, based upon the results of a requested
F.B.L. investigation, the court concluded that the incident
was harmless. Upon learning of these events after trial,
the defendant-petitioner moved for a new trial. Without
holding a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 205 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1953).
The Supreme Court, however, held that a hearing was
necessary—not to determine whether the incident occurred
—but rather to ‘‘determine the cireumstances [surrounding
the incident], the impact thereof upon the juror, and wheth-
er or not it was prejudicial.’ 347 U.S. at 230.
This concept of the limited purpose of a Hearing is also
suggested by the Second Cireuit’s decision in United States
v. Silverman, 449 F.2d 1341 (2d Cir. 1971). There the court
indicated that a hearing would be necessary—again, not to
determine whether a claimed disqualification existed—but
rather to determine whether ‘‘the claimed disqualification
might have adversely affected the challenged juror’s ability
to decide the case intelligently.”’ 449 F.2d at 1344. In
Silverman, an income tax evasion case, the juror’s in-
ability to read and write English was not disputed. At the
hearing, therefore, the only question facing the court was
whether this disability precluded the juror from rendering
a fair and impartial verdict.
18 This principle had been enunciated prior to Remmer, Mattox
v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-150 (1892), Morley v. Cran-
more Skimobiles, 67 F.Supp. 812 (D.N.H. 1946) ; and has been re-
affirmed since Remmer, Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1963)
(per curiam) ; Marshal v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
13
Similarly, in other cases involving a post-verdict attack
upon a juror’s qualifications, the existence of the dis-
abling condition was not in issue, for the factors relied up-
on as being responsible for the disabling condition were
readily evident.” Thus, where the juror suffered from a
physical impairment, the existence of the impairment was
not disputed. Where the juror was unable to read or write,
this inability was not controverted. Where the juror was
an alien, infant or convicted felon, the alienage, infancy or
conviction of the juror was not in issue. Where the juror
had engaged in some form of misconduct, the fact that the
misconduct occurred was not questioned. And where the
juror’s mental competency was determined in a separate
and unrelated proceeding, mental capacity was not con-
tested. What was questioned and what was contested
though, was the extent to which the disqualifying factor
tainted a juror’s deliberations and prevented him from
rendering a fair and impartial verdict.
In the instant case, however, where the juror’s compe-
tency has not been determined in a separate and unrelated
proceeding, the court would be constrained to perform
the additional task of delving into the mind of the juror
and making the initial determination of whether or not the
® See, c.g., Raub v. Carpenter, 187 U.S. 159, 161-162 (1902)
(infancy, felony conviction) ; United States v. Silverman, 449 F.2d
1341 (2nd Cir. 1971) (inability to read and write English) ; United
States v. DeLeon, 462 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1972) (juror under in-
dictment) ; Holmes v. United States, 284 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1960)
(improper communications to jury); Ford v. United States, 201
F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1953) (juror convicted of felony); Ryan v.
United-States, 191 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied sub.
nom., Dunean v. United States, 342 U.S. 928 (1951) (improper
communications to jurors) ; Faith v. Neely, 41 F.R.D. 361 (N.D.W.
Va. 1966) (juror misconduct, intoxication); Hollingsworth v.
Duane, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 353 (Pa. Dist. 1801) (alienage) ; Lindsay
v. State, 189 Tenn. 355, 225 S.W. 2d 533 (1949) (deafness) :
Batson v. State, 216 Ala. 275, 113 So. 300 (1927) (alienage).
aE can Cd KS ea ptt
14
juror was mentally competent.” Such a probe was not
undertaken in Peterman, Eskildson and Daverse; and the
court would be ill-advised to undertake such a probe here.
Testimony would be necessary at the very least, not only
from the subject juror regarding her deliberations, but
also from her fellow jurors, regarding the nature and ex-
tent of the subject juror’s participation in the delibera-
tions.” Yet, such a probe militates against the well-estab-
*” Although the defendants have requested that the juror under-
go a mental examination, it is highly doubtful whether the court
has the authority to order such an examination. The Supreme
Court has held that federal courts do not have the common law
power to order such an examination; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bots-
ford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); see also Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1 (1941) ; Camden and Suburban Ry. Co. v. Stetson, 177 U.S.
172 (1900) ; and no statute can be found which authorizes it. In-
deed, in civil cases, the court may only order, upon a motion for
good cause, a party or a person under the legal control of party
to submit to a mental examination. F.R.Civ.P.35(a). See, cy.
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). Similarly, in crim-
inal cases, only the defendant is subject to the court’s control. 18
U.S.C. §§ 4244, 4245. See also Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1965)
(per curiam) ; United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700, 710 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1026 (1970); United States v. Dris-
coll, 399 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Albright, 388
F.2d 719, 722-724 (4th Cir. 1968); Alexander v. United States,
380 F.2d 33, 39 (8th Cir. 1967) ; Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d
710, 721 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968). No authority has been cited—in-
deed, no authority has been found—which permits the court to
order a person who is neither a party nor a person under the con-
trol of a party in a judicial proceeding, to undergo a mental ex-
amination.
2! It has been held that where a juror was able ‘‘to intelligently
consider the evidence, appreciate the arguments of counsel, the
rulings of law, the charge of the court, and to arrive at a rational
conelusion,’’ a new trial will not be granted. Commonwealth v.
Jordan, 207 Mass. 259, 93 N.E. 809, 814-815 (1911), aff’d Jordan
v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167 (1912). See Ex Parte Lovelady,
152 Tex. Crim. 93, 207 S.W. 2d 396, cert. granted, 333 U.S. 867,
cert. dismissed, 333 U.S. 879 (1948); Anderson v. State, 54 Ariz.
OE eee ae
-—_
7 AEN ATI Me
15
lished general rule which inhibits a court from inquiring
‘‘in any way whatever as to what occurred during the
jury’s deliberations.’’ United States v. Grieco, 261 F.2d
414, 415 (2nd Cir. 1958), cert. denied 395 U.S. 907 (1959).
Indeed, it is axiomatic that jurors are incompetent to tes-
tify as to matters which would impeach their verdict, re-
gardless of the means employed. Hence, courts have
consistently refused to consider letters and affidavits of
jurors which attempt to impeach their verdict.”
These general rules, however, are not absolute. The
Supreme Court, having recognized that the adherence to
inflexible rules is incompatable with the administration of
justice, has relaxed the rigidity of these rules in order to
protect the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair
and impartial jury. McDenald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268-
269 (1915). Nonetheless, post-verdict inquiries remain
limited to extraordinary circumstances in which funda-
mental incompetency or actual bias is shown. Thus, to
387, 96 P.2d 281 (1939); State v. Camp, 110 W.Va. 444, 158 S.E.
664 (1931) ; Burik v. Dundee Woolen Co., 66 N.J.L. 420, 49 A. 442
(1901) ; Mackin v. People, 115 Ill. 312, 3 N.E. 222 (1885). Sce
also United States v. Silverman, 449 F.2d 1341, 1344 (2nd Cir.
1971) (in which the Court of Appeals stated that a juror must be
able ‘‘to decide a case intelligently’’) ; Ford v. United States, 201
F.2d 300, 301 (Sth Cir. 1953). In those circumstances in which
a hearing might be required, testimony from the subject juror and
the other jurors would be necessary to determine whether a juror
deliberated intelligently.
*2 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); Hyde v. United
States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S.
140 (1892).
*3'The refusal to receive affidavits from jurors attempting to
impeach their verdict can be traced to Lord Mansfield’s ruling in
1785, Vaise v. Delaval, I.T.R. 11 (1785); and has been *‘univer-
sally followed”’ in this country. McDonald, 238 U.S. at 268.
*4 See, e.g. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 168 (1950) :
Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 512-514 (1948) ; Mattox v.
ee ee ee
PAE SE Os
16
come within this high standard, ‘‘[t]here must be a show-
ing of a prima facie case sufficient to satisfy the judge that
the [exposure of the jury’s discussions during deliberations]
should be let in.’’ Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14
(1952). The alleged disability must be ‘‘so obvious a dis-
qualification or so inherently prejudicial as a matter of
law ... to require the court, of its own motion or on peti-
tioner’s suggestion afterward to set the verdict aside and
grant a new trail.’’*
It has been said that the showing must be of a ‘‘constitu-
tional dimension.’’ United States v. Provenzano, 240
F.Supp. 393, 408 (D.N.J.); aff’d per curiam 353 F.2d 1011
(3rd Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 905 (1966). The mere
allegation of the existence of a disability, the ‘‘mere charge
of a wrongdoing . . . without more,’’ United States v.
Silverman, 449 F.2d 1341, 1344 (2d Cir. 1971), the mere
inclusion in the panel of a disqualified juror, United States
v. Clark, 289 U.S. 1, 14 (1933), does not warrant the dis-
closure of the debates, thoughts and votes of the jury while
considering their verdict.** Clearly, post-verdict statements
of a juror, without more, which reflect certain beliefs, con-
sidered by some to be unconventional, neither meet the
high standards mandated by the Supreme Court and the
Second Circuit; nor justify tearing down the veil of secre-
cy which properly protects the jury’s deliberations.
United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892); United States v. Silverman,
449 F.2d 1341, 1344 (2nd Cir. 1971) ; Ford v. United States, 201
F.2d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 1953).
* Frazier, 335 U.S. at 513. Sce also Clark, 289 U.S. at 14;
McDonald, 238 U.S. at 268-269; Mattoz, 146 U.S. at 149.
*6 Even the “‘mere opportunity for prejudice or corruption’’
may not be a sufficient showing. As Mr. Justice Holmes stated
in Hold v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 251 (1910), ‘‘If the mere
opportunity for prejudice or corruption is to raise a presumption
that they exist, it will be hard to maintain a jury trial under the
conditions of the present day.’’
SRE ARI as ni RAE. VE YPN OA LEPC <a
17
Furthermore, if the jurors were permitted to testify,
questions relating to the motives and influences which af-
fected their deliberations would be improper. As Judge
Timbers has pointed out
Few doctrines are more firmly established in our
jurisprudence than the proposition that the validity
of a verdict may not be attacked, and hence a new trial
will not be granted, upon a showing of the mental op-
erations and emotional reactions of jurors in reaching
a particular verdict.
United States v. Reed, 313 F.Supp. 451, 454 (D. Conn. 1970).
This rule, which was adopted by the Supreme Court in
Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892), has been con-
sistently reaffirmed both by the Supreme Court* and the
Second Circuit.** Mattox drew the distinction between prop-
*7 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (1952) ; Hyde v. United
States, 225 U.S. 347, 382-384 (1911); Mattox v. United States,
146 U.S. 140 (1892).
“8 United States v. Miller, 403 F.2d 77, 83-84 n. 11 (2nd Cir.
1968); United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1961),
cert. denied sub. nom. Mittelman v. United States, 368 U.S. 984
(1962) ; United States v. Grieco, 261 F.2d 414 (2nd Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907 (1959); Rotondo v. Isthmian Steam-
ship Co., 243 F.2d 581, 583 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834
(1957) ; United States v. Reed, 313 F.Supp. 451, 454 (D. Conn.
1970), aff'd 487 F.2d 57 (2nd Cir. 1971). Other circuits have
also continued to follow this rule. See, e.g. Armstrong v. United
States, 228 F.2d 764, 769 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 918
(1956) ; Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739, 745 (4th Cir.) cert.
denied 335 U.S. 826 (1948); Young v. United States, 163 F.2d
187, 188-190 (10th Cir.), cert. denicd 332 U.S. 770 (1947). The
ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, ap-
proved, in 1968, the following standard relating to impeachment
of a verdict.
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, no evidence
shall be received to show the effect of any statement, conduct,
erg el ae a
Bea ia eit bas eS ee a ae eal Ga
DLO RAMS SA SOLD PCIE A ENE BORE
18
er and improper testimony: testimony as to objective mat-
ters (‘‘any facts bearing upon the question of the existence
of any extraneous influences’’) was declared to be proper;
however, testimony as to subjective matters (‘‘how far that
influence operated upon his [the juror’s] mind’’) was
deemed to be improper. 146 U.S. at 149.
The refusal of the Second Cireuit to deviate from this
rule is amply supported by their decisions. In Rotondo v.
Isthmian Steamship Co. 243 F.2d 581 (2d Cir. 1957), a per
curiam opinion, the court refused to allow a post-verdict
examination of the jury, stating
it is completely well settled that, when objection rests
upon the jurors’ testimony as to what were the rea-
sons that in fact induced them to find their verdict, the
court will not hear them.
243 F.2d at 583 (citations omitted). Moreover, in United
States v. Crosby; 299 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied
sub. nom. Mittelman v. United States, 368 U.S. 984 (1962),
the Mattox subjective-objective limitation on the scope of
inquiry was specifically relied upon in rejecting a request
for a post-verdict examination of jurors. In Crosby, the
defendants claimed that the jury’s deliberations were
tainted by the use and knowledge of information obtained
from news accounts. Citing Mattox, the Court of Appeals
acknowledged that juror testimony could be received ‘‘to
prove the fact that they read the newspapers,’’ 294 F.2d at
949, but not to establish the effect of such knowledge upon
event or condition upon the mind of a juror or concerning
the mental processes by which the verdict was determined.
ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Trial
by Jury, § 5.7(a) (1968).
Dm CN EIS eA Dee LE
19
their reasoning. Thus, as Judge Friendly declared in
Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1968), ‘‘any
relaxation of the Mattox rule’’ relating to a post-verdict
inquiry into a juror’s mental process would be viewed with
‘‘apprehension”’ by this court. 403 F.2d at 84 n. 11.
Continued adherence to these rules is reasonable. To
permit a disappointed litigant to distort certain facts, in-
nocent on their face, as a basis for attacking a jury’s ver-
dict, would be to open the proverbial Pandora’s box. As
Judge Smith said in Crosby, and Judge Friendly subse-
quently adopted in Miller,
There are many cogent reasons militating against
post-verdict inquiry into jurors’ motives for decision.
The jurors themselves ought not be subjected to har-
assment; the courts ought not be burdened with large
numbers of applications mostly without real merit; the
chances and temptations for tampering ought not be
increased; verdicts ought not be made so uncertain.
United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d at 950; Miller v. United
States, 403 F.2d at 82.*° In addition, to permit a verdict,
to be reopened without a sufficient basis,in fact, would be
*° The Court of Appeals held that the refusal to ‘‘examine the
jurors as to their mental process’’ was not error by the district
court. 294 F.2d at 950.
%°TIn State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118 A.2d. 812 (1955), the
Court stated :
The better reasoned decisions support the exclusion of jurors’
testimony as to their mental processes . . . upon the sounder
ground that, being personal to each juror, the working of
the mind of any of them cannot be subjected to the test of
other testimony, and therefore .. . such testimony should not
be received to overthrow the verdict to which all assented.
118 A.2d at 816 (citations omitted.)
20
to seriously impair the integrity of a verdict. And, by di-
luting the efficacy of a jury’s pronouncement, the constitu-
tional guarantee of trial by jury, asserted by defendants,
would also be weakened; for the integrity of a jury’s ver-
dict is an undeniable cornerstone of this Sixth Amendment
right. Cf. United States ex rel. Daverse v. Hohn, 198 F.2d
934, 938 (Srd Cir. 1950). Therefore, before an assault on
a verdict receives judicial approval, the Supreme Court’s
warning in McDonald v. Pless should be considered:
But let it once be established that verdicts solemniy
made and publicly returned into court can be attacked
and set aside on the testimony of those who took part
in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many
would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of discov-
ering something which might invalidate the finding.
Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated
party in an effort to secure from them evidence of
facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set
aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus
used, the result would be to make what was intended
to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of
public investigation—to the destruction of all frank-
ness and freedom of discussion and conference.
238 U.S. at 267-268.
Considering the instant case, I do not believe that the
facts justify the reopening of the jury’s verdict. Defend-
ants have not offered any evidence of a separate, unrelated
determination of mental incompetency. Nor have they sus-
tained their burden of overcoming the presumption of
sanity which protects the juror. The most that can be said
of their shallow showing is that it invites a ‘‘fishing ex-
pedition into a juror’s compentency.’’ This cannot be
countenanced. Moreover, there was nothing in the de-
21
meanor of the juror during voir dire, trial or deliberations
to indicate that she was anything but competent to serve
on the jury. On voir dire, ihe jurors were asked group
questions in an effort to elicit from them their feelings of
bias or prejudice which would prevent them from render-
ing a fair and impartial verdict." In direct colloquy with
*! The jurors were asked the following group questions relating
to bias and prejudice:
Does any juror have any mental reservation as to the ac-
ceptance of these principles of law?
And I would assume in response to each and every one of
my questions that your silence indicates that you do not.
Do you have any preconceived ideas or prejudices that
would prevent or hinder you from following the instructions
that the Court will give you in greater detail at a later time
and the principles of law which have just recently been out-
lined for you? -s
Does any juror have any prejudice or bias for or against
any point of view concerning the charges summarized for you
from the indictment?
Does any juror know or has any juror or member of his
family or any associate had any dealings, either directly or
indirectly, with the defendants named in the indictment and
presently on trial before you or, for that matter, with any
member of their families or friends or associates?
Has any past experience of a juror in any way whatso-
ever caused a juror to doubt his ability to sit as a completely
impartial and unbiased trier of the facts? Ladies and gentle-
men, I have tried in these questions to direct your attention
to possible reasons you might not be able to sit as a fair juror.
Let me now ask you quite apart from any prior questions,
does any juror have the slightest doubt in his mind for any
reason whatsover that he would be able to serve conscien-
tiously, fairly and impartially in this case and render a true
and just verdict according to the law as it will be explained?
Let me try it a different way. I am sure you can recognize
that even if I sat here until eternity caught up with me and
if I had the infinite judgment of our diety I could not pos-
22
me, the juror answered directly and responsively, stating
that she understood my questions and comments, and speci-
fying the particular ones which applied to her. Nothing
in her responses and demeanor indicated that her reason-
ing abilities or mental processes were deficient. Indeed,
her ability to recall my questions applicable to her, con-
veyed the opposite impression. Likewise, during the three
weeks of trial and three days and nights of deliberations,
I did not notice anything unusual about her. Nor was any-
thing unusual concerning her brought to my attention by
either the attorneys or jurors. (1 might add that the at-
torneys and the jurors were always quick to bring matters
to my attention which they thought of moment).
sibly be secure that I have covered every possible question
which would root out and bring to the surface any possible
prejudice which is important to a consideration of this case.
Il am not unaware that all of us, without exception, are the
subject of various conditioning influences that we acquire
in life’s work and by virtue of experiences which either bruises
us or elevates us, but what you are asked to do as jurors is
to sublimate any prejudices or any bias which you may have
in determining the facts of the case and to accept the law as
given you.
So what I am attempting to find out, and essentially this
must rely upon your honesty, your good faith and your will-
ingness to be candid with the Court, what I want to find out
is upon an examination of yourselves, can you say that you
can sit fairly and impartially in judgment in this case should
you ultimately be chosen to serve?
Do you have any doubt whatsoever about your ability to
render a fair and impartial verdict upon the facts in evidence
and the law to be applied to those facts?
Soul searching is what is necessary at this point because
essentially, really regardless of how you answer any ques-
tions, the fact of the matter remains that I must appeal to
your honesty and your sense of fairness to reveal to the Court
any sense or any feeling which might make it difficult or im-
possible for you to render a fair and impartial verdict.
Transcript of January 4, 1973, at pp. 10, 21-23.
23
The defendants’ second request that the verdicts be set
aside even without a hearing is utterly without foundation.
A showing which is too weak to permit an inquiry into the
jury’s deliberations is, a fortiori, too weak to warrant a
new trial. Also, based upon a comparison of the facts of
this case with the facts of those cases in which mental in-
competency was alleged by movants and rejected by the
courts, it is clear that defendants’ showing is too weak to
justify setting aside the verdict.
*2 In all cases in which a juror’s incompetency has been alleged
as a basis for attacking a verdict, the courts, for differing reasons,
have been unanimous in refusing to grant a new trial. Thus, for
example, in Iverson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 126 N.J.L.
280, 19 A.2d 214 (1941), within a week after a verdict was ren-
dered, a juror was found to be suffering from a type of insanity
‘‘which conjures up an imaginary world and results in a loss of
‘contact with reality.”’’ 19 A.2d at 218. Nevertheless, the trial
court refused to grant a new trial because ‘‘it was not shown that
the juror was so incompetent at trial as not to be able to com-
prehend ‘the nature and quality’ of his acts.’’ Jd. In State v. Welty,
65 Wash. 244, 118 P.9 (1911), a juror, prior to trial, had been
twice adjudged insane and committed to and discharged from an
asylum. Five months after trial, the juror was again adjudged in-
sane and committed to an asylum. The trial court denied defend-
ant’s motion for a new trial and the Supreme Court of Washington
affirmed. In Anderson v. State, 54 Ariz. 387, 96 P.2d 281 (1939),
the juror in question was declared incompetent to manage his own
24
Accordingly, defendants’ motion is denied.
So ordered.
DAVID N. EDELSTEIN,
Chief U.S.D.J.
Dated: New York, New York
July 18, 1973
affairs *‘some months’’ before trial, and remained under the dis-
ability throughout the trial. The Supreme Court of Arizona up-
held the trial court’s rejection of defendant’s motion for a new
trial, holding that only a declaration of insanity, without the
requisite restoration to sanity, would be sufficient to disqualify a
juror. Similarly in Grand Lodge A.O.U.W. of Ark. v. Wood, 113
Ark. 502, 168 S.W. 1070 (1914), the juror in question had been
adjudged insane ‘‘[s]everal months before the trial’? and had been
committed to the appropriate state hospital. Although he was re-
leased after a *‘short period’’ of confinement the juror was never
legally restored to sanity. Admitting that the juror was disquali-
fied to serve, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, nevertheless re-
fused to order a new trial. The court reasoned that the disquali-
fication was merely a technical violation of the statute which estab-
lished qualifications for jurors, and therefore did not warrant a
new trial.
Sce also the cases listed in n. 8, supra.
25
Appendix 2.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For tHe Seconp Circuit
Nos. 113-114—September Term, 1973.
(Argued September 13, 1973 Decided January 4, 1974.)
Docket Nos. 73-1759, 73-1769
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JOHN DIOGUARDI ayn LOUIS OSTRER,
Defendants-A ppellants.
Before:
LuMBarD, FRIENDLY AND FEINBERG,
Circuit Judges.
Appeal from convictions, after a jury verdict, in the
District Court for the Southern District, David N. Edel-
stein, Chief Judge, for violations of the federal securities
laws (15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 77x, 78j(b) and 78ff), Rule 10b-5
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (17 CFR 240.
10b-5), and federal mail fraud statute (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341),
and for conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371); and from a denial
of new trial motions for alleged incompetency on the part
of a juror contrary to 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (4).
Affirmed.
Tes é
RL mye am
26
Haroitp F. McGuime, Jr., Assistant United States Attor-
ney for the Southern District of New York (Paul J.
Curran, United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, S. Andrew Schaffer and John
W. Nields, Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys
for the Southern District of New York, on the brief),
for Appellee.
GretcHEN Wuire Oserman, New York, New York (Jay
Goldberg, on the brief), for Appellant Dioguardi.
SHetpon H. Eisen, New York, New York (Orans, Elsen
& Polstein, Lewis Shapiro, Anthony J. Ferrara and
Henry J. Boitel, on the brief), for Appellant Ostrer.
Lumsagrp, Circuit Judge:
John Dioguardi and Louis Ostrer appeal from judgments
of conviction entered on April 12, 1973, after a three-week
jury trial held in January 1973 in the Southern District,
and from the denial by Chief Judge Edelstein of new trial
motions. The forty-count indictment was filed May 27, 1971,
against the appellants and seven others ' Count one charged
the defendants with conspiring, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 to violate provisions of the federal securities laws
and regulations, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 77x, 78j(b), and 78ff,
1 Of the seven other defendants named in the indictment, three
entered guilty pleas (Michael Hellerman, Fred Goodman, and
Michael Caricato). Three were tried jointly in a separate trial
and were convicted of one or two offenses (Gary Fredericks,
Richard Greenberg, and Anthony Soldano), see United States v.
Greenberg, doe. no. 72-2368 (2d Cir.), aff’d from the bench, Feb.
16, 1973. The case of the seventh defendant (Morris Winter) was
not tried in view of his cooperation with the government and his
guilty plea in a related case. Winter, Hellerman, and Goodman
testified for the government, as did Steven Schoengold and Bruce
Halpern, both named as co-conspirators.
ow
sve oe mr te
27
and Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR 240.10b-5,? and the federal mail
and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343. The
remaining counts charged substantive violations of these
same provisions, except 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
On January 26, 1973, the jury found Ostrer guilty on
eleven of the seventeen counts submitted to them by the
court, and Dioguardi on four of the nineteen counts sub-
mitted as to him* Prior to sentencing, the defendants
moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, for an evi-
dentiary hearing. The basis for this motion was an un-
solicited letter from one of the jurors to Dioguardi which
allegedly established the incompetency of that juror. In
reliance on this, and on the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1865
*15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) codifies section 17(a) of the Securities Act
of 1933, prohibiting fraud in the sale of securities. Wilful viola-
tion of this section is made criminally punishable by section 24 of
the Securities Act of 1933, now 15 U.S.C. § 77x. Rule 10b-5 of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (17 C.F.R. ¢ 240.10b-5),
which prohibits fraud or the use of manipulative devices in both
the purchase and sale of securities, was promulgated under 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b), originally section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. Wilful violation of this rule is made crim-
inally punishable by section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, now 15 U.S.C. § 78ff.
3 Both defendants were found guilty on the conspiracy count
(18 U.S.C. § 371). Ostrer was found guilty on the following sub-
stantive counts :
9—Causing a sale confirmation to be placed in the mail in
furtherance of a fraudulent scheme for the sale of stock (15
U.S.C. §§ Tiq(a), T7x) ;
16 through 19—Causing purchase confirmation to be placed
in the mail as part of a manipulative device in contravention
of Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; 15 U.S.C. §$§ 78j(b),
78ff) ;
31, 33 through 36—Use of the mails as part of a scheme to
defraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341).
Dioguardi was found guilty on only three of the substantive
counts: 16, 17, and 31.
basa 25d 2 Rnanteh to) Tete anette anil, Mev ae |
Re eee
28
(b)(4), they claim that they had been deprived of their
right to have their case heard and decided by a panel
of twelve competent jurors. Judge Edelstein denied the
motion on April 12th. He sentenced Dioguardi to nine
years’ imprisonment and a $30,000 fine, and Ostrer to three
years’ imprisonment and a $55,000 fine. *
In addition to their objections relating to alleged juror
incompetency, the defendants raise four other claims of
error in the conduct of the trial: first, that the govern-
ment prosecutor’s argument in summation, to the effect
that neither defendant called witnesses to contradict the
governnent’s testimony, was improper comment on each
appellant’s failure to testify in view of the assertion by
each that he alone was in a position to contradict the
government’s witnesses; secondly, that it was error for
the trial court to have refused to charge, as requested,
that the testimony of admitted perjurers and felons was
to be scrutinized with care and caution; thirdly, that it
was improper for the trial court to have ruled that Dio-
guardi’s acquittal of another crime could not be proved
when the government intended to utilize the acts underly-
ing the acquittal to show a prior course of illegal con-
duct; finally that consecutive sentences for Dioguardi on
two of the counts charging securities law violations, counts
16 and 17, were improper since the underlying facts con-
stituted only a single offense.
4 The sentences imposed by Judge Edelstein were as follows: in
the case of Dioguardi, a prison term of 5 years and a $10,000 fine
on count 1, 2 years and $10,000 on count 16 and similarly on count
17, and 5 years and $1000 on count 31; and in the case of Ostrer,
3 years and a $10,000 fine on count 1, 3 years and a $5000 fine on
count 9, 2 years and a $10,000 fine on each of counts 16 through 19,
3 years on each of counts 31 and 33 through 35, and 5 years on
count 36. Dioguardi’s prison terms are consecutive, Ostrer’s con-
current. The sentence imposed on Dioguardi on count 31 was
suspended, with five years’ probation. The sentence imposed on
Ostrer on count 36 was also suspended, with one day’s probation.
29
We find the defendants’ arguments unpersuasive and
we accordingly affirm the convictions below and let Dio-
guardi’s sentences stand.
1.
The evidence at trial revealed a scheme to manipulate
the price of the stock of Belmont Franchising Corporation
(‘*Belmont’’), a substantially worthless over-the-counter
security. The book value of the stock was almost negli-
gible (Belmont’s assets were essentially paper holdings
in other concerns); it had been traded for only a short
time and for at most a few dollars a share®
In January of 1970, Michael Hellerman, who pleaded
guilty and testified for the government, began steps to
5 Belmont’s initial offering of stock to the public was made in the
spring of 1969. In an offering circular dated March 21, 1969, and
under the statutory exemption from registration for small issues,
Belmont offered 100,000 shares out of an authorized 1,000,000, par
value 1¢, at an offering price of $3 a share. The circular stated
that the offering was speculative and that the price of the shares
bore no relation to the book value of the company. In fact, at the
time, Belmont’s total assets amounted to roughly $10,000 and its
liabilities to roughly $7000.
By October 20, 1969, according to the 2A form filed by Belmont
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on that date, only
870 shares of the offering had been sold, with 99,130 unsold shares
remaining.
On January 2, 1970, in exchange for a total of 195,000 restricted
shares of Belmont stock, Belmont acquired 100% holdings in three
other concerns: Top Secret International Programming, Slimo-
rama International Corp., and Wonderful World of Grooming.
Prior sales of these newly-acquired companies amounted to merely
a few thousands of dollars, and net profits for each were about
$1000. Nonetheless they listed total assets slightly in excess of
$1,000,000. Top Secret International Programming listed a ‘‘com-
puter program’’ value at $500,000, and the other two enterprises
each listed ‘‘formula rights’’ valued at $250,000... These assets
were reflected in supplementary notes in Belmont’s financial state-
ments for the end of 1969, but the underlying statements of the
“hip BR cis EARLE RAT
:
;
30
drive up the price of Belmont stock, first tu $5 or $6 a
share and then to nearly $50 a share. At thai time two
stock manipulators, Anthony Soldano and Fred Goodman,
in concert with Hellerman, commenced acquiring substan-
tially all of the 28,720 known publicly tradeable shares of
Belmont. Goodman and Soldano executed their purchases
ostensibly through the open market, using brokers who
quoted prices for Belmont through the National Quota-
tion Bureau’s pink sheets for over-the-counter securities.
These purchases created the appearance of an active pub-
lic market in the stock.
By early March, 1970 Goodman and Soldano had caused
the market price of Belmont as quoted in the pink sheets
to reach $15 a share. They did this primarily through
directions to their brokers, who traded small quantities
of the stock among themselves. In the meantime, Good-
man and Soldano had acquired control, they believed, of
all the outstanding stock.
At this point Hellerman’s role became paramount. Ac-
cording to his testimony, he already had an understanding
with Dioguardi that ‘‘whatever I did in the future ,...
he would have 25 per cent.’’ It had also been agreed
between Hellerman, on one side, and Goodman and Sol-
dano on the other that once the price of Belmont stock
reached $15, Hellerman and his associates would purchase
all the stock at the $15 level, with a $5 per share kickback,
prior to further manipulation upwards. In confirming this
arrangement with Goodman and Soldano, Hellerman took
Soldano to Dioguardi’s office ‘‘to make sure it was on the
record,’’
three subsidiaries, conveniently acquired after the start of the year,
were unaudited.
Belmont’s second 2A statement, filed with the SEC in April,
1970, indicated that 28,720 shares of the March 21, 1969, offering
had been sold, and that no more of the original 100,000 shares were
still being offered.
31
According to Hellerman, it was at this time in early
March that he brought Ostrer into the scheme, although
the two were only recently acquainted. Ostrer agreed to
commit himself to buy 14,000 shares of Belmont at $15
a share ($210,000 total), with the understanding that he
would split any future profits with Hellerman, that Heller-
man would guarantee him against loss, and that a loan
of the purchase money would be arranged so that he would
not have to ‘‘lay out a quarter’’ of the $210,000. Purchase
orders in Ostrer’s name or in his behalf were to be made
through various New York Stock Exchange firms.
Ostrer then placed crders in his own name and in his
sister’s for 14,000 shares of Belmont. However, most Ex-
change firms which he approached refused to accept his
orders, and he was forced to place relatively large block
orders through firms where brokers were already in league
with Hellerman. °
Contemporaneously, Hellerman made arrangements with
others to purchase the remaining 14,000 or so shares of
Belmont. These individuals were able to pay the selling
brokers (at the $15 a share price), but Ostrer was unable
to raise the $210,000 needed to ‘‘hold up’’ his end of the
deal, a circumstance which left his brokers unpaid. Ac-
cording to Hellerman, he thereupon obtained a loan for
Ostrer through Dioguardi. The funds, totalling $60,000,
came from Hickey DiLorenzo, at an interest rate of 142%
a week. DiLorenzo also demanded and received $24,000
from Hellerman for this favor (pari of the kickback
® Among these orders were ones through Bruce & Co. on March
10, 1970, for 2000 shares, and through Kelsey & Co. on Mareh 11,
1970, for 3500 shares. Co-conspirator Bruce Halpern (see fn, 1
supra) was a principal of Bruce & Co. Co-conspirator Schoengold
was a vice president of Kelsey & Co., and Hellerman was an un-
disclosed owner of Kelsey.
These particular purchases on March 10th and 11th are relevant
to defendant Dioguardi’s challenge (discussed further below) to
alleged pyramiding of offenses.
Le ie 65 Aba Fas ee PE AS eT eee
32
profits already made). In addition, Hellerman also ad-
vanced Ostrer $52,500, and Ostrer obtained the balance he
needed from other sources.
Thereafter, from the end of March through late April,
1970, Hellerman directed purchases and sales of Belmont
stock at ever-increasing prices among the individuals and
brokers whom he controlled. He kept Dioguardi, Ostrer,
_ and DiLorenzo informed as the price rose. He also arranged
for Ostrer to sell off enough stock, through a nominee, to
repay the $60,000 loan from DiLorenzo—with a $1700 profit
left over which he split with Ostrer. By the end of April
he had received approximately $140,000 in kickbacks from
Goodman and Soldano. He gave $30,000 to Dioguardi, and
invested $9,000 more in a business in which Dioguardi had
an interest.
In early May, 1970, the scheme failed. The president of
Belmont, through a broker unknown to the manipulators,
began to sell heavily his own ‘‘investment’’ stock in the
corporation. The market was unable to absorb’ the sales,
and Hellerman was unwilling to buy the stock and could not
find other purchasers. Consequently the market for Bel-
mont collapsed, leaving Ostrer (among others) with large
quantities of unsold stock. Ostrer then tried to hold Heller-
man responsible for his losses. Hellerman became worried
because DiLorenzo took Ostrer’s side. Dioguardi subse-
quently arbitrated the dispute to some extent, and arranged
for partial compensation to Ostrer to the sum of $25,000.
At trial Dioguardi called no witnesses and based his de-
fense primarily on cross-cxamination going to the lack
of credibility of the government’s major witnesses, who
were all accomplices, Ostrer did not testify but he did call
two witnesses whose testimony indicated that Ostrer had
been a ‘‘victim’’ of Hellerman’s machinations,
About ten days after trial, Dioguardi received a letter
from one of the jurors, Miss Genena Rush, a nurse’s aide
33
employed at Flower Fifth Avenue Hospital in New York
City. The letter was written on stationery bearing the
zodiac sign of Libra, and on one page the legend that it
was ‘‘the heavenly house under which I was born.’’ The
juror wrote of her clairvoyant powers which enabled her
to see that Dioguardi was basically a good person. She
stated her belief that he was guilty, ‘‘Your mistake your
guilty,’’ and questioned him about Hellerman, ‘‘Why you
let such a relationship exist between you and a man like
Hellerman?,’’ and called upon him to repent, ‘‘One word
appear before me repent. If you repent and run a clean
business it is the good within you that will save you, and
you will gain what you have lost.’’ Miss Rush stated that
I have eyes and ears that I can see things before it
happen. I can tell you about other and what they are
thinking and doing.
and that her eyes
are only partly open .... Unfortunate, a curse was
put upon them some years ago. I have some people
working on them.
The letter is reproduced in full in the margin. *
7™ Miss Rush’s letter reads as follows:
521 W 152 Street, New York, N.Y. 10031
February 8th—1973
Dear Mr. Dioguardi,
Under the situation and such circumstance T hope that I
have made the right decision. I talk to my friends Bertha and
her husband Olive about this, Olive agree that I write to you.
Bertha, however, was against it. Nevertheless, I felt I had to
write you. I cannot omit what I have seen. When I saw the
good within you and how hard your wife was trying; I prayed
about it. One word appear before me repent. If you repent
and run a clean business it is the good within you that will
save you, and you will gain what you have lost. Before T
continue T must explain something to you. I have eyes and
34
Dioguardi’s attorneys sent copies of the letter to seven
psychiatrists, all of whom responded (one in an affidavit)
ears that | can see things before it happen. I can tell you
about other and what they are thinking and doing. If I am
wrong about this it is the first time.
I would like to visit you. I would like to talk to you about
what appear before me. 1 would like to do so when my eyes
fully open. They are only partly open. | don’t know at the
present when they will open. Unfortunate, a curse was put
upon them some years ago. I have some people working on
them. Everything is being done that can be done. So we
will have to wait. As I stated I cannot omit what appear be-
fore me, when I was on the jury bench. You feel that this
is the end for you. However, it is not. Something appear
before me that I must do. It is the good within you that I
must use and within that good, you will gain what you have
lost. If, however, I am wrong it is the first time.
Why, you let such a relationship exist between you and a
man like Hellerman? When I think of the good that I saw
within you it does not add up. Where did Hellerman get those
fur coats? Does he have any for sail? Omit the question.
I really can't afford one, and if I probably be afraid to wear it.
Why persecute your wife? Your mistake your guilty then
take it out on her. The ordeal you put her through I wonder
how she survive through it. One word appear before me brave.
She is a brave girl. She love you. She never stop loving you
not a single moment. Tell her to please be careful. From
what I can see she is still in business. I suggest it is not wise
at*this time. I believe she is being watch.
That was a good lawyer you had. I entain to send him some
custom as soon as my eyes open.
Tell Ostrer I am praying for him.
Mr. Dioguardi, I want to ask a favor of you please.
I want you to look upon me as a woman and I look upon
you as a man and not white man and black woman. Olive
agree with me.
Let’s leave color out, OK.
I was told you will only have to serve one third of the time
given. So relax this is not the end. Soon you will be free.
When I call the Federal information center and the record
room yesterday they all know you. They all seem to have it
in for you. Its seated deep within them like a personal matter.
. Sin . ely,
Genena
35
to the effect that, in their opinion, what Miss Rush had
written indicated hallucinatory tendencies, symptoms of
possible psychosis, paranoia, and grandiosity, and in gen-
eral an inability to appreciate reality without fantasizing. *
The psychiatrists also pointed out that further psychiatric
analysis was needed before a diagnosis could be ventured
with any certainty, or before it could be said that Miss
Rush’s infirmities, whatever their nature and extent, might
have rendered her unable to comprehend the proceedings at
triel.* The psychiatrists were given no information about
The letter sheets were printed with the word ‘‘LIBRA’”’ and a pic-
ture of a woman with scales. On the last page of the letter, under
the picture, Miss Rush wrote, ‘‘The sign Libra is the heavenly
house of the zodiac under which I was born.’’ The letter was ad-
dressed to ‘‘Mr. John Dioguardi, Federal Correction Institution,
Dan Bury, Conn. 06813.”
8 The copy of the letter which Dioguardi’s attorneys used at first
was not the original from Jaror Rush. Rather it was a hand-
written copy which Dioguardi had made of the original and which
he had forwarded to them. Somewhere in transcribing the word
‘‘omit’’ was changed to ‘‘admit’’ in the fifth sentence of the first
paragraph and also in the ninth sentence of the second paragraph.
Thus ‘‘I cannot omit what I have seen . . .”’ became ‘‘I cannot
admit what I have seen .. .”” and, similarly, ‘‘I cannot omit what
appear before me . . .’” became “‘I cannot admit what appear be-
fore me....’’ Six of the seven psychiatrists (all except Dr. Port-
now) received their copy of the letter in this incorrect form. These
errors may have influenced their reading and subsequent analysis
of the letter, but we do not think significantly. The defendants’
contentions concerning the competency of Miss Rush rest as much
on the letter taken as a whole as on any particular sentences. While
not belittling its importance, we do not think that reliance on the
incorrect word ‘‘admit’’ was, as the government contended, ‘‘the
cornerstone of [the] various psychiatric opinions.”’
® The supporting letters of the psychiatrists and the affidavit of
Dr. Portnow need not be set out at length. Samples of their con-
clusions are as follows:
1.) Dr. Stanley L. Portnow (affidavit of April 2. 1973) :
[T]he letter makes a positive presumptive showing that . . .
the juror suffered from a chronic psychotie thought disorder
the juror or about the trial and the issues, and the court
had forbidden anyone to seek to interview her.
which so severed her relationship with reaiiiy that she was un-
able to exercise critical judgment or to function in an un-
biased manner in the evaluation of evidence produced at the
trial. Indeed, it would appear that her unsoundness of mind
was so overwhelming that she was subject to auditory and
visual hallucinations, delusions and a belief in her own omni-
potence.
The exact nature of the type of psychosis which the juror is
afflicted, can be further investigated. ... Such an investiga-
tion would entail clinical psychiatric interviews and, of par-
ticular importance, psychological testing. . . .
2.) Dr. Samuel C. Karlan (letter of March 15, 1973) :
It is clear from this letter that this patient is having imagi-
nations about what she can see and what she can do and these
are in the form of visual! hallucinations and apparently audi-
tory hallucinations. It is also clear from this letter that she
had these visions while she was on the jury.
It is therefore my opinion that the letter is evidence that
this patient underwent a psychotic episode while she was ou
the jury and while she wrote this letter, which is suggestive
of a schizophrenic mechanism and that she was not in contact
with reality.
3.) Dr. Robert W. Damino (letter of March 15, 1973) :
The contents of the letter written by Gemena (sic) Rush
indicate that she is substantially disturbed in reality relation-
ships . . . that she was having visual hallucinations . . . [and]
that this woman was making an identification with the ac-
[A]t the time she served on the jury she was utterly incapable
of thinking logically as to the evidence, and utterly incapable
of properly evaluating the evidence.
4.) Dr. Jerry C. Atkins (letter of March 16, 1973) :
My impression is judging from this letter Miss Rush would
have had great difficulty exercising sound judgment during
the trial mentioned in her letter. Her religious convictions
could be classified aS’ being ideas of grandiosity and further-
more there is evidence of auditory and visual halucinations
(sic) in her description of herself.
5.) Dr. John J. Vetter (letter of March 15, 1973) :
[T]here is clear cut evidence of mental disorder.... The
abnormal thinking processes, impairment of judgment, halluci-
37
On the basis of Miss Rush’s letter and the opinions of
the psychiatrists, Dioguardi and Ostrer moved pursuant
natory experience and delusional belief directly involving the
case at hand, would indicate an incapacity, by reason of mental
infirmity, to render efficient jury service, or to have functioned
efficiently as a juror in the case concerned.
6.) Dr. Arnold H. Zucker (letter of March 5, 1973) :
The writer is emotionally involved with Mr. Dioguardi, in
an intensive manner.
The writer is concerned with Mr. Dioguardi’s welfare and
fate.
The writer wishes to be helpful and supportive.
The writer believes: she possesses powers of clairvoyance and
feels impelled to act upon her revelations.
The writer experiences guilt about Mr. Dioguardi’s incar-
ceration. She is conwinced about his ‘‘bad’’ behavior (wrong-
doing, association with ‘‘a man like Hellerman’’) but ‘‘sees””
the ‘‘good’’ in him. Her responses are somewhat appropriate
in the context of her educational, cultural, and religious back-
ground. To alleviate her guilt feelings an ‘save’? Mr. Dio-
guardi, she urges him to ‘‘repent’’, mend his ways, and main-
I believe that the data suggests the following psychodiag-
nostic impressions, which require clinical confirmation (psy-
chiatric evaluation of the writer).
1. Above the culttural-religious beliefs, autistic (patholog-
ical fantasy preoccupation) frends are indicated . .. .
2. Paranoid trend's are significant. . . .
[M]y psychiatric impression is that of a highly paranoid,
autistically preoccupied (probably psychotic ) individual, who
has maintained fairly adequate external controls and function-
ing, but who may be decompensating due to the strong emo-
tions produced by her role in the trial.
) Dr. Donald M. Brough (letter of February 28, 1973) :
[T ]his letter was written consciously with every good inten-
tion on the part of Mrs. (sic) Rush in an effort to behelpful
to Mr. Dioguardi. Hiowever, . . . the writer was here showing
evidence of being Inallucinated, delusional and would prove
to be suffering from a Paranoid Condition.
Taking it in a far- less literal fashion, allowing the greatest
degree of latitude imterpreting what she wrote, so that it can
en ee Ee ee ee
38
to Rule 33, F.R.Crim.P., for a new trial or, in the alterna-
tive, for an evidentiary hearing on the competency of Miss
Rush as a juror. They asserted that an uncontroverted
showing of incompetency had been made out, in violation
of 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(4) and their constitutional rights. ”
Judge Edelstein, after hearing oral arguments and re-
ceiving briefs, denied the motion for a new trial and <
further investigation of the juror’s competency on Apri
12, 1973, and later filed a thorough and considered opinion
on July 18, 1973. He stated:
be taken as a somewhat picturesque, idiosyncratic expression
of her ideas, influenced by educational, cultural and religious
factors, I still would find important grounds for believing
that the letter shows that she was involved in this situation
in a very unreal and unusual way.
In my opinion it is most likely that she is, in fact, suffering
from a Paranoid Condition in which she has hallucinatory
experiences and delusional thinking.
Whatever the court may consider the proper steps to take
in regard to any other aspect of the case, it would be my hope
that further psychiatric examination would be gently encour-
aged upon her, and that she would be willing to cooperate.
#28 U.S.C. § 1865, which is part of the Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968, P.L. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53, provides in relevant
part as follows:
(b) In making such determination [whether a juror is
qualified to serve] the chief judge of the district court, or
such other district court judge as the plan may provide, shall
deem any person qualified to serve on grand and petit juries
unless he...
(4) is incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmity,
to render satisfactory jury service. .. .
The Act provides no guidelines, however, for what procedures are
to be followed where there is, after trial, discovery of possible
grounds for juror disqualification. However, see fn. 12, below. See
also ABA Standards Relating to Trial by Jury, Parts IT, V, and
Commentary (Approved Draft 1968).
39
Moreover, there was nothing in the demeanor of the
juror during voir dire, trial or deliberations to indicate
that she was anything but competent to serve on the
jury. On voir dire, the jurors were asked group ques-
tions in an effort to elicit from them their feelings
of bias or prejudice which would prevent them from
rendering a fair and impartial verdict. [footnote
omitted] In direct colloquy with me, the juror an-
swered directly and responsively, stating that she un-
derstood my questions and comments, and specifying
the particular ones which applied to her. Nothing in
her responses and demeanor indicated that her rea-
soning abilities or mental processes were deficient. In-
deed, her ability to recall my questions applicable to
her, conveyed the opposite impression. Likewise, during
the three weeks of trial and three days and nights of
deliberations, I did not notice anything unusual about
her. Nor was anything unusual concerning her brought
to my attention by either the attorneys or jurors.
Examination of the juror on the voir dire had disclosed
that she was then employed by Flower Fifth Avenue Hos-
pital as a patient attendant assisting the nurses and had
been so employed for four years. In answer to the court’s
question as to whether any questions or comments applied
to her, she stated that in 1944 she was employed by the
Navy Department in Cleveland as assistant to the foreman
in the cleaning department. Prior to her current hospital
employment she was a silk finisher in a cleaning shop in
the Bronx.
II.
A—Competency of Juror Rush -
It is well settled that only clear evidence of a juror’s in-
competence to understand the issues and to deliberate at
ad
eT eee nae
40
the time of his service requires setting aside a verdict. And
only strong evidence that it is likely that the juror suf-
fered from such incompetence during jury service will
justify an inquiry into whether such incompetence in fact
did exist. In our view the juror’s letter, and the essentially
horseback uninformed opinions of the psychiatrists regard-
ing the letter, fall considerably short of justifying any fur-
ther inquiry. Furthermore, the appellants have not cited
a single authority which supports a grant of their motion
on this record. Judge Edelstein was entirely correct in
denying the motion.
Reluctance to inquire into the state of mind of any juror
and into the conduct of the jurors during their delibera-
tions rests on sound reason." The rule against any inquiry
whatever recognizes exceptions only where there is clear
and incontrovertible evidence of incompetence shortly be-
fore or after jury service, clear evidence of some criminal
act, or evidence of some ‘‘objective fact’’ of internal im-
propriety. '* Even in the case of recent incompetence a hear-
™ See 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2349, 2352-2354 (McNaughton
rev., 1961). As the Supreme Court said in Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156, 178 (1953) :
Nor have the courts favored any public or private post-trial
inquisition of jurors as to how they reasoned, lest it operate
to intimidate, beset and harass them. This Court will not ac-
cept their own disclosure of forbidden quotient verdicts in
damage cases. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264. Nor of com-
promise in a criminal case whereby some jurors exchanged
their convictions on one issue in return for concession by other
jurors on another issue. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347.
**If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would
be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the
constant subject of public investigaton—to the destruction
of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.’’
McDonald v. Pless, [238 U.S. 264 (1915) ] at 267-268.
See 18 U.S.C. $4 245(b), 1503, 1504. See also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1867(f). Such exceptions as these whicl the law has condoned
to the privacy and sanctity of the jury refbct the need to preserve
41
ing will be had to establish that it must have existed during
jury service.
The strong policy against any post-verdict inquiry into
a juror’s state of mind was stated by this court regarding
an analogous situation in United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d
928, 950 (1961), cert. denied sub nom. Mittelman v. United
States, 368 U.S. 984 (1962) :
its impartiality. The quickfiess with which jury findings will be
set aside when there is proof of tampering or external influence,
and the severe penalties imposed on those attempt such interference,
parallel the reluctance of courts to inquire into jury deliberations
when a verdict is valid on its face. See Mattoc v. United States, 146
U.S. 140, 149-50 (1892). Such exceptions support rather than un-
dermine the rationale of the rule that possible internal abnormali-
ties in a jury will not be inquired into except ‘in the gravest and
most important cases.’’ McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269
(1915).
These considerations explain the one exception to the rule against
a jury impeaching its own verdict allowed in those instances when
the evidence offered of internal impropriety concerns ‘‘objective
facts.”’ This ‘‘distinction between what may and what may not
be established by the testimony of jurors to set aside a verdict”’
has been recognized by the Supreme Court. See Mattox v. United
States, supra, at 148-149. However, courts have invoked the excep-
tion and permitted inquiry into a jury's deliberation only when
there has been a strong showing of ‘‘objective’’ impropriety, such
as blood relation between juror and defendant or extraneous ma-
terial brought to the jurors attention during deliberations. As the
Supreme Court said in United States v. Reid, 53 US. 360, 366
(1851), ‘‘{C]ases might arise in which it would be impossible to
refuse [evidence of impropriety] without violating the plainest
principles of justice.’’ But ** [u]nquestionably such evidence ought
always to be received with great caution.”’ Nor has the Court seen
fit since then to relax its position, McDonald v. Pless, supra, at
269. See Rotondo v. Isthmian Steamship Co., 243 F.2d 581, 583
(2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 949-950
(2d Cir. 1961). cert, den. sub nom. Mittelman v. United States,
368 U.S. 984 (1962); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2349 (McNaughton
rev.. 1961). See also ABA Standards Relating to Trial by Jury,
Sec. 5.7; United States v. ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 812
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 US. 906 (1971); and Judge
Friendly’s discussion in Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77 (2d
Cir. 1968), fn. 11, at 83-84. ;
42
There are many cogent reasons militating against
post-verdict inquiry into jurors’ motives for decision.
The jurors themselves ought not be subjected to ha-
rassment; the courts ought not be burdened with large
numbers of applications mostly without real merit;
the chances and temptations for tampering ought not
be increased ; verdicts ought not be made so uncertain.
We cited this language in Miller v. United States, 403
F.2d 77 (1968) where the court also emphasized, at page 82,
the importance of the dangers presented by inquiries that
go beyond objective facts: ‘‘inhibition of jury room delib-
erations, harassment of jurors, and increased incidence of
jury tampering.’’ See also Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156, 178 (1953); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268
(1915); and Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 147-151
(1892).
With respect to post-verdict evidence of possible juror
incomvetency during the trial, courts have refused to set
aside a verdict, or even to make further inquiry, unless
there be proof of an adjudication of insanity or mental in-
competence closely in advance of the time of jury ser-
vice. * Only when proof of this nature has been offered, or
proof of a closely contemporaneous and independent post-
trial adjudication of incompetency, * have courts conducted
13 See Anderson v. State, 54 Ariz. 387, 96 P.2d 281 (1939) ; Grand
Lodge A.O.U.W. of Ark. v. Wood, 113 Ark. 502, 168 S.W. 1070
(1914) ; Austin v. People, 106 Colo. 506, 107 P.2d 798 (1940);
Brown v. State, 219 Ark. 647, 243 S.W. 2d 938 (1951); Ex parte
Lovelady, 207 S.W. 2d 396 (Tex. Crim., 1947), cert. granted, 333
U.S. 867, cert. dism., 333 U.S. 897 (1948); Douthitt v. State, 182
Teun. 577, 188 S.W. 2d 555 (1945) ; State v. Buey, 104 Mont. 416,
66 P.2d 1049 (1937); Eastman Kodak Stores, Inc. vy. Summers,
277 S.W. 2d 476 (Kan. C.C.A. 1964).
4 See Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167 (1912), aff’g. Com-
monwealth v. Jordan, 207 Mass. 259, 93 N.E. 809 (1911) ; State v.
Camp, 110 W.Va. 444, 158 S.E. 664 (1931); Burik v. Dundee
a
43
hearings to determine whether the disability in fact affected
the juror at the time of trial.
But absent such substantial if not wholly conclusive evi-
dence of incompetency, courts have been unwilling to sub-
ject a juror to a hearing on his mental condition merely on
the allegations and opinions of a losing party. In Peterman
v. Indian Motorcycle Co., 216 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1954), the
plaintiff, shortly after judgment against him in a civil suit
for personal injury, moved for a new trial on the grounds
‘‘that certain information, discovered since the trial, dis-
closed the mental unfitness of the foreman of the jury,
whose condition, if it had been known .. ., would have b: 2n
a ground for disqualification.’”’ Judge Wyzanski heard
counsel on the motion and requested an offer of proof
from the plaintiff’s attorney.
The offer of proof was... that the juror in question,
because of his mental disturbance, has been receiving
disability compensation from the Veterans Bureau;
that he has difficulty in sleeping and concentrating;
that his memory is not good; that he has had depressed
periods during which he entertained the idea of suicide ;
that he has had to undergo treatment for anxiety re-
action to a psychic episode expressed by auditory hai-
lucinations; that he has been under the care of a psy-
chiatrist for an extended period, with little prospect of
an early overcoming of his difficulties. [Jd., at 293.]
s
Judge Wyzanski held that the offer of proof was inadequate
and denied the plaintiff’s motion.'* The Court of Appeals
for the First Cireuit agreed, stating that:
- Woolen Co., 66 N.J.L. 420, 49 A. 442 (1901) ; Iverson v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Amer., 126 N.J.L. 280, 19 A.2d 214 (1941) ; State v.
Welty, 65 Wash. 244, 118 P. 9 (1911).
15Tt is not clear to what extent Judge Wyzanski treated the
plaintiff’s motion for a new trial in Peterman as also being a mo-
Re! 2S Stee Se
q
:
4
4
q
7
44
Considering the strong policy against the too-ready
impeachment of jury verdicts on the basis of such
after-thoughts suggested by a disappointed litigant, . . .
the trial judge cannot be held to have abused his dis-
cretion in declining to grant a new trial on this ground.
[Id.}
See also United States ex rel. Daverse v. Hohn, 198 F.2d
934 (3rd Cir. 1952).
In light of this legal background, we do not believe ap-
pellants made enough of a case to justify further inquiry
into the competence of Juror Rush. No evidence was of-
fered of any history of mental instability on the part of
Miss Rush, much less evidence of any adjudication of in-
sanity or incompetence. Indeed, what we do know of her
past, although it is little, reflects quite the contrary situa-
tion. She has held steady employment over the past four
years as a nurse’s aide at Flower Fifth Avenue Hospital,
and apparently had steady employment before that as well.
The trial judge, as noted above, found the juror alert and
responsive and he noted nothing unusual about her during
the three weeks of trial and three days and nights of de-
liberation. Although the opinions of experts are not to be
dismissed altogether, they were here of necessity formed in
a vacuum, based on one piece of evidence, and fall far
short of constituting the sort of ‘‘objective fact’’ which can
justify inquiry into the internal workings of the jury. The
fact that there is no evidence of harassment of Miss Rush
or solicitation of the letter does not render irrelevant the
policy considerations which forbid inquiry into the internal
workings of the jury absent objective evidence of impro-
priety. In another case a letter coul
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