Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission

Supreme Court brief1974

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In The

DEC 29

Supreme Court of the Hnited Shtates,,,.,

October Term, 1973

No '¥3-1315

MORNINGSIDE RENEWAL COUNCIL, INC., and

RIVERSIDE DEMOCRATS, INC.,

Petitioners,

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and TRUSTEES OF

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT _,

JOHN G. LIPSETT

Attorney for Petitioners

420 Lexington Avenue

New York, New York 10017

(212) 685-4294

(6932) LUTZ APPELLATE PRINTERS, INC.

Lew and Financial Printing

South River, N.J. New York, N.Y. Philedelphia, Pa. Washington, D.C.

(201) 257-6850 (212) $65-6377 (21S) 563-5587 (202) 783-7288

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Official Report of Opinion Below ............. 2

I, = Wl aida sae ty a we le Serer eee 2

Questions Presented ........-.-.---2-+----- 2

Statutes, Regulations and Other Provisions Involved .. 3

Statement of the Case .............22206. 6

Reasons for Granting the Writ:

I. A federal question of general and continuing

importance has been decided in a manner which

appears to conflict with applicable decisions of

EE a as ado in a a we ee a a ee 16

II. The decision below conflicts in an important

respect with decisions of other Courts of

Appeals concerning the scope of the National

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and

otherwise significantly restricts the scope of

EE as Se add ae oe a ae & Oa ae eee 21

a er aa ae 25

il

Contents

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Cited:

Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United

States Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109

ke er er eee ae 12

Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316

U.S. 407, 421

er ae ee er eee 21

Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir.1971) ...... 23

Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert.

i. Ge We CUED nc cee ce eee wee 22

Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421

ae ra are a a eae a gon 23

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d

CU Es nw co hw we 6 ee 23

NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969) .. 17

Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir.

ka earn ee et a ee eas A rae 22, 23

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) ... . . . 17,20

Statutes Cited:

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Section

102,

ii

Contents

42. U.S.C.A. Section 4332 ......-.-

42. U.S.C.A. Section 4332(2)(c) . . - -

98 U.S.C. Section 2342 ...-..----

98 U.S.C. Section 2350 ....------

98 U.S.C. Section 1254(1) .....-.---

Other Authorities Cited:

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10:

Section 2.801 ......---+e-2-

Section 60.40 ..... 2-2 eee ees

SS? eee a ae a

ae rar eee eee ee

Se avéae acu ee ee oe ee

H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong. 2d Sess., 21-26 (1946).

S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 13-16 (1945)

17

17

PRPS PPR PT PI *

Ee Oe aT See | ’ ‘

iv

Contents

Page

Guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality, 36

Federal Register 7724 ............... 6, 24

APPEN DIX

A NN ss 6-5 ow eee a we Oe ake la

Order of United States Court of Appeals ......... 18a

Initial Decision of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board . 21a

Decision of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Dated

aks re at a caning iy he aah oe 102a

Memorandum and Order ..............2.-2e6. 149,

In The

Supreme Court of the Hnited States

October Term, 1973

>

No.

MORNINGSIDE RENEWAL COUNCIL, INC., and

RIVERSIDE DEMOCRATS, INC.,

Petitioners,

US.

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and TRUSTEES OF

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW

YORK,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

Petitioners Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. and

Riverside Democrats, Inc. respectfully pray that a writ of

certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

entered in this proceeding on July 5, 1973.

r

to

: OFFICIAL REPORT OF OPINION BELOW

The official report of the majority opinion and

: dissenting opinion delivered in the Court below is found at

: 482 F.2d 234. Copies of such opinions are annexed hereto.

: JURISDICTION

The judgment sought to be reviewed was dated and

entered on July 5, 1973. A timely petition for a rehearing

was denied by order dated and entered on October 4,

1973. The same petition, treated as a petition for a

3 rehearing en banc, was denied by order dated and entered

4 on October 4, 1973, with three judges dissenting. Copies

i of such orders are annexed hereto. The statutory

provisions believed to confer on this Court jurisdiction to

review the judgment in question by writ of certiorari are

28 U.S.C. Section 2350 and 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).

eT OR ee TTR OW

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Must the Atomic Energy Commission establish

generally applicable substantive safety criteria for research

reactors prior to the licensing and operation of Columbia

University’s nuclear reactor?

2. Must the Atomic Energy Commission prepare an

environmental impact statement pursuant to the National

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 prior to the licensing

and operation of Columbia University’s nuclear reactor?

_

3

STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND

OTHER PROVISIONS INVOLVED

With respect to Question 1:

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations:

Section 2.801. Initiation of rule making — Rule

making may be initiated by the Commission at its

own instance, on the recommendation of another

agency of the United States, or on the petition of

any other interested person.

Section 50.40. Common standards — In

determining that a license will be issued to an

applicant, the Commission will be guided by the

following considerations:

(a) The process to be performed, the operating

procedures, the facility and equipment, the use of

the facility, and other technical specifications, or

the proposals in regard to any of the foregoing

collectively, provide reasonable assurance that the

applicant will comply with the regulations in this

Chapter, including the regulations in Part 20, and

that the health and safety of the public will not be

endangered.

(b) The applicant is technically and financially

qualified to engage in the proposed activities in

accordance with the regulations in this Chapter.

(c) The issuance of a license to the applicant will

not, in the opinion of the Commission, be inimical

to the common defense and security or to the

health and safety of the public.

ee | :

(d) Any applicable requirements of Appendix “D”

have been satisfied.

Section 50.41. Additional standards for class 104

licenses. — In determining that a class 104 license

will be issued to an applicant, the Commission will,

in addition to applying the standards set forth in

section 50.40 be guided by the following

considerations:

(a) The Commission will permit the widest amount

of effective medical therapy possible with the

amount of special nuclear material available for

such purposes.

(b) The Commission will permit the conduct of

widespread and diverse research and development.

* * *

With respect to Question 2:

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Section

102 (42 U.S.C.A. Section 4332):

Shui Patino WAN Berg erties net

The Congress authorizes and directs that to the

fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations,

and public laws of the United States shall be

: interpreted and administered in accordance with

: the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all

agencies of the Federal Government shall —

* * *

ww

(c) include in every recommendation or report on

proposals for legislation and other major Federal

actions significantly affecting the quality of the

human environment, a detailed statement by the

responsible official on —

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed

action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which

cannot be avoided should the proposal be

implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term

uses of man’s environment and_ the

maintenance and enhancement of longterm

productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable

commitments of resources which would be

involved in the proposed action should it be

implemented.

Prior to making any detailed statement, the

responsible Federal official shall consult with and

obtain the comments of any Federal Agency which

has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with

respect to any environmental impact involved.

Copies of such statement and the comments and

views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local

agencies, which are authorized to develop and

enforce environmental standards, shall be made

available to the President, the Council on

Environmental Quality and to the public as

provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall

accompany the proposal through the existing

agency review processes.

Guidelines of the Council on Environmental Quality

(36 Federal Register 7724):

The statutory clause “major Federal actions

significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment” is to be construed by agencies with a

view to the overall, cumulative impact of the

action proposed (and of further actions

3 contemplated). Such actions may be localized in

their impact, but if there is potential that the

environment may be significantly affected, the

statement is to be prepared. Proposed actions, the

environmental impact of which is likely to be

highly controversial, should be covered in all cases.

he cs) cena ies ae Mah i HD oR be NIT TD Sa ORK A Ht SLD ha EI: catia ‘

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Sidi eatin eas sad m

Columbia University was granted a construction

permit by the Atomic Energy Commission (the

“Commission”) to build a Triga Mark II reactor on its

Morningside Heights campus in Manhattan, New York

City, on December 30, 1963. Morningside Heights is a

densely populated area, having an average of 628 persons

per net residential acre. Within a few blocks of the area,

population density approximates 1,000 persons per acre.

The median range within Manhattan is 500-600 persons.

SRP TS OS I 0 BPE, PU te rere 4

_—

Triga reactors are research reactors manufactured by a

subsidiary of Gulf Oil Corporation. According to

information supplied by Gulf and Columbia, 29 Triga

reactors of various descriptions are in operation, under

construction or contracted for in the United States.

Numerous other research reactors are operated by

universities and others in the United States.

The Columbia reactor was built with funds of the

National Science Foundation. The Commission has agreed

to provide funds for the fuel elements needed to operate

the reactor. The total grants from agencies of the federal

government amount to approximately $671,000.

After the reactor was built, Columbia sought an

operating license and on March 18, 1968, the Commission

gave notice of the proposed issuance of an operating

license. The petitioners requested leave to intervene in the

proceeding in April, 1968, and after a long adjournment

requested by Columbia, were granted leave to intervene in

June, 1969.

The proceeding was heard initially before an Atomic

Safety and Licensing Board, composed of three members

— Valentine B. Deale, Esq., a Washington, D.C. attorney,

Chairman; Dr. Eugene Greuling, Professor of Physics at

Duke University, and Mr. Hood Worthington, a retired

physicist from du Pont de Nemours & Co. None of these

was a Commission staff member.

At hearings in New York City in November, 1969, and

July, 1970, the petitioners’ witness, Dr. William J.

Nicholson of the School of Medicine at Mount Sinai

Hospital, New York City, proposed that a catastrophic

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accident could occur by virtue of the rupture of the

cladding of one or several fuel elements of the reactor in

air at a high temperature. He indicated a likely fission

products release fraction of 4 per cent (40,000 parts per

million) based on the results of certain Commission

sponsored tests, known as the SNAPTRAN tests. Such a

release, he testified, could give a thyroid dose of 20 rem

outside the reactor building from the rupture of one fuel

element and 1400 rem from the rupture of all 70 fuel

elements in the reactor. Such a dose compares with the

concentration of one rem or less allowable under the

standards for normal operation set by the Commission.

The Licensing Board noted that there was no questioning

the 4 per cent figure as being properly related to sucha

high temperature accident.

Dr. Nicholson urged a conservative approach to the

type of accident that should be postulated for purposes of

assuring the public safety. His approach was to postulate

an accident producing a release of radioactivity such as had

occurred under experimental conditions. This conservative

approach is similar to that which is used in evaluating the

safety of power reactors, in which the accident postulated

is one resulting in the release of appreciable quantities of

fission products. Dr. Nicholson suggested various accidents

or incidents, including sabotage and a falling aircraft, that

might result in a substantial release of fission products. His

testimony that such accidents might cause serious

consequences was consistent with the Safety Analysis

Report submitted by Columbia.

Columbia and the Commission’s Regulatory Staff, on

the other hand, proposed a less serious accident, the failure

of the cladding of a single fuel element at a lower

temperature while exposed to air. Referring to a

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_

experiment performed in 1966 by Gulf, Columbia

reported that the maximum fission product release from

this accident was 15 parts per million. In presenting this

calculation, however, Columbia failed to take into account

an earlier experiment of which it was aware conducted by

Gulf in 1960. This experiment gave a release fraction for

the same accident of 9600 parts per million. Dr. Nicholson

first exposed this inconsistency, testifying that “this

changes these calculations from a discussion of a minor

problem to that of a major catastrophe.”

It was further brought out at these hearings that the

fission products release fractions postulated by the

Regulatory Staff for purposes of safety calculation in the

case Of previously licensed Triga reactors had been

inconsistent in the extreme, ranging from 10 parts per

million to 28,000 parts per million.

On April 6, 1971, the Licensing Board issued an Initial

Decision denying authorization to issue an operating

license. While not accepting the petitioners’ proposed

accident, the Licensing Board noted the absence of

applicable substantive criteria in regard to accidents to

research reactors and ruled as follows:

“B. The absence of applicable substantive criteria

of the Commission and of convincing objective

standards of the regulatory staff — all quite

distinct from provisions at 10 CFR Part 50, such

as at sections 50.40 and 50.41 (b) — prompts the

Licensing Board to decline answering the question

of whether the health and safety of the public

would be endangered upon the occurrence of a

postulated accident to the applicant’s reactor. The

Licensing Board considers it inappropriate to

10

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enforce an answer derived from the narrow

confines of a single proceeding and its ow

personal views about the degree to which the

health and safety of the public ought to be

protected against accident consequences.”

Yalan fads daw milter en's,

On the subject of the conflict in experimental data,

the Licensing Board ruled as follows:

“C. In the Licensing Board’s opinion, the fission

3 products release fraction under postulated accident

: conditions for such a standard product as a Triga

reactor ought to be a matter of proven

determination and unquestionable validity. From

the Licensing Board’s standpoint, resolution of

existing conflict in data and ascertainment of firm

figures ought to be accomplished through a new

experiment under the auspices of the regulatory

staff. The sponsorship of such an experiment, in

the Licensing Board’s view, is within the province

of the regulatory staff in attending to the interests

of the public in the process of licensing Triga

reactors. There ought to be an end to the past

practice of the regulatory staff, which lessens its

credibility, of shifting basis in its safety evaluation

: of accident conditions from one Triga case to

another by varying the combination of postulated

; accident and fission products release fraction

4 assumed.”

Ath Aaa Baked Bb a Sae9 G8 Det Noche PE MOSM

Ree ep ee ee m

In its exceptions to the Initial Decision filed with the

Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, Columbia did

not take issue with these principal rulings of the Licensing

Board and indeed called upon the Commission to conduct

11

a further experiment on “‘an objective and impartial basis”’.

The Regulatory Staff filed exceptions claiming that the

operating license should have been issued. The petitioners,

while concurring in the principal rulings of the Licensing

Board, also filed exceptions to certain rulings of the

Licensing Board, including its refusal to require a NEPA

environmental impact statement. The Gulf Oil Corporation

initially stated on April 12, 1971, in a letter from Ralph H.

Peters to all U.S.A. Triga owners, that it was ‘“‘most

anxious to see that new independent experiments are

conducted as quickly as possible.”

Barely a month after writing this letter, Mr. Peters

wrote a letter to Dr. Peter A. Morris, the Director of the

Commission’s Division of Reactor Licensing, the first of an

exchange of letters signed “Ralph” and “Pete’’, in which

he advised that Gulf intended to conduct further

experiments. The letter stated: ‘‘We hope to have you or

members of your staff participate fully in these

experiments so that they will be deemed to have been

done ‘under the auspices of the Regulatory Staff’.”’ Dr.

Morris responded by advising that Robert J. Schemel of his

Division would attend the tests “tas an observer”. This

correspondence was submitted to the Appeal Board on

May 27, 1971. Dr. Morris was then advised by Mr. Peters

on May 27, 1971, that the tests would begin on June 17,

1971. The Appeal Board was then so advised. On June 14,

1971, the Appeal Board ordered a new hearing, stating

that it desired that information conceming the results of

the new experiments be included in the record as new

evidence.

On September 9, 1971, Columbia requested that the

hearing date then scheduled for October 27, 1971, be

cancelled and the proceeding held in abeyance “until there

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has been a reasonable opportunity for Columbia University

— and for any other party who may so desire — to assess

the implications of Calvert Cliffs for this proceeding and to

inform the Appeal Board of its views in connection

therewith.”” The decision referred to, Calvert Cliffs

Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic

Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), held

in part that the Commission’s regulatory processes had

failed to meet NEPA requirements. The Regulatory Staff

indicated that it had no objection to this request.

Nonetheless, the request was denied by the Appeal Board

and the hearing date of October 27, 1971, was confirmed.

The petitioners, who had maintained that the evidence

already in the record mandated an environmental report,

then moved for leave to introduce further evidence from

Dr. Ernest J. Sternglass of the School of Medicine at the

University of Pittsburgh, regarding the effects of Triga

reactors on the health, safety and environment of

surrounding residents.

Hearings were held on October 27, 1971, and

February 15, 1972, before the three-member Apped

Board, which included two ranking permanent staff

members of the Commission. At these hearings Dr.

Sternglass, who previously had published papers presenting

evidence that low levels of environmental! radiation from

nuclear weapons tests, nuclear power reactors and fuel

processing facilities appear to have led to detectable rises

in childhood leukemia, chronic respiratory diseases and

infant mortality, reported his study of infant mortality

and prematurity in the neighborhood of three Triga

reactors.

_—

13

Data on infant mortality rates for the town of State

College, Penna., in which is located the Pennsylvania State

College reactor and for Lebanon City, a control city 90

miles to the east, were compared. With 1962 as a reference

equal to 100, infant mortality in State College rose to 229

in 1968 but in Lebanon City declined to 48. Moreover, in

addition to this upward trend, two clear peaks of infant

mortality occurred in State College in 1965 and 1968.

These peaks correspond to the measured peaks of total

beta activity and also of unidentified beta activity

discharged by the reactor.

In Urbana, Illinois, site of the University of Illinois

Triga reactor, infant mortality, with 1962 as a reference

equal to 100, increascd to 296 in 1963, 233 in 1964, 430

in 1965, 314 in 1966, 287 in 1967 and 151 in 1968, while

in McLean County, a control county 20 to 60 miles to the

northwest, infant mortality declined during this period.

Again, the levels of infant mortality were related to

possible increases and decreases in radioactive discharges,

in that the reactor became operative in late 1960, was

upgraded to a power of 250 kilowatts in 1965, sustained

an accidental release in 1966 and was shut down for

extensive modifications in 1968.

With respect to the Triga reactors operated by Gulf Oil

Corporation in San Diego, California, rises in infant

mortality up to 10.7% (2-'’% standard errors) took place in

San Diego County relative to California as a whole within a

year after a prototype Triga reactor went into operation,

peaking the year following the reported release of fresh

fission products from a damaged fuel element in 1963.

Following start-up of the Gulf Trigas in 1960, the rate of

infant mortality in San Diego County exceeded the rate in

ee a ee

14

California as a whole in each of nine consecutive yeos.

whereas in previous years there was no such uninterrupted

pattern.

Additional evidence was introduced at these hearings

concerning radioactive discharges from the Pennsylvania

State College Triga reactor. In the case of this reactor,

argon-41 radioactive gas is released to the environment

from the pneumatic sample changer and the dry irradiation

tubes and from the reactor pool water. No accurate

measurement of such releases has been made, although it

was brought out at the hearings that such releases were

underestimated in official reports by three to nine times in

the last five years. In addition, liquid radioactive wastes

have escaped into the environment either through

accidental leakage from the reactor pool or through

deliberate discharges from the hold-up tank which receives

the liquid waste produced in the regeneration of the

reactor pool demineralizer. Leakage from the reactor tank,

which amounted in 1970 alone to 101,180 gallons,

presumably reached the underground water system.

Except for the pool water leakage, all other liquid waste

was discharged to a storm water system. This waste

included or may have included thirteen different isotopes.

Total liquid waste release reached peaks of 3,475

microcuries in 1965, 2,292 microcuries in 1968, 11,321

microcuries in 1970 and 2,969 microcuries in 1971.

The Appeal Board, on May 18, 1972, issued a Decision

authorizing the issuance of an operating license. On the

issue of standards, the Appeal Board agreed with the

Licensing Board that there were no applicable regulations

establishing safety standards for research reactors. The

Appeal Board went on to hold, however, that the absence

— >

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_—

15

of standards would not inhibit it from passing on the

safety of the reactor “under the circumstances of this

case.” It did, nonetheless, strongly recommend that

specific standards for the evaluation of an accident

situation in a research reactor should be formulated.

The Appeal Board further held that the operation of

the reactor would not have a significant impact on the

environment and therefore a NEPA environmental

statement was not required.

In two important respects, however, the decision of

the Appeal Board indicated, in petitioners’ opinion, a

considerable potential environmental effect. First, as

pointed out in Judge Oakes’ dissenting opinion in the

Court of Appeals, the Appeal Board did not consider it

desirable to use the limits for permissible radiation doses

under normal operations for evaluating the effects of a

postulated accident in a research reactor “inasmuch as

they are unduly restrictive for that purpose”. Second, the

Appeal Board and Licensing Board found it necessary to

impose numerous conditions in order to provide

reasonable assurance that the public health and safety

would not be compromised by willful damage or

destruction and otherwise to limit radioactive releases

from the reactor. Among these conditions are limitations

on the access to keys; alarm systems for the reactor

control room, the outer reactor control room, the outer

reactor room and the reactor itself; an hourly guard

inspection of the reactor control room and outer reactor

room, facilitated by a wide-angle viewing system in each

room; sealing of the truck door in the parking area during

operation of the reactor; amendment of Columbia’s

emergency plans to assure compliance with Appendix E,

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10 CFR Part 50; and measures for reducing the discharg

of radioactive gas from the reactor.

By order of July 28, 1972, the Appeal Board denie<

the petitioners’ petition for reconsideration. Thereafter, ;

petition for review was filed with the Court of Appeals fo;

the Second Circuit. Jurisdiction to review the final orde

of the Commission was conferred on the Court of Appeal

by 28 U.S.C. Section 2342. By judgment entered July 5

1973, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. Althoug

the Commission is authorized, by virtue of the Appea

Board’s decision and the judgment of the Court o

Appeals, to issue an operating license for the Columbi:

reactor, petitioners are not aware that such a license ha

yet been issued.

Copies of the opinions and orders of the Court 0

Appeals and the decisions and orders of the Atomic Safet

and Licensing Board and the Atomic Safety and Licensin

Appeal Board are annexed hereto.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

A federal question of general and_ continuin

importance has been decided in a manner which appears t

conflict with applicable decisions of this Court.

Triga reactors and other research reactors are i

wide-spread use in the United States and may be used eve

more widely in the future. They have not been operate

however, in densely populated cities. The continuing lac

of any general accident safety standards is a matter ¢

i

17

great general concern, particularly for densely populated

urban areas. Petitioners urge that such standards should

have been established by rule-making proceedings prior to

the granting of an operating license herein. The Court of

Appeals, with one judge dissenting, held that the decision

whether to conduct rule-making rather than adjudicatory

proceedings was for the Commission to make.

This Court and various justices thereof have indicated

in the past that agencies should use their rule-making

power as much as possible to formulate rules of general

application. Thus, in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194

(1947), the Court stated in part at 202:

“Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have

the ability to make new law prospectively through

the exercise of its rule-making powers, it has less

reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to

formulate new standards of conduct within the

framework of the Holding Company Act. The

function of filling in the interstices of the Act

should be performed, as much as possible, through

this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be

applied in the future.”

In NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969)

the plurality opinion stated in part as follows at 764-65:

“The rule-making provisions of that Act, which the

Board would avoid, were designed to assure

fairness and mature consideration of rules of

general application. See H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th

Cong., 2d Sess., 21-26 (1946); S. Rep. No. 752,

79th Cong., 1st Sess., 13-16 (1945). They may not

18

be avoided by the process of making rules in the

course of adjudicatory proceedings. There is no

warrant in law for the Board to replace the

statutory scheme with a rule-making procedure of

its own invention. Apart from the fact that the

device fashioned by the Board does not comply

with statutory command, it obviously falls short of

the substance of the requirements of the

Administrative Procedure Act. The ‘rule’ created in

Excelsior was not published in the Feder

Register, which is the statutory and accepted

means of giving notice of a rule as adopted; only

selected organizations were given notice of the

‘hearing’, whereas notice in the Federal Register

would have been general in character; under the

Administrative Procedure Act, the terms or

substance of the rule would have to be stated in

the notice of hearing, and all interested parties

would have an opportunity to participate in the

rule making.”

Douglas, J., dissenting in the same case, stated in part

as follows at 777-78:

“The rule-making procedure performs important

functions. It gives notice to an entire segment of

society of those controls or regimentation that is

forthcoming. It gives an opportunity for persons

affected to be heard.

... Agencies discover that they are not always

repositories of ultimate wisdom; they learn from

en eee a

19

the suggestions of outsiders and often benefit from

that advice. See H. Friendly, The Federal

Administrative Agencies 45 (1962).

This is a healthy process that helps make a society

viable. The multiplication of agencies and their

growing power make them more and more remote

from the people affected by what they do and

make more likely the arbitrary exercise of their

powers. Public airing of problems through rule

making makes the bureaucracy more responsive to

public needs and is an important brake on the

growth of absolutism in the regime that now

governs all of us.”

In his dissenting opinion in the case, Harlan, J. stated

part as follows at 781:

“One cannot always have the best of both worlds.

Either the rule-making provisions are to be

enforced or they are not. Before the Board may be

permitted to adopt a rule that so significantly

alters pre-existing labor-management

understandings, it must be required to conduct a

satisfactory rule-making proceeding so that it will

have the benefit of wide-ranging argument before it

enacts its proposed solution to an important

problem.”

If rule-making provisions are to be enforced at all,

hey should be enforced in this case. Many aspects of the

ase, brought out in Judge Oakes’ dissenting opinion in the

Yourt of Appeals, point to the necessity here of general

Tee Seo ee

ea

20

objective rules formulated by rule-making. Among thes

are: that the independent Atomic Safety and Licensin

Board in its Initial Decision denied authoriziation for a

operating license in part because of the lack of objectiy,

accident safety standards; that the regulatory staff of th

Commission has shifted the basis of its safety evaluation o:

accident conditions from one Triga case to another (jj

such cases fission products release fractions postulated fo,

purposes of safety calculation have ranged from 10 part

per million to 28,000 parts per million); that in reversin;

the Licensing Board’s denial of authorization, the Appea

Board relied on safety tests conducted by the mos

interested party, the reactor manufacturer; tha

notwithstanding its reversal of the Licensing Board, th

Appeal Board strongly recommend the formulation o

safety standards; and that the three- member Appeal Boar

included two high-ranking staff members of th

Commission, a body which is charged with the dual dut

of passing on licenses on the one hand and promoting th

use of atomic power on the other, and which has agreed t

provide substantial funds for the operation of the reactor

On the other hand, this Court also has outlined certail

circumstances in which rule-making may not be required

Thus, in the Chenery case, supra, relied on by the Court o

Appeals, the Court stated at 332 U.S. 202-03:

“In other words, problems may arise in a cas

which the administrative agency could no

reasonably foresee, problems which must be solve

despite the absence of a relevant general rule. 0

the agency may not have had sufficient experienc

with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying it

tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule. Or th

21

problem may be so specialized and varying in

nature as to be impossible of capture within the

boundaries of a general rule. In those situations,

the agency must retain power to deal with the

problems on a_ case-to-case basis if the

administrative process is to be effective. There is

thus a very definite place for the case-by-case

evolution of statutory standards. And the choice

made between proceeding by general rule or by

individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies

primarily in the informed discretion of the

administrative agency. See Columbia Broadcasting

System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 421.”

None of the particular circumstances cited above

which might favor ad hoc adjudication apply in this case.

Indeed, both the Licensing Board and Appeal Board

recognized that there should be general objective

standards. And nowhere are such standards more

important than in the case of a reactor located in a densely

populated urban area, indeed in an area far more densely

populated than any other in the United States in which an

operating reactor is situated.

il.

The decision below conflicts in an important respect

with decisions of other Courts of Appeals concerning the

scope of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

and otherwise significantly restricts the scope of such Act.

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

requires an environmental statement in the case of “‘major

Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the

human environment” 42 U.S.C. Section 4332(2)(C).

a Se a ed ee

li eg

isbii. Miedhete sith Suara dah atthe

22

The majority in the Court below held that the Appeal

Board’s decision that an environmental impact statement

was not necessary was not arbitrary and capricious. The

dissenting judge, however, found that such finding was

arbitrary and capricious. Both the majority and dissent

applied the “arbitrary, capricious” standard of review in

accordance with the prior decision of the Court below in

Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829 (2nd Cir. 1972),

cert. den., 412 U.S. 908 (1973). Petitioners believe, first,

that a broader standard of review should have been

applied, in accordance with decisions in other Circuits. In

Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir.

1973), the Court held that the proper standard of judicia

review of an agency’s threshold determination not to file

an environmental impact statement was not the narrower

arbitrary capricious standard but a more relaxed rule of

reasonableness. The Court stated at 465-66:

“_..In support of its argument that the arbitrary

or capricious standard should govern, the agency

relies on the well-settled proposition that, in the

absence of fraud, administrative findings of fact are

conclusive if supported by any substantial record

evidence. However, this usual fact determination

review rule ought not be applied to test the basic

jurisdiction-type conclusion involved here. NEPA

was intended not only to insure that the

appropriate responsible official considered the

environmental effects of the project, but also to

provide Congress (and others receiving such

recommendation or proposal) with a sound basis

for evaluating the environmental aspects of the

particular project or program. The spirit of the Act

_

23

would die aborning if a facile, ex parte decision

that the project was minor or did not significantly

affect the environment were too well shielded from

impartial review. Every such decision pretermits all

consideration of that which Congress has directed

be considered ‘to the fullest extent possible.’ The

primary decision to give or bypass the

consideration required by the Act must be subject

to inspection under a more searching standard.”

Accord: Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d

421 (5th Cir. 1973). The Court in Save Our Ten Acres,

supra, noted that other Circuits had enunciated a more

strict standard than arbitrariness to determine whether an

agency had complied with the NEPA requirements in cases

dealing with issues other than an agency’s determination

not to file a statement. Thus, in Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d

1130 (4th Cir. 1971), the Court stated at 1139:

“With regard to NEPA, the statutory requirement

of a ‘detailed statement ...on the environmental

impact of the proposed action’ places a heavy

burden on the LEAA.”

In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458

F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1972) the Court stated that “a

tule of reason is implicit in this aspect of the law.”

Whether the proper standard of review is a rule of

reasonableness or the arbitrary, capricious standard, an

environmental impact statement should have been

prepared in this case. The guidelines issued by the Council

on Environmental Quality, the agency charged, in part,

with implementing the Act, provide in part at 36 F.R.

a al ia I ee

eee ee ee ne ee

we

24

7724 that “if there is potential that the environment may

be significantly affected, the statement is to be prepared.

Proposed actions, the environmental impact of which is

likely to be highly controversial, should be covered in all

cases.”

The evidence at the hearings more than demonstrated

a sufficient risk of radiation exposure to the public to

require the conclusion that there was “potential that the

environment may be significantly affected’’ and that the

environmental impact of the Columbia reactor was “‘likely

to be highly controversial’. Two expert witnesses, with

long experience in the field of nuclear energy, testified for

petitioners and both concluded, in detailed presentations,

that the reactor presented a risk to the public. If such

testimony cannot satisfy the tests laid down by the

Council on Environmental Quality, it is doubtful that a

citizen, particularly one of limited resources, ever could

compel an agency to produce an environmental impact

statement.

Judge Oakes in his dissenting opinion expressed the

view that enough potential environmental effect was

demonstrated to require the preparation of a

environmental impact statement. He stated that “the

effect of the majority’s decision is to give the agencies a

loophole big enough to make NEPA meaningless”. The

petitioners submit that it is very important that this should

not happen.

25

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to

review the judgment and opinion of the Second Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ JOHN G. LIPSETT

Attorney for Petitioners

OPINION OF THE COUa

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE Seconp Ctrcuit

= =

Sor

No. 524—September Term, 1972.

(Argued March 12, 1973 Decided July 5, 1973.)

Docket No. 72-2093

—orr

MoRNINGSIDE RENEWAL CounciL, Inc. and

RiverstpeE Democrats, Inc.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

Unitep States Atomic ENERGY CoMMISSION and

Untirep States or AMERICA,

Respondents,

TrusTEES OF CoLuMBIA University in the City of New York,

Intervenor.

v

a

4

Before:

Hays, Munuican and Oakes,

Circuit Judges.

=

or

Petition to review an order of the Atomic Energy Com-

mission authorizing the Commission’s Director of Regula-

tion to issue a license to the Trustees of Columbia Uni-

versity to operate a Triga Mark IT nuclear reactor located

om the Columbia University campus at 120th Street and

Amsterdam Avenue in New York City.

Petition denied.

a

i

LE MR LEIS Et: Ft SERN TPR SCD SES

Opinion of the Court

Joun G. Lipsert, New York, New York, fo,

Petitioners.

Joun Cuo (Martin R. Hoffmann, General Coup.

sel, Jerome Nelson, Solicitor, U.S. Atomic

Energy Commission, Washington, D.C,

Kent Frizzell, Assistant Attorney General,

Edmund B. Clark and Peter R. Steenland,

Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C., on the brief), for Re.

spondent.

Epwarp A. Groosert, Washington, D.C. (John

Wheeler, Thacher, Proffit & Wood, New

York, New York, Bennett Boskey, Volpe,

Boskey & Lyons, Washington, D.C., on the

brief), for Intervenor.

Hays, Circuit Judge:

I. Introduction

This action seeks review of an order of the Atomic

Energy Commission authorizing the Commission’s Dire.

tor of Regulation to issue a license to the Trustees of

Columbia University to operate a Triga Mark II nuclear

reactor located at 120th Street and Amsterdam Avenve

in New York City. The reactor in question, which has

already been built, will be used for the training of nuclear

engineering students and for research and it can also lk

used to produce isotopes for medical research. It was

constructed in a building on the Columbia campus follov-

ing a 1963 Commission proceeding authorizing its cor-

struction. The petitioners herein did not participate in

that proceeding and no appeal was taken from the Com-

mission’s decision.

- Opinion of the Court

The order at issue in this appeal consists of a decision

of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board dated

May 18, 1972, 2 CCH Atomic Energy Law Rep. { 11,595,

and an order of the same Board, dated July 28, 1972,

denying a petition for reconsideration. The decision and

order reversed a prior Initial Decision of the Atomic

Safety and Licensing Board which denied authorization

to operate the reactor. The parties to the proceeding

before the Commission were two proponents of the oper-

ating license, Columbia, the applicant for the license, and

the Regulatory Staff of the Commission, and three oppo-

nents of the license, the two petitioners herein, Morning-

side Renewal Council, Inc. and Riverside Democrats, Inc.,

and an individual intervenor who is not involved in this

appeal. The members of the Appeal Board whose decision

is being challenged are Dr. John H. Buck, a nuclear physi-

cist, Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles, the Dean of the School of

Engineering and Applied Science of the University of

Virginia and Algie A. Wells, an attorney.

This action presents us with several issues for review:

First, whether the record before the Appeal Board, act-

ing for the Commission, contains sufficient evidence to

support its major findings that (1) the operation of the

reactor will not be inimical to public health and safety,

and (2) the issuance of the license does not constitute a

‘major federal action significantly affecting the quality

of the human environment” requiring a detailed environ-

mental statement to be issued under section 102(c) of the

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Second,

whether the Appeal Board erred in failing to implement

certain rulings of the Licensing Board before it passed

upon the application for authorization, whether the Ap-

peal Board was justified in conducting additional eviden-

tiary hearings in this proceeding and whether those

hearings should have been held in New York City rather

te... 4705

44

Opinion of the Court

than in Washington, D.C. Finding substantial evidene

in the record to support the Appeal Board’s conclusions

and noting no error in its procedural determinations, we

reject the contentions of the petitioners, deny their peti.

tion for review and uphold the decision and order of the

Appeal Board.

II. The Factual Background

In 1963, Columbia sought and received a permit to con.

struct the research reactor involved in this proceeding,

The University acted pursuant to the provisions of the

Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §2011 et seq., which provides

for a two-stage procedure for the licensing of nuclear

reactors. Under the Act, applications for construction

permits shall be granted “if the application is otherwise

acceptable to the Commission,” whereas licenses to operate

the reactors shall be issued by the Commission

“Upon finding that the facility authorized has been

constructed and will operate in conformity with the

application as amended and in conformity with the

provisions of this chapter and of the rules and regula.

tions of the Commission, and in the absence of any

good cause being shown to the Commission why the

granting of a license would not be in accordance with

the provisions of this chapter... .”

42 U.S.C. §2235.

In dealing with licenses for reactors to be used for re

search and development and for medical therapy,

“(t]he Commission is directed to impose only such mit-

imum amount of regulation of the licensee as the Com

mission finds will permit the Commission to fulfill its

obligations under this chapter to promote the comma

. 5a

Opinion of the Court

defense and security and to protect the health and

safety of the public and will permit the conduct of

widespread and diverse research and development.”

U.S.C. §2134(c).

The permit to build the Triga reactor was issued to

slumbia after a full safety review by the Commission’s

egulatory Staff and after a Federal Register notice had

een published announcing the opportunity for a public

earing on the issue. No one sought such a hearing and

9 appeal was taken from the Commission’s decision. The

sactor was then constructed in a pbuilding on the Columbia

ampus.

In February of 1967, Columbia University applied for

license to operate the research reactor. One year later,

he Commission’s Regulatory Staff issued a Safety Evalua-

‘on which concluded that the reactor unit could be operated

afely. The Commission thereupon announced its intention

» issue the operating license and published a Federal

Register notice inviting petitions to intervene from those

chose interests might be affected by the issuance of the

icense. Applications were received from petitioners and

me other person.

After the passage of more than one year (a period which

neluded a delay requested by Columbia) the Commission

ssued a further Federal Register notice providing for a

hearing before the Licensing Board and admitting peti-

tioners as parties to the proceedings. The hearing was

designed with particular emphasis on the issue of whether

there was reasonable assurance that the reactor could be

operated without endangering the public health and safety.

At the hearings, conducted in New York City in Novem-

ber, 1969 and July, 1970, testimony was presented by over

twenty witnesses and resulted in more than 1,500 pages of

“a On April 6, 1971, the Licensing Board issued

se PRS

+ SERRE

-

“a =

Pre eee

6a a,

Opinion of the Court

its Initial Decision denying Columbia an operating license.

Although the Board specifically found that in normal use

the reactor could be operated safely without endangering

the health and safety of the public and that the issuance

of the license would not be inimical to the common defense

and security, it concluded that it could not authorize the

issuance of the license because of the absence of “applicable

substantive criteria of the Commission and of convincing

objective standards of the Regulatory Staff” dealing with

the type of hypothetical accidents which are postulated for

the purpose of determining the safety of particular re

actors. In addition to this lack of standards, the Licensing

Board noted that there were certain discrepancies in the

experimental data submitted to it to be used for assessing

the effects of the hypothetical accidents. The Board con-

cluded that it had to “decline answering the question of

whether the health and safety of the public would be en-

dangered upon the occurrence of a postulated accident”

because it considered it “inappropriate to enforce an ap-

swer derived from the narrow confines of a single proceed-

ing and its own personal views about the degree to whieh

the health and safety of the public ought to be protected

against accident consequences.” Suggesting the need for

further experimentation as well as objective “accident”

criteria relating to the danger to public health and safety,

the Licensing Board denied the authorization to issue the

operating license.

All of the parties involved filed exceptions to the Board's

Initial Decision. The proceedings then went before the

Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board to which the

Commission has delegated all of its adjudicatory authority.

In June of 1971, following a review of the record, the

Appeal Board determined that clarification of the record

Was necessary in certain areas before it could properly

decide the issue. Therefore, it ordered that an opportuni

_ a 7a

Opinion of the Court

for oral argument be afforded and that additional hearings

he held before the Appeal Board directed particularly to

three areas: the explanation of the discrepancies in some

of the experimental data used to predict the release of

radioactive fission products under postulated accident con-

ditions; the criteria to be used to evaluate the predicted

effects of the postulated accidents; and an additional ex-

planation from Columbia of its security plans and proce-

dures for preventing unauthorized access to the reactor

area.

In May of 1972, after two days of hearings at which

twelve technical experts testified, the Appeal Board issued

its decision authorizing the issuance of the operating li-

eense. Its findings included the following: That when

considered in light of the additional experimental data and

darifying information submitted to the Board, the release

fssion data were “reasonably consistent”; that the acci-

dents hypothesized by the petitioners herein were not cred-

ible (thus affirming the Licensing Board’s rejection of

those hypotheses); that for the purposes of analysis it

would adopt the Regulatory Staff’s hypothetical accident

situation which was more severe than any accident which

had oceurred during all previous experience with this type

of reactor; that regulations as to postulated accidents for

research reactors, which the Licensing Board had thought

necessary, were not essential because even under the pos-

tulated conditions, any release of radioactive fission prod-

ucts would not exceed the guidelines for allowable releases

of radioactivity for normal operations; and that therefore

there was no danger to the public health and safety from

the operation of the reactor. The Appeal Board did, how-

ever, impose additional security requirements upon Colum-

bia as a condition of its obtaining the license.

On the basis of the entire record, the Appeal Board con-

s. that “issuance of the operating license will not be

Wee: -_

ie ee el ee

8a

Opinion of the Court

inimical to the health and safety of the public.” After

analyzing the potential environmental effect of the reactor,

the Board determined that its operation “will not have g

significant impact on the environment and, for that reason

. .. an environmental statement under the National Enyi-

ronmental Policy Act is not required.” On July 28, 1972,

the Board denied the petitioners’ request for reconsidera-

tion of its decision.

Ill. The Substantive Claims

We deny the petition to review and we uphold the de.

cision and order of the Commission’s Appeal Board. We

have examined the Appeal Board record and decision as

well as the Licensing Board’s Initial Decision and we find

no grounds upon which to base reversal of the final order

at issue herein. It is clear from the extensive and thorough

record that the Appeal Board carefully considered all

aspects of the issues involved in the granting of an operat-

ing license for this particular reactor. Since the challenged

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the ree.

ord, it is not within the competence of this court to overrule

the Board’s determination. See Scenic Hudson Preserva-

tion Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463,

468 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).

The Board’s decision that an environmental impact state-

ment pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act

of 1969 was not necessary was based upon its threshold

finding that the licensing involved in this case was nota

“major federal action significantly affecting the quality of

the human environment.” This finding too was supported

by substantial evidence in the record and the Board’:

decision was clearly not arbitrary and capricious. On this

issue, the agency has the authority to make its own thresh-

old determination. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F

POOP ES SIONS TT v C0 TE OT OF, ret — 2

_ —— 9a

Opinion of the Court

(ad Cir. 1972); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F. 2d 640, 644 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 409 U.S.

999 (1972). Moreover, in this instance, there was a review-

sble environmental record made with the participation of

the public so that the finding that no NEPA statement was

necessary was made by the Board with full knowledge of

all of the environmental questions raised by the petition-

ers. Here the underlying issue was “safety” and the in-

quiry into that area was detailed and entirely adequate.

IV. The Procedural Claims

Petitioners contend that rule-making rather than ad-

jndicatory proceedings should have been conducted in this

ease. However, that decision is one for the agency to make

for that is where the expertise which is necessary to make

such a determination lies. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332

US. 194, 203 (1947); N.L.R.B. v. A.P.W. Products Co.,

316 F.2d 899, 905-6 (2d Cir. 1963). Absence of general

regulations and objective criteria regarding postulated ac-

cident situations, which the Licensing Board thought neces-

sary hefore granting authorization to issue the license,

presents no bar to the issuance of the license in this case

since the Board’s decision is amply supported by a full

record. Just as an agency may reverse its hearing ex-

aminer, the Appeal Board, acting as the Commission itself

in this case, may reverse the Licensing Board, especially on

questions of policy and discretion.

The Appeal Board’s actions were well within its powers

when it conducted limited evidentiary hearings and ordered

them held in Washington, D.C. as the Board said:

“Holding of a proceeding of this type is clearly within

the Appeal Board’s jurisdiction. The Administrative

Procedure Act, which is specifically made applicable

ie. proceedings of this type by Section 181 of the

EEE ON

10a

Opinion of the Court

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S¢

§2231, contemplates that when an initial decision jg

subject to review within an agency, the reviewing body

may ‘restrict its decisions to questions of law, or to

the question of whether the findings are supported by

substantial evidence or the weight of evidence . ,.

[or] it may make entirely new findings either upon the

record or upon new evidence which it takes.’ . ... The

authority vested in the Appeal Board includes the en.

tire authority and review functions which would other.

wise be exercised by the Commission in a given case,

It follows that the Appeal Board has the Commission's

authority, as contemplated under the Administrative

Procedure Act, to take evidence incident to its appel.

late review ....” (footnote omitted.)

10 C.F.R. §2.703(b) states that the time and place of

hearing will be fixed “with due regard for the convenience

of the parties or their representatives, the nature of the

proceeding, and the public interest.” This is obviously a

guideline to the agency’s discretionary authority. The Ap

peal Board did not abuse its discretion in determining that

Washington, D.C. was the appropriate place to hold the

additional hearings, especially in light of the fact that

petitioner’s only witness was from Pittsburgh, Pennsyl-

vania and several of the witnesses representing the Com-

mission’s Regulatory Staff were from the Washington,

D.C. area. Other witnesses were from Pennsylvania ani

California while only two were from New York.

Petition denied.

4

4

v

P lla

Opinion of the Court

Ques, Circuit Judge (dissenting) :

I respectfully dissent.

While there may have been an overreaction on the part

of some to the threats from this “little” reactor, there are

two points which seem te me to require reversal—the ab-

snce of AEC safety standards relating to teaching or

research reactors and the absence of an Environmental Im-

pact Statement (EIS) under NEPA.

Regarding safety standards, the AEC Safety and Licens-

ing Board itself denied a license because it would not an-

swer questions about the reactor’s possible effect on public

health and safety absent applicable substantive criteria

and convincing objective standards concerning evaluation

of possible nuclear accidents. 2 CCH Atom. En. L. Rep.

{11,595 (May 18, 1972). One must certainly agree with

the Safety and Licensing Board that the “fission products

release fraction under postulated accident conditions for

such a standard product as a Triga reactor ought to be

amatter of proven determination and unquestionable valid-

ity.” Moreover, apparently the regulatory staff of AEC

has shifted the basis of its safety evaluation of accident

conditions from one Triga case to another. The Appeal

Board did not really disagree with the need for standard

regulations—in fact it strongly recommended adoption of

them—but went ahead and granted a license here anyway.

While the petitioners’ postulated accidents seem quite re-

mote to me, it may be that there is some other postulated

1 Petitioners’ expert postulated three hypothetical accidents: (1) sab-

otage, causing the loss of shielding water plus rupturing of one of

several fuel elements; (2) any circumstance causing a fuel element to

reach 1000° centigrade, followed by a rupture of the fuel elements in

air; (3) an aircraft accident.

Even through sabotage at Columbia University is not exactly an

unheard-of-event, there was substantial evidence that the juxtaposition

of so many relatively sophisticated operations would apparently be re-

i quired to make the sabotage effective that the “Mission Impossible”

12a

Opinion of the Court

accident that should be taken into account that was yy

in evidence in this proceeding, and a rule-making procedy

would seem to be the preferable way to develop thi

Through a rule-making procedure the Commission my

“educate itself,” cf. Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labo

469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972); Texaco, Inc. v. FPC,

F.2d 740, 744 (3rd Cir. 1969), and formulate all of th

necessary standards and requirements based upon appn

priate scientific data, and that would make it easier fy

everyone to know the Commission’s regulations on an iss

of substantial importance; apparently Triga and othe

teaching reactors are widely used and may be even me

widely used in the future. Courts, I believe, have

power to remand for rule-making proceedings in cases

this type, where the agency obviously should have form

lated a generalized policy but has failed to do so. Cf. B

Aerospace Co. Division of Textron, Inc. v. NLRB, 475 Fi

485, 494-96 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, C.J.) (change i

Labor Board’s “managerial employees” exception to cove

age of National Labor Relations Act made through adjud

cation remanded to Board for rule-making proceeding

A rule-making proceeding here is particularly app

priate for another reason—it might serve as a measure @

protection against the agency’s own interests’ influenc

its disposition of this particular case. I have already me

tioned the Commission’s variable “standards” for licensing

Triga reactors.

team would be required to effectuate it. There is some evidence

indicate that 1000° centigrade cannot be attained in a Triga. Whik]

cannot agree with the AEC view that it is a one in 10 billion ch

that an airplane would accidentally strike the Columbia Triga, be

I don’t think such an event is susceptible to meaningful mathemati

computation, there is some evidence, however, that it would tk

vertically dropping plane penetrating four feet of earth, two feet

reinforced concrete and a steel beam crane at a specific time

fission product accumulation was high to create a possibility of sm

radioactive release.

—

13a

Opinion of the Court

[continue? to express concern that the AEC is charged

ith the dual duty of passing on licenses on the one hand

at promoting the use of atomic power on the other. The

EC also has an interest in seeing this reactor licensed to

romote its Nuclear Education Training Program; to this

aj it has entered into an agreement with Columbia to

rovide post-license funds for the operation of the reactor

nj to waive charges for Commission-owned special nu-

kar material involved in its operation. My concern is sO

meh the greater where, as here, the independent Safety

nd Licensing Board has denied the license, but was over-

nled by the three-member Appeal Board, consisting of

so AEC staff members. Moreover, the safety tests relied

pon by the Appeal Board here were conducted by the

sost interested party, the manufacturer of the reactor,

slowing an exchange of correspondence between “Ralph”

Mr. Peters of Gulf Oil) and “Pete” (Dr. Peter A. Morris,

Director of the AEC Division of Reactor Licensing) in

shich Gulf advised the Commission that “We hope to have

fu or members of your staff participate fully in these

xperiments so that they will be deemed to have been

jone ‘under the auspices of the Regulatory Staff.’” Fol-

owing this Dr. Morris advised Gulf that he would attend

he tests “as an observer.” In holding that the FPC could

not adopt as its own an EIS drawn up by a state agency-

2 See Developments in Environmental Law, 3 E.L.R. 50001, 50008

(1973) :

. . . for the most part the agencies which must do the “full good

faith” balancing of economic and social costs against environmental

eosts are generally structured to be advocates for economic expan-

sion. As long as agencies are left to do the balancing, and as long

as they have a dual mandate of environmental protection and eco-

nomie development in their particular field—for example, power

growth for the FPC, nuclear development for the AEC, or flood

containment for the Army Corps of Engineers—is not the environ-

ment bound to come out on the short end?

Emphasis original.)

—

applicant for a power. license this court said in Greey

County Planning Board v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (yj

Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972): “The danger ¢

this procedure [the one followed by the FPC], and [its

obvious shortcoming, is the potential, if not likelihood, tha

the applicant’s statement will be based upon self-serving

assumptions.” (Emphasis supplied.) While Greene Count

dealt with the requirements of NEPA, I cannot belie

that the AEC should be held to any lesser standard in it

safety licensing procedures. The Commission should no

be permitted to abdicate its responsibility for ensurin

public safety to a party with a large financial stake in th

outcome of the tests it is conducting. One good way t

insure it does not do so is to require it to draw up safet;

standards generally applicable to all teaching reactors, no

just to the one in this particular case.

With regard to the necessity for the preparation ani

filing of an EIS under NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970),

the threshold question is whether, or to what extent, th

agency’s own determination that a given agency action i

not a “major Federal action significantly affecting th

quality of the human environment,” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(¢)

is binding upon us. This court has previously held i

Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1972), that

“the appropriate criterion ... is the ‘arbitrary, capriciov

standard established by the Administrative Procedure Act

since the meaning of the term ‘significantly’ as used i

§ 102(2)(C) of NEPA can be isolated as a question o

law.” The two relevant factors for consideration, Haul

v. Kleindienst went on to say, 471 F.2d at 830-31, were

“(1) the extent to which the action will cause adver

environmental effects in excess of those created by exist

ing uses in the area affected by it, and (2) the absolat

quantitative adverse environmental effects of the actio

itself, including the cumulative harm that results aa

ERROR I FON TU eT CSO LEE TS le 5 oe - seen -

l4a

Opinion of the Court

— 15a

Opinion of the Court

entribution to existing adverse conditions or uses in the

fected area.” I do not think that it would be inconsistent

vith, or stretching, this language to say that the true first

test is the extent to which the action has the potential of

causing adverse environmental effects. Cf. Scientists In-

stitute v. AEC, 41 U.S.L.W. 2674 (D.C. Cir., June 12, 1973)

(NEPA requires EIS for AEC’s breeder reactor program

wen though program is presently only in research and

development stage in part because of potential future

avironmental effects of program). For Hanly articulated

a threshold test, and if its questions are answered in the

negative then an EIS, through which the full scope of the

potential environmental effects of a “major Federal action”

are actually bronght out, would not be required. If the

potential is substantial then the impact statement must be

fortheoming; NEPA speaks of making an initial deter-

nination “as to whether the proposal would have a signifi-

cant effect,” not whether it “does have” such an effect.

By upholding the AEC’s determination that there would

not be any such significant potential effect here, the major-

ity apparently adopts the “rational basis” standard of

review rejected by the Hanly court. See 471 F.2d at 829.

The effect of the majority’s decision is to give the agencies

aloophole big enough to make NEPA meaningless, or in

Judge Skelly Wright’s words a “paper tiger.” See Calvert

(lif's’ Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d

1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The potential effect of a

nuclear accident on the environment of New York City

would be pretty substantial, if not catastrophic, and even

though the Safety and Licensing Board and the Appeal

Board did not accept the petitioners’ postulated accidents,

they each considered safety standards that involved hypo-

thetical “accidents.” The fact that the former found there

were no generalized standards and that the latter found

> under the regulatory staff’s postulated accident situa-

Perens

LYE ETS et eR PR Ag ET ee

16a

Opinion of the Court

tion “the health and safety of the public will not be «

dangered” do not take away from the proposition that ;

the event of an accident the damage would be great, 1);

fact that the Appeal Board in its decision did “not considd

it desirable to use the standards of 10 CFR Part 20 f

evaluating the effects of a postulated accident in a researd

reactor” even while it “strongly recommend[ed] that sp

cific standards for the evaluation of an accident situatioy

in a research reactor should be formulated” in and of its¢

indicates to me that there is here involved a suffciey

“potential” of environmental effect to require an imp

statement.

Moreover, ten pages of the Appeal Board decision ;

devoted to answering the testimony of appellant’s exper,

a Dr. Sternglass, relative to infant mortality rates in th

vicinity of Triga reactors at Penn State College, the Un

versity of Illinois and in San Diego where the Gulf-Ga

eral Atomic Corporation has its plant. It may be that br

Sternglass’s determinations do not have any “valid scia

tific foundation,” as the Appeal Board held. (I supp

that many thought that Rachel Carson’s thoughts and fear

expressed in Silent Spring had none either.) But does thi

mean that there is not a potential environmental eff

that at least bears examination through the preparatia

of an EIS? I should suppose that even though this is

“little” research reactor its potential environmental impa

is at least as significant as that of a federal jail, Hanly:

Kleindienst, supra, or the abandonment oi a 1.8 mile strett!

of railroad, City of New York v. United States, 337 fF.

Supp. 150, 158-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (three-judge cout)

See generally Developments in Environmental Law,

E.L.R. 50001, 50005 (1973). The finding here by the Co

mission that no impact statement is required in my ve

was arbitrary and capricious.

———

17a

Opinion of the Court

Tere an impact statement to be required the AEC could

targue that the Appeal Board’s decision amounted to

, This is so because (A) the Board relied quite heavily

, data furnished by the manufacturer contrary to the

quirements of Greene County Planning Board v. FPC,

pra, and because (B) there has not been consultation

ith other concerned federal agencies such as EPA or

EW, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).

Because I think that the AEC did not meet the require-

ents of its own Act in reversing the Safety and Licensing

ward and because I think enough potential environmental

sect was demonstrated to require the preparation of an

IS, I dissent.

| 18a

ORDER OF UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND CIRCUIT

% spas Eiite 5 Ay

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

in and for the Second Circuit held at the United States

Court House, in the City of New York on the fourth day

of October, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-three.

Present:

(isda kasi OF Oy Ne Pe a Te he ane EN

HON. PAUL R. HAYS,

HON. WILLIAM H. MULLIGAN,

HON. JAMES L. OAKES,

eee pee One eee

Circuit Judges.

Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. and_ Riverside

Democrats, Inc.,

Petitioners- Appellants,

Docket No. 72-2093

United States Atomic Energy Commission and United

States of America,

Respondents-A ppellees,

Trustees of Columbia University of the City of New York,

Intervenor.

19a

Order of United States Court of Appeals

A petition for a rehearing having been filed herein by

counsel for the appellant,

Upon consideration thereof, it is

Ordered that said petition be and it hereby is denied.

s/ A. Daniel Fusaro

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND CIRCUIT

At a stated term of the United States Court of

Appeals, in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United

States Court House, in the City of New York, on the

fourth day of October, one thousand nine hundred and

seventy-three.

cn eee ee Oe eae OSE HRD ODO aeereaan eae eeeceor22=? ee >

Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. and Riverside

Democrats, Inc.,

Petitioners- Appellants,

™ Docket No. 72-2093

United States Atomic Energy Commission and United

States of America,

Respondents- Appellees.

20a

Order of United States Court of Appeals

Trustees of Columbia University of the City of New York,

Intervenor.

A petition for a rehearing containing a suggestion that

the action be reheard in banc having been filed herein by

counsel for the appellant, a pollof the judges in regular

active service having been taken at the request of such a

judge, and there beisug uv majority in favor thereof,

Upon consideration thereof, it is

Ordered that said petition be and it hereby is DENIED.

Judges Mansfield, Oakes and Timbers dissent.

s/ Irving R. Kaufman

Irving R. Kaufman

Chief Judge

_—

2la

INITIAL DECISION OF

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

in the Matter of

TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK

Docket No. 50-208

ATOMIC SAFETY AND

LICENSING BOARD

Eugene Greuling

Hood Worthington

Valentine B. Deale, Chairman

PREFATORY NOTE

The Licensing Board acknowledges that much time has

elapsed between the beginning of the hearing and the

Initial Decision and believes that a word or two of

explanation is in order.

The major factor holding up the Initial Decision was

the unforeseen circumstance of competing heavy demands

on the time of two of the Licensing Board’s members,

particularly its Chairman, arising out of their commitments

in conducting other nuclear reactor licensing proceedings.

One of these proceedings, a contested one involving two

power reactor operating licenses, practically preempted the

time of the Chairman for several months. Additionally,

Initial Decision

illness of one of its members reduced the Licensing Board’s

capacity to move ahead at normal pace.

Apart from those circumstances, the present

proceeding raised certain troublesome problems for the

Licensing Board which added to the lapsed time between

the first hearing and the Initial Decision. The problems,

discussed in the Initial Decision, occasioned extended

study following the first hearing, a certification to the

Appeal Board and a request to the parties for additional

data, a second hearing, and thereafter further extended

study in the course of preparing the Initial Decision.

The foregoing considerations in no way pertain to the

deferral of the proceeding prior to the hearing for 12-%

months at the applicant’s request.

E. G.

H. W.

April 6, 1971

23a

Initial Decision

CONTENTS

OF

INITIAL DECISION

APPEARANCES IN BEHALF OF PARTIES

PRELIMINARY MATTERS (Pars. 1-13)

ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL AND OTHER

CONSIDERATIONS (Pars. 14-21)

FINDINGS OF FACT (Pars. 22-62)

Applicant’s Qualifications and Related Matters (Pars.

23-32)

Common Defense and Security (Par. 33)

Location and Characteristics of Applicant’s Reactor

and Other Data (Pars. 34-41)

Applicant’s Reactor under Normal Operation —

Radioactive Releases and Safeguards (Pars. 42-48)

Applicant’s Reactor under Accident Conditions (Pars.

49-62)

Tables I-V (following Par. 62)

Re...

24a

Initial Decision

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS PROPOSED BY

PARTIES (Par. 63) d

CONCLUSIONS (Pars. 64-70) d

ORDER (Par. 71) §

APPEAL AND REVIEW PROCEDURES (Par. 72) ;

Attachment

LICENSING BOARD’S POSITION WITH RESPECT TO —

Applicant’s Proposed Findings and Conclusions i

Regulatory Staff’s Proposed Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law

Findings and Conclusions of Mrs. Mary Hays Weik (

Proposed Findings of Fact of Morningside Renewal

Council, Inc. and Riverside Democrats, Inc.

Proposed Conclusions of Law of Morningside Renewal

Council, Inc. and Riverside Democrats, Inc. I

25a

Initial Decision

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

In the Matter of

TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA Docket No. 50-208

UNIVERSITY IN THE

CITY OF NEW YORK

INITIAL DECISION

APPEARANCES IN BEHALF OF PARTIES

Bennett Boskey, Esq., in behalf of Trustees of

Columbia University in the City of New York, Applicant;

Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq., Neil J. Newman, Esq., and

Thomas F. Engelhardt, Esq., in behalf of the Regulatory

Staff of the United States Atomic Energy Commission;

Mrs. Mary Hays Weik, Intervenor, pro se;

Justus C. Poole in behalf of Morningside Renewal

Council, Inc., Intervenor; and

John G. Lipsett, Esq., in behalf of Riverside

Democrats, Inc., Intervenor.

PRELIMINARY MATTERS

1. The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of

New York (applicant) filed with the Commission an

application, dated May 6, 1963, for a permit to construct a

alii leh aie.

26a

Initial Decision

Triga Mark II nuclear reactor on Columbia University’s

campus in the Morningside Heights area of New York City.

Following review by the Commission’s regulatory staff of

the application and of amendments thereto including

responses to inquiries of the regulatory staff, Construction

Permit No. CPRR-78 was issued to the applicant on

December 30, 1963. By letter amendment of February 3,

1967, to its original application, the applicant sought an

operating license and, at that time and later in due course,

it furnished to the regulatory staff data relating to the

proposed operation of its facility. On March 18, 1968, the

Commission gave notice of the proposed issuance of an

operating license; its notice was published in the Federal

Register on March 26, 1968 (33 F.R. 5021).

2. Among other matters, the notice provided that

within 30 days from the date of publication, any person

whose interests might be affected by the issuance of the

proposed license could file a petition for leave to intervene

in accordance with the requirements of the Commission’s

Rules of Practice. Mrs. Mary Hays Weik, Morningside

Renewal Council, Inc. (Morningside) and Riverside

Democrats, Inc. (Riverside) sought to intervene in the

proceeding. Other expressions of interest were received.

The Commission’s regulatory staff filed an answer to the

three requests to intervene, taking the position it would

not object to the granting of intervention. The applicant

filed no response. On May 24, 1968, the applicant filed

with the Commission a request that the Commission defer

consideration of its pending application for an operating

license. On June 10, 1969, the applicant requested the

Commission to resume consideration of the application.

27a

Initial Decision

3. On June 25, 1969, the Commission issued a notice

of hearing. This notice, published in the Federal Register

on June 28, 1969 (34 F.R. 10011), provided for a public

prehearing conference and hearing in New York City,

permitted Mrs. Weik, Morningside and Riverside to

intervene, defined the issues for consideration at the

hearing, and established this Atomic Safety and Licensing

Board (Licensing Board) to conduct the proceeding.

4. On July 30, 1969, the Licensing Board, for its own

orientation purposes, visited the location of the reactor

and surrounding premises. The parties were given notice of

this tour by the board and were invited to accompany it

on the occasion. Representatives of the applicant and the

regulatory staff and intervenor Mrs. Weik did so.

5. On the following day, July 31, the prehearing

conference was held. After giving consideration to the

earlier application of Riverside for a postponement of the

scheduled hearing date and the comments thereon by the

other parties, the Licensing Board rescheduled the hearing

from August 19, as set out in the notice of hearing, to

September 23. The Licensing Board requested the

following items, all of which it subsequently received: a

consolidated safety analysis report from the applicant and

its operating procedures, the regulatory staff’s evaluation

thereof, financial liability and indemnity information from

the regulatory staff, and the views of the parties

concerning the relevance in the proceeding of radiological

safety factors involved in the transportation of radioactive

material to and from the subject facility. In keeping with

prehearing conference procedure, the Licensing Board

re-identified the issues to be considered by it at the hearing

and determined which of the same were in controversy. It

ee

28a

Initial Decision

confirmed that pulse mode was well as steady state

: operation was within the scope of the hearing and noted

questions and areas of particular interest to it for

development by the parties at the hearing. The Licensing

Board also addressed itself to limited appearance requests

and procedural matters relating to the conduct of the

hearing. The Licensing Board issued a memorandum on

August 20, 1969, embracing the prehearing considerations

noted herein.

6. By letter of September 8, Riverside requested a

further postponement of the hearing. By a request of the

same date, the Director Office of Radiation Control,

Department of Health, City of New York, also sought a

postponement of the hearing. In addition, the Licensing

Board determined that there had been inadequate public

notice regarding the opportunity afforded interested

persons to make a limited appearance (there was nothing

on the subject in the initial notice of hearing or later order

changing the date of hearing). In view of the foregoing, the

Licensing Board on September 12 rescheduled the hearing

to begin on November 18, 1969, and saw to it that the

official announcement of the new hearing date in the

Federal Register included information concerning limited

appearances (34 F.R. 14616, September 19, 1969). The

hearing then took place in New York City as rescheduled,

continuing for three days —— November 18, 19, and 20,

1969.

7. There were thirty-two limited appearances pursuant

to section 2.715(a) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice.

This section provides that a person who is not a party may,

in the discretion of the presiding officer, be permitted to

make a limited appearance by making an oral or written

-

29a

Initial Decision

statement of his position on the issues. The purpose of

limited appearances is to enable members of the public

who are not parties to the proceeding to bring their views

and concerns to the attention of the parties and the

Licensing Board so that such views and concerns, though

they do not constitute formal evidence, may be given

appropriate consideration in the course of the evidentiary

hearing.

8. Of the thirty-two persons making limited

appearances, thirty indicated opposition to Columbia

University operating a reactor on its Morningside Heights

campus. Of the opponents six were members or

members-elect of federal, state and city legislative bodies

representing people living in the immediate area of the

reactor or nearby. These political officials were United

States Representatives William F. Ryan (20th Cong. Dist.,

N.Y., represented at the hearing by Mrs. Jean Faust) and

Edward I. Koch (17th Cong. Dist., N.Y., represented at the

hearing by Peter Bernuth);State Senator Basil A. Paterson,

27th Senatorial District, New York City; State

Assemblyman Franz S. Leichter, 69th District, New York

City; and New York City Councilmen-elect Carter Burden

(4th District — who forwarded his views by telegram) and

Eldon R. Clingan (At-large, Manhattan — who forwarded

his views by letter).

9. Representatives of four neighborhood organizations

asserted the opposition of their organizations to Columbia

University’s application for an operating license: Mrs.

Edith Bach, Social Worker, Midwest Side Neighborhood

Health Council; Robert W. Hedges, Chairman,

Morningsiders United; Mrs. Naomi Patterson, President,

_ —_—_

30a

Initial Decision

Parents Association P. S. 36-125 (represented at the

hearing by Mrs. Ports); and Miss Marie M. Runyon,

Chairman, Morningside Tenants’ Committee.

10. Residents of the community, including Columbia

University students at graduate level, also spoke as private

individuals against the proposed operating license. These

persons included Mrs. Mary Boyd ( who also presented her

views to the Licensing Board by letter), Miss Glenda

Cimino, John W. Grifalconi (who supplemented his oral

statement with two exhibits), Dr. Janet Karlson, Mrs. Ann

Margetson, Stonewall Jackson McMurray, III, Mrs. Pamela

Rich, and Miss Deborah Solomon (who supplemented her

oral statement with a later letter to the Licensing Board).

Melvin Morgulis, Jeff Newman, and Robert Lee Smith also

voiced their opposition to the proposed operating license.

11. Others who made known their opposition to the

applicant’s position by means of a letter or telegram to the

Licensing Board were Mrs. Anna M. Bennett, Dr. and Mrs.

Michael Bender, Robert M. Ginsberg, George H. Hickerson,

Mr. and Mrs. Michael McKeen, Dr. Robert J. Von Gutfeld,

and Edward H. Wright.

12. The remaining two persons among the count of

those making limited appearances were Miss Mary Ann

Sweeney, a third year Columbia University student, and

Hanson Blatz, Director, Office of Radiation Control, New

York City Department of Health. Miss Sweeney confined

her oral statement to telling of the difficulty which she

and another person had in gaining entrance to the hearing.

Mr. Blatz’s prepared statement, which included an

explanation of the safety precautions followed in

3la

Initial Decision

transporting radioactive material through New York City,

concluded that there is no reason for the government of

New York City to object to the operation of Columbia

University’s reactor as planned.

13. Principal contentions of the limited appearers

opposing the proposed license are set forth below, together

with comments thereon by the Licensing Board:

a. Contention: The community in the vicinity of

the reactor site is unwilling to accept the risks,

whatever they might be, of having a nuclear reactor in

its midst, particularly in the absence of suitable

consultation by the applicant with the community and

in the absence of compensating benefits to itself. The

situation is aggravated by the applicant’s record in

dealing with the interests of the community and also

by the fact that the location of the reactor on the

Morningside Heights campus is simply for the

convenience of teaching but a dozen or so students.

Comment: The responsibility of the Licensing

Board is to adjudicate issues set out in the notice of

hearing. Other issues, which may be decisive to other

authorities or interests, are beyond the Licensing

Board’s regard. It has no occasion to determine the

sentiment of the neighboring community toward the

proposed license or to weigh the benefits or lack

thereof which the community may derive from the

proposed operation of the reactor. Nor is the

proceeding a trial of the applicant’s public relations

policies and practices toward its neighbors.

32a

Initial Decision

b. Contention: The hazard to public health and

safety in transporting radioactive material in the City

of New York, especially in the area of the reactor site,

is enough to preclude justification of licensing the

reactor.

Comment: The concern about the possibility of

serious accidents in transporting radioactive material in

the streets of New York City is irrelevant to the

proceeding, not because of the nature of the subject

matter but rather because of a division of

responsibility between the Atomic Energy Commission

and the Department of Transportation. The latter has

jurisdiction over the transportation of radioactive

materials and over safety regulations with respect

thereto; the former does not. As an arm of the

Commission, the Licensing Board must confine its

determinations to matters within the scope of the

Commission’s authority. Thus, in the present case, the

Licensing Board focuses on radiological health and

safety factors bearing upon the operation of the

reactor at the reactor site. Nevertheless, for the

information of the public, the Licensing Board both

permitted and arranged for data to be included in the

record bearing upon safety questions and safety

measures relating to the transportation of radioactive

material to and from the reactor site. Information

about the infrequency of such anticipated

transportation was also included in the record.

c. Contention: The proceeding itself is weighted in

favor of granting the license, as evidenced by the

following: (i) AEC’s promotional role is in conflict

33a

Initial Decision

with its regulatory responsibilities; (ii) earlier AEC

permission to build the reactor practically forecloses

AEC now from denying an operating license; and (iii)

notice to the public about the hearing is inadequate,

the Federal Register being a largely unread and

generally unobtainable publication.

Comment: This contention attacks the licensing

system and implicates the underlying law and

regulations. The Congress can act on the statutory

basis for the licensing system; the Commission can act

on the regulations implementing the governing

statutory law; the Licensing Board can act on neither.

With respect to (i), the broad political controversy of

whether it is desirable to permit an agency at one and

the same time to be a promoter and a regulator has

persisted through several decades of development in

administrative law. The controversy, while an

appropriate matter for a legislative body to consider if

it so chooses, is clearly beyond the province of the

Licensing Board. With respect to (ii), the Initial

Decision itself is reply enough. With respect to (iii), the

official status of the Federal Register as a legal vehicle

of notice, and its circulation, are matters outside the

Commission’s authority. In addition to notices placed

in the Federal Register, the Commission, in accordance

with its regular practice, distributed to the news media

public announcements of its own regarding the

proposed licensing and related hearing matters

associated with this proceeding. The participation

herein of two citizens associations and an individual as

intervenors and of 32 others as limited appearers

indicates a degree of effectiveness of the notices

undertaken by the Commission.

34a’

Initial Decision

d. Contention: Operation of the reactor in the

Terrace Building involves serious risk of radiological

hazards to a densely populated area, including a

residential community, both from the planned usage of

the reactor and from accident circumstances, including

those from external causes.

Comment: The contention relates directly to basic

issues in this proceeding which are adjudicated by the

Licensing Board in this Initial Decision.

e. Contention: There is little or no knowledge

about the effects of adding radioactive pollutants to an

already heavily polluted atmosphere. The potentid

danger from the emission of Argon-41 from the stacks

has not been adequately assessed. The AEC standands

are not sufficient.

Comment: The AEC standards governing limits of

permissible exposure to radiation are based on

recommendations which had been developed by the

Federal Radiation Council and approved by the

President. In the absence of substantial, authoritative

data to the contrary, expressions of dissatisfaction

with the standards and general allegations aimed 2

raising doubts about them are not sufficient to move

the Licensing Board to seek their re-examination. For

further statement and references, see last paragraph

beginning on page two, Attachment D.

35a

Initial Decision

ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL AND

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

14. Following the three days of hearing and following

the completion of the customary post-hearing filings in the

middle of January 1970, the Licensing Board, after

extended study of the full record, concluded that it

required advice concerning certain AEC regulations and

standards and also, additional factual information.

Accordingly, on April 6, it certified two questions to the

Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (Appeal

Board) and requested the parties to submit specified

additional data. The two certified questions were as

follows:

Is the applicant’s reactor a “testing facility”

according to the defintion at 10 CFR Section

50.2(r)(1)?

If a substantial meltdown of the core with

subsequent release of appreciable quantities of

fission products is not the type of major accident

which should be hypothesized for purposes of site

analysis, then what sort of an accident should be

hypothesized for such purposes in the present

proceeding —— wherein a Triga Mark II reactor is

proposed to be operated in the midst of a densely

populated community?

The additional data requested of the parties pertained to

the following: whole body and thyroid dosages at specified

locations under hypothesized accident conditions; details

of experiments forming the basis of certain calculations of

36a

Initial Decision

the applicant bearing upon fission product releases under

accident conditions; reports concerning applicant’s

operation of the reactor at Industrial Reactor

Laboratories; AEC records of accidental fission product

releases at Triga reactors; public health and safety

considerations associated with the location of the

applicant’s reactor above an old water course and its

proximity to the Croton aqueduct system; operating

procedures for protecting the reactor against industrial

sabotage or damage or destruction as a result of civil

disturbance; use of COg2 instead of air in the reactor’s

beam tubes; operating procedures for opening and closing

the ventilation system; possible new amendments to the

applicant’s Safety Analysis Report and its operating

procedures; underlying supports for emergency

procedures; extent of applicant’s control, possession or use

of unlicensed radioactive material or unlicensed sources of

radiation within the vicinity of the reactor site; and

proposed amendment to operating license to give specific

acknowledgementof brief pulsing to high power peaks.

15. In light of the responses which it received from the

Appeal Board and the parties, the Licensing Board by

order of June 16 reopened the hearing for limited

purposes. At the reopened hearing in New York City on

July 10, the Licensing Board received further evidence and

arguments from the parties on specific subjects which it

had identified in its June 16 order. The submission by the

parties of amended proposed findings and conclusions and

also of supplemental factual data and comment wa

completed shortly before the end of September 1970.

37a

Initial Decision

16. During the three days of hearing in November

1969, the applicant’s witnesses supporting the

quthorization of an operating license were: Ralph H.

Peters, Manager, Triga Reactor Program, Gulf General

Atomic Incorporated; Marvin E. Wyman, Ph.D. (nuclear

physics), Chairman, Nuclear Engineering, University of

Illinois; Warren F. Goodell, Ph.D. (physics), Vice President

for Administration of Columbia University and member of

the University’s Radiation Safety Committee and its

Reactor Safety Committee; William W. Havens, Ph.D.

(physics), Director of the Division of Nuclear Science and

Engineering of the School of Engineering and Applied

Science of Columbia University; and Michael G. Woram,

Columbia University’s Reactor Supervisor. At the

continued hearing on July 10, 1970, Dr. Havens and

Messrs. Peters and Woram gave further testimony in behalf

of the applicant and Leon J. Lidofsky, Ph.D. (physics),

Chairman of Columbia University’s Reactor Safety

Committee, also testified in support of the proposed

17. Witnesses for the regulatory staff, which supported

the proposed license, gave testimony at both the

November 1969 and July 1970 hearing sessions. Those

members of the staff providing testimony at the earlier

hearing session were Robert J. Schemel, Chief, Operating

Reactor Branch No. 1, AEC Division of Reactor Licensing;

Thomas P. Flood, Reactor Engineer, Operating Reactor

Branch No. 1, AEC Division of Reactor Licensing; Floyd

Cantrell, Reactor Inspector, AEC Division of Compliance;

Richard B. Chitwood, Chief, Irradiated Fuel Branch, AEC

Division of Materials Licensing; and Charles A. Lovejoy,

Staff Accountant, Office of the Controller, AEC

38a

Initial Decision

(testimony by affidavit upon consent of parties and the

Licensing Board). Members of the regulatory staff

providing testimony at the July 10, 1970, hearing were

Messrs. Schemel, Flood and Cantrell, and also Anthony T.

Cardone, Geologist, Site, Environmental and Radiation

Safety Group. AEC Division of Reactor Licensing.

18. The three intervenors produced the following

witnesses. At the hearings on November 18-20, 1969, Mrs.

Mary Hays Weik, a newspaper woman, testified in her own

behalf, and at the hearing on July 10, 1970, Mrs. Weik

again testified and John W. Grifalconi, a city planner and

architect, who had previously made a limited appearance,

also testified as a witness in support of Mrs. Weik’s general

position. Riverside Democrats, Inc., with whom

Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. joined in the

presentation of, in effect, a single case of opposition to the

proposed license, had one witness at each of the hearing

sessions, namely, William J. Nicholson, Ph.D. (physics),

Assistant Professor of Community Medicine at Mount

Sinai School of Medicine, New York City. In addition,

there was introduced into the record at the first of the two

hearing sessions as part of the case of Riverside Democrats,

Inc. (and also of Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. by

adoption) the written statement of Martin Sonenberg,

M.D., Chief of the Division of Endocrinology of the

Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research.

19. The issues for consideration by the board as

prescribed by the Commission in the notice of hearing are:

a. Whether there is reasonable assurance (i) that

operetion of the reactor at not in excess of 250

39a

Initial Decision

kilowatts (thermal) under the conditions and

limitations proposed can be conducted without

endangering the health and safety of the public, and

(ii) that such operation will be conducted in

compliance with the rules and regulations of the

Commission;

b. Whether the applicant is technically and

financially qualified to engage in the activities as

authorized by the operating license in accordance with

the rules and regulations of the Commission;

c. Whether issuance of the license to operate the

facility under the terms and conditions proposed will

be inimical to the common defense and security or to

the health and safety of the public.

20. At the prehearing conference it was determined

that among the parties, including the intervenors, only a

part of the three issues were in controversy. The applicant

and the regulatory staff on the one hand and the three

intervenors on the other hand confined their disagreement

to those parts of the first and third issues above (a and c)

relating to the health and safety of the public. There was

no contest then about the applicant’s compliance with the

Commission’s rules and regulations, about the applicant’s

technical and financial qualifications, or about the

common defense and security issue. However, in their

proposed findings and conclusions, Riverside and

Momingside contested every issue with the applicant and

the regulatory staff except the applicant’s financial

qualifications. At the prehearing conference, intervenor

Mrs. Weik controverted the applicant and the regulatory

as i lee bh = Ue

40a

Initial Decision

staff on the health and safety issues alone; in her proposed

findings and conclusions following the November 18-20,

1969 hearings, she also addressed herself to the applicant’s

financial qualifications.

21. The proceeding is a “contested”’ one within the

meaning of section 2.4(n) of the Commission’s Rules of

Practice and the Commission’s procedures applicable to

contested proceedings (Section VI, Appendix A, Rules of

Practice) are guidelines for the Licensing Board.

FINDINGS OF FACT

22. The record of this proceeding contains detailed

information about the applicant’s reactor, associated

facilities and arrangements for the reactor’s operations.

The information embraces factual, analytical and expert

opinion data as to such related subjects as the site of the

reactor, safety features provided in the reactor’s design,

safeguards to prevent accidents and to limit their effect,

evaluations of various hypothetical accidents, operating

procedures, and financial and technical qualifications of

the applicant. Significant data in the record, or the absence

thereof, bearing upon the Licensing Board’s conclusions

with respect to the issues set out in the notice of hearing

are indicated in this section.

Applicant’s Qualifications

and Related Matters _

23. The applicant is a non-profit, educationa

institution incorporated under the laws of the State of

New York. As of June 30, 1969, the applicant’s assets

4la

Initial Decision

totaled $490 million, of which $160 million represented

land, buildings, and equipment, and $279 million,

investments. Income for the year ended June 30, 1969

totaled $151 million; expenditures, $160 million.

24. The estimated operating costs of the applicant’s

reactor for the 1970-1971 year (exclusive of overhead

which is budgeted separately) amounts to approximately

$54 thousand. Such costs would be paid out of the

applicant’s general operating funds. Research costs

associated with the use of the reactor would be met by

other funds, grants and contracts. The Commission, under

its Nuclear Education Training Program, has entered into

an agreement with Columbia University under which funds

have been granted to the University for fabrication of fuel

and all use and other charges for the Commission-owned

special nuclear material required by the applicant’s reactor

have been waived.

25. Because the proposed license is for the conduct of

educational activities by a non-profit, educational

institution, the applicant’s commitment of its own assets

against possible public liability losses attendant to a

nuclear accident involving the subject reactor is effectively

limited to $250,000 —— an amount which can be covered

by nuclear accident liability insurance. For public liability

losses in excess of this amount to an aggregate of $500

million, the United States Government, under Section

170k of the Atomic Energy Act, agrees to indemnify and

hold harmless the licensee and other persons as their

interests may appear.

—

26. The applicant’s contractor, Gulf General Atomic

Incorporated, designed, manufactured and installed the

subject reactor. Gulf General Atomic has extensive

experience in a wide range of activities in the fields of

nuclear research, development, and manufacture. Its

research resulting in the development of Triga reactors

dates back to 1957 and its experience with Triga reactors

since then has been continuing and comprehensive. In his _

testimony, the manager of the company’s Triga reactor |

program reported that his company’s experience includes

the operation of three Triga reactors at its laboratories in

San Diego, California. Two of these have been operating

for several years at steady state power levels of 1500 kw,

or six times the steady state power level of the applicant’s

Triga, and two have been pulsed for a total of over 18,000

times with maximum fuel temperatures of about 450

degrees centigrade.

42a

Ini tial Decision

27. For fuel loading and startup, Gulf General Atomic

will send to the applicant a startup engineer thoroughly

familiar with Triga reactors and after he and his electronics

‘ expert aide have double checked the _ installation

completed by previous members of a Gulf General Atomic

installation team and after the AEC inspectors are satisfied

with all systems, fuel loading and reactor startup will be

performed in accordance with detailed procedures

prepared by Gulf General Atomic and accepted by the

AEC. Such procedures, according to the testimony, have

been in effect for ten years and during that time have been

followed in the course of all Triga reactor startups. Once

the subject facility is demonstrated to operate

satisfactorily, Gulf General Atomic then will turn it over

to the applicant.

43a

Initial Decision

28. The applicant’s Triga Mark II reactor is part of the

nuclear engineering program supervised by the Division of

Nuclear Science and Engineering of the Faculty of

Engineering. The Director of the Division is responsible for

all of the programs in nuclear science and engineering in

the applicant’s Engineering School. Under current

planning, two licensed senior reactor operators are to be

directly responsible for the operation of the reactor ——

one, the Reactor Director who has the rank of professor

with a background of experience in atomic energy since

1941, and the other, the Reactor Supervisor, who is a

full-time nonacademic staff member with reactor

operation experience. Both will be licensed operators

under AEC rules and regulations.

29. Independent surveillance of the _ reactor’s

operations within the applicant’s organization will be the

responsibility of its Reactor Safety Committee —— a group

of persons with distinguished technical background ——

appointed by the President of the University. The

Committee is scheduled to review the formulation of and

the adherence to appropriate rules and procedures to

insure safe operation of the subject reactor. In particular,

the Committee will (a) review and approve experimental

programs prior to execution, (b) review and approve all

changes in existing experimental plans involving any

changes in the reactor core, core loading, control rods, or

shielding components, and (c) insure that all activities and

experiments conform with all applicable government

‘regulations and licenses in regard to the operation of the

reactor facility, handling special nuclear materials, and

possession and handling of activated by-product material.

44a

Initial Decision

30. The University’s Health Physicist will assign to the

reactor installation members of his staff as needed to

handle radiation monitoring problems in aid of the

University’s Radiation Safety Committee —— a committee

approved by and reporting to the University President with

respect to general problems of radiation hazards at the

University.

31. The applicant has prepared written operating

procedures for its reactor and the regulatory staff has

reviewed these procedures in light of the requirement in

the Technical Specifications that there shall be written

instructions in effect for, but not limited to, the following

subject: (a) checkout and calibration of reactor operating

instrumentation and control, control rod drives, and area

radiation monitors and air particulate monitors, (b) reactor

startup, routine operation and reactor shutdown, (c)

emergency and abnormal conditions, including evacuation,

re-entry and recovery, (d) fuel loading or unloading, (e)

control rod removal or replacement, and (f) maintenance

operations which may affect reactor safety. The regulatory

staff found that the applicant’s procedures carry out the

requirements of the proposed license. Certain suggestions

of the regulatory staff with respect to amending or

augmenting the procedures have been taken care of by the

applicant and other limited recommendations are suitable

for implementation, as the regulatory staff sees fit, prior to

the issuance of an operating license.

32. Subsequent to the first hearing and prior to the

second hearing, on May 21, 1970, the Commission

published for public comment certain proposed

amendments to 10 CFR Part 50. The _ proposed

a

_—

45a

Initial Decision

amendments provided that information required of an

applicant for a construction permit or an operating license

concerning plans for coping with an emergency be in

accordance with a proposed new Appendix E to 10 CFR

Part 50, entitled “Emergency Plans for Production and

Utilization Facilities.” Later, the proposed amendment

with limited modifications was adopted by the

Commission, becoming effective January 23, 1971. The

record shows that the applicant developed its emergency

procedures following discussions with, among others, the

Director, Office of Radiation Control, Department. of

Health of New York City; the Security Office of Columbia

University; the Chief in Charge of Fire Prevention, New

York City Fire Department; and the Chief, Nuclear

Facilities Section, Environmental Surveillance and Control

Program, National Center for Radiological Health,

Department of HEW. The record also shows that the

method for evacuating the reactor building and other

buildings is based on the fire evacuation plan of Columbia

University and that following notification of civil

authorities of an emergency, the plans and emergency

procedures of the civil authorities will be followed.

According to the regulatory staff at the second hearing,

the applicant’s emergency procedures met the intent of the

then proposed amendment to 10 CFR Part 50 with regard

to plans for coping with emergencies.

Common Defense

and Security

33. The record contains no evidence that the interests

of common defense and security are involved in the

proposed operation of the applicant’s reactor. The

activities which would be covered by the proposed

2

N On

46a

Initial Decision

operating license will be within the jurisdiction of the

United States. The principal officers of the administration

of Columbia University are all United States citizens,

There is no suggestion that the applicant is owned,

controlled, or dominated by a foreign party. The record

contains no classified information and the applicant has

agreed to safeguard in accordance with Commission

regulations any Restricted Data which might become

involved. Further, no problem is indicated with respect to

the need for military uses of special nuclear material

required for the proposed facility and, as regards the

safeguarding of special nuclear material which it obtains,

the applicant will be required to comply with applicable

Commission regulations.

Location and Characteristics

of Applicant’s Reactor and

Other Data

34. The applicant’s reactor is housed in the basement

of a four-story building (three stories above ground)

known as the Terrace Building. The Terrace Building is

located in the block of Columbia University campus

bounded by College Walk, 120th Street, Amsterdam

Avenue, and Broadway. This block is in the midst of the

residential community Morningside Heights, Borough of

Manhattan, New York City. Morningside Heights is a

densely populated area, having an average of 628 persons

per net residential acre. In a few blocks of the Morningside

Heights area, population density approximates 1,000

persons per acre. By way of comparison, the median range

within Manhattan is 500-600 persons per net residential

acre.

47a

Initial Decision

35. From a geological standpoint, the site of the

reactor is over bedrock with no history of surface ground

displacement which might be expected to cause damage to

the reactor. The site, being approximately 100 feet above

the level of the nearby Hudson River, is free from danger

of flooding as a result of a rising of the river. The reactor

site is on the side of a hill. No flooding of the storm sewers

in the area has occurred in the past fifty years.

86. The applicant’s reactor is a research reactor. It is a

Triga Mark II reactor designed by Gulf General Atomic

Incorporated, formerly the General Atomic Division of the

General Dynamics Corporation. It is a heterogeneous

pool-type reactor cooled by water, moderated by

zirconium hydride and water, and designed to be operated

in a steady state condition at power levels up to 250 kw. It

also incorporates the capability to conduct experiments

involving rapid insertions of excess reactivity which result

in split second pulses at peak powers of approximately

250,000 kw. The reactor core is to be located near the

bottom of a concrete-aluminum lined tank, 6.5 feet in

diameter by 20.5 feet deep, and will be covered by

approximately 16 feet of water. Surrounding the core is a

l-foot thick graphite reflector, water and a minimum of 8

feet 2 inches of concrete. Experimental facilities include 4

horizontal beam ports, a graphite thermal column, a

pneumatic transfer system, a central thimble, and a bulk

shielding facility.

37. The core utilizes solid fuel elements in which the

zirconium hydride moderator is homogeneously combined

with 20% enriched uranium. The reactor loading will have

a maximum excess reactivity of 2.45% delta k/k above the

48a

Initial Decision

cold, clean, critical condition. A core composed of this

type of fuel element has a demonstrated negative prompt

temperature coefficient of reactivity. The reactor’s peaked

power pulse is limited to an energy release which results in

fuel temperatures less than 400° centigrade. The

experimental program for the reactor is so designed that

the maximum reactivity insertion for pulsed operation is

1.5% delta k/k. A mechanical stop assures that this

limitation will not be exceeded. The design incorporates

four instrumentation channels to monitor and indicate on

the control console the neutron flux, power level, and the

rate of change of the flux. Three control rods with a total

worth of about 5.4% delta k/k are provided to control the

power level. In addition, a system of interlocks, radiation

monitors and alarms has been provided.

38. The distinctive safety characteristic of the

applicant’s reactor is the negative prompt temperature

coefficient associated with Triga reactors. Because of this

_ characteristic, safe operation of the reactor is assured oy

the very nature of the fuel material which limits its power

output to safe levels. The Triga reactor is distinguished

from other research reactors, which secure safety of

operation entirely through administrative and engineered

safeguards (such as mechanical and electronic safety

devices). Research reactors, in turn, are vastly different

from power reactors in that the latter generally relate to

power levels thousands of times the power levels of

research reactors, which produce no electric power and are

operated solely as sources of nuclear radiation.

39. The fuel material for the applicant’s Triga is 2

mixture of uranium and zirconium hydride. The uranium

is enriched with 20% of the fissionable isotope

49a

Initial Decision

uranium-235. This mixture is incapable of nuclear

explosion. It is capable of sustaining a chain reaction at the

low power levels useful in research reactors.

40. The Licensing Board asked the regulatory staff to

furnish a summary of contents of the AEC records of each

accidental release of fission products at a Triga reactor,

including time, place, model of reactor, its operation

licensee, extent of release and its cause, amount of damage

or injury, if any, and remedial action. In response to the

Licensing Board’s request, the regulatory staff introduced

into the record data identifying nine accidental releases of

fission products at Triga reactors since November 1963.

According to the data, all of the releases were within

licensed limits, none resulted in concentration in

unrestricted areas in excess of 10 CFR Part 20 limits for

continuous exposure, and none of the occurrences resulted

in facility damage of personnel injuries. Domestic locations

of Triga reactors under AEC operating licenses! with

steady state power levels from 250 kw (same as

applicant’s) to 1500 kw, are: Aerojet-General Corp., San

Ramon, California; Armed Forces Radiobiology Research

Institute, Bethesda, Maryland; Gulf General Atomic, Inc.

1. The following information is a matter of public record:

Except for the present matter, the issuance of an AEC operating

license for any reactor in the research reactor category (which

includes Trigas) has never been the subject of a prior public hearing

and review by an atomic safety and licensing board. The reason is

that in the history of atomic safety and licensing boards no one

before now has ever formally contested the issuance of an operating

license for a research reactor. As of December 31, 1970, there were

AEC licenses in effect for 72 operating research reactors of which 22

were Trigas.

7

50a

Initial Decision

(3), San Diego, California; Kansas State University,

Manhattan, Kansas; Michigan State University, Lansing,

Michigan; Northrop Corporate Laboratories, Hawthome,

California; Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon;

Pennsylvania State University, University Park,

Pennsylvania; Reed Institute, Portland, Oregon; US.

Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, Jefferson

County, Colorado; Universities of —— California (2) at

Berkeley and Irvine, Illinois at Urbana, Texas at Austin,

and Wisconsin at Madison; and Washington State

University at Pullman. The remaining four Trigas under

AEC operating licenses all have authorized steady state

power levels of less than 250 kw. .

41. The inspector from the AEC Division of

Compliance assigned to the applicant’s reactor reported at

the November 1969 hearings that AEC inspections had

made ten inspections of the applicant’s reactor,

surrounding facilities, and associated procedures and found

compliance by the applicant with its safety commitments

in the building of the reactor. Those items which were

incomplete were identified and were regarded as items

understandably incomplete at the given stage of

construction. The regulatory staff identified no safety

problem which it considered to be unresolved.

Applicant’s Reactor under

Normal Operation —— Radioactive

Releases and Safeguards

42. Normal operation of the applicant’s reactor is of

two types, namely, steady state operation and pulse mode

operation. Whereas the text of the proposed license refers

-

Sla

Initial Decision

only to the former type of opération, the latter type is

provided for in the Technical Specifications of the

applicant’s reactor which are incorporated into the

proposed license by reference. Steady state operation

involves positioning the reactor control rods so that the

reactor power is kept at levels not in excess of 250 kw for

indefinite lengths of time. Pulse mode operation involves

the rapid withdrawal of a single rod. In this mode of

operation, a peak power level of approximately 250,000

kw can be attained for a very short length of time (several

one-thousandths of a second). In the pulse mode of

operation, the peak power is limited by the inherent

nuclear characteristics of the reactor, i.e., the higher fuel

temperatures cause self-termination of the transient.

Although the rate of energy generation (power) during a

pulse is high; the total energy generated is relatively small,

because of the short time involved. Further, the regulatory

staff calculated that if the applicant were to operate the

reactor repetitively in the pulse mode, the resultant fission

product inventory (in terms of curies) would be less than if

the reactor had been operated continuously at 250 kw for

the same overall length of time.

43. As a result of normal operation of the reactor,

radioactive gases, liquids and solids are produced. Of the

gases released in normal operation, the most important

from the standpoint of potential hazard is Argon-41. This

gas is generated in air-filled beam holes in or near the core

of the reactor. If all the beam holes were full of air and all

were simultaneously discharged immediately after the

reactor had run steadily at 250 kw, the consequence would

be a brief rise of the radioactivity in the stack to about 4.5

times the maximum concentration of Argon-41 permissible

for continuous discharge under 10 CFR 20.106(a) and 10

Initial Decision

CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 1. The applicant

recognizes the desirability of minimizing the discharge of

radioactivity and intends either to fill the beam holes with

carbon dioxide, helium or other gas that presents no such

activation problem as air, or to shut down the reactor until

the Argon-41 has decayed to a level that presents no

difficulty in meeting regulations.2. The applicant has

shown the will and has the means to keep the releases from

its reactor of Argon-41 and other radioactive gases well

below the maximum concentration permitted under AEC

regulations for release to the atmosphere. The applicable

regulations are the Licensing Board’s criteria for

determining when releases endanger public health and

safety and there was no meaningful evidence before the

Licensing Board challenging the validity of the regulations.

44. Effluents from the reactor which reach the air in

the reactor room will be diluted by the air entering the

room through fresh air inlets and through inleakage

resulting from the room being maintained below the

outside pressure by the ventilating system. All exhaust air

from the reactor room will pass through a system of filters,

including a pre-filter and a 0.3 micron absolute filter

located on the suction side of the reactor room exhaust

blower. The blower discharges through an automatic

damper into the reactor exhaust stack. The stack, which is

a welded, stainless steel duct three feet in diameter, goes

up the side of the adjacent, +8-story S.W. Mudd Building

and continues above the tower roof 15 feet higher in the

2. A wait of 24 hours will reduce the concentration of Argon-41

by a factor of over 8000 through the natural process of radioactive

decay.

Initial Decision

air. The 25 mph velocity at which the ventilating air is

exhausted from the stack extends the effective height of

the stack beyond the height specified in the Technical

Specifications as the minimum height for release of air or

other exhaust from the reactor room, namely, 249 feet

above ground level. Under normal operation, the air in the

room and at the mouth of the stack offer no hazard to

public health and safety under AEC standards. The

applicant’s witness indicated that the exhaust air at the

mouth of the stack is likely to be cleaner than the intake

air because of the purifying effect of the filtering system.

45. A three-inch vent from the reactor thermal column

and beam ports and another line at one of the reactor faces

are included in the ventilation system. Blower and damper

controls are managed by the operator in the control room

and in the event of a power failure, all dampers fail in a

shut position. Each door opening to the reactor room,

except the truck entrance door, will have two locks, one of

which is electrically actuated by the reactor operator in

the control room. The truck entrance door will remain

locked except when loading and unloading operations

require it to be open. The doors are the only non-sealed

penetrations through the reactor room walls. According to

calculations of the applicant, the truck entrance door

accounts for 50% of the total leakage rate from the reactor

room through its six doors when the ventilation system is

off.

46. No liquids are continuously discharged from the

reactor to the outside world in normal operation. The

reactor core is cooled by the natural convection currents

of the water pool in which the reactor is immersed. Heat is

54a

Initial Decision

removed from the water of this pool by means of a

water-to-water heat exchanger external to the reactor

tank and by an evaporative cooling tower on the secondary

water loop. The reactor water circulates in a closed loop

system. The elevation of this system is well above the

reactor core so that the core cannot be exposed as a result

of a rupture in the loop.

47. The drainage systems in the reactor room are

closed systems with no tie-in to the public sewer system.

The floor area in the immediate vicinity of the reactor base

is slanted toward a sump capable of containing all of the

shielding water in the reactor tank. The sump, made of

water-proofed concrete reinforced with steel rods and

covered with five coats of epoxy, rests on bedrock.

Additionlly, all sink and shower drains about the reactor

drain into a 750-gallon stainless steel hold-up tank.

Disposal of contaminated water in the tank and sump is

provided for according to AEC regulations.

48. The principal solid material which would be

activated as a result of operation of the applicant’s reactor

is used fuel. At infrequent intervals, the applicant might

choose to remove used fuel elements from the reactor core

by transferring them to a-storage rack in the reactor tank.

The rack itself is designed to prevent a critical mass. Later,

the applicant could place the used fuel elements while still

under water in a protective cask for removal from the tank

and delivery at the reactor room to a carrier licensed for

such purposes by the Department of Transportation. The

used fuel ceases to be the applicant’s responsibility when

the carrier takes over. According to Gulf General Atomic,

most of the Trigas in operation, even those in operation

Initial Decision

for ten years, have never occasioned the shipment of

radioactive fuel. Other solid material activated in the

reactor in normal operation, such as sample carriers, parts

of the core framework, and small tools, will be handled by

conventional means developed over many reactor-years of

experience.

Applicant’s Reactor

under Accident Conditions

49. Consideration of the applicant’s reactor under

accident conditions bears upon the issue in the notice of

hearing of whether the issuance of the proposed license

will be inimical to the health and safety of the public.

Thus, if under accident conditions the public would be

exposed to excessive radiation, the issuance of the license

would be regarded as inimical to the health and safety of

the public regardless of the extent of the assurances that

the reactor could and would normally be operated under

the terms of the proposed license without endangering

public health and safety.

50. At 10 CFR Part 100, the Commission has set forth

reactor site criteria for stationary power and testing

reactors. These criteria are measures for determining

whether it is acceptable to locate a particular reactor of

either of these types at a given site. The criteria provide

guidelines for permissible public exposure to radiation

under reactor accident conditions. The guidelines are

identified in terms of dosages, length of exposure,

populatior. affected and distances from the reactor site.

The guidelines also indicate the nature of the accident to

be postulated, which historically has been a double-ended

56a

Initial Decision

rupture of the primary coolant piping with a fission

products release calculated on the basis of a 100% core

meltdown. For further guidance, the reactor site criteria

refer to Technical Information Document 14844, US.

Atomic Energy Commission, dated March 23, 1962.

Rey a ee

51. The Commission has set forth no comparable site

criteria for research reactors in general or for the Triga

type research reactors in particular. Nor has it under its

i statutory authority directed any special class treatment of

: Triga reactors in terms of safety standards or required

: findings antecedent to licensing. The absence of specific

guidelines oriented to research reactor licensing led the

Licensing Board to certify to the Atomic Safety and

Licensing Appeal Board the question of what sort of

accident should be hypothesized in the present proceeding.

The Licensing Board, which has been concerned about

licensing a nuclear reactor for operation in the midst of a

dense population center, particularly noted that depending

: on the nature of the accident hypothesized and the

postulated fission products release associated therewith,

the applicant’s reactor might be considered either safe or

unsafe for licensing. The Licensing Board stated its view

that such substantive factors of measurement are proper

subjects for the Commission’s determination rather than

the Licensing Board’s or the parties’. The Appeal Board

took the position that the Commission’s regulations at 10

CFR Part 50 provide sufficient guidance to the Licensing

Board. Accordingly, without providing any substantive

answer to the certified question, the Appeal Board referred __

it back to the Licensing Board for determination of an

answer on the basis of the record. The referenced Part 50

of the Commission’s regulations identifies general

57a

Initial Decision

procedures for the licensing of production and utilization

facilities and section 50.34, noted in passing by the Appeal

Board, identifies certain data which are required to be

included in applications for construction permits and

operating licenses. Following receipt of the Appeal Board’s

response, the Licensing Board reopened the hearing record

for limited purposes, including further development of the

subject of postulated reactor accident conditions and

related exposure of the public to radiation.

52. Drawing upon the Commission’s approach to

standardize the analysis of safety considerations pertaining

to site and to accidental events for stationary power and

testing reactors by hypothesizing or postulating a major

accident (see 10 CFR 100.11, including footnote 1), the

Licensing Board considers that the accident to be

postulated in the present proceeding ought to be one

which would result in potential hazards not exceeded by

those from any accident considered credible. In this sense,

the accident is the type (though obviously with vastly

different physical characteristics) which the regulatory

staff uses in measuring whether public health and safety

are adequately protected under power reactor accident

conditions. Speculation about how the accident might

come about is obviated, the principle being that the hazard

from the postulated accident is as great or greater than the

potential hazard reasonably associated with any credible

accident. on

—— 53. The applicant, the regulatory staff, and Riverside

and Morningside together each proposed an accident to be

postulated for the purpose of determining whether public

health and safety are endangered under accident

conditions. The applicant’s proposed accident, identified

58a

Initial Decision

by it as the maximum credible accident, is a defect in the

cladding of a fuel element with the shielding water in place

either prior to or simultaneously with an accidental

insertion of all the available excess reactivity. This is the

worst type of accident reported as having actually

happened to a Triga reactor. In identifying a substantially

more severe accident as its design basis accident, the

regulatory staff stated that it “‘examined all ordinary

means by which high temperature conditions could be

attained and found that, in the case of the Columbia Triga

reactor, physical limitations precluded the high

temperature rupture of the cladding of ali or any

significant number of the fuel elements.” The design basis

accident of the regulatory staff is the failure of the

cladding of a single fuel element while exposed to air. Both

the applicant’s maximum credible and the regulatory

staff’s design basis accidents do not contemplate

temperatures in excess of 400° centigrade. Momingside

and Riverside proposed the most serious accident, namely,

a rupture in air at temperature in the neighborhood of

1000° centigrade of one or several fuel elements.

54. In the opinion of the Licensing Board, credibility

is not the mark of the accident possibilities which the

intervenors have described in suport of the accident

which they would postulate .or safety calculation

purposes. The first of these accident possibilities is

sabotage of the reactor by high temperature destruction of

the fuel elements with the shielding water removed. This

theoretical possibility supposes that determined saboteurs

with advanced knowledge of physics and mechanics could

plan and successfully execute without prior detection a

most complex feat, even under ideal experimental

59a

Initial Decision

conditions, involving extensive preparation, highly

specialized skills and tools, and serious personal risk.

Another accident possibility invoked by the intervenors is

a burning aircraft crash. Because of the physical

arrangements of the buildings about the reactor, a crashing

aircraft, if it were to have any chance of causing the

disaster envisioned by the intervenors, would have to fall

vertically through a pin-point location (14’ x 14’) on the

roof of the Terrace Building four stories above the reactor

core, then across a steel beam and into the reactor core’s

cellar housing, namely, a shielding water pool 6.5’ in

diameter, 20.5’ in depth and with walls of concrete 8’2” in

thickness, which is assumed to be insufficiently protective

of the core at the time of the crash. Other references by

the intervenors to accident possibilities at 1000°

centigrade were mere conceptualizations — a core loading

accident out of context with the applicant’s reactor and an

overheating of the fuel elements in an undefined manner

causing a rupture of the cladding, which, according to Gulf

General Atomic’s experience and analysis, can sustain

operation at temperatures in excess of 1000° centigrade.

55. Of the three accidents, the Licensing Board prefers

for present purposes the one proposed by the regulatory

staff. In terms of the Licensing Board’s thinking, a

yardstick accident ought to be greater than one which

actually happened and accordingly, the applicant’s

maximum credible accident is regarded as unsuitable. At

the same time, in the Licensing Board’s opinion, it would

be unrealistic to postulate the sort of accident proposed by

Morningside and Riverside because the consequences of

such an accident are too far removed from the potential

hazard reasonably associated with any credible accident.

60a

Initial Decision

As the Licensing Board sees the situation, no credible

accident would result in a potential hazard greater than the

one which would come about under the regulatory staff's

proposed accident.

56. In addition to the postulated accident, the

assumed fission products release fraction is also critical to

any determination of whether the health and safety of the

public are adequately protected under reactor accident

conditions. The applicant and the regulatory staff assumed

a fission products release fraction of 1.5 x 10-5, that is, 15

parts per million. This figure was based on an experiment

and calculations performed in 1966 by General Atomic

Division of General Dynamics Corporation (General

Atomic). The figure was accepted by both the applicant

and the regulatory staff, which had checked the figure

with independent analytical calculations of their own but

with no new experimental data. The figure was challenged

by a witness for Morningside and Riverside as not being

proper for use in measuring the hazards associated with the

applicant’s reactor under accident conditions. The witness’

attack on the figure was based on two points: first, by its

very nature the high temperature accident proposed by

Morningside and Riverside would involve a substantially

higher fission products release fraction than would result

from the accidents proposed by the applicant and the

regulatory staff, and second, the release fraction assumed

by the applicant and the regulatory staff for their

accidents is open to question because of an experiment in

1960 by General Atomic which supported a higher release

fraction than 1.5 x 10-5. Following through with his

second point, Riverside’s witness noted, too, differences of

indeterminate significance between the conditions of the

6la

Initial Decision

later experiment and those applicable to the subject

reactor as well as certain variances among the data derived

from the later experiment. The manager of the Triga

reactor program of Gulf General Atomic Incorporated

(which succeeded to General Atomic) affirmed his

conviction as to the validity of the conclusion derived

from the later experimental data (as did the applicant and

the regulatory staff, and all with supporting reasons) but

candidly stated that a determined search by his company

uncovered no satisfactory explanation for the different

experimental results. Nor did the applicant or the

regulatory staff disclose any experimental data of its own

or of another source which would either shed light on the

discrepancy of fission products release fractions derived

from the two experiments or establish a fission products

release fraction of unquestionable validity. The two release

fractions as determined in 1960 and 1966 are 9600 parts

per million (0.96%) and 3 parts per million (3 x 10°6),

respectively. Neither the 1960 figure nor the 1966 figure,

which are more than 3,000 times apart, includes any

multiplicative safety factor. The fission products release

fraction 15 parts per million (1.5 x 10-5) represents the

product of multiplying the figure of 3 parts per million by

a safety factor of 5.

57. Morningside and Riverside proposed a fission

products release fraction of 4% (40,000 parts per million)

as appropriate for their yardstick accident, namely, a

rupture of the cladding of one or several fuel elements in

air at temperature in the neighborhood of 1000°

centigrade. The two intervenors based the 4% figure on the

results of certain AEC sponsored tests, known as the

SNAPTRAN tests (completed in 1964). These tests

Initial Decision

involved the deliberate destruction at high temperature —

the record indicates 1100° centigrade — of a reactor

chemically similar to the applicant’s in that it was an

uranium-zirconium hydride fuel reactor. The applicant’s

and the regulatory staff’s challenge to the proposed fission

products release fraction of 4% was based on their

contention that a high temperature accident as proposed

by the two intervenors has no applicability in the

proceeding. There was no questioning the 4% figure as

being properly related to such a high temperature accident.

The fission products release fractions considered at the

hearing thus range from a low of 3 parts per million (to

which a safety factor of 5 had been applied) to a high of

40,000 parts per million.

58. In its consideration of the applicant’s Triga

reactor, the regulatory staff mainly relied on information

supplied by the manufacturer of Triga reactors and by

Triga reactor operators and on its own analysis of such

information. Relevant experimantal data developed either

by itself or by one of its contractors were not in evidence.

Further, the regulatory staff did not appear to have an

objective standard for determining the acceptability of

Triga reactors under accident conditions or to have a stable

approach for making calculations pertinent to determining

radiation exposure under such conditions. In about half of

the cases of licensed, operating Trigas, the regulatory staff

hypothesized an accident while shielding water was in

place. In the remainder of cases, the more recent ones, the

hypothesized accident involved the failure of one fuel

element while in air. For just four Trigas, the maximum

fission products release fraction assumed was 10° (10

parts per million). For other Trigas — including a number

licensed after the General Atomic experiment in 1966 —

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63a

Initial Decision

the corresponding release fraction figure used for purposes

of safety evaluation was 1% or 2% (10,000 or 20,000 parts

per million). In one instance, the regulatory staff made a

safety calculation for a Triga on the basis of a fission

products release fraction of 2.8% (28,000 parts per

million) — which is the approximate equivalent of

multiplying the 1960 experimentally derived figure of

96% by a safety factor of 3.

59. As noted earlier, the reactor site criteria for

stationary power and testing reactors at 10 CFR Part 100

set certain guidelines for evaluating a reactor site under

accident conditions. According to these guidelines, an

individual located on the boundary of the defined

“exclusion area” for two hours immediately following

onset of the postulated fission products release should not

receive a total radiation dose to the whole body in excess

of 25 rem or a total radiation dose in excess of 300 rem to

the thyroid from iodine exposure. Similarly, an individual

located on the outer boundary of the defined “low

population zone” who is exposed to the radioactive cloud

resulting from the postulated fission product release

(during the entire period of its passage) should not receive

the foregoing radiation doses. The guidelines also provide

that the distance from the reactor to the nearest boundary

of a densely populated center containing more than about

25,000 residents should be at least one and one-third times

the distance from the reactor to the outer boundary of the

low population zone and that greater distances may be

necessary where large cities are involved. The Licensing

Board endeavored to extract criteria from these guidelines

to evaluate the dangers to public health and safety of a

postulated accident to the applicant’s reactor. The

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64a

Initial Decision

Licensing Board’s extended efforts to arrive at objective

criteria in this manner were unproductive. “Exclusion

area” and “low population zone,” together with the

indicated radiation exposure limits therefor, and

“population center distance’”’ have no sensible application

to the applicant’s situation. In the Licensing Board’s

judgment, the concept of “exclusion area” at 10 CFR Part

100 is not compatible with any part of the area

immediately outside the reactor room within the Terrace

and Mudd Buildings complex. Though the applicant may

exclude persons from such area, the area is much too

public to fit into the category of an “exclusion area.”

Clearly, there is no “low population zone.” about the

reactor site, and “population center distance” is

non-existent. Nor do the radiation exposure limits at 10

CFR Part 20, which are applicable to normal operation,

afford a practicable approach for dealing with the issue of

public health and safety under conditions of a postulated

accident unless the accident consequences are of such a

minor sort that they might be assumed to be embraced in

normal operation.

60. U 235 is the primary source of radiation in nuclear

reactors. The amount of U 235 for possession and use by

the applicant in connection with the proposed operation

of its reactor is 3.3 kg. This compares to amounts ranging

from 54 kg to 216 kg for the four licensed test reactors in

operation and to amounts ranging from 250 kg to 5,000 kg

for licensed power reactors in operation.3 From an

3. Data compiled from information available to the public

through the Public Proceedings Branch, Office of the Commission’s

Secretary.

65a

Initial Decision

individual’s standpoint, there is no difference between a

given dose of radiation from a power or test reactor and

one in the same amount from a research reactor.

61. The extent of public exposure to radioactive

releases emitting from the reactor exhaust stack was

calculated by the applicant for the following locations: (i)

at ground level at West 119 Street and Amsterdam Avenue,

(ii) in the S.W. Mudd Building for floors above the 7th

(reflecting the proximity of air intakes to the mouth of the

stack), and (iii) by a window of the highest occupied floor

(the 19th) of the nearby Interchurch Center. In the course

of the applicant’s calculations for location (i), a dilution

factor of greater than 20,000 was arrived at. With respect

to location (ii), the calculations indicated that a fuel

element cladding failure with the shielding water in place

would cause exposure for the first hour to be at the most 7

millirem. With respect to location (iii), a dilution factor of

more than 16,000 was calculated. On the other hand,

apropos to the interest of Morningside and Riverside in the

extent of exposure of people living in nearby apartment

buildings to stack emissions of Argon-41, the regulatory

staff stated that the applicable dilution factor varies from

40 to 200.

62. A summary of the calculated radiation doses in

millrem (mr) under various accident conditions at

specified locations outside the reactor area with different

assumptions as to the fission products release fraction and

the status of the ventilation system (whether on or off) is

presented in the five tables below. Tables I and III presents

figures submitted by the applicant in response to the

Licensing Board’s request for additional data following its

Initial Decision

study of the record of the earlier hearing. Table I]

represents an extension of Table I and Tables IV and V

represent extensions of Table III. The regulatory staff

noted its “essential agreement” with the applicant’s

calculations and though they gave a different application

to the calculations than did the applicant, the intervenors

did not dispute the applicant’s figures as such. With

reference to whether the ventilation system is on or off

during accident conditions, the applicant’s operating

procedures of August 15, 1969 provide for the ventilation

system being shut down under conditions of an accident

involving radiation releases and its turning on thereafter

depending on evaluation of the accident.

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67a

Initial Decision

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APPLICANT’S MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT

(Defect in Cladding of a Fuel Element With Shielding Water in Place and Fission

Products Release Fraction Assumed To Be 2.8% or 28,000 ppm)

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69a

Initial Decision

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70a

Initial Decision

TABLE IV

REGULATORY STAFF’S DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT

(One Ruptured Fuel Element in Air With Fission Products Release Fraction Assumed To

Be 2.8% or 28,000 ppm)

Doses at Truck Door Doses At West 119 St. Doses at Mouth

Exposure in Parking Area and Amsterdam Ave. of Stack

Time Whole Body Thyroid Whole Body Thyroid Whole Body Thyroid

Ventilation Off

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Tla

Initial Decision

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72a

| 7

Initial Decision

. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

PROPOSED BY PARTIES

63. The Licensing Board’s position with respect to the

findings and conclusions proposed by each of the parties is

set forth on attachments hereto. Attachment A pertains to

the proposed findings and conclusions of the applicant;

Attachment B to those of the regulatory staff; and

Attachment C to those of intervenor Mrs. Weik. The

proposed joint findings of fact of intervenors Morningside

and Riverside are considered at Attachment D and their

proposed joint conclusions of law are considered at

Attachment E.

CONCLUSIONS

(Paragraphs 64-69 are addressed directly to the

formal issues in the notice of hearing, set out at

paragraph 19.)

64. There is reasonable assurance that operation of the

applicant’s reactor at steady-state power levels up to a

maximum of 250 kilowatts (thermal) and in the pulse

mode with reactivity insertions up to a maximum of 1.5%

delta k/k under the conditions and limitations in the form

of license proposed by the regulatory staff, together with

the associated Technical Specifications, can be conducted

without endangering the health and safety of the public.

65. There is reasonable assurance that such operation

of the applicant’s reactor would be conducted in

compliance with the rules and regulations of the

Commission should such a license be issued.

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73a

Initial Decision

66. The applicant is technically qualified to engage in

the activities within the scope of the proposed license in

accordance with the rules and regulations of the

Commission.

67. The applicant is financially qualified to engage in

the activities within the scope of the proposed license in

accordance with the rules and regulations of the

Commission.

68. The issuance of the proposed license to the

applicant would not be inimical to the common defense

and security.

69. The Licensing Board declines to decide the issue of

whether the issuance of the proposed license will be

inimical to the health and safety of the public. In this

regard, the Licensing Board notes the following:

A. The Licensing Board identifies the foregoing

issue with the question of whether under a postulated

reactor accident the health and safety of the public

would be endangered.

B. The absence of applicable substantive criteria of

the Commission and of convincing objective standards

of the regulatory staff — all quite distinct from

provisions at 10 CFR Part 50, such as at sections 50.40

and 50.41(b) — prompts the Licensing Board to

decline answering the question of whether the health

and safety of the public would be endangered upon the

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74a

Initial Decision

occurrence of a postulated accident to the applicant’s

reactor. The Licensing Board considers it inappropriate

to enforce an answer derived from the narrow confines

of a single proceeding and its own personal views about

the degree to which the health and safety of the public

ought to be protected against accident consequences.

C. In the Licensing Board’s opinion, the fission

products release fraction under postulated accident

conditions for such a standard product as a Triga

reactor ought to be a matter of proven determination

and unquestionable validity. From the Licensing

Board’s standpoint, resolution of existing conflict in

data and ascertainment of firm figures ought to be

accomplished through a new experiment under the

auspices of the regulatory staff. The sponsorship of

such an experiment, in the Licensing Board’s view, is

within the province of the regulatory staff in attending

to the interests of the public in the process of licensing

Triga reactors. There ought to be an end to the past

practice of the regulatory staff, which lessens its

credibility, of shifting basis in its safety evaluation of

accident conditions from one Triga case to another by

varying the combination of postulated accident and

fission products release fraction assumed.

D. In order to facilitate ultimate resolutionof the

subject issue which it has declined to decide in this

Initial Decision, the Licensing Board has incorporated

herein basic data derived from the hearing and certain

judgments thereon bearing upon the issue.

75a

Initial Decision

70. Apart from paragraph 69, it is the Licensing

Board’s position that prior to any licensing of the

applicant to operate its reactor the following items should

be taken care of to the satisfaction of the regulatory staff.

A. Air leakage from the reactor room, particularly

at the truck entrance door, be reduced to the extent

practicable;

B. Locking and unlocking of the truck entrance

door be placed under the control of a person in the

reactor room in a manner comparable to his control

over other doors to the room;

C. Once the postulated accident and its fission

products release fraction are authoritatively

determined, radiation exposure resulting from stack

emissions with the ventilation system open under

accident conditions be calculated for persons in the

S.W. Mudd Building who might be affected because of

that building’s air intakes, for persons on ground level

at the corner of Amsterdam Avenue and West 119

Street, for persons on the 19th floor of the

Interchurch Center at an open window facing

Claremont Avenue, and for persons living in and using

nearby apartment and public buildings;

D. Applicant’s emergency plans and procedures be

reviewed and if necessary, be amended in order to

assure compliance with the substantive requirements

for an applicant seeking a license to operate a nuclear

reactor, as set forth in the new Appendix E. 10 CFR

Part 50; and

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76a

Initial Decision

E. In addition to the provisions in the form of

license accompanying the notice of hearing, the license

itself ought to include a provision specifying that the

licensee may operate the reactor in the pulse mode with

reactivity insertions up to a maximum of 1.5% delta

k/k.

ORDER

71. Not being in position to make a proper

determination of one issue in the notice of hearing, as

noted at paragraph 69, the Licensing Board necessarily

denies authorization to the Director of Regulation to issue

to the applicant the proposed operating license.

APPEAL AND REVIEW PROCEDURES

72. Within twenty (20) days after service of this Initial

Decision, any party to this proceeding may file exceptions

to the Initial Decision and a brief in support of them with

the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board. Copies of

such exceptions and brief shall be served on all other

parties. Further, any party to this proceeding may file a

brief in support of or in opposition to exceptions filed by

any other party within ten (10) days after the service of

exceptions. The Rules of Practice, 10 CFR Part 2, include

additional information about administrative appeal and

review procedures applicable to this Initial Decision. The

Commission’s delegation of its review function in this

matter to the Appeal Board was indicated by notice

published in the September 11, 1969 issue of the Federal

Register (34 F.R. 14302).

77a

Initial Decision

ATOMIC SAFETY AND

LICENSING BOARD

s/ Eugene Greuling

Eugene Greuling

s/ Hood Worthington

Hood Worthington

s/ Valentine B. Deale

Valentine B. Deale

Chairman

Washington, D.C.

April 6, 1971

ATTACHMENT A

Licensing Board’s Position With

Respect to Applicant’s Proposed

Findings and Conclusions

Following each of the two hearing sessions, on

November 18-20, 1969 and on July 10, 1970, the

applicant submitted a set of proposed findings and

conclusions. The applicant also submitted responses to the

two corresponding proposed findings and cenclusions of

Morningside and Riverside. The paragraph references

below are to the applicant’s second set of proposed

findings and conclusions, which superseded its first one.

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78a

Initial Decision

Paragraphs 1 through 10 of the applicant’s proposed

findings and conclusions recite the principal considerations

in the procedural history of the proceeding. The

considerations are amply identified in the Initial Decision.

The Licensing Board did consider the evidence referenced

by the applicant at subparagraphs 11(a) through 11(e).

The applicant’s conclusions on the issues set out in the

notice of hearing are proposed at paragraphs 12, 13 and

14. The Licensing Board is in agreement with paragraph

12, paragraph 13, and that part of paragraph 14 pertaining

to common defense and security. The remainder of

paragraph 14 answers negatively the noticed issue of

whether the issuance of the proposed license will be

inimical to the health and safety of the public. The

Licensing Board takes no position on this issue for the

reasons indicated at paragraph 69 of the Initial Decision.

With respect to the last four paragraphs of the

applicant’s proposed findings and conclusions, the

Licensing Board agrees with paragraph 15, disagrees with

paragraph 16 on the basis of the unanswered safety issue

referred to above, regards paragraph 17 as superfluously

restating substantive considerations attended to elsewhere,

and necessarily rejects the announcement at paragraph 18

that an order for the issuance of the license is being issued.

ATTACHMENT B

Licensing Board’s Position With

Respect to Regulatory Staff’s

Proposed Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law

79a

Initial Decision

The regulatory staff submitted proposed findings and

conclusions of law following the hearing on November

18-20, 1969 and supplemented such findings and

conclusions after the hearing on July 10, 1970. The

regulatory staff also submitted responses to the two

corresponding proposed findings and conclusions of the

three intervenors.

In its first two sections, covering preliminary matter

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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