Appendix — Heyne v. Nelson ex rel. Nelson

Supreme Court brief1974

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IN THE

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 72-1970, 73-1446 SepremsBer TERM aNnp Session, 1973

Eric Neuson, by his next friend, |

CorntnE Netson, and Danie. R.

Roserts, by his next friend,

Rorert Brown, on behalf of

themselves and a class of persons

similarly situated but too numer-

ous and too transitory to men-

tion,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

Rosert P. Herne, individually and

in his capacity as CoMMISSIONER

or Corrections, Indiana Depart-

ment of Corrections,

Rosert E. Harpy, individually and

in his capacity as Drrecror,

Inprana YoutH Avutuonrirty, Indi-

ana Department of Corrections,

AutrreD R, Bennett, individually

and in his capacity as SuPERIN-

TENDENT, InpIANA Boys ScHoo.,

Defendants-A ppellants. |

Appeals from the

United States Dis-

trict Court for the

Northern District

of Indiana, South

Bend Division.

No. SB-C-72-S-98

Roserr A. Grant,

Judge.

ArcuEp SepreMBER 20, 1973—Degciwwep January 31, 1974

Before Kizzy, Senior Circuit Judge, Famonnp and

SprecHER, Circuit Judges.

A-1

RENE PTL EN TES TRIE a

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Kuey, Senior Circuit Judge. The district court in this

class civil rights action’ enjoined defendants from imple-

menting alleged unconstitutional practices and policies in

condueting the Indiana Boys School under their adminis-

tration; and declared the practices and policies unconstitu-

tional. In Appeal No, 72-1970 defendants challenge the

validity of the judgment granting the injunction, and in

Appeal No. 73-1446 challenge the declaratory judgment.

We affirm.

The School, located in Plainfield, Indiana, is a medium

security state correctional institution for boys twelve to

eighteen years of age, an estimated one-third of whom

are non-criminal offenders. The boys reside in about six-

teen cottages. The School also has academic and vocational

school buildings, a gymnasium and an administrative

building. The average length of a juvenile’s stay at the

School is about six and one-half months. Although the

School’s maximum capacity is less than 300 juveniles, its

population is generally maintained at 400. The counselling

staff of twenty individuals includes three psychologists

with undergraduate academic degrees, and one part-time

psychiatrist who spends four hours a week at the institu-

tion. The medical staff includes one part-time physician,

one registered nurse, and one licensed practical nurse.

The complaint alleged that defendants’ practices and

policies violated the 8th and 14th Amendment rights of

the juveniles under their care. Plaintiffs moved for a

temporary restraining order to protect them from, inter

alia, defendants’ corporal punishment and use of control-

tranquilizing drugs. After hearing, the district court

denied the motion and set the date for hearing on the

merits. Defendants’ answer generally denied plaintiffs’

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A-3

allegations. Trial briefs were filed upon the issue whether

defendants deprived plaintiffs of their alleged right to

adequate rehabilitative treatment.

The court found that it had jurisdiction and that the

corporal punishment and the method of administering

tranquilizing drugs by defendants constituted cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of plaintiffs’ 8th and 14th

Amendment rights. The judgment restraining the chal-

lenged practices followed. The court thereafter, in a

separate judgment, declared plaintiffs had the right to

adequate rehabilitative treatment.”

I—CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

A.

It is not disputed that the juveniles who were returned

from escapes or who were accused of assaults on other

students or staff members were beaten routinely by guards

under defendants’ supervision. There is no proof of formal

procedures that governed the beatings which were adminis-

tered after decision by two or more staff members. Two

staff members were required to observe the beatings.

In beating the juveniles, a ‘‘fraternity paddle’’ between

¥%” and 2” thick, 12” long, with a narrow handle, was used.

There is testimony that juveniles weighing about 160

pounds were struck five blows on the clothed buttocks,

2 Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972). The

district court’s decision was entered as if a declaratory judg-

ment on the right to treatment. We treat that portion of the

decision, however, as an otherwise nonappealable interlocu-

tory order and grant review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292

(b). Formal certification by a district judge is not always

required in a marginally final case. See Gillespie v. U. S. Steel

Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 154 (1964) ; 9 Moore’s Federal Practice,

7110. 12 and 7110. 22(3).

A-4

often by a staff member weighing 285 pounds. The beating

caused painful injuries.* The district court found that this

disciplinary practice violated the plaintiffs’ 8th and 14th

Amendment rights, and ordered it stopped immediately.

We recognize that the School is a correctional, as well

as an academic, institution.‘ No case precisely in point

3 The trial record indicates that one juvenile was struck with

such force that it caused him to sleep on his face for three days,

with black, blue and numb buttocks. One juvenile testified

that he bled after receiving five blows on his buttocks. An-

other, Daniel Roberts, testified that once he pleaded, to no

avail, with staff personnel not to be beaten until after certain

blisters on his buttocks ceased to cause him pain.

4 (a) The law appears to be well settled in both state and

federal jurisdictions that school officials do not violate 8th

Amendment proscriptions against cruel and unusual punish-

ment where the punishment is reasonable and moderate. Ware

v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1971); Sims v. Board

of Education, 329 F. Supp. 678 (D.C. N.M. 1971) ; Tinkham

v. Kole, 252 Iowa 1303, 110 N.W.2d 258 (1961); Carr v.

Wright, (Ky.) 423 S.W.2d 521 (1968) ; Houeye v. ‘St. Helen

Parish School Board, 223 La. 966, 67 'So.2d 553 (1953). In

Ware there was evidence of beatings usually administered

by hitting the student on his buttocks with a paddle. -The

paddle was wooden, 2’ long, 44” to 14” thick, 6” wide, used

under a written rule which proscribed corporal punishment

without parents’ permission. The district court oe that

“some of the seven thousand” teachers in the public school

district abused the policy, but that that fact, and nothing

more, would not make the policy itself unconstitutional. In

Sims, the court found that beatings by school officials did

not constitute cruel and unusual punishment where the

plaintiff student received three blows with a paddle on the

buttocks and experienced slight physical harm. In our case,

there is ample evidence that the beatings caused severe in-

jury. See generally 68 Am. Jur. 2d Schools §258 (1973).

(b) The courts in recent years have frowned upon the

use of corporal punishment in penal and correctional institu-

tions. See generally 60 Am. Jur. 2d Penal and Correctional

Institutions §43 (1972). Corporal punishment has not been

used for years in federal prisons. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d

571, 575 (8th Cir. 1968). Courts have enjoined prison per-

sonnel from inflicting corporal punishment including the use

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has been cited or found which decided whether supervised

beatings in a juvenile reformatory violated the ‘‘cruel and

unusual’’ clause of the 8th Amendment.® However, the

test of ‘cruel and unusual’’ punishment has been outlined.

In his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.

238, 279 (1971), Justice Brennan stated that:

The final principle inherent in the [Cruel and Un-

usual Punishment] Clause is that a severe punishment

must not be excessive. A punishment is excessive

under this principle if it is unnecessary: The infliction

of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport

with human dignity when it is nothing more than the

pointless infliction of suffering. If there is a signifi-

cantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the

purposes for which the punishment is inflicted, the

punishment inflicted is unnecessary and therefore

excessive. (Citations omitted.)

Expert evidence adduced at the trial unanimously con-

demned the beatings. The uncontradicted authoritative evi-

dence indicates that the practice does not serve as useful

of a strap for whipping. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Su 683

(E.D. Ark. 1965); Jackson v. Bishop, supra. In T; the

court did not hold prison waeees are se unconstitu-

tional, but stated that they will be enjoi if excessive, and

not applied under recognizable standards. In Jackson the 8th

Circuit held that use of a strap in Arkansas penitentiaries

was cruel and unusual punishment. See generally, Holt v.

Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) ; Comment, Cruel

and Unusual Punishment-Arkansas Penitentiary Violates the

Eighth Amendment, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 456 (1970); M.

Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment, 24 Stan.

L. Rev. 838 (1972).

5 The court in Lollis v. New York, 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.

N.Y. 1970), involving the constitutionality of solitary confine-

ment in juvenile institutions, obliquely considered the binding

and handcuffing of an inmate. Inmates of Boys’ Training

School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.C. R.I. 1972), also

concerned the question of whether isolation of juvenile

inmates constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

—_— scat stadia - SN LL EL I IN Ee OT i: myers:

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punishment or as treatment, and it actually breeds counter-

hostility resulting in greater aggression by a child. For

these reasons we find the beatings presently administered

3 are unnecessary and therefore excessive. We think, under

' the test of Furman, that the district court did not err in

deciding that the disciplinary beatings shown by: this

* record constituted cruel and unusual punishment.*

The 8th Amendment prohibition against cruel and un-

usual punishment is binding on the states through the 14th

Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) ;

Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). The meaning

; of cruel and unusual punishment in law has varied through

| the course of history, and as the Court observed in Trop

: v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) :

F The [8th Amendment] must draw its meaning from

the evolving standards of decency that mark the

progress of a maturing society.

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The district court’s decision meets tests that have been

applied in decisions to determine whether the standards

of decency in a maturing society have been met, i.e.:

whether the punishment is disproportionate to the offense,

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) ; and whether

the severity or harshness of the punishment offends

‘*broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized stand-

ards, humanity, and decency.’’ Jackson v. Bishop, 404

F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). The record before us discloses

that the beatings employed by defendants are dispropor-

tionate to the offenses for which they are used, and do

not measure up to contemporary standards of decency in

our contemporary society.

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6 We do not hold that all corporal punishment in juvenile

institutions or reformatories is per se cruel and unusual.

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There is nothing in the record to show that a less severe

punishment would not have accomplished the disciplinary

aim. And it is likely that the beatings have aroused ani-

mosity toward the School and substantially frustrated its

rehabilitative purpose. We find in the record before us,

to support our holding, general considerations similar to

those the court in Jackson found relevant: (1) corporal

punishment is easily subject to abuse in the hands of the

sadistic and unscrupulous, and control of the punishment

is inadequate ; (2) formalized School procedures governing

the infliction of the corporal punishment are at a mini-

mum; (3) the infliction of such severe punishment frus-

trates correctional and rehabilitative goals; and (4) the

current sociological trend is toward the elimination of all

corporal punishment in all correctional institutions.

The Indiana Supreme Court decision in Indiana State

Personnel Board v. Jackson, 244 Ind. 321, 192 N.E.2d 740

(1963), cited by the defendants, is of no aid to set aside

the district court decision. There the court held, inter alia,

under the parens patriae doctrine, that a public school

teacher, in proper cases and proportions, may administer

corporal punishment.’ We agree with that decision.

Witnesses for both the School and the juveniles testified

at trial that tranqulizing drugs, specifically Sparine and

Thorazine, were occasionally administered to the juveniles,

not as part of an ongoing psychotherapeutic program, but

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; for the purpose of controlling excited behavior.* The reg-

istered nurse and licensed practical nurse prescribed intra-

muscular dosages of the drugs upon recommendation of

; the custodial staff under standing orders by the

: physician.® Neither before nor after injections were the

* juveniles examined by medically competent staff members

to determine their tolerances.

The district court also found this practice to be cruel

and unusual punishment. Accordingly the court ordered

the practice stopped immediately, and further ordered that

no drug could be administered intramuscularly unless spe-

cifically authorized or directed by a physician in each case,

and unless oral medication was first tried, except where

the staff was directed otherwise by a physician in each

case.

We agree with defendants that a judge lacking expertise

in medicine should be cautious when considering what are

; ‘‘minimal medical standards’’ in particular situations.

However, practices and policies in the field of medicine,

; among other professional fields, are within judicial com-

petence when measured against requirements of the Con-

stitution. We find no error in the competent district

8 Plaintiff Steven Hegg testifed that on one occasion while

he was recuperating from a blow to the nose inflincted upon

him by another student, his nose began to bleed profusely

and he began to vomit and “holler for help.” The nurse told

him there was nothing seriously wrong with him; but when

Steven continued to request help, she became infuriated and

injected him with a tranquilizing drug. Eric Nelson testified

to the effect that he was given shots of tranquilizing drugs

on several occasions for the purpose of preventing him from

running away from the School.

9 The standing order provided that an emotionally upset boy

under 116 pounds be given a half cc or 25 milligrams of

Sparine. Above that weight he was to be given one cc or 50

milligrams of Sparine.

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court’s determination here that the use of tranquilizing

drugs as practiced by defendants was cruel and unusual

punishment.

We are not persuaded by defendants’ argument that

the use of tranquilizing drugs is not ‘‘punishment.’’ Ex-

perts testified that the tranquilizing drugs administered

to the juveniles can cause: the collapse of the cardio-

vascular system, the closing of a patient’s throat with

consequent asphyxiation, a depressant effect on the pro-

duction of bone marrow, jaundice from an affected liver,

and drowsiness, hemotological disorders, sore throat and

ocular changes.”

The interest of the juveniles, the School, and the state

must be considered in determining the validity of the use

of the School’s tranquilizing drugs policy. The interest of

the state appears to be identical more or less with the

interest of the maladjusted juveniles committed to the

School’s care, i.e., reformation so that upon release from

their confinement juveniles may enter free society as well

adjusted members. The School’s interest is in the attain-

ment and maintenance of reasonable order so that the

state’s purpose may be pursued in a suitable environment.

The School’s interest, however, does not justify exposing

its juveniles to the potential dangers noted above. Nor

10 Dr. James W. Worth, psychologist with the Mental

— Center of St. Joseph County, Indiana, also testified as

ows:

I think the use of major tranquilizing drugs without

intelligent and informed medical observation have no

place . . . in the institution. These are serious drugs. They

have serious effect on the individual... . {I]f this is

not done with a full medical understanding of this indi-

vidual with a physician present, harm could occur and

ea er I think it tends to be degrading to an

indivi :

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ean Indiana’s interest in reforming its delinquent or mal-

adjusted juveniles be so compelling that it can use ‘‘eruel

and unusual’’ means to accomplish its benevolent end of

reformation. :

We hold today only that the use of disciplinary beatings

and tranquilizing drugs in the circumstances shown by

this record violates plaintiffs’ 14th Amendment right pro-

tecting them from cruel and unusual punishment. We do

not intend that penal and reform institutional physicians

cannot prescribe necessary tranquilizing drugs in appro-

priate cases. Our concern is with actual and potential

abuses under policies where juveniles are beaten with an

instrument causing serious injuries, and drugs are admin-

istered to juveniles intramuscularly by staff, without try-

ing medication short of drugs and without adequate

medical guidance and prescription."

11 Experts testified that the following minimum medical safe-

guards should be followed in the use of tranquilizing drugs:

(1) The individual administered the drug should be ob-

served, during the duration of the drug’s effect, by trained

medical personnel, familiar with the possible adverse and

harmful side effects of the drug used.

(2) The person receiving an IM (intramuscular) injection

of a major tranquilizing drug should first receive a diagnosis

or prescription authorizing the use of said drug by a qualified

medical doctor, child psychiatrist, psychologist or physician.

(3) IM injections should only be administered by a

physician or intern and only after all attempts have failed

to get the individual to take the drug orally.

(4) Major tranquilizing drugs, such as Thorazine and

Sparine, should not be administered IM, unless given in a

hospital where there is an intensive care unit and emergency

facilities which could deal with possible adverse effects from

the use of said drugs.

(5) Major tranquilizing drugs should only be used to con-

trol psychotic or pre-psychotic breakdowns or as a followup

in assisting a schizophrenic patient from having a recurrence

of a psychotic breakdown.

(6) Major tranquilizing drugs shorid not be used merely

to induce sleep or unconsciousness for a period of time, but

only as a part of a psychotherapeutic program of treatment.

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II—THE RIGHT TO REHABILITATIVE

TREATMENT

The School staff-to-juvenile ratio for purposes of treat-

ment is approximately one to thirty. The sixteen coun-

selors are responsible for developing and implementing

individualized treatment programs at the institution, but

the counselors need have no specialized training or experi-

ence. Administrative tasks (‘‘paper work’’) occupy more

than half of the counselors’ time. The duties of the staff

psychiatrist are limited to crises. He has no opportunity

to develop and manage individual psychotherapy pro-

grams. The three staff psychologists do not hold graduate

degrees and are not certified by Indiana. They render,

principally, diagnostic services, mostly directed toward

supervising in-take behavior classifications.

In June, 1971, the School adopted what was described

as a differential treatment program, bottomed mainly on

the Quay Classification System. Under the Quay System,

upon their admission to the School, juveniles are classified

with respect to four personality and behavior types on

the basis of standardized tests: the inadequate, the

neurotic, the aggressive, and the sub-cultural. Each of the

sixteen cottages at the School houses twenty to thirty juve-

niles, with common personality and behavior patterns.

Each cottage is served by a staff comprising a house man-

ager, a counselor, an educator, and a consulting psycholo-

gist. The cottage staff meets weekly for evaluation of the

rehabilitation program of each inmate. Upon admission

to a cottage, each juvenile agrees to improve his behavior

in four areas of institutional life: ‘‘cottage,’’ ‘‘recrea-

tion,’’ ‘‘school,’’ and ‘‘treatment.’’ Correspondingly, each

has responsibility for physical maintenance of the residen-

tial area, social and athletic activities, specified levels of

academic or vocational skills, and improved personality

A-12

goals. With success in each of the four areas, the juvenile

earns additional privileges, ultimately culminating in a

parole date.

The district court decided that both Indiana law and

the federal Constitution secure for juvenile offenders a

‘tright to treatment,’’ and that the School failed to provide

minimal rehabilitative treatment. Defendants contend that

there exists no right to treatment under the Constitution

or Indiana law, and that if there is the right, the Quay

Classification System used at the School did not violate

the right. We hold, with the district court, that juveniles

have a right to rehabilitative treatment.

The right to rehabilitative treatment for juvenile of-

fenders has roots in the general social reform of the late

nineteenth century, was nurtured by court decisions

throughout the first half of this century, and has been

established in state and federal courts in recent years.

In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967), the Court stated:

The early reformers were appalled by adult pro-

cedures and penalties, and by the fact that children

could be given long prison sentences and mixed in

jails with hardened criminals . . . The child was to

be ‘‘treated’’ and ‘‘rehabilitated’’ and the procedures,

from apprehension through institutionalization, were

to be ‘‘clinical’’ rather than ‘‘ punitive.’’

Since the beginning, state courts have emphasized the need

for ‘‘treatment”’ in their Juvenile Court Acts. Wisconsin

Industrial School for Girls v. Clark County, 79 N.W. 422,

427 (Wise. 1899); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198,

199 (Pa. 1905); Ex Parte Sharp, 96 P. 563, 564 (Idaho

1908); Wissenberg v. Bradley, 229 N.W. 205, 207 (Iowa

1929).

A-13

The United States:Supreme Court has never definitively

decided that a youth confined under the jurisdiction of a

juvenile court has a constitutionally guaranteed right to

treatment. But the Court has assumed, in passing on the

validity of juvenile proceedings, that a state must provide

treatment for juveniles. In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.

541 (1966), the Court reversed the district court’s convic-

tion of a sixteen year old after the District of Columbia

Juvenile Court had waived its jurisdiction. Justice Fortas

there, writing for the Court, commented on the theory

and practice of juvenile courts:

There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds

for concern that the child receives the worst of both

worlds; that he gets neither the protection accorded

to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative

treatment postulated for children. 383 U.S. at 556.

Later, in In re Gault, supra, Justice Fortas ‘‘reiterate[d]

the view’’ of Kent that the juvenile process need not meet

the constitutional requirements of an adult criminal trial,

but must provide essential “‘due process and fair treat-

ment.’’ This view has been continued subsequent to Gault

in the Supreme Court decisions involving juvenile court

procedures. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 ( 1970) ; McKeiver

v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).

It is true that the Supreme Court cases discussed above

deal with procedural due process and not the right to reha-

bilitative treatment, but several recent state and federal

eases, out of concern—based upon the parens patriae doc-

trine underlying the juvenile justice system—that rehabili-

tative treatment was not generally accorded in the juvenile

reform process, have decided that juvenile inmates have

a constitutional right to that treatment. M. v. M., 336

N.Y.S. 2d 304 (1972); Inmates of Boys’ Training School

WS" ARTETA ELLIE DATOS EIS, 2 Se TOPPA, ARO eas

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: v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.C. R.I. 1972); Martarella

q v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (8.D. N.Y. 1972)

q ‘ In Martarella the court found a clear constitutional right

to treatment for juveniles based on the 8th and 14th

: Amendments:

_. What, we have said, although the record would justify

] more, is sufficient to establish that, however, benign

‘the purposes for which members of the plaintiff class

: are held in custody, and whatever the sad necessities

} which prompt their detention, they are held in penal

condition. Where the State, as parens patriae, imposes

such detention, it can meet the Constitution’s require-

: ment of due process and prohibition of cruel and

unusual punishment if, and only if, it furnishes ade-

' quate treatment to the detainee. 349 F. Supp. at 585.

_ (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted.)

After an historical analysis of the development of the

right, the court concluded :

In sum, the law has developed to a point which justi-

fies the assertion that: ‘‘A new concept of substantive

due process is evolving in the therapeutic realm. This

concept is founded upon a recognition of the concur-

rency between the state’s exercise of sanctioning

powers and its assumption of the duties of social re-

sponsibility. Its implication is that effective treatment

must be the quid pro quo for society’s right to exercise

its parens patriae controls. Whether specifically

recognized by statutory enactment or implicitly

derived from the constitutional requirements of due

process, the right to treatment exists.’’ 349 F. Supp.

at 600. (Footnotes omitted.)

In a most recent case, Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp.

166 (E.D. Tex. 1973), a federal district court specifically

found that juveniles at Texas’ six juvenile training schools

have both a statutory and constitutional right to treatment.

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We hold that on the record before us the district court

did not err in deciding that the plaintiff juveniles have

the right under the 14th Amendment due process clause

to rehabilitative treatment.’

III—ADEQUACY OF TREATMENT

Experts testified at the trial, and the defendants admit,

that the Quay System of behavior classification is not

treatment. And case histories of maladjusted juveniles

show that use of the System falls far short of its improved

personality goals. Mrs. Betty Levine, resident instructor

in sociology at the Unitersity of Indiana, testified that

the School lacks the individual treatment given in the Indi-

ana Girls School. The record shows very little individual

treatment programmed, much less implemented, at the

School; and it is unclear exactly how much time is spent

in individual counselling. We conclude that the district

court could properly infer that the Quay system as used

in the School failed to provide adequate rehabilitative

treatment.

We leave to the competent district court the decision:

what is the minimal treatment required to provide consti-

tutional due process, having in mind that the juvenile

12 We note that the district court additionally determined

that a right to treatment in this case has a statutory basis

in view of the “custody, care, and discipline’ language of

the Indiana Juvenile Court Act, Burns Ind. Stat. Ann.

§9-3201. (Emphasis supplied.) We agree with this conclu-

sion. Since we have today determined that the federal Consti-

tution affords juveniles a right to treatment, any interpreta-

tion of the Indiana Act which would find no such right to

exist would itself be unconstitutional.

——e PS EL EEE MET LA OE OTOL IEE LOT FE LEE LG EAI T IELTS TRAIT

A-16

process has elements of both the criminal and mental

health processes.”

In our view the ‘‘right to treatment”’ includes the right

to minimum acceptable standards of care and treatment

for juveniles and the right to individualized care and treat-

3 ment. Because children differ in their need for rehabilita-

tion, individual need for treatment will differ. When a

: state assumes the place of a juvenile’s parents, it assumes

4 as well the parental duties, and its treatment of its

juveniles should, so far as can be reasonably required,

q be what proper parental care would provide. Without a

i program of individual treatment the result may be that

the juveniles will not be rehabilitated, but warehoused,

und that at the termination of detention they will likely

be incapable of taking their proper places in free socicty;

their interests and those of the state and the school thereby

1 being defeated.

‘We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court

in each appeal, and remand" only for the limited purpose

18 The juvenile justice process can be understood to be

a hybrid between the criminal system and the mental

health process.

see 8 &

. . . Finally, the arguments for the right to treatment

in both processes rely heavily upon the medical services,

especially psychiatry and psychology.

Note, A. Right to Treatment for Juveniles, 1973 Wash.

U.L.Q. 157, 160.

See also, N. Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy

the Ills of the Juvenile Process? 57 Geo. L.J. 848, 860-61

(1969) ; Note, The Courts, the Constitution and Juvenile Insti-

tutional Reform, 52 B.U.L.Rev. 38, 42-49 (1972).

14 See note 2, supra.

Te ee ny at — .

Sadeenetc: ite ae ers one eat RDA SL repNTAaessiasceeanee

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of further proceedings in No. 73-1446 with respect to the

right to rehabilitative treatment.

A true Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

SLI LILIES RN IOS

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. FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT:

"United States Court of Appeals

Chicago, Illinois 60604

January 31, 1974

Before :

Hon. ROGER J. KILEY, Senior Circuit it Judge

Hon. THOMAS E. FAIRCHILD, Circuit Judge

Hon. ROBERT A. SPRECHER, Circuit Judge

ERIC NELSON, etc. et al, Appeal from the

Plaintiffs-A ppellees, United States Dis-

trict Court for the

No. 72-1970, 73-1446 vs. | Northern District

ROBERT P. HEYNE, etc., et al., of Indiana, South

Defendants-A ppellants. | Bend Division.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the

record from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, and

was argued by counsel.

On consideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged

by this court that the judgment of the said District Court

in each appeal be, and the same is hereby, AFFIRMED,

with costs, and these causes be and the same are hereby

REMANDED to the said District Court for further pro-

ceedings in No. 73-1446 with respect to the right to reha-

bilitative treatment, in accordance with the opinion of this

Court filed this day.

ee ook

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OLE ND IIL CEPI IO NBS LM DENS PE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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