Appendix — Heyne v. Nelson ex rel. Nelson
Supreme Court brief1974
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
IN THE
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 72-1970, 73-1446 SepremsBer TERM aNnp Session, 1973
Eric Neuson, by his next friend, |
CorntnE Netson, and Danie. R.
Roserts, by his next friend,
Rorert Brown, on behalf of
themselves and a class of persons
similarly situated but too numer-
ous and too transitory to men-
tion,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Rosert P. Herne, individually and
in his capacity as CoMMISSIONER
or Corrections, Indiana Depart-
ment of Corrections,
Rosert E. Harpy, individually and
in his capacity as Drrecror,
Inprana YoutH Avutuonrirty, Indi-
ana Department of Corrections,
AutrreD R, Bennett, individually
and in his capacity as SuPERIN-
TENDENT, InpIANA Boys ScHoo.,
Defendants-A ppellants. |
Appeals from the
United States Dis-
trict Court for the
Northern District
of Indiana, South
Bend Division.
No. SB-C-72-S-98
Roserr A. Grant,
Judge.
ArcuEp SepreMBER 20, 1973—Degciwwep January 31, 1974
Before Kizzy, Senior Circuit Judge, Famonnp and
SprecHER, Circuit Judges.
A-1
RENE PTL EN TES TRIE a
A-2
Kuey, Senior Circuit Judge. The district court in this
class civil rights action’ enjoined defendants from imple-
menting alleged unconstitutional practices and policies in
condueting the Indiana Boys School under their adminis-
tration; and declared the practices and policies unconstitu-
tional. In Appeal No, 72-1970 defendants challenge the
validity of the judgment granting the injunction, and in
Appeal No. 73-1446 challenge the declaratory judgment.
We affirm.
The School, located in Plainfield, Indiana, is a medium
security state correctional institution for boys twelve to
eighteen years of age, an estimated one-third of whom
are non-criminal offenders. The boys reside in about six-
teen cottages. The School also has academic and vocational
school buildings, a gymnasium and an administrative
building. The average length of a juvenile’s stay at the
School is about six and one-half months. Although the
School’s maximum capacity is less than 300 juveniles, its
population is generally maintained at 400. The counselling
staff of twenty individuals includes three psychologists
with undergraduate academic degrees, and one part-time
psychiatrist who spends four hours a week at the institu-
tion. The medical staff includes one part-time physician,
one registered nurse, and one licensed practical nurse.
The complaint alleged that defendants’ practices and
policies violated the 8th and 14th Amendment rights of
the juveniles under their care. Plaintiffs moved for a
temporary restraining order to protect them from, inter
alia, defendants’ corporal punishment and use of control-
tranquilizing drugs. After hearing, the district court
denied the motion and set the date for hearing on the
merits. Defendants’ answer generally denied plaintiffs’
1 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
A-3
allegations. Trial briefs were filed upon the issue whether
defendants deprived plaintiffs of their alleged right to
adequate rehabilitative treatment.
The court found that it had jurisdiction and that the
corporal punishment and the method of administering
tranquilizing drugs by defendants constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of plaintiffs’ 8th and 14th
Amendment rights. The judgment restraining the chal-
lenged practices followed. The court thereafter, in a
separate judgment, declared plaintiffs had the right to
adequate rehabilitative treatment.”
I—CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
A.
It is not disputed that the juveniles who were returned
from escapes or who were accused of assaults on other
students or staff members were beaten routinely by guards
under defendants’ supervision. There is no proof of formal
procedures that governed the beatings which were adminis-
tered after decision by two or more staff members. Two
staff members were required to observe the beatings.
In beating the juveniles, a ‘‘fraternity paddle’’ between
¥%” and 2” thick, 12” long, with a narrow handle, was used.
There is testimony that juveniles weighing about 160
pounds were struck five blows on the clothed buttocks,
2 Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972). The
district court’s decision was entered as if a declaratory judg-
ment on the right to treatment. We treat that portion of the
decision, however, as an otherwise nonappealable interlocu-
tory order and grant review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292
(b). Formal certification by a district judge is not always
required in a marginally final case. See Gillespie v. U. S. Steel
Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 154 (1964) ; 9 Moore’s Federal Practice,
7110. 12 and 7110. 22(3).
A-4
often by a staff member weighing 285 pounds. The beating
caused painful injuries.* The district court found that this
disciplinary practice violated the plaintiffs’ 8th and 14th
Amendment rights, and ordered it stopped immediately.
We recognize that the School is a correctional, as well
as an academic, institution.‘ No case precisely in point
3 The trial record indicates that one juvenile was struck with
such force that it caused him to sleep on his face for three days,
with black, blue and numb buttocks. One juvenile testified
that he bled after receiving five blows on his buttocks. An-
other, Daniel Roberts, testified that once he pleaded, to no
avail, with staff personnel not to be beaten until after certain
blisters on his buttocks ceased to cause him pain.
4 (a) The law appears to be well settled in both state and
federal jurisdictions that school officials do not violate 8th
Amendment proscriptions against cruel and unusual punish-
ment where the punishment is reasonable and moderate. Ware
v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1971); Sims v. Board
of Education, 329 F. Supp. 678 (D.C. N.M. 1971) ; Tinkham
v. Kole, 252 Iowa 1303, 110 N.W.2d 258 (1961); Carr v.
Wright, (Ky.) 423 S.W.2d 521 (1968) ; Houeye v. ‘St. Helen
Parish School Board, 223 La. 966, 67 'So.2d 553 (1953). In
Ware there was evidence of beatings usually administered
by hitting the student on his buttocks with a paddle. -The
paddle was wooden, 2’ long, 44” to 14” thick, 6” wide, used
under a written rule which proscribed corporal punishment
without parents’ permission. The district court oe that
“some of the seven thousand” teachers in the public school
district abused the policy, but that that fact, and nothing
more, would not make the policy itself unconstitutional. In
Sims, the court found that beatings by school officials did
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment where the
plaintiff student received three blows with a paddle on the
buttocks and experienced slight physical harm. In our case,
there is ample evidence that the beatings caused severe in-
jury. See generally 68 Am. Jur. 2d Schools §258 (1973).
(b) The courts in recent years have frowned upon the
use of corporal punishment in penal and correctional institu-
tions. See generally 60 Am. Jur. 2d Penal and Correctional
Institutions §43 (1972). Corporal punishment has not been
used for years in federal prisons. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d
571, 575 (8th Cir. 1968). Courts have enjoined prison per-
sonnel from inflicting corporal punishment including the use
A-5
has been cited or found which decided whether supervised
beatings in a juvenile reformatory violated the ‘‘cruel and
unusual’’ clause of the 8th Amendment.® However, the
test of ‘cruel and unusual’’ punishment has been outlined.
In his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 279 (1971), Justice Brennan stated that:
The final principle inherent in the [Cruel and Un-
usual Punishment] Clause is that a severe punishment
must not be excessive. A punishment is excessive
under this principle if it is unnecessary: The infliction
of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport
with human dignity when it is nothing more than the
pointless infliction of suffering. If there is a signifi-
cantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the
purposes for which the punishment is inflicted, the
punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore
excessive. (Citations omitted.)
Expert evidence adduced at the trial unanimously con-
demned the beatings. The uncontradicted authoritative evi-
dence indicates that the practice does not serve as useful
of a strap for whipping. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Su 683
(E.D. Ark. 1965); Jackson v. Bishop, supra. In T; the
court did not hold prison waeees are se unconstitu-
tional, but stated that they will be enjoi if excessive, and
not applied under recognizable standards. In Jackson the 8th
Circuit held that use of a strap in Arkansas penitentiaries
was cruel and unusual punishment. See generally, Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) ; Comment, Cruel
and Unusual Punishment-Arkansas Penitentiary Violates the
Eighth Amendment, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 456 (1970); M.
Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment, 24 Stan.
L. Rev. 838 (1972).
5 The court in Lollis v. New York, 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.
N.Y. 1970), involving the constitutionality of solitary confine-
ment in juvenile institutions, obliquely considered the binding
and handcuffing of an inmate. Inmates of Boys’ Training
School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.C. R.I. 1972), also
concerned the question of whether isolation of juvenile
inmates constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
—_— scat stadia - SN LL EL I IN Ee OT i: myers:
A-6
punishment or as treatment, and it actually breeds counter-
hostility resulting in greater aggression by a child. For
these reasons we find the beatings presently administered
3 are unnecessary and therefore excessive. We think, under
' the test of Furman, that the district court did not err in
deciding that the disciplinary beatings shown by: this
* record constituted cruel and unusual punishment.*
The 8th Amendment prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment is binding on the states through the 14th
Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) ;
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). The meaning
; of cruel and unusual punishment in law has varied through
| the course of history, and as the Court observed in Trop
: v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) :
F The [8th Amendment] must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.
re | Tora? ee
The district court’s decision meets tests that have been
applied in decisions to determine whether the standards
of decency in a maturing society have been met, i.e.:
whether the punishment is disproportionate to the offense,
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) ; and whether
the severity or harshness of the punishment offends
‘*broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized stand-
ards, humanity, and decency.’’ Jackson v. Bishop, 404
F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). The record before us discloses
that the beatings employed by defendants are dispropor-
tionate to the offenses for which they are used, and do
not measure up to contemporary standards of decency in
our contemporary society.
E
,
.
.
x
q
a
4
’
6 We do not hold that all corporal punishment in juvenile
institutions or reformatories is per se cruel and unusual.
8 (RP ew sar
A, yen, SE TT Sa arena ape emer are “ cs |
A-7
There is nothing in the record to show that a less severe
punishment would not have accomplished the disciplinary
aim. And it is likely that the beatings have aroused ani-
mosity toward the School and substantially frustrated its
rehabilitative purpose. We find in the record before us,
to support our holding, general considerations similar to
those the court in Jackson found relevant: (1) corporal
punishment is easily subject to abuse in the hands of the
sadistic and unscrupulous, and control of the punishment
is inadequate ; (2) formalized School procedures governing
the infliction of the corporal punishment are at a mini-
mum; (3) the infliction of such severe punishment frus-
trates correctional and rehabilitative goals; and (4) the
current sociological trend is toward the elimination of all
corporal punishment in all correctional institutions.
The Indiana Supreme Court decision in Indiana State
Personnel Board v. Jackson, 244 Ind. 321, 192 N.E.2d 740
(1963), cited by the defendants, is of no aid to set aside
the district court decision. There the court held, inter alia,
under the parens patriae doctrine, that a public school
teacher, in proper cases and proportions, may administer
corporal punishment.’ We agree with that decision.
Witnesses for both the School and the juveniles testified
at trial that tranqulizing drugs, specifically Sparine and
Thorazine, were occasionally administered to the juveniles,
not as part of an ongoing psychotherapeutic program, but
E
S
:
:
:
e
:
:
E
— — SOPRA a + eS a tS oe
A-8
; for the purpose of controlling excited behavior.* The reg-
istered nurse and licensed practical nurse prescribed intra-
muscular dosages of the drugs upon recommendation of
; the custodial staff under standing orders by the
: physician.® Neither before nor after injections were the
* juveniles examined by medically competent staff members
to determine their tolerances.
The district court also found this practice to be cruel
and unusual punishment. Accordingly the court ordered
the practice stopped immediately, and further ordered that
no drug could be administered intramuscularly unless spe-
cifically authorized or directed by a physician in each case,
and unless oral medication was first tried, except where
the staff was directed otherwise by a physician in each
case.
We agree with defendants that a judge lacking expertise
in medicine should be cautious when considering what are
; ‘‘minimal medical standards’’ in particular situations.
However, practices and policies in the field of medicine,
; among other professional fields, are within judicial com-
petence when measured against requirements of the Con-
stitution. We find no error in the competent district
8 Plaintiff Steven Hegg testifed that on one occasion while
he was recuperating from a blow to the nose inflincted upon
him by another student, his nose began to bleed profusely
and he began to vomit and “holler for help.” The nurse told
him there was nothing seriously wrong with him; but when
Steven continued to request help, she became infuriated and
injected him with a tranquilizing drug. Eric Nelson testified
to the effect that he was given shots of tranquilizing drugs
on several occasions for the purpose of preventing him from
running away from the School.
9 The standing order provided that an emotionally upset boy
under 116 pounds be given a half cc or 25 milligrams of
Sparine. Above that weight he was to be given one cc or 50
milligrams of Sparine.
PPPOE epee
BAD i — |
7 a ere ee
© maser = . “
nie Bi aa ene —
A-9
court’s determination here that the use of tranquilizing
drugs as practiced by defendants was cruel and unusual
punishment.
We are not persuaded by defendants’ argument that
the use of tranquilizing drugs is not ‘‘punishment.’’ Ex-
perts testified that the tranquilizing drugs administered
to the juveniles can cause: the collapse of the cardio-
vascular system, the closing of a patient’s throat with
consequent asphyxiation, a depressant effect on the pro-
duction of bone marrow, jaundice from an affected liver,
and drowsiness, hemotological disorders, sore throat and
ocular changes.”
The interest of the juveniles, the School, and the state
must be considered in determining the validity of the use
of the School’s tranquilizing drugs policy. The interest of
the state appears to be identical more or less with the
interest of the maladjusted juveniles committed to the
School’s care, i.e., reformation so that upon release from
their confinement juveniles may enter free society as well
adjusted members. The School’s interest is in the attain-
ment and maintenance of reasonable order so that the
state’s purpose may be pursued in a suitable environment.
The School’s interest, however, does not justify exposing
its juveniles to the potential dangers noted above. Nor
10 Dr. James W. Worth, psychologist with the Mental
— Center of St. Joseph County, Indiana, also testified as
ows:
I think the use of major tranquilizing drugs without
intelligent and informed medical observation have no
place . . . in the institution. These are serious drugs. They
have serious effect on the individual... . {I]f this is
not done with a full medical understanding of this indi-
vidual with a physician present, harm could occur and
ea er I think it tends to be degrading to an
indivi :
A-10
ean Indiana’s interest in reforming its delinquent or mal-
adjusted juveniles be so compelling that it can use ‘‘eruel
and unusual’’ means to accomplish its benevolent end of
reformation. :
We hold today only that the use of disciplinary beatings
and tranquilizing drugs in the circumstances shown by
this record violates plaintiffs’ 14th Amendment right pro-
tecting them from cruel and unusual punishment. We do
not intend that penal and reform institutional physicians
cannot prescribe necessary tranquilizing drugs in appro-
priate cases. Our concern is with actual and potential
abuses under policies where juveniles are beaten with an
instrument causing serious injuries, and drugs are admin-
istered to juveniles intramuscularly by staff, without try-
ing medication short of drugs and without adequate
medical guidance and prescription."
11 Experts testified that the following minimum medical safe-
guards should be followed in the use of tranquilizing drugs:
(1) The individual administered the drug should be ob-
served, during the duration of the drug’s effect, by trained
medical personnel, familiar with the possible adverse and
harmful side effects of the drug used.
(2) The person receiving an IM (intramuscular) injection
of a major tranquilizing drug should first receive a diagnosis
or prescription authorizing the use of said drug by a qualified
medical doctor, child psychiatrist, psychologist or physician.
(3) IM injections should only be administered by a
physician or intern and only after all attempts have failed
to get the individual to take the drug orally.
(4) Major tranquilizing drugs, such as Thorazine and
Sparine, should not be administered IM, unless given in a
hospital where there is an intensive care unit and emergency
facilities which could deal with possible adverse effects from
the use of said drugs.
(5) Major tranquilizing drugs should only be used to con-
trol psychotic or pre-psychotic breakdowns or as a followup
in assisting a schizophrenic patient from having a recurrence
of a psychotic breakdown.
(6) Major tranquilizing drugs shorid not be used merely
to induce sleep or unconsciousness for a period of time, but
only as a part of a psychotherapeutic program of treatment.
A-11
II—THE RIGHT TO REHABILITATIVE
TREATMENT
The School staff-to-juvenile ratio for purposes of treat-
ment is approximately one to thirty. The sixteen coun-
selors are responsible for developing and implementing
individualized treatment programs at the institution, but
the counselors need have no specialized training or experi-
ence. Administrative tasks (‘‘paper work’’) occupy more
than half of the counselors’ time. The duties of the staff
psychiatrist are limited to crises. He has no opportunity
to develop and manage individual psychotherapy pro-
grams. The three staff psychologists do not hold graduate
degrees and are not certified by Indiana. They render,
principally, diagnostic services, mostly directed toward
supervising in-take behavior classifications.
In June, 1971, the School adopted what was described
as a differential treatment program, bottomed mainly on
the Quay Classification System. Under the Quay System,
upon their admission to the School, juveniles are classified
with respect to four personality and behavior types on
the basis of standardized tests: the inadequate, the
neurotic, the aggressive, and the sub-cultural. Each of the
sixteen cottages at the School houses twenty to thirty juve-
niles, with common personality and behavior patterns.
Each cottage is served by a staff comprising a house man-
ager, a counselor, an educator, and a consulting psycholo-
gist. The cottage staff meets weekly for evaluation of the
rehabilitation program of each inmate. Upon admission
to a cottage, each juvenile agrees to improve his behavior
in four areas of institutional life: ‘‘cottage,’’ ‘‘recrea-
tion,’’ ‘‘school,’’ and ‘‘treatment.’’ Correspondingly, each
has responsibility for physical maintenance of the residen-
tial area, social and athletic activities, specified levels of
academic or vocational skills, and improved personality
A-12
goals. With success in each of the four areas, the juvenile
earns additional privileges, ultimately culminating in a
parole date.
The district court decided that both Indiana law and
the federal Constitution secure for juvenile offenders a
‘tright to treatment,’’ and that the School failed to provide
minimal rehabilitative treatment. Defendants contend that
there exists no right to treatment under the Constitution
or Indiana law, and that if there is the right, the Quay
Classification System used at the School did not violate
the right. We hold, with the district court, that juveniles
have a right to rehabilitative treatment.
The right to rehabilitative treatment for juvenile of-
fenders has roots in the general social reform of the late
nineteenth century, was nurtured by court decisions
throughout the first half of this century, and has been
established in state and federal courts in recent years.
In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967), the Court stated:
The early reformers were appalled by adult pro-
cedures and penalties, and by the fact that children
could be given long prison sentences and mixed in
jails with hardened criminals . . . The child was to
be ‘‘treated’’ and ‘‘rehabilitated’’ and the procedures,
from apprehension through institutionalization, were
to be ‘‘clinical’’ rather than ‘‘ punitive.’’
Since the beginning, state courts have emphasized the need
for ‘‘treatment”’ in their Juvenile Court Acts. Wisconsin
Industrial School for Girls v. Clark County, 79 N.W. 422,
427 (Wise. 1899); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198,
199 (Pa. 1905); Ex Parte Sharp, 96 P. 563, 564 (Idaho
1908); Wissenberg v. Bradley, 229 N.W. 205, 207 (Iowa
1929).
A-13
The United States:Supreme Court has never definitively
decided that a youth confined under the jurisdiction of a
juvenile court has a constitutionally guaranteed right to
treatment. But the Court has assumed, in passing on the
validity of juvenile proceedings, that a state must provide
treatment for juveniles. In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541 (1966), the Court reversed the district court’s convic-
tion of a sixteen year old after the District of Columbia
Juvenile Court had waived its jurisdiction. Justice Fortas
there, writing for the Court, commented on the theory
and practice of juvenile courts:
There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds
for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds; that he gets neither the protection accorded
to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children. 383 U.S. at 556.
Later, in In re Gault, supra, Justice Fortas ‘‘reiterate[d]
the view’’ of Kent that the juvenile process need not meet
the constitutional requirements of an adult criminal trial,
but must provide essential “‘due process and fair treat-
ment.’’ This view has been continued subsequent to Gault
in the Supreme Court decisions involving juvenile court
procedures. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 ( 1970) ; McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
It is true that the Supreme Court cases discussed above
deal with procedural due process and not the right to reha-
bilitative treatment, but several recent state and federal
eases, out of concern—based upon the parens patriae doc-
trine underlying the juvenile justice system—that rehabili-
tative treatment was not generally accorded in the juvenile
reform process, have decided that juvenile inmates have
a constitutional right to that treatment. M. v. M., 336
N.Y.S. 2d 304 (1972); Inmates of Boys’ Training School
WS" ARTETA ELLIE DATOS EIS, 2 Se TOPPA, ARO eas
A-14
: v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.C. R.I. 1972); Martarella
q v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (8.D. N.Y. 1972)
q ‘ In Martarella the court found a clear constitutional right
to treatment for juveniles based on the 8th and 14th
: Amendments:
_. What, we have said, although the record would justify
] more, is sufficient to establish that, however, benign
‘the purposes for which members of the plaintiff class
: are held in custody, and whatever the sad necessities
} which prompt their detention, they are held in penal
condition. Where the State, as parens patriae, imposes
such detention, it can meet the Constitution’s require-
: ment of due process and prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment if, and only if, it furnishes ade-
' quate treatment to the detainee. 349 F. Supp. at 585.
_ (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted.)
After an historical analysis of the development of the
right, the court concluded :
In sum, the law has developed to a point which justi-
fies the assertion that: ‘‘A new concept of substantive
due process is evolving in the therapeutic realm. This
concept is founded upon a recognition of the concur-
rency between the state’s exercise of sanctioning
powers and its assumption of the duties of social re-
sponsibility. Its implication is that effective treatment
must be the quid pro quo for society’s right to exercise
its parens patriae controls. Whether specifically
recognized by statutory enactment or implicitly
derived from the constitutional requirements of due
process, the right to treatment exists.’’ 349 F. Supp.
at 600. (Footnotes omitted.)
In a most recent case, Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp.
166 (E.D. Tex. 1973), a federal district court specifically
found that juveniles at Texas’ six juvenile training schools
have both a statutory and constitutional right to treatment.
LLP ONES Zea .
= FLT OS les Rh pay ae .
POL RELL LOS II PE TUE RR AEOLIAN ES oe NFS LD
A-15
We hold that on the record before us the district court
did not err in deciding that the plaintiff juveniles have
the right under the 14th Amendment due process clause
to rehabilitative treatment.’
III—ADEQUACY OF TREATMENT
Experts testified at the trial, and the defendants admit,
that the Quay System of behavior classification is not
treatment. And case histories of maladjusted juveniles
show that use of the System falls far short of its improved
personality goals. Mrs. Betty Levine, resident instructor
in sociology at the Unitersity of Indiana, testified that
the School lacks the individual treatment given in the Indi-
ana Girls School. The record shows very little individual
treatment programmed, much less implemented, at the
School; and it is unclear exactly how much time is spent
in individual counselling. We conclude that the district
court could properly infer that the Quay system as used
in the School failed to provide adequate rehabilitative
treatment.
We leave to the competent district court the decision:
what is the minimal treatment required to provide consti-
tutional due process, having in mind that the juvenile
12 We note that the district court additionally determined
that a right to treatment in this case has a statutory basis
in view of the “custody, care, and discipline’ language of
the Indiana Juvenile Court Act, Burns Ind. Stat. Ann.
§9-3201. (Emphasis supplied.) We agree with this conclu-
sion. Since we have today determined that the federal Consti-
tution affords juveniles a right to treatment, any interpreta-
tion of the Indiana Act which would find no such right to
exist would itself be unconstitutional.
——e PS EL EEE MET LA OE OTOL IEE LOT FE LEE LG EAI T IELTS TRAIT
A-16
process has elements of both the criminal and mental
health processes.”
In our view the ‘‘right to treatment”’ includes the right
to minimum acceptable standards of care and treatment
for juveniles and the right to individualized care and treat-
3 ment. Because children differ in their need for rehabilita-
tion, individual need for treatment will differ. When a
: state assumes the place of a juvenile’s parents, it assumes
4 as well the parental duties, and its treatment of its
juveniles should, so far as can be reasonably required,
q be what proper parental care would provide. Without a
i program of individual treatment the result may be that
the juveniles will not be rehabilitated, but warehoused,
und that at the termination of detention they will likely
be incapable of taking their proper places in free socicty;
their interests and those of the state and the school thereby
1 being defeated.
‘We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court
in each appeal, and remand" only for the limited purpose
18 The juvenile justice process can be understood to be
a hybrid between the criminal system and the mental
health process.
see 8 &
. . . Finally, the arguments for the right to treatment
in both processes rely heavily upon the medical services,
especially psychiatry and psychology.
Note, A. Right to Treatment for Juveniles, 1973 Wash.
U.L.Q. 157, 160.
See also, N. Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy
the Ills of the Juvenile Process? 57 Geo. L.J. 848, 860-61
(1969) ; Note, The Courts, the Constitution and Juvenile Insti-
tutional Reform, 52 B.U.L.Rev. 38, 42-49 (1972).
14 See note 2, supra.
Te ee ny at — .
Sadeenetc: ite ae ers one eat RDA SL repNTAaessiasceeanee
. SanOTE ener STADIA I ST Bo ly BRAY a
A-17
of further proceedings in No. 73-1446 with respect to the
right to rehabilitative treatment.
A true Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
SLI LILIES RN IOS
A-18
. FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT:
"United States Court of Appeals
Chicago, Illinois 60604
January 31, 1974
Before :
Hon. ROGER J. KILEY, Senior Circuit it Judge
Hon. THOMAS E. FAIRCHILD, Circuit Judge
Hon. ROBERT A. SPRECHER, Circuit Judge
ERIC NELSON, etc. et al, Appeal from the
Plaintiffs-A ppellees, United States Dis-
trict Court for the
No. 72-1970, 73-1446 vs. | Northern District
ROBERT P. HEYNE, etc., et al., of Indiana, South
Defendants-A ppellants. | Bend Division.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the
record from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, and
was argued by counsel.
On consideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged
by this court that the judgment of the said District Court
in each appeal be, and the same is hereby, AFFIRMED,
with costs, and these causes be and the same are hereby
REMANDED to the said District Court for further pro-
ceedings in No. 73-1446 with respect to the right to reha-
bilitative treatment, in accordance with the opinion of this
Court filed this day.
ee ook
ee .
OLE ND IIL CEPI IO NBS LM DENS PE
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.