Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Life of the Land v. Brinegar

Supreme Court brief1974

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Text

Anited States

OcToBER TERM, 1973

No. 3- 1088

LIFE OF THE LAND, et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

CLAUDE S. BRINEGAR, Secretary of

Transportation, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

MicHakEL R. SHERWOOD,

Suite 433,

735 Bishop Street,

Honolulu, Hawaii 96813,

Telephone: (808) 521-7474,

Counsel for Petitioners.

Hart, SHERWOOD, LEAVITT,

BLANCHFIELD and Hatt,

Suite 433,

735 Bishop Street,

Honolulu, Hawaii 96813,

Telephone: (808) 521-7474,

Of Counsel.

January 8, 1974.

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Opinions below

Jurisdiction

Questions presented

Statutory provisions involved

Statement: of the case

Reasons for granting the writ

Subiect Index

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I. The decision below conflicts with the decisions of other

II.

Ill.

Conelusion

circuits with respect to the proper standard of judicial

review of the threshold federal agency decision to omit

discussion or even mention in an environmental impact

statement under NEPA of certain environmental con-

sequences of and alternatives to a proposed project

The decision below conflicts with the decisions of the

District of Columbia Cireuit in NRDC v. Morton, 458

F.2d 827 (D.C.Cir. 1972) and with this court in

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.

402 (1971), with respect to the need to discuss and

consider alternatives to a proposed airport expansion

project under NEPA and AADA, respectively

A. NEPA

B. AADA

The decision below conflicts with the decision of the

Second Circuit in Greene County Planning Board v.

FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. den. 409

U.S. 849 (1972) as to whether the preparation of an

EIS may be delegated to a private company with a

direet financial interest in an affirmative decision on

the propsed project which is the subject of the EIS..

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Table of Authorities Cited

Cases Pages

Calvert Clifts’ Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d

COOP (ERE Bisa oasis se nre ook Coss dome eRe eae 11, 14,18

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, F.Supp.

ery ag 9 B.L.R. 20423 (W.D.Tenn. 1973) ......------ 11

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402

CO ices cones ea ncee See beet kee eS 11, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27

Conservation Society v. Seeretary of Transportation, 362

F.Supp. 627 (D.Vt. 1973) 2.2.2... eee ee eee eee ee eee 29

Environmental Defense Fund vy. Corps of Engineers, 470

F.2d 289 (Sth Cir. 1972), cert. den. 409 U.S. 1072 (1973) 16

First National Bank v. Riehardson, .... F.2d 2... 5 E.RC.

1830, 3 E.L.R. 20771 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 1973) ........ 15

Greene County Planning Board vy. Federal Power Commis-

sion, 455 F.2d 412 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. den. 409 U.S.

CON CURE de Ones abba cava eee an Oue ere ees 27, 28, 29

Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d $23 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.

dea. ... US. —.., SS BCL. F290 CUSTD) oi ccc ckcssicese 15

lowa Citizens v. Volpe, . F.Supp.. ; . + E.R.

1755. 3 RL 2001S (62. dowa 1972)... «6. 6 ccccnsseees 30

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d

Ce Tee ie ED 6, Cu wae ue scea vies ee ee re eice ae eas 14, 21

NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C.Cir. 1972) .......... 20

Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger. 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir.

DRE a eee daaousbigcisex ioe eaw cee pees 14, 15,17

Sierra Club v. Froehlke, F.2d, _.., 5 BBC. 1920

eb ok! We a: | Ee nee ar ee 16, 17, 18, 30

Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973) ............ 15

Wyoming Council v. Butz, ... F.2d... 5 E.R.C. 18H, 3

E.L.B. 20630 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 1973) ............ 15, 16,17

Statutes

Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970 | AADA)

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ee EN oe acuta se teen Nea ee a eeenwnn 22

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askin SECT COY snobs scans o ceed cnn xne se eee ee

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TaBLe oF AUTHORITIES CITED lii

Pages

OR RENO le a leer eros eo eee 22

RM EEO) Cro haa a eee ee 22

National Environmental Policy Aet of 1969 (NEPA) United

pees Cada, Bitee AB ols ec eee cee +

on > ns Ra a Rea MTEL Fa Ak AA Re nS ne 4

chick ae cp EE Te SRE AOR PE eat koe Fatt: +

ee SUI cree oe eee res Laat tice. tak 11

RE ee es Te ee +

MON CR oa ae sy kee a ee 12

ert CO. ee, 9, 12, 13, 27

Pee eee tee ee ee ee 20

ee 1) See Lone eat fal nea ae 20

d U.S.C. (Administrative Procedure Act):

NN EMC e cee cer ee nee 5

NE Co ey ee erat 15. 16

Se an, RD enon ae en a teen 22

Se Wares NO MENDY os ro ee es ah ee al 3

28 U.S.C. (Federal Question) Section 1331 ............... 5

28 U.S.C. (Regulation of Interstate Commerce) Section 1337 5

28 U.S.C. (Mandamus) Section 1361 ..................... 5

Other Authorities

Anderson, NEPA in the Courts: A Legal Analysis of the

National Environmental Poliey Act (Environmental Law

Institute, 1973), Chapter 1 (“NEPA and Congress”). pp.

BOE) oxen skeen Ca kene cee he ee ee. 13

Delegation of the Drafting of Environmental Impact State-

ee ee |S | = | Reig Seen eel ee 30

Environmental Quality, the Fourth Annual Report of the

Council on Environmental Quality (1973) p. 242 ...... 16

House Report 90-601, U.S. Code Cong. Adm. News, pp.

ER co a ne wee ee te Ua ete eee 2

S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st Cong.. Ist Sess. 9 (1969) ........ 13

Stanford Research Institute, Runway Development Require-

ment at Honolulu International Airport (1969) pp. 2, 12.

ee

s < i _)

Gu the Supreme Court |

OF THE

Rnited States

OcTOBER TERM, 1973

No.

LIFE OF THE LAND, et al.,

Petitioners, '

Vs.

CLAUDE S. BrRINEGAR, Secretary of

Transportation, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

to the United States Court of Appeals :

for the Ninth Circuit

The petitioners, Life of the Land, Hawaii Audubon

Society, Friends of the Earth, Raymond Catania,

J. Abraham Pasadaba, Wilfred H. Paul, Jr., and

Pete Kaululaau G. Thompson, respectfully pray that

a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and

opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

¢ RS TNE ee ae ae

2

the Ninth Circuit entered in this proceeding on Sep-

tember 10, 1973, rehearing denied, October 16, 1973."

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,

(hereinafter ‘‘Opinion”), not yet officially reported,

appears at 5 E.R.C. 1780, 3 E.L.R. 20811,? and as

Appendix A. That court’s Order denying the Petition

for Rehearing appears as Appendix B. The Decision

and Order of the United States District Court for

the District of Hawaii, dated December 22, 1972,

is reported at 363 F.Supp. 1171 (D.Haw. 1972) and

appears as Appendix C. The Final Decision and

Order of that court, dated April 13, 1973, incorporat-

ing by reference the reasoning set forth in the Decem-

ber 22, 1972 Decision and Order, appears as Appen-

dix D.

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit was entered on September 10, 1973. A

timely petition for rehearing en bane was denied by

1Respondents are Claude S. Brinegar, Secretary of the United

States Department of Transportation; John Shaffer, Adminis-

trator, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), National Office;

Jack Webb, Administrator, FAA, Pacific Region; E. Alvey Wright,

Director, Hawaii Department of Transportation; Kalihi Palama

Community Council; James Y, Muraoka; Takeshi Uyesugi; and

Dillingham Corporation.

*“E.R.C.” citations refer to Environment Reporter Cases, pub-

lished by the Bureau of National Affairs: “F.L.R.” citations refer

to Environmental Law Reporter, published by the Environmental

Law Institute.

er . - . “ Sk eee |

that court on October 16, 1973. This petition for

certiorari was filed within 90 days of the latter date.

This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

§1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Is the standard of judicial review under the

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of a

threshold agency decision to omit from an environ-

mental impact statement any mention of certain en-

vironmental impacts of and alternatives to the pro-

posed project, whether that decision was arbitrary

and capricious, with the burden of proof upon plain-

tiffs, or whether that decision was reasonable, with

the burden of proof upon the agency ?

2. Is an environmental impact statement for an

airport expansion project that fails to mention reason-

able non-construction alternatives to the project ade-

quate under the National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA) and under the Airport and Airways Develop-

ment Act of 1970 (AADA)?

3. Does NEPA permit the preparation of an en-

vironmental impact statement to be delegated to a

private party with a major and direct financial inter-

est in the proposed project which is the subject of that

impact statement?

a

4

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

A. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

(NEPA) United States Code, Title 42:

$4321. Purpose.

(Text set forth in Appendix E)

$4331. Congressional declaration of policy.

(Text set forth in Appendix E)

$4332. Administration consistent with policies of

Act.

(Text set forth in Appendix E)

B. Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970

(AADA) United States Code, Title 49:

§1716. Submission and approval of projects for

airport development.

(Text set forth in Appendix E)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an environmental law case involving the

adequacy of the Environmental Impact Statement

(hereinafter **EIS”) for the Reef Runway project at

Honolulu International Airport, Honolulu, Hawaii,

and the appropriate standard of judicial review there-

of, under the provisions both of the National En-

vironmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.

$$4321 et seq., and the Airport and Airways Develop-

ment Act of 1970 (AADA), 49 U.S.C. §$1701 et seq.

The case presents issues of nation-wide importance

concerning which the circuits are in conflict, and upon

which this Court has never ruled.

-

~

Petitioners, the Plaintiffs and Appellants below,

are three environmental organizations and four indi-

vidual residents of Kalihi-Palama, the area most af-

fected by flight patterns of aircraft arriving and de-

parting from Honolulu International Airport (here-

inafter *‘HIA”). Respondents are those agencies and

employees of the Federal and State governments re-

sponsible for construction of the Reef Runway. Ad-

ditional Respondents, allowed by the District Court to

intervene over the objection of Petitioners, see De-

cision and Order of the District Court, 363 F.Supp.

1176, footnote 19, Appendix C, p. 42, are the private

company awarded the construction contract for the

project, and other Kalihi-Palama residents who favor

the runway.

Petitioners filed suit challenging the EIS for the

Reef Runway project in the United States District

Court for the District of Hawaii on November 8,

1972. Jurisdiction of that court was based upon 5

U.S.C. §701-6 (Administrative Procedure Act); 28

U.S.C. §1331 (Federal Question); 28 U.S.C. $1337

(Regulation of Interstate Commerce); and 28 U.S.C.

§1361 (Mandamiis). Record p. 3.

The Complaint alleged, inter alia, that Respondents

had not complied with the requirements of Section

102(2)(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C), be-

cause the Reef Runway EIS failed to discuss or even

mention certain reasonable alternatives to the pro-

posed runway, Ree. 11-13; that Respondents had not

satistied the requirements of Section 16(¢)(4) of

AAD A, 49 U.S.C. §1716(¢) (4), because they had not

6

established that no feasible and prudent alternative

to the Reef Runway existed, Rec. 14-15; and that

Respondents had violated NEPA’s requirement that

the “responsible [federal] official” prepare the EIS

by delegating preparation thereof to a private con-

sultant with a financial interest in construction of the

proposed Reef Runway, Rec. 15-14.

The Reef Runway would be a new 12,000 foot jet

runway at HIA, 6,700 feet seaward of and parallel

to the existing primary runway, that would nearly

double the capacity of HIA. The runway would cost

more than $70,000,000.00 and is scheduled to be com-

pleted by 1975. It would be built off-shore and would

consume some 1,240 acres of ocean coral reef, 765

acres of which would be paved over. EIS, (D-1 in

evidence below) pp. 11, 12, 38.

Approximately 186 acres of silted coral mudflats

used for roosting and nesting by birds, including the

Hawaiian Stilt, an endangered species of bird unique

to the Hawaiian Islands, would be destroyed. EIS,

p. 26.

The Reef Runway would affect water quality in the

surrounding ocean, although whether that effect would

be beneficial or adverse is in dispute. See: EIS, pp.

18, 31-2: D-6 (“Plan to Enhance Water Quality in

Keehi Lagoon”) (beneficial impact): D-16, Appendix

3 (“Study Report—Proposed Reef Runway—Hono-

lulu International Airport”), p. 5: D-18 (“Hydraulic

Model Study. Proposed Reef Runway, Honolulu In-

ternational Airport”), $4, p. 43: Tr. 241-6: 319, 320:

P-28 through P-33, and P-39 (adverse impact).

See Re oe ee Se ons

~l

Similarly, the Runway would have an impact both

upon air quality and population levels within the

state, although agein the nature of those impacts is

disputed. See Tr. 5746; 686; 766-7 (air quality:

negligible or even beneficial impact); Tr. 134-5; 152,

161-3; 188; 199-200 (air quality: adverse impact) ;

Tr. 767-8; 783-4; 804-5; S07 (demographic impact:

negligible) ; Tr. 24, 27, 29-34, 38-40, 46, 56, 57-8, 65-6,

67, 69, 75 (demographic impact: adverse).

The Reef Runway EIS, dated January, 1972, is the

document prepared by Respondents to satisfy the pro-

visions of AADA, and particularly 49 U.S.C.

$1716(¢) (4), as well as those of NEPA: Tr. 758;

789-90; Opinion, App. A, p. 29. It consists of a

total of 46 pages, plus appendages, including a one-

and-three-quarter page discussion of four alternatives

to the proposed Reef Runway: (1) a new on-shore

runway oriented in a 100°-280° direction; (2) a new

on-shore runway parallel to existing runway 08-26;

(3) a 4,000 foot westward extension of existing run-

way 08-26 plus an additional new on-shore 6,500 foot

reliever runway parallel thereto: and (4) foregoing

construction of the Reef Runway altogether. EIS,

pp. 34-5.

The purposes of the Reef Runway, as set forth in

the EIS, are (1) to increase the capacity of HIA;

(2) to reduce the level of aircraft noise over adja-

3The EIS does not discuss or even mention the impact of the

project upon either air quality in terms of invisible air pollution,

or upon population levels and the adverse “secondary” effects that

flow from increased population. See Opinion, App. A. pp. 18-21.

8

cent populated areas by moving present overflights

seaward from those areas: (3) to lessen the danger

of an aircraft crash into populated areas by the same

means: and (4) to increase flexibility at HIA to

allow for runway repairs and shut-downs. EIS, pp.

4-5; Opinion, App. A, p. 12.

The chief issue in this litigation has been whether

Respondents have complied with the requirements of

NEPA and AADA that they discuss in the ETS and

consider in their decision-making reasonable alterna-

tives to the Reef Runway which might accomplish

these objectives with less environmental harm and at

a smaller economic cost.

Petitioners demonstrated at trial that a variety of

such reasonable “non-construction” alternatives exist

that were not discussed or even mentioned in the

EIS. One such alternative, for example, would be

to require the two commercial inter-island carriers,

Hawaiian Airlines and Aloha Airlines, to commence

the takeoff runs of their twin jet DC-9’s and Boeing

737’s, respectively, from the far western end of the

existing primary jet runway, rather than from the

present takeoff point, approximately 4,000 feet to

the east and closer to the populated areas. At least

as to those aireraft, which are as noisy as a Boeing

747, this procedure would immediately eliminate noise

and over-flight problems in the Kalihi-Palama Com-

munity. Tr. pp. 206-19; 230-1; D-20 (Stanford Re-

search Institute, Runwan Development Requirement

at Honolulu International Airport (1969), at pp. 2,

12, 32).

Ty tte te tee oe ee

Other reasonable alternatives not mentioned in the

EIS include removing military and general aviation

from HIA (thereby reducing the number of opera-

tions at HIA by a total of 56%, see Opinion, App.

p. 5, and increasing the capacity of HIA by the

same percentage), improving air traffic control, em-

ploying aircraft with less noisy engines, retrofitting

older aircraft with quieter engines, adjusting and

consolidating airline schedules so as to increase the

passenger load factor on individual flights, and con-

verting the aircraft fleet to wide-body aircraft. See

“The Jamaica Bay-Kennedy Airport, A Multi-Disci-

plinary Environment Study”, in evidence as P-4(a)

and P-4(b); Tr. 407-13, 423-4, 427-31 (testimony of

Prof. Joseph Sax); 815-16 (National Transportation

Report).

The Ninth Circuit ruled that the failure of the

Reef Runway EIS to mention these alternatives

(as well as its failure to include other informa-

tion such as the impact of the project upon popula-

tion levels and air quality) did not render it and the

decision-making process inadequate under NEPA.

The court held that such omissions in an EIS violate

that statute only if Petitioners are able to demon-

strate that the threshold agency decisions to omit were

arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.

Opinion, App. A. pp. 22-4 (non-construction alterna-

tives); pp. 18-9 (demographic impact); pp. 20-1 (air

quality impact).

With respect to AADA, the Ninth Circuit held

that the EIS should be taken into account in deter-

Pew ee

10

mining whether the Secretary of Transportation had

satisfied the AADA requirement that he determine

that no feasible and prudent alternative to the Reef

Runway exist before approving the project. Opinion,

App. A, p. 29. Relying on its NEPA rulings, the

court held that the Secretary had complied with

AADA. Ibid.

A private engineering firm, the Ralph M. Parsons

Company (hereinafter “Parsons”), which, as found

by the Ninth Circuit, “had a financial interest in an

affirmative decision on the proposed project”, Opin-

ion, App. A, p. 13, participated substantially in the

preparation of the EIS.

The full extent of Parsons’ participation, and of

its apparent financial conflict of interest therein, is,

however, unclear in the record because the district

court judge ruled several times at pretrial and dur-

ing the course of the trial as a matter of law that the

preparation of an EIS may be delegated to a private

party with a major financial interest in the pro-

posed project. See eg.. Tr. pages 357-8: 363. Con-

sequently, Petitioners were precluded by the trial

court from developing the relative degrees of par-

ticipation by Parsons, the state ageney, and the fed-

eral agency, although Petitioners’ counsel made ample

offers of proof on this issue. Tr. 363: 365-6; 368:

369-70 : 372; 375-81.

Notwithstanding this, the Ninth Cirenit rejected

Petitioners’ improper delegation claim on the eround

that the FAA had participated significantly in the

preparation of the EIS. Opinion, App. A, pp. 14, 15.

11

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISIONS

OF OTHER CIRCUITS WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPER

STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE THRESHOLD

FEDERAL AGENCY DECISION TO OMIT DISCUSSION OR

EVEN MENTION IN AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-

MENT UNDER NEPA OF CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL CON-

SEQUENCES OF AND ALTERNATIVES TO A PROPOSED

PROJECT.

This case involves more than the technical suffi-

ciency of the EIS for the Reef Runway,’ and indeed

more than the fate of the Reef Runway itself. Rather,

the opinion below constitutes an emasculating inter-

pretation of NEPA, ‘‘the broadest and perhaps most

important” of recent federal environmental legisla-

tion, Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. AEC,

449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C.Cir. 1971).

NEPA was intended by Congress to achieve ambi-

tious but vitally important goals. Section 101(a) of

NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4331(a), declares it to be the “con-

tinuing policy of the Federal Government... to use

all practicable means and measures . . . to create and

to maintain conditions under which man and nature

ean exist in productive harmony... .” NEPA directs,

moreover, that ‘‘to the fullest extent possible ... the

*Petitioners do not seek merely a superficial rewriting of the

EIS. Petitioners contend, rather, that if the various non-construc-

tion alternatives to the project are genuinely considered by the

decision makers, the ultimate decision that the Reef Runway is

necessary at all may well be reversed. Cf. Citizcns to Preserve

Overton Park v. Volpe, —... F.Supp. —.. —... 3 E.L.R. 20425,

20423 (W.D.Tenn. 1973) (Secretary of Transportation, upon being

compelled to consider alternatives to proposed routing of interstate

highway through park following Supreme Court decision in Cii/-

zens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). re-

verses prior decision to approve federal funding for such route.)

Be sere eins oe FB lA A Let CBS

12

policies, regulations, and public laws of the United

States shall be interpreted and administered in ac-

cordance with the policies set forth in this Act.” 42

U.S.C. §4332(1).

The primary device created by Congress to effec-

tuate this policy is the requirement contained in Sec-

tion 102(2)(C) of NEPA that prior to undertaking

‘‘major Federal actions significantly affecting the

quality of the human environment” the ‘‘responsible

[federal] official” must prepare a ‘‘detailed state-

ment” (the so-called **EIS”) including discussion of,

inter alia, *‘the environmental impact of the proposed

action”; ‘‘any adverse environmental effects which

cannot be avoided should the proposal be implement-

ed”; and ‘‘alternatives to the proposed action”. 42

U.S.C. §43832(2)(C).

The importance Congress placed upon the section

102(2)(C) requirements as a means of achieving

NEPA’s goals is emphasized by NEPA’s legislative

history. In hearings concerning NEPA held at a time

when the bills under consideration did not include

these requirements, Senator Jackson, NEPA’s prin-

cipal sponsor, responded as follows to a witness who

suggested the need therefor:

I have been concerned with the adequacy of the

policy declarations in the bill that I introduced.

Obviously, this is not enough... .

. I agree with you that realistically what is

needed in restructuring the governmental side of

this problem is to legislatively create those situa-

tions that will bring about an action-forcing pro-

eedure with which departments must comply.

— ——

Rac POM Ara OSES SOT ae ee IO SE

13

Otherwise, these lofty declarations are nothing

more than that. It is merely a finding and state-

ment but there is no requirement as to implemen-

tation. Heartnys on S.1075, 8.237, and S.1752

before the Senate Committee on Interior and

Insular Affairs, 91st Congress, Ist Session 116

(1969).

NEPA was thereupon amended by the Committee

to establish the Section 102(2)(C) EIS procedures,

which were again characterized as ‘‘action-forcing”

both in the Committee Report, S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st

Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1969), and by Senator Jackson on

the floor of the Senate during debate on the passage of

the bill. 115 Cong. Rec. 40416 (1969).

Once prepared by the responsible federal agency,

the EIS is to be circulated to ‘‘appropriate federal,

state and local agencies” for their review and com-

ment. The EIS, together with any such comments, is

then to ‘‘be made available to the President, the

Council on Environmental Quality and to the public”

prior to any final determination on the project. 42

U.S.C. §4332(2)(C).

From this statutory scheme, it is manifest that

NEPA is to ‘‘serve as an environmental full disclo-

sure law, providing information which Congress

thought the public should have concerning the par-

ticular environmental costs involved in a_ project,”

Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1285 (1st Cir. 1973)

5For a detailed summary of the legislative history of NEPA,

see Anderson, NEPA in the Courts: A Legal Analysis of the Na-

tional Environmental Policy Act (Environmental Law Institute,

1973), Chapter 1 (“NEPA and Congress”), pp. 1-14.

Ce

14

(emphasis supplied), whose purpose is to compel con-

sideration of environmental factors in the decision-

making process, not only by the particular agency

involved, but also by the ultimate decision makers:

The President, the Congress, and the public. See:

Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committce vu. AEC, 449

F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Natural Resources

Defense Counsel v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 835 (D.C.

Cir, 1971); Seve Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d

463, 466 (Sth Cir. 1973).

This function was spelled out in a report prepared

for the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular

Affairs:

To make policy effective through action, a com-

prehensive system is required for the assembly

and reporting of relevant knowledge; and for

placing before the President, the Congress, and

the people, for public decision, the alternative

courses of action that this knowledge suggests.

L. Caldwell, A Special Report to the Senate

Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, A Na-

tional Policy for the Environment 11, 90th Cong.,

2nd Sess. (Comm. print July 11, 1968). Also at

115 Cong. Ree. S. 12129 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1969).

Because of this fundamental purpose of NEPA and

the EIS, the courts should review with especially

close scrutiny threshold agency decisions not to pre-

pare an EIS at all or to omit discussion in an EIS

of certain environmental impacts of, or alternates

to, a proposed project.

The Ninth Circuit, however, has now held that it

will apply the Administrative Procedure Act’s very

Ran a Pe URE ee NE er a

limited ‘‘arbitrary and capricious” standard of re-

view, 5 U.S.C. §706(2) (A), to these threshold agency

decisions. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit places the

burden upon Petitioners to demonstrate that such

decisions were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of

discretion. Opinion, App. A, pp. 17-24. For example,

the court held that Petitioners had failed to prove

that the various non-construction alternatives not

mentioned in the EIS, even though ‘‘utilized at other

airports in the continental United States, are neces-

sarily adaptable to the unique situation existing at

HLA.” Opinion, App. A, p. 24, fn. 13.

By adopting this very limited standard of review

the Ninth Cireuit has put itself at odds with at least

four other Courts of Appeals that have passed on the

standard of review under NEPA of these threshold

agency decisions. There are now three different stand-

ards of review in the various circuits: (1) That of

the Ninth Circuit in this ease; (2) That of the See-

ond Circuit in Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823,

829, 836 (2d Cir. 1972), vert. denied, 0. U.S... 93

S.Ct. 2290 (1973), and of the Seventh Circuit in First

National Bank v. Richardson, —... F.2d ....., 5 E.R.C.

1830, 3 E.L.R. 20771, 20776 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 1973)

(arbitrary and capricious standard is appropriate, but

the agency has the affirmative duty to develop a review-

able environmental record and to demonstrate that

its decision was not arbitrary and capricious); and

(3) that of the Fifth Cireuit in Save Our Ten Acres

uv. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 465-7, (5th Cir. 1973), and

the Tenth Cireuit in Wyoming Couneil v. Butz, ......

F.24 ....... > E.R.C, 184, 1846, 3 E.L.R. 20830, 20831

ED ones

ros ei ®

16

(10th Cir. Sept. 21, 1973) (arbitrary and capricious

standard rejected; appropriate standard is whether

the agency’s decision was reasonable, with the burden

of demonstrating reasonableness upon the ageney).°

This split among the circuits creates an intolerable

situation. Federal agencies with responsibilities affect-

ing the environment now must devise NEPA proced-

ures and evaluate the adequacy of impact statements

in terms of three different judicial standards. The

matter is complicated by the fact that many agency

actions affect the environment in more than one judi-

cial circuit. With impact statements currently being

prepared by federal agencies at a rate of more than

1,000 per year, see Environmental Quality, the Fourth

Annual Report of the Council on Environmental

Quality (1973), at 242, establishment of a uniform

standard for judicial review is an urgent necessity.

Perhaps the standard set forth in the APA, 5 U.S.C.

§706(2) CA), is the correct standard for review of the

ultimate substantive agency decision to proceed or not

to proceed with the project. See, eg. Environmental

Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289,

297-300 (Sth Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072

(1973); Sterra Club v. Froehlke, ......... | Fae = aie ,

5 E.R.C. 1920, 1925 (7th Cir. Oct. 2, 1973). But the

SThese cases involve agenev decisions whether to prepare an

impact statement at all rather than what to inelude in an impact

statement, Clearly, however, both decisions have the same relation

to the statutory goals and must be judged by the same standard,

Otherwise, an ageney could too easily defeat the purposes of NEPA

by preparing an EIS that was little more than a hollow shell, omit-

ting crucial information on the impacts of and alternatives to the

proposed project.

17

Ninth Circuit has confused the issue of review of the

ultimate substantive decision of the agency with the

question of procedural compliance by the agency with

NEPA, and more particularly of the adequacy of the

EIS in terms of what information should be included

therein. Clearly two different standards of review

should apply to these distinct issues. See Save Our Ten

Acres v. Kreger, supra, at 472 F.2d 467; Sierra Club v.

Froehlke, supra, at ........ F.24¢ ......., 5 E.R.C. 1924.

The narrow arbitrary and capricious standard of re-

view under the Administrative Procedure Act is an

inappropriate standard of review of procedural com-

plianee since “NEPA’s specific requirements in [$4332

(2)(C)] clearly speak in mandatory terms, and do

not leave the determination to administrative discre-

tion. [citations omitted]”. Wyoming Council v. Butz.

vewneee BYE cesses! comny O ELR.C, 18+, 1846, 3 E.L.R. 20830,

20831 (10th Cir, Sept. 21, 1973). While “some area

of judgment is [of course] involved . . . the compass

of the judgment to be made is narrow .. .”, and the

test on review should be that ‘the determination must

be reasonable in the light of the mandatory require-

ments and high standards set by the statute. [Cita-

tions omitted.]” 7d. at... Fd... 5 ELL.R. 1847, 3

E.L.R. 20831. Accord: Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger,

472 F.2d 463, 465-7 (5th Cir. 1973).

Moreover, the spirit of the Act demands that the

burden of proving compliance therewith fall upon the

ageney, and not upon citizen plaintiffs, since

the very nature of this legal area is so extensive

that if the burden were placed wholly upon citi-

—_= -—

18

zen plaintiffs, the full disclosure requirements

of NEPA would never be implemented satisfac-

torily, and environmental protection as contem-

plated by Congress would be little more than a

fiction.

Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F.Supp. 1289, 1335 (S.D.

Tex. 1973). See also Calvert Cliffs’, supra, at H9 F.2d

1118-9.

The practical effect of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling,

if left unchallenged is, to render NEPA superfluous

and an act of futility by the Congress, because even

before NEPA an agency's decision to adopt one alter-

native rather than another was subject to review under

the APA standard.

Specifically, the decision below nullifies the two basic

purposes of NEPA. First, it permits an agency too

easily to exclude from its impact statement and its

decision-making process alternatives not compatible

with its own narrow conception of its mission, a con-

ception which may be inconsistent with environmental

protection. A major purpose of NEPA was to compel

agencies to take a broader view.’

*That this result actually will eceur is apparent from this case,

where the Ninth Cireuit appreved an impact statement for a

STO.000,000,00 airpert construction project which devotes only

one-and-three-fourths pages to alternatives and which mentions

no alternatives involving safer and more efficient airport manage-

ment as opposed to additional construction. By employing its

unique standard, the Ninth Circuit was able to justify omission

of the alternative of removing Air Force jets by simply noting

that “the Air Foree had refused to move ... .”. Opinion, App.

A. pp. 22-3. But ene purpese of the EIS should have been to

examine the costs and benefits of the Air Foree decision. The

oe 2 TAN igre 2 ar

19

Second, it allows the agency too easily to frustrate

the goal of NEPA to bring the public into the decision-

making process with regard to environmental matters,

and to open the opportunity for the public, with full

data available to it in the form of an adequate EIS,

to effect changes in substantive decisions made by pub-

lic agencies, even though those decisions might not be

so wrong us to be characterizable as arbitrary, capri-

cious, or an abuse of discretion.®

Ninth Cireuit justified non-diseussion of the alternative of higher

landing fees on the bootstrap ground that this alternative was

considered but rejected by Respondents. Jd. at 23. The court held

that Respondents need not mention the alternatives of moving pri-

vate aircraft and requiring inter-island jets to take off at different

points because each of these measures was only a partial solution.

Ibid. And, finally, the Ninth Cireuit ratified Respondents’ failure

to mention the alternatives of consolidating airline schedules and

converting to wide-hody aircraft by stating that nothing in the

record indicated these to be reasonable alternatives, Jd. at 24, and

at the same time brushing off the positive experience with these

techniques at other airports as being irrelevant. Jd. at 24, n. 13.

If NEPA’s requirement that an agency “diseuss in detail” the

alternatives to a proposed action means no more than this, it

might as well not exist.

‘In the Reef Runway situation, for example, had the public

been appraised in the EIS of the full adverse effects upon the

State of increased population and air pollution, or of certain

alternatives to the project which did not happen to appeal to the

ageney, or were not within the agency's jurisdiction (such as

compelling the military to remove its operations from HITA), the

publie might very well, through persuasion or intervention via

Congress, have overruled the ageney decision to proceed, ¢iren

though that decision was not necessarily invalid under the APA

test.

20

Il. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISIONS

OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT IN NRDC v.

MORTON, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C.CIR. 1972) AND WITH THIS

COURT IN CITIZENS TO PRESERVE OVERTON PARK v.

VOLPE, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), WITH RESPECT TO THE NEED

TO DISCUSS AND CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES TO A PRO-

POSED AIRPORT EXPANSION PROJECT UNDER NEPA AND

AADA, RESPECTIVELY.

A. NEPA.

As previously noted, NEPA requires that the EIS

for a major federal action include discussion of the

**. . . alternatives to the proposed action”. 42 U.S.C.

§4332(2)(C) (iii). Further, $4332(2)(D) mandates

the federal agency to **study, develop, and describe

appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of

action in any proposal which involves unresolved

conflicts concerning alternative uses of available re-

= 99

sources.

The Ninth Cireuit held that Petitioners had not

proved that Respondents’ failure to mention in the

EIS a whole range of non-construction alternatives

to the Reef Runway was not arbitrary and capricious

or an abuse of discretion. The propriety of this stan-

dard of review is discussed in Section I, supra. Among

the reasons given fer this general conclusion are (1)

that removing military and general aviation operations

from HIA altogether, and compelling the inter-island

carriers to commence their take-offs from the far

western end of the existing runway, would not, by and

of themselves individually, totally solve the noise and

safety problems at HIA, Opinion, App. A, pp. 22-3,

and (2) that certain alternatives, such as, specifically,

removing the Air Force KC-155 tanker operations

CNS ee re ee

21

from HIA to a nearby military airport, were not

within the immediate jurisdiction of the state agency:

“There is, however, evidence indicating that the Air

Force had refused to move its jet tankers to another

base, effectively eliminating implementation of this

alternative” (emphasis supplied), Jbid.

The Ninth Cireuit’s ruling on alternatives under

NEPA places it squarely in conflict with the other

leading NEPA case on the necessity to discuss alter-

Natives in an EIS, Natural Resources Defense Council

v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833-6 (D.C.Cir. 1972). Mor-

ton held both that an agency may not “disregard

alternatives merely because they do not offer a com-

plete solution to the problem”, 7d. at 458 F.2d 836,

and that an agency may not omit discussion of an

alternative in an EIS merely because implementation

of that alternative is not within the jurisdiction of the

particular agency. Id. at 458 F.2d 834.

The policy reasons for this rule are the same as

those already noted in Section I, supra, to wit, that

the EIS is designed not only to force the particular

agency involved to consider environmental factors in

its decision-making process, but, at least equally im-

portant, is also ‘‘for the guidance of these ultimate

decision-makers [Congress, the President, and the

public]” Id. at 458 F.2d 835.

B. AADA.

The Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970,

49 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq., which authorizes the expen-

diture of substantial federal funds “in order to bring

about, in conformity with the national airport system

22

plan, the establishment of a nationwide system of

public airports adequate to meet the present and fu-

ture needs of civil aeronautics”, 49 U.S.C. $1714(a),

also expresses the Congressional intent that such air-

ports be compatible with the surrounding natural en-

vironment and not contribute to its degradation. See

generally 49 U.S.C. §1716(¢) (4), -(d), and -(e).

To this end, Section 16(¢)(4) of AADA, 49 U.S.C.

§1716(c) (4), imposes even more stringent require-

ments than does NEPA upon the federal agency to

consider alternatives before approving major airport

expansion projects:

... The Secretary [of Transportation] ... shall

authorize no such project found to have adverse

[environmental] effect unless the Secretary shall

render a finding, in writing, following a full and

complete review, which shall be a matter of pub-

lic record, that no feasible and prudent alterna-

tive exists and that all possible steps have been

taken to minimize such adverse effect. (Emphasis

supplied.)

The ‘‘no feasible and prudent alternative” language

of AADA is identical to that of Section 4(f) of the

earlier enacted Department of Transportation Act

of 1966 concerning approval of highways through

parks, 49 U.S.C. $1653(f), [23 U.S.C. $138]. Indeed,

the House Report on AADA states: **The responsi-

bility thus vested in the Secretary of Transportation

is comparable to that contained in Section 4(f) of

. . . the Department of Transportation Act.” House

Report 90-601, U.S. Code Cong. Adm. News, pp.

3057-8.

st Ke — A a a ETRE

23

This Court interpreted é4(f) in Citizens to Preserve

Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). In

Overton Park, Mr. Justice Marshall, speaking for a

unanimous Court (Mr. Justice Douglas took no part

in the consideration or decision of the case; Mr. Jus-

tices Brennan and Blackmun filed short concurring

opinions), stated that

This language is a plain and explicit bar to the

use of federal funds for construction of highways

through parks—only the most unusual situations

are exempted.

... For this exemption to apply the Secretary

must find that as a matter of sound engineering

it would not be feasible to build the highway

along any other route. Id. at 401 U.S. 411. (Em-

phasis supplied).

Further, this Court stated that

. .. The very existence of the statutes indicates

that protection of parkland was to be given para-

mount importance. The few green havens that

are public parks were not to be lost unless there

were truly unusual factors present in a particular

ease or the cost or community disruption result-

ing from alternate routes reached extraordinary

magnitudes. If the statutes are to have any mean-

ing, the Secretary cannot approve the destruction

of parkland unless he finds that alternate routes

present unique problems. Id, at 401 U.S. 412-13.

(Emphasis supplied.)

The Court reversed, indicating that it was not clear

from the record whether the Secretary had made the

requisite findings, and if so, the reasons ‘‘why he

24

believed there were no alternative routes .. .” Id. at

401 U.S. 408.

Although not concerned necessarily with parklands

in section 16(¢)(4) of AADA, Congress must have

been equally concerned with the increased noise and

air pollution, demographic impact, and safety prob-

lems that new airports and airport expansions inevi-

tably bring.’ Thus, the Secretary “cannot approve”

these inevitable adverse environmental impacts unless

he finds “as a matter of sound engineering” that alter-

natives to the proposed airport expansion “would not

be feasible”, or that they present costs or “community

disruption” of “extraordinary magnitude”, or other-

wise present *‘unique problems”.

“Respondents will argue at this point that the Reef Runway is

unique in that its effect would be to improve air quality, noise

levels. and safety in the populated areas adjacent to HIA by mov-

ing aircraft operations 6,700 feet seaward, away from those areas.

This argument is necessarily based upon the premise that use of

the existing runway will be discontinued upon completion of the

Reef Runway. This premise, however, is erroneous. The State Re-

spondents have conceded, for example, that the existing runway

will continue to be used by jet aireraft even after the Reef

Runway is completed. P-107; Tr. 640. Moreover, the United States

Air Force, whose KC-135 tankers are conceded by all parties to be

the worst noise and safety offenders at HLA, has consistently re-

fused to commit itself to utilizing the new Reef Runway. Indeed,

if the Respondents are unwilling to compel inter-island jets to taxi

an additional 4,000 feet to the western end of the existing runway

before taking off because of the extra cost this entails, Tr. 215, it

is difficult to see why either the Air Force or the commercial over-

seas carriers would or should take it upon themselves to incur the

extra cost and fuel consumption in taxiing nearly 7,000 additional

feet out to the Reef Runway. And, in any event, if, as the State

and Federal Respondents maintain, the number of operations at

HIA will have doubled by the year 1985 (from 250,000 operations

in 1971 to an estimated 493,000 operations in 1985), Opinion, App.

A. p. 5, it follows that by 1985, both the Reef Runway and the

existing runway will be employed to full capacity.

ASS DEGAS er OOS SEO BS

<8 —— a ee eee

25

The Federal Respondents herein considered the EIS

prepared under NEPA as constituting the “public

record” of the mandated “full and complete review”

of alternatives by the Secretary required by AADA,

Tr. 758, 789-90, 829, and added thereto only a one

paragraph conclusionary letter dated January 21,

1972 from the FAA Regional Director, that “After

careful and thorough consideration of the facts con-

tained herein [i.e., in the EIS], ... it is the finding of

the undersigned . . . that there is no feasible and pru-

dent alternative to the requested action which has not

been considered... .” D-27 in evidence below (empha-

sis supplied).

The Secretary thus not only misread the require-

ment of §16(c)(4), he made none of the findings

required by Overton Park. Moreover, the EIS, as the

“public record”, contains no mention whatsoever, let

alone discussion, of the several alternatives that the

record indicates do exist, have in fact been employed

successfully at other airports, and indeed have been

endorsed by the very same Secretary on another oc-

easion as having significance ‘‘to the nation as a

whole”. Indeed, the “public record” of the review

proceeding reveals no point at which these alterna-

10“The Jamaica Bay-Kennedy Airport, a Multi-Disciplinary

Environmental Study”, in evidence as P-4(a) and P-4(b). This

study, which diseussing in detail the use of non-construction

alternatives only at Kennedy Airport, was endorsed by then

Seeretary of Transportation John A. Volpe in a letter attached to

it dated March 13, 1970 as having signifieance “not only to the

immediate New York situation, but to the nation as a whole . 7

P-4(a), page xiii; Tr. 405.

rer ct BESET RNS Re ER OE

26

tives were considered and rejected after enactment

of Section 16(¢)(4)."

The Ninth Circuit’s cramped interpretation of $16

(e)(4) conflicts in principle with the broad and ex-

pansive interpretation emphatically and unanimously

given the identical Department of Transportation

Act language by this Court in Overton Park. The

court simply incorporated its previous rulings with

respect to alternatives under NEPA, and concluded

that the Secretary of Transportation ‘‘could have

reasonably believed that in this case there are no

feasible alternatives or that alternatives do involve

unique problems”, Opinion, App. A, p. 30, quoting

from Overton Park, supra, at 401 U.S. 416 (emphasis

in Opinion, but not in Overton Park), and that the

Secretary’s action was not arbitrary or capricious.

If the decision below is permitted to stand, the

goals of §16(c)(4) will be defeated. The Court of

Appeals, by stressing the ‘‘could have reasonably be-

lieved” branch of the Overton Park standard and

ignoring the equally important requirement that the

reasonable belief be based on consideration of “all

relevant factors”, in effect turned the FAA’s omis-

sions in this case into a ground for upholding the

agency’s action. This standard of review could wreck

the statutory scheme by allowing agencies to approve

environmentally harmful actions to which feasible

11Any rejection of an alternative which oceurred prior to enact-

ment of §16(¢) (4) in May 1970 could not qualify as a valid ground

for the required finding, since it may have been based on an en-

tirely different standard.

re agen.

27

and prudent alternatives exist simply by ignoring

those alternatives throughout the review process.’*

A rule that would accord with the statutory purpose

of Section 16(¢)(4) and with Overton Park is that

when no evidence appears in the public record that

a rejected alternative is not feasible and prudent,

and plaintiffs present prima facie evidence that it

is, the burden then shifts to the defendant official

to explain further the reasons for his decision. Only

thus can the court be assured that all relevant factors

were considered and that the decision was not arbi-

trary or capricious.

tI. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISION

OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT IN GREENE COUNTY PLANNING

BOARD v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409

U.S. 849 (1972) AS TO WHETHER THE PREPARATION OF

AN EIS MAY BE DELEGATED TO A PRIVATE COMPANY

WITH A DIRECT FINANCIAL INTEREST IN AN AFFIRMA-

TIVE DECISION ON THE PROPOSED PROJECT WHICH IS

THE SUBJECT OF THE EIS.

NEPA requires that the ‘‘detailed statement” be

prepared by the ‘‘responsible official” of the Federal

agency involved. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C).

12The magnitude of planned airport development in the United

States anderlines the significance of this issue: 349 impact state-

ments on file with the President’s Council on Environmental

Quality (CEQ) through September 30, 1973 involved airport

projects, see 102 Monitor, Environmental Impact Statements, Vol.

3, No. 9, page 178 (Oct. 1973) (Published by the CEQ); in purely

monetary terms, projected major airport development costs for

the next ten vears in the states included within the Ninth Cireuit

(ineluding Guam) amounts to $997,756,000.00; the nation-wide

figure is $4,342,238,000.00. See Federal Aviation Administration,

1972 National Airport Systems Plan (NASP), pp. 30-1.

28

In this case, however, a private consultant, the

Ralph M. Parsons Co., which, as the Ninth Circuit

found, Opinion, App. A, p. 13 did and does have a

‘‘financial interest in the affirmative decision on the

proposed project”, (to wit, 15.5% of the total project

cost, or nearly $11,000,000), actively participated in

the preparation of the EIS. /bid. The court found

nothing wrong in this, holding that a “firm with a

financial interest in the project may ... assist with the

drafting of the EIS”. Jbid.

On the other hand, the court stated, at p. 15,

that the participation by the FAA in the preparation

of the EIS “precludes us from concluding that

there was any improper or illegal delegation in this

ease”. This statement is somewhat bewildering, since,

as indicated above, Petitioners were precluded by

the trial court from developing the relative extent

of participation in the preparation of the Reef Run-

way EIS by the FAA, the State of Hawaii, and

Parsons.

In any event, the Ninth Circuit is now in conflict

with the law of the Second Circuit as set forth in

Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power

Commission, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert.

denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972). Greene County held

that NEPA prohibits the Federal Power Commission

from delegating the task of preparing an EIS to

the applicant for a license to construct the very

project which is the subject of the EIS, on the

grounds that such a procedure creates “the potential,

if not the likelihood, that the applicant’s statement

29

will be based upon self-serving assumptions”, Jd.

at 420. Greene County has been expansively inter-

preted within the Second Circuit. See Conservation

Society v. Secretary of Transportation, 362 F.Supp.

627, 629-32 (D.Vt. 1973) (presently on appeal) (held,

a violation of NEPA for Federal Highways Adminis-

tration to delegate to the Vermont Department of

Highways the task of drafting the EIS for a highway,

even though the federal agency consulted with the

drafters at all stages, commented upon the draft as it

progressed, and adopted the final product as its own).

The extent of federal participation required by

NEPA in the preparation of an impact statement is

an issue of fundamental importance because it ef-

fects most agency procedures for the preparation of

such statements. The conflict in the circuits there-

fore results in an intolerable situation: agencies

must tailor their NEPA procedures for similar

projects in different parts of the country so as to

satisfy conflicting demands.

Moreover, apart from the express statutory require-

ment, strong policy reasons dictate that an EIS be

prepared by the ‘‘responsible official”. An EIS must

be as neutral and objective as possible, since its

basic purpose is not to justify a decision already

made on a proposed project, or even to influence a

positive decision thereon, but rather is to provide

both the agency and the ultimate-decision makers

With an objective survey of the environmental conse-

quences of and the alternatives to the proposed action,

with which information an environmentally informed

pre mre etre oe 1 od dee ORNL ST LT RAAT “ . bak meat SR

30

decision may be made, uninfluenced by strictly mone-

tary interests.'* Thus the very integrity of the impact

statement procedure, and therefore of NEPA itself,

is at stake. See generally, Comment, Delegation of the

Drafting of Environmental Impact Statements, 2

E.L.R. 10153 (1973).

If federal agencies are permitted to entrust prepa-

ration of impact statements to self-interested private

contractors, the objective look at environmental im-

pacts and alternatives which Congress considered so

important is not likely to occur. In this case, for

example, the consultant to whom the preparation was

entrusted had a substantial interest in additional run-

way construction, and many alternatives not involving

construction were therefore quite naturally not even

mentioned in the EIS.

'8While it may be permissible for the federal agency to dele-

wite the preparation of the EIS to the state agency involved, see,

o.g., Lowa Citizens v. Volpe, ....... F.Supp., 1: el , + E.R.C. 1755,

1759, 3 E.L.R. 20013, 20015-6 (S.D. Iowa 1972), for the state

egeney in turn to delegate such task to a private party with an

enormous monetary stake in the project surely goes beyond the

intent of Congress. For the financial conflict of interest involved

herein is to be distinguished from what might be termed a “mission

interest” or an “institutional bias” had by federal or state officials

who are proposing a project, see Sierra Club v. Frochlke, ...... F.2d

, .w» DS E.R.C. 1920, 1922, 3 E.L.R. 20823, 20825 (7th Cir.

Oct. 2, 1973): Parsons stood to lose several million dollars if a

decision were made not to proceed with the Reef Runway, whereas

the Federal and State protagonists retain their positions and con-

tinue to reeeive their salaries regardless.

ee ae)

penne

31

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue

to review the judgment and opinion of the Ninth

Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

MIcHAEL R, SHERWOOD,

Counsel for Petitioners.

Hart, SHERWOOD, LEAVITT,

BLANCHFIELD and HAt1,

Of Counsel.

January 8, 1974.

(Appendices Follow)

ARETE) REY ONE SIUC RD SARE AP RET O'S hy Ne eee

ieee A ate oe Se TE em

Appendix A

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

No. 73-1784

‘N

Life of the Land; Hawaii Audubon Society;

Friends of the Earth; Sierra Club; Ray-

mond Catania; J. Abraham Pasadaba;

Wilfred H. Paul, Jr.; and Pete Kaululaau

G. Thompson,

Appellants,

vs.

Claude S. Brinegar, Individually and in his

capacity as Secretary of the United States

Department of Transportation; John Shaf-

fer, Individually and in his capacity as

Administrator, FAA National Office: Jack

Webb, Individually and in his capacity as

Administrator, FAA, Pacifie Region; Fu- >

jio Matsuda, Individually and in his eapac-

ity as Director, Hawaii Department of

Transportation,

OPP REAER ES IP

Appellees,

and

Kalihi-Palama Community Council, James

Y. Muraoka, Takeshi Uvyesugi, General

Contractors Association of Hawaii, a non

profit Hawaii Corporation, and Dillingham j

Corporation, a Hawaii corporation, dba

Hawaiian Dredging and Construction

Company,

ipl llatiadadhticl he.

Intervenors-Appellees.

[September 10, 1973]

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2

OPINION

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Before: HAMLIN and TRASK, Circuit Judges,

and BELLONI, District Judge*

INTRODUCTION

This environmental law case is an appeal from the

Final Decision and Order of the United States Dis-

trict Court for the District of Hawaii, holding that

appellees have complied with the provisions of the

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),

42 U.S.C. § § 4321 et seq., and the Airport and Air-

ways Development Act of 1970 (AADA), 49 U.S.C.

§ $1701, et seq., and denying appellants’ prayer for a

permanent injunction sought against the Secretary

of Transportation and other officials in connection

with the construction of the reef runway extension

(Reef Runway project) at the Honolulu, Hawaii, In-

ternational Airport (HIA).

We affirm, concluding that appellees have satisfied

the provisions of both NEPA and AADA.

THE PARTIES

Appellants, plaintiffs below, are four environmental

organizations' purportedly “concerned with the pres-

*The Honorable Robert C. Belloni, United States District Judge,

Portland, Oregon, sitting by designation.

1The environmental groups, all non-profit organizations, are Life

of the Land, Hawaii Audubon Society, Friends of the Earth, and

Sierra Club. The National Audubon Society has submitted an

amicus brief.

anaes Do nes eC

3

ervation of our natural environment,” and four named

individual residents of areas affected by flight patterns

of aircraft arriving and departing from HIA. Ap-

pellants all claim to suffer adverse and irreparable

injuries as a result of specific and allegedly illegal

acts committed by appellees.’

Appellees, defendants below, are the Secretary of

Transportation,® as the federal official ultimately re-

sponsible for federal involvement in the Reef Runway

project; two named individual administrators of the

Federal Aviation Agency said to have been contribu-

tors to the Secretary’s alleged malfeasance or non-

feasance; and the director of the Hawaii Department

of Transportation, as the state official ultimately re-

sponsible for prosecution of the project.

Permitted to intervene as defendants below were

the Dillingham Corporation, the contractor which has

been awarded the construction contract on the pro-

posed project; two named individuals who reside in

areas affected by overflights to HIA, and the Kalihi-

Palama Community Council, Honolulu, representing

other residents of those areas.

2Appellees below did not question, nor did the district court

consider, the propriety of appellants’ standing to maintain this

action. We are satisfied, however, that appellants are properly

before this court. See United States v. SCRAP, |... US... (June

18, 1973) (slip opinion at 13-19). Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405

U.S. 727 (1972): San Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 472 F.2d

1021, 1023-24 (9 Cir. 1973).

3At the time of this suit’s initiation in the district court, John A.

Volpe was the Secretary of Transportation. He has subsequently

been replaced by Claude S. Brinegar.

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THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS

On November 8, 1972, one day before the scheduled

opening of bids for construction of the Reef Runway

project, this action for injunctive relief was filed by

appellants in the United States District Court for the

District of Hawaii. Upon said filing, the district court

issued a Temporary Restraining Order.

A hearing on appellants’ motion for a preliminary

injunction was held from December 13, 1972, to De-

cember 22, 1972. On the latter date. the district court

denied the prayer for a preliminary injunction and

dissolved the Temporary Restraining Order previ-

ously entered.

On March 29, 1973, trial was held on the merits, at

at which time the evidence of the previous hearing

was incorporated as if adduced at that time. Addi-

tional testimony was also presented.

On April 13, 1975, the district court filed its Final

Order and Decision, denving appellants’ prayer for a

permanent injunction. The district court also denied

appellants’ motion for an injunction pending appeal.‘

After filing a timely notice of appeal, appellants on

April 27, 1973, sought an injunction pending appeal

to this court. On June 11, 1973, after oral argument,

we granted that motion. On August 7, 1973, we heard

oral argument on the merits, and the case was sub-

mitted for decision.

4In its Final Order and Decision, the district court incorporated

by reference the reasoning set forth in its Deeember 22, 1972,

Decision and Order. The latter is reported at _.. F.Supp. ......

(D. Haw. 1972).

-

3)

BACKGROUND OF THE PROPOSED PROJECT

There was evidence before the district court sup-

porting the following statement of facts.

Hawaii is approximately 2,400 miles from the con-

tinental United States. Over 99 per cent of all pas-

Sengers travel to and from Hawaii by aircraft, and

the Honolulu International Airport has consequently

assumed the status of that state’s principal gateway.

Further, due to its unique location, HITA is the third

largest point of entry for international arrivals in the

United States. During labor disputes involving marine

transport, HIA takes on special importance, as air-

craft become the sole means of shipping and receiving

cargo.

HIA serves not only the personal and commercial

interests of Hawaii and the nation, but is also vital

to the military. With the closing of adjacent Hickam

Air Field, the United States Air Force engages in

substantial operations at HTA. Of the over 250,000

operations (a landing or take-off) at the airport in

fiscal 1971, military operations accounted for 52.221,

with 113,701 commercial operations, and 89,992 for

general aviation.°

HIA is presently operating at capacity levels dur-

ing peak hours. Forecasts indicate that the number

of aircraft operations will increase to 382,000 by 1975,

at which time HIA is expected to reach and surpass

both hourly and annual capacity levels, and to 493,000

by 1985.

5HIA is 32nd in small craft operations.

6

Accompanying projected increases in aircraft opera-

tions at HLA has been an increasingly disturbing prob-

iem of aircraft noise pollution. This noise problem,

which first appeared in substantial form with the

introduction of jet aircraft around 1960, is accentu-

ated because of the airport’s location in close prox-

imity to densely populated residential areas, and to

downtown business sections. Further, the prevailing

trade winds, which affect aircraft landings and take-

offs, complicate the problem.

Increasing operations by jet aircraft have also en-

hanced the danger of a disaster in the event of a

landing or take-off aceident. There is evidence that

jet aircraft mishaps most often occur within forty

seconds after take-off, or about 1.6 miles from the

end of the runway. In the case of HIA’s present

configuration, this would place the aircraft in the

midst of the Kalihi-Palama residential neighborhood.

In 1961 or 1962, public concern encouraged investi-

gations of potential solutions, including that of simply

moving the jet aircraft seaward, away from human

habitation.

In 1962, subsequent to the State Legislature’s pas-

sage of a resolution reflecting official concern for

I{IA’s noise problem, the state authorized preparation

of a report on means to alleviate the problems con-

comitant with the introduction of jet aircraft at HIA.

This early study resulted in the recommendation of

the construction of a “Seaward Jet Runway.” a pro-

posal which was, however, never implemented because

its unfavorable alignment with prevailing winds made

it too hazardous to use,

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7

In 1967, consultants were authorized by state offi-

cials to prepare a plan for future development of HLA.

These consultants recommended the construction of

a runway to be located 1.500 feet south and parallel

to the existing runway. This plan was in turn sub-

mitted to a citizens’ Task Force committee, appointed

by the Governor of Hawaii. Committee members in-

cluded responsible local, state and federal officials, and

members of the general public. Beginning in Febru-

ary, 1967, and continuing through April, 1970, the

Task Force committee met monthly on some 46 or

47 occasions to consider various aspects of the run-

Way construction proposals. These meetings were for

the most part open to the public, and publicized in

the news media. Included in these discussions were

considerations of possible alternatives to, and enviren-

mental effects of, the proposed new runway.

The Task Force committee’s work culminated in a

June, 1968, recommendation that there be constructed

what is essentially the project here at issue—a new

12,000 foot long runway on filled reefland. located

6,700 feet south of the existing runway. Such a run-

way would largely eliminate the spectre of a disastrous

aircraft accident in a populated residential area, and

would also reduce noise pollution by moving it more

than a mile away.

In September, 1968, airline representatives to the

Task Foree committee commissioned their own study,

which concluded that the proposed runway was un-

necessary. and that the noise problem could he effec-

tively alleviated with an extension of the existing

runway, and the construction of a shorter runway for

Bee 6 he hen

~8

inter-island traffic. After review and discussion, the

Task Force committee in January, 1970, concluded

that the airline proposal provided insufficient benefits

to justify a change from the plan of the Reef Runway

concept. The final recommendation of the Task Force

committee in favor of the Reef Runway was approved

by the Governor of Hawaii in February, 1970.

In order to fund the project, the state applied to

the Federal Aviation Agency for a matching 50-50

grant pursuant to the Airport and Airways Develop-

ment Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. In compli-

ance with that statute, a hearing was held on the

proposed Reef Runway in Honolulu on March 22,

1971. Life of the Land and the Hawaii Audubon

Society, two of the appellants herein, appeared at

the hearing, urging consideration of measures to pro-

tect a rare water bird endangered by the proposed

project.

The Federal Aviation Agency and the State of Ha-

waii are presently committed to the construction of

the Reef Runway. It is to be located in Keehi Lagoon,

Manala Bay, south of the existing runway system.

The project, whose estimated cost is upwards of $60

million, is scheduled to be completed in two increments

by 1975.

There is nothing in the record indicating that the

planners of the project believed, or had reason to

believe, that the project would have an irreparably

deleterious effect upon the environment. On the econ-

trary, the possibility of various environmental side

benefits, such as reduction of air and water pollution,

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9

enhancement of recreational boating facilities and im-

provement in area fishing, see infra, were all hope-

fully anticipated.

THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY ACT

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,

42 U.S.C. § § 4821 et seq., became effective on Janu-

ary 1, 1970. The Reef Runway project is conceded by

appellees to be a “major federal action, significantly

affecting the quality of the human environment,” and

is therefore subject to compliance with that statute.

NEPA, termed by one court “the broadest and

perhaps most important” of recent federal environ-

mental legislation, Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Com-

mittee, Inc. v. United States AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,

1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971), “essentially states that every

federal agency shall consider ecological factors when

dealing with activities which may have an impact on

man’s environment.” Zabel v. Tabb, 480 F.2d 199, 211

(5 Cir. 1970). See generally, Calvert Cliffs’, supra,

449 F.2d at 1111 et seq.

To insure that environmental ramifications of pro-

posed projects are properly considered by those re-

sponsible for their implementation, section 102(2)

(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 43832(2) (C)® requires

that an environmental impact statement (EIS) he

prepared to “assess adverse environmental effects and

®Section 102(2) (C) of NEPA provides in part:

“See. 102. The Congress authorizes and directs that. to the

fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations. and public

laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administere<

10

discuss alternatives to the proposed action.” Com-

mittee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg,

463 F.2d 783, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1971). As such, the EIS

“provides a basis for (a) evaluation of the benefits

of the proposed project in light of the environmental

risks, and (b) comparison of the net balance for the

proposed action with the environmental risks pre-

sented by alternative courses of action.” Natural Re-

sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827,

833 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

Compliance with NEPA’s requirement that an EIS

be prepared required the officials involved to essen-

tially duplicate in the form of more formalized studies

the accumulated considerations of the preceding sev-

eral vears of investigation and planning, which we

have described, supra.’ Preparation of the EIS com-

in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act, and (2)

all agencies of the Federal Government shall

e*#¢

(C) inelude in every recommendation or report on pro-

posals for legislation and other major Federal actions signifi-

cantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a de-

tailed statement by the responsible official on

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be

avoided should the proposal be implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of

man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of

long-term productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of

resources which would be involved in the proposed action

should it be implemented.

* * *”

7NEPA does not apply retroactively, but it is applicable to con-

tinuing or on-going federal projects commenced prior to January

1, 1970. Lathen v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1116, 1121 (9 Cir. 1971),

The cases are collected in Citizens Organized to Defend the En-

SETI oa

Peiiemews=

PER TORII IE Ae

il

menced in December, 1970, and continued until the

draft environmental statement was sent out for com-

ments on September 23, 1971. Participating in the

writing of the draft EIS were federal and state offi-

cials, and employees of the Ralph M. Parsons Com-

pany, a private consulting firm. After comments were

solicited and received from numerous federal, state

and local agencies, private organizations (including

three of the appellants), and interested individuals,

the team returned to work and prepared the final EIS

for official approval and submission to the Council on

Environmental Quality (CEQ).

The final EIS, dated January, 1972, was approved

by the Federal Aviation Agency’s regional director,

in connection with his obligation under AADA. On

January 21, 1972, the director transmitted the EIS

and the comments thereon to the Federal Aviation

Agency's Washington, D.C. headquarters, for the ap-

proval of the Department of Transportation’s Assist-

vironment, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F.Supp. 520, 538 (S.D. Ohio 1972)

and Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F.Supp. 1289, 3 ELR 20248,

20259 (S.D. Tex. February 16, 1973).

NEPA does not contemplate that the decision to proceed with

the project be first made by the officials involved, subsequent to

which the EIS is prepared as a mere technicality in fulfilment of

the statute. Here, however, the federal and state officials involved

had contemplated and acquiesced in proeceding with the Reef Run-

way project before NEPA’s passage. The faet that EIS was here

prepared after a decision to proceed with the runway project had

been made is attributable to the timing of NEPA’s effectiveness.

We reject the implication made by appellants’ counsel at oral argu-

ment that the appellecs have undermined the thrust of the statute.

To the contrary, there is ample evidence in the record indicating

that appellees have acted in a good faith attempt to comply with

both the spirit and letter of NEPA. Sec City of New York v.

United States, 344 F.Supp. 929, 938 (E.D. N.Y. 1972).

12

ant Secretary for Environment and Urban Systems.*

The Assistant Secretary approved the EIS on Febru-

ary 29, 1972, and transmitted it to the CEQ on March

1, 1972.

The EIS totals 46 pages, plus appendages. It sets

forth four purposes for construction of the Reef

Runway project: (1) Reduction of the level of air-

craft noise over metropolitan Honolulu, and the

Kalihi-Palama area, adjacent to HIA, in particular;

(2) improvement in safety by moving operations sea-

ward and away from populated areas in the event of

aircraft accidents: (3) increasing airfield capacity to

provide for efficient handling of the increasing traffic;

and (4) providing an alternative runway during pe-

riods when the existing principal runway is under

repair.

The major thrust of this appeal is appellants’ con-

tention that the preparation, contents and distribution

of the EIS failed to comply with NEPA require-

ments. We will examine the specifies of the EIS in

our discussion and disposition of this contention.

Delegation of the EIS’ Preparation

Appellants first assert that the preparation of the

instant EIS was improperly delegated to a private

consulting firm which had a major and direct con-

‘As reasonably interpreted, NEPA does not require the Secretary

of Transportation to personally review and approve every EIS

submitted to Washington. (f. United States v. King, ... F.2d.

(9 Cir. February 28, 1973) (delegation of authority to authorize

interception of oral and wire communications pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 2516).

2 ae RO a on ee EES Lt oe ert

13

tingent financial interest in the Reef Runway’s con-

struction.

In June, 1968, the state appellees entered into a

contract with Ralph M. Parsons Company (Parsons),

a private consulting firm, whereby Parsons agreed to

render management consultant services for the engi-

neering, design and construction of the Reef Runway

project. According to the contract terms, Parsons was

to receive a “Guaranteed Maximum Compensation”

which consisted of °15.5% of the Estimated Total

Project Cost.” The contract defined “project” as “con-

struction, ready for operation by state,” of five com-

ponents, one of which was the Reef Runway.

It does appear from the record that Parsons had a

financial interest in an affirmative decision on the

proposed project. We find nothing, however, in either

the wording of NEPA or the case law, which indicates

that, as a matter of law, a firm with a financial interest

in the project may not assist with the drafting of

the EIS. As the Eight Circuit has indicated, compli-

ance with section 102 of NEPA is based upon good

faith objectivity rather than subjective impartiality.

Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers,

470 F.2d 289, 296 (8 Cir. 1972). aff’g 342 F.Supp.

1211 (D. Ark. 1972). See also Sierra Club v. Froehlke,

359 F.Supp. 1289, 35 ELR 20248, 20268 (S.D. Tex.

February 16, 1973).

Appellees concede that under NEPA, the applicable

federal agency must bear the responsibility for the

ultimate work product designed to satisfy the re-

quirement of section 102(2) (C). We find no de-

Te

ileal ad

14

parture from this requirement here. The record indi-

cates that Federal Aviation Agency officials actively

participated in all phases of the EIS preparation

process. The chief of the Airport Division of the

Federal Aviation Agency's Pacific Region testified

that he assisted with the preparation from its early

stages onward. He stated that, as part of the prepara-

tion, regular meetings with other federal officials,

State of Hawaii officials, as well as the Parsons rep-

resentatives, were held. Further, an employee of Par-

sons testified as to the active involvement of the

Federal Aviation Agency in the EIS preparation

process. The Parsons employee concluded that the EIS

“was more or less a joint effort by Parsons, the State

and the F.A.A.”

The record further reveals that federal officials in

Washington, upon receipt of the EIS, continued active

examination thereof.

We agree with the district court’s conclusion that

“the evidence shows that F.A.A. officials did in fact

work together with state officials and a private con-

tractor and gave it close attention.” The case law

dealing with the delegation of EIS preparation has

heretofore been limited to federal agency delegation

to a state agency, and has permitted such delegation

where the federal agency significantly participated in

the preparation of the EIS. See Citizens for Mass

Transit Against Freeways v. Brinegar, 357 F.Supp.

1269 (D. Ariz. 1973): National Forest Preservation

Group v. Volpe, 352 F.Supp. 123 (D. Mont. 1972).

Unlike Greene County Planning Board v. F.P&.. 455

F.2d 412, 420 (2 Cir.) cert. denied 409 U.S. 852 (1972

and Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc.

v. Secretary of Transportation, —.. F.Supp. ——,

(D. Vt. July 27, 1973) (opinion at 6), the federal

agency here involved did not “abdieate a significant

part of its responsibility” to another organization.

While Parsons may have assisted in the EIS’ prepa-

ration, the significant and active participation by the

F.AJA. therein precludes us from concluding that

there was any improper cr illegal delegation in this

case?

Publication and Dissemination of the EIS

Section 102(2) (C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C),

provides in part:

Prior to making anv detailed statement, the re-

sponsible Federal official shall consult with and

obtain the comments of any Federal agency which

has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with

respect to any environmental impact involved.

Copies of such statement and the comments and

views of the appropriate Federal, State and local

agencies, which are authorized to develop and

enforce environmental standards, shall be made

available to the President, the Council on En-

vironmental Quality and to the public as provided

by seetion 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the

proposal through the existing agency review proc-

esses: (emphasis added)

It is uncontested that the comments to the draft

statement were not attached to the final ETS and

*Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d, supra, at 1122, 1126, relied upon by

appellants, is not apposite. There. no EIS statement had been

prepared.

al i leila

16

further, that the FAA failed to include within the

EIS the text of all references used in the statement’s

preparation. Appellants urge that these omissions ren-

der the EIS legally insufficient. We disagree.

The federal agency comments: These comments to

the draft statement were compiled as a separate docu-

ment. The comments did, however, follow the proposal

through the agency review process, as required by

NEPA. See Monroe County Conservation Society, Inc.

v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 698 (2 Cir. 1972). The record

indicates that the comments were submitted to the

Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Environ-

mental and Urban Systems. The Comments were sub-

sequently forwarded to the Council on Environmental

Quality and the National Technical Information Serv-

ice, where they became a part of the public record.

In Monroe County, supra, relied upon by appellants,

the court noted that “there is no indication that [the

comments] accompanied the statement through the

review process.” 472 F.2d at 698.

References to the EIS: Appellants also assign error

to the fact that the F.A.A. failed to include within the

EIS the text of all 22 references used in the state-

ment’s preparation.

The record indicates that these references consisted

of approximately 2,000 pages of technical material.

They were kept on file and made available at the

F.A.A.’s regional office in Honolulu. The appellants

had ready access to these documents, and did in fact

avail themselves of them. The references were also

available for forwarding to Washington upon request.

I ee EO PR Fee ee

17

Appellants’ insistence that the federal agenev com-

ments and technical references physically accompany

the EIS is an attempt to place form over substance.

We have previously rejected such tacties in the NEPA

context. Sce Jicarrilla Apache Tribe of Indians v.

Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1283-85 (9 Cir. 1973). As one

court has indicated, “[NEPA] must be construed in

the light of reason.” N.R.D.C. v. Morton, supra, 485

F.2d at 837.

There was no error in either the publication or

dissemination of the EIS in this case.

Substantive Content of the EIS

Appellants further contend that the EIS is sub-

stantively inadequate, and have submitted voluminous

briefs in support of their argument. Appellants’ sub-

stantive attack on the EIS encompasses assertions

that the statement fails to discuss the proposed

runway’s environmental consequences of increased

population and air pollution, fails to discuss “non-

construction” alternatives to the project. and in-

adequately discusses those alternatives which are

considered. Further, appellants assert that the EIS

discussion of the runway’s environmental effeets upon

noise pollution, water quality, recreation and wildlife

is inadequate.

Standard of Review: Agency action under NEPA

is subject to judicial review pursuant to §10(e) of

the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)

(A). See Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of

Engineers, supra, 470 F.2d at 298-99, n.14: Town of

Groton v. Laird, 353 F.Supp. 344, 348 (D. Conn.

eo

18

1972). As such, a reviewing court may set aside agency

action which is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the

law.” See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,

401 U.S. 402, 413 (1971). See also Scenic Hudson

Preservation Conference v. F.P.C., 453 F.2d 463, 467

(2 Cir. 1971), cert. denied 407 U.S. 926 (1972). Cf.

Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 465-66

(5 Cir. 1973). As we recently stated in Jicarilla

Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275,

1281 (9 Cir. 1973):

“Reversal of a substantive decision is appropriate

only to situations where ‘the actual costs and

benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly

gave insufficient weight to environmental fac-

tors.’ ” (citation omitted) See also, Environmental

Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 352-53

(8 Cir. 1972); N.R.D.C., Ine. v. Morton, supra,

458 F.2d at 838.

We examine appellants’ substantive challenges,

therefore, mindful of the circumscribed nature of our

review.

Demographic Effects: Appellants argue that the

EIS is inadequate in that it fails to include a study

of the effect of the Reef Runway project upon the

population of Honolulu and Hawaii. Appellants con-

tend that a major incentive behind construction of

the Reef Runway is Hawaii’s need to accommodate

and encourage increased tourism to the state. Ap-

pellants then posit that the effect of increased tour-

ism will be to increase the permanent population of

Honolulu, to the detriment of the local “quality of

el meee 2 eee eer bare

19

life.” Hence, they argue that the EIS must contain

an analysis of the demographic effects of the project.

We reject this reasoning. That an increase in Hono-

lulu’s tourism will result in an increase in that city’s

permanent population is speculative. Certainly, there

in no empirical data in the record supportive of the

allegation. We agree with the district court’s conelu-

sion that “requiring the kinds of demographic discus-

sion suggested by [appellants] is unreasonable in the

context of this project.”

Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2 Cir.), cert. de-

nied 409 U.S. 990 (1972) and Lathan v. Volpe, 350

F.Supp. 252 (W.D. Wash. 1972) where EIS diseus-

sions of demographic ramifications of the projects in

issue were held to be warranted, are factually distin-

guishable. Hanly involved the proposed construction

of a prison detention facility in New York City, while

Lathan involved the proposed construction of a high-

way through a populated Seattle area. In both cases,

the proposed project could reasonably be projected to

have an effect upon local population patterns to a

degree not evidenced here.’°

10In Havly v. Mitchell, supra. the court noted, 460 F.2d at 642:

“Plaintiffs are all living members of the Chatham Square

Civic Community for a Planned Community, a non-profit

group concerned with the development and protection of that

portion of lower Manhattan called the Civie Center. Although

the area contains many government buildings, including sev-

eral courthouses, surprisingly at least 50,000 people live there

and in adjacent Chinatown. Included in that group are over

3,000 persons living in approximately 660 cooperative apart-

ment buildings called Chatham Towers and Chatham Green.

These face the proposed new jail, some 100-150 feet away.”

In Lathan +. Volpe, supra, the proposed highway was described

as follows, 350 F.Supp. at 263:

Poteet IO BOTT wane ies

20

Air Pollution: It is agreed by all parties that no

Studies were made of the effect of the Reef Runway

project upon air pollution. The failure to conduct

such a study, however, was not an inadvertent omis-

sion. Rather, a threshold decision was made by federal

and state officials that air pollution studies were un-

necessary in this specific case because of the very

nature and location of the proposed project.

The Reef Runway will relocate aircraft take-offs,

the major source of aircraft air pollution, 6,700 feet

seaward, and away from the populated areas of Hono-

lulu. The essence of this project, therefore, involves

moving the sources of the air pollution away from

people. The federal and state officials concluded that

detailed air pollution studies were unnecessary, on

the premise that at the verv least. the project was

extremely unlikely to worsen the air quality in any

relevant sense.

Further, appellants do not claim that the project

will deteriorate the existing air qualitv; rather, they

“The proposed segment involved herein would create a ten-

lane highway along the alignment of an existing four-lane

highway. It would cross Lake Washington from the east on a

floating bridge, enter Seattle by a tunnel through the Mount

Baker district, emerge and continue through a heavily popu-

lated area, and join I-5, a north-south interstate highway.”

See also Lathan v. Volpe, supra, 455 F.2d 1114, where we noted

that this highway ran “through a densely populated, low in-

come, city area; * * *.”

Similarly distinguishable is Sierra Club v. Froehlke, supra, 3

ELR at 20271-20272, where the court observed that “there is rea-

son to believe that there will be development, growth and industrial

expansion as a result” of the project there in issue. As we note in

the text, appellants’ contention that the Reef Runway project will

result in expansion of the permanent population of Honolulu is

mere speculation, unsupported by the record.

eat we < ee e

21

urge that a detailed study may conceivably reveal that

anticipated environmental improvement may be less

than expected.

The distriet court acknowledged that the EIS may

well have set forth in more detail the reasoning lead-

ing to the conclusion that there were no significant

air pollution problems inherent in the project. But,

on the record as a whole, we are unable to conclude

that the district court erred in rejecting appellants’

air pollution arguments.

Alternatives: Section 102(2)(C) (iii) of NEPA,

42 U.S.C. § 4832(2)(C) (iii), requires that the EIS

include a discussion of “alternatives to the proposed

action.” See CEQ Guideline, § 62 (iv), 36 Fed. Reg.

7725 (1971). Appellants contend that the EIS here

‘*fails completely to discuss some reasonable and feasi-

ble alternatives to the proposed action,” and “treats

other alternatives in insufficient detail.”

The EIS contains a brief discussion of four alterna-

tives to the proposed construction of the Reef Run-

way extension. Three involve various runway concepts

and configurations, and the fourth, the alternative of

taking no action.

In support of their allegation that the alternatives

which were considered were insufficiently treated, ap-

pellants introduced at trial testimony calculated to

discredit certain data considered in rejecting only

one alternative—that of extending the existing runway

back into adjoining Hickam Air Field.’ The planners,

11The other construction alternatives considered were construc-

tion of the “Seaward Jet Runway,” and construction of a close-in

GE tt acess

22

in addition to concluding that this alternative would

create more noise than it would alleviate, noted that

the replacement cost to the military would be $37 mil-

lion. At trial, appellants introduced evidence indicat-

ing that this figure was inflated. No other evidence on

the subject of alleged insufficiently treated alterna-

tives was offered. There is, for instance, no allegation

that an important consideration in connection with a

given alternative was ignored. We find no error in the

EIS’ discussion of alternatives.

In addition to challenging the disposition in the

EIS of alternatives which were in fact considered,

appellants further contend that there exist alterna-

tives not considered which could well accomplish the

objectives of the Reef Runway project. These alleged

alternatives are identified by appellants as “non-con-

struction alternatives,” which they defined as ‘‘those

arrangements for managing airports as to questions

like noise and capacity and air pollution which do not

involve the building of new structures.”

For instance, appellants suggest removal of the Air

Foree’s KC-135 jet tankers, the loudest of the aircraft

operating from HIA, to an adjacent airfield. There

is, however, evidence indicating that the Air Force

had refused to move its jet tankers to another base.

effectively eliminating implementation of this alter-

parallel runway. Both were rejected because of inability to alleviate

the noise and safety problems.

The alternative of taking no action was rejected because, without

the proposed project, high noise levels would continue unhampered,

and the problems of safety would remain unsolved. Further, the

failure to provide for the expected growth in airport traffie would

result in inereasing delays.

@ RES

tees Pott ca ee ae

23

native. Further, removal of the jet tankers would

obviously do little to alleviate the significant noise

pollution and safety problems attributable to com-

mercial aviation.

Another alternative urged by appellants is the im-

position of higher landing fecs at HLA, in the hope

of reducing commercial aircraft traffic. This alter-

native was considered early in the planning process,

but rejected as ineffectual inasmuch as attempts at

other airports to reduce trattie by such means have

proven unsuccessful.

Appellants further suggest that private aircraft be

transferred to another airfield. Again, however, such

a transfer would have no effect upon the noise and

safety problems presented by larger aireraft. It fur-

ther appears that a ban en general aviation would

violate legal agreements entered into by HLA, guaran-

teeing the airport’s accessibility to all users.

Appellants also urge that the inter-island aircraft

operating out of HIA could be required to commence

their take-offs at a different point on the present run-

way configuration, thereby eliminating the noise prob-

lem. The record, however, indicates that only a minor

percentage of the aircraft operating at HLA would

be affected by this alternative. and it would therefore

have onlv a token effect on the over-all situation.

Finally, there is nothing in the record to indicate

that alternatives such as the readoption of airline

schedules, imposition of curfew restrictions,’? or con-

12At any rate, the state is apparently without constitutional au-

thority to impose aircraft curfew restrictions. City of Burbank v.

Lockheed Air Terminal, ........ US. ...... (May 14, 1973).

See 6

24

version to wide-body aircraft design are either rea-

sonable or feasible alternatives in this case.’®

NEPA’s “alternatives” discussion is subject to a

construction of reasonableness. N.R.D.C., Inc. v. Mor-

ton, supra, 458 F.2d at 834. Certainly, the statute

should not be employed as a crutch for chronic fault-

finding. Accordingly, there is no need for an EIS to

consider an alternative whose effect cannot be reason-

ably ascertained, and whose implementation is deemed

remote and speculative. Id. at 834. Rather, the EIS

need only set forth those alternatives “sufficient to

permit a reasoned choice.” Jd. at 836. This has been

done. See also Committee for Nuclear Responsibility,

Ine. v. Seaborg, supra, 463 F.2d at 787; Pennsylvania

Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F.Supp. 238,

250 (M.D. Pa. 1970).

Appellants also challenge the adequacy of the EIS’

discussion of the Reef Runway’s impact upon the

human and natural environment. They challenge’ state-

ments as unsupportable, contradictory and factually

erroneous. We examine these contentions, again mind-

ful of the limited scope of our review, supra.

Noise Pollution: Appellants do not assert that the

project will have an adverse effect upon the environ-

ment by increasing noise pollution. Indeed, a prime

reason for the Reef Runway project is to reduce the

level of jet noise in the areas adjacent to HIA.

The EIS does discuss and graph the noise situation

in some detail. There is substantial evidence in the

13We reject appellants’ implication that various techniques util-

ized at other airports in the continental United States are neces-

sarily adaptable to the unique situation existing at HIA.

. 8 PARLE LR REPEALED LS

25

record, including testimony by responsible federal of-

ficials, supporting the EIS’ conclusion that the project

will result in significant reduction of noise pollution.

Appellants’ prime objection to the EIS’ treatment

of noise pollution is the omission therein of “on-site”

noise measurement techniques. In lieu thereof, the

F.A.A. utilized another well-recognized scientific tech-

nique, which rendered “on-site” measurement unneces-

sary. The record indicates that “on-site” measurements

of independent organizations were in fact considered

by the planners.

Undoubtedly, there exists a plethora of scientific

studies which could have been, but were not, used to

measure the noise pollution levels in the area involved.

We cannot, however, conclude that the district court

made a “clear error in judgment,” Citizens to Preserve

Overton Park, supra, 401 U.S. at 416, in concluding

that ‘‘(t)he kinds of studies suggested by [appel-

lants}] may be useful but are hardly necessary.”

Water Quality: The EIS, utilizing four scientific

studies undertaken for the project, concluded that the

project would result in an improvement of the water

quality in the marine area adjacent to the Reef Run-

way.

At trial, appellant presented scientific studies and

various letters from university professors purportedly

contradicting the EIS’ water quality conclusions.

One scientist testified that one of the studies re-

ferred to in the EIS, a report of a hydraulic study

prepared under the auspices of the University of

Hawaii, might be read as indicating a different con-

26

clusion from that given in the EIS. The record indi-

cates, however. that this study was based upon a

proposed configuration of the project which was sub-

sequently changed, An analysis of the project based

upon this new configuration was supportive of the

hydraulie study.

Appellant also introduced letters at trial after testi-

mony was terminated, which questioned certain data

and conclusions relied upon in the preparation of

the EIS’ water quality analysis. Apart from the

obvious observation that the letter writers were, for

the most part. not available for cross-examination,

we note that disagreement among experts will not

serve to invalidate an EIS. Indeed, **(f)urther studies,

evaluation and analyses by experts are almost certain

to reveal inadequacies or deficiencies.” Environmental

Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 342 F.Supp.

1211, 1217 (E.D. Ark. 1971), aff'd 472 F.2d 289 (8

Cir. 1972). The purpose of the EIS is to inform the

decision makers of the environmental ramifications of

the proposed action. See Committee for Nuclear Re-

sponsibility v. Seaborg, supra, 403 F.2d at 787. The

statement need not achieve scientific unanimity on the

desirability of proceeding with the proposed action.

Recreation: The EIS anticipates an enhancement

of recreational boating facilities and an improvement

in fishing conditions as a result of improvement in

the water quality of Keehi Lagoon, supra, and the

construction of channels to the open sea.

Appellants contend, however, that construction of

the Reef Runway will result in “loss of surfing sites”

and “loss of the effective use of the proposed Sand

Island Park due to high aircraft noise.”

In support of the first allegation, appellants intro-

duced at trial the tetimony of the founder of a local

surfing club, who was described as an “out-reach”

worker with disadvantaged vouths. The witness testi-

fied that the vouths feared the project might result

in adverse surfing conditions. This was the sole evi-

dence produced at trial supportive of the “loss of

surfing site” arguments. The district court was under-

standably unpersuaded by this hearsay testimony.

The contention that use of a proposed nearby park

will be adversely affected as a result of noise from

aircraft utlizing the Reef Runway was adequately con-

sidered in the EIS.

On the record as a whole, we are unable to upset the

district court’s conclusion that the EIS adequately

deals with the recreational aspects of the Reef Run-

way project.

Wildlife: The EIS: acknowledges that the pro-

posed project will have an adverse environmental ef-

fect upon certain wildlife. This is the only clearly

documented adverse environmental effect of the proj-

ect which could be said to be signifieant. The statement

notes that the Reef Runway project will displace some

186 acres of silted coral mudflats used for feeding and

roosting by birds, including the rare Hawaiian Stilt.

Up to 100 of these endangered birds may be affected.

Appellants’ concern for the Hawaiian Stilt is the

basis of their attack upon this aspect of the EIS.

WOT IT?

Prepewy seemnmpans ape neon MRE RENTER OM NE LIE SANIT OBRINT ETT FER RM ON

28

The record indicates that the plight of the Stilts

has continuously been a matter of concern to the plan-

ners of the project. As recommended by appellants,

the replacement habitats at nearby Pearl Harbor

Naval Station are being developed in conjunction with

the project. Also included in the project itself is the

construction of certain ponds and islets suitable for

the birds at a cost in excess of $350,000. Cf. Sierra

Club v. Froehlke, supra, 3 ELR at 20272.

The main contention of appellants here is that the

size of the replacement habitats may prove to be in-

adequate. But the district court noted, and we con-

cur, that if the size of the habitats do indeed prove

to be inadequate, there is no reason why adjustments

could not be made even if the construction as planned

proceeds to completion.

The record indicates that the project’s planners

were concerned with, and took adequate steps to mini-

mize, the harm presented te the birds. The discussion

in the EIS of the project’s environmental ramifica-

tions upon wildlife was adequate.

It is our conelusion that the EIS here in issue ade-

quately complies with NEPA requirements."

14Appellants, noting that the EIS must stand or fall on its own

merits, also contend that the distriet court impermissibly permitted

the Federal Aviation Ageney to “bolster” the document with “ex-

trinsic evidence.”

The record indicates otherwise. The “extrinsic evidence” was

testimony showing why certain matters were not contained in the

EIS. and was presented after appellants had challenged such deii-

ciencies. The testimony was by “the administrative officials who

participated in the decision * * * explaining their action.” Cifizes

to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, supra, 401 U.S. at 420. Ther

Was no error.

SE RR EL SS

29

AIRPORT AND AIRWAYS DEVELOPMENT

ACT OF 1970

In addition to their NEPA contentions, appellants

asselt that appellees have failed to comply with the

requirements of section 16(¢)(4) of the Airport and

Airways Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1716

(c) (4). We find this contention equally without merit.

Section 16(¢)(4) of AADA requires. in pertinent

part, that the Secretary of Transportation

shall authorize no [airport extension] project

found to have adverse effect unless (he) shall

render a finding, in writing, following a full and

complete review, which shall be a matter of public

record, that no feasible and prudent alternative

exists and that all possible steps have been taken

to minimize such adverse effect.

The record indicates that the required finding was

made as a product of lengthy review by federal of-

ficials. The finding is supported by the EIS which,

one court has held, may itself be considered as a sec-

tion 16(¢)(4) finding. Cifizers Airport Commission

of Chesterfield County ve Velpe, 351 F.Supp. 52, 59

(E.D. Va. 1972).

There are virtually no cases indicating the standard

of review a court must employ when analyzing com-

pliance with section 16(¢) (4). In Citizens to Preserve

Overton Park v. Volpe, supra, however, the Supreme

Court construed section 4(f) of the Department of

Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f).

which contains virtually the identical relevant lan-

30

guage of AADA.” The Supreme Court there stated

that “the reviewing court must be able to find that

the Secretary could have reasonably believed that in

this case there are no feasible alternatives or that

alternatives do involve unique problems.” 401 U.S. at

416 (emphasis added). The Court further noted that,

pursuant to section 702(2)(A) of the Administrative

Procedure Act, the Secretary’s action must not have

been arbitrary or capricious. /d.

Incorporating the discussion of the adequacy of the

EIS in our analysis of appellees’ compliance with

NEPA, we conclude that under the applicable stand-

ards of review, appellees have complied with AAD A.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the injunction pend-

ing appeal is hereby dissolved effective immediately,

and the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

15Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966,

49 U.S.C. § 1653(f), mandates that the Secretary of Transportation

disapprove any project which requires the use of parklands unless

“(1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such

land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to mini-

mize harm to such park, recreational area [ete.] * * *.”

The relevant language in section 16(¢)(4) of AADA reads “no

feasible and prudent alternative exists,” and “all possible steps

have been taken to minimize” harm to the environment.

Te NIT ORE Ba RR Sg DE aS © ERE OH od

Appendix B

In the United States Court of Appeals

For the Ninth Circuit

No. 73-1784

Life of the Land, et al., ]

Appellants, |

Ve

Claude S. Brinegar, et al.,

Appellees, r

and

Dillingham Corporation, ete.. |

Intervenor/Appellee. J

[Filed Oct. 16, 1973]

ORDER

Before: Hamutn and Trask, Cireuit Judges, :

and BeELLont, District Judge*

The panel as constituted in the above case has voted

to deny the petition for rehearing and to reject the

suggestion for a rehearing en bane.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion

for en bane rehearing, and no judge of the court has

requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en

bane. Fed. R. App. P. 35(b).

*Honorable Robert C. Belloni, United States District Judge,

Portland, Oregon, sitting by designation.

32

The petition for rehearing is denied and the sug-

gestion for a rehearing en bane is rejected.

The panel has also voted to deny the motion to

stay the dissolution of the injunction, and further,

to deny the alternative motion for reinstatement of

the injunction pending appeal.

Dated: October 15, 1973.

O. D. Hamlin,

United States Circuit Judge.

Tes --- oO SEES UR DA XK Seer

Appendix C

363 F.Supp. 1171 (1972)

United States District Court,

D. Hawaii.

Civ. No. 72-3683

Life of the Land et al., Plaintiffs, |

¥.

John Volpe, Individually and in his ea- |

pacity as Secretary of the United |

States Department of Transporta- \

tion, et al., Defendants, |

|

and

Kalihi-Palama Community Council et |

al., Defendants-Intervenors. j

Dee. 22, 1972.

DECISION AND ORDER

SaMUEL P. Kine, District Judge.

This case involves the administrative steps taken

in authorizing the Reef Runway Project at Honolulu

International Airport.’

“The proposed action involves Federal financial assistance pur-

suant to the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970 to con-

struct a new runway at Honolulu International Airport, Honolulu,

Hawaii. The construction of this runway, generally referred to as

the ‘Reef Runway’. consists of filling, grading and paving an air-

plane runway 12,000 feet long, 200 feet wide with a 1,000-foot long

runway safety area on each end and 250-foot wide shoulders. The

runway, to be located approximately 6,700 feet seaward of existing

Runway 8-26, will include a protective structure 1,050 feet seaward

of and parallel to the new runway to prevent storm wave damage.”

EIS page i.

o+

The pending issue requires a decision as to whether

a preliminary injunction shall be granted prohibiting

further implementation of the project. A temporary

restraining order was signed by Judge Pence just be-

fore the opening of bids for the construction of the

runway. That order resulted in’a suspension of the

bidding process and is still in effect.

Plaintiffs are four organizations concerned with our

natural environment and four individuals living in

an area affected by this airport’s operations. Defend-

ants are the federal and state officials concerned with

the project. Intervenors, as defendants, are the con-

tractors who submitted bids for the construction of

the runway, the General Contractors Association of

Hawaii, two residents of Kalihi-Palama, and the Ka-

lihi-Palama Community Council representing other

residents of the affected area.

The operative statutes are the National Environ-

mental Policy Act (NEPA), especially § 102(2)(C),

and the Airport and Airway Development Act

(ADAP), especially § 16.°

The defendants appear to have complied with the

requirements of these statutes.

NEPA demands that all agencies of the Federal

Government

‘include in every recommendation or report on

proposals for legislation and other major Fed-

eral actions significantly affecting the quality of

the human environment, a detailed statement by

the responsible official on—

242 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).

349 U.S.C. § 1716.

a 2 FRGRES Btn eo coro TS

35

(1) the environmental impact of the proposed

action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which

cannot be avoided should the proposal be

implemented, .

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term

uses of man’s environment and the main-

tenance and enhancement of long-term

productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable com-

mitments of resources which would be in-

volved in the proposed action should it be

implemented.”*

A detailed statement called a Final Environmental

Impact Statement (EIS) was prepared. It purports

to discuss the required matters.

ADAP demands that the Secretary of Transporta-

tion shall consult with the Secretaries of the Interior

and Health, Education and Welfare, regarding envi-

ronmental effects, and shall not authorize an airport

project

“found to have adverse effect unless the Secre-

tary shall render a finding, in writing, following

a full and complete review, which shall be a

matter of public record, that no feasible and pru-

4Portion of 42 U.S.C. § 4832(2)(C). There are other provisions

of 42 U.S.C. § 4332 which are pertinent and have been considered.

For example, plaintiffs pointed to the requirement that copies of

the EIS and of the comments and views of the appropriate federal.

state, and local agencies “shall accompany the proposal through

the existing ageney review process” and argued that this was not

done. The evidence showed that this was done.

St err owes

36

dent alternative exists and that all possible steps

have been taken to minimize such adverse ef-

fect.’

The Secretary of Transportation obtained com-

ments from the other two referenced departments and

made the necessary finding.

[1] Case law makes it clear, nevertheless, that a

NEPA statement may be inadequate even though it

contains material covering the statutory subjects of

inquiry, and that the administrative process may be

improper even though it includes the use of such a

statement.®

So it is necessary to consider the several questions

raised by plaintiffs as to the adequacy of the EIS as

measured by the standards developed by these cases.’

In doing so, I consider the statements in the EIS

to be augmented by the attachments thereto and the

references listed therein.’ I also make distinctions

5Portion of 49 U.S.C. § 1716(c)(4). Other requirements of

ADAP are mentioned below.

‘Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); Calvert Cliffs’

Coordinating Committee, Ine. v. United States Atomie Energy

Commission, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 449 F.2d 1109 (1971); Lathan

y. Volpe, 350 F.Supp. 262 (W.D. Wash. 1972); Brooks v. Volpe,

350 F.Supp. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1972).

‘Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91

S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971); Environmental Defense Fund,

Ine. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (Sth

Cir. 1972).

‘There are 24 documents, including the required comments by

concerned federal agencies, among the references to the EIS. Many

of these references ran well over 100 pages in length. The refer-

ences were made available to interested mmbers of the public in-

eluding plaintiffs, along with the EIS itself, before the public

hearings which were held in connection with the project.

37

among these cases based upon the character of the

project.®

I have made these measurements. I find that the

discussion set forth in the EIS complies with the re-

quirements of NEPA, or that in those instances where

additional discussion or disclosure should be set forth

in the EIS the only delinquency is in draftsmanship

and not in any failure to consider the deleted matter

as if it had been set forth in full in the EIS, or that

the question raised by plaintiffs is one to which the

EIS need not address itself.!° Without attempting an

exhaustive discussion of each of the matters as to

which plaintiffs argue that the EIS is deficient, I

shall illustrate the three categories mentioned.

Plaintiffs question the treatment in the EIS of the

problem of noise pollution. But the EIS does discuss

and graph the noise situation in some detail. The

kinds of studies suggested by plaintiffs may be useful

®*For example, an adequate EIS in connection with the establish-

ment of a new airport might well differ quantitatively and quali-

tatively from an adequate EIS in connection with the expansion of

an existing airport.

“On March 22, 1971, a publie hearing was held... At the

hearing, the State of Hawaii... presented evidence that the Reef

{vomway would:

Reduce noise over Honolulu

Keduce overflights over Honolulu

Increase airfield capacity

Provide an alternate runway during periods when the exist-

ing principal runway is under repair”

EIS page 8.

10See Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 3 ERC

1126 (D.C.Cir. October 5, 1971); Conservation Couneil v. Frochike,

340 F.Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff'd 4 ERC 1044 (4th Cir.

May 2, 1972); Jiearilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471

F.2d 1275 (9 Cir. 1973).

EP ED GNI Re a Pe ae

-

EP eee one es >

38

but are hardly necessary. They suggest a degree of

certainty to which the situation does not lend itself.

Plaintiffs question the treatment in the EIS of air

pollution. But building the runway does not permit

air pollution beyond limits set by other laws which

control air quality. The EIS does treat of the visual

aspects of air pollution, and the evidence adduced in-

dicates that nobody considered other aspects of air

pollution to be an important problem until this action

was filed, and that the government agencies charged

with policing air quality felt that there would be no

significant problem in this area. Perhaps the EIS

should set forth in more detail the reasoning leading

to this conclusion. But it cannot be said that air pol-

lution was not considered by the decision makers.

[2,3] Plaintiffs question the omission from the

EIS of any discussion of the demographic impact of

the traffic facilitated by the runway. Undoubtedly an

EIS should discuss all of the significant primary en-

vironmental effects, and all of the substantial see-

ondary environmental effects, of a project. How far

beyond these effects an EIS should go may still be an

open question, but there must be some limit. A ‘‘rule

of reason” was suggested in argument."! In my opin-

ion, requiring the kinds of demographic discussion

suggested by plaintiffs is unreasonable in the context

of this project.

11See Natural Resources Defense Council, Ine. v. Morton, 148

U.S.App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827 (1972); Committee for Nuclear Re-

sponsibility v. Seaborg, supra n. 10; EDF v. United States Army

Corps of Engineers, supra n. 7,

- 3 RICE Snerremcrnsmmenrs ee ere

39

The discussion in the EIS of alternatives needs

separate consideration. Case law places special em-

phasis on this NEPA requirement and especially on

the inclusion of abandonment of the project as an

alternative."* The EIS here is very sketchy in this

area. Yet it does appear from the evidence that the

responsible officials in the decision making process and

in the review processes did in fact consider many

alternatives, including nonconstruction alternatives. I

am persuaded that Mr. Thompson is right when he

argues that a detailed discussion of national pro-

grams to reduce noise pollution and to improve op-

erational efficiency should not have to be repeated in

every EIS for every airport project. On the other

hand, these statements are designed as much to alert

and inform the public as to perform the function of

the devil’s advocate for the decision makers.’* What

is obvious and platitudinous to those who live with a

program daily for several years is new and fearful

to one who is confronted with the same program for

the first time. While the EIS here may be minimally

in technical compliance with statutory requirements,

it leaves much to be desired as an example of the art

of communication.

Mention should be made here of the extensive con-

sideration of this project over a period of some 10

12Natural Resources Defense Council, Ine. v. Morton, supra n. 11.

18The eases emphasize the functions of the EIS in (1) providing

evidence that the decision-making process required by NEPA was

in fact followed, and (2) giving the decision makers who are re-

moved from the initial proposal, sufficient data from whieh to make

their own determination of costs and benefits. See Brooks v. Volpe,

supra n. 6,

FE PP ey PE OLE Te

40

years. Planning did not begin with NEPA, and waile

some of the present vocabulary is new, the concerns

to which planners addressed themselves are not. A

special task force on the airport development, in-

volving responsible local, state and federal officials

and members of the public, met about once a month

for some + years, and wound up recommending the

reef runway. The secretary of that committee testified

to the many matters discussed. Because of the input

from this committee’s members and from other

sources, the original plan was in fact materially al-

tered, as, for example, by the change from a straight

sea wall to an S-curve sea wall.

Again, it should be noted that many of the effects

feared by plaintiffs can be alleviated or prevented, if

they eventuate, even if construction as planned pro-

ceeds to completion.

Other questions were raised with respect to com-

pliance with NEPA and ADAP requirements.

[4] I ruled previously that NEPA does not pre-

vent the employment of a private contractor who

has a financial stake in the project to draft an EIS.

NEPA does require that the final EIS be sufficiently

reviewed and considered by the *‘responsible official”

to insure that it was a part of the decision making

process.'* Here the evidence shows that FAA officials

did in fact work tegether with state officials and a

4EDF v. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, supra n. 7; Greene

County Planning Board v. Federal Power Com‘n, 455 F.2d 412

(2d Cir. 1972): Upper Pecos Association v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233

(10th Cir. 1971).

OE EN os OO WEE ree ES sees

41

private contractor in the preparation of the EIS and

gave it close attention.

The absence of a national airport development SVs-

tem plan is proposed as a basis for prohibiting this

development.’® The evidence is that there is such a

plan although it has not yet been published.

The certificate of the governor and the finding of

the Secretary of Transportation’’ are said to be un-

supported. Assuming without deciding that these exee-

utive actions are subject to judicial review, there is

ample support in the record for the proposition that

they are deliberate conclusions based upon ample in-

formation.

[5] Under all of the cireumstances and upon the

evidence adduced it is my opinion that it is improb-

able that plaintiffs will prevail upon the merits of

their complaint. Therefore, a preliminary injunction

Plaintiffs assert that the “comments and views of the oppre-

priate Federal, State, and local agencies” did not “accompany th

proposal through the existing ageney review processes” as requircd|

by 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The short answer to this assertion is

that they did.

49 USC. § 1716(a): “. . . No project application shall propose

airport development other than that included in the then curr it

revision of the nacional airport system plan formulated by the

Secretary under this subehapter . . .”

49 USC. § 1716 (e) (1): “The Secretary shall not approve any

project application for a project involving airport location, a major

runway extension, or runway location unless the frovernor of the

State In which such project may be located e>rtifes in writing te

the Seerctary that there is reasonable assurance that the project

will be lecated, designed, constructed. and operated so as te eon pls

with epplicable air and water quality standards... .” a

49 U.S.C. $1716.) (4). See quote referenced to n. 5 supra,

yee

AUNTS IE TIN SEEN

bail il a

2

will be denied.*® The temporary restraining order is

lifted.

[6] I will entertain requests for additional find-

ings of fact and conclusions of law.*”

19The matter eame on before me for hearing on a permanent

injunction on Mareh 29, 1973. No further substantial evidence was

addueed, and the matter was submitted on the reeord made at the

hezring on a preliminary injunction with some additional offerings.

I reaffirmed my earlier decision. denied a permanent injunction.

and denied the request for a stay pending appeal. (There were

some changes in parties between Deeember 22. 1972. and Mareh

29, 1973. Following the December 22. 1972. decision. bids were

opened, and a contract was awarded. The unsnecessful bidders

withdrew as defendants-intervenors herein. There was earlier a

passing suggestion that there might be a standing issue. but imas-

much as at least one plaintiff had standing the issue was not pur-

sued. I was prepared to hold that all plaintiffs had standing.

Plaintiffs had sought to prevent intervention by the defendants

intervenors, but I earlier ruled against them and allowed the inter-

vention. )

*"Defendants-intervenors sought to avoid plaintiffs’ challenge by

charging them with laches, citing Clark v. Volpe, 342 F.Supp.

1324 (E.D.La.1972). aff'd 461 F.2d 1266 (Sth Cir. 1972). The

appellate court cited Ragland v. Mueller, 460 F.2d 1196 (Sth Cir.

1972), which held that it was unreasonable to apply NEPA retro-

actively to a road project when 16 of 20 miles had already been

fully completed and the right-of-way for the remaining 4 miles

had already been aequired. I ruled previously that plaintiffs were

not barred by laches. There was no showing that plaintiffs’ timing

constituted unreasonable delay. Rather, the evidence showed that

plaintiffs tsed the period between approval of the EIS on Feb-

ruary 29, 1972, and the filing of this action on November 8, 1972.

to pursue available administrative remedies. The court may even

decline to invoked laches in environmental cases “because of the

public interest status accorded ecology preservation by the Con-

gress.” Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d

1323, 1329 (4th Cir. 1972). See Pennsylvania Environmental Coun-

cil, Ine. v. Bartlett, 315 F.Supp. 238, 246 (M.D.Pa.1970). aff'd 454

F.2d 614 (3rd Cir. 1971): Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining

the Environment v. Volpe. 330 F.Supp. 918, 924 (M_D.Pa.1971)-

Nolep vy. Volpe, 333 F.Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971): Natural Re-

swirees Defense Couneil v. Grant, 341 F.Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C.

1972).

In the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Civil No. 72-3683

Life of the Land et al., Plaintiffs, :

vs.

John Volpe, Individually and in his ea-

pacity as Secretary of the United

States Department of Transporta- >

tion, et al., Defendants,

and

Kalihi-Palama Community Council et

al., Defendants-Intervenors. J

FINAL DECISION AND ORDER

This matter having come on regularly for hearing

on the merits on March 29, 1973, and the Court being

fully advised in the premises, now therefore, for the

reasons set forth in this Court’s Decision and Order

herein dated December 22, 1972,

It Is Hereby Ordered that the request of the plain-

tiffs for a permanent injunction be and the same

hereby is, DENIED.

It Is Further Ordered that the plaintiffs’ request

for an injunction pending appeal, made pursuant to

Rule 62(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and

RR Sy VO as

i i ei Daal Ee

aah

44

Rule 8(a), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, be,

and the same hereby is, DENIED.

Dated: This 12th day of April 1973 at Honolulu,

Hawaii.

Samuel P. King,

Judge of the above-entitled

Court.

FE Se ee rm Eo TP Abs XS Ts

Appendix E

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

A. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969:

United States Code, Title 42:

§ 4321. Purpose.—The purposes of this Act are:

To declare a national policy which will encourage

productive and enjoyable harmony between man

and his environment; to promote efforts which

will prevent or eliminate damage to the environ-

ment and biosphere and stimulate the health and

welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of

the ecological systems and natural resources im-

‘portant to the Nation; and to establish a Council

on Environmental Quality.

§ 4331. Congressional declaration of policy.—

(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound ;

impact of man’s activity on the interrelations of ;

all components of the natural environment, par-

ticularly the profound influences of population

growth, high-density urbanization, industrial ex-

pansion, resource exploitation, and new and ex- :

panding technological advances and recognizing :

further the critical importance of restoring and

maintaining environmental quality to the overall :

welfare and development of man, declares that it

is the continuing policy of the Federal Govern-

ment, in cooperation with State and local govern-

ments, and other concerned public and private

organizations, to use all practicable means and :

measures, including financial and technical assist-

ance, in a manner calculated to foster and pro-

mote the general welfare, to create and maintain

conditions under which man and nature can exist

in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, eco-

nomic, and other requirements of present and fu-

ture generations of Americans,

46

(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth

in this Act, it is the continuing responsibility of

the Federal Government to use all practicable

means, consistent with other essential considera-

tions of national policy, to improve and coordi-

nate Federal plans, functions, programs, and re-

sources to the end that the Nation may—

(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each genera-

tion as trustee of the environment for succeeding

generations;

(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful,

productive, and esthetically and culturally pleas-

ing surroundings;

(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses

of the environment without degradation, risk to

health or safety, or other undesirable and unin-

tended consequences;

(5) achieve a balance between population and

resource use which will permit high standards of

living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities; . . .

§ 4332. Administration consistent with policies

of Act.—The Congress authorizes and directs

that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the poli-

cies, regulations, and public laws of the United

States shall be interpreted and administered in

accordance with the policies set forth in this

Act, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Govern-

ment shall—

(C) include in every recommendation or re-

port on proposals for legislation and other major

Federal actions significantly affecting the quality

of the human environment, a detailed statement

by the responsible official on—

<eeag BR. tea TS eest, fer me

— —

47

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed

action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which

cannot be avoided should the proposal be imple-

mented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term

uses of man’s environment and the maintenance

and enhancement of long-term productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commit-

ments of resources which would be involved in

the proposed action should it be iimpleimented.

Prior to making any detailed statement, the re-

sponsible Federal official shall consult with and

obtain the comments of any Federal agency which

has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with

respect to any environmental impact involved.

Copies of such statement and the comments and 3

views of the appropriate Federal, State, and

local agencies, which are authorized to develop

and enforce environmental standards, shall be

made available to the President, the Council on

Environmental Quality and to the public as pro-

vided by section 552 of title 5, United States

Code, and shall accompany the proposal through

the existing agency review processes;

(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate

alternatives to recommended courses of action in

any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts

concerning alternative uses of available resources;

48

B. Airport and Airways Development Act of 1970:

United States Code, Title 49: .

81716. Submission and approval of projects

for airport development.—(a) Submission.— ...

[A]ny public agency, or two or more _ public

agencies acting jointly, may submit to the Secre-

tary a project application, in a form and contain-

ing such information, as the Secretary may

prescribe, setting forth the airport development

proposed to be undertaken... .

(c) Approval.—(1) All airport ~ development

projects shall be subject to the approval of the

Secretary, ...

(4) It is declared to be national policy that

airport development projects authorized pursuant

to this part shall provide for the protection and

enhancement of the natural resources and the

quality of environment of the Nation. In imple-

menting this policy, the Secretary shall consult

with the Secretaries of the Interior and Health,

Education, and Welfare with regard to the effect

that any project involving airport location, a

major runway extension, or runway location may

have on natural resources including, but not lim-

ited to, fish and wildlife, natural, scenic, and rec-

reation assets, water and air quality, and other

factors affecting the environment, and shall au-

thorize no such project found to have adverse ef-

fect unless the Secretary shall render a finding,

in writing, following a full and complete review,

which shall be a matter of public record, that no

feasible and prudent alternative exists and that

all possible steps have been taken to minimize

such adverse effect.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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