Petition for a Writ of Certiorari — Holtzman v. Schlesinger
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SUPRER. COURT. UL &.
IN THE i
Supreme Court of the United Sisies
OcTOBER TERM, 1973
No. 23 = Q 4 l
——
EvizabpeTH HoLtTzMaN, individually and in her capacity as a
member of the United States House of Representatives; 1st
Lr. ARTHUR Watson, 43rd Strategic Wing, United States Air
Force, Anderson Air Force Base, Guam; Carrain James H.
Strain, 43rd Strategic Wing, United States Air Force, Ander-
son Air Force Base, Guam; Caprain MicuaeL. FLUGGER, 43rd
Strategic Wing, United States Air Force, Anderson Air Force
Base, Guam; and Captain DonaLp E. Dawson, 307th Strategic
Wing, United States Air Force, U-Tapao, Thailand,
Petitioners.
—against—
JaMEs R. SCHLESINGER, individually and as Secretary of Defense:
Jounx L. McLvcas, individually and as Secretary of the Air
Force; and Wiiiiam P. CLEMENTS, individually and as Deputy
Secretary of Defense,
Respondents.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
\
Burt NEUBORNE
LEON FRIEDMAN
Metvin L. WULF
American Civil Liberties Union
22 East 40th Street
New York, New York
Attorneys for Petitioners
Of Counsel:
Marvin M. KarPATKIN
NorMAN SIEGAL
a TS
INDEX
PAGE
aera la a Sean ae ick ne ill
SN nae anes eevee suena 2
EOI ae LLP LR LEAST NEL LOD 3
NINN NO ccc rcnicbslcindaasntbnceomrresonenelaees 3
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ...... 4
Statement of the Case —_....... he BLEND, RIS PO +
Reasons For GRANTING THE WRIT:
Certiorari should be granted because the decision
of the majority below, upholding the legality of
orders directing petitioners to bomb Cambodia,
incorrectly resolved an issue of critical national
significance and established a potentially disas-
trous precedent validating unilateral executive
Fe gett al ch GRO IA SAY 5 RO NEE SEO NEE 10
1. Congress Neither Authorized Nor Ratified the
Orders Directing Petitioners to Bomb Cam-
ND etn ee ee akicsan 13
2. No Procedural Obstacle Exists to Judicial Re-
view of the Legality of the Orders Directing
Petitioners to Bomb Cambodia ~ 02.0... 19
ei See REEL REID 19
IIR no ne ne a °0
i
PAGE
C. Political Question 2... seers 21
D. Exhaustion of Military Remedies .-.........-.---- 26
CGMCTUBION a cccscenn onc nno nnn nsenesenonetesesenssunnenenseeninsnssenensanerentes 27
APPENDIX:
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit ......-.....-.--.--..----sse--e-onssennereeeneses la
Order Denying Rehearing in Bane ........---------------- 26a
United States District Court's Opinion of June 13,
sien ereree ein menncagmeninpeeenaceencionsinns 28a
United States District Court's Opinion of July 25,
ec esis deatnainaanerenninnnnnnynccterrensneaiea setae tta
Justice Marshall's Opinion Denying Application to
Vacate Stay oon... c-ceseececceecceeecececeesesesnenenensetensnenenses 72a
Justice Douglas’ Opinion Vacating Stay ........----.--- Sta
Justice Marshali’s Opinion Granting Stay -............. 89a
Justice Douglas’ Dissenting Opinion ...........-.------ 91:
Denial of Application for Extraordinary Sitting .. 96a
Justice Burger's Order Denying Extraordinary
dk RMD ae ASME anor iar mere te ara Va
Judgment of District Court: ........----- eee Sa
iii
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: .
Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966) ..........-... 20
Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) -....... 10, 11
Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970) ...........--- 11, 12, 24
Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess
Anne County, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) -.....-----------e 20
Da Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971) cert.
den., 405 U.S. 979 (1972) -..-..--e-eccceeeeeeceesseeeeectetesstees 6, 11, 12
Da Costa v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973) -........... 12
Levy v. Parker, —— F.2d —— (3rd Cir. 1973), cert.
U.S. ——, 42 U.S.L.W. 3235 (Oct. 23,
granted,
UTS) ness nsanennnnancnnnenceennveseceneensncnvserenensennnannsenennavewensennnnsnsenes 27
Massachusetts v. Laird, $51 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971) ...11, 12
Mitchell v. Laird, F.2d —— (D.C. Cir. 1973) ........ 6, 12
Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969)... eee 26
Orlando v. Laird. 317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) ..11, 13
Orlando vy. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.) cert. den., 404
TS 6 (i). 6, 11, 12, 15, 24
Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972)... 26
Perkins v. Laird, F.2d —— (8th Cir. 1970) cert.
den.. 403 U.S. 965 (1972) ......-------.-.0--s-c--ceceeesnesnsneeeeneenees 12
Powell v. MeCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) ..........-.------- 20
St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1948) -.........--- 20
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) ...........-.------------ 20
iv
PAGE
United States v. Johnson, 38 CMR 44 (1967) ~.......... 26-27
United States v. SCRAP, US. CREED mceisccsccs 19, 20
United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953) .... 19
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
SONI, MI car ccacescats cast pscauecestpacermaserereseekacaine 13, 22, 23, 24, 25
Constitutional Provisions:
United States Constitution
RID Be I Ba a pacecsconsrestnpuinicayiexciadosseioberaloriesbiies passim
I I oar es cacccnesesicanessdectonind passim
IE Es Bk a ctestactiniciorncceimenvtniccennss passim
Statutes:
Be se WOR iasccatasteaccciccavane sso aedadsrueniacmncivenmarriaas 3
BP MN ee eee cas 13
I I I ol ectpte ccs peaennceaine cena eens 13, 16
ONIN TU OI asso eacce cs dabcsencieaneheinsceneoseibadelanes 21
Other Authorities:
Cong. Ree. H3558—H3598 (daily ed. May 10, 1973) ........ 14
Cong. Ree. $12561 (daily ed. June 29, 1973) ................ 16, 17
Berger, War Making by the President, 121 U. of Pa.
FM Re kk: : EMRENOS DNR: SETI RENTED et Ere Merck een Sena 11
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. p. 508
PRI Sisensiaasccasiccislavcaecnaniselin dasscclactaiesdullppiousanaaac msomteonaintein 8
Lofgren, War Making Under the Constitution: The
Original Understanding, 81 Yale L. Jour. 672 (1972) 11
6 Presidential Documents of Richard Nixon, 596 (1970) 6
PAGE
Public Papers of the Presidents, Richard M, Nixon,
1970, pp. 405-410; 476-480: 529-541 (G.P.O. 1971) .... 6,7
Public Papers of the Presidents, Richard M. Nixon,
1971, pp. 265, 449-50 (G.P.O. 1972) ..........cccecceoseceosesses 8
Rehnquist, The Constitutional Issues—Administration
Position, 45 NYU Law Rev. 628 (1970) oo. 6
Stevenson, United States Military Action in Cambodia:
Questions of International Law, reprinted in 3 The
Vietnam War and International Law (Falk ed.
MRD sia auatinn dasa ta reahalicaiica nour otnaseat ama cee ek eee 6-7
Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Powers: A
Critique, 60 Cal, L. Rev. 623 (1972) 0... 1]
pervs Hees
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OctToBeR TERM, 1973
Euizapern Houtrzman, individually and in her capacity as
a member of the United States House of Representa-
tives: Ist Lr. Artruur Warsoxn, 43rd Strategie Wing,
United States Air Foree, Anderson Air Foree Base,
Guam; Captain James H. Stray, 48rd Strategic Wing.
United States Air Force, Anderson Air Foree Base,
Guam; Captaris Micnaret Piuvccer, 45rd Strategie Wing,
United States Air lForee, Anderson Air Force Base,
Guam: and Captars Donatp FE. Dawson, 307th Strategic
Wing, United States Air Foree, U-Tapao, Thailand,
Petitioners,
—against—
James R. Scuvesincer, individually and as Secretary of
Defense: Joun L. MeLucas, individually and as Seere-
tary of the Air Force; and Witiiam P. CLements, in-
dividually and as Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Respondents.
<i
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Petitioners pray that a petition for a writ of certiorari
issue to review the judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, entered on August 8,
1973, reversing the determination of the Distriet Court,
Bradissisnsinen wor
9
a
dated July 25, 1973, that the Executive lacked constitutional
authorization to commit American forces to combat in and
over Cambodia.
Opinions Below
The majority and dissenting opinions of the Second Cir-
cuit reversing the decision of the District Court are re-
ported at 484 F.2d 1307 and are set forth in the Appendix,
infra, at pp. la-25a. The order of the Second Circuit deny-
ing rehearing in bane (Oakes, J., dissenting) is not officially
reported and is set forth in the Appendix, infra, at p. 27a.
The decision of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (Judd, J.), ruling that the
Executive lacked constitutional authority to order peti-
tioners to bomb Cambodia is reported at 361 F. Supp.
d44 and 361 F. Supp. 553 and is set forth in the Appendix,
infra, at pp. 28a-Tla. The opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall
declining to vacate the stay of the District Court’s order
is reported at —— US. , 388 L. Ed.2d 18 and is set
forth in the Appendix at pp. 72a-S4a. The opinion of Mr.
Justice Douglas vacating the stay of the District Court’s
order is reported at US. . 38 L. Ed.2d 28, and
is set forth in the Appendix at pp. 85a-89a. The order of
Mr. Justice Marshall staying the order of the District
Court and Mr. Justice Douglas’ dissent therefrom are re-
ported at U.S. ——. 38 L. Ed.2d 33, and are set forth
in the Appendix at pp. 90a-96a. The orders of the Chief
Justice denying petitioners’ applications for an extraordi-
nary session of the Court are unreported and set forth in
the Appendix at pp. 96a-97a.
Jurisdiction
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on
August 8, 1973 [A la]. A timely petition for rehearing
in bane was denied by the Second Circuit on September 17,
1973 [A 26a-27a]. This Court has jurisdiction to entertain
this petition under 28 U.S.C. ¢1254(1).
Questions Presented
1. Were the orders issued by the Executive branch to
petitioners, directing them to engage in the combat bomb-
ing of Cambodia in May and June, 1973, constitutionally
authorized within the meaning of Article I, Section 8,
Clause 11 of the Constitution?
2. Did the Executive branch possess authority to order
American forces to engage in combat operations in or over
Cambodia in the absence of Congressional authorization?
3. Did Congress authorize the commitment of American
forces to combat in Cambodia within the meaning of Article
I, Section 8 of the Constitution?
4. Do petitioners possess standing to challenge the con-
stitutionality of orders directing American forces to engage
in combat activities in Cambodia?
d. Is judicial review of the constitutionality of orders
directing petitioners to engage in combat in Cambodia pre-
cluded by the political question doctrine?
6. Is this proceeding moot despite the pendency of court
martial charges against a petitioner who refused to obey
orders to bomb Cambodia?
earl |
eT eee
weer
LI RSMEANS ALSO RONMENT AEN PRT RH MOS LAH SIGE RFA A EVENT YOR III BMY 27
eon eae
Deaitesiinninnen Bret ahlih: desi haahidlgion seni
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved
Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution.
Statement of the Case
Petitioners, Captain Donald Dawson, Lt. Arthur Watson,
Captain James H. Strain and Captain Michael Flugger,
were 5-52 bomber crewmen assigned to Air Force combat
units who declined to engage in the bombing of Cambodia
during May and June of 1973.
Petitioner. Elizabeth Holtzman, is a member of the
United States House of Representatives from the 16th Con-
gressional District of New York who challenged the author-
ity of the Executive branch to commit American forces to
combat in Cambodia in the absence of Congressional au-
thorization.
Congresswoman Holtzman commenced this action in
April, 1973. While the District Court pondered proce-
dural aspects of the case, Captain Strain, Captain Flugger,
Lt. Watson and Captain Dawson joined Congresswoman
Holtzman in challenging the constitutionality of orders di-
recting them to bomb Cambodia [A 42a-43a; 7la].
Upon announcing their intention to challenge the legality
of orders directing them to bomb Cambodia, Captain
Strain, Captain Flugger and Lt. Watson were immediately
declared unfit for flight duty and returned to the United
States to undergo psychiatric evaluation. Lt. Watson has
been permitted to resign from the Air Force.* Captain
‘Lt. Watson's resignation carries with it an unsatisfactory ef-
ficiency rating attributable not to his combat performance. which
all concede was exemplary, but solely to his refusal to bomb Cam-
bodia.
a PS Os gg ee Ce Rar rm
3
Strain and Captain Flugger have remained in the Air
Force, but continue to be barred from flight duty and pro-
fessional advancement solely because they refused to bomb
Cambodia in the absence of Congressional authorization.
Captain Dawson’s refusal to bomb Cambodia was met
with a more drastic response. He was charged with failure
to obey a lawful order to bomb Cambodia and is currently
assigned to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines await-
ing trial by General Court Martial.
As Mr. Justice Marshall has already noted herein [A
73a], the basie facts underlying this controversy are mat-
ters of public record and have been exhaustively canvassed
by Judge Judd in his District Court opinion [A 45a-7la].
Prior to April 30, 1970, the Executive branch repeatedly
assured both the Congress and the American people that
the United States was not engaged in combat activities in
or over Cambodia. As Mr. Justice Marshall and Judge
Oakes noted, however, the Executive's pre-April 30, 1970
disclaimers were pursuant to a systematic plan of decep-
tion designed to conceal covert American combat operations
in Cambodia from Congress and the American people.*
* Convocation of Captain Dawson's court martial has heen de-
layed pending a decision on his application for discharge as a
conscientious objector. To date. the application has been denivd by
several levels of Air Force authority. Final review by the Secre-
tary of the Air Force has not heen completed.
* Indeed. the Air Force falsified its internal records in order to
conceal the scope and nature of American combat activity in Cam-
bedia. The falsified records were inadvertently submitted to Judze
Judd by the United States Attorney. acting in the best of faith.
When the falsification became known. the false fizures were replaced
with new data which, we are assured. accurately reflect United
States combat activity in Cambodia.
inl ttl
ERS ee ere ane
ab Avena ids ink ies
‘Ue
MA aud
Bailie sicp rissa messiness
6
On April 30, 1970, the Executive ordered American forces
“to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-
Vietnam border.” 6 Presidential Documents of Richard
Nixon, 596, 598 (1970). In response to widespread attacks
upon the power of the Executive to order American forces
to combat in Cambodia in the absence of Congressional
authorization, then Deputy Attorney General William
Rehnquist argued that the lawful presence of American
forces in Vietnam' created penumbral constitutional author-
ity in the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take steps
to protect the lives of Americans fighting in Vietnam. See
generally, Rehnquist, The Constitutional Isswes—Admin-
istration Position, 45 NYU Law Rev. 628 (1970); Public
Papers of the Presidents, Richard Nixon, 1970, pp. 405-
410; 476-480; 529-541 (G.P.O. 1971); Stevenson, United
States Military Action in Cambodia: Questions of Inter-
* The legality of the commitment of American combat forces to
Vietnam in the absence of explicit Congressional authorization is
itself a highly doubtful proposition. Although several courts have
found sufficient Congressional authorization of the Vietnam war
in the passage of military appropriations bills, petitioners earnestly
believe that such a view of the war powers clause renders it a
virtual nullity. Petitioners agree with the observation of Judges
Wyzanski and Bazelon in Mitchell v. Laird, F.2d (D.C.
Cir. 1973), that a vote on a collateral appropriation bill cannot
provide the explicit and formal Congressional action required hy
Article I, Section 8, clause 11. The issue is diseussed at length in
the petition of certiorari lodged with this Court in Orlando v.
Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2nd Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971)
and Da Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2nd Cir. 1971) cert. denied,
405 U.S. 979 (1972) respectively. However, whatever the effect of
appropriations bills on the use of force in Vietnam, no similar
authorization existed for the use of American forces in Cambodia.
In view of the apparently active participation by Mr. Justice
Rehnquist in the formulation and enunciation of the Executive's
legal position, petitioners have filed a motion requesting him to
recuse himself from participation in this case.
-
é
national Law, reprinted in 3 The Vietnam War and Inter-
national Law (Falk ed. 1972).
In the period after April 30, 1970, the Executive consist-
ently espoused the “penumbral power” doctrine and justi-
fied its sporadie use of combat forces in Cambodia solely
as necessary to protect the lives of American soldiers de-
ployed in Vietnam. Thus, on June 3, 1970, President
Nixon stated:
“The only remaining American activity in Cambodia
after July 1 [1970] will be air missions to interdict
the movement of enemy troops and material where J
find that it is necessary to protect the lives and security
of our men in South Vietnam.” Public Papers of the
Presidents, Richard M. Nixon, 1970, p. 478 (G.P.O.
1971). (Emphasis added)
Again, on June 30, 1970, President Nixon stated:
“We will conduct—with the approval of the Cambodian
Government—air interdiction missions against the
enemy efforts to move supplies and personnel through
Cambodia toward South Vietnam to reestablish base
areas relevant to the war in Vietnam. We do this to
protect our forces in South Vietnam. Public Papers
of the Presidents, Richard M. Nixon, 1970, p. 538
(G.P.O. 1971) (emphasis added).
Finally, on July 1, 1970, President Nixon stated:
“I'm going to use, as I should, the air power of the
United States to interdict all flows of men and supplies
which I consider are directed toward South Vietnam.
That is my role in defending American men.” Ibid., p.
502 (emphasis added).
Betws. dy
8
See also, Public Papers of the Presidents, Richard M.
Nixon, 1971, pp. 265, 449-50 (G.P.O. 1972); Testimony of
Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Hearings before the
Committee on foreign Relations, United States Senate,
92nd Cong., lst Sess. p. 508 (1971).
On April 1, 1973, the last American soldier was with-
drawn from South Vietnam. Since American military ac-
tivity in Cambodia had been justified solely as necessary
to protect American forces in South Vietnam, the with-
drawal of American forces from South Vietnam on April
1, 1973 deprived the Executive of the only legal basis
which it had ever asserted for the use of American combat
forces in Cambodia. Deprived of the only legal basis which
it had ever asserted for ordering American forces to Cam-
bodia, the Executive embarked on a search for a new legal
“handle” which would permit it to continue the vastly
intensified bombing of Cambodia.
On July 25, 1973, Judge Judd ruled that no Congres-
sional authorization existed for the commitment of Amer-
ican forces to combat in Cambodia [A 44a-7la]. On July
27, 1973, a panel of the Second Circuit stayed Judge Judd’s
decision pending review on the merits. On August 1, 1973,
Mr. Justice Marshall declined to vacate the Second Cir-
cuit’s stay [A 72a-S4a]. On August 4, 1973, Mr. Justice
Douglas vacated the Second Circuit’s stay and reinstated
Judge Judd’s injunction [A 85a-89a]. On August 4, 1973,
Mr. Justice Marshall issued a superseding order staying
Judge Judd’s injunction pending appeal [A 90a]. On Au-
gust 6, 1973, the five available active judges of the Second
Circuit denied petitioners’ application to hear the appeal
A SN LE 2 eit 2
9
from Judge Judd’s order in bane.’ On August 8, 1973, a
divided panel of the Second Circuit, consisting of Judges
Oakes, Mulligan and Timbers, reversed Judge Judd’s de-
termination,’ ruling that petitioners lacked standing [A
17a-19a]; that judicial review of the legality of orders to
bomb Cambodia was barred by the political question doc-
trine [A 4a-l2a]: and that Congress had, in directing the
Executive to terminate the bombing of Cambodia no later
than August 15, 1973, impliedly authorized hostilities until]
that date [A 13a-l7a]. On August 9 and 10, 1973, peti-
tioners’ applications to the Chief Justice for an extraordi-
nary sitting of this Court were denied [A 96a-97a].
Six Federal judges have expressed an opinion on the
merits of this controversy: Judge Judd and Judge Oakes
have sustained petitioners’ position; Mr. Justice Marshall
and Mr. Justice Douglas have indicated sympathy for peti-
tioners’ position. Only two of the six, Judges Mulligan
and Timbers, have rejected it. In view of the extraordinary
importance of both the substantive and procedural issues
raised herein and in view of the fact that the views es-
poused by a majority of the panel below have commanded
the support of only two of the six judges who have spoken
in this case, final resolution of the matter by this Court
seems particularly appropriate.
° Judge Mulligan, in his majority opinion, suggests that the
denial of in bane status was designed to expedite the appellate
process [A 4a].
* Judge Mulligan wrote for the majority. Judge Oakes dissented.
rattle obissiaes,
10
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
Certiorari should be granted because the decision of
the majority below, upholding the legality of orders
directing petitioners to bomb Cambodia, incorrectly
resolved an issue of critical national significance and
established a potentially disastrous precedent validating
unilateral executive warmaking.
Captain Donald Dawson is facing a General Court Mar-
tial for declining to bomb Cambodia on June 21, 1973.
His colleagues, Lt. Watson, Captain Flugger and Captain
Strain, have either resigned from the service or been indefi-
nitely grounded because they sought to challenge the
legality of orders directing them to bomb Cambodia. In
refusing to declare petitioners’ orders unlawful, the ma-
jority below refused to be bound by the law which had
painfully evolved from litigation questioning the legality
of the Vietnam war and, instead, virtually abdicated all
judicial responsibility for the enforcement of a critical pro-
vision of the Constitution.’
Although litigation concerning the constitutionality of
the commitment of American forces to combat in Vietnam
has been voluminous* (and divided on many questions),
several basic principles have emerged clearly, and have
varied hardly at all from those initially enunciated by
* Judge Judd, in his opinion, applied precisely the standards
which he had utilized three years earlier to uphold the legality of
the commitment of American forces to combat in South Vietnam.
Berk vy. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
*The cases are collected below. 484 F.2d at 1312 n. 3 [A
12a-13a].
2 ANE EE TE Toe in ER RARE A RT i es
11
Judges Judd and Dooling in their pioneer efforts in Berk
Vv. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) and Orlando y.
Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
First, prior to the decision below, our courts had been
virtually unanimous in holding that “(history makes clear
that Congressional power ‘to declare war’ conferred by
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution was intended as an
explicit restriction upon the power of the Executive to
initiate war on his own prerogative...” Berk y. Laird,
429 F.2d 305 (2nd Cir. 1970) at 305.°
Second, our courts had ruled that the Executive lacked
unilateral power to commit American forces to combat in
the absence of Congressional authorization or ratification,
E.g. Orlando y. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2nd Cir. 1971)
cert. denied, 404 U.S, 869 (1971).
Third, three circuits had ruled that while the form
utilized by the legislature to express its authorization of
combat activities is solely within the discretion of Congress,
the judiciary may—and should—determine whether Con-
gress has—in fact—authorized the Executive to order
Americans into combat. E.g. Massachusets vy. Laird, 451
F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); Orlando yx. Laird, supra; Da Costa
v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2nd Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 405
dent, 121 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 29 (1972); Wormuth. Th: Niron
Theory of the War Powers: A Critique, 60 Cal. L. Rev 623 (1972) ;
Lofgren, War Making Under the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 81 Yale L. Jour. 672 (1972).
12
U.S. 979 (1972); Perkins v. Laird, —— F.2d —— (Sth Cir.
1970) cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972)."°
Finally, our courts have recognized that when the Legis-
lature and Executive branches are in open conflict concern-
ing the waging of war, it is the duty of the judiciary to
enforce the Constitution against a recalcitrant Executive.
E.g. Berk vy. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2nd Cir. 1970) at 305;
Orlando v. Laird, 445 F.2d 1089 (2nd Cir. 1971) at 1042;
Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971) at 34;
Da Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 13868 (2nd Cir. 1971) at 1370;
Da Costa y. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2nd Cir. 1973) at 1156.
Unfortunately, in declining to affirm Judge Judd, the
majority below upheld the legality of military combat
orders issued in the absence of a shred of Congressiortal
authorization and reiterated in the teeth of formal and
explicit Congressional opposition. Unless corrected, the
erroneous refusal of the majority below to perform its
constitutional duty will stand as a dangerous invitation to
Executive intransigence. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter cau-
tioned t. enty-one years ago, in words which have acquired
even more signficance with the passage of a generation:
The accretion of dangerous power does not come in
a day. It does come, however slowly, from the genera-
*° Petitioners believe that Article I, Section 8 requires that Con-
gress authorize the commitment of American forces to combat in
a formal, explicit and unambiguous manner. Accordingly, while
petitioners are in basic agreement with many of the lezal principles
articulated in Orlando v. Laird, supra, and its progeny, petitioners
disagree with so much of those opinions as per uit Congress to
authorize a war by implication by enacting collateral measures.
Petitioners believe that it is not too much to ask that decisions of
the magnitude of authorizing armed hostilities be taken with the
formality and explicitness which would be required of a private
party contracting for the purchase of a parcel of real estate or
making a will. Cf. Mitchell v. Laird, F.2d —— (D.C. Cir.
1973) (per Bazelon and Wyzanski, JJ.).
13
tive force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions
that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of
authority, Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
If we are to prevent the “accretion of dangerous power”
which would flow from the judicial validation of the pro-
cedures utilized by the Executive in ordering petitioners
to bomb Cambodia, the decision of the majority below must
be set aside.
1. Congress Neither Authorized Nor Ratified the Orders
Directing Petitioners to Bomb Cambodia.
Judge Mulligan ruled below that Congress, in forbidding
the Executive to bomb Cambodia after A
ugust 15, 1973"
had impliedly—
and unwittingly—ratified and authorized
the bombing of Cambodia up to that date. Howey
view of Congressional activity indicates that Congress, far
from authorizing or ratifying the bombing of Cambodia,
repeatedly, explicitly and formally declined to do so and
took every step available to it to terminate the
unilateral commitment of forces to combat.
er, a re-
Executive's
On May 10, 1973, the House of Repr
esentatives declined
by a vote of 219-188 to authorize
the Executive to transfer
funds to the Pentagon's Cambodian account to p
ay for the
bombing of Cambodia.”
* PL 93-52; PL 93-50,
'* Having suffered this rebuff in the House, the P
discovered that it did not really need the transfer authority to
bomb Cambodia and never renewed its request. Of course, the
failure to obtain transfer authority did not prevent the Pentagon
from continuing the bombing unabated.
entagon suddenly
AEM LE ALE, MOLI DE LEGG I: CE:
_ — ‘ PURO nt
2 ph OER TORRE: ELLOS VE SPLEEN EIRENE LIE HS MERI SENSE IS AO PRE TG SNIEE OI
oem rer PRIS L REO Ee LOO
reece SLEEP RELA OL Tey OB)
14
Moreover, on May 10, 1973, the House of Representa-
tives, by a vote of 224-188, adopted an amendment pro-
posed by Representative Long of Maryland, which pro-
vided:
“None of the funds herein appropriated to the Depart-
ment of Defense under this Act shall be expended to
support directly or indirectly combat activities in, over
or from off the shores of Cambodia by United States
forces.”
The debate surrounding the adoption by the House of
the Long Amendment clearly reveals the hostility with
which the Cambodian bombing was viewed. See generally,
Cong. Ree. May 10, 1973, pp. H3558-H3598 (daily ed.).
On May 31, 1973, the Senate, by a vote of 63-19, adopted
an amendment proposed by Senator Eagleton which pro-
vided:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds
herein, heretofore or hereafter appropriated may be
obligated or expended to finance the involvement of
United States military forces in hostilities in or over
or from off the shores of Laos or Cambodia.”
Although the tenor of the House and Senate amendments
were similar, since the Senate version was more stringent,
the differing provisions were sent to a Senate-House Con-
ference Committee. The Senate conferees insisted upon
the stringent Eagleton Amendment, while the House con-
ferees, led by Representative Mahon, who made no secret
of his opposition to any restraints on American military
activities in Cambodia, refused to accede. Finally, on June
ASU AR TR | AN Ber emmee
15
25, 1973, the House of Representatives voted 235-172 to
accept the Eagleton Amendment. The Second Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1973, containing the Eagleton
Amendment, was accepted by the Senate on June 26, 1973,
by a vote of 81-11, and sent to the President for his signa-
ture. However, on June 27, 1973, President Nixon, in an
unprecedented refusal to accede to the will of Congress in
refusing to authorize military activity, vetoed the Seeond
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1973 because he found
the restraints upon his military activities unacceptable."
On June 27, 1973, the House of Representatives voted
240-175 to override the veto, but fell 35 votes short of the
required 33 majority.
Faced with (a) the certainty of a Presidential veto of
any bill containing the Eagleton Amendment and (b) the
critical necessity of enacting general governmental fund-
ing legislation prior to the expiration of the fiscal year on
June 30, 1973, Congress sought to walk a constitutional
tightrope. On the one hand Congress wished to enact the
desperately needed 1973-1974 general governmental funding
bills, but on the other hand Congress wished to avoid the
pitfall (created in part by the analysis in Orlando) of
unwillingly authorizing the President's use of force in
Cambodia by appropriating money for the war's prosecu-
—
*S A serious question exists as to whether the President may veto
an exercise of Congress’ independent constitutional responsibilities
under Article I, Section 8. However, since, despite the veto, no
Congressional authorization for the Cambodian bombing exists, it
is unnecessary to explore the legality of the President's purported
veto, Since it is the President's inertial responsibility under Article
I, Section 8 to induce a majority of Congress to affirmatively author-
ize a war, it is difficult to understand how the President ean veto
the expression of a majority of both Houses explicitly forbidding
him from engaging in a given war.
a
FILO ODOLIE LEE LDF LOL IOS MA
foi REAR PRS OOS PEDIC) EHP
‘ a ee De ie
5 LIE OE AME ALI TENT ELEN SOGY LENT LLLP ILL, ,
De Ati
A, DATO
We Ore sere
Pewee
rw Se a ee ee ee tee A SO Ra |
16
tion. Congress solved its dilemma by re-enacting general
funding legislation containing the Eagleton Amendment
expressing its unequivocal opposition to the bombing of
Cambodia but deferring the mandatory cut-off of Cam-
bodian funds until August 15, 1973, upon extracting a prom-
ise from the President that he would not veto such a bill.
President Nixon, thereupon, signed the desperately needed
general funding bills on June 30, 1973 with the Eagleton
Amendments as modified.**
The Executive now argues that Congress, in deferring
the date of the cut-off of funds in the Eagleton Amendment
until August 15, 1973, in order to avoid a threatened Presi-
dential veto, unwittingly authorized and ratified the Execu-
tive’s use of force in Cambodia. However, it is absurd to
contend that Congress, having been frustrated by an un-
precedented Presidential veto in its efforts to cut-off all
funds for Cambodia, authorized or approved the use of
force in Cambodia merely because, in the words of Senator
McGovern, it embarked upon a “tactical effort to get the
best possible veto-proof solution.” Cong. Rec. June 29,
1973, p. S12561 (daily ed.).
Senator Fulbright, perhaps the Senate’s most implacable
foe of American military operations in Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia, was the principal architect of the ‘‘veto-proof
solution” which the government now contends acts as a
** Thus, the final text of the Eagleton Amendment, attached to
the continuing resolution, provides:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after
August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated
may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly
combat activities hy United States military forces in or over
or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos
or Cambodia.” Pub. Law 93-52.
Pa Se Ee ee ee
17
back door approval of the Cambodian bombing. In explain-
ing his support of the modified Eagleton Amendment, Sena-
tor Fulbright stated:
“The acceptance of an August 15 cut-off date should
in no way be interpreted as recognition by the [Senate
Foreign Relations Committee] of the President’s au-
thority to engage U.S. forces in hostilities until that
date. The view of most members of the committee has
been and continues to be that the President does not
have such authority in the absence of specific Congres-
sional approval.” Cong. Rec. June 29, 1973, p. $12560
(daily ed.).
* * s s st
“The acceptance of an August 15 cutoff date should in
no way be interpreted as recognition by the Committee
of the President's authority to engage United States
forces in hostilities until that date.” Id. at S12562.
During the extensive debate on the modified Eagleton
Amendment not a single member of the Senate suggested
that its passage was intended to bestow any authority on
the Executive to bomb Cambodia. Rather, no fewer than
23 Senators** explicitly asserted that the passage of the
modified Eagleton Amendment could not authorize the
* Fulbright, Javits, MeGovern, Eagleton, Mansfield, Hatfield,
Kennedy, Bayh, Stevenson, MeIntyre, Church, Haskell. Humphrey,
Hallings, Muskie, Mathias, Nelson, Hartke, Pastore, Mondale, Moss.
Cranston and Symington. Senators Eagleton, Bayh and Muskie
expressed the fear that the Executive would attempt to misuse the
enactment of the August 15 cut off as an implied authorization
for the bombing. They were repeatedly assured, however. by the
measure’s sponsor that it did not grant any authority to the Execu-
tive, but merely sought to end his actions in Cambodia at the earliest
“veto-proof” date.
A Or ee AOS
ne
18
President to engage in hostilities. As Senator Allen, hardly
a Senate dove, noted:
“The Amendment is not a grant of authority. It is a
limitation on authority, and it will bring this war to
a very definite halt.” Jd. at $12575.
It is, therefore, futile for the Executive to suggest that
the modified Eagleton Amendment, designed to end the
Cambodian bombing as quickly as Congress understood it
possible to do so, had the unintended effect of establishing
a fictitious Congressional assent to the war in Cambodia.
As Judge Judd noted below:
“It cannot be the rule that the President needs a vote
of only one-third plus one of either House in order
to conduct a war, but this would be the consequence of
holding that Congress must override a Presidential
veto in order to terminate hostilities which it has not
authorized” [A 69a].
Unless this Court affirms Judge Judd, the President will
be empowered to commit American forces to combat over
the objections of the Congress and to continue his military
policies so long as he can persuade one-third of either
House to sustain his veto. Such a procedure, permitting
the American President far more power than the British
sovereign, is a far ery from the hopes of the Founding
Fathers when they sought by the war powers clause to
establish Congress as the ultimate arbiter of war and
peace.
The majority below appeared to assume that it remains
constitutional for the Executive to commit American forces
19
to combat unilaterally so long as 24 of both Houses of Con-
gress do not order him to stop. However, the inertial bur-
den under Article I, Section 8, clause 11, does nct lie with
Congress to marshal veto-proof majorities in both Houses
to prevent the President from waging war: rather, the
inertial burden lies with the President to secure the ap-
proval of a majority of both Houses as a pre-condition to
the waging of war. Whether or not Congress was able to
express its opposition to the commitment of American
forces to combat in Cambodia by veto-proof majorities, it
remains clear that the President failed in his inertial bur-
den of persuading majorities of both Houses to grant him
Constitutional authorization to wage war in Cambodia.
2. No Procedural Obstacle Exists to Judicial Review of
the Legality of the Orders Directing Petitioners to
Bomb Cambodia.
A. Standing
The majority below ruled that the Air Force petitioners
lacked standing to challenge the legality of orders direct-
ing them to bomb Cambodia because the Air Force had
removed them from combat status [A 1l7a-1%a]. However.
such a wooden application of the standing doctrine is wholly
at variance with the decisions of this Court. e.g. United
States v. SCRAP, US. (1973).° and establishes
a blueprint for evasion permitting the military to frustrate
judicial review merely by reassigning dissenters. Cf. United
States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953).
The majority's refusal to recognize the Air Force peti-
tioners’ standing ignores the vital and continuing personal
*6In fact, such an application confuses standing with mootness.
a ——E — — SS te RETR RE
20
stake which each maintains in this controversy. In de-
clining to recognize Captain Dawson’s standing, the ma-
jority was without judicial sanction. Captain Dawson is
awaiting General Court Martial for declining to comply
with the orders to bomb Cambodia at issue herein. To
refuse to recognize such a “stake” in the outcome of this
litigation as sufficient to satisfy “standing” is to reduce
the concept to a meaningless post hoc label. Compare,
United States v. SCRAP, U.S. —— (1973).
B. Mootness
It will doubtless be argued that this case is moot in
view of the cessation of American bombing of Cambodia
on August 14, 1973. However, the legality of the orders
directing petitioners to bomb Cambodia remains a live
issue generating dramatic practical consequences for each
petitioner. E.g. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) ;
Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne
County, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); Bank of Marin vy. England,
38d U.S. 99 (1966). See also, St. Pierre v. United States,
319 U.S. 41 (1948); Sibron v. New Yori:, 392 U.S. 40
(1968).
7 The stake which Captain Strain and Captain Flueger retain
in this controversy is nothing less than the preservation of their
Air Force careers. Each has been indefinitely grounded for chal-
lenging the legality of their orders and can salvage their careers
only hy establishing that they were justified in questioning the
power of the Executive to order them to bomb Cambodia in the
absence of Congressicnal authorization. Captain Strain has already
been passed over for promotion as a consequence of this challenge
to his orders. Lt. Watson has resigned from the Air Force as a
direct consequence of his refusal to bomb Cambodia. His resigna-
tion carried with it an unsatisfactory performance rating attrib-
utable solely to his contention that his Cambodian orders were
unlawful.
rate sts PP Bre Pte eae
The most clearly defined “collateral consequence” herein
attaches to Captain Donald Dawson. Captain Dawson de-
clined to bomb Cambodia on June 21, 1973 and is now
facing a General Court Martial. However, if Congress did
not authorize the commitment of American forces to com-
bat in Cambodia, Captain Dawson’s refusal to bomb Cam-
bodia cannot subject him to court martial. Thus, in the
most literal sense, the issue of whether Captain Dawson
will be the last American casualty in Southeast Asia turns
on the outcome of this proceeding.*
C. Political Question
The majority below ruled that judicial review of the
legality of petitioners’ orders was barred by the political
question doctrine [A 4a-12a]. While several courts have
ruled that the political question doctrine precludes judi-
cial review of the procedures utilized by Congress in exer-
cising its power under Article I, Section 8, clause 11, no
court has suggested that the judiciary is totally powerless
to restrain the Executive from committing American forces
to combat in the teeth of Congressional opposition.
Petitioners do not ask this Court to substitute its judg-
ment for the judgment of the Executive as to the wisdom,
* The collateral consequences attaching to the remaining Air
Force petitioners are described supra at p. 20 n. 17. The recent
enactment of the War Powers Act, PL 93-148. while helpful in
resolving certain issues, does not purport to speak to the constitu-
tional power of the Executive to order forces into combat in the
absence of explicit Congressional authorization. While the War
Powers Act places weleome restraints upon unilateral Executive
warmaking of extended duration, it does not purport to deal with
the critical question raised herein of the President's initial power
to order American forces into combat. Moreover, since the orders
to petitioners were issued prior to the passage of the Act. the
legality of the order directed to Captain Dawson remains un-
affected by subsequent legislation.
PR RER DEEN A 8 me A MEE A EE BO AE Sat
99
propriety or morality of committing American forces to
combat in Cambodia. However, just as this Court’s power is
circumscribed by the Constitution, so the power of the Ex-
ecutive to commit American forces to combat is subject to
constitutional limitation. It is the gravamen of this case,
not that the Executive was wrong about the wisdom of mili-
tary activities in Cambodia, but that the political branch
explicitly designated by Article I, Section 8, clause 11 of the
Constitution to be the ultimate arbiter of war and peace
has been ignored and repudiated by the Executive’s uni-
lateral commitment of American forces to combat in Cam-
bodia. Thus, petitioners do not ask this Court to “second
guess” the President, but merely to review whether the
branch of government to which the war power has been
textually committed by the Constitution has, in fact, au-
thorized the commitment of American forces to Cambodia.
In effect, petitioners ask this Court to do nothing more than
assure conformity to constitutional norms of procedural
conduct in the exercise of the most awesome power any
nation can possess—the power to impose its will on others
by armed force.
In Youngstown Sheet € Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952), the Supreme Court ruled that President
Truman had acted in excess of his constitutional powers in
seizing the nation’s steel mills to head off a threatened
strike which he feared would hinder the Korean war effort.
Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court in Youngstown,
phrased the issue and summarized the arguments of the
parties as follows:
“We are asked to decide whether the President was
acting within his constitutional power when he issued
an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take
s.- Geiser eS * See 2 Eee ia.
23
possession of and operate most of the nation’s steel
mills. The mill owners argue that the President’s
order amounts to lawmaking, a legislative function
which the Constitution has expressly confided to the
Congress and not to the President. The government’s
position is that the order was made on findings of the
President that his action was necessary to avert a na-
tional catastrophe which would inevitably result from a
stoppage of steel production, and that in meeting this
grave emergency the President was acting within the
aggregate of his constitutional powers as the Nation’s
Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces of the United States”. 343 U.S. at 582.
The Court ruled in Youngstown that the determination
whether to seize private property for public use was com-
mitted under Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution to the
Congress—not the Executive—and that in the absence of
express Congressional authorization, the President lacked
constitutional authority to seize the private property in
question.”
Petitioners’ position bears a striking resemblance to
those advanced by the plaintiffs in Youngstown. Para-
phrasing Mr. Justice Black, this Court is asked to decide
whether the President acted in excess of his constitutional
power when he issued orders directing the Secretary of
Defense to order American combat forces to engage in
combat in Cambodia after the withdrawal of American
combat forces from South Vietnam. Petitioners argue
that the President’s order amounts to Executive exercise
‘oF Ts ee
1? As Mr. Justice Douglas has noted, surely the power to seize
lives is no less subject to constitutional limitation than is the power
to seize property [A 87a].
WAret
Ads Peet
24
of the responsibilities explicitly vested in Congress by
Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution. The
Executive's position, drawn largely from the memorandum
of Secretary of State Rogers, is that the President’s order
was made upon a determination by the President that
the pursuit of a stable peace in Indochina required the use
of American combat forces in Cambodia and that, in
carrying out his Cambodian military policy, the President
was acting within the aggregate of his constitutional
powers as the Nation’s Chief Executive and the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
However, just as the authority to seize private property
for public use is an Article I, Section 1 Congressional
power, so the decision as to whether to commit American
forees to fight and perhaps die is ultimately reserved
under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, to Congress.” Ac-
cordingly, the Executive may seize neither steel mills nor
human beings in order to prosecute combat activities in
the absence of clear and explicit Congressional authoriza-
tion. E.g. Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2nd Cir. 1970);
Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
Moreover, applying the identical set of “manageable
standards” utilized by the Youngstown Court, this Court
is equipped to ascertain whether adequate Congressional
authorization exists to commit American forces to combat
in Cambodia.
2° Indeed, the explicit grant of the war power to Congress by
Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, is a more mandatory grant of
authority to the legislature than was the undifferentiated grant
of legislative power to Congress pursuant to Article I, Section 1
which was before the Court in Youngstown.
eee SEAS RE EL eI ae TN
25
The first “manageable standard” utilized by the Youngs-
town Court to measure the existence or non-existence of
Congressional authorization were negative expressions of
Congressional will evidencing a desire to deny the Execu-
tive the power in question. Thus, the Court ia Poungstown
noted that the power to seize private property in order to
avert labor unrest was considered and rejected by Con-
gress in 1947. Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted, first, that
the House in 1947 had explicitly rejected en amendment
to the Taft-Hartley Act which would nave authorized
seizure and, second, that a Committee of the Senate had
similarly rejected seizure legislation in 1947. 345 U.S. at
600-601 ; 602-603. See also, 343 U.S. 659 (Jackson, J., con-
curring); and 343 U.S. at 660 (Burton, J., concurring).
In the instant case, the negative Congressional expres-
sion concerning the commitment of American forces to
Cambodia is infinitely stronger than the equivocal Con-
gressional actions relied upon by the Youngstown Court.*!
The second “manageable standard” utilized by the
Youngstown Court was the inability of the Executive to
point to a Congressional act which could fairly be said was
intended to authorize the actions in question.
Similarly, the Executive in the instant case can point to
no act of Congress from which affirmative authorization
to bomb Cambodia may be fairly implied.
*? The negative expressions of Congress concerning the commit-
ment of American forces to combat in Cambodia are discussed in
detail supra at pp. 13-18. Briefly put, the House of Kepresentatives
repeatedly expressed its opposition to an American com!at role
in Cambodia. (May 10, 1973, 219-188; May 10, 1973, 224-172:
June 25, 1973, 235-172: June 27, 1973, 241-173.) The Senate was
no less explicit. (May 31, 1973, 63-19; June 26, 1973, 81-11; June
27, 1975, 67-29; June 27, 1973, 72-19.)
er rh 6 DE Fe rte OL. MOST ete $e nah
26
D. Exhaustion of Military Remedies
Respondents will doubtless contend that this Court lacks
power to rule on the legality of orders directing petitioners
to bomb Cambodia under traditional notions of exhaustion
of military remedies. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34
(1972).
In Parisi, a serviceman was court martialed for refusing
to obey an order directing him to embark for Vietnam. This
Court ruled that a Federal Court was empowered to grant
his application for a writ of habeas corpus as a conscien-
tious objector despite the pendency of court martial pro-
ceedings.
In Parisi, as in the instant case, the military tribunals
are not functionally equipped to deal with the serious and
difficult constitutional questions raised by the plaintiffs.
Cf. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969) at 696 n. 8. The ex-
pertise of the military justice system simply does not
extend to a determination of whether sufficient Congres-
sional authorization for a war exists under Article I, Sec-
tion 8. Only an Article III, civilian, court is equipped to
render a determination on so difficult a constitutional issue.
Indeed, it is highly problematic whether the military justice
system is empowered to declare an order illegal under Arti-
cle I, Section 8. Parisi v. Davidson, supra at 42-44. Accord-
ingly, since the relief which Captain Dawson seeks is not
“available to him with reasonable promptness and certainty
through the machinery of the military judicial system...”
this Court is free to grant appropriate relief. Parisi v.
Davidson, supra at 41-42."
2? The Court of Military Appeals has ruled that it lacks power
to determine whether Congress has authorized military activity
within the meaning of Article I, Section 8, clause 11. E.g., United
27
CONCLUSION
For the reason stated above, a writ of certiorari should
issue herein.
December 15, 1973
Respectfully submitted,
Burt NEUBORNE
Leon FRievpMAN
Metvin L. WuLr
American Civil Liberties Union
22 Kast 40th Street
New York, New York
Attorneys for Petitioners
Of Counsel:
Marvin M. Karpatkin
NorMan SIEGAL
States v. Johnson, 38 CMR 44 (1967). Accordingly, it would be
futile to require Captain Dawson to present his defenses to the
Court of Military Appeals.
Moreover, the experience of Captain Howard Levy and Captain
Dale Noyd, who as a consequence of being obliged to exhaust mili-
tary remedies, were required to serve virtually their entire sen-
tences prior to being permitted access to an Article III Court
cannot he ignored. There is something radically wrong with a
system of justice which required Captain Levy to serve 214 years
in prison before he was permitted access to the civilian court which
vacated his conviction. Levy v. Parker, F.2d (8rd Cir.
1973), cert. granted. USS. , 42 US.L.W. 3235 (Oct. 23,
1973). Certainly, Captain Dawson should not be compelled to
risk prison before being permitted access to the only court system
capable of assessing his defense.
| J pbuaivtpeSie = Te eee :
APPENDIX
a saa blac reheat ail
ARIELLE ST PLIES ELIE TED TIRE DIN RET ET ES t
APPENDIX
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For THE Seconp Circuit
Bn.
-
No. 1132—September Term, 1972.
(Argued August 8, 1973 Decided August 8, 1973.)
Docket No. 73-2094
a.
~
ExizapetH HourzMan, individually and in her capacity as
a member of the United States House of Representa-
tives; Ist Lr. ArrHur Watson, 43rd Strategic Wing,
United States Air Force, Anderson Air Force Base,
Guam; Caprars Micuaet Fivacer, 43rd Strategic Wing.
United States Air Force, Anderson Air Force Base.
Guam; Caprais James H. Srrary, 43rd Strategie Wing,
United States Air Force, Anderson Air Force Base,
Guam; and Caprarxy Doxatp E. Dawson, 307th Strategic
Wing, United States Air Force, U-Tapo, Thailand,
Plaintiff s-Appellees,
—against—
James R. Scutesincer, individually and as Secretary of
Defense; Jonx L. McLvcas, individually and as Acting
Secretary of the Air Foree; and Wiuiam P. Curwents.
individually and as Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Defendants-Appellants.
?
Lr aL oe nee Tete a Th rr a ete vivant
a re il i are hn 1 i te
Before:
Mvtuicay, Oakes and Timsers,
Circuit Judges.
so.
e
Appeal from a judgment entered in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Orrin
G. Judd, Judge, declaring that there was no existing Con-
gressional authority for bombing or ordering military
forces into Cambodia, and permanently enjoining the de-
fendants from further participating in military activities
in or over Cambodia.
Reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the
complaint.
a.
7
Burt Nevrorne, New York, New York (Leon
Friedman, American Civil Liberties Union,
New York, New York; Norman Siegel and
Paul Chevigny, New York Civil Liberties
Union, New York, N.Y., of Counsel), for
Plaintiff s-Appellees.
James Dunstop Porter, Jr., Assistant United
States Attorney, Chief, Civil Division, Brook-
lyn, New York (Robert A. Morse, United
States Attorney for the Eastern District of
New York), for Defendaxts-Appellants,
Eric M. Lrepermax, New York, New York, for
Hon. Parren J. Mitchell, et al. as Amici
Curiae.
JoserpH F. McDoxatp, New York, New York,
for The Lawyers Committee to End the War
and Certain Individuals as Amici Curiae.
ey
~~
3a
Mutuicay, Circuit Judge:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States
District Court, Eastern District of New York, Hon. Orrin
G. Judd, District Judge, dated July 25. 1973, granting plain-
tiff’s motion for summary judgment and providing both
declaratory and injunctive relief. The judgment declared
that “there is no existing Congressional authority to order
military forces into combat in Cambodia or to release bombs
over Cambodia, and that military activities in Cambodia
by American armed forces are unauthorized and unlawful
....” The order further enjoined and restrained the named
defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees
and attorneys “from participating in any way in military
activities in or over Cambodia or releasing any bombs
which may fall in Cambodia.” The effective date of the
injunction was postponed until 4:00 o'clock on July 27, 1973
to provide the defendants with an opportunity to apply to
this court for a stay pending appeal. A panel of this court
heard oral argument on the stay on the morning of July 27,
1973 and unanimously granted defendants’ motion for a
stay, setting the time for argument of the appeal on August
13, 1973 which was the first day of sitting of the next panel
of this court. The parties were given leave to move for
further expedition of the appeal. Plaintiffs then made ap-
plication to Mr. Justice Marshall of the Supreme Court,
Circuit Justice for the Second Circuit, for a vacatur of
the stay. Mr. Justice Marshall denied the application to
vacate the stay on August 1, 1973 writing an opinion in
which he noted that either side could further advance the
date of the argument before this court. —— U.S. _ On
the motion of plaintiffs, not opposed by defendants. this
court on August Ist further accelerated argument of the
Ppiivsirine: salah ahi or dA
Ae el os cet
4a
appeal to August 8, 1973. On August 2, 1973 plaintiffs made
application to Mr. Justice Douglas to vacate the stay and
on August 4, 1973 he issued an opinion and order vacating
the stay entered by this court. —— U.S. ——. Later in the
afternoon of August 4, 1973, Mr. Justice Marshall rein-
stated the stay announcing that he had polled the other
members of the Supreme Court and that they were unani-
mous in overruling the order of Mr. Justice Douglas.
US. . On August 3, 1973, after a hearing before
Mr. Justice Douglas, plaintiffs petitioned this court for an
en banc hearing of this appeal. By order dated August 6th
this motion was denied by the unanimous vote of the five
active judges of this court who could be readily contacted.
In view of the admonition of Mr. Justice Marshall that it is
in the public interest that the issues herein be resolved as
expeditiously as possible, the convening of this court en
banc could only have delayed a hearing on the merits.
The argument of this appeal was heard on August Sth
and to further speed any further appellate review this court
filed its judgment in the late afternoon of that day, re-
versing the judgment below and dismissing the complaint.
Judge Oakes dissented. We announced that opinions
would promptly follow so that if the Supreme Court did
entertain an appeal it might have the benefit of the views of
the panel. Even though the exigencies of time preclude the
articulation of the majority view as elaborately or com-
pletely as might otherwise be appropriate in a case of this
significance, it nonetheless represents our considered and
deliberate opinion.
I
At the outset, as the parties agreed below and on the
argument on appeal, we should emphasize that we are not
da
deciding the wisdom, the propriety or the morality of the
war in Indo-China and particularly the on-going bombing
in Cambodia. This is the responsibility of the Executive
and the Legislative branches of the government. The role
of the Judiciary is to determine the legality of the chal-
lenged action and the threshold question is whether under
the “political question” doctrine we should decline even to
do that. Ever since Varbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803) the federal courts have declined to judge some
actions of the Executive and some interaction between the
Executive and Legislative branches where it is deemed in-
appropriate that the judiciary intrude. It is not possible
or even necessary to define the metes and bounds of that
doctrine here. The most authoritative discussion of the
subject is found in Mr. Justice Brennan’s opinion in Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) which elaborated criteria that
have since guided this court in determining whether a
question involving the separation of powers is justiciable or
is a political question beyond our purview. In Orlando v.
Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869
(1971), this court held that the question of whether or not
Congress was required to take some action to authorize the
Indo-China war was justiciable under Baker v. Carr, supra,
since there was present a judicially discoverable and man-
ageable issue. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55
(1939). On the basis of evidence produced at the hearings
in the district court, this court found Congressional authori-
zation in support of the military operations in Southeast
Asia from the beginning, relying on the Tonkin Gulf Reso-
lution of August 10, 1964, plus continuing appropriation
bills providing billions of dollars in support of military
operations as well as the extension of the Military Selective
Service Act. We were careful to note:
Dien. bas iw seat
NN Lar BEST.
ee neta me 25 Ov em Oa rea aed
6a
Beyond determining that there has been some mutual
participation between Congress and the President,
which unquestionably exists here, with action by the
Congress sufficient to authorize or ratify the military
activity at issue, it is clear that the constitutional pro-
priety of the means by which Congress has chosen to
ratify and approve the protracted military operations
in Southeast Asia is a political question. Id. at 1043
(emphasis in original).
It is significant that the court noted that the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution of August 10, 1964 had since been repealed on
December 31, 1970.
In Da Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972) this court specifically rejected
the contention that the repeal by Congress of the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution removed the Congressional authorization
previously found sufficient in Orlando. We noted:
As the constitutional propriety of the means by which
the Executive and the Legislative branches engaged in
mutual participation in prosecuting the military op-
erations in Southeast Asia, is, as we held in Orlando,
a political question, so the constitutional propriety of
the method and means by which they mutually par-
ticipate in winding down the conflict and in disengag-
ing the nation from it, is also a political question and
outside of the power and competency of the judiciary.
Id. at 1370.
The most recent holding of this court now pertinent is
Da Costa v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (1973) where an inductee
urged that the President’s unilateral decision to mine the
harbors of North Vietnam and to bomb targets in that
7a
country constituted an escalation of the war, which was
illegal in the absence of additional Congressional authoriza-
tion. Judge Kaufman found that this was a political ques-
tion which was non-justiciable, recognizing that the court
was incapable of assessing the facts. He stated in part:
Judges, deficient in military knowledge, lacking vital
information upon which to assess the nature of battle-
field decisions, and sitting thousands of miles from the
field of action, cannot reasonably or appropriately de-
termine whether a specific military operation consti-
tutes an “escalation” of the war or is merely a new
tactical approach within a continuing strategic plan.
What if, for example, the war “de-escalates” so that it
is waged as it was prior to the mining of North Viet-
nam’s harbors, and then “escalates” again? Are the
courts required to oversee the conduct of the war on a
daily basis, away from the scene of action? In this
instance, it was the President's view that the mining of
North Vietnam’s harbors was necessary to preserve
the lives of American soliders (sic) ir South Vietnam
and to bring the war to a close. History will tell
whether or not that assessment was correct, but with-
out the benefit of such extended hindsight we are power-
less to know.
We fail to see how the present challenge involving the
bombing in Cambodia is in any significant manner distin-
guishable from the situation discussed by Judge Kaufman
in Da Costa v. Laird. Judge Judd found that the continuing
bombing of Cambodia, after the removal of American
forces and prisoners of war from Vietnam, represents “a
basic change in the situation: which must be considered
Bivteen sci
Sa
in determining the duration of prior Congressional au-
thorization.” He further found such action a tactical de-
cision not traditionally confided to the Commander-in-Chief.
These are precisely the questions of fact involving military
and diplomatic expertise not vested in the judiciary, which
make the issue political and thus beyond the competence
of that court or this court to determine. We are not privy
to the information supplied to the Executive by his pro-
fessional military and diplomatic advisers and even if we
were, we are hardly competent to evaluate it. If we were
incompetent to judge the significance of the mining and
bombing of North Vietnam’s harbors and territories, we
fail to see our competence to determine that the bombing
of Cambodia is a “‘basie change” in the situation and that
it is not a “tactical decision” within the competence of the
President. It is true that we have repatriated American
troops and have returned American ground forces in Viet-
nam but we have also negotiated a cease fire and have en-
tered into the Paris Accords which mandated a cease fire
in Cambodia and Laos. The President has announced that
the bombing of Cambodia will terminate on August 15,
1973 and Secretary of State Rogers has submitted an affi-
davit to this court’ providing the justification for our mili-
? AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM P. RoGErs
Washington,
District of Columbia, ss.
William P. Rogers, being duly sworn, deposes and says as fol-
lows:
1. In my capacity as Secretary of State of the United States of
America, 1 have knowledge of and responsibility for the conduct
of the foreign relations of the United States, including relations
with the Government of Cambodia.
2. It is my understanding that on July 25, 1973, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in the
case of Holtzman et al v. Schlesinger et al, ordered the cessation
FN RA ee CET SEIT Be BG . —s ee
papieege Peer 5 . Sere
9a
tary presence and action until that time. The situation
fluctuates daily and we cannot ascertain at any fixed time
either the military or diplomatic status. We are in no
position to determine whether the Cambodian insurgents
of further military activities by United States armed forces in
Cambodia and that this order was stayed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. It is my judgment,
that if that stay were not continued, the District Court’s order
would cause irreparable harm to the United States, to the conduct
of our foreign relations, and to the protection of United States
nationals in Cambodia.
3. In the conduct of United States relations with Cambodia, the
American Ambassador in Phnom Penh has communicated to the
Cambodian Government the fact of the enactment on July 1, 1973
of Public Law 93-50 (87 Stat. 99) and Public Law 93-52 (87
Stat. 130). Our Ambassador has further informed the Cambodian
Government that the United States Government interprets the
aforesaid public laws as requiring a cessation of all combat ac-
tivities in Cambodia by the armed forces of the United States on
and after August 15, 1973.
4. In consequence of the enactment of the aforesaid public laws,
intensive planning has been undertaken within the United States
Government and between representatives of the American and
Cambodian Governments. As a result, plans have been developed
which include:
(i) emergency increases in the levels of the Cambodian
armed forces;
(ii) accelerated deliveries and distribution during the first
two weeks in August of military equipment, especially air-
craft and related spare parts, pursuant to the United States
Military Assistance Program;
(iii) accelerated deliveries and distribution during this
same period of food stuffs, medical supplies and other items
for humanitarian relief of the Cambodian population;
(iv) redeployment of Cambodian armed forces. and in some
cases civilians whom those forces are protecting, from exposed
positions to positions where they can defend themselves and
be resupplied in the absence of United States combat air sup-
port on and after August 15, 1973.
5. All of the above-described plans are for the purpose of im-
proving the Government of Cambodia’s self-defense capability
through assistance programs approved by the Congress and the
President. All of these plans have been premised upon an as-
Bien. War Gee IN
10a
are patriots or whether in fact they are inspired and
manned by North Vietnam Communists. While we as men
may well agonize and bewail the horror of this or any war,
the sharing of Presidential and Congressional responsibility
particularly at this juncture is a bluntly political and not
a judicial question.
sumption of continued United States combat air support for the
Cambodian armed forces through August 14, 1973. On the basis
of the information available to me, it is my judgment that the
absence of such air support prior to that date would permit hostile
military forces to disrupt those plans and would expose United
States military and civilian personnel who are responsible for their
implementation, to grave risk of personal injury or death.
6. Moreover, in view of this close cooperation and planning be-
tween the United States and the Cambodian Government, and
considerable reliance placed by the Cambodian Government on
this agreed timing, any premature and unilateral cessation of
needed air support by the United States would he seen by the
Government of Cambodia and by many other governizents as a
breach of faith by the United States and would seriously under-
mine the credibility of the United States and impair the conduct
of our foreign relations.
7. Quite apart from the question of timing, the order of the
District Court, in enjoining “military activities” might well be
construed more broadly than the prohibitions against “combat
activities” contained in the above-mentioned public laws and
thereby could be deemed to preclude such activities as the use of
United States armed forces to evacuate United States diplomatic
personnel and other United States nationals from Cambodia should
this be required at any future time, even after United States
combat activities in Cambodia have ceased.
8. The specific consequences as described herein of a failure to
stay the District Court’s order would constitute irreparable harm
to the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States by
imperiling the ability of the Government of Cambodia to prepare
for assuming full responsibility for its defense, by imperiling the
safety of United States nationals in Cambodia, and by undermin-
ing the credibility of the United States. In a broader sense, the
efforts of the United States to achieve a stable peace in Indochina
would be undermined and the cease-fire agreements presently in
effect in Viet-Nam and Laos would be gravely jeopardized.
/s/ Witu1am P. RocGers
SE AE ot 0 ah ae : wae . ~s 2 Oe A
Fee TI
[SRB CERES ROR RN:
lla
We think the comments of Judge Wyzanski writing for
a unanimous Court of Appeals panel in the District of
Columbia are particularly apt here:
Whether President Nixon did so proceed [to end the
war] is a question which at this stage in history a court
is incompetent to answer. A court cannot procure
the relevant evidence: some is in the hands of foreign
governments, some is privileged. Even if the necessary
facts were to be laid before it, a court would not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the President, who has
an unusually wide measure of discretion in this area,
and who should not be judicially condemned except in
a case of clear abuse amounting to bad faith. Other-
wise a court would be ignoring the delicacies of dip-
lomatie negotiation, the inevitable bargaining for the
best solution of an international conflict, and the scope
which in foreign affairs must be allowed to the Presi-
dent if this country is to play a responsible role in the
council of the nations. Mitchell v. Laird, 476 F.2d 533,
538 (1973).
The court below and our dissenting Brother assume that
since American ground forces and prisoners have been re-
moved and accounted for, Congressional authorization has
ceased as determined by virtue of the so-called Mansfield
Amendment, P.L. 92-156, 85 Stat. 433, § 601. The fallacy
of this position is that we have no way of knowing whether
the Cambodian bombing furthers or hinders the goals of
the Mansfield Amendment. That is precisely the holding of
Da Costa vy. Laird, supra, 471 F.2d at 1157. Moreover, al-
though § 601(a)(1) of the Amendment urges the President
I oe er eh BE me “ SO at A RE ID RTI Ks oe
12a
to remove all military forces contingent upon release of
American prisoners, it also in § 601 (a)(2) urges him to
negotiate for an immediate cease fire by all parties in the
hostilities in Indo-China. (Emphasis added). In our view,
the return and repatriation of American troops only repre-
sents the beginning and not the end of the inquiry as to
whether such a basic change has occurred that the Execu-
tive at this stage is suddenly bereft of power and authority.
That inquiry involves diplomatic and military intelligence
which is totally absent in the record before us, and its diges-
tion in any event is beyond judicial management. The stric-
tures of the political question doctrine cannot be avoided
by resort to the law of agency as the court did below,
finding the Congress the principal and the President an
agent or servant.? Judicial tpse dizits cannot provide any
proper basis particularly for the injunctive relief granted
here which is unprecedented in American jurisprudence.*
* The resort of the court below to the Second Restatement of
Agency § 38, promulgated by the American Law Institute, is in-
deed inapposite. Aside from its introductory Scope Note (p. 2)
which disclaims the Restatement’s applicability to public ofticers,
the denomination of the Congress as the Principal and the Presi-
dent as the Agent in the conduct of hostilities is overly simplistic.
It ignores the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief, and his
primacy in foreign relations, particularly in achieving the peace.
See Wallace. The War Making Powers: A Constituticnal Flaw?
57 Cornell L. Rev. 719, 744 (1972). It is perhaps significant that
the Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected a proposal that
the Constitution provide the Congress with the power to declare
peace as well as war, and carefully noted that the conduct of war
“was an Executive function.” 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Fed-
eral Convention of 1787, at 313, 319 & n.* (rev. ed. 1937).
3 To date no other federal court has attempted to halt American
involvement in hostilities in Southeast Asia. Our own court as
well as the First Circuit has concluded that the war-implementing
legislation passed by Congress was sufficient authorization. Da
Costa v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 979 (1972); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971), aff'g 317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N-Y.
8 5 Gabe rete Maks oe een ER ES a ae
a
13a
Il
Since the argument that continuing Congressional ap-
proval was necessary, was predicated upon a determination
1970) and 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (Judd, J.) ; Massa-
chusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.), aff'g 327 F. Supp. 378
(D. Mass. 1971). Numerous courts have dismissed suits challeng-
ing American involvement on the ground that a “political ques-
tion” was involved. Mitchell v. Laird, 476 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir.
1973) ; Da Costa v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973); Mora
v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
934 (1967) ; Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967) (ef. Mitchell v. Laird, supra): Drinan
v. Niron, Civ. No. 73-1424-T (D. Mass., Aug. 8, 1973); Mitchell v.
Richardson, Civ. No. 939-73 (D.D.C., July 23, 1973), notice of
appeal filed, Aug. 1, 1973; Gravel vy. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C.
1972); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd
without opinion, 410 U.S. , 93 S.Ct. 1545 (1973); Massachu-
setts v. Laird, 327 F. Supp. 378 (D. Mass.), aff'd on other grounds.
451 F.2d 26 (Ist Cir. 1971) (hut ef. Mitchell v. Laird, supra) ;
Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Va. 1970). One might also
include cases such as Sarnoff v. Connally, 457 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 929 (1972), and Head v. Nixon, 342 F. Supp.
521 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 951 (Sth Cir. 1972), where the
courts dismissed claims that Congressional appropriations were an
unconstitutional delegation of the war-making powers, as involving
political questions. See also Atlee v. Laird, supra. Other suits
challenging the legality of the war have been dismissed on other
grounds. Mottola v. Niron, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'g
318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (standing); Pietsch v. Presi-
dent of the United States, 434 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1970). cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971) (standing) ; Velvel v. Niron, 415 F.2d
236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970), aff’g 287
F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968) (standing); Campen v. Niron, 56
F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (standing); Gravel v. Laird, supra
(political question, standing and sovereign immunity); Da Costa
v. Niron, 55 F.R.D. 145 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 456
F.2d 1335 (1972).
We find particularly persuasive the scholarly opinion of Judge
Adams of the Third Circuit in Atlee v. Laird, supra, the only case
involving the Southeast Asia conflict which the Supreme Court
has affirmed. In all other cases where review was sought, certiorari
has been denied as this note documents. In Massachusetts v. Laird,
400 U.S. 886 (1970), the Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts leave to file an original bill of complaint seeking
an adjudication of the constitutionality of the United States role
in the Indo-China war.
l4a
that the Cambodian bombing constituted a basic change in
the war not within the tactical discretion of the President
and since that is a determination we have found to be a
political question, we have not found it necessary to dwell
at length upon Congressional participation. We see no need
to address ourselves to the Fulbright provisos discussed in
Judge Oakes’ opinion since they predate the Paris Accord
which places the military stance in Cambodia in such focus
that we cannot judge their present efficacy or applicability.
In any event we agree with his conclusion that they do not
affect American forces which is the issue here. We cannot
resist however commenting that the most recent expression
of Congressional approval by appropriation, the Joint
Resolution Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal 1974
(P.L. 93-52), enacted into law July 1, 1973, contains the
following provision:
Sec. 108. Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or hereto-
fore appropriated may be obligated or expended to
finance directly or indirectly combat activities by
United States military forces in or over or from off the
shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or
Cambodia.
Assuming arguendo that the military and diplomatic is-
sues were manageable and that we were obliged to find
some participation by Congress, we cannot see how this
provision does not support the proposition that the Con-
gress has approved the Cambodian bombing. The statute
is facially clear but its applicability is contested by plain-
tiffs on several grounds which were essentially adopted by
the court below. The argument is made that the Congress
didn’t really mean what it said because it was coerced by
15a
the President who had vetoed Congressional Bills which
would have immediately cut off Cambodian funds. Not
being able to muster sufficient strength to overcome the
veto, the argument runs, the Congress was forced willy nilly
to enact the appropriation legislation. Resort is made to
the floor debate which it is argued bolsters the view that
individual legislators expressed personal disapproval of
the bombing and did not interpret the appropriation as an
approval to bomb but simply a recognition that it gave the
President the power to bomb. It is further urged that since
the Constitution entrusts the power to declare war to a
majority of the Congress, the veto exercised makes it pos-
sible for the President to thwart the will of Congress by
holding one-third plus one of the members of either House.
We find none of these arguments persuasive.
1) Since the statute is not ambiguous, resort to legisla-
tive history is unjustified. See Mr. Justice Jackson's opin-
ion in Schwegmann v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,
395-96 (1951).
2) Resort to legislative materials is not permissible
where they are contradictory or ambiguous. NLRB v.
Plasterers Local 79, 404 U.S. 116, 129 n.24 (1971). A fair
reading of the Congressional Record for June 29, 1973
establishes this proposition. Members of Congress Drinan
and the plaintiff Holtzman here for example both voted
against the measure because it would authorize the bombing
until August 15, 1973.
While the court below relied on the colloquy between
Senators Eagleton and Fulbright, it inadvertently omitted
the following:
Mr. Eacteton. In the light of the legislative history,
meaning the statement of former Secretary of Defense
16a
Richardson that we will continue the bombing unless
the funds are cut off, will we with the adoption of this
resolution permit the bombing of Cambodia for the
next 45 days? This is the question I pose to the Senator
from Arkansas.
Mr. Fursricu:. Until August 15.
Mr. Eactetox. Would it permit the bombing of
Laos?
Mr. Fursricut. It would not prevent it.
119 Cong. Ree. S 12562 (daily ed. June 29, 1973) [Em-
phasis added}.
In sum, even if the legislative history were considered
it is at best ambiguous and does not clearly support the
theory that the Congress did not mean what it said.
3) We cannot agree that the Congress was “coerced”
by the President’s veto. There was unquestionably a Con-
gressional impasse resulting from the desire of a majority
of Congress to stop bombing immediately and the desire of
the President that his discretion be unfettered by an arbi-
trarily selected date. Instead of an acute constitutional
confrontation, as Senator Javits noted an “agreement” was
reached. (119 Cong. Rec. S 12561 (daily ed. June 29, 1973) ).
This version of the situation is also the conclusion of Judge
Tauro in his opinion of August 8, 1973 (Drinan v. Nizon,
Civ. No. 73-1424-T (D. Mass.)) which exhaustively studies
the record.
4) While the Constitution vests the war declaring an-
thority in the Congress, the Founding Fathers also con-
ferred the veto power upon the President. (Art. I, §7,
el. 2). The suggestion that the veto power is impotent with
respect to an authority vested solely in Congress by the
—
17a
Constitution is unsupported by any citation of authority
and is hardly persuasive. It of course assumes here that
the Cambodian bombing constitutes a new war requiring a
new declaration and that it is not part of the extrication
of a long suffering nation from an Indo-China war lasting
for severa] years. This again in our view is the nucleus
of the issue and we have no way of resolving that question
particularly here on a motion for summary judgment.*
III
We finally note, although again not necessary in view of
our holding in Part I, our disagreement with our colleazue
Judge Oakes that any of the parties plaintiff have standing.
We have held that mere taxpayer status does not confer
standing to litigate the constitutionality of the Indo-China
war. Pietsch v. President of the United States, 434 F.2d
861 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971): see
Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969). cert. denied.
396 U.S. 1042 (1970). See also Mottola vy. Nixon, 464 F.2d
178 (9th Cir. 1972). In Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302. 206
(2d Cir. 1970), we held that a serviceman does have stand-
ing if he is under orders to fight in the combat to which he
*The dissenting opinion of Judge Oakes, finding no Congres-
sional authorization by appropriation by reason of the secret
bombings of Cambodia in 1969 and 1970 as reported in the Vew
York Times (which is not in the Record before us any more than
the Pentagon Papers were before this court in Da Costa v. Laird.
supra, 448 F.2d at 1370) if anything emphasizes the inability of
the judiciary to make reasoned judgments with manazeable or
discoverable information in foreign relations particularly in time
of war. Secrecy in diplomacy and in military strategy durinz
hostilities has heen customary since at least the time of the Trojan
War. The relationship of the alleged misfeasance here committed
and the action of Congress is again a political question. Its pro-
priety in any event is beyond the scope of appropriate judicial
serutiny. See Proverbs 20, v. 18 “Designs are strengthened by
counsels: and wars are to be managed by governments.”
ive en ee an
18a
objects. Here none of the servicemen plaintiffs are pres-
ently under orders to fight in Cambodia. They have been
relieved of any such military obligation and indeed one
has been separated from the service. Their present status
in our view moots the appeal as to them and we cannot
agree that their status is preserved because of the “cogni-
zable danger of recurrent violation” doctrine of United
States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). In
view of the termination of the air strikes on August 15,
1973 and their present status, we can perceive of nothing
more than the merest possibility that such eventuality will
occur. United States v. W. T. Grant Co., supra, requires |
more than this. See Atherton Mills vy. Johnston, 259 US.
13 (1922). Neither do We see any adequate support for the
standing of Representative Holtzman. She has not been
denied any right to vote on Cambodia by any action of
the defendants. She has fully participated in the Congres-
sional debates which have transpired since her election to
the Congress. The fact that her vote was ineffective was
due to the contrary votes of her colleagues and not the
defendants herein. The claim that the establishment of
illegality here would be relevant in possible impeachment
proceedings against the President would in effect be asking
the judiciary for an advisory opinion which is precisely and
historically what the “case and controversy” conditions set
forth in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution forbid.
See Correspondence of the Justices (1793), reprinted in
part in H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and
the Federal System 64-66 (2d ed. P. Bator et al. 1973). The
judgment sought could hardly have any subsequent binding
effect on those who have the responsibility for such a mea-
sure. Its effect on the named defendants would be clearly
academic and moot since they have no interest in contro-
verting it.
AS Se ee See Re 2 man “~ anew ee ee #
19a
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with
instructions to dismiss the complaint. The mandate shall
issue forthwith.
te.
hos
Oakes, Circuit Judge (dissenting) :
I believe there is standing for Congresswoman Holtzman
under Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962) and Cole-
man v. Miller, 307 U.S. 435, 457-46 (1939). I believe there
is standing for the airmen-appellees under Berk v. Laird,
429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970) and Massachusetts v. Laird,
451 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1971) which has not been mooted
by their return to the United States. United States v. W. T.
Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953).
I believe there is justiciability under Da Costa v. Laird,
471 F.2d 1146, 1156 (2d Cir. 1973), (Da Costa II1) where
the question “whether a radical] change in the character of
war operations . . . might be sufficiently measurable judi-
cially to warrant a court’s consideration ....” was ex-
pressly reserved. There is here “a manageable standard”
under Da Costa III and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), since there has been such a
“radical change in the character of war operations.” The
Defense Department is continuing to bomb in Cambodia
despite the cease-fire in Vietnam and despite the return
of our prisoners of war from North Vietnam. The justi-
ciable question then is whether there is any Constitutional
authorization for the employment of United States armed
forces over Cambodia, now that the war in Vietnam has
come to an end. There is no question under the law of
this Cireuit, Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d
Cir.) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971), that the Executive
lacks unilateral power to commit American forces to combat
Boies ss seve a ds aah ite ia
pesos ne ae i RPL
20a
absent a “belligerent attack” or “a grave emergency.” See
Mitchell v. Laird, 476 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Has Congress ratified or authorized the bombing in Cam-
bodia by appropriations acts or otherwise? Congress can
confer power on the Executive by way of an appropriations
act. Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331
U.S. 111, 116 (1947) (creation of new agency by Executive
Order ratified by appropriation). And this Cireuit has
expressly held that congressional authorization fot the war
in Vietnam may be found in appropriations acts. Da Costa
v. Laird, 48 F.2d 1368, 1370 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 979 (1972) (Da Costa II). Orlando y. Laird, supra,
443 F.2d at 1042.
I do not, moreover, agree with appellees’ argument that
the Fulbright “proviso” adopted in all of the recent ap-
propriations bills and limiting the use of Defense Depart-
ment funds to support “Vietnamese or other free world
forces in actions designed to provide military support and
assistance to the government of Cambodia or Laos,” limited
all prior authorizations to expenditures for United States
forces in Cambodia only in aid in the release of Americans
held as prisoners of war. E.g., Armed Forces Military
Procurement Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-441, §502(a)(1),
S4 Stat. 905 (1970). The language of the apprepriations
acts seems to me to differentiate between “other free world
forces” and “Armed Forces of the United States.” ¢.g., id.
*502(a)(2). The legislative history indicates also that
there is a difference between “other free world forces” and
“United States armed forces.” Even though the Fulbright
proviso did not provide any affirmative grant of authority
to the President to use “Armed Forces of the United
States” in Cambodia, 119 Cong. Ree. S 7385-87 (daily ed.
Apr. 13, 1973), Senator Fulbright himself considered the
°la
proviso operative only in respect to “South Vietnamese or
other foreign military operations in support of the Cam-
bodian or Laotian Governments.” Jd. at S 7385 (emphasis
supplied).
Thus an argument could be made that congressional
authorization of appropriations with knowledge of our
“presence” in Cambodia was ratification. But for author-
ization on the part of Congress by way of an appropria-
tion to be effective, the congressional action must be based
on a knowledge of the facts. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474, 506-07 (1959) (appropriation to Defense Department
for security program did not ratify procedure denying right
of an individual to confront witnesses). I am aware of only
one instance in which it has previously been argued that
a war was illegal as a result of Congress being misinformed
as to the underlying facts surrounding American partic-
ipation in that war. While the argument was unique and
unsuccessful to boot, however, time has vindicated it, I
believe. Furthermore, it was advanced by one whose views
are worth consideration, even if they were expressed in
“dissent,” so to speak. I refer of course to Abraham Lin-
coln and his argument as a lone Congressman on Janu-
ary 12, 1848, in opposition to our “incursion” into Mexico
and what later was called the Mexican War. See Cong.
Globe, 30th Cong. Ist Sess. 93 et seg. (Appendix 1848).
And here, incredibly enough, it appears that neither the
American people nor the Congress, at the time it was voting
appropriations in aid of the war in Vietnam, were given
the facts pertaining to our bombing in Cambodia. Recent
disclosures have indicated that Air Foree B-52 bombers
were secretly attacking Cambodia in 1969, 1970 and even
later while the United States was publicly proclaiming
respect for Cambodian neutrality. See N.Y. Times July 17,
Bde sie wt ante retea a ee ee
OO mle I
1973, at 1; July 18, 1973, at 1, July 22, 1973, Sec. E, at 3;
July 24, 1973, at 1; July 25, 1973, at 1; July 29, 1973 at 1;
Aug. 8, 1973, at 6; Aug. 9, 1973, at 7.
The government argues that these secret bombings oc-
eurred in 1969 and 1970, and ended when our activities in
Cambodia became open subsequently. But the Congress
whose ratification by way of appropriations acts is con-
tended for here did not beccme aware of these covert
bombings until July of 1973. And meanwhile the Congress
had declared in the so-called Mansfield Amendment that it
was “the policy of the United States to terminate at the
earliest practicable date all military operations of the
United States in Indochina... .” Appropriations Author-
ization-Military Procurement Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-156, $601, 85 Stat. 423 (92nd Cong., lst Sess. 1971).
The combination of concealment of the facts from Con-
gress together with the cnactment of a policy of “earliest
practicable” withdrawal do not amount in my mind to an
appropriations carte blanche to the military to carry on
bombing in Cambodia after the cease-fire, withdrawal of
our troops from Vietnam, and return of our prisoners of
war from North Vietnam.
We come then to the effect of the legislation, following
upen a presidential veto of an immediate prohibition against
the use of funds to bomb in Cambodia, adopted as a com-
promise this July 1st: the Continuing Appropriations Act
for Fiscal Year 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-52, 93rd Cong. 2nd
Sess. (July 1, 1973) which expressly provided that “... on
or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore
appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance di-
rectly or indirectly combat activities by United States mili-
tary forces in or over or from off the shores of North
Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.” §108. In
23a
colloquy between Senators Eagleton and Fulbright, inad-
vertently omitted in the briefs of appellees and the opinion
of the lower court, the former inquired whether “the adop-
tion of this resolution [would] permit the bombing of
Cambodia” and Senator Fulbright replied, “Until August
15”. 119 Cong. Ree. S 12562 (daily ed. June 29, 1973).
Again, in the same colloquy Senator Fulbright, conceding
“Presidential power”, said that “The President has the
power to do a lot of things of which T do not approve,”
after being asked by Senator Eagleton whether under the
resolution the President’s “power to bomb in Indochina
_. . will now be sanctioned by our action.” Jd. In neither
case, however, is there recognition of legality or past au-
thorization. Senator Fulbright had previously stated, as
Judge Judd recognized, that “The acceptance of an August
15 cut off date should in no way be interpreted as recog-
nition by the committee of the President’s authority to
engage U.S. forces in hostilities until that date. The view
of most members of the committee has been and continues
to be that the President does not have such authority in
the absence of specific congressional approval.” 119 Cong.
Ree. S 12560 (daily ed. June 29, 1973).
It can be argued that Congress could, if it had so desired,
cut off the funds for bombing Cambodia immediately by
overriding the Presidential veto. This was indeed cham-
pioned by those voting against the ultimate compromise
Resolution. But it does not follow that those who voted in
favor of the Resolution were thereby putting the Con-
gressional stamp of approval on the bombing continuation.
While the Resolution constituted a recognition that Exec-
utive power was being exercised, it did not constitute a
concession that such exercise was rightful, lawful or con-
stitutional.
|
a ee ee ms
24a
It may be that those voting for the Resolution thought
that in some way previous appropriations acts or the omis-
sion expressly to prohibit a continuation of bombing after
the cease-fire and return of our prisoners of war amounted
to an authorization, which could only be limited by affirma-
tive congressional action. But as I have previously sug-
gested I cannot find any express congressional authoriza-
tion for such a continuation of the Cambodian bombing,
nor do I think that authorization can be implied from prior
appropriations acts. This being true, affirmative action on
the part of Congress was not necessary as a matter of
constitutional law. An agreement by the Executive to some
cut off date was essential, however, because the legality of
bombing continuation might not be tested or testable for
months to come, by the very nature of the judicial process.
Therefore, Congress as I see it, took the only practical way
out. It acknowledged the reality of the Executive’s exercise
of power even while it disputed the Executive’s authority
for that exercise. It agreed to a final cut-off date as the
best practical result but never conceded the legality or con-
stitutionality of interim exercise.
Thus the Resolution of July 1, 1973 cannot be the basis
for legalization of otherwise unlawful Executive action.
We are talking here about the separate branches of govern-
ment, and in doing so we must distinguish between the ex-
ercise of power on the one hand and authorization for such
exercise on the other. That the Executive Branch had the
power to bomb in Cambodia, there can be no doubt; it did
so, and indeed is continuing to do so. Whether it had the
constitutional authority for its action is another question.
If we return to fundamentals, as I think we must in the
ease of any conflict of view between the other two Branches
of Government, it will be recalled that the Founding Fathers
ieiteeetre ore reece sett aaa ETAL Er
25a
deliberately eschewed the example of the British Monarchy
in which was lodged the authority to declare war and to
raise and regulate fleets and armies. Seve The Federalist
No. 69 (A. Hamilton). Rather these powers were deliber-
ately given to the Legislative Branch of the new American
Republic in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution. See
7 Works of Alexander Hamilton 81 (J. Hamilton ed. 1851),
cited in Note, Congress, The President, and The Power to
Commit Forces to Combat, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1771, 1773 n.14
(1968). I fail to see, and the Government in its able
presentation has failed to point out, where the Congress
ever authorized the continuation of bombing in Cambodia
after the cease-fire in Vietnam, the withdrawal of our
forces there, and the return of our prisoners of war to our
shores. Accordingly, I must dissent, and although on a
somewhat different analysis would affirm the judgment
below.
| i.
ER OS a PELL ON TOLER wt
26a
Order Denying Rehearing in Banc
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Seconp Circuit
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals,
in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United States
Court House, in the City of New York, on the 17th day
of September, one thousand nine hundred and _ seventy-
three.
Docket No. 73-2054
—<
EuizaBetH HoitzMan, individually and in her capacity as a
member of the United States House of Representatives,
lst Lr. ArtHur Watson, 43rd Strategic Wing, United
States Air Force, Anderson Air Force Base, Guam,
Caprars Micuaen Fivacer, 48rd Strategic Wing, United
States Air Force, Anderson Air Foree Base, Guam,
Captaris James H. Srrary, 43rd Strategie Wing, United
States Air Foree, Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, and
Caprars Donatp E. Dawson, 307th Strategie Wing,
United States Air Force, U-Tapo, Thailand,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
—V-.—
James R. Scutesincer, individually and as Secretary of
Defense, Jonx L. McLvcas, individually and as Sece-
retary of the Air Force, and Wittiam P. CLEMENTS,
individually and as Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Defendants-A ppellants.
FL ODT mR RM a
—
27a
A petition for a rehearing containing a suggestion that
the action be reheard in bane having been filed herein by
counsel for the appellees, a poll of the judges in regular
active service having been taken at the request of such a
judge, and there being no majority in favor thereof,
Upon consideration thereof, it is
Ordered that said petition be and it hereby is Dentep.
Judge Oakes dissents.
Irvine R. KaurmMan
Chief Judge
rar ithot.
eR 8 RE EES WE we - = « 7 a
United States District Court’s Opinion
of June 13, 1973
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Eastern District or New York
No. 73-C-537.
June 13, 1973.
—_—< >
ExizapetH Hoitzman, Individually and in her capacity as a
Member of the United States House of Representatives,
Plaintiff,
ee
Extuiot L. Ricwarpson, Individually and as Secretary of
Defense and Rosert C. Seamans, Jr., Individually and
as Secretary of the Air Force,
Defendants.
<>
Jupp, District Judge:
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, a member of the United States House of Repre-
sentatives from a Brooklyn district, seeks a determination
that the President of the United States and the military
personnel under his direction and control may not engage in
intensive combat operations in Cambodia and elsewhere in
Indochina in the absence of congressional authorization.
> on
29a
Motions
1. Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment declaring
that the defendants may not order American military forces
to combat in Cambodia and granting appropriate injunctive
relief.
2. Plaintiff has also moved to serve an amended and
supplemental complaint adding as plaintiffs three Air
Force officers stationed in Guam, none of whom are resi-
dents of the Eastern District of New York.
3. Congressman Parren J. Mitchell of the Seventh Con-
gressional District of Maryland, togetiier with seven other
Congressmen from districts not within the Eastern District
of New York, have moved for leave to file a brief as amici
curiae.
4. Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a valid claim for relief because (a) plain-
tiff lacks standing; (b) the court lacks jurisdiction over the
subject matter; and (c) the complaint involves non-justici-
able political questions on which relief cannot be granted.
Defendants also assert that the motion for summary judg-
ment is premature.
No motion has yet been made to implement the state-
ment that the complaint is brought on behalf of all simi-
larly situated Congressmen. It is not yet necessary to deter-
mine whether the case may properly be treated as a class
action.
Facts
The complaint was filed on April 17, 1973. Plaintiff
asserted among other things that her right to an undiluted
Path be
ita ldo 5d and Aa | ea atte nk be! len tba Dacha Nha?
30a
vote upon the declaration of hostilities was impaired by
presidential action in engaging in extensive combat in Cam-
bodia without congressional authorization. She pointed out
that cease-fire had been negotiated in Vietnam, all Ameri-
ean servicemen had been withdrawn, and all American
prisoners of war had been released; and she asserted that
no congressional authorization exists for committing Amer-
ican forces to combat in Cambodia.
An order to show cause why the court should not de-
clare continued military activities in Cambodia to be unlaw-
ful was signed on April 19 by Judge Dooling, to whom the
ease had been assigned as a related case. Before the re-
turn date of the motion, Judge Dooling determined that the
case was not in fact related to prior matters before him, and
directed that it be reassigned under this court’s random as-
signment plan. On the return date of the order to show
cause on April 26, 1973, the matter was adjourned at de-
fendants’ request until May 18, with answering papers to
be served by May 16.
The motion for summary judgment and injunctive relief
was served and filed on May 8, 1973, accompanied by a state-
ment of allegedly undisputed facts pursuant to Rule 9(g) of
this court’s General Rules. In particular, plaintiff asserted
that the United States is currently engaged in large-scale
combat air operations in Cambodia involving hundreds of
war planes based in Thailand and Guam, and that United
States war planes dropped 39,500 tons of explosives on
Cambodia during March 1973 and flew 180 combat missions
daily during the first three weeks of April. Plaintiff fur-
ther asserts as undisputed material facts that the last
American serviceman was withdrawn from Vietnam on
March 28, 1973 and the last American prisoner of war was
repatriated on April 1, 1973, and that although no Con-
3la
gressional authorization exists for the commitment of
American forces to combat in Cambodia, the Executive has
informed Congress that it is prepared to continue its mili-
tary activities whether or not the Congress appropriates
funds for the Cambodian combat operations.
Defendants’ response asserts that there are still over
1,300 missing in action in the Vietnam hostilities who have
not vet been accounted for. Defendants also assert by affi-
davit of the Chief of the Civil Division of the United States
Attorney's office that “there may well be dispute as to asser-
tions made in plaintiff's Rule %(g) statement.” They re-
quest time to submit papers addressed to the merits.
The plaintiffs who are proposed to be added assert that
they are being compelled to comply with unlawful orders,
and to risk their lives in unauthorized bombing missions
over Cambodia.
The brief of the Protestant, Catholic and Jewish religious
groups, which appear as amici, assert that the existence of
Congressional authorization to make war is justiciable, and
point out that participation in Cambodian hostilities may
conflict with the Agreement on Ending the War and Restor-
ing Peace in Vietnam.
Discussion
It is necessary to deal first with the question of the tim-
ing of the motions, then with the issue of plaintiff's stand-
ing and other jurisdictional questions, and finally with the
particular motions of the several parties.
Timing
The government relies on the provision of F.R.Civ. P.
12(a) that the United States or an officer or agency thereof
32a
has sixty days “after the service upon the United States
attorney of the pleading” within which to answer a com-
plaint.
Rule 56, however, provides that a party may move for
summary judgment “at any time after the expiration of 20
days from the commencement of the action.” Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment was served 21 days after the
complaint was filed.
The difference between the two rules is significant. The
time is computed in different ways. Since an action is com-
menced under F.R.Civ.P. 3 by the filing of a complaint,
regardless of the time when it is served, the measure of
time in Rule 56 is unrelated to the time in Rule 12. More-
over, Rule 56 does not provide for a longer time before a.
motion can be made against a government agency than one
against a private party.
Judge Charles E. Clark, a distinguished authority on
procedure, criticized the original federal rule for not per-
mitting the filing of a motion for summary judgment as
soon as an action is brought. See his dissent in United
States v. Adler’s Creamery, Inc., 107 F.2d 987, 992 (2d
Cir. 1939). The 1946 amendment, which permitted a mo-
tion for summary judgment in advance of answer, should
be interpreted in a manner to expedite the disposition of
litigation. There is no need to impart into it the 60-day
period for government answer that was specified in old
Rule 12. A plaintiff moving for summary judgment before
answer may be required to face a somewhat higher stand-
ard, however. As Professor Moore has suggested, a motion
before answer should not be granted “unless it is clear that
an issue of material fact cannot be presented.” 6 Moore’s
Federal Practice (2d ed. 1948, 1972) § 56.07, p. 2092.
33a
There has never been any requirement of any delay in the
consideration of a preliminary injunction in an action
against a United States officer or agency, except as the
court in its discretion may find to be appropriate.
The court therefore rejects the argument that the motion
for summary judgment was premature.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Jurisdiction
Defendants’ three grounds for this motion to dismiss are
all essentially jurisdictional, whether described as relat-
ing to standing, subject matter, or political question.
Standing
Under Article TIT, § 2, Clause 1, of the Constitution, the
jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to “eases” and “con-
troversies.” Judicial definitions of the elements requisite
for “eases” and “controversies” have proved to be elusive.
Unlike case or controversy, terms specifically enumerated
in Article III, “standing” is not mentioned in the Constitu-
tion. It received its first full expression in Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923).
Later, in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20
L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), the Court stated that political ques-
tions, advisory opinions, and lack of standing result in there
being no justiciable controversy. Whether standing is de-
nominated a component of jurisdiction or of justiciability
may at first blush seem unimportant, due to the require-
ment that both issues must be resolved before any deter-
mination can be made of the merits of the controversy.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663
(1962); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973).
way: )
Bidtiaws ihn ad
34a
However, a complaint may be dismissed for lack of juris-
diction of the subject matter only if the claim is so at-
tenuated and insubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of
merit. Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S.
561, 24 S.Ct. 553, 48 L.Ed. 795 (1904) ; Baker v. Carr, supra.
Plaintiff has raised a serious constitutional question deal-
ing with the war-making power of Congress enumerated in
Article I, ¢8 of the Constitution. The seriousness of this
question has been recognized repeatedly within this circuit.
Berk vy. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970); Orlando v.
Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971). The delicate balance
in the relationship between Congress and the President con-
cerning the power to wage war is a controversy arising
under the Constitution and therefore within the jurisdic-
tion of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).
Whether a particular party has a sufficient stake in an
otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolu-
tion of it is what has traditionally been referred to as the
question of standing to sue. In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972), the
Supreme Court held that when a party, such as the plain-
tiff here, does not rely on any specific statute authorizing
invocation of the judicial process,
the question of standing depends upon whether the
party has alleged such a “personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy,” Baker v. Carr... as to en-
sure that “the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be
presented in an adversary context and in a form his-
torically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.”
Flast v. Cohen.
The heart of the question becomes whether the plaintiff
has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
35a
controversy as to assure the concrete presentation of issues
in an adversary context so that a court will be properly
guided in determining difficult issues. The controversy in-
volved must be a substantial one admitting of specific relief.
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct.
461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937).
In the present case the court is not being asked to decide
ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues. The
issue has been focused as sharply as possible: Whether the
President’s orders directing the bombing of Cambodia con-
stituted a usurpation of Congress’ war making power under
Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. Nor is this a case in which
the court is being asked to decide a hypothetical question or
abstract issue. Plaintiff is not asking for a determination
whether the President would violate the Constitution by en-
gaging in certain acts, but rather a determination that the
present action of the President violates the Constitution.
Nor is this a collusive suit where the parties are suspected
of sharing the same interests.
Plaintiff gua Congresswoman does not merely suffer in
some indefinite way in common with people generally. She
is a member of a specific and narrowly defined group—the
House of Representatives. As a Congresswoman, plaintiff
is called upon to appropriate funds for military operations,
raise an army, and declare war. Additionally, plaintiff has
a continuing responsibility to insure the checks and bal-
ances of our democracy through the use of impeachment.
When a plaintiff is a member of a narrowly defined group,
which has been more directly affected by the conduct in
question than has the general population, the test for stand-
ing should be met. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court
—a Functional Analysis, 86 Harv. L.Rev. 645 (Feb. 1973).
Vee 7 wy ee TE IEE Le rs - - “ Ce CS LE a3;
36a
The question whether a particular person is a proper
party to maintain the action does not, by its own force,
raise separation of powers problems related to improper
judicial interference in areas committed to other branches
of the federal government. Flast v. Cohen, supra.
Professor Jaffee has stated, in Standing Again, 84 Harv.
L.Rey. 633, at 634, 635 (1971),
My own view has been and continues to be that a plain-
tiff who does not have a “protected interest,” whether
as an individual or as a group, does not have a right
to review, but that a court in its discretion may at the
suit of such a person review the legal question if it
deems such consideration to be in the public interest.
...I1 believe ... that any citizen can constitutionally
be a plaintiff ... in a “public law” suit even though
he suffers no injury whatever beyond his concern for
the public interest.
In Mitchell v. Laird, 476 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. March 20,
1973), thirteen members of the United States House of
Representatives filed a complaint against the President
and the Secretaries of State, Defense, Navy. and Air Force,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against continued
warfare in Indochina. In finding that the plaintiffs had
standing, the Court relied upon the fact that it would be
the duty of plaintiffs to consider impeachment if defen-
dants’ actions contravened the Constitution, that plaintiffs
have a quite distinct duty to determine whether to make ap-
propriations to support the hostilities, and that plaintiffs
might have to take other legislative actions related to such
hostilities, such as raising an army or enacting other civil
or criminal legislation.
37a
Standing of legislators was also upheld in Trombetta v.
State of Florida, 353 F.Supp. 575 (M.D.Fla. 1973), ruling
that members of the Florida Legislature had standing to
seek a declaratory judgment whether the proposed Twenty-
seventh (Equal Rights) Amendment to the United States
Constitution was repugnant to Articles V and VI of the
United States Constitution; and in Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939), an original pro-
ceeding in mandamus by members of the Kansas Legisla-
ture against the Secretary of the Senate of Kansas and
others to compel the Secretary to erase an endorsement
on the Senate resolution ratifying the Child Labor Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. The Trombetta
and Coleman cases, involving state legislatures, are not
completely parallel, but a member of Congress should have
an equal right to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court.
Congresswoman Holtzman is a member of a well defined
group that is directly affected by defendants’ action. She
has presented a sharply focused controversy in an adver-
sary context. Her responsibilities as a Congresswoman
give her the nexus necessary to have standing to contest
the policies of defendants that allegedly infringe upon her
Article I duties.
The standing of the airmen as added plaintiffs is clear,
Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970), if they can
pass the test of venue, discussed later.
Political Question
In determining whether there is subject-matter jurisdic-
tion, the court must consider whether the case presents a
“political question” outside its jurisdiction, before it can
reach the merits of the controversy. This is a facet of the
problem of justiciability.
Sa Peoke = . rm core ae
38a
The Second Circuit has shaped its formulation of the
political question doctrine from guidance provided by the
Supreme Court in cases such as Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153
(1952); and Powell v. MeCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct.
1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). In Berk v. Laird, supra, 429
F.2d at 305, it held that a soldier seeking to enjoin orders in
the Vietnam hostilities as lacking constitutional authority
had a right to ask a court to determine whether there were
“judicially discoverable and manageable standards” for re-
solving the issue. In Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042
(2d Cir. 1971), it held that courts should not review the
form of congressional authorization, once it had been de-
termined that there was “any action by the Congress suffi-
cient to authorize or ratify the military activity in ques-
tion.” In DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1155 (2d Cir.
1973), it held that judges could not appropriately deter-
mine
whether a specific military operation constitutes an
“escalation” of the war or is merely a new tactical ap-
proach within a continuing strategic plan.
Defendants rely on this statement but fail to consider the
court’s further statement (p. 1156) that
We specifically do not pass on the point urged by ap-
pellant whether a radical change in the character of
war operations—as by an intentional policy of indis-
eriminate bombing of civilians without any military
objective—might be sufficiently measurable judicially to
warrant a court’s consideration, i.e., might contain a
standard which we seek in this record and do not find.
39a
The appeal in that case was from an order denying injune-
tive relief, after the court had reviewed documentary mate-
rial submitted by both sides. Here the issue arises on a
motion to dismiss the complaint on its face. The motion for
summary judgment on the merits is not being considered
vet.
The teaching of those cases is that the political question
exception to jurisdiction depends on the facts of the par-
ticular case, but that the question of the balance of con-
stitutional authority to declare war, as between the execu-
tive and legislative branches, is not a political question.
The Second Circuit rule was not repudiated by the Su-
preme Court’s summary affirmance of Atlee v. Laird,
347 F. Supp. 689 (1972), aff'd, 411 U.S. 911, 93 S.Ct. 1545,
36 L.Ed.2d 304 (1973). The district court there dealt with
a question whether Congress could constitutionally au-
thorize warfare by appropriation bills rather than whether
Congress had in fact given approval to the acts of the
executive. The district court in Atlee referred to the rapid
changes in world polities as a reason for not taking juris-
diction, but stated (p. 707):
This, of course, is one reason justifying a court’s taking
small steps in sensitive areas, because the judiciary
lacks the flexibility found in the political departments,
to deal adequately with a constantly chang.ng world
scene.
The Atlee case dealt with a general challenge to “the con-
stitutionality of the war in South East Asia.” 347 F.Supp.
at 691. Lack of merit may also have been mingled with
procedural issues in the affirmance of the Aflee case, since
the Supreme Court had previously refused to review cases
which upheld the President’s authority to use American
spepswiowen: _— eh ee AI Pa) mae . bau = a ee REN ERNE ORR
40a
forces in Vietnam. It had denied certiorari in the Berk,
Orlando, and DaCosta eases. Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302,
cert. denied, 404 U.S. S869, 92 S.Ct. 94, 30 L.Ed.2d 113
(1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, cert. denied, 404
U.S. 869, 92 S.Ct. 94, 30 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971); DaCosta v.
Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979, 92 S.Ct.
1193, 31 L.Ed.2d 255 (1972).
The present case, dealing with Cambodian combat opera-
tions, involves other issues, for the Senate and the House
have spoken separately on Cambodia, and the entire Con-
gress, in approving limited foreign aid to Cambodia, 22
U.S.C. § 2415(g), expressly stated in 1972 (P.L. 92-226)
that such aid
. shall not be construed as a commitment by the
United States to Cambodia for its defense.
Judge Dooling said in his opinion in DaCosta v. Laird
of May 24, 1972, concerning political question:
The actual conduct of a defined war, when that war is
in its lawful progress, is such an area. (Emphasis
added).
The present case, attacking only the use of bombers in
Cambodia after the Vietnam cease-fire, has a narrower
reach than Atlee and may present one of the “small steps
in sensitive areas” which is within the realm of justiciabil-
itv under the district court’s opinion in Atlee.
This is one of the first suits brought after the withdrawal
of American troops from Vietnam and the return of pris-
oners of war. Reluctance to jeopardize the safety of
American soldiers or prisoners is no longer a barrier to
judicial determination of the constitutionality of a phase
of war activity.
—— anne
4la
Therefore the case does not prersent a tactical decision
in an ongoing war like DaCosta ILI, supra, 471 F.2d 1146
(whether to mine Haiphong harbor). Rather it involves
the question whether the authorized Vietnam war has ter-
minated. Courts have often been asked to determine when
| a war has ended and peace has begun. F.g., United States
| v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81
L.Ed. 255 (1936); cf., United States v. Swift, Crim. No.
72-747-W, District of Massachusetts, Opinion of Wyzan-
ski, J., March 28, 1973.
The political question doctrine does not appear to justify
dismissal of this complaint before examination of the
merits, on which this court has reached no decision,
Advisory Opinion
Plaintiff is not seeking a judicial determination as to
her rights upon the happening of some events in the future.
Rather, she is seeking a judicial declaration that military
operations currently being conducted in Cambodia are in
violation of the United States Constitution. This does not
come within the rule forbidding advisory opinions, a rule
which stems from the risk that comes from passing on
abstract questions rather than limiting decisions to con-
crete cases in which a question is precisely framed by a
clash of genuine adversary argument. Wright, Federal
Courts (2d ed. 1970) pp. 37-38; Berger, Standing to Sue
in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78
Yale L.J. 816, 830-31 (1968).
Venue
There is no doubt of the proper venue of this action as
originally brought by plaintiff, a Brooklyn resident, since
42a
express provision in 28 U.S.C. §1391(e)(4) permits suit
against a federal officer or agency in any judicial district
where the plaintiff resides. Suit by the airmen might have
to be brought in some other district if they were not joined
in this action, or if plaintiff Holtzman did not have stand-
ing. Their presence as plaintiffs in a suit properly brought
by Congresswoman Holtzman, however, does not prevent
the venue being proper for all plaintiffs, since only one
plaintiff need be a resident of the district. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
340 F.Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev’d on other grounds,
459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972).
Amount in Controversy
In determining the amount in controversy, the court may
consider the pecuniary result to either party which a judg-
ment might produce. Berman v. Narragansett Racing
Assoe., 414 F.2d 311 (ist Cir. 1969); Bass v. Rockefeller,
331 F.Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Note, Federal Jurisdic-
tional Amount: Determination of the Matter in Contro-
versy, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1369 (1960).
With millions of dollars in expenditures involved as part
of the bombing operation, there is no question that the
requirement of $10,000 or more in controversy is met.
Plaintiff's Motions
Addition of parties is not governed by F.R. Civ. P. 15,
concerning amendments of pleadings, but F.R. Civ. P. 21,
which states that
Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court
on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action... .
43a
Burlington Hospital v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 48 F.R.D. 348
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) ; Maynard, Merel & Co. v. Carcioppolo, 51
F.R.D. 273 (S.D.N.¥. 1970).
It is entirely appropriate and timely to permit the addi-
tion of the proposed military plaintiffs.
Summary Judgment
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will be held
in abeyance pending the receipt of additional papers from
the defendants. In view of the length of time the court has
had the matter under advisement, during which defen-
dants have had an opportunity to assemble the pertinent
facts, they should be prepared to set forth their contentions
without much further delay.
It is ordered:
(1) That defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint be
denied ;
(2) That plaintiff be granted leave to serve an amended
and supplemental complaint adding First Lieutenant Ar-
thur Watson, Captain Michael Flugger, and Captain James
H. Strain as plaintiffs;
(3) That defendants answer such amended and supple-
mental complaint within ten days after its service on the
United States Attorney;
(4) That Hon. Parren J. Mitchell, Bella S. Abzug, Don-
ald M. Fraser, Herman Badillo, Benjamin I. Rosenthal,
Robert W. Kastenmeier, Don Edwards, and Michael J.
Harrington, Members of Congress, be granted leave to file
briefs in the case as amici curiae;
(6) That the matter be set down for argument on that
motion for summary judgment by June 25, 1973; and
(6) That the amtter be set down for argument on that
motion at 10:00 a.m. on June 29, 1973.
tia
United States District Court’s Opinion
of July 25, 1973
United States District Court,
E. D. New York.
No. 73-C-537.
July 25, 1973.
~—
EuizaBetH Hoitzman, Individually and in her capacity as
a member of the United States House of Representa-
tives, et al., Plaintiffs,
Vv.
James R. Scutestncer, Individually and as Secretary of
Defense, et al., Defendants.
<<
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Jupp, District Judge.
Plaintiffs seek a determination that the President of
the United States and the military personnel under his
direction and control may not engage in intensive combat
operations in Cambodia and elsewhere in Indochina in the
absence of Congressional authorization required under Ar-
ticle I, § 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution. The case is before
the court on plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgmeni for
lack of genuine issues of material fact. Additionally, plain-
tiffs seek declaratory and/or injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs have also moved to add as plaintiff another
Air Force officer on active duty, Captain Donald Dawson,
PS TE Sr ee TN a OS WEEKS
45a
and to stay the defendants from ordering him to engage
in bombing missions over Cambodia.
Posture of the Case
At an earlier stage this court denied defendants’ motion
to dismiss the complaint, and overruled the contentions that
Congresswoman Holtzman lacked standing to challenge the
military activities in question and that the controversy
presented a nonjusticiable political question.
Both sides were given an opportunity to submit any addi-
tional papers that would bear on the appropriateness of
summary judgment.
Facts
Review of the facts may begin with 1970, since the earlier
phases of hostilities in Indochina have been summarized
in an earlier case.
This court held in September 1970 in Berk v. Laird, 317
F.Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y.1970), aff'd sub nom., Orlando v.
Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971), that Congress had
authorized hostilities in Vietnam to that date through a
series of appropriation acts.
Hostilities in Cambodia
In response to Presidential pronouncements concerning
the necessity of military action in Cambodia, there was a
series of Congressional responses seeking in the main to
limit such mijitary action, and culminating in two laws en-
acted on July 1, 1973 which directed that no funds might
be expended for Cambodian combat activities after August
15, 1973.
Fe Sa Net, ca ee
46a
On April 30, 1970, the President stated in an address
to the nation that “North Vietnam has occupied military
sanctuaries all along the Cambodian frontier with South
Vietnam,” that Cambodia had therefore called on the United
States for assistance, and that attacks were therefore being
launched “to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cam-
bodian-Vietnam border.” The Situation in Southeast Asia,
6 Presidential Documents 596, 597, 598.
On June 30, 1970, a report by the President on the Cam-
bodian operation, released at San Clemente, California,
stated that all American troops had withdrawn from Cam-
bodia, but that the United States would continue to conduct
air interdiction missions to prevent supplies and personnel
being moved through Cambodia toward South Vietnam, and
that “We do this to protect our forces in South Vietnam.”
The President also stated that one of the reasons for at-
tacking the enemy’s “sanctuaries” in Cambodia was that
this would “enhance the prospects of a negotiated peace.”
The Cambodian Operation, 6 Presidential Documents 843,
850, 852.
The so-called Fulbright proviso, limiting military sup-
port to Cambodia except to the extent necessary to insure
the safe withdrawal of United States forces from Southeast
Asia and the release of American prisoners of war, was
adopted by the Congress during the summer of 1970 and
inserted in the War Forces-Military Procurement Act of
1971 and became law with the President’s approval on
October 7, 1970. This proviso, which was repeated in every
subsequent military appropriation and authorization act,
reads as follows:
. . nothing [herein] shall be construed as authoriz-
ing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese
~
47a
or other free world forces in actions designed to pro-
vide military support and assistance to the Government
of Cambodia or Laos: Provided further, That nothing
contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit
support of actions required to insure the safe and or-
derly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. Forces
from Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release of Amer-
icans held as prisoners of war.
P.L. 91-441, 84 Stat. 905; P.L. 91-668, 84 Stat. 2020; P.L.
92-156, 85 Stat. 423; P.L. 92-204, 85 Stat. 716; P.L. 92-436,
86 Stat. 734; P.L. 92-570, 86 Stat. 1184.
On the evening of the same day the Fulbright proviso
became law, October 7, 1970, the President addressed the
nation by radio and television and stated that the North
Vietnamese were carrying on aggression in Laos and Cam-
bodia as well as in Vietnam and that “The war in Indochina
has been proved to be of one piece; it cannot be cured by
treating only one of its areas of outbreak.” The New Ini-
tiative for Peace in Southeast Asia, 6 Presidential Docu-
ments 1349, 1350.
The Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 (P.L. 91-652,
84 Stat. 1942), approved January 1, 1971, provided:
See. 7. (a) In line with the expressed intention of
the President of the United States, none of the funds
authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any
other Act may be used to finance the introduction of
United States ground combat troops into Cambodia, or
to provide United States advisers to or for Cambodian
military forces in Cambodia.
(b) Military and economic assistance provided by
the United States to Cambodia and authorized or ap-
+ ENS EAT
48a
propriated pursuant to this or any other Act shall not
be construed as a commitment by the United States to
Cambodia for its defense.
On February 25, 1971, the President submitted a foreign
policy report to Congress, saying again that the war in
Indochina was “of one piece,” that because of North Viet-
namese infiltration in Cambodia “We faced the prospect of
one large enemy base camp 600 miles along South Viet-
nam’s flank;” and that our policy for Cambodia included
“air missions against enemy supplies and personnel that
pose a potential ihreat to South Vietnam or seek to estab-
lish base areas relevant to Vietnam.” United States For-
eign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace, 7 Presiden-
tial Documents 305, 328, 332.
On November 17, 1971, the so-called Mansfield amend-
ment became law by action of Congress with the President’s
approval, and expressed the United States policy “to termi-
nate at the earliest practicable date all military operations
of the United States in Indochina.” The pertinent portions
of this amendment, which was part of the Appropriations
Authorizations-Military Procurement Act, 1972, state:
Sec. 601. (a) It is hereby declared to be the policy
of the United States to terminate at the earliest practi-
cable date all military operations of the United States
in Indochina, and to provide for the prompt and or-
derly withdrawal of all United States military forces
at a date certain, subject to the release of all American
prisoners of war held by the Government of North
Vietnam and forces allied with such Government and
an accounting for all Americans missing in action who
have been held by or known to such Government or
49a
such forces. The Congress hereby urges and requests
the President to implement the above-expressed policy
by initiating immediately the following actions:
(1) Establishing a final date for the withdrawal
from Indochina of all military forces of the United
States contingent upon the release of all American
prisoners of war held by the Government of North
Vietnam and forces allied with such Government and
an accounting for all Americans missing in action
who have been held by or known to such Government
or such forces.
(2) Negotiate with the Government of North Viet-
nam for an immediate cease-fire by all parties to the
hostilities in Indochina.
(3) Negotiate with the Government of North Viet-
nam for an agreement which would provide for a
series of phased and rapid withdrawals of United
State military forces from Indochina in exchange for
a corresponding series of phased releases of Amer-
ican prisoners of war, and for the release of any re-
maining American prisoners of war concurrently
with the withdrawal of all remaining military forces
of the United States by not later than the date estab-
lished by the President pursuant to paragraph (1)
hereof or by such earlier date as may be agreed upon
by the negotiating parties.
ae
In the Defense Appropriation Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-204), :
approved December 18, 1971, Congress specified: i
Sec. 738(a) Not to exceed $2,500,000,000 of the appro-
priations available to the Department of Defense dur-
]
ee Hc Tite ina © ~ sd*.oc5 Soe “ ae See aa ee
50a
ing the current fiscal year shall be available for their
stated purposes to support (1) Vietnamese and other
free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces (2)
local forces in Laos and Thailand; and for related costs,
on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of De-
fense may determine: . . . Provided further, that
nothing in clause (1) of the first sentence of this sub-
section shall be construed as authorizing the use of
any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free
world forces in actions designed to provide military
support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia
or Laos: Provided further that nothing contained in
this section shall be construed to prohibit support of
actions required to insure the safe and orderly with-
drawal or disengagement of U.S. Forces from South-
east Asia, or to aid in the release of Americans held
as prisoners of war.
This language was continued in all subsequent military
authorization or appropriations acts. See Appropriations
Authorization-Military Procurement Act, 1972, P.L. 92-156,
85 Stat. 423, November 17, 1971, See. 501; Military Procure-
ment Act, 1973, P.L. 92-436, 86 Stat. 734, September 26,
1972, See. 601; Department of Defense Appropriation Act,
1973, P.L. 92-570, 86 Stat. 1184, October 26, 1972, See. 737.
In the Foreign Assistance Act, 1971, approved on Febru-
ary 7, 1972, the Congress expressly stated that limited for-
eign aid to Cambodia “shall not be construed as a commit-
ment by the United States to Cambodia for its defense.”
P.L. 92-226, 22 U.S.C. § 2415(g). The Act recognized the
existence of bombing in Cambodia, in language which both
sides cite. The pertinent provisions of the Act read as
follows:
ng welt
5la
See. 655. Limitations Upon Assistance to or for
Cambodia.—(a) Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, no funds authorized to be appropriated by
this cr any other law may be obligated in any amount
in excess of $341,000,000 for the purpose of carrying
out directly or indirectly any economic or military as-
sistance, or any operation, project, or program of any
kind, or for providing any goods, supplies, materials,
equipment, services, personnel, or advisers in, to, for,
or on behalf of Cambodia during the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1972.
(ec) No funds may be obligated for any of the pur-
poses described in subsection (a) of this section in, to,
for, or on behalf of Cambodia in any fiscal year be-
ginning after June 30, 1972, unless such funds have
been specifically authorized by law enacted after the
date of enactment of this section. In no ease shall
funds in any amount in excess of the amount specif-
ically authorized by law for any fiscal year be obligated
for any such purpose during such fiscal year.
(d) The provisions of subsections (a) and (c) of
this section shall not apply with respect to the obliga-
tion of funds to carry out combat air operations over
Cambodia.
(e) After the date of enactment of this section,
whenever any request is made to the Congress for the
appropriation of funds for use in, for, or on behalf of
Cambodia for any fiscal year, the President shall fur-
nish a written report to the Congress explaining the
purpose for which such funds are to be used in such
fiscal year.
es
RY ee ete ae ne ee 25S ce RIT SI
52a
See. 656. Limitations on United States Personne!
and Personnel Assisted by United States in Cambodia.
—The total number of civilian officers and employees
of executive agencies of the United States Government
who are citizens of the United States and of members
of the Armed Forces of the United States (excluding
such members while actually engaged in air operations
in or over Cambodia which originate outside Cambodia)
present in Cambodia at any one time shall not exceed
two hundred. The United States shall not, at any time,
pay in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, the com-
pensation or allowances of more than eighty-five indi-
viduals in Cambodia who are citizens of countries other
than Cambodia or the United States. For purposes of
this section, “executive agency of the United States
Government” means any agency, department, board,
wholly or partly owned corporation, instrumentality,
commission, or establishment within the executive
branch of the United States Government. (Emphasis
added).
On February 9, 1972, the President stated to Congress
that North Vietnam continued to threaten the legitimate
governments in Laos and Cambodia “in order to further
its attacks on South Vietnam,” and stated that “In Cam-
bodia, operations are at the request of the Government
and serve to relieve enemy pressures against Cambodia as
well as South Vietnam.” United States Foreign Policy for
the 1970’s: The Emerging Structure of Peace, 8 Presiden-
tial Documents 235, 343-45.
On April 18, 1972, testimony before the House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on Armed Services stated that a sig-
nificant portion of the Navy and Air Force incremental
~
ft
Ye .
d3a
war costs of $2,023,000,000 for fiseal 1972 “could be at-
tributed to operations in Laos and Cambodia.” Cong. Ree.
9173. Some information presented at that time was classi-
fied and made available for inspection only by members
of Congress.
Events in 1973
On January 27, 1973, the parties participating in the
Paris Conference on Vietnam signed an Agreement on End-
ing the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, which stated
in Article 20(a):
... The parties participating in the Paris Conference
on Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the terri-
tory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach
‘on the sovereignty and security of one another and of
other countries.
The affidavit of the Assistant United States Attorney
opposing the motion for summary judgment asserts that
after January 27, 1973, despite a unilateral cessation of
hostilities by the governments of Cambodia and the United
States, “the North Vietnamese launched a general offensive
in Cambodia, continuing the combat there. The military
response of the United States continued.”
In fact, there is evidence that air operations over Cam-
bodia since January 27, 1973 have escalated sharply. A re-
port on United States Air Operations in Cambodia pre-
pared for the Subcommittee on United States Security
Agreements and Commitments Abroad (April 1973—
G.P.O.), states on page 7 that in the period February 16
through February 28, 1973, an average of twenty-three
tactical air sorties a day and five B-52 sorties were flown
in Cambodia. In the following two-week period, March 1-
dS4a
March 15, an average of fifty-eight tactical and gunship
sorties and twenty B-52 sorties were flown. Between March
16-March 31, an average of 184 tactical sorties and fifty-
eight B-52 sorties were flown. A statistical summary sub-
mitted by the Department of Defense to the Senate Armed
Services Committee on June 19, 1973 shows that in the
period October 30, 1972-January 27, 1973, 936 combat sor-
ties were flown over Cambodia and that in the period
January 27, 1973-April 30, 1973, 12,136 sorties were flown.
The last American combat troops were withdrawn from
South Vietnam on March 28, 1973 and the last known Amer-
ican prisoners of war were released on April 1, 1973.
Secretary of State Rogers on April 3, 1973, submitted a
statement on “Presidential Authority to Continue U.S. Air
Combat Operations in Cambodia” to the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations at hearings concerning the Depart-
ment of State Appropriations Authorization for fiseal 1974.
The statement asserted its view that
the conflicts in Laos and Cambodia are closely related
to the conflict in Vietnam and, in fact, are so inter-
related as to be considered parts of a single conflict.
Hearings on S. 1248 and H.R. 5610, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
p. 452. It was further stated that the presence of North
Vietnamese troops in Laos and Cambodia threatened the
right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people,
which was guaranteed by the Paris Agreement, and that air
strikes in Cambodia were not for the defense of Cambodia
as such, but to enforce compliance with the Vietnam (cease-
fire) Agreement. Id. 453.
d0a
Congressional Moves After the Repatriation of
American Prisoners of War
The Defense Department sought authority in May 1973
to transfer $500 million to cover existing shortages of men
and material. About $175 million was earmarked for Cam-
bodian bombing operations. See 119 Cong.Ree. H 3449
(daily ed. May 8, 1973). On May 10, 1973, the House voted
down the transfer authority by a vote of 219-188. 119 Cong.
Ree. H 3561, 3592-93 (daily ed. May 10, 1978).
Immediately thereafter the House adopted the Long
Amendment to the Second Supplemental Appropriations
Bill H.R. 7447, which explicitly forbade the use of Defense
Department funds for the Cambodian bombing. The amend-
ment read:
None of the funds herein appropriated to the Depart-
ment of Defense under this Act shall be expended to
support directly or indirectly combat activities in, over,
or from off the shores of Cambodia by United States
forces.
119 Cong.Ree. H 3593 (daily ed. May 10, 1973). The Long
Amendment passed by a vote of 224-172. /bid. at H 3598.
Thereafter the Senate adopted a broader amendment to
H.R. 7447, barring the use of any and all funds thereto-
fore appropriated for the Defense Department for the
bombing of Cambodia. It was introduced by Senator Eagle-
ton on May 29, 1973:
Sec. 305. None of the funds herein appropriated under
this Act or heretofore appropriated under any other
Act may be expended to support directly or indirectly
combat activities in, over or from off shores of Cam-
bodia, or in or over Laos by United States forces.
a ere em
26a
119 Cong.Ree. S 9827 (daily ed. May 29, 1973). The Eagle-
ton amendment was adopted by a vote of 63-19 on May 31.
1973. 119 Cong.Ree. S 10128 (daily ed. May 31, 1973).
Since the Eagleton amendment was more inclusive than
the Long amendment, the measure went to a conference
committee of the two houses. On June 25, 1973, the House
receded and aceepted the broader Eagleton amendment by
a vote of 235 to 172. 119 Cong.Ree. H 5268 (daily ed. June
25, 1973). The House refused to adept a proposed amend-
ment to delay the effect of the Eagleton amendment. The
vote was 204 to 204. Ibid. H 5274.
Thereafter on June 26, 1973, the Senate agreed to the
conference report on H.R. 7447 containing the Eagleton
amendment. The vote was $1 to 11. 119 Cong.Ree. S 12057
(daily ed. June 26, 1973). The bill was then sent to the
President.
The President vetoed H.R. 7447 on June 27, 1973. The
House voted 241 to 173 to override the veto—a majority of
sixty-eight votes but short of the required two-thirds vote.
119 Cong.Ree. H 5487 (daily ed. June 27, 1973).
On the same day, the Senate voted to attach the Eagleton
amendment to H.R. S410. a bill to continue the existing in-
crease in public debt through November 30, 1973. The
amendment read as follows:
See. 501. No funds heretofore or hereafter appropri-
ated under any Act of Congress may he obligated or ex-
pended to support directly or indirectly combat activi-
ties in, over, or from off the shores of Cambodia or
in or over Laos by United States forces.
119 Cong.Ree. S 12171 (daily ed. June 27, 1973). The
amendment was adopted by a vote of 67 to 29. Ibid. at S
o7a
12173. Thereafter the debt limit bill with the Eagleton
amendment was passed by a vote of 72 to 19. Ibid. at S
12220.
On June 26, 1973 the House also adopted two amend-
ments to the Continuing Appropriations Resolution (H.J.
Res. 636), barring funds for Cambodian bombing. Con-
gressman Long introduced the following amendment:
None of the funds under this joint resolution hereto-
fore appropriated may be expended to support directly
or indirectly combat activities in er over Cambodia
or Laos or off the shores of Cambodia or Laos by
United States forces.
Cong.Ree. H 5363 (daily ed. June 26, 1975). It passed
by a vote of 218 to 194. Jhid. at H 5371. Congressman Ad-
dabbo introduced a similar amendment.
See. 108. None of the funds under this Joint Resolu-
tion may be expended to support direetly or indirectly
combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam
and South Vietnam or off the shores of Cambodia,
Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam by United
States forces without the express consent of Congress.
It passed by a vote of 240 to 172. Ibid. at H 5373.
Faced with the dilemma of the President set upon vetoing
any hill containing riders cutting off funds for Cambodian
military operations and the urgency of providing funds
for the operation of the federal government, Senator Ful-
bright on June 29, 1973, after confereaces with White
House representatives, introduced the following amend-
ment to the Continuing Appropriations Resolution (H.J.
Qari
oSa
See. 169. Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein, hereto-
fore or hereafter appropriated may be obligated or ex-
pended to finance the involvement of United States
military forces in hostilities in or over or from off the
shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or
Cambodia.
119 Cong.Ree. S 12560 (daily ed. June 29, 1973). The
Senate voted to adopt the Fulbright amendment 64 to 26.
Ibid. S 12580. The Senate then voted to delete the earlier
Eagleton amendment from the Continuing Appropriations
Resolution. Ilid. S 12581.
The House refused to pass S 109 2s worded and in con-
erence S 108 was adopted. 119 Cong.Rec. No. 104 (daily ed.
June 30, 1973). The Conference Report was approved by
the House on June 30. Ibid. at H 5781. HJ. Res. 636, the
Joint Resolution Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal
1974, Publie Law 93-52, was signed into law by the Presi-
dent on July 1 and provided:
Sec. 108. Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or here-
tofore appropriated may be obligated or expended to
finance directly or indirectly combat activities by
United States military forces in or over or from off
the shores of North Vietnam. South Vietnam, Laos or
Cambodia.
On July 1, the President also signed into law H.R. 9055,
the Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1973, Public
Law 93-50. The Act includes the following provision:
See. 307. None of the funds herein appropriated under
this Act may be expended to support directly or in-
09a
directly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos,
North Vietnam and South Vietnam by United States
forces, and after August 15, 1973, no other funds here-
tofore appropriated, under any other Act may be ex-
pended for such purpose. (Emphasis added.)
Other Facts
The defendants do not disagree with plaintiffs’ conten-
tion that all ground combat troops were withdrawn from In-
dochina on Mareh 28, 1973. There is reference in the papers
to a few members of the armed forces stationed as guards
to the Embassy in Saigon, but no assertion that they are
there to continue the Vietnam war.
The complete repatriation of all known American prison-
ers of war is established by testimony before Congress
quoted in plaintiffs’ papers. Frank A. Sieverts. Special
Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State for Prisoner of
War/ Missing in Action Matters, in testimony before the
National Security Poliey and Scientific Developments Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
May 31, 1973, stated:
It should be noted that there is no indication from
these debriefings [of returning POW’'s] that any Amer-
ican personnel continue to be held in Indochina. All
American prisoners known to any of our returned
POW’s have either been released or been listed by the
communist authorities as having died in captivity. Re-
turnees with whom I have talked, including those who
appeared before this Subcommittee May 23, are clear
in their belief that no U.S. prisoners continue to be
held.
Breton eye ners
60a
Defendants assert that the complete repatriation of
prisoners of war is not an undisputed fact, but they have
presented no evidence that there are any such prisoners re-
maining in North Vietnam or anywhere in Indochina. There
remain. however, over 1.250 members of the armed forees
listed as missing in action, who have not heen located or
officially declared to have died.
Plaintiffs and the amici assert that continuing hostilities
in Cambodia do not represent activities of North Vietnam-
ese troops, but a civil war between Khmer insurgents and
the official government of Cambodia.
Plaintiffs and the amici also assert that continued U.S.
bombing in Cambodia is causing the death and maiming of
many civilians.
Defendants stated on oral argument that if summary
judgment is denied, they would propose to offer testimony
from Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger, and Dr. Kissinger concerning the necessity for
the air operations and the importance of continuing bomb-
ing in Cambodia because of continuing confidential negotia-
tions for a Cambodian cease-fire. No other offer of proof
has been made on behalf of the defendants.
On July 23, 1973, the government informed the court that
statistical data reflecting bombing activities in Cambodia
between March 1969 and April 1970 had been “declassified”
and were published in revised Table concerning fighter-
bomber munitions and B-52 munitions in the Congressional
Record for July 18, 1973. Defendants do not contend, how-
ever, that these facts were known to Congress before July
1, 1973. The court does not find that these facts are rele-
yant to the issues dealt with herein.
6la
Discussion
1. Legal Standards
The Court of Appeals of this cireuit has spoken several
times concerning earlier aspects of the Vietnam hostilities.
The teaching of DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir.
1973), Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971),
and Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970), is that the
question of the balance of constitutional authority to de-
clare war, as between the executive and legislative branches,
is not a political question and hence presents a justiciable
issue, if plaintiffs can succeed in showing that there are
manageable standards to resolve the controversy.
The Court of Appeals in Berk v. Laird, supra, 429 F.2d
at 305, stated that there might be manageable standards
to determine whether “prolonged foreign military activi-
ties without any significant congressicnal authorization”
might violate
a discoverable standard ealling for some mutual par-
ticipation by Congress in accordance with Article I,
section 8. (Emphasis from the original.)
This court on remand found that Congress in appropria-
tions bills from 1°65 through 1969 had shown “its continued
support of the Vietnam action” and that Congress’ choice
of appropriations bills rather than a formal declaration of
war to effectuate its intent involved a political question
which did not prevent the finding that the fighting in Viet-
nam was authorized by Congress and that such fighting
was not a usurpation of power by either of the Presidents
who had been in office after 1964. Berk v. Laird, supra, 317
F.Supp. at 726, 728-731.
€
+
62a
Nevertheless, appropriations bills do not necessarily in-
dicate an open-ended approval of all military operations
which may be conducted. See Mitchell v. Laird, 476 F.2d
093, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Note, Congress, The President
and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 Harv.L.
Rey. 1171, 1802 (1968).
In affirming this court's Berk decision and Judge Dool-
ing’s similar Orlando decision, the Court of Appeals stated
the test of whether there were manageable standards for
adjudication as being “whether there is any action by the
Congress sufficient to authorize or ratify the military ac-
tivity in question.” Orlando v. Laird, supra, 443 F.2d at
1042. It found that there was evidence of “an abundance
of continuing mutual participation in the prosecution of
the war.” 443 F.2d at 1042 (Emphasis added).
More recently in DaCosta v. Laird, supra, 471 F.2d at
1151, the Court of Appeals dealt with the question “whether
within the context of a lawful war, the President's order
to mine the harbors of North Vietnam was properly au-
thorized.” It held in that instance (at p. 1155) that judges
could not determine “whether a specific military operation
constitutes an ‘escalation’ of the war or is merely a new
tactical approach within a continuing strategic plan.” How-
ever, it added (at p. 1156):
In so stating, however, we specifically do not pass on
the point urged by appellant whether a radical change
in the character of war operations—as by an inten-
tional policy of indiscriminate bombing of civilians
without any military objective—might be sufficiently
measurable judicially to warrant a court's considera-
tion, i.e., might contain a standard which we seek in
this record and do not find.
63a
The court finds no evidence of intentional bombing of
civilians, but the mining of North Vietnam harbors was a
part of the war in Vietnam. Ii bombi ing in Cambodia is
not part of the war in Vietnam. there may be a standard
available here which the Court of Appeals did not find in
DaCosta.
Therefore the manageable standard which this court must
apply is the existence of Coneressional authority for the
present bombing activities over Cambodia. now that Ameri-
ean forces have been withdrawn and prisoners of war have
been repatriated. In order to be entitled to relief, plaintiffs
must show, under this standard, and the test of “continuing
mutual participation” set forth in Orlando. either that Con-
gress has not participated with the executive in the a authori-
zation of the hostilities in Cambodia or that Congress has
terminated any such authorization.
2. The Extent of Congress‘onal eluthorization of
Cambodian Hostilities
Cambodia was not mentioned in any of the appropria-
tions bills referred to in Berk. Tho 1964 appropriations
bill for the Department of Defense (P.L. 89-18, 79 Stat.
109) referred to “military activities in Southeast Asia.”
See 317 F.Supp. at 724. But the De ‘partment of sig nse
Alga Act for 1968 (P.L. 90-96, 81 Stat. » 248,
§ 639(a)) made appropriations available to ase only
(1) Vietnamese and other free world forces
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