Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Castro v. United States

Supreme Court brief1974

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1973

Lucio Castro,

PETITIONER 3

‘

Vv. '

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4

RESPONDENT ‘

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

ROY R. BARRERA

NICHOLAS AND BARRERA

424 E. Nueva By La Villita

San Antonio, Texas 78205

Telephone: 512, 224-5811

Attorney for Petitioner

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

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APPENDIX

1. Per Curiam Opinion of the Court of Appeals

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3. Order of Court of Appeals Denying

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CITATIONS

Alford v. ge } Sate, 282 U. S. 687, 51 S, Ct. 218,

De ae semmrenesiiowlant

Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719, 88 S. Ct. 1318,

Ed, 2d 255 (1968)

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v. California, 393 U. S. 314, 89 S. Ct. 540,

QL L. Ed. 2c) SOG (1068) ooccccscsccccccesssnecssssssssssseseceseee

Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, 83 S, Ct. 1194,

Ed. 2d 215 (1963)

United States, 391 U. S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620,

a cs snsansuninusnsonncoreonoe

Direct Sales Company v. United States, 319 U. S. 703,

63 S. Ct. 1265, 87 L. Ed. 1674 (1042) ................ cesses:

Douglas v. Alabama, 38 U. S. 414, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13

L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965) .. anaes é,

Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 91 S. Ct. 210, 27 L.

Ed, 2d 213 (1970)

Ingram v. United States, 360 U. S. 672, 79 S. Ct. 1314,

2% 8 OL, eee

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065,

13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965) .. as.

Smith v., Illinois, 390 U. S. 129, 88 S. Ct. 148,

Sm 2 gravee 9, 10

United States v. Johnson, 323 U. S. 273, 65 S. Ct. 249

| RHee llt ANRN LRG, 12

Constitution and Statutes:

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Iu the Supreme Court of the. Hnited States

OcTOBER TERM, 1973

NO. 73-527

Lucio CAasTRO,

PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

The Petitioner, LUCIO CASTRO, respectfully

prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judg-

ment and opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which affirmed the Pe-

titioner’s conviction of conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute and to distribute heroin hydro-

chloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a) (1).

OPINIONS BELOW

There was no formal opinion of the District Court.

The per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals

(Appendix, hereinafter cited “App.,” infra, p. 17)

reg

Dif 3S TR LT

has not been reported. The judgment of the Court of

Appeals is reproduced below (App., infra, p. 18).

The order of the Court of Appeals denying Petitioner’s

petition for rehearing is reproduced below (App.,

infra, p. 19).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered

on June 26, 1973 (App., infra, p. 17). The order of

the Court of Appeals denying Petitioner’s Petition for

Rehearing was entered on July 23, 1973 (App., infra,

p. 19). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

28 U.S.C. §1254 (1) and Rule 22 of the Rules of the

Supreme Court of the United States,

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether after additional discovery the refusal

to allow the Petitioner to recall witness

THOMAS SALINAS for further cross-ex-

amination violated the Sixth Amendment.

2. Whether the failure to grant the Petitioner’s

motion for a mistrial after the guilty plea of

his co-defendant violated the Fifth and Sixth

Amendments.

3. Whether the trial court lacked venue and

jurisdiction in violation of the Sixth Amend-

ment.

4. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sup-

port the finding of guilt as to the conspiracy

in count one of the indictment, 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a) (1) and 846.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

INVOLVED

Article III, Section 2, clause 3 to the Constitution of

the United States provides, in pertinent part:

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of

Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such

Trial shall be held in the State where the said

Crimes shall have been committed... .

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States provides, in pertinent part:

No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law... .

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States provides:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,

by an impartial jury of the State and district

wherein the crime shall have been committed,

which district shall have been previously as-

certained by law, and to be informed of the

nature and cause of the accusation; to be

confronted with the witnesses against him; to

have compulsory process for obtaining wit-

nesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance

of Counsel for his defense.

STATEMENT

On December 6, 1972, the Petitioner, LUCIO

CASTRO, was charged in count one of a seven count

indictment with conspiracy to possess with intent to

distribute and to distribute heroin hydrochloride, a

Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance, in vio-

lation of 21 U.S.C. 99 841(a) (1) and 846 (Appendix

on Appeal, hereinafter cited “‘R.,” pp. 1-6). The con-

spiracy alleged in count one of the indictment allegedly

commenced from on or about November 1, 1971, and

continued up to and including June 1, 1972, and fur-

ther included as defendants, ANTONIO V. ENRI-

QUEZ, THOMAS D. SALINAS, FELIX GARCIA

BENEVIDES, a/k/a FELIX G. BENAVIDZ, JOE

2° SESS a A

YNOSTROSA, and ARLENE SALINAS, The overt

acts alleged in count one of the indictment in further-

ance of the conspiracy failed to mention or to name

the Petitioner, LUCIO CASTRO. The Petitioner plead

not guilty and proceeded to trial before a jury in the

Abilene Division of the Northern District of Texas,

Abilene, Texas. The case was transferred from the Fort

Worth Division, where the indictment was returned, to

the Abilene Division on the motion of the court. On

the first day of trial, defendants THOMAS D. SA-

LINAS and FELIX GARCIA BENEVIDES entered

pleas of guilty, the Court granted a severance on the

part of JOE YNOSTROSA and ARLENE SALINAS,

and the evidence in the trial commenced with the two

remaining defendants, ANTONIO V. ENRIQUEZ

and the Petitioner, LUCIO CASTRO. The Petitioner

rested his case at the conclusion of the case of the gov-

ernment and did not offer any witnesses in his behalf

and did not testify in his behalf. On January 18, 1972,

tht Petitioner was found guilty of count one of the

indictment, the Court having overruled the Petitioner’s

motions for a new trial and arrest of judgment, and

the Petitioner was sentenced to a fifteen year term of

confinement, with a special parole term of three years

in addition to the fifteen year term of imprisonment.

The Petitioner appealed the judgment of the trial

court to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit and the Court of Appeals affirmed the

judgment of the trial court on June 26, 1973 (Appen-

dix, hereinafter cited ““App.,” infra, p. 17). The Court

of Appeals denied the Petitioner’s petition for rehearing

on July 23, 1973 (App., infra, p. 19).

Briefly stated, the facts that gave rise to the ques-

tions presented by the Petitioner in his appeal and in

this petition for writ of certiorari are as follows:

In the Court of Appeals below, the Petitioner at-

tacked the failure of the trial court to grant his motion

for a mistrial after his codefendant, ANTONIO V.

ENRIQUEZ, had plead guilty on the second day of

the trial. The failure to grant the Petitioner’s motion

for mistrial occurred after the Petitioner had previ-

ously requested the trial court to grant him relief from

prejudicial joinder because of the affect of the mis-

joinder of both the alleged offenses and the defendants.

The failure to grant a mistrial also occurred after

evidence had been introduced before the jury in sup-

port of some of the other counts of the indictment in

which the Petitioner was not named. The Petitioner

also contended in the Court of Appeals below that his

Sixth Amendment rights were seriously abridged by

the denial of the trial court to recall the government

witness, THOMAS D. SALINAS, for futher cross-

examination prior to the government resting their case.

The Petitioner had previously had the opportunity and

did cross-examine the witness fully as to certain mat-

ters he testified about, but as a result of the delayed

discovery by the government of letters in their file (R.

917-923) written by the witness, THOMAS D. SA-

LINAS, the Petitioner desired to further confront and

cross-examine the government witness for the purpose

of attacking and impeaching his credibility. Such fur-

ther confrontation and cross-examination of the gov-

ernment’s witness was critically necessary in view of

the fact that the only two witnesses of the many

government witnesses at the trial that testified as to

any incriminating facts concerning the Petitioner were

the witnesses, THOMAS D. SALINAS, and his wife,

ARLENE SALINAS (R. 362-408, 429-552, 552-

PORES Ske TEE TE RENE TP a a eS SS

610). At the trial on the merits the testimony of the

two government witnesses (THOMAS D. SALINAS,

an indicted co-conspirator, and ARLENE SALINAS,

an unindicted co-conspirator) was admitted into evi-

dence and was in conflict on two critical points, the

first being whether or not ARLENE SALINAS was

ever present at or about the time the alleged conspiracy

took place, and the second being the approximate date

that the Petitioner was allegedly observed handling

narcotic drugs. The Petitioner contended in his appeal

that the denial of further confrontation and cross-

examination prior to the government resting their case

placed the Petitioner in the untenable position of going

forward with evidence after his motion for judgment

of acquittal had been overruled, and, thereby, put him

in jeopardy of the application of the waiver doctrine.

The Petitioner also sought to challenge in his appeal

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit the failure of the trial court to grant his motion

for change of venue and motion for dismissal of the

indictment based upon the lack of venue and lack of

jurisdiction of the court of either the Petitioner or the

alleged offense. Although the case was tried in the

Northern District of Texas and although a discernable

part of the testimony concerned conduct and actions

of other defendants within the Northern District of

Texas, the only evidence tending to connect the Peti-

tioner, a resident of San Antonio, Texas, with the

offense alleged in count one of the indictment occurred

in San Antonio, Texas, which is located in the Western

District of Texas. Also in the Court of Appeals below

the Petitioner objected to the sufficiency of the evi-

dence to support the finding of guilt as to the conspir-

acy alleged in count one of the indictment, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a) (1) and 846. The Petitioner

contended that at best, and in taking the evidence of

the government witnesses in the light most favorable to

the government, that the evidence nevertheless failed

to establish the requisite knowledge on the part of the

Petitioner of the criminal activity involving the pos-

session or possession with intent to distribute heroin

hydrochloride, and failed to establish that the Peti-

tioner entered into an agreement, either actually, con-

structively, tacitly, or by implication, to commit an

illegal act against the United States.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The Petitioner contended in the trial court and

in the Court of Appeals below that the refusal to

allow the Petitioner after additional discovery the op-

portunity to recall the government witness, THOMAS

D. SALINAS (indicted co-conspirator), for further

cross-examination seriously abridged the Petitoner’s

Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and cross-

examination. Of the fourteen witnesses called by the

government the two most material witnesses, with

respect to any implication of the Petitioner in the al-

leged conspiracy to support count one of the indict-

ment, were government witnesses THOMAS D. SA-

LINAS, an indicted co-conspirator (R. 205-368, 362-

408, 429-552), and his wife, ARLENE SALINAS, an

unindicted co-conspirator (R. 552-610). The Peti-

tioner had requested prior to the trial on the merits a

bill of particulars (critical to the Petitioner in light of

the fact that the Petitioner was not named in any of

the overt acts alleged in the indictment covering the

period of the conspiracy, from November 1, 1971,

until June 1, 1972), which was denied. The Petitioner

also requested in his pretrial motion for discovery the

statements of any of the co-defendants or co-conspira-

tors, whether indicted or unindicted, and regardless of

when made or to whom made, The motions having

been denied the cause proceeded to trial and on the

first day the witness, THOMAS D. SALINAS, took

the stand for the government, and the government

complied with the Petitioner’s Jencks Act requests

and furnished to the Petitioner what was purportedly

the case file and all of the statements of the witness,

THOMAS D. SALINAS. With the statements of

THOMAS D. SALINAS available to the Petitioner for

cross-examination, the witness, THOMAS D. SALI-

NAS, concluded his testimony and was excused from

the stand (R. 552). After having been excused from

the stand the Petitioner was furnished three (3) addi-

tional letters in the handwriting of the government

witness, THOMAS D. SALINAS, and written by him

(1) to the Honorable Sarah T. Hughes, United States

District Judge, and (2) to the Honorable Leo Brewster,

United States District Judge, and (3) to the United

States Attorney (R. 917-923). The trial court denied

the Petitioner the right to further confrontation and

cross-examination of the witness at the time of the

discovery of the additional three letters (R. 676), and

denied his request to recall the witness again prior to

the government resting their case (R. 788).

The further confrontation and cross-examination of

the witness, THOMAS D. SALINAS, in light of the

content of the letters to Judge Hughes, to Judge

Brewster, and to the United States Attorney, was crit-

ical to the Petitioner in order to afford him the oppor-

tunity to impeach the government witness. In his letter

to Judge Hughes SALINAS admitted his past use of

drugs, admitted his past use of heroin as a palliative for

bad nightmares, and made statements about how he was

doing all within his power to assist the government and

government agents (R. 917-918). In the letter to the

United States Attorney, dated December, 1972, the

witness SALINAS made statements to the effect that

the government had made him promises and that the

government had not lived up to their promises. The

witness SALINAS in that letter threatened the Untied

States Attorney to refuse to testify for the government

and threatened to allow the Petitioner to go free unless

the government helped the witness, THOMAS D.

SALINAS (R. 922-923). The content of the letters

of the witness was contradictory in part to the state-

ments he made on the witness stand, and the Petitioner

should have had the opportunity to confront and cross-

examine the witness about his statements in order to

apprise the jury as to the nature, environment, and

credibility, or lack of credibility, of the witness.

4 <

dh.

The failure to allow the Petitioner to recall the wit-

ness for further confrontation and cross-examination

seriously abridged the Petitioner’s Sixth Amenment

right to confrontation and cross-examination. Smith

v. Illinois, 390 U. S. 129, 88 S. Ct. 748, 19 L. Ed. 2d

956 (1968). In Smith v. Illinois, supra, this court held

that a defendant is deprived of his right to confront

the witnesses against him, guaranteed by the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments, when he is denied the right

to ask the principal prosecution witness either his cor-

rect name or where he lives. This Court, per Mr. Justice

Stewart, stated that “the very starting point in expos-

ing falsehood and bringing out the truth through

cross-examination must necessarily be to ask the wit- :

;

NESS RIE, SCE LIAO IT,

PR IY ARETE Pe EAD OD

a aac

ness who he is and where he lives. The witness’ name

and address open countless avenues of in-court exam-

ination and out-of-court investigation. To forbid the

most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively

to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.” See

also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20

L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968). Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400,

85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965). Douglas v.

Alabama, 38 U. S. 414, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d

934 (1965). Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123,

88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968). Dutton v.

Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 91 S. Ct. 210, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213

(1970). Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 89 S, Ct.

§40, 21 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1968). Alford v. United States,

282 U.S. 687, 51 S. Ct. 218, 75 L. Ed. 624 (1931).

The decision of the Court of Appeals below opens

the door in future trials, as in this case, for the govern-

ment to withhold, either by design or accident, mate-

rial or documents within their possession which will

materially assist any defendant in any criminal case in

the effective cross-examination of government wit-

nesses. It only becomes necessary for the government

to turn over to the defendant, after the witness in

question has fully testified and has left the witness

stand, any documents that may be tend to discredit the

witness and thereby comply with the Jencks Act, and

thus, to compel the defendant to then place on the

witness stand the chief witness of the government in

order to illicit the contradictory statements of the gov-

ernment witness. In Smith v. Illinois, supra, this court

stated that the underlying rationale for the confronta-

tion and cross-examination of witnesses is to expose

falsehood and bring out the truth and the denial of

such confrontation and cross-examination would be

constitutional error of the first magnitude. The Peti-

tioner respectfully submits herein that any limitation

by the trial court on full and complete confrontation

and cross-examination which tends to deprive a defend-

ant of exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth

is a serious constitutional error and a denial of a de-

fendant’s constitutional right to full and complete

confrontation and cross-examination. See Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d

215 (1963).

2. The Petitioner in the trial court in the Court of

Appeals below contended that the trial court was with-

out jurisdiction because it lacked venue, and alterna-

tively, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because

of the failure to establish sufficient evidence to justify

venue in the Northern District of Texas. Consequently,

the Petitioner was denied a fair and impartial trial.

The Framers to the Constitution drafted Article III,

Section 2, clause 3, aware of the unfairness and hard-

ship to which trial in an environment alien to the ac-

cused exposes him, The importance of that safeguard

was underscored by the Sixth Amendment to the Con-

stitution, which was plainly intended to protect persons

accused of crimes of the serious hardship of defending

prosecutions in places removed and remote from their

homes. The Petitioner herein was indicted in the Fort

‘Worth Division of the Northern District of Texas,

and the case was subsequently transferred to the Abi-

lene Division of the Northern District of Texas. His

home and the only area where his participation, if any,

occurred was in San Antonio, Texas, in the Western

District of Texas. A review of the entire record and

evidence compells the conclusion that all of the wit-

nesses were in agreement that the Petitioner was nev-

er in Fort Worth, Texas, and that he had not partic-

ipated in any of the multiple narcotic sales the other

defendants admittedly were involved in, and that he

had never stated by his own admissions any complicity

in the conspiracy between THOMAS D. SALINAS

and ANTONIO V. ENRIQUEZ. The venue in the

instant case was maintained by the mere allegation in

the indictment, unsupported by the evidence. This

Court condemned that type of situation in United

States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 65 S. Ct. 249 (1944).

The Court stated in Johnson that “plainly enough,

such leeway not only opens the door to needless hard-

ship to an accused by prosecution remote from home

and from appropriate facilities for defense, but it also

leads to the appearance of abuses, if not abuses, in the

selection of what may be deemed a tribunal favorable

to the prosecution.” This Honorable Court should

grant a writ in this case in order to decide whether or

not the trial court lacked venue and jurisdiction in

violation of the Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to

trial by an impartial jury “of the state and district

wherein the crime shall have been committed.”

3. The Petitioner also contended in the Court of

Appeals below that he was substantially deprived of a

fair and impartial trial when the trial court failed to

grant his motion for mistrial after the entry of the

guilty plea by his co-defendant, ANTONIO ENRI-

QUEZ. The Petitioner had requested by written mo-

tion prior to trial for relief from prejudicial joinder

both as to the offenses alleged in the indictment and

as to his co-defendants. See Rule 8 (a), (b), Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure. The indictment was a

seven count indictment naming six defendants, but the

Petitioner was oly named in one count of the indict-

ment, the conspiracy count. The conspiracy count

failed to allege or name any overt acts against the

Petitioner. The probability of irreparable harm and

prejudice is almost always certain where the jury has

the opportunity to impute to one defendant the acts

and statements of another defendant named in other

counts of the indictment. Such is almost always the

inevitable result when several defendants are charged

with a single offense or related offenses. In the instant

case substantial evidence had been accumulated and

presented before the jury as to the involvement of the

Petitioner’s co-defendant, THOMAS D. SALINAS,

with narcotics over a period of time commencing in

November, 1971, until June, 1972. The sudden ab-

sence of co-defendant, ENRIQUEZ, from the trial, and

his obvious plea of guilty, served to impress upon the

jury his confession of guilt, which was tantamount to

a confession or statement against the Petitioner. Under

such circumstances prejudice was created against the

Petitioner, and he timely moved for a mistrial (R. 421-

423), the denial of which deprived him of a fair and

impartial trial. Such a denial cannot be considered

harmless error, and this Court should grant a writ in

this case in order to resolve the issue.

4. Although the Petitioner conceded that the evi-

dence sufficiently reflected the participation of the

other defendants in an alleged conspiracy, he respect-

fully submits that the evidence nevertheless failed to

sufficiently connect him with the conspiracy alleged

in count one of the indictment. The jury verdict find-

ing the Petitioner guilty demonstrates the inherent

harm and prejudice that occurs as a result of the hear-

say declarations of the other defendants in the absence

of any independent and corroboratig actions on the

part of a co-defendant. This Honorable Court should

grant a writ in the case at bar in order to establish a

SOE T AEE AIAG IE ty 3

uniform test to be applied in the circuit courts of ap-

peals in circumstantial evidence cases to prove conspir-

acy. See Ingram v. United States, 360 U. S. 672, 79 S.

Ct. 1314, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1503 (1959). Direct Sales

Company v. United States, 319 U. S. 703, 63 S. Ct.

1265, 87 L. Ed. 1674 (1942). In Ingram, supra, this

Court stated the fundamental rule that for a convic-

tion for conspiracy to be sustained there must be proof

of an agreement to commit an offense against the

United States. Moreover, the Court stated in Direct

Sales Company v. United States, supra, that conspiracy

law should not be utilized as a “dragnet.” In the case

at bar the government witness, THOMAS D. SALI-

NAS, testified that he observed the Petitioner engaged

in the illegal acts about the middle of May, 1972,

approximately two weeks before this arrest. The witness

further stated that he had never seen the Petitioner on

prior trips, and that the Petitioner never told him that

he was a partner in the narcotics trade, and that the

Petitioner never appeared in the Fort Worth area (R.

395, 399, 481-482). The government witness also

stated in cross-examination that his wife, ARLENE

SALINAS, was never in the ENRIQUEZ home at the

time he witnessed the events in question, and that his

wife, ARLENE SALINAS, was not a witness and knew

nothing about the cutting of narcotics on the occasion

that the Petitioner was allegedly present (R. 489-490).

ARLENE SALINAS testified, in direct conflict with

her husband, THOMAS D. SALINAS, that the events

in question occurred in the month of March, 1972,

and she further positively stated that another man,

previously identified by her husband as “Veto,” was

not present (R. 569-574, 593). Thus, on two material

matters, the time of the alleged conspiracy and the

parties who participated in the alleged conspiracy, the

two critical government witnesses were in direct con-

tradiction to each other. Such a conflict of testimony

allows the jury to speculate and conjecture on what

the true facts are. It is apparent in the case at bar that

the evidence is insufficient to prove a conspiracy, and

that a conspiracy cannot be made out by merely piling

inferences upon inferences. See Ingram v. United

States, supra. Direct Sales Company v. United States,

supra.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the

Court of Appeals in the instant case raises substantial

questions of general importance in the administration

of criminal justice, and it is, therefore, respectfully

submitted that this petition for certiorari be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

NICHOLAS AND BARRERA

424 E. Nueva By La Villita

San Antonio, Texas 78205

Telephone: 512, 224-5811

Attorneys for Petitioner

‘ROY R. BARRERA

September, 1973.

ye Neg oS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have served three copies of

the foregoing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

on the Solicitor General, Mr. Robert Bork, United

States Department of Justice, 12th Street, Washington,

D. C. 20530, by placing same in the United States

Mail on this___—. day of September, 1973.

ROY R. BARRERA

Attorney for Petitioner

APPENDIX

IN THE

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No, 73-1542

Summary Calendar*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LUCIO CASTRO,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas

(June 26, 1973)

Before WISDOM, AINSWORTH and CLARK,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: AFFIRMED. See Local Rule 21.

*Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty

Company of New York, et al., 5 Cir, 1970, 431 F.2d 409,

Part I.

'See NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 5 Cir.

1970, 430 F.2d 966.

sndiasihdiaatenieideteniiaiiaeeieemn eee

IN THE

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

October Term, 1972

No, 73-1542

D. C. Docket No. CR 4-1159

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LUCIO CASTRO,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas

Before WISDOM, AINSWORTH and CLARK,

Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of

the record from the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Texas, and was taken under

submission by the Court upon the record and briefs on

file, pursuant to Rule 18;

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now

here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judg-

ment of the said District Court in this cause be, and

the same is hereby, affirmed.

June 26, 1973

Issued as Mandate:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No, 873-1542

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

LUCIO CASTRO,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

(July 23, 1973)

Before WISDOM, AINSWORTH and CLARK,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing

filed in the above entitled and numbered cause be and

the same is hereby DENIED.

sleet

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