Opposition Brief — Betta v. California

mere

Subject Index

Page

IN WIE «4c op sons ncreinstat nina aion a EA eae ae ae Rete eae 1

SII 94 RGN an iGans oihok ana ee ene oon eee ee 2

I I 655s pu khang one Ruicad BRIE eek aS 2

I os. os he Cau ue maueeeweermae 2

en SE osc oan cu iaseank cameneemewees uae 4

Fee rn Ie me iv OR 7

Betta’s contention that he was unlawfully arrested is

neither properly before this court nor meritorious .... 7

I

The overhearing of petitioners’ conversations within the

apartment did not violate their reasonable expectation

OF GD nk cs ewe hind haveeabansdebnsacb eases 11

CID cnwe ds dan pen tate ueeakce eee 14

Table of Authorities Cited

Cases Pages

Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) ................ 9,10

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) .......... 8

Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) .........0..00... 7

Darley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277 (1966) ... 2.0.0... ccccccces 8

Edelman vy. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953) .............. 8

Hart v. Supsrior Court, 21 Cal.App.3d 496, 98 Cal.Rptr.

ee: SOUR ceo ke uth keue ee ona eee arateulie oe 13

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) .............. 12

OS ee aed

ii TaBLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Pages

Lockridge v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 166, 89 Cal.Rptr.

Pe ED CED ediendesecsncwcseesscnsveens 10

Newsom v. Smyth, 365 U.S. 604 (1961) ...............0-- 7,8

People v. Berutko, 71 Cal.2d 84, 77 Cal.Rptr. 217, 453 P.2d

CE oo sek chubaxaecedaderisaenessceennvensees 13

People v. Bradley, 1 Cal.3d 80, 81 Cal.Rptr. 457, 460 P.2d

CP cit iaccosdvavhe rence ae eeenackeesenkeens 13

People v. Colvin, 19 Cal.App.3d 14, 96 Cal.Rptr. 397 (1971) 13

People v. Foster, 19 Cal.App.3d 649, 97 Cal.Rptr. 94 (1971) 13

People v. Guerra, 21 Cal.App.3d 534, 98 Cal.Rptr. 627

ee er errr eer Tr rere 13

People v. Johnson, 70 Cal.2d 541, 75 Cal.Rptr. 401, 450

a aaa and a eea eee ane nncn ed 10

People v. Manis, 268 Cal.App.2d 653, 74 Cal.Rpir. 423

"GREP eerie ARs TE areata pee pen a eae ees ee 10

People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955) .... 138

People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448, 30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380

Re Lak Pa gu Fes koa eo OA 9

People v. O’Brien, 71 Cal.2d 394, 79 Cal.Rptr. 313, 456

ee se Oa ea keane eRe onde ease seas 7

People v. Rogers, 270 Cal.App.2d 705, 75 Cal.Rptr. 919

CE ab upc th de eeubes Dison steekar wh soseetesess 7

People v. Rose, 267 Cal.App.2d 648, 73 Cal.Rptr. 349 (1968) 7

People v. Seals, 263 Cal.App.2d 575, 69 Cal.Rptr. 861 (1968) 13

People v. Stoner, 65 Cal.2d 595, 55 Cal.Rptr. 897, 422 P.2d

ED 56 Gian ua bessseeaksevanetnewsss eereesses 10

People v. Superior Court, 274 Cal.App.2d 228, 78 Cal.Rptr.

Cie ieee Sek ta Dead eee aeE Seek be aaa ee 7

People v. Terry, 70 Cal.2d 410, 77 Cal.Rptr. 460, 454 P.2d

36 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 .....-...........8- 13

Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1969) ........... 13

Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943) ....... 10,11

Stembridge v. Georgia, 343 U.S. 541 (1952) ............... 8

Terry v. Obie, TE US. 3 CIBGS) «nnn nen cccccccecccscnsee 9,10

Thompson v. Superior Court, 262 Cal.App.2d 98, 68 Cal.

Ee SEN ss cen daiindvereaeedinesancmade taken 7

TaBLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED ili

Pages

United States v. Fuller, 441 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1971) ....... 12

United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1968) ...... 13

United States v. Perry, 339 F.Supp. 209 (S.D. Cal. 1972) .. 18

United States v. Seohnlein, 423 F.2d 1051 (4th Cir. 1970),

cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 ..........ccccccccccccccscces 10

United States v. Wilkes, 451 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1971) ....... 12

Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ..... 10

Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 (1960) ............. 7

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) .......... 10, 11

Codes

Penal Code:

ec ch ake set been bRaneanihecsenns 2

od os eh ARSC ARR ReNORadse Rend 2

PTET PE CCC TTT OEE ETE TET CETTE 2

ER Re Ie oS ee 2

ee a ae Sea R RA ee RE SEO 2

ee hen tener 3

Constitutions

United States Constitution:

NS ee ee eee 12

Statutes

Title 28, United States Code:

Ne hacen ick eLakhehnneneas 2

Texts

43 A.L.R.3d, Ann., pages 385, 404-406 (1972) ............. 11

:

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SSA Nap aS se ats

SERNA ABUNRIE AILS ATRESIA NT cs SOREN OEY

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

Rnited States

OcToBEeR TERM, 1973

No. 73-505

Rosert Evcene Berra and Raymonp L. Na,

Petitioners,

VS.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

to the Court of Appeal of the State of California,

First Appellate District, Division One

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeal of the State of

California for the First Appellate District, certified

not to be published in the official reports, is appended

to the Petition pp. i-v.

ESATA MENT OLY

Oh heat Sele gai

2

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is conferred by Title

28, United States Code section 1257(3).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1, Whether overhearing from an outside stairwell

a conversation taking place within an apartment vio-

lates the occupants’ reasonable expectation of privacy ?

2. Whether the temporary detention of a person

several minutes to determine if he is involved in

specific criminal activity violates the subject’s con-

stitutional right to be free from an unreasonable in-

vasion of privacy?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 18, 1971, the San Francisco District At-

torney filed an information in superior court charg-

ing petitioners in count one with violation of Cali-

fornia Penal Code section 337a(2) (keeping or occu-

pying a place with paraphernalia for the purpose of

recording wagers); in count two with violation of

California Penal Code section 337a(4) (recording

wagers); and in count three with violation of Cali-

fornia Penal Code section 337a(6) (accepting wa-

gers). (CT 1-2). On June 30, 1971, petitioners were

arraigned on the above charges and entered pleas of

not guilty (CT 3). On August 24, 1971. petitioners

filed motions under California Penal Code sections

995 and 1538.5 to set aside the information and sup-

3

press evidence (CT 28). On August 27, 1971, a hear-

ing was held on these motions and the suppression

motion was submitted on the basis of the preliminary

hearing transcript and additional testimony (CT 32).

On September 7, 1971, both motions were denied

(CT 34). On that same date petitioners withdrew

their former pleas of not guilty and entered pleas of

guilty to count one of the information, and counts

two and three were dismissed on the district attor-

ney’s motion (CT 35).

On October 1, 1971, petitioners were arraigned for

judgment. Petitioner Betta was sentenced to state

prison for the term prescribed by law, the sentence

was suspended and he was placed on probation for

a period of three years on the condition that he pay

probation costs in the amount of $750 (CT 36). With

respect to petitioner Ng, imposition of sentence was

suspended and he was placed on two years probation

on the condition he pay $500 in probation costs (CT

37).

On October 4, 1971, petitioners filed notices of ap-

peal from the judgments and the order denying their

motion to suppress evidence (CT 38; Cal. Pen. Code

§ 1538.5(m)). On March 29, 1973, the California

Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and the order

denying petitioner’s motion to suppress evidence (Pe-

tition, p. v). On April 23, 1973, the California Court

of Appeal denied petitioner’s petition for rehearing

(Petition, p. vi). On June 20, 1973, the California Su-

preme Court denied petitioner’s petition for hearing

(Petition, p. vii). On September 18, 1973, petitioners

4

filed the present petition for writ of certiorari in this

Court.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On April 31, 1971, the San Francisco Police De-

partment received a telephone complaint from an

unidentified male caller that bookmaking activity was

taking place at 2455 Polk Street, apartment 1; that

telephone numbers 441-1162 and 441-1168 were those

being used for the bookmaking operation; and that

a possible suspect was a tall heavy set white male

adult (PRT 5, 23-24).' Officers Bailey, Johnston, Cal-

lagy, and Mayer responded to the Polk Street address

at approximately 1 p.m. (PRT 5). Johnston and

Mayer stationed themselves in front of the building.

Bailey and Callagy went down an alleyway next to

the building, through an unlocked door characterized

as the tradesmen’s entrance and up one flight of a

circular stairway to an exposed landing at the rear

door of apartment 1 (PRT 8, 16, 23, 47; RT 1, 3,

24-26). The tradesmen’s entrance allowed free access

from the alleyway to the rear area of the apartment

building. It and the stairway appeared to have been

designed for tradesmen servicing the building, 1.e.,

public utilities employees such as Pacific Gas and

Electric servicemen, garbage men, ete., and for rou-

tine deliveries (RT 24-26).

“PRT” refers to the preliminary hearing transcript of June

9, 1971. “RT” refers to the reporter’s transcript of the hearing

held on August 27, 1971, pursuant to petitioner’s motion to sup-

press evidence.

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Bailey stood approximately five inches from the

rear door of apartment 1 and heard two males con-

ducting over the telephone what were in his expert

opinion, unlawful bookmaking activities (PRT 7-8,

17). Bailey then heard one of the suspects exit the

apartment (PRT 8). Approximately a minute later,

Bailey heard the voices of his partner (Johnston)

and one of the suspects on the other side of the door

opening onto the common hallway (PRT 8, 15).

Bailey immediately opened the door and informed

Johnston that he had overheard bets being taken in

the premises and that Betta was one of the persons

he heard in the apartment (PRT 8-9, 47, 54). John-

ston promptly placed Betta under arrest (PRT 21,

54). Johnston and Mayer immediately proceeded to

the front door of the apartment, knocked and an-

nounced their purpose and presence, received no

response after a period of approximately one minute,

and then forced the door open (PRT 9, 21, 41).

The officers found Ng sitting at a table in the bed-

room (PRT 10, 33, 53). On the table were two black

telephone sets, a daily bulletin known as a “scratch

sheet,” and documents reflecting gambling records

(PRT 11-12). Bailey recognized Ng’s voice as one

of those he had heard in the apartment (PRT 27-

31). Ng was arrested and both petitioners were ad-

vised of their constitutional rights (PRT 32, 35).

Thereafter, and in response to Mayer’s question why

he had left the apartment, Betta stated that “it was

the telephone call that didn’t sound right . . . and

that instead of going downstairs, if he went upstairs

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... We would not have seen him.” (PRT 36-37). While

the officers were in the apartment the telephone rang

several times, Johnston answered it, and the other

parties placed bets with him (PRT 47-48).

The telephone call referred to by Betta apparently

was placed by Johnston shortly after the officers ar-

rived at the premises (PRT 37, 49). Approximately

one-half hour after the officers arrived at the premises,

Johnston and Mayer observed Betta coming out the

front door of the apartment building (PRT 38, 47-

48). They greeted Betta, identified themselves as police

officers, advised Betta that they were making a hook-

making investigation, and asked him if he lived in

the building (PRT 38). Betta stated that he did not

live there but was looking for a friend who owned

the building (PRT 38). When asked how long he

had been in the building Betta stated he had been

there approximately ten to fifteen minutes (PRT 38).

Maver told him he was lying hecause Mayer had been

outside the building for approximately one-half hour

(PRT 38). Mayer then asked Betta, “If he would

accompany us back up to apartment No. 1,” and

Betta stated that he would (PRT 38, 40). When

Betta asked if he was under arrest, Mayer replied,

“No, we are on a bookmaking investigation.” (PRT

40). When Betta and the officers arrived upstairs,

Bailey appeared and advised Johnston that Betta was

one of the persons he had heard taking wagers inside

the apartment (PRT 9, 47, 54). At this point Betta

was arrested.

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ARGUMENT

I

BETTA’S CONTENTION THAT HE WAS UNLAWFULLY AR-

RESTED IS NEITHER PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT

NOR MERITORIOUS

The basis for Betta’s arrest was the identification

of his voice by Officer Bailey (PRT 54). However,

neither at the preliminary hearing, the hearing on

the motion to suppress, nor in the first instance in

the court of appeal, did Betta ever contend that the

voice identification was improper or that evidence of

the voice identification should be suppressed.? It is

well established under California law that failure to

raise with particularity the issue presented and the

evidence to be suppressed precludes consideration of

that issue on appeal. See People v. O’Brien, 71 Cal.

2d 394, 401-404, 79 Cal. Rptr. 313, 456 P.2d 969 (1969) ;

People v. Superior Court, 274 Cal.App.2d 228, 231-

232, 78 Cal.Rptr. 830 (1969); People v. Rose, 267

Cal. App.2d 648, 651-652, 73 Cal.Rptr. 349 (1968) ;

see also People v. Rogers, 270 Cal.App.2d 705, 707-

708 n. 1, 75 Cal.Rptr. 919 (1969); and Thompson v.

Superior Court, 262 Cal.App.2d 98, 68 Cal.Rptr. 530

(1968). Failure to properly raise the issue at the trial

level clearly furnishes an independent and adequate

state ground for the opinion of the court of appeal.

thereby precluding review here. See Douglas v. Ala-

bama, 380 US. 415, 422 (1965); Wolfe v. North

Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 (1960); Newsom v. Smyth,

2As he admits, this contention was raised for the first time in

the court of appeal by way of his reply brief. Pet. 17.

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365 U.S. 604 (1961); Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277

(1956) ; Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953) ;

and Stembridge v. Georgia, 343 U.S. 541 (1952).

Accordingly, as petitioners did not see fit to provide

respondent with the opportunity of meeting this issue

at the proper level, the contention should be disre-

garded.

In any event, and assuming the issue properly here,

it is of no merit. Viewing the evidence most favor-

ably to the prosecution, as this Court must, the record

amply reflects that Betta consented to go with Officer

Mayer up to the apartment. See PRT 38, 40. No im-

proper assertion of authority was made which com-

pelled Betta to accompany the officers. Cf. Bumper v.

North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). Rather, the

officer’s testimony reflects that Betta went “of his

own free will” after the officers identified themselves,

told him of the reason for their presence, and asked

him to accompany them back to the apartment (PRT

38, 40). Although the officers may have required him

to accompany them had he refused to do so (PRT

40), they were not confronted with that situation. Ac-

cordingly, although the court of appeal did not rely

on those facts in its opinion, it certainly was not

precluded from doing so and, certainly had that issue

been properly put before them, they could have denied

relief on this ground also.

Secondly, and as the court of appeal pointed out

(Petition, pp. iv-v), the record does not reflect

that Betta was arrested when initially confronted by

the officers. At that point they had made no decision

=_—ss wae a aaa PEE RDI EOE wv

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whether to take him into custody. However, they did

have sufficient information and cause to detain Betta.

“The Fourth Amendment does not require a

policeman who lacks the precise level of infor-

mation necessary for probable cause to arrest to

simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to

occur or a criminal to escape. . .. A brief stop

of a suspicious individual, in order to determine

his identity or to maintain the status quo mo-

mentarily while obtaining more information, may

be most reasonable in light of the facts known to

the officer at the time. . . .” Adams v. Williams,

407 U.S. 143, 145-146 (1972). Accord, Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) ; and People v. Mickel-

son, 59 Cal.2d 448, 450-451, 30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380

P.2d 658 (1963).

Here, as the court of appeal pointed out, the officers

had a more than adequate basis upon which to detain

Betta for questioning as he left the apartment build-

ing. Consider the following: (1) Betta was observed

leaving the apartment building at the time the officers

knew unlawful gambling activities were taking place

therein. (2) When observed he was only a short

distance from the alleged unlawful gambling activi-

ties. (3) He was observed leaving the building only

one minute after Officer Johnston had-telephoned the

bookmakers. (4) He denied living in the building

and gave the officers a patently false answer in re-

sponse to their questions after he had been advised

that a gambling investigation was underway. Surely

such circumstances would have indicated to a reason-

able man in a like position that a temporary deten-

tion until more information could be obtained was

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necessary to the proper discharge of his duties. Adams

v. Williams, supra; People v. Manis, 268 Cal.App.2d

653, 658-659, 74 Cal.Rptr. 423 (1969). Accordingly,

it is submitted that the few seconds it took the officers

and Betta to travel the few feet upstairs to the apart-

ment was only a slight restraint on Betta’s liberty of

movement, and therefore entirely reasonable under

the circumstances. Terry v. Ohio, supra, 32-33 (1968).

Fourthly, and even assuming Betta’s detention un-

lawful, the voice identification evidence should not

have been suppressed. It was not derived by any er-

ploitation of that detention. Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 487-488 (1963). See also

Lockridge v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 166, 170-171,

89 Cal.Rptr. 731, 474 P.2d 683 (1970); and People v.

Johnson, 70 Cal.2d 541, 546, 75 Cal.Rptr. 401, 450

P.2d 865 (1969). Betta was simply overheard con-

versing with the officers who had done nothing more

than escort him to the suspect apartment. It appears

mere coincidence that Officer Bailey overheard Betta’s

voice in the hallway as they approached.

Finally, the voice identification evidence should not

have been suppressed because it was something the

officers would have secured regardless of whether they

had arrested Betta at the door to the building or not.

See Lockridge v. Superior Court, supra; People v.

Stoner, 65 Cal.2d 595, 602 n. 3, 55 Cal.Rptr. 897, 422

P.2d 585 (1967) ; United States v. Secohnlein, 423 F.2d

1051, 1053 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913;

Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 209 (D.C. Cir.

1963); Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790, 792 (2d

11

Cir. 1943). See also Annotations, 43 A.L.R.3d 385,

404-406 (1972). Here the officers were aware of Betta’s

identity when he produced his driver’s license at the

outset of the preliminary investigation and was rec-

ognized by Officer Johnston (PRT 51). That the offi-

cers would not have later sought him out had he not

been arrested at that particular moment is certainly

an unreasonable conclusion. And clearly, that inter-

view would have resulted in his identification as one

of the suspects. Accordingly, as this evidence would

have been developed regardless of whether Betta was

arrested then or later, it is submitted he has suffered

no prejudice thereby and therefore the evidence

should not be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States,

supra.

IT

THE OVERHEARING OF PETITIONERS’ CONVERSATIONS

WITHIN THE APARTMENT DID NOT VIOLATE THEIR REA-

SONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY

The record reflects that Inspector Bailey stood ap-

proximately five inches from the rear door of the

apartment and overheard petitioners negotiating

gambling transactions. No contention is made by pe-

titioners that the officers were in a place where they

were not entitled to be. Nor would such a contention

be valid. In this respect, and as we have noted in our

statement of facts, supra, the record reflects that the

area where Bailey was standing appears to have been

open to the public. Bailey was standing on the ex-

posed landing of the first floor stairwell on the outside

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rear of the building. This landing opened into the

first floor hallway, which could be entered simply by

opening an unlocked door separating the two. Access

to the stairwell and landing was gained by simply

walking down an alley, through an unlocked door,

and up the stairs. It appears that anyone could ap-

proach the premises as properly by this means as

by going to the front door. The only possible distinc-

tion being that this means of access was less formal

and therefore probably was intended for use by em-

ployees or other persons providing goods or services

to the occupants, as opposed to the formalities ac-

corded invited guests. Certainly, there was no greater

expectation of privacy intended with respect to that

exposed outside landing than would normally be ac-

corded the common hallway inside.

What petitioners do argue is that their conversa-

tions within the apartment were entitled to consti-

tutional protection because they intended those

conversations to be private. They rely on Katz v.

United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). However, that

reliance is misplaced. As the opinion of the court of

appeal points out, it is indeed well established that

the overhearing of a conversation under circumstances

such as these, just as is the making of observations

through open windows from a proper vantage point,

does not constitute a search, invade any reason-

able expectation of privacy, and is therefore not pro-

hibited by the Fourth Amendment. See United States

v. Wilkes, 451 F.2d 938, 941, n. 6 (2d Cir. 1971);

United States v. Fuller, 441 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1971);

BRIERE LE TINS GOO NY FD OT eS PEELE ONE AS POE NE LLL LITE BLM INE BO FAT ENE ANTE LOI SIM

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13

Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621, 625 (9th Cir. 1969) ;

United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880, 883-884 (2d

Cir. 1968) ; and United States v. Perry, 339 F.Supp.

209, 213 (S. D. Cal. 1972), wherein the court com-

mented :

“The general rule is that information obtained

by an officer using his natural senses, where the

officer has a right to be where he is, is admissible

evidence. The fact that the information is in the

form of conversations emanating from a private

space, such as a hotel room, is not a bar to its

admissibility. [Citation omitted.] Furthermore,

the fact that it may be necessary to place one’s

ear against a door in order to comprehend the

conversations inside a room does not make the

search unlawful. [Citation omitted.]” See also

People v. Bradley, 1 Cal.3d 80, 81 Cal.Rptr. 457,

460 P.2d 129 (1969); People v. Berutko, 71 Cal

2d 84, 91, 77 Cal.Rptr. 217, 453 P.2d 721 (1969) ;

People v. Terry, 70 Cal.2d 410, 427, 77 Cal.Rptr.

460, 454 P.2d 36 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S.

911; People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 759, 761-762,

290 P.2d 855 (1955); People v. Guerra, 21 Cal.

App.3d 534, 538, 98 Cal.Rptr. 627 (1971) ; Hart v.

Superior Court, 21 Cal.App.3d 496, 505, 98 Cal.

Rptr. 565 (1971); People v. Foster, 19 Cal.App.

3d 649, 653, 97 Cal.Rptr. 94 (1971); People v.

Colvin, 19 Cal.App.3d 14, 20, 96 Cal.Rptr. 397

1971); People v. Seals, 263 Cal.App.2d 575, 577,

69 Cal.Rptr. 861 (1968).

Thus, the short answer to petitioners’ argument is

that regardless of whatever their personal intentions

may have heen, the fact they spoke loudly and clearly

enough to be heard by persons standing outside their

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apartment in a place where those persons had a right

to be clearly precludes that speech from constitutional

protection. It is therefore submitted the police offi-

cers properly overheard their unlawful activities.

x

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully sub-

mitted that the petition for writ of certiorari should

be denied.

Dated, December 18, 1973.

EVELLE J. YOUNGER,

Attorney General of the State of California,

Epwarp A. Hinz, JR,

Chief Assistant Attorney General—

Criminal Division,

Doris H. Mater,

Assistant Attorney General—Writs Section,

DERALD E. GRANBERG,

Deputy Attorney General,

Don JACOBSON,

Deputy Attorney General,

Attorneys for Respondent.

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