Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Holtzman v. Schlesinger

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SUPRER. COURT. UL &.

IN THE i

Supreme Court of the United Sisies

OcTOBER TERM, 1973

No. 23 = Q 4 l

——

EvizabpeTH HoLtTzMaN, individually and in her capacity as a

member of the United States House of Representatives; 1st

Lr. ARTHUR Watson, 43rd Strategic Wing, United States Air

Force, Anderson Air Force Base, Guam; Carrain James H.

Strain, 43rd Strategic Wing, United States Air Force, Ander-

son Air Force Base, Guam; Caprain MicuaeL. FLUGGER, 43rd

Strategic Wing, United States Air Force, Anderson Air Force

Base, Guam; and Captain DonaLp E. Dawson, 307th Strategic

Wing, United States Air Force, U-Tapao, Thailand,

Petitioners.

—against—

JaMEs R. SCHLESINGER, individually and as Secretary of Defense:

Jounx L. McLvcas, individually and as Secretary of the Air

Force; and Wiiiiam P. CLEMENTS, individually and as Deputy

Secretary of Defense,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

\

Burt NEUBORNE

LEON FRIEDMAN

Metvin L. WULF

American Civil Liberties Union

22 East 40th Street

New York, New York

Attorneys for Petitioners

Of Counsel:

Marvin M. KarPATKIN

NorMAN SIEGAL

a TS

INDEX

PAGE

aera la a Sean ae ick ne ill

SN nae anes eevee suena 2

EOI ae LLP LR LEAST NEL LOD 3

NINN NO ccc rcnicbslcindaasntbnceomrresonenelaees 3

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ...... 4

Statement of the Case —_....... he BLEND, RIS PO +

Reasons For GRANTING THE WRIT:

Certiorari should be granted because the decision

of the majority below, upholding the legality of

orders directing petitioners to bomb Cambodia,

incorrectly resolved an issue of critical national

significance and established a potentially disas-

trous precedent validating unilateral executive

Fe gett al ch GRO IA SAY 5 RO NEE SEO NEE 10

1. Congress Neither Authorized Nor Ratified the

Orders Directing Petitioners to Bomb Cam-

ND etn ee ee akicsan 13

2. No Procedural Obstacle Exists to Judicial Re-

view of the Legality of the Orders Directing

Petitioners to Bomb Cambodia ~ 02.0... 19

ei See REEL REID 19

IIR no ne ne a °0

i

PAGE

C. Political Question 2... seers 21

D. Exhaustion of Military Remedies .-.........-.---- 26

CGMCTUBION a cccscenn onc nno nnn nsenesenonetesesenssunnenenseeninsnssenensanerentes 27

APPENDIX:

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit ......-.....-.--.--..----sse--e-onssennereeeneses la

Order Denying Rehearing in Bane ........---------------- 26a

United States District Court's Opinion of June 13,

sien ereree ein menncagmeninpeeenaceencionsinns 28a

United States District Court's Opinion of July 25,

ec esis deatnainaanerenninnnnnnynccterrensneaiea setae tta

Justice Marshall's Opinion Denying Application to

Vacate Stay oon... c-ceseececceecceeecececeesesesnenenensetensnenenses 72a

Justice Douglas’ Opinion Vacating Stay ........----.--- Sta

Justice Marshali’s Opinion Granting Stay -............. 89a

Justice Douglas’ Dissenting Opinion ...........-.------ 91:

Denial of Application for Extraordinary Sitting .. 96a

Justice Burger's Order Denying Extraordinary

dk RMD ae ASME anor iar mere te ara Va

Judgment of District Court: ........----- eee Sa

iii

PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: .

Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966) ..........-... 20

Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) -....... 10, 11

Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970) ...........--- 11, 12, 24

Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess

Anne County, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) -.....-----------e 20

Da Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971) cert.

den., 405 U.S. 979 (1972) -..-..--e-eccceeeeeeceesseeeeectetesstees 6, 11, 12

Da Costa v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973) -........... 12

Levy v. Parker, —— F.2d —— (3rd Cir. 1973), cert.

U.S. ——, 42 U.S.L.W. 3235 (Oct. 23,

granted,

UTS) ness nsanennnnancnnnenceennveseceneensncnvserenensennnannsenennavewensennnnsnsenes 27

Massachusetts v. Laird, $51 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971) ...11, 12

Mitchell v. Laird, F.2d —— (D.C. Cir. 1973) ........ 6, 12

Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969)... eee 26

Orlando v. Laird. 317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) ..11, 13

Orlando vy. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.) cert. den., 404

TS 6 (i). 6, 11, 12, 15, 24

Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972)... 26

Perkins v. Laird, F.2d —— (8th Cir. 1970) cert.

den.. 403 U.S. 965 (1972) ......-------.-.0--s-c--ceceeesnesnsneeeeneenees 12

Powell v. MeCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) ..........-.------- 20

St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1948) -.........--- 20

Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) ...........-.------------ 20

iv

PAGE

United States v. Johnson, 38 CMR 44 (1967) ~.......... 26-27

United States v. SCRAP, US. CREED mceisccsccs 19, 20

United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953) .... 19

Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.

SONI, MI car ccacescats cast pscauecestpacermaserereseekacaine 13, 22, 23, 24, 25

Constitutional Provisions:

United States Constitution

RID Be I Ba a pacecsconsrestnpuinicayiexciadosseioberaloriesbiies passim

I I oar es cacccnesesicanessdectonind passim

IE Es Bk a ctestactiniciorncceimenvtniccennss passim

Statutes:

Be se WOR iasccatasteaccciccavane sso aedadsrueniacmncivenmarriaas 3

BP MN ee eee cas 13

I I I ol ectpte ccs peaennceaine cena eens 13, 16

ONIN TU OI asso eacce cs dabcsencieaneheinsceneoseibadelanes 21

Other Authorities:

Cong. Ree. H3558—H3598 (daily ed. May 10, 1973) ........ 14

Cong. Ree. $12561 (daily ed. June 29, 1973) ................ 16, 17

Berger, War Making by the President, 121 U. of Pa.

FM Re kk: : EMRENOS DNR: SETI RENTED et Ere Merck een Sena 11

Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations,

United States Senate, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. p. 508

PRI Sisensiaasccasiccislavcaecnaniselin dasscclactaiesdullppiousanaaac msomteonaintein 8

Lofgren, War Making Under the Constitution: The

Original Understanding, 81 Yale L. Jour. 672 (1972) 11

6 Presidential Documents of Richard Nixon, 596 (1970) 6

PAGE

Public Papers of the Presidents, Richard M, Nixon,

1970, pp. 405-410; 476-480: 529-541 (G.P.O. 1971) .... 6,7

Public Papers of the Presidents, Richard M. Nixon,

1971, pp. 265, 449-50 (G.P.O. 1972) ..........cccecceoseceosesses 8

Rehnquist, The Constitutional Issues—Administration

Position, 45 NYU Law Rev. 628 (1970) oo. 6

Stevenson, United States Military Action in Cambodia:

Questions of International Law, reprinted in 3 The

Vietnam War and International Law (Falk ed.

MRD sia auatinn dasa ta reahalicaiica nour otnaseat ama cee ek eee 6-7

Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Powers: A

Critique, 60 Cal, L. Rev. 623 (1972) 0... 1]

pervs Hees

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OctToBeR TERM, 1973

Euizapern Houtrzman, individually and in her capacity as

a member of the United States House of Representa-

tives: Ist Lr. Artruur Warsoxn, 43rd Strategie Wing,

United States Air Foree, Anderson Air Foree Base,

Guam; Captain James H. Stray, 48rd Strategic Wing.

United States Air Force, Anderson Air Foree Base,

Guam; Captaris Micnaret Piuvccer, 45rd Strategie Wing,

United States Air lForee, Anderson Air Force Base,

Guam: and Captars Donatp FE. Dawson, 307th Strategic

Wing, United States Air Foree, U-Tapao, Thailand,

Petitioners,

—against—

James R. Scuvesincer, individually and as Secretary of

Defense: Joun L. MeLucas, individually and as Seere-

tary of the Air Force; and Witiiam P. CLements, in-

dividually and as Deputy Secretary of Defense,

Respondents.

<i

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Petitioners pray that a petition for a writ of certiorari

issue to review the judgment of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit, entered on August 8,

1973, reversing the determination of the Distriet Court,

Bradissisnsinen wor

9

a

dated July 25, 1973, that the Executive lacked constitutional

authorization to commit American forces to combat in and

over Cambodia.

Opinions Below

The majority and dissenting opinions of the Second Cir-

cuit reversing the decision of the District Court are re-

ported at 484 F.2d 1307 and are set forth in the Appendix,

infra, at pp. la-25a. The order of the Second Circuit deny-

ing rehearing in bane (Oakes, J., dissenting) is not officially

reported and is set forth in the Appendix, infra, at p. 27a.

The decision of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of New York (Judd, J.), ruling that the

Executive lacked constitutional authority to order peti-

tioners to bomb Cambodia is reported at 361 F. Supp.

d44 and 361 F. Supp. 553 and is set forth in the Appendix,

infra, at pp. 28a-Tla. The opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall

declining to vacate the stay of the District Court’s order

is reported at —— US. , 388 L. Ed.2d 18 and is set

forth in the Appendix at pp. 72a-S4a. The opinion of Mr.

Justice Douglas vacating the stay of the District Court’s

order is reported at US. . 38 L. Ed.2d 28, and

is set forth in the Appendix at pp. 85a-89a. The order of

Mr. Justice Marshall staying the order of the District

Court and Mr. Justice Douglas’ dissent therefrom are re-

ported at U.S. ——. 38 L. Ed.2d 33, and are set forth

in the Appendix at pp. 90a-96a. The orders of the Chief

Justice denying petitioners’ applications for an extraordi-

nary session of the Court are unreported and set forth in

the Appendix at pp. 96a-97a.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on

August 8, 1973 [A la]. A timely petition for rehearing

in bane was denied by the Second Circuit on September 17,

1973 [A 26a-27a]. This Court has jurisdiction to entertain

this petition under 28 U.S.C. ¢1254(1).

Questions Presented

1. Were the orders issued by the Executive branch to

petitioners, directing them to engage in the combat bomb-

ing of Cambodia in May and June, 1973, constitutionally

authorized within the meaning of Article I, Section 8,

Clause 11 of the Constitution?

2. Did the Executive branch possess authority to order

American forces to engage in combat operations in or over

Cambodia in the absence of Congressional authorization?

3. Did Congress authorize the commitment of American

forces to combat in Cambodia within the meaning of Article

I, Section 8 of the Constitution?

4. Do petitioners possess standing to challenge the con-

stitutionality of orders directing American forces to engage

in combat activities in Cambodia?

d. Is judicial review of the constitutionality of orders

directing petitioners to engage in combat in Cambodia pre-

cluded by the political question doctrine?

6. Is this proceeding moot despite the pendency of court

martial charges against a petitioner who refused to obey

orders to bomb Cambodia?

earl |

eT eee

weer

LI RSMEANS ALSO RONMENT AEN PRT RH MOS LAH SIGE RFA A EVENT YOR III BMY 27

eon eae

Deaitesiinninnen Bret ahlih: desi haahidlgion seni

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved

Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution.

Statement of the Case

Petitioners, Captain Donald Dawson, Lt. Arthur Watson,

Captain James H. Strain and Captain Michael Flugger,

were 5-52 bomber crewmen assigned to Air Force combat

units who declined to engage in the bombing of Cambodia

during May and June of 1973.

Petitioner. Elizabeth Holtzman, is a member of the

United States House of Representatives from the 16th Con-

gressional District of New York who challenged the author-

ity of the Executive branch to commit American forces to

combat in Cambodia in the absence of Congressional au-

thorization.

Congresswoman Holtzman commenced this action in

April, 1973. While the District Court pondered proce-

dural aspects of the case, Captain Strain, Captain Flugger,

Lt. Watson and Captain Dawson joined Congresswoman

Holtzman in challenging the constitutionality of orders di-

recting them to bomb Cambodia [A 42a-43a; 7la].

Upon announcing their intention to challenge the legality

of orders directing them to bomb Cambodia, Captain

Strain, Captain Flugger and Lt. Watson were immediately

declared unfit for flight duty and returned to the United

States to undergo psychiatric evaluation. Lt. Watson has

been permitted to resign from the Air Force.* Captain

‘Lt. Watson's resignation carries with it an unsatisfactory ef-

ficiency rating attributable not to his combat performance. which

all concede was exemplary, but solely to his refusal to bomb Cam-

bodia.

a PS Os gg ee Ce Rar rm

3

Strain and Captain Flugger have remained in the Air

Force, but continue to be barred from flight duty and pro-

fessional advancement solely because they refused to bomb

Cambodia in the absence of Congressional authorization.

Captain Dawson’s refusal to bomb Cambodia was met

with a more drastic response. He was charged with failure

to obey a lawful order to bomb Cambodia and is currently

assigned to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines await-

ing trial by General Court Martial.

As Mr. Justice Marshall has already noted herein [A

73a], the basie facts underlying this controversy are mat-

ters of public record and have been exhaustively canvassed

by Judge Judd in his District Court opinion [A 45a-7la].

Prior to April 30, 1970, the Executive branch repeatedly

assured both the Congress and the American people that

the United States was not engaged in combat activities in

or over Cambodia. As Mr. Justice Marshall and Judge

Oakes noted, however, the Executive's pre-April 30, 1970

disclaimers were pursuant to a systematic plan of decep-

tion designed to conceal covert American combat operations

in Cambodia from Congress and the American people.*

* Convocation of Captain Dawson's court martial has heen de-

layed pending a decision on his application for discharge as a

conscientious objector. To date. the application has been denivd by

several levels of Air Force authority. Final review by the Secre-

tary of the Air Force has not heen completed.

* Indeed. the Air Force falsified its internal records in order to

conceal the scope and nature of American combat activity in Cam-

bedia. The falsified records were inadvertently submitted to Judze

Judd by the United States Attorney. acting in the best of faith.

When the falsification became known. the false fizures were replaced

with new data which, we are assured. accurately reflect United

States combat activity in Cambodia.

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ab Avena ids ink ies

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MA aud

Bailie sicp rissa messiness

6

On April 30, 1970, the Executive ordered American forces

“to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-

Vietnam border.” 6 Presidential Documents of Richard

Nixon, 596, 598 (1970). In response to widespread attacks

upon the power of the Executive to order American forces

to combat in Cambodia in the absence of Congressional

authorization, then Deputy Attorney General William

Rehnquist argued that the lawful presence of American

forces in Vietnam' created penumbral constitutional author-

ity in the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take steps

to protect the lives of Americans fighting in Vietnam. See

generally, Rehnquist, The Constitutional Isswes—Admin-

istration Position, 45 NYU Law Rev. 628 (1970); Public

Papers of the Presidents, Richard Nixon, 1970, pp. 405-

410; 476-480; 529-541 (G.P.O. 1971); Stevenson, United

States Military Action in Cambodia: Questions of Inter-

* The legality of the commitment of American combat forces to

Vietnam in the absence of explicit Congressional authorization is

itself a highly doubtful proposition. Although several courts have

found sufficient Congressional authorization of the Vietnam war

in the passage of military appropriations bills, petitioners earnestly

believe that such a view of the war powers clause renders it a

virtual nullity. Petitioners agree with the observation of Judges

Wyzanski and Bazelon in Mitchell v. Laird, F.2d (D.C.

Cir. 1973), that a vote on a collateral appropriation bill cannot

provide the explicit and formal Congressional action required hy

Article I, Section 8, clause 11. The issue is diseussed at length in

the petition of certiorari lodged with this Court in Orlando v.

Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2nd Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971)

and Da Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2nd Cir. 1971) cert. denied,

405 U.S. 979 (1972) respectively. However, whatever the effect of

appropriations bills on the use of force in Vietnam, no similar

authorization existed for the use of American forces in Cambodia.

In view of the apparently active participation by Mr. Justice

Rehnquist in the formulation and enunciation of the Executive's

legal position, petitioners have filed a motion requesting him to

recuse himself from participation in this case.

-

é

national Law, reprinted in 3 The Vietnam War and Inter-

national Law (Falk ed. 1972).

In the period after April 30, 1970, the Executive consist-

ently espoused the “penumbral power” doctrine and justi-

fied its sporadie use of combat forces in Cambodia solely

as necessary to protect the lives of American soldiers de-

ployed in Vietnam. Thus, on June 3, 1970, President

Nixon stated:

“The only remaining American activity in Cambodia

after July 1 [1970] will be air missions to interdict

the movement of enemy troops and material where J

find that it is necessary to protect the lives and security

of our men in South Vietnam.” Public Papers of the

Presidents, Richard M. Nixon, 1970, p. 478 (G.P.O.

1971). (Emphasis added)

Again, on June 30, 1970, President Nixon stated:

“We will conduct—with the approval of the Cambodian

Government—air interdiction missions against the

enemy efforts to move supplies and personnel through

Cambodia toward South Vietnam to reestablish base

areas relevant to the war in Vietnam. We do this to

protect our forces in South Vietnam. Public Papers

of the Presidents, Richard M. Nixon, 1970, p. 538

(G.P.O. 1971) (emphasis added).

Finally, on July 1, 1970, President Nixon stated:

“I'm going to use, as I should, the air power of the

United States to interdict all flows of men and supplies

which I consider are directed toward South Vietnam.

That is my role in defending American men.” Ibid., p.

502 (emphasis added).

Betws. dy

8

See also, Public Papers of the Presidents, Richard M.

Nixon, 1971, pp. 265, 449-50 (G.P.O. 1972); Testimony of

Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Hearings before the

Committee on foreign Relations, United States Senate,

92nd Cong., lst Sess. p. 508 (1971).

On April 1, 1973, the last American soldier was with-

drawn from South Vietnam. Since American military ac-

tivity in Cambodia had been justified solely as necessary

to protect American forces in South Vietnam, the with-

drawal of American forces from South Vietnam on April

1, 1973 deprived the Executive of the only legal basis

which it had ever asserted for the use of American combat

forces in Cambodia. Deprived of the only legal basis which

it had ever asserted for ordering American forces to Cam-

bodia, the Executive embarked on a search for a new legal

“handle” which would permit it to continue the vastly

intensified bombing of Cambodia.

On July 25, 1973, Judge Judd ruled that no Congres-

sional authorization existed for the commitment of Amer-

ican forces to combat in Cambodia [A 44a-7la]. On July

27, 1973, a panel of the Second Circuit stayed Judge Judd’s

decision pending review on the merits. On August 1, 1973,

Mr. Justice Marshall declined to vacate the Second Cir-

cuit’s stay [A 72a-S4a]. On August 4, 1973, Mr. Justice

Douglas vacated the Second Circuit’s stay and reinstated

Judge Judd’s injunction [A 85a-89a]. On August 4, 1973,

Mr. Justice Marshall issued a superseding order staying

Judge Judd’s injunction pending appeal [A 90a]. On Au-

gust 6, 1973, the five available active judges of the Second

Circuit denied petitioners’ application to hear the appeal

A SN LE 2 eit 2

9

from Judge Judd’s order in bane.’ On August 8, 1973, a

divided panel of the Second Circuit, consisting of Judges

Oakes, Mulligan and Timbers, reversed Judge Judd’s de-

termination,’ ruling that petitioners lacked standing [A

17a-19a]; that judicial review of the legality of orders to

bomb Cambodia was barred by the political question doc-

trine [A 4a-l2a]: and that Congress had, in directing the

Executive to terminate the bombing of Cambodia no later

than August 15, 1973, impliedly authorized hostilities until]

that date [A 13a-l7a]. On August 9 and 10, 1973, peti-

tioners’ applications to the Chief Justice for an extraordi-

nary sitting of this Court were denied [A 96a-97a].

Six Federal judges have expressed an opinion on the

merits of this controversy: Judge Judd and Judge Oakes

have sustained petitioners’ position; Mr. Justice Marshall

and Mr. Justice Douglas have indicated sympathy for peti-

tioners’ position. Only two of the six, Judges Mulligan

and Timbers, have rejected it. In view of the extraordinary

importance of both the substantive and procedural issues

raised herein and in view of the fact that the views es-

poused by a majority of the panel below have commanded

the support of only two of the six judges who have spoken

in this case, final resolution of the matter by this Court

seems particularly appropriate.

° Judge Mulligan, in his majority opinion, suggests that the

denial of in bane status was designed to expedite the appellate

process [A 4a].

* Judge Mulligan wrote for the majority. Judge Oakes dissented.

rattle obissiaes,

10

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Certiorari should be granted because the decision of

the majority below, upholding the legality of orders

directing petitioners to bomb Cambodia, incorrectly

resolved an issue of critical national significance and

established a potentially disastrous precedent validating

unilateral executive warmaking.

Captain Donald Dawson is facing a General Court Mar-

tial for declining to bomb Cambodia on June 21, 1973.

His colleagues, Lt. Watson, Captain Flugger and Captain

Strain, have either resigned from the service or been indefi-

nitely grounded because they sought to challenge the

legality of orders directing them to bomb Cambodia. In

refusing to declare petitioners’ orders unlawful, the ma-

jority below refused to be bound by the law which had

painfully evolved from litigation questioning the legality

of the Vietnam war and, instead, virtually abdicated all

judicial responsibility for the enforcement of a critical pro-

vision of the Constitution.’

Although litigation concerning the constitutionality of

the commitment of American forces to combat in Vietnam

has been voluminous* (and divided on many questions),

several basic principles have emerged clearly, and have

varied hardly at all from those initially enunciated by

* Judge Judd, in his opinion, applied precisely the standards

which he had utilized three years earlier to uphold the legality of

the commitment of American forces to combat in South Vietnam.

Berk vy. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).

*The cases are collected below. 484 F.2d at 1312 n. 3 [A

12a-13a].

2 ANE EE TE Toe in ER RARE A RT i es

11

Judges Judd and Dooling in their pioneer efforts in Berk

Vv. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) and Orlando y.

Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).

First, prior to the decision below, our courts had been

virtually unanimous in holding that “(history makes clear

that Congressional power ‘to declare war’ conferred by

Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution was intended as an

explicit restriction upon the power of the Executive to

initiate war on his own prerogative...” Berk y. Laird,

429 F.2d 305 (2nd Cir. 1970) at 305.°

Second, our courts had ruled that the Executive lacked

unilateral power to commit American forces to combat in

the absence of Congressional authorization or ratification,

E.g. Orlando y. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2nd Cir. 1971)

cert. denied, 404 U.S, 869 (1971).

Third, three circuits had ruled that while the form

utilized by the legislature to express its authorization of

combat activities is solely within the discretion of Congress,

the judiciary may—and should—determine whether Con-

gress has—in fact—authorized the Executive to order

Americans into combat. E.g. Massachusets vy. Laird, 451

F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); Orlando yx. Laird, supra; Da Costa

v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2nd Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405

dent, 121 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 29 (1972); Wormuth. Th: Niron

Theory of the War Powers: A Critique, 60 Cal. L. Rev 623 (1972) ;

Lofgren, War Making Under the Constitution: The Original

Understanding, 81 Yale L. Jour. 672 (1972).

12

U.S. 979 (1972); Perkins v. Laird, —— F.2d —— (Sth Cir.

1970) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972)."°

Finally, our courts have recognized that when the Legis-

lature and Executive branches are in open conflict concern-

ing the waging of war, it is the duty of the judiciary to

enforce the Constitution against a recalcitrant Executive.

E.g. Berk vy. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2nd Cir. 1970) at 305;

Orlando v. Laird, 445 F.2d 1089 (2nd Cir. 1971) at 1042;

Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971) at 34;

Da Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 13868 (2nd Cir. 1971) at 1370;

Da Costa y. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2nd Cir. 1973) at 1156.

Unfortunately, in declining to affirm Judge Judd, the

majority below upheld the legality of military combat

orders issued in the absence of a shred of Congressiortal

authorization and reiterated in the teeth of formal and

explicit Congressional opposition. Unless corrected, the

erroneous refusal of the majority below to perform its

constitutional duty will stand as a dangerous invitation to

Executive intransigence. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter cau-

tioned t. enty-one years ago, in words which have acquired

even more signficance with the passage of a generation:

The accretion of dangerous power does not come in

a day. It does come, however slowly, from the genera-

*° Petitioners believe that Article I, Section 8 requires that Con-

gress authorize the commitment of American forces to combat in

a formal, explicit and unambiguous manner. Accordingly, while

petitioners are in basic agreement with many of the lezal principles

articulated in Orlando v. Laird, supra, and its progeny, petitioners

disagree with so much of those opinions as per uit Congress to

authorize a war by implication by enacting collateral measures.

Petitioners believe that it is not too much to ask that decisions of

the magnitude of authorizing armed hostilities be taken with the

formality and explicitness which would be required of a private

party contracting for the purchase of a parcel of real estate or

making a will. Cf. Mitchell v. Laird, F.2d —— (D.C. Cir.

1973) (per Bazelon and Wyzanski, JJ.).

13

tive force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions

that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of

authority, Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,

343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).

If we are to prevent the “accretion of dangerous power”

which would flow from the judicial validation of the pro-

cedures utilized by the Executive in ordering petitioners

to bomb Cambodia, the decision of the majority below must

be set aside.

1. Congress Neither Authorized Nor Ratified the Orders

Directing Petitioners to Bomb Cambodia.

Judge Mulligan ruled below that Congress, in forbidding

the Executive to bomb Cambodia after A

ugust 15, 1973"

had impliedly—

and unwittingly—ratified and authorized

the bombing of Cambodia up to that date. Howey

view of Congressional activity indicates that Congress, far

from authorizing or ratifying the bombing of Cambodia,

repeatedly, explicitly and formally declined to do so and

took every step available to it to terminate the

unilateral commitment of forces to combat.

er, a re-

Executive's

On May 10, 1973, the House of Repr

esentatives declined

by a vote of 219-188 to authorize

the Executive to transfer

funds to the Pentagon's Cambodian account to p

ay for the

bombing of Cambodia.”

* PL 93-52; PL 93-50,

'* Having suffered this rebuff in the House, the P

discovered that it did not really need the transfer authority to

bomb Cambodia and never renewed its request. Of course, the

failure to obtain transfer authority did not prevent the Pentagon

from continuing the bombing unabated.

entagon suddenly

AEM LE ALE, MOLI DE LEGG I: CE:

_ — ‘ PURO nt

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14

Moreover, on May 10, 1973, the House of Representa-

tives, by a vote of 224-188, adopted an amendment pro-

posed by Representative Long of Maryland, which pro-

vided:

“None of the funds herein appropriated to the Depart-

ment of Defense under this Act shall be expended to

support directly or indirectly combat activities in, over

or from off the shores of Cambodia by United States

forces.”

The debate surrounding the adoption by the House of

the Long Amendment clearly reveals the hostility with

which the Cambodian bombing was viewed. See generally,

Cong. Ree. May 10, 1973, pp. H3558-H3598 (daily ed.).

On May 31, 1973, the Senate, by a vote of 63-19, adopted

an amendment proposed by Senator Eagleton which pro-

vided:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds

herein, heretofore or hereafter appropriated may be

obligated or expended to finance the involvement of

United States military forces in hostilities in or over

or from off the shores of Laos or Cambodia.”

Although the tenor of the House and Senate amendments

were similar, since the Senate version was more stringent,

the differing provisions were sent to a Senate-House Con-

ference Committee. The Senate conferees insisted upon

the stringent Eagleton Amendment, while the House con-

ferees, led by Representative Mahon, who made no secret

of his opposition to any restraints on American military

activities in Cambodia, refused to accede. Finally, on June

ASU AR TR | AN Ber emmee

15

25, 1973, the House of Representatives voted 235-172 to

accept the Eagleton Amendment. The Second Supplemental

Appropriations Act of 1973, containing the Eagleton

Amendment, was accepted by the Senate on June 26, 1973,

by a vote of 81-11, and sent to the President for his signa-

ture. However, on June 27, 1973, President Nixon, in an

unprecedented refusal to accede to the will of Congress in

refusing to authorize military activity, vetoed the Seeond

Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1973 because he found

the restraints upon his military activities unacceptable."

On June 27, 1973, the House of Representatives voted

240-175 to override the veto, but fell 35 votes short of the

required 33 majority.

Faced with (a) the certainty of a Presidential veto of

any bill containing the Eagleton Amendment and (b) the

critical necessity of enacting general governmental fund-

ing legislation prior to the expiration of the fiscal year on

June 30, 1973, Congress sought to walk a constitutional

tightrope. On the one hand Congress wished to enact the

desperately needed 1973-1974 general governmental funding

bills, but on the other hand Congress wished to avoid the

pitfall (created in part by the analysis in Orlando) of

unwillingly authorizing the President's use of force in

Cambodia by appropriating money for the war's prosecu-

—

*S A serious question exists as to whether the President may veto

an exercise of Congress’ independent constitutional responsibilities

under Article I, Section 8. However, since, despite the veto, no

Congressional authorization for the Cambodian bombing exists, it

is unnecessary to explore the legality of the President's purported

veto, Since it is the President's inertial responsibility under Article

I, Section 8 to induce a majority of Congress to affirmatively author-

ize a war, it is difficult to understand how the President ean veto

the expression of a majority of both Houses explicitly forbidding

him from engaging in a given war.

a

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16

tion. Congress solved its dilemma by re-enacting general

funding legislation containing the Eagleton Amendment

expressing its unequivocal opposition to the bombing of

Cambodia but deferring the mandatory cut-off of Cam-

bodian funds until August 15, 1973, upon extracting a prom-

ise from the President that he would not veto such a bill.

President Nixon, thereupon, signed the desperately needed

general funding bills on June 30, 1973 with the Eagleton

Amendments as modified.**

The Executive now argues that Congress, in deferring

the date of the cut-off of funds in the Eagleton Amendment

until August 15, 1973, in order to avoid a threatened Presi-

dential veto, unwittingly authorized and ratified the Execu-

tive’s use of force in Cambodia. However, it is absurd to

contend that Congress, having been frustrated by an un-

precedented Presidential veto in its efforts to cut-off all

funds for Cambodia, authorized or approved the use of

force in Cambodia merely because, in the words of Senator

McGovern, it embarked upon a “tactical effort to get the

best possible veto-proof solution.” Cong. Rec. June 29,

1973, p. S12561 (daily ed.).

Senator Fulbright, perhaps the Senate’s most implacable

foe of American military operations in Vietnam, Laos and

Cambodia, was the principal architect of the ‘‘veto-proof

solution” which the government now contends acts as a

** Thus, the final text of the Eagleton Amendment, attached to

the continuing resolution, provides:

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after

August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated

may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly

combat activities hy United States military forces in or over

or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos

or Cambodia.” Pub. Law 93-52.

Pa Se Ee ee ee

17

back door approval of the Cambodian bombing. In explain-

ing his support of the modified Eagleton Amendment, Sena-

tor Fulbright stated:

“The acceptance of an August 15 cut-off date should

in no way be interpreted as recognition by the [Senate

Foreign Relations Committee] of the President’s au-

thority to engage U.S. forces in hostilities until that

date. The view of most members of the committee has

been and continues to be that the President does not

have such authority in the absence of specific Congres-

sional approval.” Cong. Rec. June 29, 1973, p. $12560

(daily ed.).

* * s s st

“The acceptance of an August 15 cutoff date should in

no way be interpreted as recognition by the Committee

of the President's authority to engage United States

forces in hostilities until that date.” Id. at S12562.

During the extensive debate on the modified Eagleton

Amendment not a single member of the Senate suggested

that its passage was intended to bestow any authority on

the Executive to bomb Cambodia. Rather, no fewer than

23 Senators** explicitly asserted that the passage of the

modified Eagleton Amendment could not authorize the

* Fulbright, Javits, MeGovern, Eagleton, Mansfield, Hatfield,

Kennedy, Bayh, Stevenson, MeIntyre, Church, Haskell. Humphrey,

Hallings, Muskie, Mathias, Nelson, Hartke, Pastore, Mondale, Moss.

Cranston and Symington. Senators Eagleton, Bayh and Muskie

expressed the fear that the Executive would attempt to misuse the

enactment of the August 15 cut off as an implied authorization

for the bombing. They were repeatedly assured, however. by the

measure’s sponsor that it did not grant any authority to the Execu-

tive, but merely sought to end his actions in Cambodia at the earliest

“veto-proof” date.

A Or ee AOS

ne

18

President to engage in hostilities. As Senator Allen, hardly

a Senate dove, noted:

“The Amendment is not a grant of authority. It is a

limitation on authority, and it will bring this war to

a very definite halt.” Jd. at $12575.

It is, therefore, futile for the Executive to suggest that

the modified Eagleton Amendment, designed to end the

Cambodian bombing as quickly as Congress understood it

possible to do so, had the unintended effect of establishing

a fictitious Congressional assent to the war in Cambodia.

As Judge Judd noted below:

“It cannot be the rule that the President needs a vote

of only one-third plus one of either House in order

to conduct a war, but this would be the consequence of

holding that Congress must override a Presidential

veto in order to terminate hostilities which it has not

authorized” [A 69a].

Unless this Court affirms Judge Judd, the President will

be empowered to commit American forces to combat over

the objections of the Congress and to continue his military

policies so long as he can persuade one-third of either

House to sustain his veto. Such a procedure, permitting

the American President far more power than the British

sovereign, is a far ery from the hopes of the Founding

Fathers when they sought by the war powers clause to

establish Congress as the ultimate arbiter of war and

peace.

The majority below appeared to assume that it remains

constitutional for the Executive to commit American forces

19

to combat unilaterally so long as 24 of both Houses of Con-

gress do not order him to stop. However, the inertial bur-

den under Article I, Section 8, clause 11, does nct lie with

Congress to marshal veto-proof majorities in both Houses

to prevent the President from waging war: rather, the

inertial burden lies with the President to secure the ap-

proval of a majority of both Houses as a pre-condition to

the waging of war. Whether or not Congress was able to

express its opposition to the commitment of American

forces to combat in Cambodia by veto-proof majorities, it

remains clear that the President failed in his inertial bur-

den of persuading majorities of both Houses to grant him

Constitutional authorization to wage war in Cambodia.

2. No Procedural Obstacle Exists to Judicial Review of

the Legality of the Orders Directing Petitioners to

Bomb Cambodia.

A. Standing

The majority below ruled that the Air Force petitioners

lacked standing to challenge the legality of orders direct-

ing them to bomb Cambodia because the Air Force had

removed them from combat status [A 1l7a-1%a]. However.

such a wooden application of the standing doctrine is wholly

at variance with the decisions of this Court. e.g. United

States v. SCRAP, US. (1973).° and establishes

a blueprint for evasion permitting the military to frustrate

judicial review merely by reassigning dissenters. Cf. United

States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953).

The majority's refusal to recognize the Air Force peti-

tioners’ standing ignores the vital and continuing personal

*6In fact, such an application confuses standing with mootness.

a ——E — — SS te RETR RE

20

stake which each maintains in this controversy. In de-

clining to recognize Captain Dawson’s standing, the ma-

jority was without judicial sanction. Captain Dawson is

awaiting General Court Martial for declining to comply

with the orders to bomb Cambodia at issue herein. To

refuse to recognize such a “stake” in the outcome of this

litigation as sufficient to satisfy “standing” is to reduce

the concept to a meaningless post hoc label. Compare,

United States v. SCRAP, U.S. —— (1973).

B. Mootness

It will doubtless be argued that this case is moot in

view of the cessation of American bombing of Cambodia

on August 14, 1973. However, the legality of the orders

directing petitioners to bomb Cambodia remains a live

issue generating dramatic practical consequences for each

petitioner. E.g. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) ;

Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne

County, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Bank of Marin vy. England,

38d U.S. 99 (1966). See also, St. Pierre v. United States,

319 U.S. 41 (1948); Sibron v. New Yori:, 392 U.S. 40

(1968).

7 The stake which Captain Strain and Captain Flueger retain

in this controversy is nothing less than the preservation of their

Air Force careers. Each has been indefinitely grounded for chal-

lenging the legality of their orders and can salvage their careers

only hy establishing that they were justified in questioning the

power of the Executive to order them to bomb Cambodia in the

absence of Congressicnal authorization. Captain Strain has already

been passed over for promotion as a consequence of this challenge

to his orders. Lt. Watson has resigned from the Air Force as a

direct consequence of his refusal to bomb Cambodia. His resigna-

tion carried with it an unsatisfactory performance rating attrib-

utable solely to his contention that his Cambodian orders were

unlawful.

rate sts PP Bre Pte eae

The most clearly defined “collateral consequence” herein

attaches to Captain Donald Dawson. Captain Dawson de-

clined to bomb Cambodia on June 21, 1973 and is now

facing a General Court Martial. However, if Congress did

not authorize the commitment of American forces to com-

bat in Cambodia, Captain Dawson’s refusal to bomb Cam-

bodia cannot subject him to court martial. Thus, in the

most literal sense, the issue of whether Captain Dawson

will be the last American casualty in Southeast Asia turns

on the outcome of this proceeding.*

C. Political Question

The majority below ruled that judicial review of the

legality of petitioners’ orders was barred by the political

question doctrine [A 4a-12a]. While several courts have

ruled that the political question doctrine precludes judi-

cial review of the procedures utilized by Congress in exer-

cising its power under Article I, Section 8, clause 11, no

court has suggested that the judiciary is totally powerless

to restrain the Executive from committing American forces

to combat in the teeth of Congressional opposition.

Petitioners do not ask this Court to substitute its judg-

ment for the judgment of the Executive as to the wisdom,

* The collateral consequences attaching to the remaining Air

Force petitioners are described supra at p. 20 n. 17. The recent

enactment of the War Powers Act, PL 93-148. while helpful in

resolving certain issues, does not purport to speak to the constitu-

tional power of the Executive to order forces into combat in the

absence of explicit Congressional authorization. While the War

Powers Act places weleome restraints upon unilateral Executive

warmaking of extended duration, it does not purport to deal with

the critical question raised herein of the President's initial power

to order American forces into combat. Moreover, since the orders

to petitioners were issued prior to the passage of the Act. the

legality of the order directed to Captain Dawson remains un-

affected by subsequent legislation.

PR RER DEEN A 8 me A MEE A EE BO AE Sat

99

propriety or morality of committing American forces to

combat in Cambodia. However, just as this Court’s power is

circumscribed by the Constitution, so the power of the Ex-

ecutive to commit American forces to combat is subject to

constitutional limitation. It is the gravamen of this case,

not that the Executive was wrong about the wisdom of mili-

tary activities in Cambodia, but that the political branch

explicitly designated by Article I, Section 8, clause 11 of the

Constitution to be the ultimate arbiter of war and peace

has been ignored and repudiated by the Executive’s uni-

lateral commitment of American forces to combat in Cam-

bodia. Thus, petitioners do not ask this Court to “second

guess” the President, but merely to review whether the

branch of government to which the war power has been

textually committed by the Constitution has, in fact, au-

thorized the commitment of American forces to Cambodia.

In effect, petitioners ask this Court to do nothing more than

assure conformity to constitutional norms of procedural

conduct in the exercise of the most awesome power any

nation can possess—the power to impose its will on others

by armed force.

In Youngstown Sheet € Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.

579 (1952), the Supreme Court ruled that President

Truman had acted in excess of his constitutional powers in

seizing the nation’s steel mills to head off a threatened

strike which he feared would hinder the Korean war effort.

Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court in Youngstown,

phrased the issue and summarized the arguments of the

parties as follows:

“We are asked to decide whether the President was

acting within his constitutional power when he issued

an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take

s.- Geiser eS * See 2 Eee ia.

23

possession of and operate most of the nation’s steel

mills. The mill owners argue that the President’s

order amounts to lawmaking, a legislative function

which the Constitution has expressly confided to the

Congress and not to the President. The government’s

position is that the order was made on findings of the

President that his action was necessary to avert a na-

tional catastrophe which would inevitably result from a

stoppage of steel production, and that in meeting this

grave emergency the President was acting within the

aggregate of his constitutional powers as the Nation’s

Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief of the

Armed Forces of the United States”. 343 U.S. at 582.

The Court ruled in Youngstown that the determination

whether to seize private property for public use was com-

mitted under Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution to the

Congress—not the Executive—and that in the absence of

express Congressional authorization, the President lacked

constitutional authority to seize the private property in

question.”

Petitioners’ position bears a striking resemblance to

those advanced by the plaintiffs in Youngstown. Para-

phrasing Mr. Justice Black, this Court is asked to decide

whether the President acted in excess of his constitutional

power when he issued orders directing the Secretary of

Defense to order American combat forces to engage in

combat in Cambodia after the withdrawal of American

combat forces from South Vietnam. Petitioners argue

that the President’s order amounts to Executive exercise

‘oF Ts ee

1? As Mr. Justice Douglas has noted, surely the power to seize

lives is no less subject to constitutional limitation than is the power

to seize property [A 87a].

WAret

Ads Peet

24

of the responsibilities explicitly vested in Congress by

Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution. The

Executive's position, drawn largely from the memorandum

of Secretary of State Rogers, is that the President’s order

was made upon a determination by the President that

the pursuit of a stable peace in Indochina required the use

of American combat forces in Cambodia and that, in

carrying out his Cambodian military policy, the President

was acting within the aggregate of his constitutional

powers as the Nation’s Chief Executive and the Com-

mander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

However, just as the authority to seize private property

for public use is an Article I, Section 1 Congressional

power, so the decision as to whether to commit American

forees to fight and perhaps die is ultimately reserved

under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, to Congress.” Ac-

cordingly, the Executive may seize neither steel mills nor

human beings in order to prosecute combat activities in

the absence of clear and explicit Congressional authoriza-

tion. E.g. Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2nd Cir. 1970);

Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert.

denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).

Moreover, applying the identical set of “manageable

standards” utilized by the Youngstown Court, this Court

is equipped to ascertain whether adequate Congressional

authorization exists to commit American forces to combat

in Cambodia.

2° Indeed, the explicit grant of the war power to Congress by

Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, is a more mandatory grant of

authority to the legislature than was the undifferentiated grant

of legislative power to Congress pursuant to Article I, Section 1

which was before the Court in Youngstown.

eee SEAS RE EL eI ae TN

25

The first “manageable standard” utilized by the Youngs-

town Court to measure the existence or non-existence of

Congressional authorization were negative expressions of

Congressional will evidencing a desire to deny the Execu-

tive the power in question. Thus, the Court ia Poungstown

noted that the power to seize private property in order to

avert labor unrest was considered and rejected by Con-

gress in 1947. Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted, first, that

the House in 1947 had explicitly rejected en amendment

to the Taft-Hartley Act which would nave authorized

seizure and, second, that a Committee of the Senate had

similarly rejected seizure legislation in 1947. 345 U.S. at

600-601 ; 602-603. See also, 343 U.S. 659 (Jackson, J., con-

curring); and 343 U.S. at 660 (Burton, J., concurring).

In the instant case, the negative Congressional expres-

sion concerning the commitment of American forces to

Cambodia is infinitely stronger than the equivocal Con-

gressional actions relied upon by the Youngstown Court.*!

The second “manageable standard” utilized by the

Youngstown Court was the inability of the Executive to

point to a Congressional act which could fairly be said was

intended to authorize the actions in question.

Similarly, the Executive in the instant case can point to

no act of Congress from which affirmative authorization

to bomb Cambodia may be fairly implied.

*? The negative expressions of Congress concerning the commit-

ment of American forces to combat in Cambodia are discussed in

detail supra at pp. 13-18. Briefly put, the House of Kepresentatives

repeatedly expressed its opposition to an American com!at role

in Cambodia. (May 10, 1973, 219-188; May 10, 1973, 224-172:

June 25, 1973, 235-172: June 27, 1973, 241-173.) The Senate was

no less explicit. (May 31, 1973, 63-19; June 26, 1973, 81-11; June

27, 1975, 67-29; June 27, 1973, 72-19.)

er rh 6 DE Fe rte OL. MOST ete $e nah

26

D. Exhaustion of Military Remedies

Respondents will doubtless contend that this Court lacks

power to rule on the legality of orders directing petitioners

to bomb Cambodia under traditional notions of exhaustion

of military remedies. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34

(1972).

In Parisi, a serviceman was court martialed for refusing

to obey an order directing him to embark for Vietnam. This

Court ruled that a Federal Court was empowered to grant

his application for a writ of habeas corpus as a conscien-

tious objector despite the pendency of court martial pro-

ceedings.

In Parisi, as in the instant case, the military tribunals

are not functionally equipped to deal with the serious and

difficult constitutional questions raised by the plaintiffs.

Cf. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969) at 696 n. 8. The ex-

pertise of the military justice system simply does not

extend to a determination of whether sufficient Congres-

sional authorization for a war exists under Article I, Sec-

tion 8. Only an Article III, civilian, court is equipped to

render a determination on so difficult a constitutional issue.

Indeed, it is highly problematic whether the military justice

system is empowered to declare an order illegal under Arti-

cle I, Section 8. Parisi v. Davidson, supra at 42-44. Accord-

ingly, since the relief which Captain Dawson seeks is not

“available to him with reasonable promptness and certainty

through the machinery of the military judicial system...”

this Court is free to grant appropriate relief. Parisi v.

Davidson, supra at 41-42."

2? The Court of Military Appeals has ruled that it lacks power

to determine whether Congress has authorized military activity

within the meaning of Article I, Section 8, clause 11. E.g., United

27

CONCLUSION

For the reason stated above, a writ of certiorari should

issue herein.

December 15, 1973

Respectfully submitted,

Burt NEUBORNE

Leon FRievpMAN

Metvin L. WuLr

American Civil Liberties Union

22 Kast 40th Street

New York, New York

Attorneys for Petitioners

Of Counsel:

Marvin M. Karpatkin

NorMan SIEGAL

States v. Johnson, 38 CMR 44 (1967). Accordingly, it would be

futile to require Captain Dawson to present his defenses to the

Court of Military Appeals.

Moreover, the experience of Captain Howard Levy and Captain

Dale Noyd, who as a consequence of being obliged to exhaust mili-

tary remedies, were required to serve virtually their entire sen-

tences prior to being permitted access to an Article III Court

cannot he ignored. There is something radically wrong with a

system of justice which required Captain Levy to serve 214 years

in prison before he was permitted access to the civilian court which

vacated his conviction. Levy v. Parker, F.2d (8rd Cir.

1973), cert. granted. USS. , 42 US.L.W. 3235 (Oct. 23,

1973). Certainly, Captain Dawson should not be compelled to

risk prison before being permitted access to the only court system

capable of assessing his defense.

| J pbuaivtpeSie = Te eee :

APPENDIX

a saa blac reheat ail

ARIELLE ST PLIES ELIE TED TIRE DIN RET ET ES t

APPENDIX

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For THE Seconp Circuit

Bn.

-

No. 1132—September Term, 1972.

(Argued August 8, 1973 Decided August 8, 1973.)

Docket No. 73-2094

a.

~

ExizapetH HourzMan, individually and in her capacity as

a member of the United States House of Representa-

tives; Ist Lr. ArrHur Watson, 43rd Strategic Wing,

United States Air Force, Anderson Air Force Base,

Guam; Caprars Micuaet Fivacer, 43rd Strategic Wing.

United States Air Force, Anderson Air Force Base.

Guam; Caprais James H. Srrary, 43rd Strategie Wing,

United States Air Force, Anderson Air Force Base,

Guam; and Caprarxy Doxatp E. Dawson, 307th Strategic

Wing, United States Air Force, U-Tapo, Thailand,

Plaintiff s-Appellees,

—against—

James R. Scutesincer, individually and as Secretary of

Defense; Jonx L. McLvcas, individually and as Acting

Secretary of the Air Foree; and Wiuiam P. Curwents.

individually and as Deputy Secretary of Defense,

Defendants-Appellants.

?

Lr aL oe nee Tete a Th rr a ete vivant

a re il i are hn 1 i te

Before:

Mvtuicay, Oakes and Timsers,

Circuit Judges.

so.

e

Appeal from a judgment entered in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Orrin

G. Judd, Judge, declaring that there was no existing Con-

gressional authority for bombing or ordering military

forces into Cambodia, and permanently enjoining the de-

fendants from further participating in military activities

in or over Cambodia.

Reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the

complaint.

a.

7

Burt Nevrorne, New York, New York (Leon

Friedman, American Civil Liberties Union,

New York, New York; Norman Siegel and

Paul Chevigny, New York Civil Liberties

Union, New York, N.Y., of Counsel), for

Plaintiff s-Appellees.

James Dunstop Porter, Jr., Assistant United

States Attorney, Chief, Civil Division, Brook-

lyn, New York (Robert A. Morse, United

States Attorney for the Eastern District of

New York), for Defendaxts-Appellants,

Eric M. Lrepermax, New York, New York, for

Hon. Parren J. Mitchell, et al. as Amici

Curiae.

JoserpH F. McDoxatp, New York, New York,

for The Lawyers Committee to End the War

and Certain Individuals as Amici Curiae.

ey

~~

3a

Mutuicay, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States

District Court, Eastern District of New York, Hon. Orrin

G. Judd, District Judge, dated July 25. 1973, granting plain-

tiff’s motion for summary judgment and providing both

declaratory and injunctive relief. The judgment declared

that “there is no existing Congressional authority to order

military forces into combat in Cambodia or to release bombs

over Cambodia, and that military activities in Cambodia

by American armed forces are unauthorized and unlawful

....” The order further enjoined and restrained the named

defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees

and attorneys “from participating in any way in military

activities in or over Cambodia or releasing any bombs

which may fall in Cambodia.” The effective date of the

injunction was postponed until 4:00 o'clock on July 27, 1973

to provide the defendants with an opportunity to apply to

this court for a stay pending appeal. A panel of this court

heard oral argument on the stay on the morning of July 27,

1973 and unanimously granted defendants’ motion for a

stay, setting the time for argument of the appeal on August

13, 1973 which was the first day of sitting of the next panel

of this court. The parties were given leave to move for

further expedition of the appeal. Plaintiffs then made ap-

plication to Mr. Justice Marshall of the Supreme Court,

Circuit Justice for the Second Circuit, for a vacatur of

the stay. Mr. Justice Marshall denied the application to

vacate the stay on August 1, 1973 writing an opinion in

which he noted that either side could further advance the

date of the argument before this court. —— U.S. _ On

the motion of plaintiffs, not opposed by defendants. this

court on August Ist further accelerated argument of the

Ppiivsirine: salah ahi or dA

Ae el os cet

4a

appeal to August 8, 1973. On August 2, 1973 plaintiffs made

application to Mr. Justice Douglas to vacate the stay and

on August 4, 1973 he issued an opinion and order vacating

the stay entered by this court. —— U.S. ——. Later in the

afternoon of August 4, 1973, Mr. Justice Marshall rein-

stated the stay announcing that he had polled the other

members of the Supreme Court and that they were unani-

mous in overruling the order of Mr. Justice Douglas.

US. . On August 3, 1973, after a hearing before

Mr. Justice Douglas, plaintiffs petitioned this court for an

en banc hearing of this appeal. By order dated August 6th

this motion was denied by the unanimous vote of the five

active judges of this court who could be readily contacted.

In view of the admonition of Mr. Justice Marshall that it is

in the public interest that the issues herein be resolved as

expeditiously as possible, the convening of this court en

banc could only have delayed a hearing on the merits.

The argument of this appeal was heard on August Sth

and to further speed any further appellate review this court

filed its judgment in the late afternoon of that day, re-

versing the judgment below and dismissing the complaint.

Judge Oakes dissented. We announced that opinions

would promptly follow so that if the Supreme Court did

entertain an appeal it might have the benefit of the views of

the panel. Even though the exigencies of time preclude the

articulation of the majority view as elaborately or com-

pletely as might otherwise be appropriate in a case of this

significance, it nonetheless represents our considered and

deliberate opinion.

I

At the outset, as the parties agreed below and on the

argument on appeal, we should emphasize that we are not

da

deciding the wisdom, the propriety or the morality of the

war in Indo-China and particularly the on-going bombing

in Cambodia. This is the responsibility of the Executive

and the Legislative branches of the government. The role

of the Judiciary is to determine the legality of the chal-

lenged action and the threshold question is whether under

the “political question” doctrine we should decline even to

do that. Ever since Varbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)

137 (1803) the federal courts have declined to judge some

actions of the Executive and some interaction between the

Executive and Legislative branches where it is deemed in-

appropriate that the judiciary intrude. It is not possible

or even necessary to define the metes and bounds of that

doctrine here. The most authoritative discussion of the

subject is found in Mr. Justice Brennan’s opinion in Baker

v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) which elaborated criteria that

have since guided this court in determining whether a

question involving the separation of powers is justiciable or

is a political question beyond our purview. In Orlando v.

Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869

(1971), this court held that the question of whether or not

Congress was required to take some action to authorize the

Indo-China war was justiciable under Baker v. Carr, supra,

since there was present a judicially discoverable and man-

ageable issue. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55

(1939). On the basis of evidence produced at the hearings

in the district court, this court found Congressional authori-

zation in support of the military operations in Southeast

Asia from the beginning, relying on the Tonkin Gulf Reso-

lution of August 10, 1964, plus continuing appropriation

bills providing billions of dollars in support of military

operations as well as the extension of the Military Selective

Service Act. We were careful to note:

Dien. bas iw seat

NN Lar BEST.

ee neta me 25 Ov em Oa rea aed

6a

Beyond determining that there has been some mutual

participation between Congress and the President,

which unquestionably exists here, with action by the

Congress sufficient to authorize or ratify the military

activity at issue, it is clear that the constitutional pro-

priety of the means by which Congress has chosen to

ratify and approve the protracted military operations

in Southeast Asia is a political question. Id. at 1043

(emphasis in original).

It is significant that the court noted that the Tonkin Gulf

Resolution of August 10, 1964 had since been repealed on

December 31, 1970.

In Da Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.

denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972) this court specifically rejected

the contention that the repeal by Congress of the Tonkin

Gulf Resolution removed the Congressional authorization

previously found sufficient in Orlando. We noted:

As the constitutional propriety of the means by which

the Executive and the Legislative branches engaged in

mutual participation in prosecuting the military op-

erations in Southeast Asia, is, as we held in Orlando,

a political question, so the constitutional propriety of

the method and means by which they mutually par-

ticipate in winding down the conflict and in disengag-

ing the nation from it, is also a political question and

outside of the power and competency of the judiciary.

Id. at 1370.

The most recent holding of this court now pertinent is

Da Costa v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (1973) where an inductee

urged that the President’s unilateral decision to mine the

harbors of North Vietnam and to bomb targets in that

7a

country constituted an escalation of the war, which was

illegal in the absence of additional Congressional authoriza-

tion. Judge Kaufman found that this was a political ques-

tion which was non-justiciable, recognizing that the court

was incapable of assessing the facts. He stated in part:

Judges, deficient in military knowledge, lacking vital

information upon which to assess the nature of battle-

field decisions, and sitting thousands of miles from the

field of action, cannot reasonably or appropriately de-

termine whether a specific military operation consti-

tutes an “escalation” of the war or is merely a new

tactical approach within a continuing strategic plan.

What if, for example, the war “de-escalates” so that it

is waged as it was prior to the mining of North Viet-

nam’s harbors, and then “escalates” again? Are the

courts required to oversee the conduct of the war on a

daily basis, away from the scene of action? In this

instance, it was the President's view that the mining of

North Vietnam’s harbors was necessary to preserve

the lives of American soliders (sic) ir South Vietnam

and to bring the war to a close. History will tell

whether or not that assessment was correct, but with-

out the benefit of such extended hindsight we are power-

less to know.

We fail to see how the present challenge involving the

bombing in Cambodia is in any significant manner distin-

guishable from the situation discussed by Judge Kaufman

in Da Costa v. Laird. Judge Judd found that the continuing

bombing of Cambodia, after the removal of American

forces and prisoners of war from Vietnam, represents “a

basic change in the situation: which must be considered

Bivteen sci

Sa

in determining the duration of prior Congressional au-

thorization.” He further found such action a tactical de-

cision not traditionally confided to the Commander-in-Chief.

These are precisely the questions of fact involving military

and diplomatic expertise not vested in the judiciary, which

make the issue political and thus beyond the competence

of that court or this court to determine. We are not privy

to the information supplied to the Executive by his pro-

fessional military and diplomatic advisers and even if we

were, we are hardly competent to evaluate it. If we were

incompetent to judge the significance of the mining and

bombing of North Vietnam’s harbors and territories, we

fail to see our competence to determine that the bombing

of Cambodia is a “‘basie change” in the situation and that

it is not a “tactical decision” within the competence of the

President. It is true that we have repatriated American

troops and have returned American ground forces in Viet-

nam but we have also negotiated a cease fire and have en-

tered into the Paris Accords which mandated a cease fire

in Cambodia and Laos. The President has announced that

the bombing of Cambodia will terminate on August 15,

1973 and Secretary of State Rogers has submitted an affi-

davit to this court’ providing the justification for our mili-

? AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM P. RoGErs

Washington,

District of Columbia, ss.

William P. Rogers, being duly sworn, deposes and says as fol-

lows:

1. In my capacity as Secretary of State of the United States of

America, 1 have knowledge of and responsibility for the conduct

of the foreign relations of the United States, including relations

with the Government of Cambodia.

2. It is my understanding that on July 25, 1973, the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in the

case of Holtzman et al v. Schlesinger et al, ordered the cessation

FN RA ee CET SEIT Be BG . —s ee

papieege Peer 5 . Sere

9a

tary presence and action until that time. The situation

fluctuates daily and we cannot ascertain at any fixed time

either the military or diplomatic status. We are in no

position to determine whether the Cambodian insurgents

of further military activities by United States armed forces in

Cambodia and that this order was stayed by the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. It is my judgment,

that if that stay were not continued, the District Court’s order

would cause irreparable harm to the United States, to the conduct

of our foreign relations, and to the protection of United States

nationals in Cambodia.

3. In the conduct of United States relations with Cambodia, the

American Ambassador in Phnom Penh has communicated to the

Cambodian Government the fact of the enactment on July 1, 1973

of Public Law 93-50 (87 Stat. 99) and Public Law 93-52 (87

Stat. 130). Our Ambassador has further informed the Cambodian

Government that the United States Government interprets the

aforesaid public laws as requiring a cessation of all combat ac-

tivities in Cambodia by the armed forces of the United States on

and after August 15, 1973.

4. In consequence of the enactment of the aforesaid public laws,

intensive planning has been undertaken within the United States

Government and between representatives of the American and

Cambodian Governments. As a result, plans have been developed

which include:

(i) emergency increases in the levels of the Cambodian

armed forces;

(ii) accelerated deliveries and distribution during the first

two weeks in August of military equipment, especially air-

craft and related spare parts, pursuant to the United States

Military Assistance Program;

(iii) accelerated deliveries and distribution during this

same period of food stuffs, medical supplies and other items

for humanitarian relief of the Cambodian population;

(iv) redeployment of Cambodian armed forces. and in some

cases civilians whom those forces are protecting, from exposed

positions to positions where they can defend themselves and

be resupplied in the absence of United States combat air sup-

port on and after August 15, 1973.

5. All of the above-described plans are for the purpose of im-

proving the Government of Cambodia’s self-defense capability

through assistance programs approved by the Congress and the

President. All of these plans have been premised upon an as-

Bien. War Gee IN

10a

are patriots or whether in fact they are inspired and

manned by North Vietnam Communists. While we as men

may well agonize and bewail the horror of this or any war,

the sharing of Presidential and Congressional responsibility

particularly at this juncture is a bluntly political and not

a judicial question.

sumption of continued United States combat air support for the

Cambodian armed forces through August 14, 1973. On the basis

of the information available to me, it is my judgment that the

absence of such air support prior to that date would permit hostile

military forces to disrupt those plans and would expose United

States military and civilian personnel who are responsible for their

implementation, to grave risk of personal injury or death.

6. Moreover, in view of this close cooperation and planning be-

tween the United States and the Cambodian Government, and

considerable reliance placed by the Cambodian Government on

this agreed timing, any premature and unilateral cessation of

needed air support by the United States would he seen by the

Government of Cambodia and by many other governizents as a

breach of faith by the United States and would seriously under-

mine the credibility of the United States and impair the conduct

of our foreign relations.

7. Quite apart from the question of timing, the order of the

District Court, in enjoining “military activities” might well be

construed more broadly than the prohibitions against “combat

activities” contained in the above-mentioned public laws and

thereby could be deemed to preclude such activities as the use of

United States armed forces to evacuate United States diplomatic

personnel and other United States nationals from Cambodia should

this be required at any future time, even after United States

combat activities in Cambodia have ceased.

8. The specific consequences as described herein of a failure to

stay the District Court’s order would constitute irreparable harm

to the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States by

imperiling the ability of the Government of Cambodia to prepare

for assuming full responsibility for its defense, by imperiling the

safety of United States nationals in Cambodia, and by undermin-

ing the credibility of the United States. In a broader sense, the

efforts of the United States to achieve a stable peace in Indochina

would be undermined and the cease-fire agreements presently in

effect in Viet-Nam and Laos would be gravely jeopardized.

/s/ Witu1am P. RocGers

SE AE ot 0 ah ae : wae . ~s 2 Oe A

Fee TI

[SRB CERES ROR RN:

lla

We think the comments of Judge Wyzanski writing for

a unanimous Court of Appeals panel in the District of

Columbia are particularly apt here:

Whether President Nixon did so proceed [to end the

war] is a question which at this stage in history a court

is incompetent to answer. A court cannot procure

the relevant evidence: some is in the hands of foreign

governments, some is privileged. Even if the necessary

facts were to be laid before it, a court would not sub-

stitute its judgment for that of the President, who has

an unusually wide measure of discretion in this area,

and who should not be judicially condemned except in

a case of clear abuse amounting to bad faith. Other-

wise a court would be ignoring the delicacies of dip-

lomatie negotiation, the inevitable bargaining for the

best solution of an international conflict, and the scope

which in foreign affairs must be allowed to the Presi-

dent if this country is to play a responsible role in the

council of the nations. Mitchell v. Laird, 476 F.2d 533,

538 (1973).

The court below and our dissenting Brother assume that

since American ground forces and prisoners have been re-

moved and accounted for, Congressional authorization has

ceased as determined by virtue of the so-called Mansfield

Amendment, P.L. 92-156, 85 Stat. 433, § 601. The fallacy

of this position is that we have no way of knowing whether

the Cambodian bombing furthers or hinders the goals of

the Mansfield Amendment. That is precisely the holding of

Da Costa vy. Laird, supra, 471 F.2d at 1157. Moreover, al-

though § 601(a)(1) of the Amendment urges the President

I oe er eh BE me “ SO at A RE ID RTI Ks oe

12a

to remove all military forces contingent upon release of

American prisoners, it also in § 601 (a)(2) urges him to

negotiate for an immediate cease fire by all parties in the

hostilities in Indo-China. (Emphasis added). In our view,

the return and repatriation of American troops only repre-

sents the beginning and not the end of the inquiry as to

whether such a basic change has occurred that the Execu-

tive at this stage is suddenly bereft of power and authority.

That inquiry involves diplomatic and military intelligence

which is totally absent in the record before us, and its diges-

tion in any event is beyond judicial management. The stric-

tures of the political question doctrine cannot be avoided

by resort to the law of agency as the court did below,

finding the Congress the principal and the President an

agent or servant.? Judicial tpse dizits cannot provide any

proper basis particularly for the injunctive relief granted

here which is unprecedented in American jurisprudence.*

* The resort of the court below to the Second Restatement of

Agency § 38, promulgated by the American Law Institute, is in-

deed inapposite. Aside from its introductory Scope Note (p. 2)

which disclaims the Restatement’s applicability to public ofticers,

the denomination of the Congress as the Principal and the Presi-

dent as the Agent in the conduct of hostilities is overly simplistic.

It ignores the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief, and his

primacy in foreign relations, particularly in achieving the peace.

See Wallace. The War Making Powers: A Constituticnal Flaw?

57 Cornell L. Rev. 719, 744 (1972). It is perhaps significant that

the Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected a proposal that

the Constitution provide the Congress with the power to declare

peace as well as war, and carefully noted that the conduct of war

“was an Executive function.” 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Fed-

eral Convention of 1787, at 313, 319 & n.* (rev. ed. 1937).

3 To date no other federal court has attempted to halt American

involvement in hostilities in Southeast Asia. Our own court as

well as the First Circuit has concluded that the war-implementing

legislation passed by Congress was sufficient authorization. Da

Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405

U.S. 979 (1972); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971), aff'g 317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N-Y.

8 5 Gabe rete Maks oe een ER ES a ae

a

13a

Il

Since the argument that continuing Congressional ap-

proval was necessary, was predicated upon a determination

1970) and 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (Judd, J.) ; Massa-

chusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), aff'g 327 F. Supp. 378

(D. Mass. 1971). Numerous courts have dismissed suits challeng-

ing American involvement on the ground that a “political ques-

tion” was involved. Mitchell v. Laird, 476 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir.

1973) ; Da Costa v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973); Mora

v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.

934 (1967) ; Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967) (ef. Mitchell v. Laird, supra): Drinan

v. Niron, Civ. No. 73-1424-T (D. Mass., Aug. 8, 1973); Mitchell v.

Richardson, Civ. No. 939-73 (D.D.C., July 23, 1973), notice of

appeal filed, Aug. 1, 1973; Gravel vy. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C.

1972); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd

without opinion, 410 U.S. , 93 S.Ct. 1545 (1973); Massachu-

setts v. Laird, 327 F. Supp. 378 (D. Mass.), aff'd on other grounds.

451 F.2d 26 (Ist Cir. 1971) (hut ef. Mitchell v. Laird, supra) ;

Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Va. 1970). One might also

include cases such as Sarnoff v. Connally, 457 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 409 U.S. 929 (1972), and Head v. Nixon, 342 F. Supp.

521 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 951 (Sth Cir. 1972), where the

courts dismissed claims that Congressional appropriations were an

unconstitutional delegation of the war-making powers, as involving

political questions. See also Atlee v. Laird, supra. Other suits

challenging the legality of the war have been dismissed on other

grounds. Mottola v. Niron, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'g

318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (standing); Pietsch v. Presi-

dent of the United States, 434 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1970). cert.

denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971) (standing) ; Velvel v. Niron, 415 F.2d

236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970), aff’g 287

F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968) (standing); Campen v. Niron, 56

F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (standing); Gravel v. Laird, supra

(political question, standing and sovereign immunity); Da Costa

v. Niron, 55 F.R.D. 145 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 456

F.2d 1335 (1972).

We find particularly persuasive the scholarly opinion of Judge

Adams of the Third Circuit in Atlee v. Laird, supra, the only case

involving the Southeast Asia conflict which the Supreme Court

has affirmed. In all other cases where review was sought, certiorari

has been denied as this note documents. In Massachusetts v. Laird,

400 U.S. 886 (1970), the Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth

of Massachusetts leave to file an original bill of complaint seeking

an adjudication of the constitutionality of the United States role

in the Indo-China war.

l4a

that the Cambodian bombing constituted a basic change in

the war not within the tactical discretion of the President

and since that is a determination we have found to be a

political question, we have not found it necessary to dwell

at length upon Congressional participation. We see no need

to address ourselves to the Fulbright provisos discussed in

Judge Oakes’ opinion since they predate the Paris Accord

which places the military stance in Cambodia in such focus

that we cannot judge their present efficacy or applicability.

In any event we agree with his conclusion that they do not

affect American forces which is the issue here. We cannot

resist however commenting that the most recent expression

of Congressional approval by appropriation, the Joint

Resolution Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal 1974

(P.L. 93-52), enacted into law July 1, 1973, contains the

following provision:

Sec. 108. Notwithstanding any other provision of law,

on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or hereto-

fore appropriated may be obligated or expended to

finance directly or indirectly combat activities by

United States military forces in or over or from off the

shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or

Cambodia.

Assuming arguendo that the military and diplomatic is-

sues were manageable and that we were obliged to find

some participation by Congress, we cannot see how this

provision does not support the proposition that the Con-

gress has approved the Cambodian bombing. The statute

is facially clear but its applicability is contested by plain-

tiffs on several grounds which were essentially adopted by

the court below. The argument is made that the Congress

didn’t really mean what it said because it was coerced by

15a

the President who had vetoed Congressional Bills which

would have immediately cut off Cambodian funds. Not

being able to muster sufficient strength to overcome the

veto, the argument runs, the Congress was forced willy nilly

to enact the appropriation legislation. Resort is made to

the floor debate which it is argued bolsters the view that

individual legislators expressed personal disapproval of

the bombing and did not interpret the appropriation as an

approval to bomb but simply a recognition that it gave the

President the power to bomb. It is further urged that since

the Constitution entrusts the power to declare war to a

majority of the Congress, the veto exercised makes it pos-

sible for the President to thwart the will of Congress by

holding one-third plus one of the members of either House.

We find none of these arguments persuasive.

1) Since the statute is not ambiguous, resort to legisla-

tive history is unjustified. See Mr. Justice Jackson's opin-

ion in Schwegmann v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,

395-96 (1951).

2) Resort to legislative materials is not permissible

where they are contradictory or ambiguous. NLRB v.

Plasterers Local 79, 404 U.S. 116, 129 n.24 (1971). A fair

reading of the Congressional Record for June 29, 1973

establishes this proposition. Members of Congress Drinan

and the plaintiff Holtzman here for example both voted

against the measure because it would authorize the bombing

until August 15, 1973.

While the court below relied on the colloquy between

Senators Eagleton and Fulbright, it inadvertently omitted

the following:

Mr. Eacteton. In the light of the legislative history,

meaning the statement of former Secretary of Defense

16a

Richardson that we will continue the bombing unless

the funds are cut off, will we with the adoption of this

resolution permit the bombing of Cambodia for the

next 45 days? This is the question I pose to the Senator

from Arkansas.

Mr. Fursricu:. Until August 15.

Mr. Eactetox. Would it permit the bombing of

Laos?

Mr. Fursricut. It would not prevent it.

119 Cong. Ree. S 12562 (daily ed. June 29, 1973) [Em-

phasis added}.

In sum, even if the legislative history were considered

it is at best ambiguous and does not clearly support the

theory that the Congress did not mean what it said.

3) We cannot agree that the Congress was “coerced”

by the President’s veto. There was unquestionably a Con-

gressional impasse resulting from the desire of a majority

of Congress to stop bombing immediately and the desire of

the President that his discretion be unfettered by an arbi-

trarily selected date. Instead of an acute constitutional

confrontation, as Senator Javits noted an “agreement” was

reached. (119 Cong. Rec. S 12561 (daily ed. June 29, 1973) ).

This version of the situation is also the conclusion of Judge

Tauro in his opinion of August 8, 1973 (Drinan v. Nizon,

Civ. No. 73-1424-T (D. Mass.)) which exhaustively studies

the record.

4) While the Constitution vests the war declaring an-

thority in the Congress, the Founding Fathers also con-

ferred the veto power upon the President. (Art. I, §7,

el. 2). The suggestion that the veto power is impotent with

respect to an authority vested solely in Congress by the

—

17a

Constitution is unsupported by any citation of authority

and is hardly persuasive. It of course assumes here that

the Cambodian bombing constitutes a new war requiring a

new declaration and that it is not part of the extrication

of a long suffering nation from an Indo-China war lasting

for severa] years. This again in our view is the nucleus

of the issue and we have no way of resolving that question

particularly here on a motion for summary judgment.*

III

We finally note, although again not necessary in view of

our holding in Part I, our disagreement with our colleazue

Judge Oakes that any of the parties plaintiff have standing.

We have held that mere taxpayer status does not confer

standing to litigate the constitutionality of the Indo-China

war. Pietsch v. President of the United States, 434 F.2d

861 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971): see

Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969). cert. denied.

396 U.S. 1042 (1970). See also Mottola vy. Nixon, 464 F.2d

178 (9th Cir. 1972). In Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302. 206

(2d Cir. 1970), we held that a serviceman does have stand-

ing if he is under orders to fight in the combat to which he

*The dissenting opinion of Judge Oakes, finding no Congres-

sional authorization by appropriation by reason of the secret

bombings of Cambodia in 1969 and 1970 as reported in the Vew

York Times (which is not in the Record before us any more than

the Pentagon Papers were before this court in Da Costa v. Laird.

supra, 448 F.2d at 1370) if anything emphasizes the inability of

the judiciary to make reasoned judgments with manazeable or

discoverable information in foreign relations particularly in time

of war. Secrecy in diplomacy and in military strategy durinz

hostilities has heen customary since at least the time of the Trojan

War. The relationship of the alleged misfeasance here committed

and the action of Congress is again a political question. Its pro-

priety in any event is beyond the scope of appropriate judicial

serutiny. See Proverbs 20, v. 18 “Designs are strengthened by

counsels: and wars are to be managed by governments.”

ive en ee an

18a

objects. Here none of the servicemen plaintiffs are pres-

ently under orders to fight in Cambodia. They have been

relieved of any such military obligation and indeed one

has been separated from the service. Their present status

in our view moots the appeal as to them and we cannot

agree that their status is preserved because of the “cogni-

zable danger of recurrent violation” doctrine of United

States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). In

view of the termination of the air strikes on August 15,

1973 and their present status, we can perceive of nothing

more than the merest possibility that such eventuality will

occur. United States v. W. T. Grant Co., supra, requires |

more than this. See Atherton Mills vy. Johnston, 259 US.

13 (1922). Neither do We see any adequate support for the

standing of Representative Holtzman. She has not been

denied any right to vote on Cambodia by any action of

the defendants. She has fully participated in the Congres-

sional debates which have transpired since her election to

the Congress. The fact that her vote was ineffective was

due to the contrary votes of her colleagues and not the

defendants herein. The claim that the establishment of

illegality here would be relevant in possible impeachment

proceedings against the President would in effect be asking

the judiciary for an advisory opinion which is precisely and

historically what the “case and controversy” conditions set

forth in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution forbid.

See Correspondence of the Justices (1793), reprinted in

part in H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and

the Federal System 64-66 (2d ed. P. Bator et al. 1973). The

judgment sought could hardly have any subsequent binding

effect on those who have the responsibility for such a mea-

sure. Its effect on the named defendants would be clearly

academic and moot since they have no interest in contro-

verting it.

AS Se ee See Re 2 man “~ anew ee ee #

19a

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with

instructions to dismiss the complaint. The mandate shall

issue forthwith.

te.

hos

Oakes, Circuit Judge (dissenting) :

I believe there is standing for Congresswoman Holtzman

under Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962) and Cole-

man v. Miller, 307 U.S. 435, 457-46 (1939). I believe there

is standing for the airmen-appellees under Berk v. Laird,

429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970) and Massachusetts v. Laird,

451 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1971) which has not been mooted

by their return to the United States. United States v. W. T.

Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953).

I believe there is justiciability under Da Costa v. Laird,

471 F.2d 1146, 1156 (2d Cir. 1973), (Da Costa II1) where

the question “whether a radical] change in the character of

war operations . . . might be sufficiently measurable judi-

cially to warrant a court’s consideration ....” was ex-

pressly reserved. There is here “a manageable standard”

under Da Costa III and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.

Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), since there has been such a

“radical change in the character of war operations.” The

Defense Department is continuing to bomb in Cambodia

despite the cease-fire in Vietnam and despite the return

of our prisoners of war from North Vietnam. The justi-

ciable question then is whether there is any Constitutional

authorization for the employment of United States armed

forces over Cambodia, now that the war in Vietnam has

come to an end. There is no question under the law of

this Cireuit, Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d

Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971), that the Executive

lacks unilateral power to commit American forces to combat

Boies ss seve a ds aah ite ia

pesos ne ae i RPL

20a

absent a “belligerent attack” or “a grave emergency.” See

Mitchell v. Laird, 476 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

Has Congress ratified or authorized the bombing in Cam-

bodia by appropriations acts or otherwise? Congress can

confer power on the Executive by way of an appropriations

act. Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331

U.S. 111, 116 (1947) (creation of new agency by Executive

Order ratified by appropriation). And this Cireuit has

expressly held that congressional authorization fot the war

in Vietnam may be found in appropriations acts. Da Costa

v. Laird, 48 F.2d 1368, 1370 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,

405 U.S. 979 (1972) (Da Costa II). Orlando y. Laird, supra,

443 F.2d at 1042.

I do not, moreover, agree with appellees’ argument that

the Fulbright “proviso” adopted in all of the recent ap-

propriations bills and limiting the use of Defense Depart-

ment funds to support “Vietnamese or other free world

forces in actions designed to provide military support and

assistance to the government of Cambodia or Laos,” limited

all prior authorizations to expenditures for United States

forces in Cambodia only in aid in the release of Americans

held as prisoners of war. E.g., Armed Forces Military

Procurement Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-441, §502(a)(1),

S4 Stat. 905 (1970). The language of the apprepriations

acts seems to me to differentiate between “other free world

forces” and “Armed Forces of the United States.” ¢.g., id.

*502(a)(2). The legislative history indicates also that

there is a difference between “other free world forces” and

“United States armed forces.” Even though the Fulbright

proviso did not provide any affirmative grant of authority

to the President to use “Armed Forces of the United

States” in Cambodia, 119 Cong. Ree. S 7385-87 (daily ed.

Apr. 13, 1973), Senator Fulbright himself considered the

°la

proviso operative only in respect to “South Vietnamese or

other foreign military operations in support of the Cam-

bodian or Laotian Governments.” Jd. at S 7385 (emphasis

supplied).

Thus an argument could be made that congressional

authorization of appropriations with knowledge of our

“presence” in Cambodia was ratification. But for author-

ization on the part of Congress by way of an appropria-

tion to be effective, the congressional action must be based

on a knowledge of the facts. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.

474, 506-07 (1959) (appropriation to Defense Department

for security program did not ratify procedure denying right

of an individual to confront witnesses). I am aware of only

one instance in which it has previously been argued that

a war was illegal as a result of Congress being misinformed

as to the underlying facts surrounding American partic-

ipation in that war. While the argument was unique and

unsuccessful to boot, however, time has vindicated it, I

believe. Furthermore, it was advanced by one whose views

are worth consideration, even if they were expressed in

“dissent,” so to speak. I refer of course to Abraham Lin-

coln and his argument as a lone Congressman on Janu-

ary 12, 1848, in opposition to our “incursion” into Mexico

and what later was called the Mexican War. See Cong.

Globe, 30th Cong. Ist Sess. 93 et seg. (Appendix 1848).

And here, incredibly enough, it appears that neither the

American people nor the Congress, at the time it was voting

appropriations in aid of the war in Vietnam, were given

the facts pertaining to our bombing in Cambodia. Recent

disclosures have indicated that Air Foree B-52 bombers

were secretly attacking Cambodia in 1969, 1970 and even

later while the United States was publicly proclaiming

respect for Cambodian neutrality. See N.Y. Times July 17,

Bde sie wt ante retea a ee ee

OO mle I

1973, at 1; July 18, 1973, at 1, July 22, 1973, Sec. E, at 3;

July 24, 1973, at 1; July 25, 1973, at 1; July 29, 1973 at 1;

Aug. 8, 1973, at 6; Aug. 9, 1973, at 7.

The government argues that these secret bombings oc-

eurred in 1969 and 1970, and ended when our activities in

Cambodia became open subsequently. But the Congress

whose ratification by way of appropriations acts is con-

tended for here did not beccme aware of these covert

bombings until July of 1973. And meanwhile the Congress

had declared in the so-called Mansfield Amendment that it

was “the policy of the United States to terminate at the

earliest practicable date all military operations of the

United States in Indochina... .” Appropriations Author-

ization-Military Procurement Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.

92-156, $601, 85 Stat. 423 (92nd Cong., lst Sess. 1971).

The combination of concealment of the facts from Con-

gress together with the cnactment of a policy of “earliest

practicable” withdrawal do not amount in my mind to an

appropriations carte blanche to the military to carry on

bombing in Cambodia after the cease-fire, withdrawal of

our troops from Vietnam, and return of our prisoners of

war from North Vietnam.

We come then to the effect of the legislation, following

upen a presidential veto of an immediate prohibition against

the use of funds to bomb in Cambodia, adopted as a com-

promise this July 1st: the Continuing Appropriations Act

for Fiscal Year 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-52, 93rd Cong. 2nd

Sess. (July 1, 1973) which expressly provided that “... on

or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore

appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance di-

rectly or indirectly combat activities by United States mili-

tary forces in or over or from off the shores of North

Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.” §108. In

23a

colloquy between Senators Eagleton and Fulbright, inad-

vertently omitted in the briefs of appellees and the opinion

of the lower court, the former inquired whether “the adop-

tion of this resolution [would] permit the bombing of

Cambodia” and Senator Fulbright replied, “Until August

15”. 119 Cong. Ree. S 12562 (daily ed. June 29, 1973).

Again, in the same colloquy Senator Fulbright, conceding

“Presidential power”, said that “The President has the

power to do a lot of things of which T do not approve,”

after being asked by Senator Eagleton whether under the

resolution the President’s “power to bomb in Indochina

_. . will now be sanctioned by our action.” Jd. In neither

case, however, is there recognition of legality or past au-

thorization. Senator Fulbright had previously stated, as

Judge Judd recognized, that “The acceptance of an August

15 cut off date should in no way be interpreted as recog-

nition by the committee of the President’s authority to

engage U.S. forces in hostilities until that date. The view

of most members of the committee has been and continues

to be that the President does not have such authority in

the absence of specific congressional approval.” 119 Cong.

Ree. S 12560 (daily ed. June 29, 1973).

It can be argued that Congress could, if it had so desired,

cut off the funds for bombing Cambodia immediately by

overriding the Presidential veto. This was indeed cham-

pioned by those voting against the ultimate compromise

Resolution. But it does not follow that those who voted in

favor of the Resolution were thereby putting the Con-

gressional stamp of approval on the bombing continuation.

While the Resolution constituted a recognition that Exec-

utive power was being exercised, it did not constitute a

concession that such exercise was rightful, lawful or con-

stitutional.

|

a ee ee ms

24a

It may be that those voting for the Resolution thought

that in some way previous appropriations acts or the omis-

sion expressly to prohibit a continuation of bombing after

the cease-fire and return of our prisoners of war amounted

to an authorization, which could only be limited by affirma-

tive congressional action. But as I have previously sug-

gested I cannot find any express congressional authoriza-

tion for such a continuation of the Cambodian bombing,

nor do I think that authorization can be implied from prior

appropriations acts. This being true, affirmative action on

the part of Congress was not necessary as a matter of

constitutional law. An agreement by the Executive to some

cut off date was essential, however, because the legality of

bombing continuation might not be tested or testable for

months to come, by the very nature of the judicial process.

Therefore, Congress as I see it, took the only practical way

out. It acknowledged the reality of the Executive’s exercise

of power even while it disputed the Executive’s authority

for that exercise. It agreed to a final cut-off date as the

best practical result but never conceded the legality or con-

stitutionality of interim exercise.

Thus the Resolution of July 1, 1973 cannot be the basis

for legalization of otherwise unlawful Executive action.

We are talking here about the separate branches of govern-

ment, and in doing so we must distinguish between the ex-

ercise of power on the one hand and authorization for such

exercise on the other. That the Executive Branch had the

power to bomb in Cambodia, there can be no doubt; it did

so, and indeed is continuing to do so. Whether it had the

constitutional authority for its action is another question.

If we return to fundamentals, as I think we must in the

ease of any conflict of view between the other two Branches

of Government, it will be recalled that the Founding Fathers

ieiteeetre ore reece sett aaa ETAL Er

25a

deliberately eschewed the example of the British Monarchy

in which was lodged the authority to declare war and to

raise and regulate fleets and armies. Seve The Federalist

No. 69 (A. Hamilton). Rather these powers were deliber-

ately given to the Legislative Branch of the new American

Republic in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution. See

7 Works of Alexander Hamilton 81 (J. Hamilton ed. 1851),

cited in Note, Congress, The President, and The Power to

Commit Forces to Combat, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1771, 1773 n.14

(1968). I fail to see, and the Government in its able

presentation has failed to point out, where the Congress

ever authorized the continuation of bombing in Cambodia

after the cease-fire in Vietnam, the withdrawal of our

forces there, and the return of our prisoners of war to our

shores. Accordingly, I must dissent, and although on a

somewhat different analysis would affirm the judgment

below.

| i.

ER OS a PELL ON TOLER wt

26a

Order Denying Rehearing in Banc

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Seconp Circuit

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals,

in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United States

Court House, in the City of New York, on the 17th day

of September, one thousand nine hundred and _ seventy-

three.

Docket No. 73-2054

—<

EuizaBetH HoitzMan, individually and in her capacity as a

member of the United States House of Representatives,

lst Lr. ArtHur Watson, 43rd Strategic Wing, United

States Air Force, Anderson Air Force Base, Guam,

Caprars Micuaen Fivacer, 48rd Strategic Wing, United

States Air Force, Anderson Air Foree Base, Guam,

Captaris James H. Srrary, 43rd Strategie Wing, United

States Air Foree, Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, and

Caprars Donatp E. Dawson, 307th Strategie Wing,

United States Air Force, U-Tapo, Thailand,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

—V-.—

James R. Scutesincer, individually and as Secretary of

Defense, Jonx L. McLvcas, individually and as Sece-

retary of the Air Force, and Wittiam P. CLEMENTS,

individually and as Deputy Secretary of Defense,

Defendants-A ppellants.

FL ODT mR RM a

—

27a

A petition for a rehearing containing a suggestion that

the action be reheard in bane having been filed herein by

counsel for the appellees, a poll of the judges in regular

active service having been taken at the request of such a

judge, and there being no majority in favor thereof,

Upon consideration thereof, it is

Ordered that said petition be and it hereby is Dentep.

Judge Oakes dissents.

Irvine R. KaurmMan

Chief Judge

rar ithot.

eR 8 RE EES WE we - = « 7 a

United States District Court’s Opinion

of June 13, 1973

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Eastern District or New York

No. 73-C-537.

June 13, 1973.

—_—< >

ExizapetH Hoitzman, Individually and in her capacity as a

Member of the United States House of Representatives,

Plaintiff,

ee

Extuiot L. Ricwarpson, Individually and as Secretary of

Defense and Rosert C. Seamans, Jr., Individually and

as Secretary of the Air Force,

Defendants.

<>

Jupp, District Judge:

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff, a member of the United States House of Repre-

sentatives from a Brooklyn district, seeks a determination

that the President of the United States and the military

personnel under his direction and control may not engage in

intensive combat operations in Cambodia and elsewhere in

Indochina in the absence of congressional authorization.

> on

29a

Motions

1. Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment declaring

that the defendants may not order American military forces

to combat in Cambodia and granting appropriate injunctive

relief.

2. Plaintiff has also moved to serve an amended and

supplemental complaint adding as plaintiffs three Air

Force officers stationed in Guam, none of whom are resi-

dents of the Eastern District of New York.

3. Congressman Parren J. Mitchell of the Seventh Con-

gressional District of Maryland, togetiier with seven other

Congressmen from districts not within the Eastern District

of New York, have moved for leave to file a brief as amici

curiae.

4. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for

failure to state a valid claim for relief because (a) plain-

tiff lacks standing; (b) the court lacks jurisdiction over the

subject matter; and (c) the complaint involves non-justici-

able political questions on which relief cannot be granted.

Defendants also assert that the motion for summary judg-

ment is premature.

No motion has yet been made to implement the state-

ment that the complaint is brought on behalf of all simi-

larly situated Congressmen. It is not yet necessary to deter-

mine whether the case may properly be treated as a class

action.

Facts

The complaint was filed on April 17, 1973. Plaintiff

asserted among other things that her right to an undiluted

Path be

ita ldo 5d and Aa | ea atte nk be! len tba Dacha Nha?

30a

vote upon the declaration of hostilities was impaired by

presidential action in engaging in extensive combat in Cam-

bodia without congressional authorization. She pointed out

that cease-fire had been negotiated in Vietnam, all Ameri-

ean servicemen had been withdrawn, and all American

prisoners of war had been released; and she asserted that

no congressional authorization exists for committing Amer-

ican forces to combat in Cambodia.

An order to show cause why the court should not de-

clare continued military activities in Cambodia to be unlaw-

ful was signed on April 19 by Judge Dooling, to whom the

ease had been assigned as a related case. Before the re-

turn date of the motion, Judge Dooling determined that the

case was not in fact related to prior matters before him, and

directed that it be reassigned under this court’s random as-

signment plan. On the return date of the order to show

cause on April 26, 1973, the matter was adjourned at de-

fendants’ request until May 18, with answering papers to

be served by May 16.

The motion for summary judgment and injunctive relief

was served and filed on May 8, 1973, accompanied by a state-

ment of allegedly undisputed facts pursuant to Rule 9(g) of

this court’s General Rules. In particular, plaintiff asserted

that the United States is currently engaged in large-scale

combat air operations in Cambodia involving hundreds of

war planes based in Thailand and Guam, and that United

States war planes dropped 39,500 tons of explosives on

Cambodia during March 1973 and flew 180 combat missions

daily during the first three weeks of April. Plaintiff fur-

ther asserts as undisputed material facts that the last

American serviceman was withdrawn from Vietnam on

March 28, 1973 and the last American prisoner of war was

repatriated on April 1, 1973, and that although no Con-

3la

gressional authorization exists for the commitment of

American forces to combat in Cambodia, the Executive has

informed Congress that it is prepared to continue its mili-

tary activities whether or not the Congress appropriates

funds for the Cambodian combat operations.

Defendants’ response asserts that there are still over

1,300 missing in action in the Vietnam hostilities who have

not vet been accounted for. Defendants also assert by affi-

davit of the Chief of the Civil Division of the United States

Attorney's office that “there may well be dispute as to asser-

tions made in plaintiff's Rule %(g) statement.” They re-

quest time to submit papers addressed to the merits.

The plaintiffs who are proposed to be added assert that

they are being compelled to comply with unlawful orders,

and to risk their lives in unauthorized bombing missions

over Cambodia.

The brief of the Protestant, Catholic and Jewish religious

groups, which appear as amici, assert that the existence of

Congressional authorization to make war is justiciable, and

point out that participation in Cambodian hostilities may

conflict with the Agreement on Ending the War and Restor-

ing Peace in Vietnam.

Discussion

It is necessary to deal first with the question of the tim-

ing of the motions, then with the issue of plaintiff's stand-

ing and other jurisdictional questions, and finally with the

particular motions of the several parties.

Timing

The government relies on the provision of F.R.Civ. P.

12(a) that the United States or an officer or agency thereof

32a

has sixty days “after the service upon the United States

attorney of the pleading” within which to answer a com-

plaint.

Rule 56, however, provides that a party may move for

summary judgment “at any time after the expiration of 20

days from the commencement of the action.” Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment was served 21 days after the

complaint was filed.

The difference between the two rules is significant. The

time is computed in different ways. Since an action is com-

menced under F.R.Civ.P. 3 by the filing of a complaint,

regardless of the time when it is served, the measure of

time in Rule 56 is unrelated to the time in Rule 12. More-

over, Rule 56 does not provide for a longer time before a.

motion can be made against a government agency than one

against a private party.

Judge Charles E. Clark, a distinguished authority on

procedure, criticized the original federal rule for not per-

mitting the filing of a motion for summary judgment as

soon as an action is brought. See his dissent in United

States v. Adler’s Creamery, Inc., 107 F.2d 987, 992 (2d

Cir. 1939). The 1946 amendment, which permitted a mo-

tion for summary judgment in advance of answer, should

be interpreted in a manner to expedite the disposition of

litigation. There is no need to impart into it the 60-day

period for government answer that was specified in old

Rule 12. A plaintiff moving for summary judgment before

answer may be required to face a somewhat higher stand-

ard, however. As Professor Moore has suggested, a motion

before answer should not be granted “unless it is clear that

an issue of material fact cannot be presented.” 6 Moore’s

Federal Practice (2d ed. 1948, 1972) § 56.07, p. 2092.

33a

There has never been any requirement of any delay in the

consideration of a preliminary injunction in an action

against a United States officer or agency, except as the

court in its discretion may find to be appropriate.

The court therefore rejects the argument that the motion

for summary judgment was premature.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Jurisdiction

Defendants’ three grounds for this motion to dismiss are

all essentially jurisdictional, whether described as relat-

ing to standing, subject matter, or political question.

Standing

Under Article TIT, § 2, Clause 1, of the Constitution, the

jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to “eases” and “con-

troversies.” Judicial definitions of the elements requisite

for “eases” and “controversies” have proved to be elusive.

Unlike case or controversy, terms specifically enumerated

in Article III, “standing” is not mentioned in the Constitu-

tion. It received its first full expression in Frothingham v.

Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923).

Later, in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20

L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), the Court stated that political ques-

tions, advisory opinions, and lack of standing result in there

being no justiciable controversy. Whether standing is de-

nominated a component of jurisdiction or of justiciability

may at first blush seem unimportant, due to the require-

ment that both issues must be resolved before any deter-

mination can be made of the merits of the controversy.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663

(1962); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973).

way: )

Bidtiaws ihn ad

34a

However, a complaint may be dismissed for lack of juris-

diction of the subject matter only if the claim is so at-

tenuated and insubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of

merit. Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S.

561, 24 S.Ct. 553, 48 L.Ed. 795 (1904) ; Baker v. Carr, supra.

Plaintiff has raised a serious constitutional question deal-

ing with the war-making power of Congress enumerated in

Article I, ¢8 of the Constitution. The seriousness of this

question has been recognized repeatedly within this circuit.

Berk vy. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970); Orlando v.

Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971). The delicate balance

in the relationship between Congress and the President con-

cerning the power to wage war is a controversy arising

under the Constitution and therefore within the jurisdic-

tion of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).

Whether a particular party has a sufficient stake in an

otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolu-

tion of it is what has traditionally been referred to as the

question of standing to sue. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405

U.S. 727, 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972), the

Supreme Court held that when a party, such as the plain-

tiff here, does not rely on any specific statute authorizing

invocation of the judicial process,

the question of standing depends upon whether the

party has alleged such a “personal stake in the out-

come of the controversy,” Baker v. Carr... as to en-

sure that “the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be

presented in an adversary context and in a form his-

torically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.”

Flast v. Cohen.

The heart of the question becomes whether the plaintiff

has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the

35a

controversy as to assure the concrete presentation of issues

in an adversary context so that a court will be properly

guided in determining difficult issues. The controversy in-

volved must be a substantial one admitting of specific relief.

Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct.

461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937).

In the present case the court is not being asked to decide

ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues. The

issue has been focused as sharply as possible: Whether the

President’s orders directing the bombing of Cambodia con-

stituted a usurpation of Congress’ war making power under

Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. Nor is this a case in which

the court is being asked to decide a hypothetical question or

abstract issue. Plaintiff is not asking for a determination

whether the President would violate the Constitution by en-

gaging in certain acts, but rather a determination that the

present action of the President violates the Constitution.

Nor is this a collusive suit where the parties are suspected

of sharing the same interests.

Plaintiff gua Congresswoman does not merely suffer in

some indefinite way in common with people generally. She

is a member of a specific and narrowly defined group—the

House of Representatives. As a Congresswoman, plaintiff

is called upon to appropriate funds for military operations,

raise an army, and declare war. Additionally, plaintiff has

a continuing responsibility to insure the checks and bal-

ances of our democracy through the use of impeachment.

When a plaintiff is a member of a narrowly defined group,

which has been more directly affected by the conduct in

question than has the general population, the test for stand-

ing should be met. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court

—a Functional Analysis, 86 Harv. L.Rev. 645 (Feb. 1973).

Vee 7 wy ee TE IEE Le rs - - “ Ce CS LE a3;

36a

The question whether a particular person is a proper

party to maintain the action does not, by its own force,

raise separation of powers problems related to improper

judicial interference in areas committed to other branches

of the federal government. Flast v. Cohen, supra.

Professor Jaffee has stated, in Standing Again, 84 Harv.

L.Rey. 633, at 634, 635 (1971),

My own view has been and continues to be that a plain-

tiff who does not have a “protected interest,” whether

as an individual or as a group, does not have a right

to review, but that a court in its discretion may at the

suit of such a person review the legal question if it

deems such consideration to be in the public interest.

...I1 believe ... that any citizen can constitutionally

be a plaintiff ... in a “public law” suit even though

he suffers no injury whatever beyond his concern for

the public interest.

In Mitchell v. Laird, 476 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. March 20,

1973), thirteen members of the United States House of

Representatives filed a complaint against the President

and the Secretaries of State, Defense, Navy. and Air Force,

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against continued

warfare in Indochina. In finding that the plaintiffs had

standing, the Court relied upon the fact that it would be

the duty of plaintiffs to consider impeachment if defen-

dants’ actions contravened the Constitution, that plaintiffs

have a quite distinct duty to determine whether to make ap-

propriations to support the hostilities, and that plaintiffs

might have to take other legislative actions related to such

hostilities, such as raising an army or enacting other civil

or criminal legislation.

37a

Standing of legislators was also upheld in Trombetta v.

State of Florida, 353 F.Supp. 575 (M.D.Fla. 1973), ruling

that members of the Florida Legislature had standing to

seek a declaratory judgment whether the proposed Twenty-

seventh (Equal Rights) Amendment to the United States

Constitution was repugnant to Articles V and VI of the

United States Constitution; and in Coleman v. Miller, 307

U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939), an original pro-

ceeding in mandamus by members of the Kansas Legisla-

ture against the Secretary of the Senate of Kansas and

others to compel the Secretary to erase an endorsement

on the Senate resolution ratifying the Child Labor Amend-

ment to the United States Constitution. The Trombetta

and Coleman cases, involving state legislatures, are not

completely parallel, but a member of Congress should have

an equal right to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court.

Congresswoman Holtzman is a member of a well defined

group that is directly affected by defendants’ action. She

has presented a sharply focused controversy in an adver-

sary context. Her responsibilities as a Congresswoman

give her the nexus necessary to have standing to contest

the policies of defendants that allegedly infringe upon her

Article I duties.

The standing of the airmen as added plaintiffs is clear,

Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970), if they can

pass the test of venue, discussed later.

Political Question

In determining whether there is subject-matter jurisdic-

tion, the court must consider whether the case presents a

“political question” outside its jurisdiction, before it can

reach the merits of the controversy. This is a facet of the

problem of justiciability.

Sa Peoke = . rm core ae

38a

The Second Circuit has shaped its formulation of the

political question doctrine from guidance provided by the

Supreme Court in cases such as Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,

82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Youngstown Sheet &

Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153

(1952); and Powell v. MeCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct.

1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). In Berk v. Laird, supra, 429

F.2d at 305, it held that a soldier seeking to enjoin orders in

the Vietnam hostilities as lacking constitutional authority

had a right to ask a court to determine whether there were

“judicially discoverable and manageable standards” for re-

solving the issue. In Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042

(2d Cir. 1971), it held that courts should not review the

form of congressional authorization, once it had been de-

termined that there was “any action by the Congress suffi-

cient to authorize or ratify the military activity in ques-

tion.” In DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1155 (2d Cir.

1973), it held that judges could not appropriately deter-

mine

whether a specific military operation constitutes an

“escalation” of the war or is merely a new tactical ap-

proach within a continuing strategic plan.

Defendants rely on this statement but fail to consider the

court’s further statement (p. 1156) that

We specifically do not pass on the point urged by ap-

pellant whether a radical change in the character of

war operations—as by an intentional policy of indis-

eriminate bombing of civilians without any military

objective—might be sufficiently measurable judicially to

warrant a court’s consideration, i.e., might contain a

standard which we seek in this record and do not find.

39a

The appeal in that case was from an order denying injune-

tive relief, after the court had reviewed documentary mate-

rial submitted by both sides. Here the issue arises on a

motion to dismiss the complaint on its face. The motion for

summary judgment on the merits is not being considered

vet.

The teaching of those cases is that the political question

exception to jurisdiction depends on the facts of the par-

ticular case, but that the question of the balance of con-

stitutional authority to declare war, as between the execu-

tive and legislative branches, is not a political question.

The Second Circuit rule was not repudiated by the Su-

preme Court’s summary affirmance of Atlee v. Laird,

347 F. Supp. 689 (1972), aff'd, 411 U.S. 911, 93 S.Ct. 1545,

36 L.Ed.2d 304 (1973). The district court there dealt with

a question whether Congress could constitutionally au-

thorize warfare by appropriation bills rather than whether

Congress had in fact given approval to the acts of the

executive. The district court in Atlee referred to the rapid

changes in world polities as a reason for not taking juris-

diction, but stated (p. 707):

This, of course, is one reason justifying a court’s taking

small steps in sensitive areas, because the judiciary

lacks the flexibility found in the political departments,

to deal adequately with a constantly chang.ng world

scene.

The Atlee case dealt with a general challenge to “the con-

stitutionality of the war in South East Asia.” 347 F.Supp.

at 691. Lack of merit may also have been mingled with

procedural issues in the affirmance of the Aflee case, since

the Supreme Court had previously refused to review cases

which upheld the President’s authority to use American

spepswiowen: _— eh ee AI Pa) mae . bau = a ee REN ERNE ORR

40a

forces in Vietnam. It had denied certiorari in the Berk,

Orlando, and DaCosta eases. Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302,

cert. denied, 404 U.S. S869, 92 S.Ct. 94, 30 L.Ed.2d 113

(1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, cert. denied, 404

U.S. 869, 92 S.Ct. 94, 30 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971); DaCosta v.

Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979, 92 S.Ct.

1193, 31 L.Ed.2d 255 (1972).

The present case, dealing with Cambodian combat opera-

tions, involves other issues, for the Senate and the House

have spoken separately on Cambodia, and the entire Con-

gress, in approving limited foreign aid to Cambodia, 22

U.S.C. § 2415(g), expressly stated in 1972 (P.L. 92-226)

that such aid

. shall not be construed as a commitment by the

United States to Cambodia for its defense.

Judge Dooling said in his opinion in DaCosta v. Laird

of May 24, 1972, concerning political question:

The actual conduct of a defined war, when that war is

in its lawful progress, is such an area. (Emphasis

added).

The present case, attacking only the use of bombers in

Cambodia after the Vietnam cease-fire, has a narrower

reach than Atlee and may present one of the “small steps

in sensitive areas” which is within the realm of justiciabil-

itv under the district court’s opinion in Atlee.

This is one of the first suits brought after the withdrawal

of American troops from Vietnam and the return of pris-

oners of war. Reluctance to jeopardize the safety of

American soldiers or prisoners is no longer a barrier to

judicial determination of the constitutionality of a phase

of war activity.

—— anne

4la

Therefore the case does not prersent a tactical decision

in an ongoing war like DaCosta ILI, supra, 471 F.2d 1146

(whether to mine Haiphong harbor). Rather it involves

the question whether the authorized Vietnam war has ter-

minated. Courts have often been asked to determine when

| a war has ended and peace has begun. F.g., United States

| v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81

L.Ed. 255 (1936); cf., United States v. Swift, Crim. No.

72-747-W, District of Massachusetts, Opinion of Wyzan-

ski, J., March 28, 1973.

The political question doctrine does not appear to justify

dismissal of this complaint before examination of the

merits, on which this court has reached no decision,

Advisory Opinion

Plaintiff is not seeking a judicial determination as to

her rights upon the happening of some events in the future.

Rather, she is seeking a judicial declaration that military

operations currently being conducted in Cambodia are in

violation of the United States Constitution. This does not

come within the rule forbidding advisory opinions, a rule

which stems from the risk that comes from passing on

abstract questions rather than limiting decisions to con-

crete cases in which a question is precisely framed by a

clash of genuine adversary argument. Wright, Federal

Courts (2d ed. 1970) pp. 37-38; Berger, Standing to Sue

in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78

Yale L.J. 816, 830-31 (1968).

Venue

There is no doubt of the proper venue of this action as

originally brought by plaintiff, a Brooklyn resident, since

42a

express provision in 28 U.S.C. §1391(e)(4) permits suit

against a federal officer or agency in any judicial district

where the plaintiff resides. Suit by the airmen might have

to be brought in some other district if they were not joined

in this action, or if plaintiff Holtzman did not have stand-

ing. Their presence as plaintiffs in a suit properly brought

by Congresswoman Holtzman, however, does not prevent

the venue being proper for all plaintiffs, since only one

plaintiff need be a resident of the district. Natural Re-

sources Defense Council v. Tennessee Valley Authority,

340 F.Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev’d on other grounds,

459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972).

Amount in Controversy

In determining the amount in controversy, the court may

consider the pecuniary result to either party which a judg-

ment might produce. Berman v. Narragansett Racing

Assoe., 414 F.2d 311 (ist Cir. 1969); Bass v. Rockefeller,

331 F.Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Note, Federal Jurisdic-

tional Amount: Determination of the Matter in Contro-

versy, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1369 (1960).

With millions of dollars in expenditures involved as part

of the bombing operation, there is no question that the

requirement of $10,000 or more in controversy is met.

Plaintiff's Motions

Addition of parties is not governed by F.R. Civ. P. 15,

concerning amendments of pleadings, but F.R. Civ. P. 21,

which states that

Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court

on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any

stage of the action... .

43a

Burlington Hospital v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 48 F.R.D. 348

(S.D.N.Y. 1969) ; Maynard, Merel & Co. v. Carcioppolo, 51

F.R.D. 273 (S.D.N.¥. 1970).

It is entirely appropriate and timely to permit the addi-

tion of the proposed military plaintiffs.

Summary Judgment

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will be held

in abeyance pending the receipt of additional papers from

the defendants. In view of the length of time the court has

had the matter under advisement, during which defen-

dants have had an opportunity to assemble the pertinent

facts, they should be prepared to set forth their contentions

without much further delay.

It is ordered:

(1) That defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint be

denied ;

(2) That plaintiff be granted leave to serve an amended

and supplemental complaint adding First Lieutenant Ar-

thur Watson, Captain Michael Flugger, and Captain James

H. Strain as plaintiffs;

(3) That defendants answer such amended and supple-

mental complaint within ten days after its service on the

United States Attorney;

(4) That Hon. Parren J. Mitchell, Bella S. Abzug, Don-

ald M. Fraser, Herman Badillo, Benjamin I. Rosenthal,

Robert W. Kastenmeier, Don Edwards, and Michael J.

Harrington, Members of Congress, be granted leave to file

briefs in the case as amici curiae;

(6) That the matter be set down for argument on that

motion for summary judgment by June 25, 1973; and

(6) That the amtter be set down for argument on that

motion at 10:00 a.m. on June 29, 1973.

tia

United States District Court’s Opinion

of July 25, 1973

United States District Court,

E. D. New York.

No. 73-C-537.

July 25, 1973.

~—

EuizaBetH Hoitzman, Individually and in her capacity as

a member of the United States House of Representa-

tives, et al., Plaintiffs,

Vv.

James R. Scutestncer, Individually and as Secretary of

Defense, et al., Defendants.

<<

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Jupp, District Judge.

Plaintiffs seek a determination that the President of

the United States and the military personnel under his

direction and control may not engage in intensive combat

operations in Cambodia and elsewhere in Indochina in the

absence of Congressional authorization required under Ar-

ticle I, § 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution. The case is before

the court on plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgmeni for

lack of genuine issues of material fact. Additionally, plain-

tiffs seek declaratory and/or injunctive relief.

Plaintiffs have also moved to add as plaintiff another

Air Force officer on active duty, Captain Donald Dawson,

PS TE Sr ee TN a OS WEEKS

45a

and to stay the defendants from ordering him to engage

in bombing missions over Cambodia.

Posture of the Case

At an earlier stage this court denied defendants’ motion

to dismiss the complaint, and overruled the contentions that

Congresswoman Holtzman lacked standing to challenge the

military activities in question and that the controversy

presented a nonjusticiable political question.

Both sides were given an opportunity to submit any addi-

tional papers that would bear on the appropriateness of

summary judgment.

Facts

Review of the facts may begin with 1970, since the earlier

phases of hostilities in Indochina have been summarized

in an earlier case.

This court held in September 1970 in Berk v. Laird, 317

F.Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y.1970), aff'd sub nom., Orlando v.

Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971), that Congress had

authorized hostilities in Vietnam to that date through a

series of appropriation acts.

Hostilities in Cambodia

In response to Presidential pronouncements concerning

the necessity of military action in Cambodia, there was a

series of Congressional responses seeking in the main to

limit such mijitary action, and culminating in two laws en-

acted on July 1, 1973 which directed that no funds might

be expended for Cambodian combat activities after August

15, 1973.

Fe Sa Net, ca ee

46a

On April 30, 1970, the President stated in an address

to the nation that “North Vietnam has occupied military

sanctuaries all along the Cambodian frontier with South

Vietnam,” that Cambodia had therefore called on the United

States for assistance, and that attacks were therefore being

launched “to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cam-

bodian-Vietnam border.” The Situation in Southeast Asia,

6 Presidential Documents 596, 597, 598.

On June 30, 1970, a report by the President on the Cam-

bodian operation, released at San Clemente, California,

stated that all American troops had withdrawn from Cam-

bodia, but that the United States would continue to conduct

air interdiction missions to prevent supplies and personnel

being moved through Cambodia toward South Vietnam, and

that “We do this to protect our forces in South Vietnam.”

The President also stated that one of the reasons for at-

tacking the enemy’s “sanctuaries” in Cambodia was that

this would “enhance the prospects of a negotiated peace.”

The Cambodian Operation, 6 Presidential Documents 843,

850, 852.

The so-called Fulbright proviso, limiting military sup-

port to Cambodia except to the extent necessary to insure

the safe withdrawal of United States forces from Southeast

Asia and the release of American prisoners of war, was

adopted by the Congress during the summer of 1970 and

inserted in the War Forces-Military Procurement Act of

1971 and became law with the President’s approval on

October 7, 1970. This proviso, which was repeated in every

subsequent military appropriation and authorization act,

reads as follows:

. . nothing [herein] shall be construed as authoriz-

ing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese

~

47a

or other free world forces in actions designed to pro-

vide military support and assistance to the Government

of Cambodia or Laos: Provided further, That nothing

contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit

support of actions required to insure the safe and or-

derly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. Forces

from Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release of Amer-

icans held as prisoners of war.

P.L. 91-441, 84 Stat. 905; P.L. 91-668, 84 Stat. 2020; P.L.

92-156, 85 Stat. 423; P.L. 92-204, 85 Stat. 716; P.L. 92-436,

86 Stat. 734; P.L. 92-570, 86 Stat. 1184.

On the evening of the same day the Fulbright proviso

became law, October 7, 1970, the President addressed the

nation by radio and television and stated that the North

Vietnamese were carrying on aggression in Laos and Cam-

bodia as well as in Vietnam and that “The war in Indochina

has been proved to be of one piece; it cannot be cured by

treating only one of its areas of outbreak.” The New Ini-

tiative for Peace in Southeast Asia, 6 Presidential Docu-

ments 1349, 1350.

The Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 (P.L. 91-652,

84 Stat. 1942), approved January 1, 1971, provided:

See. 7. (a) In line with the expressed intention of

the President of the United States, none of the funds

authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any

other Act may be used to finance the introduction of

United States ground combat troops into Cambodia, or

to provide United States advisers to or for Cambodian

military forces in Cambodia.

(b) Military and economic assistance provided by

the United States to Cambodia and authorized or ap-

+ ENS EAT

48a

propriated pursuant to this or any other Act shall not

be construed as a commitment by the United States to

Cambodia for its defense.

On February 25, 1971, the President submitted a foreign

policy report to Congress, saying again that the war in

Indochina was “of one piece,” that because of North Viet-

namese infiltration in Cambodia “We faced the prospect of

one large enemy base camp 600 miles along South Viet-

nam’s flank;” and that our policy for Cambodia included

“air missions against enemy supplies and personnel that

pose a potential ihreat to South Vietnam or seek to estab-

lish base areas relevant to Vietnam.” United States For-

eign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace, 7 Presiden-

tial Documents 305, 328, 332.

On November 17, 1971, the so-called Mansfield amend-

ment became law by action of Congress with the President’s

approval, and expressed the United States policy “to termi-

nate at the earliest practicable date all military operations

of the United States in Indochina.” The pertinent portions

of this amendment, which was part of the Appropriations

Authorizations-Military Procurement Act, 1972, state:

Sec. 601. (a) It is hereby declared to be the policy

of the United States to terminate at the earliest practi-

cable date all military operations of the United States

in Indochina, and to provide for the prompt and or-

derly withdrawal of all United States military forces

at a date certain, subject to the release of all American

prisoners of war held by the Government of North

Vietnam and forces allied with such Government and

an accounting for all Americans missing in action who

have been held by or known to such Government or

49a

such forces. The Congress hereby urges and requests

the President to implement the above-expressed policy

by initiating immediately the following actions:

(1) Establishing a final date for the withdrawal

from Indochina of all military forces of the United

States contingent upon the release of all American

prisoners of war held by the Government of North

Vietnam and forces allied with such Government and

an accounting for all Americans missing in action

who have been held by or known to such Government

or such forces.

(2) Negotiate with the Government of North Viet-

nam for an immediate cease-fire by all parties to the

hostilities in Indochina.

(3) Negotiate with the Government of North Viet-

nam for an agreement which would provide for a

series of phased and rapid withdrawals of United

State military forces from Indochina in exchange for

a corresponding series of phased releases of Amer-

ican prisoners of war, and for the release of any re-

maining American prisoners of war concurrently

with the withdrawal of all remaining military forces

of the United States by not later than the date estab-

lished by the President pursuant to paragraph (1)

hereof or by such earlier date as may be agreed upon

by the negotiating parties.

ae

In the Defense Appropriation Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-204), :

approved December 18, 1971, Congress specified: i

Sec. 738(a) Not to exceed $2,500,000,000 of the appro-

priations available to the Department of Defense dur-

]

ee Hc Tite ina © ~ sd*.oc5 Soe “ ae See aa ee

50a

ing the current fiscal year shall be available for their

stated purposes to support (1) Vietnamese and other

free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces (2)

local forces in Laos and Thailand; and for related costs,

on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of De-

fense may determine: . . . Provided further, that

nothing in clause (1) of the first sentence of this sub-

section shall be construed as authorizing the use of

any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free

world forces in actions designed to provide military

support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia

or Laos: Provided further that nothing contained in

this section shall be construed to prohibit support of

actions required to insure the safe and orderly with-

drawal or disengagement of U.S. Forces from South-

east Asia, or to aid in the release of Americans held

as prisoners of war.

This language was continued in all subsequent military

authorization or appropriations acts. See Appropriations

Authorization-Military Procurement Act, 1972, P.L. 92-156,

85 Stat. 423, November 17, 1971, See. 501; Military Procure-

ment Act, 1973, P.L. 92-436, 86 Stat. 734, September 26,

1972, See. 601; Department of Defense Appropriation Act,

1973, P.L. 92-570, 86 Stat. 1184, October 26, 1972, See. 737.

In the Foreign Assistance Act, 1971, approved on Febru-

ary 7, 1972, the Congress expressly stated that limited for-

eign aid to Cambodia “shall not be construed as a commit-

ment by the United States to Cambodia for its defense.”

P.L. 92-226, 22 U.S.C. § 2415(g). The Act recognized the

existence of bombing in Cambodia, in language which both

sides cite. The pertinent provisions of the Act read as

follows:

ng welt

5la

See. 655. Limitations Upon Assistance to or for

Cambodia.—(a) Notwithstanding any other provision

of law, no funds authorized to be appropriated by

this cr any other law may be obligated in any amount

in excess of $341,000,000 for the purpose of carrying

out directly or indirectly any economic or military as-

sistance, or any operation, project, or program of any

kind, or for providing any goods, supplies, materials,

equipment, services, personnel, or advisers in, to, for,

or on behalf of Cambodia during the fiscal year ending

June 30, 1972.

(ec) No funds may be obligated for any of the pur-

poses described in subsection (a) of this section in, to,

for, or on behalf of Cambodia in any fiscal year be-

ginning after June 30, 1972, unless such funds have

been specifically authorized by law enacted after the

date of enactment of this section. In no ease shall

funds in any amount in excess of the amount specif-

ically authorized by law for any fiscal year be obligated

for any such purpose during such fiscal year.

(d) The provisions of subsections (a) and (c) of

this section shall not apply with respect to the obliga-

tion of funds to carry out combat air operations over

Cambodia.

(e) After the date of enactment of this section,

whenever any request is made to the Congress for the

appropriation of funds for use in, for, or on behalf of

Cambodia for any fiscal year, the President shall fur-

nish a written report to the Congress explaining the

purpose for which such funds are to be used in such

fiscal year.

es

RY ee ete ae ne ee 25S ce RIT SI

52a

See. 656. Limitations on United States Personne!

and Personnel Assisted by United States in Cambodia.

—The total number of civilian officers and employees

of executive agencies of the United States Government

who are citizens of the United States and of members

of the Armed Forces of the United States (excluding

such members while actually engaged in air operations

in or over Cambodia which originate outside Cambodia)

present in Cambodia at any one time shall not exceed

two hundred. The United States shall not, at any time,

pay in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, the com-

pensation or allowances of more than eighty-five indi-

viduals in Cambodia who are citizens of countries other

than Cambodia or the United States. For purposes of

this section, “executive agency of the United States

Government” means any agency, department, board,

wholly or partly owned corporation, instrumentality,

commission, or establishment within the executive

branch of the United States Government. (Emphasis

added).

On February 9, 1972, the President stated to Congress

that North Vietnam continued to threaten the legitimate

governments in Laos and Cambodia “in order to further

its attacks on South Vietnam,” and stated that “In Cam-

bodia, operations are at the request of the Government

and serve to relieve enemy pressures against Cambodia as

well as South Vietnam.” United States Foreign Policy for

the 1970’s: The Emerging Structure of Peace, 8 Presiden-

tial Documents 235, 343-45.

On April 18, 1972, testimony before the House of Repre-

sentatives Committee on Armed Services stated that a sig-

nificant portion of the Navy and Air Force incremental

~

ft

Ye .

d3a

war costs of $2,023,000,000 for fiseal 1972 “could be at-

tributed to operations in Laos and Cambodia.” Cong. Ree.

9173. Some information presented at that time was classi-

fied and made available for inspection only by members

of Congress.

Events in 1973

On January 27, 1973, the parties participating in the

Paris Conference on Vietnam signed an Agreement on End-

ing the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, which stated

in Article 20(a):

... The parties participating in the Paris Conference

on Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the terri-

tory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach

‘on the sovereignty and security of one another and of

other countries.

The affidavit of the Assistant United States Attorney

opposing the motion for summary judgment asserts that

after January 27, 1973, despite a unilateral cessation of

hostilities by the governments of Cambodia and the United

States, “the North Vietnamese launched a general offensive

in Cambodia, continuing the combat there. The military

response of the United States continued.”

In fact, there is evidence that air operations over Cam-

bodia since January 27, 1973 have escalated sharply. A re-

port on United States Air Operations in Cambodia pre-

pared for the Subcommittee on United States Security

Agreements and Commitments Abroad (April 1973—

G.P.O.), states on page 7 that in the period February 16

through February 28, 1973, an average of twenty-three

tactical air sorties a day and five B-52 sorties were flown

in Cambodia. In the following two-week period, March 1-

dS4a

March 15, an average of fifty-eight tactical and gunship

sorties and twenty B-52 sorties were flown. Between March

16-March 31, an average of 184 tactical sorties and fifty-

eight B-52 sorties were flown. A statistical summary sub-

mitted by the Department of Defense to the Senate Armed

Services Committee on June 19, 1973 shows that in the

period October 30, 1972-January 27, 1973, 936 combat sor-

ties were flown over Cambodia and that in the period

January 27, 1973-April 30, 1973, 12,136 sorties were flown.

The last American combat troops were withdrawn from

South Vietnam on March 28, 1973 and the last known Amer-

ican prisoners of war were released on April 1, 1973.

Secretary of State Rogers on April 3, 1973, submitted a

statement on “Presidential Authority to Continue U.S. Air

Combat Operations in Cambodia” to the Senate Committee

on Foreign Relations at hearings concerning the Depart-

ment of State Appropriations Authorization for fiseal 1974.

The statement asserted its view that

the conflicts in Laos and Cambodia are closely related

to the conflict in Vietnam and, in fact, are so inter-

related as to be considered parts of a single conflict.

Hearings on S. 1248 and H.R. 5610, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.

p. 452. It was further stated that the presence of North

Vietnamese troops in Laos and Cambodia threatened the

right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people,

which was guaranteed by the Paris Agreement, and that air

strikes in Cambodia were not for the defense of Cambodia

as such, but to enforce compliance with the Vietnam (cease-

fire) Agreement. Id. 453.

d0a

Congressional Moves After the Repatriation of

American Prisoners of War

The Defense Department sought authority in May 1973

to transfer $500 million to cover existing shortages of men

and material. About $175 million was earmarked for Cam-

bodian bombing operations. See 119 Cong.Ree. H 3449

(daily ed. May 8, 1973). On May 10, 1973, the House voted

down the transfer authority by a vote of 219-188. 119 Cong.

Ree. H 3561, 3592-93 (daily ed. May 10, 1978).

Immediately thereafter the House adopted the Long

Amendment to the Second Supplemental Appropriations

Bill H.R. 7447, which explicitly forbade the use of Defense

Department funds for the Cambodian bombing. The amend-

ment read:

None of the funds herein appropriated to the Depart-

ment of Defense under this Act shall be expended to

support directly or indirectly combat activities in, over,

or from off the shores of Cambodia by United States

forces.

119 Cong.Ree. H 3593 (daily ed. May 10, 1973). The Long

Amendment passed by a vote of 224-172. /bid. at H 3598.

Thereafter the Senate adopted a broader amendment to

H.R. 7447, barring the use of any and all funds thereto-

fore appropriated for the Defense Department for the

bombing of Cambodia. It was introduced by Senator Eagle-

ton on May 29, 1973:

Sec. 305. None of the funds herein appropriated under

this Act or heretofore appropriated under any other

Act may be expended to support directly or indirectly

combat activities in, over or from off shores of Cam-

bodia, or in or over Laos by United States forces.

a ere em

26a

119 Cong.Ree. S 9827 (daily ed. May 29, 1973). The Eagle-

ton amendment was adopted by a vote of 63-19 on May 31.

1973. 119 Cong.Ree. S 10128 (daily ed. May 31, 1973).

Since the Eagleton amendment was more inclusive than

the Long amendment, the measure went to a conference

committee of the two houses. On June 25, 1973, the House

receded and aceepted the broader Eagleton amendment by

a vote of 235 to 172. 119 Cong.Ree. H 5268 (daily ed. June

25, 1973). The House refused to adept a proposed amend-

ment to delay the effect of the Eagleton amendment. The

vote was 204 to 204. Ibid. H 5274.

Thereafter on June 26, 1973, the Senate agreed to the

conference report on H.R. 7447 containing the Eagleton

amendment. The vote was $1 to 11. 119 Cong.Ree. S 12057

(daily ed. June 26, 1973). The bill was then sent to the

President.

The President vetoed H.R. 7447 on June 27, 1973. The

House voted 241 to 173 to override the veto—a majority of

sixty-eight votes but short of the required two-thirds vote.

119 Cong.Ree. H 5487 (daily ed. June 27, 1973).

On the same day, the Senate voted to attach the Eagleton

amendment to H.R. S410. a bill to continue the existing in-

crease in public debt through November 30, 1973. The

amendment read as follows:

See. 501. No funds heretofore or hereafter appropri-

ated under any Act of Congress may he obligated or ex-

pended to support directly or indirectly combat activi-

ties in, over, or from off the shores of Cambodia or

in or over Laos by United States forces.

119 Cong.Ree. S 12171 (daily ed. June 27, 1973). The

amendment was adopted by a vote of 67 to 29. Ibid. at S

o7a

12173. Thereafter the debt limit bill with the Eagleton

amendment was passed by a vote of 72 to 19. Ibid. at S

12220.

On June 26, 1973 the House also adopted two amend-

ments to the Continuing Appropriations Resolution (H.J.

Res. 636), barring funds for Cambodian bombing. Con-

gressman Long introduced the following amendment:

None of the funds under this joint resolution hereto-

fore appropriated may be expended to support directly

or indirectly combat activities in er over Cambodia

or Laos or off the shores of Cambodia or Laos by

United States forces.

Cong.Ree. H 5363 (daily ed. June 26, 1975). It passed

by a vote of 218 to 194. Jhid. at H 5371. Congressman Ad-

dabbo introduced a similar amendment.

See. 108. None of the funds under this Joint Resolu-

tion may be expended to support direetly or indirectly

combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam

and South Vietnam or off the shores of Cambodia,

Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam by United

States forces without the express consent of Congress.

It passed by a vote of 240 to 172. Ibid. at H 5373.

Faced with the dilemma of the President set upon vetoing

any hill containing riders cutting off funds for Cambodian

military operations and the urgency of providing funds

for the operation of the federal government, Senator Ful-

bright on June 29, 1973, after confereaces with White

House representatives, introduced the following amend-

ment to the Continuing Appropriations Resolution (H.J.

Qari

oSa

See. 169. Notwithstanding any other provision of law,

on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein, hereto-

fore or hereafter appropriated may be obligated or ex-

pended to finance the involvement of United States

military forces in hostilities in or over or from off the

shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or

Cambodia.

119 Cong.Ree. S 12560 (daily ed. June 29, 1973). The

Senate voted to adopt the Fulbright amendment 64 to 26.

Ibid. S 12580. The Senate then voted to delete the earlier

Eagleton amendment from the Continuing Appropriations

Resolution. Ilid. S 12581.

The House refused to pass S 109 2s worded and in con-

erence S 108 was adopted. 119 Cong.Rec. No. 104 (daily ed.

June 30, 1973). The Conference Report was approved by

the House on June 30. Ibid. at H 5781. HJ. Res. 636, the

Joint Resolution Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal

1974, Publie Law 93-52, was signed into law by the Presi-

dent on July 1 and provided:

Sec. 108. Notwithstanding any other provision of law,

on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or here-

tofore appropriated may be obligated or expended to

finance directly or indirectly combat activities by

United States military forces in or over or from off

the shores of North Vietnam. South Vietnam, Laos or

Cambodia.

On July 1, the President also signed into law H.R. 9055,

the Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1973, Public

Law 93-50. The Act includes the following provision:

See. 307. None of the funds herein appropriated under

this Act may be expended to support directly or in-

09a

directly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos,

North Vietnam and South Vietnam by United States

forces, and after August 15, 1973, no other funds here-

tofore appropriated, under any other Act may be ex-

pended for such purpose. (Emphasis added.)

Other Facts

The defendants do not disagree with plaintiffs’ conten-

tion that all ground combat troops were withdrawn from In-

dochina on Mareh 28, 1973. There is reference in the papers

to a few members of the armed forces stationed as guards

to the Embassy in Saigon, but no assertion that they are

there to continue the Vietnam war.

The complete repatriation of all known American prison-

ers of war is established by testimony before Congress

quoted in plaintiffs’ papers. Frank A. Sieverts. Special

Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State for Prisoner of

War/ Missing in Action Matters, in testimony before the

National Security Poliey and Scientific Developments Sub-

committee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

May 31, 1973, stated:

It should be noted that there is no indication from

these debriefings [of returning POW’'s] that any Amer-

ican personnel continue to be held in Indochina. All

American prisoners known to any of our returned

POW’s have either been released or been listed by the

communist authorities as having died in captivity. Re-

turnees with whom I have talked, including those who

appeared before this Subcommittee May 23, are clear

in their belief that no U.S. prisoners continue to be

held.

Breton eye ners

60a

Defendants assert that the complete repatriation of

prisoners of war is not an undisputed fact, but they have

presented no evidence that there are any such prisoners re-

maining in North Vietnam or anywhere in Indochina. There

remain. however, over 1.250 members of the armed forees

listed as missing in action, who have not heen located or

officially declared to have died.

Plaintiffs and the amici assert that continuing hostilities

in Cambodia do not represent activities of North Vietnam-

ese troops, but a civil war between Khmer insurgents and

the official government of Cambodia.

Plaintiffs and the amici also assert that continued U.S.

bombing in Cambodia is causing the death and maiming of

many civilians.

Defendants stated on oral argument that if summary

judgment is denied, they would propose to offer testimony

from Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense

Schlesinger, and Dr. Kissinger concerning the necessity for

the air operations and the importance of continuing bomb-

ing in Cambodia because of continuing confidential negotia-

tions for a Cambodian cease-fire. No other offer of proof

has been made on behalf of the defendants.

On July 23, 1973, the government informed the court that

statistical data reflecting bombing activities in Cambodia

between March 1969 and April 1970 had been “declassified”

and were published in revised Table concerning fighter-

bomber munitions and B-52 munitions in the Congressional

Record for July 18, 1973. Defendants do not contend, how-

ever, that these facts were known to Congress before July

1, 1973. The court does not find that these facts are rele-

yant to the issues dealt with herein.

6la

Discussion

1. Legal Standards

The Court of Appeals of this cireuit has spoken several

times concerning earlier aspects of the Vietnam hostilities.

The teaching of DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir.

1973), Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971),

and Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970), is that the

question of the balance of constitutional authority to de-

clare war, as between the executive and legislative branches,

is not a political question and hence presents a justiciable

issue, if plaintiffs can succeed in showing that there are

manageable standards to resolve the controversy.

The Court of Appeals in Berk v. Laird, supra, 429 F.2d

at 305, stated that there might be manageable standards

to determine whether “prolonged foreign military activi-

ties without any significant congressicnal authorization”

might violate

a discoverable standard ealling for some mutual par-

ticipation by Congress in accordance with Article I,

section 8. (Emphasis from the original.)

This court on remand found that Congress in appropria-

tions bills from 1°65 through 1969 had shown “its continued

support of the Vietnam action” and that Congress’ choice

of appropriations bills rather than a formal declaration of

war to effectuate its intent involved a political question

which did not prevent the finding that the fighting in Viet-

nam was authorized by Congress and that such fighting

was not a usurpation of power by either of the Presidents

who had been in office after 1964. Berk v. Laird, supra, 317

F.Supp. at 726, 728-731.

€

+

62a

Nevertheless, appropriations bills do not necessarily in-

dicate an open-ended approval of all military operations

which may be conducted. See Mitchell v. Laird, 476 F.2d

093, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Note, Congress, The President

and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 Harv.L.

Rey. 1171, 1802 (1968).

In affirming this court's Berk decision and Judge Dool-

ing’s similar Orlando decision, the Court of Appeals stated

the test of whether there were manageable standards for

adjudication as being “whether there is any action by the

Congress sufficient to authorize or ratify the military ac-

tivity in question.” Orlando v. Laird, supra, 443 F.2d at

1042. It found that there was evidence of “an abundance

of continuing mutual participation in the prosecution of

the war.” 443 F.2d at 1042 (Emphasis added).

More recently in DaCosta v. Laird, supra, 471 F.2d at

1151, the Court of Appeals dealt with the question “whether

within the context of a lawful war, the President's order

to mine the harbors of North Vietnam was properly au-

thorized.” It held in that instance (at p. 1155) that judges

could not determine “whether a specific military operation

constitutes an ‘escalation’ of the war or is merely a new

tactical approach within a continuing strategic plan.” How-

ever, it added (at p. 1156):

In so stating, however, we specifically do not pass on

the point urged by appellant whether a radical change

in the character of war operations—as by an inten-

tional policy of indiscriminate bombing of civilians

without any military objective—might be sufficiently

measurable judicially to warrant a court's considera-

tion, i.e., might contain a standard which we seek in

this record and do not find.

63a

The court finds no evidence of intentional bombing of

civilians, but the mining of North Vietnam harbors was a

part of the war in Vietnam. Ii bombi ing in Cambodia is

not part of the war in Vietnam. there may be a standard

available here which the Court of Appeals did not find in

DaCosta.

Therefore the manageable standard which this court must

apply is the existence of Coneressional authority for the

present bombing activities over Cambodia. now that Ameri-

ean forces have been withdrawn and prisoners of war have

been repatriated. In order to be entitled to relief, plaintiffs

must show, under this standard, and the test of “continuing

mutual participation” set forth in Orlando. either that Con-

gress has not participated with the executive in the a authori-

zation of the hostilities in Cambodia or that Congress has

terminated any such authorization.

2. The Extent of Congress‘onal eluthorization of

Cambodian Hostilities

Cambodia was not mentioned in any of the appropria-

tions bills referred to in Berk. Tho 1964 appropriations

bill for the Department of Defense (P.L. 89-18, 79 Stat.

109) referred to “military activities in Southeast Asia.”

See 317 F.Supp. at 724. But the De ‘partment of sig nse

Alga Act for 1968 (P.L. 90-96, 81 Stat. » 248,

§ 639(a)) made appropriations available to ase only

(1) Vietnamese and other free world forces

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Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Holtzman v. Schlesinger · 416 U.S. 936 | Frix